Anna Lerima PATULA v.
PEOPLE OF THE 2) (Main issue) W/N the testimonial and documentary evidence
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164457 | 11 April 2012 | Bersamin, J.
FACTS
1. Patula is a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores
(Footluckers). She was charged with Estafa under Art. 315, par
1(b) of the RPC. The Prosecution presented 2 witnesses.
2. 1st witness: Lamberto Go – the branch manager of Footluckers.
He testified that Patula, as sales representative, was authorized
to:
· Take orders from wholesale customers, and to collect
payments from them.
· Issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the
payments, and remit the same.
· Submit the receipts for tallying and reconciliation.
Go further testified that he confronted Patula because at first her
first volume of sales was high, but later on dropped. Patula
responded that business was slow.
3. An accounting clerk that Go summoned discovered and verified
erasures on some collection receipts. Go, then, decided to subject
her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan.
4. 2nd witness: Karen Guivencan – Footluckers store auditor. She
said that Go had requested her to audit Patula after some
customers had told Go that they had already paid their accounts
but the office ledger still reflected outstanding balances for them.
5. Guivencan conducted her audit by going to different places
where the customers are. In the course of her audit she
discovered:
· That the amounts on the original copies of receipts in
the possession of around 50 customers varied from the
amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts
Patula submitted to the office; and
· That based on the report, Patula had misappropriated
the total amount of P131, 286.92.
6. RTC: Rendered Patula guilty of Estafa. Patula as saleswoman of
Footluckers collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97
from several customers of said company under the express
obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the
collection to Footluckers but did not. Despite repeated demands,
and with intend to defraud Footluckers, Patula failed to deliver
the said collection but instead misappropriate, misapply and
convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit.
7. Patula’s contentions:
· Her Constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation were violated when the
Information did not allege her falsification, and convicted
her of estafa relying on the evidence of falsification.
· The documentary evidence submitted are private
documents that were not duly authenticated. Hence, cannot
be admitted.
ISSUES
1) (Just in case she asks) W/N the failure of the Information for
Estafa to allege Falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by
Patula violated her right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation – NO.
presented by the Prosecution are hearsay – YES.
HELD
1) First issue: NO. As a rule: an accused cannot be convicted of an
offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or
information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged
in the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.
In this case, Patula is of an idea that because the crime charged in
the Information is merely Estafa and not Estafa thru Falsification
of documents, the prosecution could not prove falsification. This
is incorrect.
- One should distinguish when Estafa and Falsification is
considered as one complex crime and when considered as two
separate offenses.
- It is a complex crime when falsification is a necessary means of
committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to
conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification are committed.
- In this case, Patula committed the falsification in order to
conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from the
estafa charged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately
prove her acts of falsification as its means of establishing her
misappropriation or conversion as an essential ingredient of the
crime duly alleged in the information.
2) Second Issue: YES.
To establish the elements of estafa, the Prosecution presented
the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documents
consisting of:
(a) The receipts allegedly issued by Patula to each of her
customers upon their payment, (b) The ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer, and (c) The confirmation
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and
receipts were marked Exhibits B to YY.
As a general rule: a private document requires authentication in
the manner allowed by law or the ROC before its acceptance as
evidence in court. Here, Exhibits B to YY were private documents
because private individuals executed them for private or business
purposes.
- > In this case, persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B
to YY (or other persons prepared the ledger in the office) that
Guivencan based her testimony. However, such ledger was not
identified by the person who made the same, or such person who
prepared the ledger was not called in the witness stand.
Therefore, Guivencan, as the witness, will be testifying on hearsay
matters.
-> Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the
amounts actually received by Patula from the customers or
remitted by Patula to Footluckers.
Guivencan exclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated
ledgers to support her audit report on Patula’s supposed
misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of independent
knowledge of the veracity of the entries.
-> As to the receipts allegedly issued by Patula, Guivencan
identified Patula’s signature on two receipts based alone on the
fact that the signatures contained the legible family name of
Patula. This is ineffectual. Apparently, Guivencan could not
honestly identify Patula’s signature on the receipts either because
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she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not
seen Patula affix her signature on the receipts.
-> Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or
signing of the documents, and Guivencan being the only witness
who testified on the entries deprived the RTC of the reasonable
opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the
entries as evidence of Patula. The denial of that opportunity
rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion
hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Notes on Hearsay:
Sec. 36, Rule 130 states that “a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in
the Rules of Court.”
Hearsay evidence is unreliable because:
- The weight of such testimony depends not upon the veracity of
the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath.
- The declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot be
cross- examined.
- The witness can simply assert that she was told so, and leaves
the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.
When hearsay rule does not apply:
Distinguished between when:
(1) It pertains only to the fact that the statement was made – the
hearsay rule does not apply; but if
(2) It pertains to the truth of the facts asserted in the statement –
the hearsay rule applies.
Bayani v. People
G.R. No. 155619 | August 14, 2007 | Austria-Martinez, J. | by
Carpio
Facts:
1. Leodegario Bayani (petitioner) was charged with
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in an Information.
Findings of facts are below:
· Petitioner has a check booklet issued by
Philippine Savings bank.
· Petitioner issued postdated Check No. 054924
payable to Cash in the amount of P10,000. It was
presented to complaining witness, Dolores
Evangelista, for encashment by Alicia Rubia.
· Witness testified that she was approached by
Alicia Rubia who told her that she was
requested by petitioner to have the check
exchanged for cash, as he needed money badly.
· PS Bank (drawee bank) dishonored the said check
for insufficiency of funds.
· The checking account of Petitioner was closed on
September 1, 1992, which at the time had only
remaining deposit in the amount of P2,414.96.
2. RTC convicted Petitioner.
3. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in refusing to acquit the Accused
(Petitioner) despite the conviction of the trial court is utterly
based on hearsay evidence
Held: No. Testimony of witness Evangelista is hearsay. Testimony
is an Independently Relevant Statement.
BUT, Petitioner is barred from questioning the
admission of said testimony.
Hence, still GUILTY.
Arguments of the Parties:
OSG: Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondent, argues that:
(1) petitioner’s denial of his liability for Check No. 05492 cannot
overcome the primordial fact that his signature appears on the
face of such check;
(2) want of consideration is a personal defense and is not
available against a holder in due course; and
(3) the constitutional presumption of innocence was overcome by
the requisite quantum of proof.
Petitioner: Denies having issued the check subject of this case. He
argues that the evidence pinpointing him as signatory on the
check is merely hearsay.
Ratio:
Section 36, Rule 130 provides that any evidence—
whether oral or documentary—is hearsay if its probative value is
not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that
of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence,
information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it
reaches the court is considered hearsay.
In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified
that she was approached by Alicia Rubia who told her that she
was requested by petitioner to have the check exchanged for
cash, as he needed money badly. Obviously, Evangelista’s
testimony is hearsay since she had no personal knowledge of the
fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the check
exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when
petitioner supposedly made this request. What she testified to,
therefore, was a matter that was not derived from her own
perception but from Rubia’s.
However, petitioner is barred from questioning the
admission of Evangelista’s testimony even if the same is hearsay.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that the trial
court shall not consider any evidence which has not been finally
offered. Section 35 of the same Rule provides that as regards the
testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is asked to testify. And under Section 36 of the same Rule,
objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the ground
therefor becomes reasonably apparent.
Thus, it has been held that “in failing to object to the testimony on
the ground that it was hearsay, the evidence offered may be
admitted.” Since no objection to the admissibility of
Evangelista’s testimony was timely made— from the time her
testimony was offered and up to the time her direct
examination was conducted—then petitioner has effectively
waived any objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated
attempts to have her testimony excluded for being hearsay has
no ground to stand on.
It has been held that although hearsay evidence may
be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party’s
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counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value, unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exception
to the hearsay evidence rule.
In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be
considered as an independently relevant statement, an
exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to
establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of
such statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the
statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant. When
Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner who
requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista was
only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not
establish the truth or veracity of Rubia’s statement since it is
merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest to
such utterance.
On this score, evidence regarding the making of such
independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary,
because the statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or
(b) be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood,
Evangelista’s statement is relevant to the issues of petitioner’s
falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and
consequently, his culpability of the offense charged.
