Asia Paper Series 2010

Beyond “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”:

Debating Universal Values in
Japanese Grand Strategy
Tomohiko Taniguchi
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 Beyond “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”:
Debating Universal Values in
Japanese Grand Strategy

Asia Paper Series

October 2010

Tomohiko Taniguchi1

1 
Tomohiko Taniguchi, previously a member of the print press, worked as deputy press secretary at Japan’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs between 2005 and 2008. He holds professorships at Keio and Meiji universities, both in Tokyo, where he
teaches international political economy and media studies. He is also a senior guest fellow with the Defense and Security
Team at the Sojitz Research Institute.
The views of the author do not necessarily reflect those of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
F
rom 2006 to 2008, the leaders of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan staked out
an expansive vision for Japanese cooperation
with fellow democracies in a geopolitical arc
stretching from Southeast Asia to Central Europe.
In their vision, deepening strategic relationships
with like-minded partners beyond the United States
would expand Japan’s diplomatic and strategic
horizons in a more competitive international
system. However, the ascent to power of the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009 called
into question the values-oriented approach that
animated this concept – the “Arc of Freedom and
Prosperity” (AFP) – as an emerging component of
Japanese grand strategy.
What is the future of Japan’s policy of promoting
the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity? With Japan
now under the rule of the DPJ, there is little
chance that any policy promoted by the former
governing party will resurface, at least for the
time being. Yet the concept has staying power: as
this paper will attest, the AFP policy was Tokyo’s
“branding” exercise from the outset. Its central aim
was to establish Japan’s democratic identity and
cement its credentials as a reliable partner for the
United States and other peer democracies, thereby
widening its strategic position. Indeed, Japan
attempted at the same time to reach out to new
allies like Australia and India in ways that indirectly
strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance. Today the
policy may have lost its logo, but its content still
lingers. In fact, underneath the surface, more
remains than meets the eye. It is to be hoped that a
more domestically stable government in Tokyo will
emerge to reemphasize the AFP in coming years.
Japan’s Embrace of Universal Values
With the appointment of Taro Aso as foreign
minister in October 2005, Japan’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) embarked on a rare
campaign of broadcasting a new strategic direction.
Aso willingly acted as its announcer-in-chief.
Starting with a speech in December 2005 titled
“Asian Strategy as I See It: Japan as the ‘Thought
Leader’ of Asia,” the foreign minister made a total
of 24 major speeches during his 22-month term
in office.1 These speeches covered a wide range of
issues and areas, spanning East, Southeast, South
and Central Asia; the Middle East; and Latin
America. No Japanese foreign minister before or The AFP policy was
since has spoken on as many issues or areas. Tokyo’s “branding”
exercise. Its central aim
Two factors were important. Firstly, MOFA was at was to establish Japan’s
that time under the leadership of Vice Minister for democratic identity and
Foreign Affairs Shotaro Yachi, who acted as its chief
cement its credentials
operating officer. As one of Japan’s most strategy-
as a reliable partner for
savvy diplomats, he wanted the direction of Japan’s
diplomatic efforts to be understood more broadly
the United States and
both domestically and internationally, and it was he other peer democracies,
who asked Aso to speak publicly on these matters. thereby widening its
Secondly, by the time Aso assumed the foreign strategic position.
ministership, Yachi had already hired a professional
journalist to write all of Aso’s speeches for a lay
audience, with as little jargon as possible. This
act was itself an anomaly in Japan’s bureaucratic
culture.
Aso delivered the AFP speech on November
30, 2006.2 For the first time in Japan’s post-war
diplomacy, a Japanese leader characterized the
country as a qualified torchbearer for the universal
values of democracy, human rights, freedom, and
the rule of law. The AFP speech echoed his earlier
one on Japan as an Asian thought-leader, in which
he had described Japan as “a been-there, done-that”
nation whose past failures and successes could
enlighten the region’s late developers. This time,
1 
Delivered in both Japanese and English on December 7. Avail-
able at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0512.
html.
2 
The speech was delivered at a gathering hosted by the
Japan Institute of International Affairs, a semi-governmental
think tank of which Aso’s grandfather, Shigeru Yoshida, was a
founder. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/
speech0611.html
Beyond “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” 1
 Aso announced that Japan would extend not only
financial aid but, more importantly, its knowledge
and experience to countries transitioning from
autocratic regimes to democracies, from Indochina
(Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) to GUAM
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova). He
For the first time in also stressed closer cooperation between Japan
and the Visegrad member countries: the Czech
Japan’s post-war
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Thus he
diplomacy, a Japanese
envisioned an arc stretching from East, Central, and
leader characterized the South Asia to Central and Eastern Europe along
country as a qualified which Japan was to help those countries struggling
torchbearer for the to achieve greater freedom and democracy.
universal values of
democracy, human No Longer Value-Shy?
rights, freedom, and the
Japan’s democracy failed in the 1930s. A militarist
rule of law. regime ensued and a wider Pacific war followed.
Stigmatized, the Japanese kept their mouths shut
when it came to discussing matters of freedom
and democracy until long after the war ended.
Addressing this, Aso said in the AFP speech,
“there [will] be people saying, when exactly did
this country that suffered such a heavy defeat in a
war and caused such great adversity both at home
and abroad suddenly arrive at such a ‘virtuous
conscience’ that it now can lecture to others? And
yet to that I can only reply that it is not normal to
insist that the ‘self ’ that one sees in the mirror is
merely an imitation or a clever invention; what one
sees when one looks in the mirror is the real thing.
... Japan is already of age, and what we need is to
let go of that way of thinking that makes us squirm
when we see our reflection in the mirror. We need
to be able to look at it without feeling ill at ease.”
What motivated this apparently sudden trumpeting
of value-driven diplomacy? Contrary to the notion
that subsequently prevailed, the Arc of Freedom
and Prosperity was not designed to hold back
Beijing. According to Aso and Yachi, the AFP’s two
chief architects, it initially focused on making the
Russians aware that Japan’s footprint could extend
2 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
right up to their doorstep. Aso himself has said that
by provoking Russia, the AFP concept could have
helped then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resume
a dialogue with the Russians on the long-running
Russo-Japanese territorial dispute. Yachi also said
that the well-grounded appreciation of Japan and
its economic achievements that he encountered in
key nations in Eurasia, including Turkey, led him to
conceptualize the arc.
In sum, both Aso and Yachi believed that alerting
Russia to Japan’s reach and presence on its western,
European front would kill two birds with one stone:
it would bring the Russians to the negotiating table
