CARANDANG V. DESIERTO (G. R. NO.
148076, January 12, 2011) majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting
Related Topics: Jurisdiction of Courts
Facts: RPN-9 is a private corporation duly register ed with the SEC.
Benedicto, a stockholder thereof, entered into a compromise
agreement with the PCGG whereby he ceded to the government his
shares of stock in RPN with an outstanding capital of 72.4% (which
was later discovered to be only 32.4%). Meanwhile, the President
appointed Carandang as a general manager and chief operating
officer of RPN. He was charged with grave misconduct before the
Ombudsman on the ground of him, as general manager of RPN,
entered into contract with AF Broadcasting, Inc. despite his being an
incorporator, director and stockholder of this said corporation; that
he help financial and material interest in a contract that had
required the approval of his office; and that the transaction is
prohibited under Section 7 (a) and Section 9 of RA No. 6713,
thereby rendering him administratively liable for grave misconduct.
Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative complaint
filed against him on the ground that the Ombudsman had no
jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a GOCC. Consequently,
he insists that he is not a public official, hence he is not subject to
the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and the criminal
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not RPN is a GOCC, which in turn renders
Carandang subject to the administrative authority of the
Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Ruling: No. RPN is not a GOCC. The law defines what GOCC are.
Section 2 of PD 2029 states that a GOCC is a stock or a non-stock
corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions, which is directly chartered by a special law, or if
organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled
by the government directly or indirectly through a parent
corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a
capital stock. Section2 (13) of EO 292 also gives a definition of such
corporations. Due to the inability to resolve the issue regarding the
actual shares owned by the PCGG, the conclusion that the
government held majority shares finds no factual or legal basis.
Hence, Carandang is not subject to the administrative authority of
the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, CRUZ, J.
Words in a statute should be read in relation to and not in isolation from
the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
Facts: Zaldivia was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes
without Mayor’s permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2 Series of 1988 of
the Municipality of Rodriguez in the Province of Rizal. An information was
filed with the MTC of Rodriguez. Zaldivia moved to quash the information
on the ground that the crime had prescribed, invoking that under Act No.
3326, violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after
two months from the commission of the offense governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. The prosecution contends that the prescriptive
period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, saying that Rule 110, Section 1, last paragraph of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that “in all cases such
institution interrupts the period of the prescription of the offense charged,”
applies to all cases including those falling under the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Issue:
Whether the phrase, “in all cases such institution interrupts the period of
the prescription of the offense charged” applies to cases falling under the
Rule on Summary Procedure
Ruling:
No, Rule 110, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully
begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not
apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in
all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases
covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary
Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or
city ordinances, the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
If there is a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1
of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail
as special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because
this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section
5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive
right. The prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal
ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The prescriptive period for
the crime imputed to the Zaldivia commenced from its alleged commission
on May 11, 1990, and ended two months after, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May
30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the
MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the
crime had already prescribed.
CRESPO VS MOGUL CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal
Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused
filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However,
Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a
much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the
appellate court.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to
refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the
Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for
dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused then filed a
petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining
order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining
order.
Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed
by the Fiscal under orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on
arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be
controlled by the complainant.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation
or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city
fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated
for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify
or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of
Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action.
The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
PINOTE v AYCO
FACTS:
State Prosecutor Pinote filed an administrative case against RTC Judge Ayco for
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and grave misconduct. In a
criminal case being handled by Pinote, Judge Ayco allowed the testimony of 2
witnesses in court, despite the absence of Pinote. Pinote, at that time, was
undergoing medical treatment in the Philippine Heart Center.
In the following hearings, despite orders of Ayco, Pinote refused to cross examine
the witnesses due to his being absent during their direct examinations, contending
that the proceedings were void. Pinote filed a Manifestation stating such, but Judge
Ayco ruled that the prosecution was waiving its right to cross-examine the 2
witnesses instead.
The Court Administrator found in favor of Pinote, stating that Ayco violated Rule
110, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE:
W/N Ayco should be held administratively liable?
HELD:
YES. Ayco should be held administratively liable.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and
direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there
are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to
prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the
private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the
trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or
otherwise withdrawn.