In any event, petitioner’s conviction did not rest solely
on Evangelista’s testimony. There are other pieces of evidence on
record that established his guilt, to wit: the subject check was
included in the booklet of checks issued by the PSBank to
petitioner; the subject check was made to apply to the account of
petitioner whose name appears on the upper portion of the said
check; and most telling is that petitioner never categorically
denied that the signature appearing on the check was his.
MIRO v. VDA DE EREDEROS
FACTS:
Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa were administratively charged
with Grave Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman by private
complainants. They were likewise charged with criminal
complaints for having violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, a.k.a. “The
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”.
Mendoza was the Director of the Regional Office VII of the LTO in
Cebu while Erederos was his niece who also worked for him.
ALingasa, on the other hand, was the one in charge of releasing
confirmation certificates to applicants in the LTO.
It was alleged that they devised a scheme wherein the
confirmation certificates were sold at P2,500 per pad without
official receipt. Alingasa, in return, would remit the collections to
Erederos who would remit the same to Mendoza. The O.R. for the
processing of the confirmation certificates issued to the private
complainant acknowledged only the amount of P40.00 which they
paid for each engine, chassis, or new vehicle, as Miscellaneous
Receipt-LTO Form 67. This amount was separate from the P2,500
required to be paid for each pad.
These confirmation certificates processed duing the previous
administration were no longer honored; thus, the private
complainants were constrained to reprocess the same by
purchasing new ones.
Based on the NBI/ Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila, it
was revealed that these confirmation certificates were given to
the representatives of car dealers, who were authorized to supply
the needed data.
Mendoza denied the accusations alleging the following as his
defenses in his counter-affidavit:
1. The confirmation certificates’ actual distribution and
processing were assigned to Alingasal
2. The processing entials the payment of P40.00 per
confirmations certificate, as administrative feel
3. Payment is only made when the confirmation
certificates are filled up and submitted for processing
with the LTO, not upon issuance;
4. And he did not give any instructions to impose
additional fees for their distribution.
5. He submitted additional evidence of affidavits of
desistance from some of the private complainants;
that they were told to sign a document only to find out
that it was already an affidavit-complaint against him.
Erederos and Alingasa defended their side arguing that they did
not collect, demand and receive any money from the
complainants as payment for the confirmation certificates.
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN MIRO’S RULING: Ruled in favor of the
private complainants.
→ Found Mendoza, Ereferos, and ALingasa guilty of grave
misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the
service.
→ Found the affidavits and NBI/ Progress report strong enough to
establish the respondents’ guilt.
→ Explained that while the distribution of confirmation
certificates to authorized car dealers is not prohibited, the
demand and the collection of payment during their distribution
are anomalous.
CA: Reversed for Mendoza, Erederos, and Alingasa.
→ The finding of the Deputy Ombudsman of grave misconduct
was not supported by substantial evidence because the affidavits
were not corroborated by any other documentary evidence.
→ The private complainants failed to categorically specify that the
respondents personally demanded from them the payment of
P2,500-- an allegation that was deemed material in establishing
their personal knowledge.
→ Without the allegation of personal knowledge the statement in
the affidavits were hearsay and should therefore, not be given
any evidentiary weight.
ISSUE: W/N it was proper for the CA to have dismissed the
administrative charge against respondents based on the
insufficiency of evidence due to them being hearsay. [YES]
HELD:
The CA found no substantial evidence to support the conclusion
that the respondents are guilty of the administrative charge
against them. Mere allegation and speculation is not evidence,
and is not equivalent to proof. Since the Deputy Ombudsman’s
findings were found wanting by the CA of substantial evidence,
the same shall not bind the court.
NOTE: The Deputy Ombudsman based his findings on the
affidavits filed by the complainants and the NBI/Progress report.
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ANALYSIS ON WHY THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE WERE NOT
CONSIDERED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
i.Why the affidavits were not substantial evidence
The affidavits show that the complainants lack personal
knowledge of the participation of Mendoza and Erederos in the
act. These affidavits indicate that the complainant have
commonly “noticed and witnessed” the anomalous sale
transaction concerning the confirmation certificates. They
uniformly allege that to secure the confirmation certificates, an
amount of P2,500 would be paid to ALingasa “who will remit her
collections to a certain Erederos.” While the payment to ALingasa
might be considered based on personal knowledge, the alleged
remittance to Erederos and Mendoza--on its face--is hearsay.
EFFECT: Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if
its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness.
→ A witness may not testify on what he merely learned, real, or
heard from others because such testimony may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read, or heard.
APPLICATION: The records show that not one of the complainants
actually witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to
Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they
specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to
Erederos. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. Based on these considerations,
the complainants failed to show that they have personal
knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa who is the
recipient of all payments. This situation, however, is affected by
the complainants’ failure to specify Alingasa’s act of personally
demanding P2,500-- a crucial element in determining her guilt or
innocence of the grave misconduct charged.
Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay; distinction
NON-HEARSAY LEGAL HEARSAY
The fact that utterances or Consists of the truth of the
statements were made. facts asserted in the
statement.
Offered not as an assertion to
prove the truth of the matter Pertains to extrajudicial
asserted, but only as to the utterances and statements
fact of the utterances made. that are offered as evidence
of the truth of the facts
This is not covered by the asserted.
hearsay rule.
Covered by the hearsay rule.
Complainants never identified the affidavits
The affidavits were never identified by the complainants. All the
allegations contained therein were likewise uncorroborated by
evidence, other than the NBI/Progree report.
ii. Why the NBI/Progress report was not substantial evidence
A material portion of the report conducted by the NBI was based
on the affidavits of two of the other complainants. It constitutes
double hearsay because the material facts recited were not within
the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the
investigation.
Africa, et. al. v. Caltex teaches us that reports of investigations
made by law enforcement officers or other public officials are
hearsay unless they fall within the scope of Sec. 44, Rule 130 of
the RoC:
1. That the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specifically enjoined by law to do so;
2. That it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other personal in
the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law;
and
3. That the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which much
have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
PEOPLE v. SALAFRANCA
FACTS
Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca
(Salafranca) on the night of July 31, 1993, after the said incident,
the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to
his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño to seek help. After having known of
the incident, Estaño then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way
to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estaño about
the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who stabbed him
and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At
around 2:30am, despite receiving medical attention, Bolanon
succumbed to death.
ISSUE
Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying
declaration or part of the res gestae?
RULING
Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a
part of res gestae, the Court has recognized that the statement of
the victim an hour before his death and right after the incident
bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the
res gestae.
Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being
hearsay, however, it may be admitted when the following
requisites concur:
(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is
under a consciousness of an impending death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his
statements, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed
him; that at the time of his declaration, he was conscious of his
impending death. Bolanon died in the emergency room a few
minutes after admission, which occurred under three hours after
the incident.
Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and
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 is admissible in evidence when the following requisites concur:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae
concur herein. That when he gave the identity of the assailant,
Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, and had no time
to contrive his identification. His utterance was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to such startling occurrence. The
statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.
Hence, such circumstances are qualified as both a dying
declaration and a part of res gestae for having borne the
requisites of the both principles.
PEOPLE v. NOEL NAVARRO
FACTS:
Jose Rabago went to Enoc Theater to view some stationary
pictures exhibited outside the theater. When he was about to go
home on board his motorcycle, he was invited by Ferdinand
Rabadon, who was drinking beer inside Adela's Restaurant, to
join him. Rabago obliged.pat
"Later, Rabadon borrowed Rabago's motorcycle which he used
in going to the bus terminal to check if his wife had already
arrived from Zamboanga. Upon his return, Rabadon invited
Rabago to Five Doors Disco but the latter opted to go home.
Rabadon, who was still on the motorcycle holding its handle
bars, offered to drive Rabago home
"When Rabago was about to mount the motorcycle, he was
pushed by one Ming Basila, causing him to fall, after which Basila
shot Rabadon twice at the back. While Rabadon was already lying
down with his leg pinned by the motorcycle, appellant shot him
three times
"Rabago ran away, but after noticing that appellant and Basila
[had] left the scene, he returned and saw Rabadon dying and
gasping for breath
"Rabago saw Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, a policeman, to whom he
reported Rabadon's killing. Rabago was investigated by policeman
Rolando Rabadon but he said that he did not see anything
"During the hearing of the case, Rabago explained that he did not
divulge the identities of the assailants for fear of his life. He claimed
that some policemen in Alaminos, Pangasinan [were] members of the
Aguila Gang which kill[ed] people. The gang [was] allegedly led by one
Ramon Navarro, appellant's brother.
