Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies 15.

1 (2016): 59–77
Edinburgh University Press
DOI: 10.3366/hlps.2016.0129
© Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies
www.euppublishing.com/journal/hlps

BEYOND STEREOTYPES OF BEDOUINS AS ‘NOMADS’

AND ‘S AVAGES ’: R ETHINKING THE B EDOUIN IN
OTTOMAN SOUTHERN PALESTINE, 1875–1900

Ahmad Amara
PhD Candidate
Department of History and the Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies
New York University
Postal Address:
P.O. Box 7838
Nazareth Illit, Israel
ahmadamara@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
This article explores and contests dominant representations of the Bedouin
in Historic southern Palestine as nomads and savages, through the study of
inter-Bedouin land conflicts in the second half of the nineteenth century. By
studying the late Ottoman period, the author seeks to examine Bedouin-
State interactions surrounding the question of territoriality and space-
making, as well as the long-standing impact of the Ottoman heritage in
southern Palestine. The available Ottoman archival resources shed important
light on Ottoman representations of the Bedouin, their space and modes
of living, and challenge hegemonic representations of the Bedouin as well
as the broader pre-Beersheba Bedouin historiography. More specifically,
the archival material shows that research categories that are dominant and
prevalent in the study of the Bedouin today, such as ‘nomadism’ and
‘pastoralism’, need to be re-thought, and new approaches to the study of
the Bedouin need to be employed.

KEYWORDS: Ottoman Palestine, Tanzimat, Bedouin, Beersheba, Naqab

(Negev), Bedouin Territoriality, Gaza

Introduction
Upon his arrival in Gaza in 1880, and acting under the order of the
Jerusalem governor to reconcile the Azazmi and the Tayaha, the Jerusalem
60 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies

Mayor Salim al-Husseini gathered the Azazmi and the Tayaha sheikhs in
the local government house in Gaza. Together with others, he conducted
the necessary negotiations to establish a peace agreement between them.
In the process of the associated investigation, the Azazmi detailed the items
robbed from them as well as the extent of the damage that the Tayaha had
caused. Both parties agreed on compensation of 500 French liras to be
paid by the Tayaha. The Jerusalem governor approved the agreement and
ordered the Battalion (tabur) commander Ali Bey to go to Gaza and collect
the 500 liras from the Tayaha. On 7 January 1888 this compensation was
distributed to the concerned Azazmi in the Gaza administrative council.1
The compensation was paid through the Azazmi sheikhs. The details and
the amounts paid were put on an official government report (mazbata)
that was signed by the sheikhs, by Ottoman officials, and witnesses.2 A list
detailing the names of the Azazmi families, the amount received, and items
for which they were compensated, was attached to the mazbata. Most of
the compensation was for loss of wheat and barley.3
The second half of the nineteenth century in southern Palestine wit-
nessed increased Bedouin fighting and increased Ottoman centralisation
of governance.4 Due to inter-Bedouin fighting, the Ottoman government
undertook a number of unusual steps, mainly peace-making efforts and
territorial demarcation. In the period under study, we know of four
missions that were orchestrated mainly through Jerusalem by its governor
Rauf Pasha (1877–1889). Rauf Pasha was a particularly strong governor
who dedicated particular attention to southern Palestine and to Bedouin
1 The eight-year time gap (1880–1888) is not well explained in the available
documents. Either it is a mistake of Salim Effendi with regards to the date of his mission,
or most probably the collection and distribution of the compensation took a long time.
2 A mazbata is an official report, signed and usually submitted by a committee or a
group. The sheikhs who signed the mazbata were: Salam bin Hammad; Nassar Shimon;
Salman al-Waldi, Audeh bin Zayid, on 7 January 1888 (26 Kanunuevvel 1303). The report
was also signed by the members of the Gaza council, and the witnesses: Sheikh Hmud
al-Wheidi the naib (chair of the nizamiye and shari’a courts), the chair of the Gaza municipal
council, the battalion head (Mohammad Ali), and Salim Effendi. Sheikh Hmud al-Wheidi
was the director of the southern Bedouin block- ). Conversion of the
dates included within this document was carried out through the Turk Tarih Kurumu
Official Website, www.ttk.gov.tr.
3 Başbakanlik Ottoman Archives (BOA), ş.D. 2280/10, 9 Haziran 1308/21 June 1892,
the mazbata and the attached compensation list are dated 20 Kanunuevvil 1303/10 January
1888.
4 Although ‘Palestine’ was not existent as an independent and defined geographic or
administrative unit at the end of the nineteenth century, I use the term here largely to
relate to the areas that remained later within the area that became Palestine. Southern
Palestine is the area that was roughly south of the line that connects Gaza and Hebron and
was administratively located within the area of the Jerusalem Governorate (mutassariflik),
and particularly the Gaza sub-district. After 1900 it is roughly the area of the Gaza and
Beersheba sub-districts.
 A. Amara Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’ 61