Ayco’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of
complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose
is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS, et al
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court is the center of this
controversy. The well-known rule, though subject to certain recognized exceptions,
is that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best
left to the trial court. Hence, “[u]nless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial court’s
assessment must be respected.”1
Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which affirmed with modification the
July 19, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 06 in
Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convicting Renandang Mamaruncas (Mamaruncas) and
Pendatum Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murder.
On February 9, 1996, the following Information4 for murder was filed against
Mamaruncas, Baginda Palao (Palao) alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and Ampuan.5
That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, except for others whose
cases are still under preliminary investigation, conspiring with and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, armed with deadly weapon, to wit: a
caliber .45 pistol, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, shoot
and wound one Baudelio R. Batoon, thereby inflicting upon him the following
physical injuries, to wit:
Cardio respiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock
Multiple gunshot wound
which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduled arraignment on May 20,
1996. Their co-accused, Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan (Abdul), remains at large.
Appellants pleaded not guilty6 and trial proceeded against them.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
its brief and substantiated by the transcripts of stenographic notes of the
proceedings, are as follows:
Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon, Juanito
Gepayo and a certain “Nito” were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoon’s
auto repair shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.
Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage
fatigues; while his two (2) companions wore Philippine Army tropical green
fatigues. Baginda Palao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the
latter he was serving it against Batoon.
The arrival of Baginda Palao’s group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon
to stop their work and observe what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the
matter after he [Batoon] [finishes] tuning-up an engine he had been working on.
Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victim’s stomach and pointing a .45 caliber
pistol at him. Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab Palao’s gun, causing the two of
them to grapple for the same. As these two wrestled for control of the gun,
Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from behind
Batoon’s right thigh with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was
also standing behind Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting Batoon’s left arm
pit with a .45 cal. [homemade] pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and
Baginda Palao finished [him off] with a single .45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito
Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene, stunned and unable to do
anything. From their vantage points three (3) to four (4) meters away, these
witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, then Commanding Officer of the
Iligan City PNP Mobile Force Company, was riding a civilian car along the highway,
heading towards Iligan City proper. He was accompanied by his driver, SPO3
William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. They heard the gunshots emanating from the
auto repair shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver to stop
the car. They alighted and proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair
shop, they saw three (3) men in camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a
person already lying on the ground. Inspector Mijares’ group shouted at the
camouflaged gunmen to stop what they were doing and to drop their firearms, at
the same time announcing that they (Mijares’ group) were policemen.
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back.
During the exchange of gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, while
Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan ran towards the road and a
nearby car. Inspector Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while
SPO3 Yee likewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car,
and Ampuan were then captured by the policemen. The lawmen also gave chase to
Baginda Palao; but he escaped.
Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for
treatment and they were eventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was
brought to the hospital by his wife; but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Based on the necropsy examination of the victim’s body, Dr. Leonardo Labanen
established that the three (3) gunshot wounds found on the body of Baudelio
Batoon (i.e., at the right thigh, left armpit and back) were inflicted at close range
due to the presence, or at least traces, of gunpowder burns.7
Only appellants testified for their defense. Their testimonies, as narrated by the
trial court, are as follows:
Accused Renandang Mamaruncas testified that he is 34 years old, married,
carpenter and a resident of Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On the morning of February 1,
1996, he was in Marawi City. He decided to come down to Iligan City to see a
movie. He left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon arrival at the Tambacan terminal in
Iligan City, he went to the house of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind about
going to a movie and returned to the Tambacan terminal in order to go back to
Marawi City. At about 11:30 a.m., Abdul Wahid Sultan arrived with Pendatum
Ampuan on board a car driven by Aminola. Abdul Wahid invited him to go with
them because he will collect some money and afterwards they will have some
enjoyment. He agreed and sat at the rear seat behind the driver. Abdul Wahid was
at the front seat with Pendatum behind at the back seat. They drove to Baraas.
They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and Pendatum Ampuan alighted.
Before walking away, Abdul Wahid handed to Renandang a .38 cal[.] revolver with
instructions to remain in the car and [keep] watch. At first he refused but Abdul
Wahid insisted so he accepted the gun. Abdul Wahid and Pendatum walked to the
shop leaving the rear right door open. About ten minutes later, he heard three
gunshots. He moved to the rear seat where the door was open and saw policemen,
who arrived and surrounded the car. He placed the gun on the seat and raised his
hands as a sign of surrender. Then with his right hand, he closed the car door. Just
as the door closed, the policemen shot him on the forearm and chest below the
right nipple. He lost consciousness and regained it only at the hospital.