Accused Noel denied any participation in the killing of Rabadon
RTC: appellant guilty of murder based on Rabago’s testimony as a
prosecution witness
ISSUE: WON it was well established that the accused is guilty of
murder based on the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence
(YES)
HELD:
With regard to Rabago's recantation of his previous testimony as a
prosecution witness, narrating the killing of Rabadon and identifying
the appellant as one of the malefactors, suffice it to say that this earlier
testimony was clear, candid and consistent. It must be stressed also
that Rabago's testimony was compatible with the findings of Dr.
Francisco E. Viray, the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim's
body. Rabago said that Rabadon had been shot five times, once in the
nape and four times in other parts of his body. Such details of his
testimony as a prosecution witness, aside from the fact that no ill
motive or bias was ascribed to him by the appellant, lends earmarks of
truth to said testimony.
The Court has held that a recantation of a testimony is exceedingly
unreliable, for there is always the probability that such recantation may
later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Where a witness who testified
for the prosecution subsequently testifies for the defense by retracting
his previous testimony, as in the present case, the test to decide which
testimony to believe is a comparison coupled with the application of
the general rules of evidence. .
In criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. To sustain conviction, the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of
that of the defense. In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of Appellant Noel Navarro with moral certainty. Indeed,
the Court has held that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and
credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a
charge for murder.
Witnesses' delayed reporting of what they know about a crime does
not render their testimonies false or incredible, for the delay may be
explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence
to get involved in a criminal case. But more than this, there is always
the inherent fear of reprisal, which is quite understandable, especially if
the accused is a man of power and influence in the community.
At the outset, it must be stated that res gestae pertains to the
admissibility of evidence, and not to its weight and sufficiency, as the
Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight
of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade.
Res gestae is defined as follows: "Statements made by a person
while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae." Rabago's statement to SPO2 Rabadon that someone had
killed his companion can be considered part of the res gestae, and
is thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
It was a spontaneous statement that was made right after a
startling occurrence and that refers to such occurrence. However,
the same cannot be said of his statement to Patrolman Rabadon,
as it lacked the requisite spontaneity, having been given in answer
to questions propounded in an investigation, a day after the
incident in question.
The appellant seems to imply that when Rabago reported the
incident to SPO2 Rabadon, Rabago's silence regarding the identity
of the killers created doubt as to the appellant's culpability for
such killing and, thus, should have been likewise considered by
the lower court in appellant's favor as part of the res gestae. This
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proposition deserves scant consideration. Such omission cannot
be taken to mean that appellant was not the culprit. The witness
was simply silent as to the identity of the assailant. Such omission,
as has been discussed, can be attributed to Rabago's fear of the
Navarros.
Contrary to the appellant's assertion that he was denied due
process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest, such claim is negated
by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as
manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered
during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial
thereafter. Faced with the detailed, clear and consistent
testimony of Jose Rabago, against whom no ill motive was
imputed, Appellant Navarro, whom the former pointed to as one
of the killers of Ferdinand Rabadon, cannot escape conviction
merely by issuing an unsubstantiated denial and resorting to
constitutional guarantees which he has already voluntarily
waived.
The crime committed was murder. As alleged in the Information,
the trial court correctly concluded that the killing of Ferdinand
Rabadon was qualified by treachery. The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked. Treachery exists
when any of the crimes against persons is committed with the
employment of means, methods or forms that tend directly and
especially to insure its execution, such that the offender faces no
risk that may arise from the defense which the offended party
might make. In the present case, not only was the victim caught
off guard by the unexpected attack of the appellant and Ming
Basila, but the testimony of Jose Rabago likewise indubitably
established that the appellant shot the victim when the victim
was already lying prostrate and defenseless.
While we affirm the trial court's conviction of the appellant for
murder, we do not agree with its disquisition finding the charge of
illegal possession of firearms to have aggravated the killing. To
prove illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must
establish two things: first, the existence of the subject firearm;
second, the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the
firearm, did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry
the same outside his residence.
In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January 5,
1991, the appellant had in his possession an unlicensed firearm
which he used in killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This firearm was
allegedly recovered on January 5, 1994, when appellant was
arrested. However, said firearm was not presented in court or
offered as evidence against the appellant. Although Rabago
testified that he saw the appellant with a "short" firearm when
the latter shot Rabadon on January 5, 1991, no other proof was
presented to show that such gun, allegedly used on January 5,
1991, was the same one recovered on January 5, 1994. The
prosecution was not able to establish sufficiently the existence of
the subject firearm, and this fact was not offset by SPO1 Edmund
Garcia of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit, who testified that
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder in Pangasinan. Since
the charge of illegal possession of firearms was not proven, the
same could not be considered to have aggravated the killing of
Ferdinand Rabadon. The court a quo would have been correct in
considering illegal possession of a firearm an aggravating
circumstance, if such possession had been established beyond
reasonable doubt. This is in line with R.A. 8294 (amending PD
1866), which regards the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as
an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.
In any case, since the killing was qualified by treachery, the crime
committed was murder. Whether with or without this alleged
generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty, reclusion perpetua,
would still be the same, because the killing was committed in
January 1991, when the imposition of the capital penalty was still
proscribed by the Constitution, and R.A. 7659 had not yet been
enacted.
||
PEOPLE V. VILLARICO
G.R. No. 158362; April 4, 2011 | Bersamin, J.
Doctrine:
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or
event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A
declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res
gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:
(a) The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence;
(b) The statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and
(c) The statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
Facts:
An information for murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court in
Misamis Occidental (RTC) against all the accused.
All the accused pleaded not guilty at their December 15, 1999
arraignment.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION1:
At around 7:50 p.m. on August 8, 1999, Haide was busy preparing
dinner in the kitchen of his family's residence in Bolinsong,
Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental.
At that time, Haide's sister-in-law Remedios Cagatan was
attending to her child who was answering the call of nature near
the toilet. From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused as
they stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at the
door — Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and Gilberto, Jr. stood
behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side, with
Ramentos behind him. When Gilberto, Jr. noticed Remedios, he
pointed his gun at her, prompting Remedios to drop to the ground
and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her mother-in-law and Haide's
mother: Nay, Nay tawo Nay (Mother, mother, there are people
outside, mother). At that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots.
Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots
just as he was coming out of the toilet, making him instinctively
jump into a hole, from where he was able to see and recognize
Gilberto, Sr., Gilberto, Jr. and Ricky who were then standing by
the kitchen door. They were aiming their guns upward, and soon
after left together with Ramentos.
Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She
recalled that Haide then came towards her from the kitchen,
asking for help and saying: Tabang kay gipusil ko ni Berting (I was
shot by Berting). At that, she and Remedios brought the wounded
Haide to Clinica Ozarraga, where he was treated for gunshot
wounds on his left scapular region (back of left shoulder) and right
1
Sorry had to copy everything from the version of the prosecution because it’s
relevant to the ruling of the case.
6
elbow. He succumbed shortly thereafter due to hypovolemic
shock or massive loss of blood.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE:
The accused denied the accusations and each proffered an alibi.
To discredit the testimony about Haide being able to identify his
assailants, the Defense presented Peter Ponggos, who narrated
that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal-habal) when Lolita
and Remedios asked for his help; and that he then aided Lolita
and Remedios in bringing Haide to the hospital. According to
Peter, he asked Haide who had shot him, but Haide replied that
there had been only one assailant whom he did not recognize.
RTC: convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by
dwelling. RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the
accused by the Prosecution's witnesses, and disbelieved their
denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical
improbability for them to be at the crime scene. The RTC found,
however, that the Prosecution was not able to prove treachery.
CA: modified the RTC's decision, holding instead that murder was
established beyond reasonable doubt because the killing was
attended by treachery.
Issue: Should an identification, to be positive, have to be made by
a witness who actually saw the assailants?
Ruling:
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not
actually see who had shot Haide; hence, their identification as the
malefactors was not positively and credibly made.
We cannot uphold the contention of the accused.
The established circumstances unerringly show that the four
accused were the perpetrators of the fatal shooting of Haide.
Their identification as his assailants by Remedios and Francisco
was definitely positive and beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically,
Remedios saw all the four accused near the door to the kitchen
immediately before the shots were fired and recognized who they
were. She even supplied the detail that Gilberto, Jr. had trained
his firearm towards her once he had noticed her presence at the
crime scene. On his part, Francisco attested to seeing the accused
near the door to the kitchen holding their firearms right after he
heard the gunshots, and also recognized them.