affairs, making his term a turning point in state-Bedouin relations

(Ben-Aryeh & Sapir 1979: 55). From the state perspective, disagreement
over Bedouin land and property rights were the main source of unrest
in the region. Whereas in some incidents Bedouin sheikhs had asked for
Ottoman interference, others were unhappy with this, fearing punitive
measures and increased taxes.
The pre-Beersheba period is very much under-researched, and the few
available studies of this period are largely characterised by two interrelated
directions of approach. The first of these stresses Bedouin autonomy and
thus Ottoman absence. Such scholarship ranges between presenting the
Bedouin as self-governed communities that did not need the state, largely
romanticising Bedouin culture, or, more pejoratively, as communities
living in lawlessness and constantly fighting (Bailey 2012; Frantzman &
Kark 2011; Yahel & Kark & Frantzman 2012). The second approach
highlights the Ottoman presence in Bedouin affairs, but represents this
presence as one of oppression (Al-Arif 1934).5 Hence, the broader
narrative is one of communities living in an extra-state space and in a
constant state of conflict driven by Bedouin savagery and blood revenge,
interrupted only by intermittent Ottoman punitive military campaigns.
These representations and explanations are not without some merit, but
they fail to account for the complexity of the situation (Nasasra et al.,
2015).6
To demonstrate this point, whilst I retain the notion of Bedouin
conflict in the foreground in this article, in my reading, Bedouin conflict
reveals dynamics far more complex than the historiography allows for, and
challenges the hegemonic representation of the Bedouin as a community
that was in a state of ‘constant fighting’, and/or practicing ‘robbery
actions’. As the main source of this alternative reading, the article utilises
original Ottoman archival resources. It relies primarily on a unique
archival file concerning a criminal investigation from 1892 into bribery
allegations against two high-ranking Arab Ottoman officials from the
notable Husseini family. The two officials were the Jerusalem Mayor Salim
Effendi al-Husseini, and Arif Bey al-Husseini, a member of the Jerusalem
administrative council (meclis-i idare) and director of education (maarif) in

5 Such phenomena are alluded to in various degrees in the work of Clinton Bailey,
Arif al-Arif, Ruth Kark, Havazelet Yahel, and Seth Frantzman and others. On Bedouin
autonomy and minimal Ottoman interference see: Bailey (2009), Rabia (2001). Many of
these resources and others rely on British sources as well as on accounts of European
travellers in the region, and Ottoman source material is almost absent from all of these
sources.
6 Nasasra et al. provides an excellent analysis of the state of scholarship concerning the
Bedouin communities and their changing paradigms.
62 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies

Jerusalem (Manna’ 1986: 121).7 From the late 1870s until 1890, both offi-
cials were involved in Bedouin affairs, mainly in reconciling land disputes.
Both were accused of receiving bribes of money and horses from the Tara-
bin sheikhs. Salim Effendi al-Husseini was accused of receiving two stal-
lions, a mare, and 500 lira from the Tarabin. In return he unjustly allocated
to them lands that belonged to the Azazmi (Büssow 2011: 543–546).8
Arif Bey was accused of receiving 1,600 lira – also from the Tarabin – for
releasing their sheikhs from prison.9 This whole affair of allegations
and investigations began after a complaint that was filed by a number of
Bedouin sheikhs, mainly the Azazmi, against the Husseinis.10 The detailed
investigation documents provide rare insights into state-Bedouin affairs in
the relevant period, particularly since the file (referred to hereafter as ‘the
investigation file’) contains the statements of a dozen local Bedouin.11
Usually, Bedouin voices are almost completely absent from the
writings on Bedouin history, as these voices are usually not available or
marginalised. Although the Bedouin voices in the investigation file were
partly manipulated and limited due to the nature of an interrogation,
they remain unique and rich. These voices inform us of first hand
self-perceptions and understanding of Bedouin experiences in the late
nineteenth century, of Bedouin identity and space. The available sources,
beyond providing us with an alternative account of Bedouin conflict,
demonstrate sophisticated and dynamic inter and intra Bedouin socio-
economic relationships and networks, and also give a rich account of
Ottoman statecraft. As for Bedouin conflict, the available documents
demonstrate that it was mainly driven by the use of and the control over
7 Haj Salim bin Hussein Effendi al-Husseini, a Muslim Ottoman, lived in Jerusalem,
being head of the municipality at the time of the investigation in 1892, when he was
54 years old, and was literate. In the year 1872, al-Husseini was appointed to the
Gaza secretariat, with a salary of 500 gurush. Toward the end of 1872, al-Husseini was
appointed to the administrative council in Jerusalem, when Kamel Pasha was appointed
as Mutasarrif. Further, al-Husseini was also a member of the Majlis al-Tamyiz (Meclis-I
temyiz-I Hukukve Cinayet- Council of Judicial Appeals and Crimes), and he finished his
tenure there when his legal membership term ended in 1297 (around 1880). Arif Bey,
the Jerusalem Ma’arif Director, was interrogated. His full name was Arif bin Musa Pasha
al-Husseini, his age was 33 years, and he was literate. See, BOA, S.D. 2280/10 9 Haziran
1308/21 June 1892; see also, Manna’ (1986: 121). The documents refer to Jerusalem as a
‘liva’, (district) whereas Jerusalem became a Mutasarriflik from 1864.
8 It is assumed that this was an Ottoman lira, which had an exchange rate in Jaffa in
1900 of 110 gurush. Compare also that the Jerusalem mayor monthly salary in 1908 was
2,000 gurush. See Schölch (2006: 104); Büssow (2011, 563–564).
9 BOA, S.D. 2280/10 9 Haziran 1308/21 June 1892.
10 Hasanabu Abdoun and Awadabu Ruqayiq, both from the Tayaha; Salim Nabhan
from the Hanjra; and Hasan al-Malta’a and Musa al-Samad of the Azazmi. See, BOA, S.D.
2280/10 9 Haziran 1308/21 June 1892; see also, BOA, DH.MKT., 1750/62, 26 Zilhicce
1307/13 August 1890.
11 The file includes about 50 pages of Arabic and Ottoman Turkish documents.
 A. Amara Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’ 63

cultivable and potentially-cultivable land, rather than by Bedouin savagery.