He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend. He is also known as
Baginda Palao. Pendatum Ampuan is not known as Abdul Wahid Sultan.
He also declared that the statement of Juanito Gepayo that only Abdul Wahid
Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan entered the shop and shot Baudelio Batoon is true
and that the testimony of P/Insp. Mijares that he also shot the victim is not true.
He denied any part in the shooting to death of Baudelio Batoon.
Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified that he is 20 years old, single, student and a
resident of Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On January 31, 1996 at about 6:00 a.m., he left
Marawi City for Iligan City on board a passenger Armak jeepney. He alighted at the
terminal behind the Gaisano Superstore and at exactly 7:00 a.m., he entered the
store and went to the upper storey to shop. When he came out, he met a friend
name[d] Bessah. Together they walked to the Maharlika Theater but then Bessah
expressed the intention to go home to Marawi City. He accompanied Bessah to the
Tambacan terminal. Then he proceeded to the house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro.
(This is a place North of the city and at the opposite side from Tambacan which is
South of the city). He arrived there at noon. He stayed overnight at his Uncle Ali’s
house. At about 9:00 a.m., the following day, February 1, 1996, he left the house of
his uncle. Outside, he met Baginda Palao, who was looking for a certain Baser, a
policeman. He wanted the latter to help him collect a debt. They went to the
terminal at the back of Gaisano store but did not find Baser. Baginda told him to
wait while he will look for Baser inside the Gaisano store. Baginda returned without
having found Baser and once again he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a
car. A little later, Baginda returned on board a car driven by one Aminola Basar.
They went to the Tambacan terminal but again did not find Baser. Instead, they
saw Renandang Mamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them to Baraas
to collect a debt. Renandang entered the car and they proceeded to Baraas. The
car stopped at a place near a shop. Baginda instructed him and Renandang to
remain in the car because he was going out to collect the debt. Baginda left the car
and entered the shop. About ten minutes later, he heard shouting followed by
gunfire. He stepped out of the car to verify and saw Baginda Palao [shoot] the
victim. He retreated to the car as the police led by Capt. Mijares arrived. They
confiscated the car key and arrested them except Baginda Palao who escaped.
They were taken to the hospital due to injuries. In his case, the sustained wounds
when mauled by the children of the victim but in another breath he admitted that
his injury was a gunshot wound when he was caught in the cross fire as the police
shot Renandang Mamaruncas. He was inside the car when he was hit. He further
admitted that Baginda Palao is known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He denied shooting
Baudelio Batoon.8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC debunked appellants’ defense of denial and held them guilty as principals
by direct participation in the killing of Baudelio Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith
and credence to the evidence of the prosecution especially on the presence of
conspiracy among the malefactors and rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum
Ampuan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended, without the presence of any other aggravating circumstances and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with
the corresponding accessory penalties attached thereto by law and to indemnify
the Heirs of Baudelio Batoon the sums of:
P10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support;
P66,904.00 for and as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as death indemnity and
P100,000.00 for and as moral damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
Having been under preventive detention since February 1, 1996, the period of such
detention shall be credited in full in favor of said accused in the service of their
respective sentences.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the Notice of Appeal10 filed by the appellants, the RTC forwarded the
records of the case to this Court. By Resolution11 dated January 31, 2000, the
Court resolved to accept the appeal. In view thereof, appellants were required to
file their brief.12 Appellants thus filed their brief on November 20, 200013 while
the OSG submitted the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee14 on May 2, 2001. Later,
however, consonant with this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo15 the
case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision17 promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeals court affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision. Said court ruled that the inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses’ testimonies pointed out by the appellants pertain only to
minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probative weight of said
testimonies. Regarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuan’s name in
the Information, the court went on to hold that such error was only a formal defect
and the proper correction of which was duly made without any objection on the
part of the defense. The CA likewise held that treachery attended the commission
of the crime.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
questioned Judgment dated July 19, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellants are to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Baudelio Batoon the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P66,904.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Disgruntled, appellants are now again before this Court in view of their Notice of
Appeal19 from the Decision of the CA.