The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco about
seeing the four accused standing near the door to the kitchen
immediately before and after the shooting of Haide inside the
kitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no other logical
inference than that the four accused were the persons who had
just shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios nor Francisco needed
to have actually seen who of the accused had 􏰀red at Haide, for it
was enough that they testified that the four armed accused: (a)
had strategically positioned themselves by the kitchen door prior
to the shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in the same positions
after the gunshots were fired; and (c) had continuously aimed
their fiearms at the kitchen door even as they were leaving the
crime scene.
The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim
as well as their familiarity with the accused who were their
neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as Haide's
assailants. In Marturillas v. People, the Court observed that the
familiarity of the witness with the assailant erased any doubt that
the witness could have erred; and noted that a witness related to
the victim had a natural tendency to remember the faces of the
person involved in the attack on the victim, because relatives,
more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice
for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law.
Moreover, Lolita's testimony show that Haide himself recognized
and identified his assailants.
The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot
by the group of Berting — uttered in the immediate aftermath of
the shooting where he was the victim — was a true part of the
res gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused as
an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res
gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The
rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission
of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or
event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A
declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res
gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:
(a) The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence;
(b) The statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and
(c) The statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal
act — the shooting of Haide — was a startling occurrence.
Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the
group of Berting was made before Haide had time to contrive or
to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the
shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the
startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is,
the identities of the assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable
as part of the res gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and only
in reaction to the startling occurrence.
But did not the fact that the name Berting without any surname
being too generic open the identification of the accused as the
assailants to disquieting doubt about their complicity?
We hold that there was no need for a surname to be attached to
the nickname Berting in order to insulate the identification by
Haide from challenge. The victim's res gestae statement was only
one of the competent and reliable pieces of identification
evidence. As already shown, the accused were competently
incriminated also by Remedios and Francisco in a manner that
warranted the logical inference that they, and no others, were the
assailants. Also, that Berting was the natural nickname for a
person whose given name was Gilberto, like herein accused
7
Gilberto, Sr. and Gilberto, Jr., was a matter of common knowledge
in the Philippines. In 􏰀ne, the pieces of identification evidence,
including Haide's res gestae statement, collaborated to render
their identification unassailable.
Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of positive
identification in People v. Gallarde, namely: (a) that by direct
evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the
act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the
accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after
the crime.
To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive and
sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence
from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in
crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy
circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and
overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the
accused.
SECURITY BANK v. GAN
Security Bank and Trust Company v. Eric Gan
G.R. No. 150464 | June 27, 2006 | Corona, J.
Facts:
· Eric Gan (Gan) opened a current account with Security Bank
and Trust Company (Security Bank) at its Soler Branch in Santa
Cruz, Manila.
· Security Bank and Gan agreed that Gan could draw checks
on the accounts provided that there were sufficient funds to
cover them.
· Gan also entered with an agreement with Qui, the Branch
Manager of Security Bank, wherein Gan was allowed to transfer
funds from his account to another person’s account within the
same branch.
· Gan then proceeded to deposit checks in his accounts and
even before they cleared, he withdrew the proceeds thereof and
transferred them to another account.
· Gan then incurred an overdraft in the amount of
P297,060.01 which prompted Security Bank to file a complaint for
sum of money against Gan.
· In order to prove its claim, Security Bank presented Patricio
Mercado (Mercado) who was the bookkeeper who handled the
account of respondent and recorded his transactions in a ledger.
Based on this ledger, Gan allegedly had a negative balance of
P153,757.78. This resulted from transfers of funds from Gan’s
current account to another person’s account. These transfers
were made under the authority of Qui.
· The RTC and the CA dismissed the complaint on the ground
that Security Bank was unable to prove that Gan owed Security
Bank since the evidence shown were merely hearsay evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the entries in the ledger testified
upon by Mercado are hearsay evidence?
Held:
YES, the entries are considered as hearsay evidence.
1. Requisites for the admission in evidence in corporate books
under Section 43 of Rule 130
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in
evidence of entries in corporate books required the
satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable
to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual,
moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course
of business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third
requisites.
a. Presentation of entries not necessary because
Mercado was able to testify
Mercado, Security Bank’s bookkeeper who prepared
the entries, was presented to testify on the
transactions pertaining to the account of respondent.
It was in the course of his testimony that the ledger
entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither
justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to
testify in court.
b. Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts
Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts
constituting the entries, particularly those entries
which resulted in the negative balance. He had no
knowledge of the truth or falsity of these entries. it is
clear that the existence of the agreements cannot be
established through the testimony of Mr. Mercado, for
he was [not in] a position to [know] those facts. As a
subordinate, he could not have done more than record
what was reported to him by his superior the branch
manager, and unless he was allowed to be privy to the
latter’s dealings with the defendant, the information
that he received and entered in the ledgers was
incapable of being confirmed by him.
Therefore, Security Bank was unable to show that Gan
incurred a negative balance in his account.
2. Gan could not be considered as estopped from denying the
claim.
Security Bank’s next argument is that Gan was estopped from
denying the claim of Security Bank since he benefited from the
special arrangement accorded to him resulting in the negative
balance. This must likewise fail. The so-called special arrangement
was never established. In addition, there was no evidence that
Gan benefited from it.
8
ENCARNACION v. CA, PILIPINO TELEPHONE
CORP.
G.R. No. L-101292 June 8, 1993 J. Padilla
DOCTRINE: An entry in the course of business “may be received as
prima facie evidence” — if the person who made the entry cannot
testify. [Sec. 37, Rule 130]
FACTS:
● Ricardo Encarnacion was a telephone service
subscriber of private respondent Pilipino Telephone
Corporation (PILTEL). Under the terms and conditions
governing the account, Encarnacion was to pay
monthly rentals (local service charges) and other bills
for long distance calls (toll charges).
● At midnight of 10 July 1982, Encarnacion’s phone
service was disconnected by PILTEL in order to switch
operations to the digital electronic system. Instead,
however, of a temporary disconnection, Encarnacion
claims his telephone went out of order and was not
operational from 10 July to 30 September 1982.
○ Despite his complaints, the telephone
service was not restored; yet PILTEL billed
Encarnacion for July, August and September
1982.
○ He refused to pay the local service charges
for said months but admits paying toll
charges (long distance calls) during the
same period.
● The telephone service was restored on 1 October
1982.
● From 1 October 1982 up to May 1983, Encarnacion
paid all service charges; however, PILTEL carried over
to his monthly bills (after the alleged restoration of
service) the unpaid local service charges for the
months of July, August and September 1982
amounting to P164.43.
○ Encarnacion refused to pay the carried over
amount, insisting that it is unjust to pay
when no service was rendered for said
period.
● Due to non-payment of the carried over amount,
PILTEL temporarily disconnected Encarnacion’s
telephone. The disconnection was later made
permanent.
● Claiming unjustified disconnection, and in order to
compel restoration of telephone service, Encarnacion
filed a complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages against PILTEL.
● PILTEL, in its answer, averred that:
○ The telephone service was operational
during the months of July, August, and
September 1982 except from July 19 to 22,
September 22 to October 2 and October 29
to November 4, 1982, as shown by the
trouble card of Tel. No. 442-4822 but for
which interruptions in, service, periodic
rebates were granted.
○ Encarnacion’s refusal to pay despite due
notices and given grace periods led to the
permanent disconnection.
● RTC ruled in favor of Encarnacion; ordered PILTEL to
restore Encarnacion’s telephone service and to pay
moral and exemplary damages.
● CA, based on the trouble card, reversed RTC; dismissed
the award of damages.
○ The notices sent by PILTEL to Encarnacion
reminding him of his unpaid bills and giving
him grace period to settle his account
negate gross negligence and bad faith in the
part of PILTEL in disconnecting the
telephone services.
■ There is no legal justification for
the award of moral and
exemplary damages.
● Before the SC, Encarnacion claims that CA committed a
serious misapprehension of fact when it considered
the trouble record (the very piece of evidence on
which the CA anchored its decision).
ISSUE: Whether the trouble card is competent evidence.
HELD: YES; the CA, therefore, did not commit any serious
misapprehension of fact when it considered the trouble card.
Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
“Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the
time of the transaction to which they refer, by a person deceased,
outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.”
The entry “may be received as prima facie evidence” — if the
person who made the entry cannot testify. The rule establishes a
disputable presumption regarding admissibility of a document.