while enriching the diplomatic capital of Japan’s ally
the United States in areas, such as Eastern Europe,
that were critical to the its global strategy. To Aso
and Yachi’s credit, the AFP was well-received by
Eastern Europeans.
The Branding Exercise and its Aftermath
The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was, from its
beginning, a policy not so much of substantiation
as of declaration. Japan could not remain tight-
lipped on universal values if it wanted to qualify
for membership in such bodies as the UN Security
Council. The AFP speech underlined Japan’s
qualifications to play a wider role in world affairs.
It was Japan’s first ever branding exercise to “sell”
its commitment to values, in order for it to be
recognized by its alliance partner and other like-
minded nations on whom Japan’s national interests
would increasingly hinge. To extend the metaphor,
the AFP acted as a huge roadside billboard. It
succeeded in grabbing global attention, but its
impact diminished as time went on. Unfortunately,
it soon became invisible.
Among other things, the Arc of Freedom and
Prosperity became a target of criticism within
Japan. Aso compiled most of his major foreign
policy speeches in book form and published
this compilation, which had the AFP explicitly
mentioned in the title, in June 2007. He may have
intended to publicize Japan’s diplomatic policies,
but his political opponents instantly regarded this
attempt as the self-promotion of a prime ministerial
aspirant. The AFP has since become not only the
LDP’s but also Aso’s signature policy in the eyes of
the public. As Aso’s star later fell, so did that of the
AFP.
Furthermore, although the policy targeted neither
Russia nor China as adversaries, it was nonetheless
regarded by some as an encircling strategy directed
against China. These opponents launched an
anti-AFP campaign soon after the original speech
was delivered. “Too provocative for Beijing,” said
some ex-diplomats, including former Japanese
ambassadors to China. Their voices gained
greater sympathy from Yasuo Fukuda when he
succeeded Abe as prime minister, after defeating
Aso in the LDP presidential election in September
2007. Fukuda’s friendship with his middle-school
classmate Sakutaro Tanino, ambassador to Beijing
from 1998-2001 and one of the most vocal
opponents of the AFP, appears to have worked to
effectively freeze the AFP. Little wonder, then, that
the Fukuda cabinet issued not a single word on
the AFP. But upon succeeding Fukuda as prime
minister, Aso understandably reemphasized the
idea. However, his term was so short that he could
reinvigorate neither the AFP policy nor his own
party, the LDP.
Square One?
So are we back to square one? The answer is
two-fold. On the one hand, Japan has resumed its
time-honored shyness and ceased to comment on
the values the AFP speech said it would commit
to spreading across the globe. On the other hand,
the pillars Japan put in place in order to sustain the
policy still remain: the DPJ government continues
to invest in deepening ties with key nations that
constitute the Arc. These include not only major
powers like India and Australia, but also regional
players in Southeast Asia, who continue to benefit
from Japanese development assistance, and states in
Central Europe, with which Tokyo continues senior
government dialogues.
During the administrations of Prime Ministers On the one hand, Japan
Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, when Taro has resumed its time-
Aso served as foreign minister, Japan strengthened honored shyness and
its alliance with the United States by reaching out
ceased to comment
to the its key allies and partner nations, thereby
on the values the AFP
expanding Japan’s own strategic footprint. Japan
signed a historic defense pact with Australia in
speech said it would
March 2007.3 This was followed in October 2008 commit to spreading
by an almost identically worded Joint Declaration across the globe. On the
on Security Cooperation between Japan and India.4 other hand, the pillars
These two remain the only defense agreements Japan put in place in
modern Japan has ever undertaken beyond its order to sustain the
formal alliance with the United States. policy still remain.
During the same period, and also for the first time
in history, Japan approached NATO and voiced its
enthusiasm for future cooperation at an operational
level. Previously, no cabinet-level member of the
Japanese government had ever visited Brussels to
address the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the
treaty organization’s supreme decision-making
institution. This was in large part because NATO
itself had shown little interest in tying up with
nonmember countries such as Japan. But Japan too
had been extremely cautious in approaching NATO,
the embodiment of collective defense, which the
Japanese government has prohibited itself from
exercising.
“I have been looking forward to speaking to you
because I am here to convey to you that Japan
3 
See ‘Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.
html.
4 
For the text, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/
pmv0810/joint_d.html.
Beyond “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” 3
 intends to work more closely with
NATO,” said Foreign Minister Aso
in his address to the NAC in May
2006.5 Eight months later, also at the
NAC, Prime Minister Abe stressed
that Japan should work with NATO’s
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Japan attempted first in Afghanistan.6 Japan at the time
to anchor itself firmly had established military ties with
to the two U.S. allies, NATO forces. Japan’s participation
in the Operation Enduring Freedom
NATO and Australia,
involved its Maritime Self-Defense
plus India, a growing
Force, whose tankers provided NATO
democratic partner of
member navies with fuel and water.
the United States, and The French navy alone received 31,190
second to establish kilolitres (8.24 million gallons) of ship
its brand recognition fuel, free of charge, from the Japanese.7
as a cornerstone of
the global democratic Helping to Strengthen the Alliance
community. All of these attempts, however half-
baked, were not made in isolation.
Figure 1
The accompanying diagram (Figure
1) demonstrates how they are It is clear, therefore, that Japan attempted first to
interconnected. The line stretching from Tokyo anchor itself firmly to the two U.S. allies, NATO
(which lies at the map’s center) to Washington D.C. and Australia, plus India, a growing democratic
represents the U.S.-Japan alliance, which had long partner of the United States, and second to establish
been the mainstay of Japan’s security. What has its brand recognition as a cornerstone of the global
now been added are, clockwise, Japan-Australia, democratic community. In so doing, Japan aimed
Japan-India, and Japan-NATO ties, three more at indirectly strengthening the Tokyo-Washington
legs to further bolster Japan’s security. The AFP alliance while simultaneously widening its strategic
was supposed to cover the dotted area, neatly area of influence. That is what the AFP and other
intersecting with the newly added legs of Japanese complementary efforts were meant to achieve.
diplomacy.
The AFP’s Legacy Under DPJ Rule
5 
Text available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/ Is there anything still in the pipeline under the
speech0605.html. DPJ with regards to the AFP or its remnants? With
6 
For Abe’s speech, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/ Australia, a small but significant step was taken
pmv0701/nato.html. in May 2010, when Tokyo and Canberra forged
7 
The DPJ-led government terminated the refueling operation an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
in January 2010, soon after it took office. For more detail see: (ACSA) between their respective militaries on the
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/hokyushien/
pdf/siryou_080311.pdf and http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/ occasion of the two countries’ third “2+2” meeting,
kokusai_heiwa/hokyushien/pdf/kekka.pdf.