These lands were an important economic resource for the Bedouin
communities who lived in the environs of Gaza and Beersheba, and
who had subsisted mainly from the growing of crops. These facts further
contradict the hegemonic representation of the Bedouin as nomadic
and/or exclusively pastoralist communities. The Ottoman government
sought first to institute peace and security, and then began to extend its
bureaucratic apparatus and further penetrate Bedouin life and affairs.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, then, the Bedouin economy was
not exclusively animal-related. Rather, the cultivation of crops was central
to Bedouin affairs in the Gaza sub-district, and many of the Bedouin
identified themselves as crop growers (and peasants), thus explaining the
value of cultivable land as an important resource to use and fight over.
Other Bedouin who had herds often hired shepherds or had other tribes
who lived in less easily cultivable lands look after their animals. With this
in mind, this article questions some of the hegemonic categories used
by those attempting to understand Bedouin life and space, categories
such as ‘nomadism’, ‘tribalism’, and ‘autonomy’ and ‘exceptionalism’.
In my research, those people typically presented in the historiography
as unsophisticated herders of animals resistant to both the state and its
institutions of registration emerged as shrewd manipulators of the newly
forming state institutions, directing their efforts towards the securing of
cultivable agricultural lands. In other words, these so-called nomadic tribes
do not seem to have acted like nomadic tribes who are outside the state
(and state-making), at least according to the conventional definitions of
these terms (Barakat 2015).

Re-Reading Bedouin Conflict Bridging the Gap between

Facts and Representations

No man will plant orchards and make improvements on land not his own;
but give him secure title, and, under the crude husbandry of even ignorant
peasants, Philistia will quickly recover her ancient prosperity. This however,
will never be realised until the Bedawin [sic] are driven back to their deep
deserts, and kept there by a firm and stable government. Neither vineyards,
nor fig-orchards, nor vegetable-gardens can exist while these plunderers are
allowed to roam at will with their all-devouring herd and droves of camels.
(Thomson 1880: 193)

Older scholarly accounts had often treated the Bedouin as barbarians

or savages that roamed the desert, maintaining an unchanging culture
for centuries. More recent accounts abandoned such terminology, but
maintained the notion of a nomadic tribal society that was rarely, if at all,
64 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies

touched by the state or by ‘settled communities’.12 This notion cannot be

easily justified; not only does the historical evidence show otherwise, but
many of the resources containing descriptions that negatively represent the
Bedouin, such as savages or plunderers, actually include facts that suggest
otherwise. Let us demonstrate this point through two old accounts of
the Beersheba Bedouin. For example, whereas the American missionary
William McClure Thomson called for the pushing of the roaming
‘plunderers’ to the desert, he notes in the same account that:
The first time I came into this region I was agreeably surprised to find it
neither flat nor barren, nor in any way resembling a sandy desert. . . The
rolling plain from that wady (Wadyes Seba’) northwards to Gaza was then
green and flowery as a meadow, and much of it clothed with wheat; but
there is not a village along the entire route, and all the grain belonged to
tent-dwelling Arabs. (Thomson 1880: 193–194)

Similarly, Elyahu Epstein’s article Bedouin of the Negeb, which was

published in the Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly of 1939, is another
example. Epstein chose to open his article by arguing that, ‘Time has
left the Nomad untouched and to-day, as for generations past, his is still
one of the most primitive types of human society. He has learnt neither
to resist natural forces nor to turn natural possibilities to his own good
use’ (Epstein 1939: 59). Strangely, Epstein included the following map
(Figure 1) of Bedouin wheat and barley cultivation immediately before
this opening sentence, providing an example of the dynamic responses
of the Bedouin to the environment that wholly undermines Epstein’s
claim of their continuing powerlessness when faced by two environmental
challenges.
While contemporary scholarly accounts are considerably less egregious
than those of Thomson and Epstein, similar representations continue to
emerge. The continued currency of simplistic visions of Bedouin social
and economic habits, and of the Bedouin as removed from the state,
remain with us (Frantzman & Kark 2011; Yahel & Kark & Frantzman
2012; Meir 1996). Close examination of the cases discussed in the
investigation file has undermined a number of these assumptions by
exposing significant and previously unseen aspects of the history of
southern Palestine and its association with the overlapping worlds of
Ottomans and Bedouins, Bedouins and non-Bedouins, and Bedouins and
other Bedouins. In the next section, assumptions are further challenged
by an examination of inter-Bedouin conflict, which proves to be a useful
lens through which to read Bedouin history and through it to challenge
major representations of Bedouin nomadism and savagery.

12 Suggesting ‘autonomy’ instead of ‘lawlessness’.

 A. Amara Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’ 65

Figure 1. Tribal map of the Negeb.