Discrediting or giving credence to a piece of evidence pertains to
its materiality or relevance (the tendency in reason to establish
the probability or improbability of a fact in issue). The trouble
record in question formed part of the records. The RTC decision
evaluated its materiality and did not give credence. The CA
believed otherwise. Unless there is a clearly grave or whimsical
abuse on its part, findings of fact of the CA will not be disturbed.
The Supreme Court will only exercise its power of review in
known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of evidence or
total void of evidence.
In the case at bar, there no reversible error in the CA decision
after considering certain statements of the trial court itself which,
ironically, ruled in favor of Encarnacion.
As to the award of damages
Assuming arguendo that the trouble record is incompetent
evidence, Encarnacion’s arguments on the total absence of phone
service for July, August, and September 1982 is belied by the
RTC's recitation of facts, thus: “The plaintiff, however, paid ‘the
toll charges’ covering long distance calls during said period of July
1982, August 1982 and September 1982.”
Why, it may be asked, was Encarnacion able to use his telephone
for long distance calls but not for local calls for the same given
period? He does not explain. It appears that the telephone line
was not really dead for the whole 3 months of July, August and
September 1982, but only for intermittent periods. We do not
condone the constant disruption of PILTEL’s telephone service,
but Encarnacion must be accurate in his claim if he expects to be
awarded damages.
9
We find no reason for the award of moral and exemplary P200,000.00, more or less at the time
damages as the disconnection was done after due notices to Consuelo Gomez died; (5) A four--door
petitioner. Encarnacion was further given a rebate for the period sedan 1979 Toyota Corona valued at
of interrupted service. His account balance was condoned by P50,000.00, more or less at the time
means of a credit memo and the telephone line was restored on Consuelo Gomez died; (6) P200,000.00
14 December 1983. These are no badges of wanton, reckless, including accrued interests on money
oppressive or malevolent actuation on the part of PILTEL. market placement with the BA Finance
Corporation
GOMEZ v. GOMEZ-SAMSON ○ After Consuelo’s death, defendants Rita and
Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or caused
G.R. No. 156284 | Feb. 6, 2007 | Chico - Nazario | Icaranom
to be prepared a Deed of Donation Inter
vivos; that in the said document, Consuelo
Doctrine:
donated the subject properties to
While the expert witness’ possible bias in favor of the side for
defendants Rita and Jesus
whom he or she testifies, and the fact that he or she is a paid
○ That the said defendants forged or caused
witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should
to be forged the signature of the donor,
weigh the same with all the other evidence adduced during trial,
Consuelo
as well as with the witness’ deportment, actions, ability and
○ That the notarial acknowledgement on the
character upon the witness stand.
said document was antedated to April 21,
1979
Facts:
○ That on the basis of the said document
(summarized version)
defendants sought the cancellation of the
● Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he
certificates of title in the name of Consuelo
is impugning, the signatures of the donee were jotted
and the issuance of new ones in the names
down before the bodies of the Deeds were
of defendants Rita and Jesus.Defendants
typewritten.
tried to effect a change of the LTC
● Respondents maintain that the bodies of the Deeds
registration of the two (2) vehicles; that
were encoded first, and then, a clashing presentation
defendant Ariston, Jr., for his part
of expert witnesses and circumstantial evidence
○ They also pre--terminated the money
ensued.
market placements with BA Finance and
● Petitioner’s expert claims she is certain of the answer:
received checks in the sums of P187,027.74
the signature came first.
and P4,405.56; that with the exception of
● Respondents’ expert, on the other hand, says that it is
the jewelries, which are with the bank,
impossible to determine which came first accurately.
defendant Ariston, Sr., has benefited and
(detailed facts)
will continue to benefit from the use of the
● The Petitioner instituted 2 cases in the RTC of Pasig:
two (2) vehicles and from the dividends
○ “Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the
earned by the shares of stocks.
Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff,
● Defendants:
versus Maria Rita Gomez--Samson, Marcial
○ Denies the material allegations in the
Samson, Jesus B. Gomez, and the Registers of
complaint and asserting that a copy of the
Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, Defendants”
deed of donation was submitted to the
○ “Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the
Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as
Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff,
early as July 2, 1979.
versus Ariston Gomez, Sr., and Ariston B. Gomez,
○ The said document is valid and not a forgery
Jr., Defendants”
or otherwise subject to similar infirmity;
● Consuelo, Ariston Jr., and Angel - (all surnamed
that the said document being valid, the
Gomez) brothers and sisters
properties covered therein passed in
● MARIA--RITA Gomez-- Samson, JESUS Gomez and
ownership to private defendants, as early as
ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR.
April 20, 1979.
while AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of Angel.
○ They have the absolute right to cause the
1st and 2nd Case
cancellation of the TCTs and have them
● Petitioner alleges the following in his complaint
transferred in their name
○ CONSUELO died on November 6, 1979
● Only direct evidence presented by the petitioner:
leaving 3 parcels of land (2 situated in
testimony of Zenaida Torres, Document Examiner of
Marikina, 1 in Pasig)
the NBI.
○ Consuelo was also the sole and absolute
● Respondent’s own expert witness: Francisco Cruz,
owner several properties: (1) 75 common
Chief of Document Examination of the PCINP Crime
shares of stock of V--Tri Realty, Inc. with a
Laboratory.
total par value of P75,000.00; (2) 11,853
● As the testimony of Zenaida Torres is the single most
common shares of stock of First Philippine
important evidence of petitioner, it is imperative to
Holdings Corporation with a total par value
examine the lengthy discussion of the trial court
of P118,530.00; (3) Jewelries and collector’s
analyzing her testimony, and the contradictory findings
items, contained in Consuelo Gomez’s Safe
of Francisco Cruz.
Deposit Box No. 44 at the PCI Bank,
TESTIMONY OF ZENAIDA TORRES (pet’s witness):
Marikina Branch; (4) A four--door sedan
1978 Mercedes Benz 200 valued at

10
 ● Signatures of Consuelo are genuine in both Deed of
Donations (Documents No. 401 and No. 402: D401,
D402)
● D401 and D402 were not typed or prepared in one
continuous sitting because the horizontal lines had
some variances horizontally.
● D401: Typewritten words “Consuelo C. Gomez” were
typed after the handwritten signature “Consuelo C.
Gomez.” This is based on her analysis of the letter “o”
in the handwritten signature, which touches the letter
“n” in the typewritten name “Consuelo C. Gomez.
● D402: typewritten words “Consuelo C. Gomez” and the
handwritten signature “Consuelo C. Gomez” “do not
even touch”
During cross-examination however the following were admitted:
(her credibility was crushed during the CE)
● She had not taken any specialized studies on the
matter of “Questioned Documents,
● she had not passed the Board Exams, as a Chemist; she
further admitted that she has not written any thesis or
similar work on the subject matter at issue
● Regarding non--typing in one continuous sitting, she
admitted that she had never seen the typewriter used
to type the Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to
get hold of it, before she made the report
● She had to admit that it is possible that if the paper
roller is loose, the horizontal alignment will have a
variance; whereas, the vertical alignment would have
no variance, and there would be nothing sinister about
this. She had to admit this, because she was
confronted with an authority on the matter (book of
Wilson Harrison).
● She had not used bromide when she took the
photographs of D401 and D402, which photographs
she later on enlarged. When she had taken the
photographs of the two (2) Donations, she had not put
the typewritten pitch measure on top. When the
photographs were enlarged, the alignment of the
typewritten words became distorted; more so when a
typewriter pitch measure is not used, when
photographing the documents.
TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO CRUZ:
(in a nutshell) “no finding or conclusion could be arrived at,”
● Lower Courts: TC sided with Francisco Cruz who
testified that it is impossible to determine accurately
which came first, because there were no intersections
at all. The trial court added: “[i]n fact, common sense,
without more, dictates that if there are no
intersections (between the typewritten and the
handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to determine which came first.”
● CA confirmed TC, stating that there is no erroneous
findings in the RTC decision
● Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida
Torres was a court--appointed expert, as opposed to
Francisco Cruz who was merely designated by
respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility of
Francisco Cruz on the (sole) ground that he had once
testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr.
● Petitioner also stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted
her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of
Donation that were then in the possession of the
Notarial Register of Quezon City. On the other hand,
Francisco Cruz conducted his tests, with respect to
D401, on the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was able to prove that the Deeds of Donation
were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper signed by
Consuelo Gomez (main issue) ---- NO
Held:
While the court cannot say that positive evidence does not carry
an inherent advantage over negative evidence when it comes to
expert witnesses, the process by which the expert witnesses
arrived at their conclusions should be carefully examined and
considered.