By Resolution20 dated November 19, 2007, this Court notified the parties that they
may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. In their
respective manifestations, the parties opted to adopt the briefs they earlier filed as
their supplemental briefs.21
In their brief, appellants assign the following errors:
That the trial court erred in convicting [them] when they should have been
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt;
and
The information filed before the trial court was substantially defective.22
The basic thrust of appellants’ first assignment of error is the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. Appellants contend that the trial court anchored its finding
and conclusion on the testimonies of witnesses Juanito Gepayo (Gepayo), Richard
Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp. Graciano Mijares (Mijares), who appear to be
inconsistent in their stand and whose credibility is therefore assailable. They
question the prosecution witnesses’ identification of Abdul and Ampuan as one
and the same person and aver that the same only leads to the logical conclusion
that said witnesses were perjured witnesses. They argue that Ampuan failed to
grasp the information read to him as he was arraigned as “Abdul Wahid Sultan alias
Pendatum Ampuan”.
On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision,
opines that inconsistencies on minor and collateral matters in the testimony of a
prosecution eyewitness do not affect his credibility. It also contends that whatever
defect the information subject of appellant Ampuan’s arraignment has had been
cured with the latter’s consent during the trial.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried to cast doubt on the
credibility of witness Gepayo anchored on the following grounds: (1) there was
serious inconsistency in his testimony on whether he knew Ampuan before the
incident; (2) his actuation of just watching the incident without giving any
assistance to his fallen employer as well as his immediate return to work thereafter
is contrary to human nature and experience; (3) while he testified that appellant
Mamaruncas was one of the wounded suspects during the encounter, he failed to
identify him in court; and, (4) in his affidavit, he identified Abdul and Ampuan as
one and the same person but later on testified to the contrary.
Credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies.
The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knows Ampuan even before the
incident is inconsequential as to discredit the credibility of Gepayo’s testimony. The
inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only to collateral or trivial matters
and has no substantial effect on the nature of the offense. In fact, it even signifies
that the witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness stand. What
matters is that there is no inconsistency in Gepayo’s complete and vivid narration
as far as the principal occurrence and the positive identification of Ampuan as one
of the principal assailants are concerned.23 “The Court has held that although
there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they
do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of the assailant.”24
It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a safer place during the shooting
incident and did not render assistance to his wounded employer. To appellants,
this reaction is contrary to human nature. We believe otherwise. This imputed
omission, to our mind, does not necessarily diminish the plausibility of Gepayo’s
story let alone destroy his credibility. To us, his reaction is within the bounds of
expected human behavior. Surely, he was afraid that they might kill him because
the malefactors were then armed with guns.25 Thus, he would not dare attempt to
stop them and stake his life in the process. At any rate, it is settled “that different
people react differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is an unusual
experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no
clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn.”26
The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in court does not bolster appellants’
cause. As the CA correctly pointed out:
x x x We agree with the prosecution’s observation that although he did not
positively identify appellant Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was however,
able to point out that there was a third person who accompanied assailants Palao
and Ampuan in approaching the victim during the incident. This is also bolstered by
Insp. Mijares[’] testimony that he saw three assailants pointing their guns at the
victim who was already lying prostrate on the ground.
In any event, even without Gepayo’s identification of Mamaruncas, the unrebutted
testimony of another prosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly points to
Mamaruncas as one of the assailants. Thus:
Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid together with two companions,
presented the warrant of arrest to your father, what happened thereafter?
A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father.
Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] your father?
A: Abdul Wahid, Sir
Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed [at] your father?
A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from Abdul Wahid, Sir.
Q: What happened after?
A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir.
Q: Who [first shot] your father?
A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x x x his name[,] he
answered that he is Renandang Mamaruncas)
xxxx
Q: After this Renandang Mamaruncas shot your father, what happened thereafter?
A: The other companion fired the next shot (witness pointing to a person sitting at
the bench inside the Courtroom and when he was asked x x x his name, he
answered that he is Pendatum [Ampuan].)28
Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo and Batoon on material
details are straightforward and consistent with each other. They personally saw
appellants at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Their combined
declarations established beyond reasonable doubt the identities of both
appellants, along with their co-accused Abdul, as the perpetrators of the crime.
As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum
Ampuan as one and the same person in his affidavit29 and yet later on testified to
the contrary, this Court finds the same inconsequential and will not outrightly
justify the acquittal of an accused. In a very recent case,30 this Court reiterated
that as between an affidavit executed outside the court and a testimony given in
open court, the latter almost always prevails. It emphasized therein that:
Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly
justify the acquittal of an accused. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit
the witness since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete. They do not purport to
contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant.