Bedouin Conflict: Between Lawlessness and Ottoman

Military Punishment
When asked what he knew of Bedouin aggression, Mohammad Hammo,
a Gazan previously a horse trader and then tithe collector (tithe multazim),
stated that all he knew was that the Bedouin were attacking land owners
and travellers (abna al-sabil), usually itinerant traders or pilgrims. As a result,
the residents of the villages and towns (ahali) filed a joint petition to the
government requesting that they provide protection and security. He went
on to explain that the arrival of Rustum Pasha in the region brought with
it a measure of what he called ‘rest and peace’.13 Rustum Pasha, who
was known for his harsh approach towards the Bedouin, was asked by
the Jerusalem governor Rauf Pasha in 1890 to institute peace in the Gaza
region (Gilbar 1990).14 This presentation of the Bedouin is not unfamiliar
13 ( ).Interrogation of Haj Mohammad Hammo, about sixty years old and
illiterate. He was interrogated in Gaza on 29 June 1892 (17 Haziran 1308), BOA, ş.D.
2280/10 9 Haziran 1308/21 June 1892.
14 Rustum Pasha decided to build the first Military Station in 1894 in al-Jahir, which
was normally manned by ten soldiers, except for the period of the ploughing season, when
it had twenty. See Al-Arif (1934, 248).
66 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies

to most readers, and Hammo’s testimony is echoed in the dominant

scholarly narrative regarding the Bedouin and Ottoman involvement in
their lives. For example, Clinton Bailey opens his chapter The Ottomans
and the bedouin tribes of the Negev as follows: ‘The history of the nineteenth-
century Negev (called, then, the Gaza District) was one of turbulent tribal
strife, as the area’s main population, the desert-dwelling Bedouin tribes,
vied with each other for territorial gain and political predominance’. To
demonstrate the tenuous character of Ottoman rule over the ‘Negev’,
Bailey cited the British explorer C.R. Conder who noted in 1875 that,
‘the Tiyaha Arabs were at war with the ‘Azazma. . . and battles are being
fought within a few miles from Gaza, quite unnoticed by the Turkish
governor’ (Bailey 1990: 321). Other scholars have produced similar
accounts of bloody Bedouin fighting and attacks on settled populations
and occasional Ottoman military incursions. Much of the writings are
influenced by the noble savage stereotype (Frantzman & Kark 2011: 5).
The authoritative Arif al-Arif provided a more detailed account of
Bedouin fighting, whilst situating it largely within the same narrative. In
his book Beersheba and its Confederations, al-Arif allocated a large section to
Bedouin ‘civil wars’, mainly between the years 1875 and 1890. According
to him, the main reason behind the major Tayah-Tarabin fighting from
1875 was the killing of a Tarabin sheikh around 1873 (Al-Arif 1934: 82).15
In 1887, another episode of fighting erupted between the Azazmi and the
Tarabin, where the former, who had supported the Tarabin in a previous
conflict, were unhappy with their subsequent land share. According to
al-Arif, the Azazmi were supported in their fight against the Tarabin by
some Tayaha. However, in most battles the Tarabin had the upper hand,
which led the Azazmi sheikh, Hasan al-Malta’a, to approach the Ottoman
rulers in Gaza and Jerusalem to ask them to stop the Tarabin, and when
they were ineffective in this he approached the Ottoman government in
Istanbul directly (Al-Arif 1934: 182–189).
The level and frequency of fighting prompted the Jerusalem governor,
Rauf Pasha, to seek to put an end to it and to institute stability in
the region. Before seeking military intervention, the governor tried to
convince the Bedouin sheikhs to reach peace. Upon their refusal he
decided to use military force. The Ottoman government sent its army in
1890, under the command of Rustum Pasha, who led a strong campaign
which was aimed especially against the Tarabin sheikhs.16 The Ottoman
government exiled and imprisoned a number of sheikhs from different
confederations (Tarabin, Tayaha, Hanajra, and the Azazmi) (Al-Arif 1934:

15 Sheikh Muhammad, father of sheikh Hammad al-Sufi, killed by another Tarabin

from the Abu Sitta tribe, see Al-Arif (1934: 82).
16 Including Hammad al-Sufi.
 A. Amara Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’ 67

188–189).17 Rustum Pasha’s punitive campaign against the Bedouin is

still remembered among them (Bailey, 1900: 331).18 According to al-Arif,
more than one peace agreement was reached among the Bedouin parties
involved in the conflict, with the knowledge of the Ottoman government.
Al-Arif closes his section on ‘civil wars’ with a picture of ‘A Bedouin
ploughing his land peacefully after establishing rule in the region’ (Al-Arif 1934:
191).19 Al-Arif ’s account is less simplistic or romanticised than Bailey’s, yet
it still shares many commonalities with the narrative provided by Hammo
from our investigation file.
The account presented above emphasises the frequent squabbles among
the Bedouin and the harsh tactics of the Ottoman military that proved
the only means of bringing peace and stability thanks to the abilities of
Rustum Pasha. The account privileges these aspects and actions over the
non-military involvement of the Ottomans in affairs, and does not dig
into Bedouin affairs and relationships, or the reasons underpinning the
fighting. The relationships among the Bedouin, the relationships with
other nearby communities, and those with the central government were
multi-layered and contingent upon a number of factors. The Ottomans
knew this, and worked to incorporate it into tenable solutions, reaching
far beyond Rustum Pasha’s ability to impose ‘peace and rule’. Moving
beyond merely punishing or educating (te’adib) the Bedouin, the Ottoman
government had integrated diplomatic and military missions, appointed
commissions of senior Ottoman administrators, and aimed to fulfil far-
reaching objectives for Bedouin affairs and space. But this situation was
not merely one where the Ottomans were acting upon the Bedouin.