4 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

involving defense and foreign ministers from both continues to be best served by its alliance with
capitals. Hitherto Japan had an ACSA only with the United States and its growing ties with peer
U.S. forces. democracies. Whatever the branding, the principles
that underlie the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity
India remains the biggest recipient of Japanese will therefore continue to help Tokyo to leverage its
foreign assistance since ascending to first place influence, and secure strategic space for itself.
in 2003. India received $2.6 billion from Tokyo
in fiscal year 2008 alone. Moreover, when DPJ
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama visited Delhi Japan, whose trade and
in December 2009, he agreed with Indian Prime investment stakes are
Minister Manmohan Singh that the two nations scattered around the
would strengthen mutual defense ties. Specifically, world, has few options.
it was agreed that India and Japan would hold Its national interest
regular staff-level meetings between the two continues to be best
militaries and conduct annual bilateral naval served by its alliance
exercises, alternately off India and Japan.8 A with the United States
comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and its growing ties with
is also soon to take effect between India and Japan. peer democracies.
Australia and India being two of the most crucial
pillars of the AFP, it can be said that the DPJ
government had done its fair share to continue
investing in the policy set up by predecessor
governments.

Now that the Hatoyama administration has ceased

to exist, the apparent drift in the Washington-
Tokyo alliance, caused by Hatoyama’s prevarication
in addressing the Okinawa base relocation issue,
has subsided for now. The fact remains, however,
that it is difficult to foresee what foreign policies
the current government will pursue. While it is
true that an influential group of DPJ politicians
wants to drag Japan closer to the Chinese sphere
of influence, Beijing succeeded in alienating them
through its increasingly high-handed approach in
the maritime domain both in the East China and
the South China Seas. Sober analysis will tell them
that a maritime democracy such as Japan, whose
trade and investment stakes are scattered around
the world, has few options. Its national interest

8 
Available: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/
pmv0912/action.html.

Beyond “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” 5

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