In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as bases of
their observations. Francisco Cruz’s statement that “no finding or
conclusion could be arrived at,” has basis on the sources
presented both by him and by Zenaida Torres. Both sets of
authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the
typewritten words “Consuelo C. Gomez” barely touch and do not
intersect the handwritten signature Consuelo C. Gomez in
Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said typewritten words
and handwritten signature do not even touch. In the case at bar,
the expert testimony that “no finding or conclusion can be
arrived at,” was found to be more credible than the expert
testimony positively stating that the signatures were affixed
before the typing of the Deeds of Donation. The former expert
testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the
authorities cited by both experts.
Petitioner’s attack on the entire testimony of Francisco Cruz
(including the part concerning whether the Deeds were typed in
one continuous sitting) rests primarily in the contention that,
while Zenaida Torres was court-­appointed, Francisco Cruz’s
testimony was solicited by respondents, one of whom had
previously solicited such testimony for another case.
While the expert witness’ possible bias in favor of the side for
whom he or she testifies, and the fact that he or she is a paid
witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should
weigh the same with all the other evidence adduced during trial,
as well as with the witness’ deportment, actions, ability and
character upon the witness stand.
The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all
these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness’
credibility, as it is in a better position than the appellate courts to
observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there is no evidence
of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in such
determination, the latter is not reviewable by this Court.
TAMANI v. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 171497 | April 4, 2011 | Peralta, J. | Montañer
FACTS:
● Respondent Sps Salvador filed a Complaint for quieting of
title against petitioners Tamani et al. over a 431 sq. m.
parcel of land
● Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of the
disputed property – an undivided parcel of land with an area
of 776 sq. m. under TCT No. 8582.
o where respondents own 345 sq.m. of the property
while the Spouses Tamani own the remaining
431 sq.m.
11
 o Tamani allegedly sold the property to Cruz (under a
Deed of Absolute Sale) who thereafter sold the
disputed property to respondents.
● Petitioners (Heirs of Tamani) filed an Answer arguing that
they were the lawful owners and were in actual possession
of the disputed property having inherited the same from
their parents.
o They contend that the signature of their parents
was forged and thus assail the validity of the
August 17, 1959 Deed of Absolute sale between
Cruz and their parents.
● During trial, at the instance of petitioners, the signature of
Demetrio Tamani appearing on the deed of sale and his
standard signatures were submitted for examination and
comparison to the Questioned Documents Division of the
NBI.
o Albacea, a document examiner of the NBI, filed a
NBI report finding that “the questioned and
standard signatures “DEMETRIO TAMANI” are
WRITTEN by one and the same person.”
● Dissatisfied with the NBI report, petitioners asked for
another examination of the signatures, this time submitting
the same to PNP Crime Laboratory Service.
o Mely Sorra, a document examiner of the PNP, filed
a PNP report finding that “the questioned
signature of DEMETRIO TAMANI marked ‘Q’
appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 17, 1959 and the standard signatures of
Demetrio Tamani marked ‘S-1’ to ‘S-11’ and ‘S-
19’ WERE WRITTEN BY TWO DIFFERENT
PERSONS.”
● RTC: ruled in petitioners’ favor Confronted with conflicting
testimonies from handwriting experts, it gave more weight
to the PNP report and testimony of Sorra because of her
educational, professional and work background.
o Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal.
● CA: in favor of respondents; ruled that RTC erred when it
relied solely on Sorra’s educational, professional and work
background when it decided to give more credence to the
PNP report. After examining the questioned and standard
signatures of Tamani, CA opined that “the similarities of
strokes are more prominent and pronounced than the
dissimilarities and the apparent dissimilarities are
overshadowed by the striking similarities in the questioned
and the standard signatures.”
ISSUES:
(1) Whether CA has the duty to independently evaluate the
authenticity of the signature. - YES
(2) Whether the authenticity of the signature of Tamani where
there are conflicting expert testimonies was properly
interpreted. -NO
HELD:
● The manner by which the RTC disposed of the issue was not
proper because while credentials of an expert witness play a
factor in the evidentiary and persuasive weight of his
testimony, the same cannot be the sole factor in
determining its value. The CA was thus correct when it
declared that the judge must conduct his own independent
examination of the signatures under scrutiny.
● HOWEVER, after review of the testimonies of the expert
witnesses and the documentary evidence, the SC is more
inclined to believe that the signature of Tamani appearing
on the August 17, 1959 Deed of Sale was forged as can be
gleaned from the testimony of Sorra, the document
examiner from the PNP Crime Laboratory.
● The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends
not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens
of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection
from an unpracticed observer. While SC was admittedly
unable to fully comprehend all the differences noted by
Sorra given that her testimony was fairly technical in nature
and description, it still has observed a good number of the
differences noted by her.
● Lastly, while it was improper for the RTC to rely solely on
Sorra’s credentials, her superior credentials, compared to
that of Albacea, give added value to her testimony.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
JORDAN CHAN PAZ vs. JEANICE PAVON
PAZ
GR No. 166579 | February 18, 2010 | Carpio, J. | Panaga
FACTS:
● Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. They
married in 1997.
● Jeanice left their conjugal home in February 1999.
● In September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that
Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the
essential obligations of marriage.
○ Self-precoccupied and self-indulgent
○ Violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices
were not satisfied
○ Liar; spends too much time with friends
○ Momma’s boi; own baby hater
○ Verbally abusive and doesn’t financially support her or
her child after she left their conjugal home
● Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that Jordan was
afflicted with “Borderline Personality Disorder” as
manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and
instability.
○ Jordan’s psychological maladies antedate their
marriage
○ His disorder is grave and incorrigible
● Jordan denied Jeanice’s allegations
○ Jeanice exaggerated her statements and had her own
personal insecurities
○ Objected the psychological report offered by Jeanice
○ He was not subjected to any interview or psychological
tests by Gates
● Gates’ conclusions were mere speculations and was
patently one-sided and is not admissible in evidence
● RTC – granted Jeanice’s petition
● Jordan filed an Appeal to RTC which was approved.
● Jeanice filed a Motion to Dismiss to CA (Jordan did not file a
Motion for Reconsideration first)
● CA – granted and dismissed Jordan’s appeal
ISSUE: WON Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations
HELD: No. Jeanice failed to prove Jordan’s psychological
incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be
12
confined "to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage."
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a
physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove
the psychological incapacity through independent evidence
adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
Gates’ report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had
no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on.
Gates’ testimony should have thus been dismissed for being
unscientific and unreliable. Jordan’s alleged psychological
incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so permanent as to
deprive him of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond. The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show
that Jordan suffered from grave psychological maladies that
paralyzed Jordan from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does
not constitute psychological incapacity.
Gates did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior"
which showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline
Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a
personality disorder made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to
perform his obligations as a husband.
TITLE: Hernandez v. Jovita San Juan-Santos
(Parang Cinderella)
G.R. No. 166470; G.R. No. 169217 August 07, 2009
PONENTE: CORONA, J
DOCTRINE: (Guardianship; Insanity; Witnesses) Under Section 50,
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his
opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted. Lulu’s attending physicians spoke and
interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly
observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was
below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions
were admissible in evidence.
FACTS:
1. 1947 – Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez or “Lulu”
(w3w) was born to spouses Felix and Maria. Maria died
while giving birth to lulu. (Potential Disney/Anime
Protagonist)
2. After the death of her mother, Lulu was left in the care
of her maternal uncle, Sotero San Juan. As the only
child of Maria and sole testate heir of Sotero, she
inherited substantial real properties from the San Juan
family.
3. In the meantime, Felix married Natividad, which union
produced three offspring, Cecilio, Ma. Victoria, and
Teresa. (Bali, evil step siblings ni Lulu)
4. 1957 – Lulu went to live with her father and his family,
and started studying at La Consolaction College, where
she only lasted up to Grade 5 due to her “violent
personality”.
5. In 1968, she was given full control of her estate;
however, her father continued to manage her
property.
6. Felix died in 1993, hence, the siblings Cecilio, Ma.
Victoria, and Teresa took over the management of the
estate.