Thus, our rulings generally consider sworn statements taken out of court to be
inferior to in court testimony (citation omitted).
The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that it was the police officers
who supplied the names of the suspects in Gepayo’s affidavit.31
Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived.
Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that the Information filed before
the trial court was substantially defective considering that it accuses Abdul and
Ampuan as one and the same person when in fact they were identified as different
persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to comprehend the Information read to
him.
The Court cannot accord merit to this argument. It is well to note that appellants
failed to raise the issue of the defective Information before the trial court through
a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the information. Their failure to
object to the alleged defect before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to a
waiver of the defect in the Information. “Objections as to matters of form or
substance in the [I]nformation cannot be made for the first time on appeal.”32
Records even show that the Information was accordingly amended during trial to
rectify this alleged defect but appellants did not comment thereon, viz:
FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:
Per manifestation and admission of this witness, the Information be amended from
[Renandang] Mamaruncas and the word and, it should be Bagindo [sic] Palao alias
Abdul Wahid Sultan and the alias Pendatum Ampuan be erased as corrected.
COURT:
Any comment from the accused.
ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:
No comment, Your Honor.33
Treachery correctly appreciated.
From the evidence and as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate
court, the facts sufficiently prove that treachery was employed by appellants. The
attack on Baudelio was so swift and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. As ruled by the
trial court:
In the above situation, treachery was considered to exist. More so in this case
when the victim was completely without any weapon from the inception of the
assault. At the moment when Pendatum Ampuan and Renandang Mamaruncas
shot him, Baudelio Batoon was not in any position to defend himself. And when
Abdul Wahid shot him while lying wounded on the ground, he was utterly
defenseless.34
Hence, both lower courts correctly found appellants guilty of murder in view of the
presence of treachery.
Conspiracy was duly proven.
We also sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists “when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary x x x [as it] may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.”35
In this case, conspiracy was clearly established. All three accused entered the shop
of Baudelio at the same time. Ampuan shot Baudelio from behind, hitting the latter
at his left armpit while Mamaruncas shot Baudelio on the thigh. When Baudelio fell
to the ground face down, Abdul shot him at the back. These consecutive acts
undoubtedly showed appellants’ unanimity in design, intent and execution. They
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably
indicate a common purpose and design in the commission of the crime.
The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA
considering that they are based on existing evidence and reasonable conclusions
drawn therefrom. It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial
court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be
given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence
already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.36 Though the rule is
subject to exceptions, no such exceptional grounds obtain in this case.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants could only
muster mere denial. As ruled in various cases by the Court, denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is inherently a weak defense as it
is negative and self-serving. “As between the categorical testimony that rings of
truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail.”
The Penalty
Undoubtedly, the crime committed is murder in view of the attending aggravating
circumstance of treachery. Murder, as defined under Article 24838 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended, is the unlawful killing of a person which is not parricide or
infanticide, provided that treachery, inter alia, attended the killing. The presence of
any one of the enumerated circumstances under the aforesaid Article is enough to
qualify a killing as murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Since only
the qualifying circumstance of treachery is found to be present, both the RTC and
the CA properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 934639
provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall
not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Pursuant to the above provision, appellants are therefore not eligible for parole.
Awards of Damages
The Court modifies the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In
line with prevailing jurisprudence,40 said award is increased to P75,000.00. Anent
the award of moral damages, the CA correctly imposed the amount of
P50,000.00.41 These “awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder
or homicide.”42
Anent the award of actual damages, the victim’s widow testified that the family
spent a total of P66,904.00 relative to the wake and burial of the victim. However,
the claim for said amount is supported merely by a list of expenses43 personally
prepared by the widow instead of official receipts. To be entitled to an award of
actual damages, “it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable x x x.”44 “A list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the
latter should have been issued as a matter of course in business transactions.”45
Thus the Court deletes the lower courts’ award of actual damages. Nonetheless,
since entitlement of the same is shown under the facts of the case, temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.0046 should be awarded in lieu of actual
damages to the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code which
provides that temperate damages “may be recovered when the court finds that
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty.”