17 According to al-Arif, the prisoners were: Hmmad al-Sufi, Saqrabu Sitta, Audih
al-Zria’i (Tarabin); Hajjajabu Hajjaj, Salim bin Nabhan, Farhan bin Qteish (Hanajrih), Ibn
Hammad (Azazmi), Hasan al-Malta’a (Azazmi), Hasanabu Shinnar, Suleiman al-Sania’,
Zaria’ al-Huzayil, and Jabr bin Atiya (all Tayha). Al-Arif (1934: 188–189).
18 Rustum pasha invited the Tarbin sheikhs: Hammad al-Sufi; Hamad al-Zria’i, Abu
Shbab, Abu Hajjaj, Hmud al-Wheidi, and Qaudabu Mugheisib. Al-Arif also mentions a
story about the Flus and Namus, Bribe or Good manners, which came up again in an
interview in Hura with Nasasrah. According to Clinton Bailey, Rustum Pasha remanded
thirteen of the Tarabin sheikhs, see Bailey (1990: 331).
19 Al-Arif adds that a Bedouin sheikh called Hasan al-Batil told him that it was Izzat
Pasha who decided to interfere and end the fighting, and that peace was also reached due
to the involvement of sheikh al-Batil. Al-Batil lied to both, al-Sufi and the Tayaha sheikh
Abu Shinnar, stating that each of the sheikhs was interested in peace and was waiting for
the other in the house of the infamous sheikh, Ali Bin Atiya, to whom we will return
later. Al-Arif (1934: 182–189). The peace between al-Sufi and Abu-Sitta generated a
marriage between Hammad al-Sufi and the daughter of the Abu-Sitta sheikh. The peace
between the Tarabin and the Azazmi was based on reconciliation, and thesanad was signed
by Mohammad bin Ayyad al-Sufi (Tarabin) and Suleiman bin Salih Jukheidim, Al-Arif
(1934: 193).
68 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies

As we will see next, the Bedouin were also active agents in this episode of
Ottoman administration and politics in the region.

Bedouin Representation in the Ottoman Tanzimat Period

Feelings of anti-tribal sentiments and the construction of such sentiments
among the Ottomans increased with the new re-ordering of the
Empire. Such feelings were best described and analysed by Derignil
and Ussama Makdisi. Deringil argues that nomadic societies became an
important source and target of mobilisation within the Ottoman ‘project
of modernity’ (Deringil 2003; Makdisi 2002) Ottoman ideology and
legitimation of power, adding that the project included an Ottoman
‘civilising mission’ under a ‘borrowed colonialism’, which included the
Middle East regions in its geographical scope. Makdisi looked more
particularly at the Ottoman representation of the Arabs as part of
an Ottoman version of orientalism. He argues that the 19th century
saw a shift in the imperial paradigm, which adopted a view suffused
with nationalist modernisation ideology, and rooted in a discourse of
progress. According to this new paradigm, the advanced imperial centre
had to reform and discipline the backward peripheries of its multi-
ethnic and multi-religious empire (Makdisi 2002: 768–769). However,
though derogatory and civilising terms were available and existent in
Ottoman documents, as demonstrated by Mostafa Minawi, the Ottoman
‘derogatory references to the Bedouins were not a central animating force
of the various Ottoman administrative branches but rather a rhetorical tool
at their disposal to be used strategically towards specific ends’ (Minawi
2015: 78). It can thus be seen that there is a gap between the dominant
representation of the tribes in the Ottoman resources and discourse and
the historical facts and the actual governmental practices (Kasaba 2010).
Thus, representing the Ottoman imperial rule as a form of colonialism
would disguise the complexity the Ottoman rule and the broader political
context (Minawi 2015: 81). Nevertheless, discursively and practically,
tribal communities were a perfect fit for ‘modernisation’ (read control)
projects. Such policies as we will see were all part of late Ottoman affairs in
southern Palestine, which included policies of land registration, Bedouin
settlement, increasing agriculture, building Beersheba town and qada’ and
later in 1908 building the Auja-Hafirkaza, building police stations, all
coupled with promotion of civilisational discourses.
The main Ottoman concerns regarding the fighting in southern
Palestine appear in an important decision of the Ottoman Council of
State from 9 September 1878 (later to become a Sultan’s order). The
decision concerned the need to increase the number of Ottoman troops
in the region. According to the Council of State, the ongoing fighting
 A. Amara Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’ 69

between the Tayaha, the Tarabin, and other Bedouin, were preventing the
ploughing and the cultivation of Bedouin lands. Moreover, the fighting
led to the damage of crops of nearby villages, and to assaults on the
residents (ahali) and travellers. As the decision noted, the twenty-six
Cavalry (mounted troops) present in the area were busy collecting tax
revenues and with other general security issues. Thus, the troops could not
manage the situation and protect the crops of the nearby villages. Instead,
100 mounted troops were needed as a backup, to be sent temporarily, and
to return to their original place upon finishing their mission. The Sultan
confirmed the Council of State’s decision.20
The Ottoman action apparently came in 1877 as a response to four
different petitions by Bedouin and non-Bedouin in the Gaza sub-district.
As Yuval Ben-Bassat shows, Bedouin were participants in the common
practice of petition writing to the Sultan and to the Ottoman authorities.
These petitions serve as an important written account of Bedouin history,
despite the effects of partial mediation by the petition writers (Ben-Bassat
2013, 2015). The petitions from the mid-1870s were seemingly part of
the Gaza inter-elite tension between the Husseini family and other Gazan
notables, and centred mainly around the position of the mufti. In two
petitions, the Gazan non-Bedouin complained that the son of the Husseini
mufti was using his ties with the Bedouin to encourage them to attack
the villagers and farmers. On the other hand, Bedouin also dispatched
two petitions to the central government in Istanbul in the same spirit.
They complained that the Husseinis with their tribal allies were stirring
unrest among the Bedouin tribes in the Gaza sub-district. The petitions
demonstrate the integration of the Bedouin in the socio-political life of the
region, as well as complicating consideration of the question of Bedouin
attacks on villagers and farmers.21
The Ottoman government’s main concerns were focussed on the two
major interconnected issues of security and land cultivation. Ottoman
documents refer to the Bedouin raids and misbehaviour as early as
1708, and later in 1860.22 The instability, non-cultivation, and damage
to the crops meant financial loss and a decrease in potential taxes for
the government. Land also appears in the investigation file as a main
source of the fighting.23 The file referred to three different accounts
20 I.şD. 41/2144, 28 Agustus 1294/ 9–9–1878. The decision concerned an
arrangement to pay the salary of 100 mounted troops
21 BOA, HR. TO., 554/80, 6 Nisan 1293/18 April 1877; BOA, HR. TO., 554/56,
9 şubat 1292/2 February 1877.
22 BOA, Dahiliye, 13711, (1708); See also, BOA, A.MKT.UM., 390/47, 21
Cimazilahir 1276/15 January 1860.
23 Interrogated on 14 July 1892 (2 Temmuz 1308), BOA, S.D. 2280/10 9 Haziran
1308/21 June 1892. He attended for interrogation by himself, unlike the Bedouin, who
were mostly brought by the police.
70 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies

of inter-Bedouin land disputes and their resolution, involving fighting

by the Tayaha-Tarabin, Azazmi-Tayaha, and Azazmi-Tayaha-Tarabin. In
the following, I discuss the details of the Azazmi-Tayaha reconciliation
agreement with which we opened this article.

The Azazmi-Tayaha Reconciliation Agreement: Bedouin

Agriculture and Territorial Relations, 1880–1888
As part of the reconciliation agreement, the Tayaha were required to pay
compensation to the Azazmi for damages that the former had caused. The
detailed table of the damaged items and the compensation amounts for
each item points to the intensive agricultural activity of Bedouin generally
and to that of the Azazmi particularly. Out of the 500 French liras, 358
F.L. (71.6%) were paid for barley and wheat losses, and the remaining
142 F.L. were paid for tents. In other words, the majority of the damages
were for a commodity that symbolised fixedness in space (grains), while
the rest of the damages were for goods that partially, but not necessarily,
symbolised mobility (tents). Such figures show that agricultural activity
was central to the Bedouin economy and a significant component of
Bedouin territorial conflict. It is particularly important to recognise this
aspect with respect to the activities of the Azazmi, who are generally
treated as camel herders rather than cultivators since they lived in areas
further south and east of Beersheba (Al-Arif 1934: 100).24 The damages
went to a considerable number of families, with thirty-nine receiving
compensation for barley and wheat.25 Sheikh Ibn Hammad together
with his two brothers, Msallam and Suleiman, received 35% of the total
compensation for barley and wheat, an indication that the Ibn Hammads
were agriculturists and large landowners.26 Forty year-old Ali, the son of
sheikh Ibn Hammad, had even introduced himself in the interrogation as
a fallah.27 At least four other Bedouin had positively identified themselves
during the interrogation as cultivators or as working in cultivation and
ploughing, with these relatively passive figures typically presented as the
opposite of Bedouin freedom and might.28

24 See Al-Arif (1934, 100), there he mentions that only a small proportion of their
lands was cultivated.
25 Twenty nine of which received also compensation for the tents.
26 BOA, S.D. 2280/10 9 Haziran 1308/21 June 1892, mazbata and list dated 20
Kanunuevvil 1303/10 January 1888.
27 Ali Ibn Hammad, 20 Haziran, estimated his age at 40 years.
28 For example, our famous sheikh Hammad al-Sufi introduced himself as working
in ‘ploughing and cultivation’. Similarly, ninety-year old Haj Salamaabu Ghalyun stated
that he was harrathzarra’ (ploughing and agriculturist- ), as did forty-year old
sheikh Salamaabu Ruqayiq. Finally, sheikh Mohammad al-Sania’, who owned a house
in Gaza and was married to a Gazan, used the same terminology in stating that he did
 A. Amara Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’ 71

Although remarkable, these identifications should not have been a

surprise given the emerging agricultural patterns in southern Palestine.
Barley was the main crop grown there, and together with the Gaza
sub-district, the Beersheba sub-district (instituted in 1900) produced
about 70% of Palestine’s barley, which was famous for its great quality.
The exports reached 40,000–60,000 tons in the years preceding WWI.
Despite some decline in Gaza’s status in later decades, Gaza remained
an important market for the Bedouin of Egypt and southern Palestine
(Schölch 2006: 164–165; Al-Dabbagh 1988: Vol. 1/2, 97, 100). According
to Braslavsky, there were 150,000 dunum of barley land in the Gaza sub-
district and 1,500,000 dunum in the Beersheba sub-district (Braslavsky
1946). Bedouin grew other crops, such as wheat, lentils, water melon,
and maize. The estimates of overall Bedouin cultivated lands on the eve of
the British occupation ranged between 2–3.5 million dunum. This wide
range is due to different patterns and intervals in Bedouin cultivation,
which were dictated by the soil and rainfall, leading to alternate annual
cultivation.29 Following World War One, and due to the increase of barley
cultivation in California and Britain, as well as the increase in transport
prices, the level of barley exports dropped and it became traded more
domestically (Braslavsky 1946).30 It was mainly traded in the Beersheba
market, and then in the markets of Gaza, Khan Yunis, al-Majdal, and
al-Faluja, where the Bedouin purchased from these markets what they
needed, such as coffee, sugar, rice, garments and other products (Al-Arif
1934: 271–272).
It appears, then, that the identification of Bedouin as fallah in this
case coincided with an expansion in cultivation in the late nineteenth
century that extended to new empty and fallow lands. The investigation
underscored this point. In the interrogation, one Gazan notable stated
that he heard that the fight between the Bedouin was over metruke land
that had been revived by some Azazmi and Tayaha, and which the Tarabin
wanted to take over.31 Metruke is empty and unclaimed public land that was
accessible to the public. According to the Ottoman Land Code there could
be an assigned metruke such as pasture allotted for particular communities.32
Mawat (dead) land is another significant land category that could be of