7. While the family were managing the estate, they
dissipated Lulu’s properties:
a. 1 was allegedly purchased by Felix and
developed into a subdivision;
b. 1 was sold to the Manila Electric Company
when Lulu was made to sign a special
power of attorney by her half-sister;
c. Cecilio also asked Lulu to authorise him to
lease one lot so he can allegedly buy a car
for her.
8. September 1998 – Lulu sought the assistance of her
maternal first cousin, Jovita, who discovered that Lulu
was made to live in the basement of the siblings’ home
and given a measly P400 daily allowance for food and
medicines. She was unkempt, grossly overweight; and
smelled of urine; medical tests conducted on her
revealed that she had rheumatism, diabetes and
tuberculosis. (PLOT TWIST)
9. Despite demand from the San Juan family for an
inventory of Lulu’s estate, the siblings ignored it, hence
Jovita filed a petition for guardianship before the RTC.
10. The siblings moved to intervene in the case. They
denied dissipating Lulu’s property.
11. If anything, Lulu was literate and competent at the
time the questioned transactions were executed, and
the any question as to the sale of the property had
long prescribed.
12. During the trial, Lulu testified as to the fact of her
genealogy, and testified that her properties were
dissipated by the siblings.
13. RTC – Found Lulu to be mentally and physically weak,
declared her an incompetent, and appointed Lulu as
guardian on a P1 Million bond, which the siblings in
their appeal to the Court of Appeals cited as
insufficient.
14. CA – denied the appeal. Hence, they elevated their
case to the SC.
15. On the other hand, Lulu, who has moved into an
apartment in Marikina, was abducted at her
apartment. (GASP)
16. It was later found out that the siblings took her to their
house in Montalban City, allegingg that Lulu voluntarily
left the house because their guardian was maltreating
her.
17. Jovita, as guardian, filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the Court of Appeals, which the CA granted,
holding that as guardian, Jovita is entitled to custody of
Lulu.
18. The siblings against elevated their case to the SC.
19. SIBLING – alleged that the medical experts who
examined Lulu were not experts in psychiatry, thus her
insanity was not duly proved, and she must be
presumed to be competent and in possession of full
mental capacity. Furthermore, under the Family Code,
legitimate sisters and brothers whether full or half-
blood should support each other, hence Lulu would
live with them.
ISSUE: WON the opinions of the physicians are admissible in
evidence? WON Lulu is incapable of taking care of herself and
13
inherits a parcel of land at Marilou Subdivision formerly belong to against them for any criminal liability in connection with the
San Juan Family? And who was her legal guardian? dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez’s estate and her
unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.
HELD: Yes, the SC found the petition to be without merit. (Talo
sina step evil siblings) PEOPLE v. EFREN CASTILLO
G.R. No. 186533 | August 9, 2010 | Sec. 50, Rule 130
RATIO:
Doctrine:
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary
the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness
witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person
has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner,
with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu’s attending
habits, and conduct of the person in question.
physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed
The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a
them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her
psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the
intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below
party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert
Facts:
opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge
● Sometime in March 2000, AAA, who was then 18 years
coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental
old, approached Efren Castillo to collect his debt.
sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample
● Instead of settling his account, Efren cuddled AAA until
opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before
they reached the house of a certain Atok. Once inside
the RTC.
the house, Efren raped AAA.
● Days thereafter, while AAA was on her way to visit her
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who,
aunt, Efren approached AAA and led her outside a
though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind
nearby chapel, where Efren raped AAA once again.
or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves
● AAA told her mother what Efren did to her.
and their property without outside aid, are considered as
● AAA’s mother accompanied her to the hospital where
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.
she was examined. The result of AAA’s physical
The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking
examination was reduced into writing as evidenced by
care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her
a Medico-Legal Certificate.
ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not
● She was also subjected to psychological tests to
Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a re-examination of
determine her mental capacity.
the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly
○ AAA was suffering from mild to moderate mental
involves questions of fact.
retardation with a mental age of 8-12 years old.
○ It was noted that she lacked personal hygiene
As a general rule, the Supreme Court only resolves questions of
and has a vague concept of big numbers and
law in a petition for review. The SC only take cognizance of
time.
questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is
○ The tests results were also reduced into writing
present in this case, thus, they adopted the factual findings of the
as evidenced by a Psychological Report.
RTC & CA.
● Efren denied having raped AAA.
○ In March 2000, he was harvesting coconuts from
Similarly, the SC sees no compelling reason to reverse the trial
7AM-5PM every day.
and appellate courts’ finding as to the propriety of respondent’s
○ Atok’s house was demolished in 1998.
appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. The SC therefore
○ AAA’s family charged him with rape because
affirms her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is
AAA’s mother got angry at him when he told her
tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her
to get married already since she is now a widow.
estate as well.
● Rolando, Efren’s father, disclosed that he accompanied
Inasmuch as respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of
Efren to AAA’s house to ask for forgiveness in case the
Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her
charge against him was true so that the matter will no
favor was also in order.
longer reach the court. But AAA’s mother would not
withdraw the case.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement
● AAA’s mother testified that even prior to the filing of
or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld
the case, Efren already admitted that he truly molested
from the one entitled thereto. Respondent, as the judicial
AAA. Also, she clarified that Atok’s house was only
guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her
demolished in 2000.
ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have
● RTC: Efren is guilty.
custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus
● CA affirmed.
after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.
● Efren contended that the records are bereft of any
evidence that would conclusively show that AAA was
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
suffering from mental retardation.
DENIED. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to
○ The supposed expert witness is not qualified
respondent, Lulu’s legal guardian, an accurate and faithful
because she had not acquired any doctorate
accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully
degree in the field of psychology or psychiatry.
appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San
○ The psychological tests administered were
Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
inadequate to establish AAA’s mental capacity.
decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed

14
 is truly a mental retardate. Her condition was so apparent to
Issue: Whether the prosecution has sufficiently proven AAA’s people who have had an oppotunity to interact and deal with her
mental retardation. - YES. that even Efren’s own father, who happens to be AAA’s neighbor,
could not deny her mental state.
Held:
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape
under the provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not People v. Avelino Felan
necessary as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent
G.R. No. 176631 | Feb. 02, 2011 | Bersamin J. |
to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual
Doctrine: Section 51. Character evidence not generally
congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental
admissible; exceptions: —
retardation of the latter. Mental retardation can be proven by
(a) In Criminal Cases:
evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the
(1) The accused may prove his good
testimony of witnesses and even the trial court’s observation.
moral character which is pertinent to
(see doctrine)
the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
Even though the psychologist who examined AAA may not qualify
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution
as an expert witness, though the psychological tests conducted
may not prove his bad moral character
may not be accurate to determine AAA’s mental capacity, such
which is pertinent to the moral trait
circumstance is not fatal to the prosecution’s case.
involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of
AAA’s mother testified that AAA has been suffering from epilepsy
the offended party may be proved if it
since she was 9 years old, which is one of the reasons why AAA
tends to establish in any reasonable
was not able to finish Grade 1. AAA’s mother further stated that
degree the probability or
compared to her younger siblings, AAA had a hard time
improbability of the offense charged.
comprehending the instructions given to her.
The attempt to discredit AAA on the ground of her being a
user of illegal drugs and of her having engaged in prostitution
Though the psychologist who examined AAA may not be qualified
deserved no consideration. First of all, AAAs use of illegal drugs
as an expert witness, her observations, however, as regards the
and engaging in prostitution, even if true, did not destroy her
appearance, manner, habits and behavior of AAA, is also
credibility as a witness or negate the rape. Indeed, the Court has
admissible in evidence as an ordinary witness’ testimony.
ruled that the victims moral character was immaterial in the
prosecution and conviction of an accused for rape, there being
A mental retardate, in general, exhibits a slow rate of maturation,
absolutely no nexus between it and the odious deed committed.
physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning
Moreover, even a prostitute or a woman of loose morals could fall
capacity. Further, the mental retardation of persons and the
victim of rape, for she could still refuse a man’s lustful advances.
degrees thereof may be manifested by their overt acts,
appearance, attitude and behavior. The dentition, manner of
walking, ability to feed oneself or attend to personal hygiene,
capacity to develop resistance or immunity to infection,
Facts:
dependency on others for protection and care and inability to
1. Avelino was charged of the crime of qualified rape for
achieve intelligible speech may be indicative of the degree of
having carnal knowledge with his own daughter, who was
mental retardation of a person. All these may be testified on by
then a minor (being 14 years old.)
ordinary witnesses who come in contact with an alleged mental
2. At about 10pm on February 12, 1995, Avelino roused
retardate.
his daughter AAA, from sleep inside their house, told her not
to be afraid, removed her underwear, spread her legs and
AAA’s impaired learning capacity, lack of personal hygiene and
went on top of her.
difficulty in answering simple questions, as testified to by her
3. AAA after the incident cried due to vaginal pain and
mother and the psychologist who had an opportunity to observe
left their house and stayed with her friends, who advised her
her appearance, manner, habits and behavior, are indicative that
to report to Mrs. Aris (a social worker from DSWD).
she is truly suffering from some degree of mental retardation.