The CA correctly deleted the indemnity for loss of earning capacity awarded by the
trial court. Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary
evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
As testified to by the widow, Florenda Batoon, the victim was earning a monthly
income of P20,000.00 and P90,000.00 as an auto repair shop and a six-wheeler
truck operator, respectively. The trial court made a conservative estimate of
P500.00 a day as the net income from the truck alone after making reasonable
deductions from its operation. Thus, ranged against the daily minimum wage then
prevailing in Region X which is P137.00 per day pursuant to Wage Order No. RX-03,
this case undoubtedly does not fall under the exceptions where indemnity for loss
of earning capacity can be given despite the lack of documentary evidence.
The Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in view of the proven
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The CA however awarded exemplary
damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P25,000.00. To conform with
prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases this amount to P30,000.00.47
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which found appellants Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is
AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1. Appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole;
2. The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00;
3. The award of P66,904.00 as actual damages is deleted;
4. P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded in lieu of actual damages;
5. The award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and
6. Appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest on
all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment.
HECTOR TREÑAS v. PEOPLE, GR No. 195002, 2012-01-25
Facts:
December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in
Iloilo City... mortgaged with Maybank... bank manager Joselito Palma
recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private... complainant
Elizabeth Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name
of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses.
Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated
December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and
00084369 for P24,000.00.
BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. Elizabeth demanded the return
of the money. Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No.
0042856.When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the
same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
case of Estafa was filed against him.
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. Petitioner asserts that
nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that P150,000
was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City.
the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated
22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner
was signed and notarized in Iloilo City
The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the
check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la
Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness...
failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in
Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove
lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH
LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
Ruling:
the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of
commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and
conjectures.
In Fukuzume v. People,[19] this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein
the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took
place within the trial court's jurisdiction.
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section
1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of
the RTC of Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information...
would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the
Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to
where the offense was committed.
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented
by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed
in Makati City.
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was
dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of
estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.
This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints,
coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present
his defense in the charges against him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of
that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
This Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly
militates against the petitioner's conduct in handling the funds of his client.
In Cuizon v. Macalino,[35] this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were
later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of
personal... honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner.
the Petition is GRANTED
The Decision... issued by the Court of Appeals... are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City.
DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors
for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.
Principles:
in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory
In Isip v. People,[18]... this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed... or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by... the accused
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information.
And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.
People vs. Balao
Ban on Ex-Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder Characteristics of an Ex-Post Facto
Law; Sufficiency of information
FACTS
A criminal case was filed against the accused Balao, Angsico, Dacalos and Lazarte
who were then public officers, being the General Manager, Team Head, Visayas
Mgt. Office, Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project mgt. Officer A and
Supervising Engineer respectively of the National Housing Authority. The criminal
offense charged against them was in relation to their office, that they allegedly
connive, confederate and mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo Cruz,
private individual and manager of A.C. Cruz Construction with deliberate intent,
with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause to be paid to A.C. Construction public funds in the
amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT
PESOS and THIRTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY,
supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were
undertaken. The Sandiganbayan expressed its anxiety over the inadequacy of the
Information in that the participation of each of the accused did not appear clear in
the resolution, much less in the Information.
ISSUE
"Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdictionin dismissing the information in Criminal
Case No. 26583 which sufficiently charged repondents
Balao,Angsico and Dacalos of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as
amended.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION (People represented by Ombudsman)
a. Contends that the Sandiganabayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
the information against the accused;
b. That the information filed is sufficient to charge the accused of
the crime committed.
DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION (Sandiganbayan Ruling)
a. There was failure to state the acts or omissions of accused-
movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos with sufficient particularity so
as to enable them to make a carefully considered plea to the
charges against them.
b. Despite a reinvestigation, the prosecution’s Memorandum dated
May 30, 2006 still failed to specify the participation of accused-
movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos.
c. That pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117 of the rules of Court, in
determining the viability of a motion to quash based on the ground
of "facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense,"
the test must be whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of
the crime as defined by law.
