X.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Art. III, sec. 16
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
 This provision guarantees the right generally to a speedy
disposition of cases. It covers the periods before, during and
after trial.
 It gives a broader protection that Sec. 14 (2) --- right to
speedy trial.
 This provision applies to civil, criminal, and administrative
cases.
SECTION 14 vs. SECTION 16
While the rights of an accused only apply to the trial phase of
criminal cases, the right to a speedy disposition of cases
covers ALL phases of JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL or
ADMINISTRATIVE proceedings. In short, the right to a speedy
trial granted in Sec. 14 is applicable only to criminal cases.
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED:
1. length of delay
2. reason for the delay
3. assertion of the right or failure to assert it
4. prejudice caused by the delay
 Factors to be considered are the same as the factors of
speedy trial. As mentioned, the right of speedy disposition of
cases is broader than the rights of the accused to speedy trial.
If the delay will focus on the trial itself, then it falls under
speedy trial.
 The remedy for the violation of this right is MANDAMUS
--- same remedy as to violation of the right to a speedy trial
[ROQUE vs. OMBUDSMAN (5/12/1999)].
Art. VIII, sec. 15
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity
of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for
all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served
upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision
or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said
period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory
period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as
may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide
or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay.
Art. VII, sec. 18, par.3
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
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Art. IX, A, sec. 7
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.
DIMARUCOT VS. PEOPLE 630 SCRA 659 (2010)
Now, you will notice in your outline, this case of
DIMARUCUT VERSUS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. There
was an abandonment of an appeal. The court still applied
the rule on speedy disposition of justice even if the
appeal had been abandoned. The court still resolved it,
dismissed it, on consideration that there is still this right
to speedy disposition of cases.
Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to
prosecute. – The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in
either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where
the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
It is clear under the foregoing provision that a criminal case
may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with notice to
the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the
prescribed time. The phrase "with notice to the appellant"
means that a notice must first be furnished the appellant to
show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was
served with a notice requiring him to show cause why his
appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file appellant’s
brief. The purpose of such a notice is to give an appellant the
opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal
should not be dismissed because of such failure, in order that
the appellate court may determine whether or not the
reasons, if given, are satisfactory.
Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in
considering the appeal abandoned with the failure of
petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions
granted to him and non-compliance to date. Dismissal of
appeal by the appellate court sans notice to the accused for
failure to prosecute by itself is not an indication of grave
abuse. Thus, although it does not appear that the appellate
court has given the appellant such notice before dismissing
the appeal, if the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the
appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file
his brief on time and the appellate court denied the motion
after considering said reasons, the dismissal was held proper.
Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior
notice, but the appellant took no steps either by himself or
through counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an
attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his
abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by
law to prosecute his appeal.
Here, the Court notes the repeated non-observance by
petitioner and his counsel of the reglementary periods for
filing motions and perfecting appeal. While still at the trial
stage, petitioner’s motion to admit and demurrer to evidence
was denied as it was not seasonably filed (petitioner was
granted fifteen (15) days from August 8, 2001 within which to
file demurrer to evidence but filed his motion to dismiss only
on September 4, 2001), in accordance with Section 23, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
Before the CA, petitioner and his counsel filed no less than
four (4) motions for extension to file brief, which was never
filed nor attached in the motion for reconsideration of the
August 29, 2007 Resolution dismissing the appeal. The last
extension given expired on June 6, 2007, without any brief
submitted by petitioner or his counsel. And even when he
filed the Omnibus Motion on May 8, 2008, still no appellant’s
brief was attached by petitioner. Neither did petitioner file
any petition before this Court questioning the validity of the
August 29, 2007 resolution and the November 27, 2007
denial of his motion for reconsideration. The dismissal of his
appeal having become final, it was indeed too late in the day
for petitioner to file the Omnibus Motion on May 8, 2008,
which was four (4) months after the finality of the resolution
dismissing the appeal.
Having been afforded the opportunity to seek
reconsideration and setting aside of the motu proprio
dismissal by the CA of his appeal for non-filing of the appeal
brief, and with his subsequent inaction to have his appeal
reinstated after the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner cannot impute error or grave abuse on the CA in
upholding the finality of its dismissal order. Non-compliance
with the requirement of notice or show cause order before
the motu proprio dismissal under Section 8, paragraph 1 of
Rule 124 had thereby been cured. Under the circumstances,
the petitioner was properly declared to have abandoned his
appeal for failing to diligently prosecute the same.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248 September 29, 2010
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES vs. JUDGE MARIA ELISA
SEMPIO DIY
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In this case of ANGELES VERSUS SEMPIO-DIY, the court
here also asked for several extensions because a Motion
for Reconsideration was not resolved within a period of
six months. However, the Supreme Court admonished the
judge’s concern even if there were several extensions
sought; the Court said that the judge must still resolve
such motion within a reasonable time limit, 3 months.
ask for an extension of time to decide the cases. This failure
to decide within the required period, given that he could have
asked for an extension, is inexcusable; it constitutes neglect
of duty as well as gross inefficiency that collectively warrant
administrative sanction.

It appears that respondent has simply forgotten about the

pending motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
95-61294 and Q-95-62690 after said cases became inactive
due to the failure of the defense to submit its reply. The
realization of the blunder came only during the semi -annual
inventory of the court’s cases. This situation could have been
avoided had respondent adopted an effective system of
record management and organization of dockets to monitor
the flow of cases for prompt and efficient dispatch of the
court’s business. Elementary court management practice
requires her to keep her own records or notes of cases
pending before her sala, especially those that are pending for
more than 90 days, so that she can act on them promptly and
without delay.

CIRILA S. RAYMUNDO vs.JUDGE TERESITO A. ANDOY

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1738 October 6, 2010

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2033-MTJ)

The case of RAYMUNDO VERSUS ANDOY… the Summary

Rules, BP 22 Case… the case was submitted for decision
on October 19, 2005 and a Motion for Reconsideration
was filed on 2006. The judge despite two motions to
render judgment failed to render a decision or resolution
on the motion for reconsideration after 3 years. The
judge here was fined Php 20,000.00.

The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed

before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within 90
days from the time the case is submitted for decision. Judges
are enjoined to dispose of the court’s business promptly and
expeditiously and to decide cases within the period fixed by
law. Failure to comply with the mandated period constitutes
a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to
a speedy disposition of their cases – a lapse that undermines
the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it to disrepute. This constitutional policy
is reiterated in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which requires a judge to dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.

In the present case, the subject cases had been submitted for
decision since October 12, 2005. As correctly pointed out by
the OCA, while the respondent judge attributed his failure to
render a decision to the heavy caseload in his sala, he did not