4. Mrs. Aris à (1) brought her first to the police station to
report the rape incident; (2) then subsequently to Dr. Pastor
Even the trial court has observed: “The prosecution presented
– a health officer, for medical examination. The doctor
their first witness in the person of the victim herself, who seemed
concluded a hymenal laceration that could be caused by
to be a retardate. The witness finds it hard to answer simple
sexual intercourse.
questions and it has to be repeated in a simple way as possible in
5. Avelino on the other hand denied the accusation and
order for her to understand…”
contends that à (1) the charged was fabricated out of anger
because he cannot give AAA her basic needs, (2) he allegedly
For purposes of determining the mental capacity of a person, the
admonish AAA to stop using illegal drugs.
personal observation of the trial judge suffices even in the
6. RTC à convicted Avelino of qualified rape and imposed
absence of an expert opinion. Hence, the aforesaid findings of the
the death penalty. On appeal, CAà modified and found him
trial court are entitled to great weight and respect being in the
guilty of simple rape, on account of AAA’s minority not being
best position as it had the opportunity to hear and observe the
established beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to RP
demeanor, conduct and attitude of AAA while testifying.
instead.
7. In his present appeal to SC, Avelino contends that both
Even Efren’s father, Rolando, during his testimony categorically
the lower courts erred in relying mainly on AAA’s testimony
admitted and confirmed that, indeed, AAA is mentally retarded
despite her not being a credible witness, for being:
and feeble-minded. Such testimony puts beyond doubt that AAA

15
 a. An illegal drugs user
b. Having engaged in prostitution
Issue: W/N the alleged using of illegal drugs and engaging in
prostitution destroy the credibility of AAA? (No.)
Held: The appeal lacks merit. SC affirmed the conviction.
All the elements of rape are competently and
sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt. AAA rendered a
complete and credible narration of her ordeal at the hands of the
accused, she also positively identified him.
It is notable that the RTC and the CA both found and
considered AAA as a credible witness whose testimony should be
believed. We accord great weight to the trial judges assessment
of the credibility of AAA and of her testimony because the trial
judge, having personally observed AAAs conduct and demeanor as
a witness, was thereby enabled to discern if she was telling or
inventing the truth. The trial judges evaluation, when affirmed by
the CA, is binding on the Court, and it becomes the burden of the
accused to project to us facts or circumstances of weight that
were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted which,
when duly considered, would materially affect the disposition of
the case differently.
We do not vary from this rule now, however,
considering that the accused did not make any showing that the
RTC, in the first instance, and the CA, on review, ignored,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted facts or circumstances
supportive of or crucial to his defense.The denial of the accused,
being worthless, was properly disregarded. It was both self-
serving and uncorroborated. It could not, therefore, overcome the
positive declarations against the accused and the positive
identification of the accused by AAA, whose good motive to
impute such a heinous act to her own father was not disproved or
refuted.
We do consider to be highly inconceivable for a
daughter like AAA to impute against her own father a crime as
serious and despicable as incest rape, unless the imputation was
the plain truth. In fact, as we observed before, it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct
a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his
remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a
lifetime of shame.
The CA correctly pronounced the accused liable for
simple rape and properly punished him with reclusion perpetua.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, supra, rape is qualified and
punished by death if it is alleged and proved that the victim was a
minor during the commission of the crime and that the offender
was her parent.
Although the information alleged that the victim was
only 14 years of age at the time of the rape, the State did not duly
establish such circumstance because no birth certificate, or
baptismal certificate, or other competent document showing her
age was presented. Her testimony regarding her age without any
independent proof is not sufficient. As a result, the penalty for
simple rape was properly reclusion perpetua.
CSC v. BELAGAN
G.R. No. 132164|Oct. 19, 2004|SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.|
Seneres
FACTS: Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the Mother and
Child Learning Center and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher
filed separate complaints against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan,
Superintendent of the Dept. of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), all from Baguio City. The charges filed by Magdalena were
sexual indignities and harassment while Ligaya accused him of
sexual harassment and various malfeasances.
DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of
Magdalena and Ligaya. Respondent denied. DECS secretary found
respondent guilty of four counts of sexual "indignities or
harassments" committed against Ligaya; and two counts of
"sexual advances or indignities" against Magdalena. He was
ordered dismissed from the service.
Upon appeal, the CSC affirmed the decision of the DECS Sec in the
case filed by Magdalena but dismissed the complaint of Ligaya.
Respondent filed a MR, contending that he has never been
charged of any offense in his 37 years of service. By contrast,
Magdalena was charged with several (22 criminal cases) offenses
before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City. In addition, the 23
complaints against Magdalena were filed with the Barangay
Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both
in Baguio City.
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against
Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility.
CSC denied the MR, holding that:
"The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual
assault is of minor significance in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the person accused of having committed the
offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a woman of ill
repute may become a victim of said offense.
As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to
have had cases before the regular courts for various offenses and
was condemned by her community for wrongful behavior does
not discount the possibility that she was in fact telling the truth
when she cried about the lecherous advances made to her by the
respondent. x x x"
Respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA – reversed CSC
and dismissed Magdalena’s complaint. CA held that Magdalena is
an unreliable witness, her character being questionable. Given her
aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, "she is not one whom
any male would attempt to steal a kiss." In fact, her "record
immediately raises an alarm in any one who may cross her path."
In absolving respondent from the charges, the Appellate Court
considered his "unblemished" service record for 37 years.
CSC filed this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is
credible.
HELD: Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally
irrelevant in determining a controversy.15 One statutory exception
is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible;
exceptions. –
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx
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 (3) The good or bad moral
character of the offended party
may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or
improbability of the offense
charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only
to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And even
assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here,
still, we cannot sustain respondent’s posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may
be proved under this provision. Only those which would establish
the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This
means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits
and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.16 Thus,
on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of assault
- character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of
embezzlement - character for honesty.17 In one rape case, where
it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and
apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction
of the accused doubtful.18
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment,
respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on
Magdalena’s chastity. What he presented are charges for grave
oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries,
malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of
evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they
do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was
trying to establish is Magdalena’s lack of credibility and not the
probability or the improbability of the charge. In this regard, a
different provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in
the testimony given. It refers to a person’s integrity, and to the
fact that he is worthy of belief.19 A witness may be discredited by
evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, honesty or
integrity. Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on
Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A
witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence
that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful
acts, except that it may be shown by the examination
of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he
has been convicted of an offense."
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in
her own behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack
pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in
his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other
witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or
reputation.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in
holding that the character or reputation of a complaining witness
in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to
the ultimate question – is Magdalena’s derogatory record
sufficient to discredit her credibility? NO.
First, most of the 22 crim cases against Magdalena were acts
committed between 1985 and 1986. As to the brgy. Complaints,
the acts complained of were committed between 1978 and 1979.
In the instant admin case, the offense was committed in 1994.
Those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of
Magdalena’s character or reputation. Settled is the principle that
evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a
time not too remote from the time in question. It is unfair to
presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral
righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every
person is capable to change or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted
in any of the criminal cases specified by respondent. The general
rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not
permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he
has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or
confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility. As it
happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut
each of the charges against her listed by respondent. (discusses
Rule 132 na so I won’t include na lang).
Third, the Resolution of the CSC is supported by substantial
evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous
manner. Her testimony is replete with details, such as the number
of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school, the
specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the
matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena
would not have normally thought about these details if she were
not telling the truth. Further, her testimony was corroborated by
Peter Ngabit, DECS Assistant Division Superintendent. Ngabit
testified that Magdalena reported to him that respondent kissed
her and asked her for a "date."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is
REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos. 966213 and 972423 are
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent ALLYSON
BELAGAN is SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1)
YEAR, with full credit of his preventive suspension.
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