d.That to allow accused Balao, Angsico and Lazarte [sic] to be
arraigned despite the seeming inadequacy of the instant
information as to their actual involvement in the offense charged,
which is not addressed by the mere allegation of conspiracy,
infringes on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
HELD
The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the
essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido
are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project
Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA
respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense in relation
to the office and while in the performance of their official functions
connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with
accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the
latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and
prejudice of the government. The felonious act consisted of causing
to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of
P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the
Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact
that no such works were undertaken by said construction company
as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
Clearly, the allegations in the 5 March 2001 information, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of
the crime. The information stated that;
1. Balao, Lazarte, Jr., Angsico, and Dacalos were the general
manager, team head of the Visayas Management Office,
and Visayas division manager, respectively, of the National
Housing Authority;
2. they committed the prohibited acts "in or about the month
of March, 1992," "while in the performance of their official
functions";
3. they caused undue injury to the Government in the amount
of P232,628.35, "supposedly for the excavation and
roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services
Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works
were undertaken";
4. they gave "unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction
and themselves"; and
5. they acted "with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality
and evident bad faith."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court SETS ASIDE
the 2 March 2007 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 26583 and orders that (1) respondents Robert P. Balao,
Josephine C. Angsico, and Virgilio V. Dacalos be reinstated as
accused in Criminal Case No. 26583; (2) the hold departure order
against them be reinstated; and (3) they be arrested or they post a
cash bond in sufficient amount.
NOTE
The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense (People vs. Lindo, 627 SCRA
519)
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada Case Digest
The single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two
distinct criminal offenses — estafa and violation of BP22. The Rules
of Court allows the offended party to intervene via a private
prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings. However, the
recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of
issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of
the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law
allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it
authorizes recovery in only one.
***********
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of QC found probable cause to charge
Rodriguez with Estafa and Violation of BP 22. Consequently,
separate informations were separately filed against Rodriguez. The
BP 22 cases were filed with the MTC of Quezon City. The docket
fees were accordingly paid by private complainant. The Estafa cases
were filed with the RTC of Quezon City and raffled to Judge
Ponferrada.
Atty. Solomon filed a Formal Entry of Appearance as private
prosecutor in the Estafa case. Rodriguez, through counsel, opposed
said entry of appearance.
Judge Ponferrada issued an Order allowing the appearance of Atty.
Solomon as private prosecutor upon payment of the legal fees.
Rodriguez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.
Rodriguez appealed, theorizing that the civil action necessarily
arising from the criminal case pending before the MTC for violation
of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in
the criminal case for estafa now pending before the RTC.
Issue:
Can a private prosecutor be allowed to intervene and participate in
the proceedings of the estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting
the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of the checks
involved which is also subject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases?
Held:
Yes. An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime,
except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the
crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in
favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of
the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but
(a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly
reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted.
In any of these instances, the private complainants interest in the
case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function
of the public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the
instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from
intervening in the estafa suit.
True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two
criminal liabilities -- one for estafa and another for violation of BP
22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one
civil liability for the offended party, who has sustained only a single
injury.
The institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases and the
inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not
exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the
Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a
criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the
institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if
both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.
The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice
Florenz D. Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the committee
tasked with the revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He
clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases was added, because the
dockets of the courts were clogged with such litigations; creditors
were using the courts as collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees
were charged for actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the
necessary inclusion of a civil action with the payment of filing fees
based on the face value of the check involved was laid down to
prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat of a criminal
prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge.
Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to preclude the
prosecution of the civil action that corresponds to the estafa case,
should the latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa and violation of
BP 22 are different and distinct from each other. There is no identity
of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be
invoked in the other. The offenses charged in the informations are
perfectly distinct from each other in point of law, however nearly
they may be connected in point of fact.
Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do not allow the reservation of
civil actions in BP 22 cases cannot deprive private complainant of
the right to protect her interests in the criminal action for estafa.
Nothing in the current law or rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of
the corresponding civil case exclusively in the court trying the BP 22
criminal case.
In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to leave the
offended parties without any remedy to protect their interests in
estafa cases. Its power to promulgate the Rules of Court is limited in
the sense that rules shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Private complainants intervention in the
prosecution of estafa is justified not only for the prosecution of her
interests, but also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice as mandated by the Constitution.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the private
prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the proceedings for
estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the corresponding civil
action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending before the
MTC. A recovery by the offended party under one remedy,
however, necessarily bars that under the other. Obviously stemming
from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment. (Rodriguez
vs. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005)
JOSE C. MIRANDA v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, GR NO. 158763, 2006-03-31
Facts:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at
that time, being at large. The case was... appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused
therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April
2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths...