filaha (cultivation) and cultivation. See, BOA, S.D. 2280/10 9 Haziran 1308/21 June 1892,
interrogated respectively, 13, 6, and 4 temmuz, 1308.
29 Letter of appointment of Major Abramson as the Chairman of the Commission
signed by Norman Bentwich, Legal Secretary, 19 August 1920, and the Commission’s
report dated 31 May 1921, PRO CO 733/18, 174761 (The Abramson Report).
30 This drop in barley value on the eve of British occupation probably helped to cast
the Bedouin more as nomads in the British orientalist-mind, rather than agriculturists.
31 21 Zilhiija 1309 sheikh Abdulla Effendi al-Ghusayn, who was born and lived in
Gaza, was a teacher, and was about fifty years old.
32 Articles 5 of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code.
72 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies

relevance when evaluating the statement of the Gazan on land revival.

Under article 103 of the Ottoman Land Code, if someone revived dead
land – land that was not claimed or possessed by anyone, or land that
was fallow, stony or distant from settlements – he would be granted a
title over it. With this in mind, it can be seen that land revival and the
expansion of cultivation was of vital interest both to the Bedouin and to
the government.
The Azazmi-Tayaha conflict and peace making process demonstrate
that Bedouin space was far from being unknown, and was for the most
part defined and regulated. Tribal territories were familiar and known.
Thus many of these lands were not subject to land disputes with other
tribes. Bedouin were also able to identify territories that did not belong
to or were not claimed by any tribe. The Metruke lands were thus not
only future potential cultivable lands, they also served as lands of refuge
for the Ibn Hammad family. The relatively mixed neighbourly relations
of different Bedouin families and tribes led to tensions and disputes over
land boundaries, and led at times to violent clashes. Further, tribal or
confederational solidarity could not be assumed. A number of families
and tribes had relatively individual personas, independent of their own
confederations. Many tribes remained neutral, or united with opposite
confederations.33 The relatively well defined territories and the Bedouin
link to their lands led the Ottoman Government to take a major decision
at the Council of State in 1891 to register Bedouin-held lands, then
estimated at 5 million dunum, in the tapu land registry.34
In sum, Bedouin conflict and the highly sophisticated peace-making
processes had to integrate local and governmental techniques and symbols,
and had to endorse complex Bedouin spatial relations. These complex
spatial relations stand in contrast to much of the received wisdom about
the Bedouin. After all, in many of these cases, the Bedouin cultivated
land, stayed in one place, and utilised state endorsed written records
to adjudicate their disputes. But if these processes made the Ottoman
state incorporate Bedouin customs as they expanded their rule, over time
the Ottoman state began to impose its own logic, rendering the space
more controllable and legible. This section tried to show how notions of
Bedouin nomadism are not well-reconciled with the historical evidence,
and how the cultivation of crops was an important animating factor
in Bedouin socio-economic practices and more particularly in Bedouin
conflicts. Following the same line, and before moving to the conclusion,
33 BOA, S.D. 2280/10 9 Haziran 1308/21 June 1892, interrogation with sheikh
Suleiman al-Huzayil on 10 July 1892 (28 Haziran 1308).
34 BOA, i.mms 122/5229 Shuray Devlet decision on May 4th 1891. (The grand vizir
approved this on 21 June 1891, with this being followed by the sultan’s approval on 23
June 1891.)
 A. Amara Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’ 73

I will examine the use of the term ‘Bedouin’ and the representations that
it carries with it.

Bedouin Space and Identity

Examination of the term ‘Bedouin’ is advisable as this term carries with it
a package of various representations, and its use is at the least historically
inaccurate. Although I am using the term in an effort to engage with
the term most scholars use, it is important to stress that neither the
term ‘Bedouin’ nor ‘desert’ appeared even once in the investigation file.35
Indeed, the use of the literal term for Bedouin (bedu) was extremely
rare in Ottoman documents; instead the term urbân was the commonly
used term, and was usually attached to qualifying adjectives such as ‘tent
dwellers’, or seyyare (mobile).36 Other terms such as aşayir (tribes) and,
in a very few instances, bedavet (Bedouin lifestyle) were used.37 More
importantly, the Bedouin in the investigation file identified themselves
by first name, then by their father’s name, and then their tribe and
confederation. They did the same when referring to other fellow Bedouin.
However, when referring to all Bedouin, like Ottoman officials they also
used the term urbân. Meanwhile, Gazans and Jerusalemites instead referred
mostly to them as the
arab.38 Hence, both terms urbân and
arab were used
to refer to what we refer to today as ‘Bedouin’.39 The term
arab was also
used in a similar way in Egypt. As noted by Timothy Mitchell, the term
had historically referred to the pastoral nomads of the desert, referring
to ‘Bedouin’ in contrast to the fellahin (peasants). However, in the Nile
Valley, those called
arab were farmers and lived in villages, and what
distinguished them from other villagers ‘was not necessarily nomadism
but their relative autonomy from Cairo and often their domination over
the fellahs themselves’ (Mitchell 2002: 61). The use of the term ‘Bedouin’
in contrast to farmers and the hegemonic use of nomadism in Bedouin
studies are not unrelated, and thus need to be challenged (Ben-Bassat
2015: 135–136; Braslavsky 1946: 242).40
35 The parallel term for ‘Bedouin’ in Turkish is bedevi or in Arabic. The Turkish
term for ‘desert’ is çölin Turkish and in Arabic.
36 Bedouin Arab was used in BOA, I. Şd 41/2144, 28 August 1294/9 September
1878. The term urbân is translated in Turkish as the ‘Arabs of the desert’. In Arabic the
term is
37 In this section there is use of Arabic and Turkish words as the archival sources
are available in both languages.
38 i.e. Arab, in Turkish arap; in Arabic .
39 Note for example that Ibn Khaldoun used the term ‘Bedouin, whereas the term
‘Aa’rabi’ ( ) used to define those Arabs who lived in the desert.
40 See a brief comment on the terms used to refer to the Bedouin in a recent article,
Ben-Bassat 2015. See also the use of the term ‘arab in Braslavsky 1946, 242, where
Braslavsky puts ‘Bedouin’ in brackets after using ‘arab.
74 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies

Further, the term
arab was also used by both Bedouin and non-
Bedouin to refer not only to the people but also to their habitation
areas. For example, some Bedouin stated that they were living in the

arab, and the investigator used the term
arab in contrast to Gaza. In
other cases, Bedouin referred to their habitation area as buyūt al-sha
r,
the tents.41 More importantly, all Bedouin interrogated stated that they
were ‘born and lived in the
arab, in our defined sites in the Gaza sub-
district’,42 or ‘in buyūt al-sha
r in our known sites’.43 Even if many lived
in tents, it did not mean they endlessly moved. It sounded acceptable
to the investigator that the 37-year-old sheikh Ali bin Atiya was born
in and continued to live in the same defined site. Thus, the tribe’s or
family’s habitation area was largely defined and permanent, which created
self-identification with the particular space. Such a wide array of terms
of identity and space has come nowadays to be largely reduced within
the term ‘Bedouin’, and associated with the desert (desert-dwellers) or
erased within assumptions of Bedouin nomadism (tent-dwellers). Such
representation has also undermined Bedouin links with the land, which
was enhanced through widespread agricultural activities. In his article
‘Where Have the Bedouin Gone?’ Donald Cole shows that except for
the name ‘Bedouin’ nothing in fact remained of most of the early
Bedouin life throughout the Middle East. Local, regional, and global
developments and changing conditions have transformed the Bedouin
through ongoing dialectic relations of continuity and change between
the earlier lifestyle (roughly referred to as ‘tradition’) and the changing
circumstances (referred to as ‘modernity’). According to Cole, Bedouin
today ‘refers less to a ‘way of life’ than to an ‘identity’. The way of life was
grounded in ecology and economy, the identity in heritage and culture’
(Cole 2003: 235–267).

Conclusions
Land rights and inter-Bedouin territorial affairs were an important entry
point to Bedouin affairs for the Ottoman government, and more broadly
to southern Palestine. As part of its reform programme, the Ottoman
government became more involved in Bedouin space and tried to frame
any agreements concerning land use in official documents. These legal,
political, and socio-economic factors, particularly Bedouin agriculture,

41 In Arabic , the living houses made of goat’ hair.BOA, ş.D. 2280/10 9

Haziran 1308/21 June 1892.
42 BOA, ş.D. 2280/10 9 Haziran 1308/21 June 1892, (18 Haziran 1308) on 30 June
1892.
43 Interrogated on 16 July 1892, (4 Temmuz 1308), BOA, ş.D. 2280/10 9 Haziran
1308/21 June 1892.
 A. Amara Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’ 75

call for the questioning of the dominant representation of the Bedouin

as homogeneous, spontaneous nomads, who live in isolation. Beyond the
matter of representation, in the study of Bedouin history and affair, the
barley economy and Gaza should be seen as being among the central
elements. Bedouin crop cultivation created a number of inter-Bedouin,
intra-Bedouin, local, regional, and global networks that need to be
explored. A look at the roots of Bedouin crop growing exposes the
fallacy of various common representations of the Bedouin communities,
their history and economy. Rather than being rootless wanderers, on the
contrary, the Bedouin and their crops became enmeshed in relationships
involving partnerships, markets, workers, land lease, money lending,
taxation, settlement, water wells and more, that went far beyond their
recognised homelands.
The centrality of crop-growing led many Bedouin to identify
themselves as arable farmers, challenging our perceptions by referring to
themselves as ‘fallahs’. An interesting comparison was made by Hutteroth
and Abdul-Fatah with regard to the 16th -century tax records, noting that
‘There are some jama’a’s which pay taxes for wheat and other field crops
in exactly the same way as to the villages. . . ’ (Hutteroth & Abdul-Fatah
1977: 28–29). How are we to understand this Bedouin-fallah identity?
Shall we maintain the dominant divisions of urban, peasants, and Bedouin
nomads? Such a blend challenges the dichotomies that have dominated
research agendas as far back as Ibn Khaldun, with opposition assumed
between Bedouin-peasant; nomad-settled; pastoralism-agriculture; and
thus savage-civilised. Departing from these dominant categories and
contrasts would allow the endorsement of new research questions and the
employment of fresh lenses through which to read Bedouin history and
affairs (Parizot, 2011).44

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