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn
confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted
the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent
motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by... the court. In the
meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over
the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise... applied this Order
to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001.
State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of
Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration... was denied in a Joint
Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a
Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
Issues:
WON an accused can...... seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the... jurisdiction of the court
Ruling:
YES:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application
for bail, but is not required for the... adjudication of other reliefs sought by
the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary...
surrender,[9] while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
As we held in the... aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief
in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
Principles:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the
case of pleadings whose prayer is... precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other...
grounds for dismissal are included;[17] (2) in criminal cases, motions to
quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.
The first two are consequences... of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the...
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by... impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the... special jurisdiction of the court applies
for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
JOSE C. MIRANDA v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, GR NO. 158763, 2006-03-31
Facts:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at
that time, being at large. The case was... appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused
therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April
2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths...
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn
confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted
the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent
motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by... the court. In the
meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over
the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise... applied this Order
to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001.
State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of
Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration... was denied in a Joint
Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a
Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
Issues:
WON an accused can...... seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the... jurisdiction of the court
Ruling:
YES:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application
for bail, but is not required for the... adjudication of other reliefs sought by
the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary...
surrender,[9] while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
As we held in the... aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief
in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
Principles:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the
case of pleadings whose prayer is... precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other...
grounds for dismissal are included;[17] (2) in criminal cases, motions to
quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.
The first two are consequences... of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the...
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by... impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the... special jurisdiction of the court applies
for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010
Crim Pro - Rule 110
Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste
charging him with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January
12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las
Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on
record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The
RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants,
thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial
court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for
murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner
questioned these two orders before the appellate court.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court
entered the plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an
Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the
trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of
murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the
Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of
homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to
the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to
the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to
murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not
just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.
Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a
defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment
is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.
An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the
crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here
is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the
same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself
from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made
known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however,
make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the
proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to
merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even
with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.
SAN AGUSTIN v. PEOPLE, 437 SCRA 392 (2004)
FACTS: Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal complaint and filed the same
with the NBI charging petitioner Barangay Chairman Ernesto San Agustin
with serious illegal detention alleging that the petitioner detained her
husband Vicente Tan without lawful ground. The investigation of the NBI
found that the victim TAN was mistaken as a “snatcher” and was turned
over to petitioner San Agustin where Tan was beaten and locked up. Luz
Tan (complainant) went to the barangay hall and inquired but they denied
having seen the victim Tan.
Later on, an inquest investigation was conducted by the State prosecutor.
She came out with a Resolution which was affirmed by the Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor, finding probable cause against the petitioner for serious
illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that he
was illegally arrested and subjected to an inquest investigation; hence, he
was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. He also prayed that
he be released from detention and that the prosecutor conduct a
preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner should be released on the ground that it did not
conform with Section 7 Rule 112 which requires preliminary investigation
to be conducted before the information is filed.
HELD: NO. An inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is
lawfully arrested without a warrant. Although the procedure does not
conform with Section 7 Rule 112, it is not a ground to nullify the arrest.
RATIO: The warrantless arrest or the detention of the petitioner in the
instant case does not fall within the provision of Section 5, Rule 113. The
inquest investigation conducted is void because under Rule 112, Section 7,
an inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is lawfully
arrested without a warrant:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person
is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires
a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest
investigation has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the
absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be
filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction
of the trial court but merely the regularity of the proceedings. It does not
impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective.
Neither is it a ground to quash the Information or nullify the order of arrest
issued against him or justify the release of the accused from detention.
However, the trial court should suspend proceedings and order a
preliminary investigation considering that the inquest investigation
conducted by the State Prosecutor is null and void. The RTC committed
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation which is merely a
review by the Prosecutor of his records and evidence instead of a
preliminary investigation as provided for in Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Whether or not there is a need for a preliminary investigation under
Section 1 in relation to Section 9 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure depends upon the imposable penalty for the crime
charged in the complaint filed with the City or Provincial Prosecutor's
Office and not upon the imposable penalty for the crime found to have been
committed by the respondent after a preliminary investigation. In this case,
the crime charged in the complaint of the NBI filed in the Department of
Justice was kidnapping/serious illegal detention, the imposable penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua to death.