G.R. NO.

129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA

MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35),
PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN,
ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
MANALO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking
to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court
and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February
14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita
M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M.
Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who
are all of legal age.
1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General
Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed
a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the estate
of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of
the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of
the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,
Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition
to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the
filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of
the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the
case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order 9 which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993,
only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses
as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and
immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the
intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15,
1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the
intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members
of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate
despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the
same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments,
which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

X X X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father,
TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties
of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.

Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.
 X X X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the
herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.

X X X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring
this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of
not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay
P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.13

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed
on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that
the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of
the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar,
shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that
the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional
facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death
of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in
the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for
doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO
for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a
bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.

b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried
and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully
determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the
legal heirs all in accordance with law.
 c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance
in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against
ANTONIO MANALO.18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the
said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial
court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and
costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil
Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule
has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the
answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or
its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered
as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Rules of Court vis-à-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply
as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court
of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed
in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably
reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil
actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
 It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know
that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger. 25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for
issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.
1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, JJ., concur.

EUHILDA C. TABUADA, G.R. No. 168799

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, as

Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City,
ERLINDA CALALIMAN- Promulgated:
LEDESMA and YOLANDA
CALALIMAN-TAGRIZA, June 27, 2008
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner assails the March 2, 2005 Order [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and the May 20,
2005 Resolution[2] of the trial court denying the motion for the reconsideration of
the challenged order.

The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the
parties in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 (the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Jose and Paciencia Calaliman) manifested to the RTC their desire
to amicably settle the case. In light of the said manifestation, the trial court issued
the following Order[3] on December 6, 2004:

In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their

respective counsel that they will be able to raise (sic) an amicable
settlement, finally, on or before 25 December 2004, the Court will no
longer be setting the pending incidents for hearing as the parties and
their counsel have assured this Court that they are going to submit a
Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement on or before 25
December 2004.

Atty. Honorato Sayno Jr., Atty. Gregorio Rubias and Atty. Raul
Retiro are notified in open court.

Serve a copy of this Order to Atty. Rean Sy.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3,[5] Rule 17, of the
Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on account of the parties failure to
submit the amicable settlement and to comply with the afore-quoted December 6,
2004 Order. The trial court, in the challenged order of even date, likewise denied
all the motions filed by the parties.[6]

Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately

moved for the reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Order arguing, among others,
that the termination of the case was premature, there being yet no payment of the
debts and distribution of the estate, and that they had already prepared all the
necessary papers for the amicable settlement.[7] Despite the said pleas for
reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to terminate the
proceedings; hence, in the assailed May 20, 2005 Resolution, [8] it affirmed its
earlier order. Dissatisfied, petitioner scuttles to this Court via Rule 45.[9]

The petition is granted.

While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly

encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural
sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. [10] Sp.
Proc. No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on
account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable
settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable
Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings[11] (which do
not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons
not entirely within the control of the parties interested), its dismissal should be
ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is the
sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of
the parties therein.[12]

The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu
propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or
any order of the court,[13] cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though
erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the December
6, 2004 Order[14] readily reveals that the trial court neither required the submission
of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the
parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given period,
their case would be dismissed.[15] Hence, it cannot be categorized as
an order requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to
the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the
parties cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly
encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise. An order
requiring submission of an amicable settlement does not find support in our
jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the
law and rules.

Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a

panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a
deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone
the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or
intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits,
and final disposition of the cases before the court.[16]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is GRANTED. The March 2, 2005 Order and the May 20, 2005
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Sp. Proc. No.
5198 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108

SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING Present:
CORPORATION,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated:
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15

May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case
No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one
of the plaintiffs therein.[2]

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was
raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of
liabilities.[3] On2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing
letters of administration in her favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and
Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. [5] In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the
above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before
the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability
corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137
and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC
required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.[8]

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a

Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of
petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the
Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private
respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate. [10] Petitioners also
filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part
of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory
that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the

manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The
petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision [12] dismissing

the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate
court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited
the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent
or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before
other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred
in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of
Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their
argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the
Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the
courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all
processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by
administratrix Benedicto with the said court.[14] Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. [15] Third, petitioners
moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the
date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them
and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate.[16]

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed
by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that
point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court x x x While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude
petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently
held that the legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material,
direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.[17]

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of

Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The
settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section
2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings.

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as

set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is
based on a contingent claim. The definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply
does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene
in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then
before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as
intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to
intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to
intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us
now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested

persons or any persons interested in the estate to participate in varying capacities in
the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before
us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of any person
interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of
hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors,
and to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule
76, which allows a person interested in the estate to petition for the allowance of a
will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of
the deceased to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or
interest therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and
place of the examination and allowance of the Administrators account to persons
interested; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to
the persons interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule
90, which allows any person interested in the estate to petition for an order for the
distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are
either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent,
under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after
granting letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately
after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears that the claims against
Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with
Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors
required under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death
of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil
Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case[21] was already pending review before
this Court at the time of Benedictos death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the
civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the
event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right
to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may
they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it
does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts
therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages
against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial
court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had
sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead
Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a
verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying
that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased,
and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been
terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took
cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate
proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings
pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate

proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their
interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in
said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left
subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified
in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable
fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily
reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination
and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No.
V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but
merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of
the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess
of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in

abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination
of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority
justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the
separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from
the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this
provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be
prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the
intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary
civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that
 questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the
estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate
action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold
that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and
caprice of the heirs x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an

action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of
the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court,
citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect
that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so
to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.[24]

Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they
are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person interested or persons
interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect their respective
interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action
for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time
judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already
been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor
or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the
testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when
such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there
is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed
to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for
under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest
in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests
can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed
by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such
relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the
intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their
interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain
to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are
mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with
service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming
to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be
furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be.
Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes
and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims,
would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would
ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by
this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of
petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado
v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same
petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the
records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from
them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of
every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were
interested persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings.
We said:
 Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the
records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the
Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as the
plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto,
et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his
estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court x x x[26]

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate

proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of
court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor
in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance
with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the
records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no
matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the
intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a
viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do

require notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties
will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to
interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and
place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2)
Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an
order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has
acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed
by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set
for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair
market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon
submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true

inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within
three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there
are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person
whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so.
Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims
against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,

the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court
the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent
one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the
creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the
debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to
fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.
Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that

petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are
entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the
Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS
EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.

Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.

Filemon Cajator for appellants.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres
Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon.
On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio,
objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter
was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed
upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said
court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal
taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.

The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule
75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province
in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
 Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.

It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties.
Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him,
resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a
house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to
this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason
Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained
until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November 26,
1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure
secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A).
Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at España Extention.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-
settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of
Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa,
78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another
domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely:
(1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3)
intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of
Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz.
Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and
had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether
he intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested
his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did
not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the
appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon
City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of
the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
España Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the
decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said
property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is untenable. lawphil.net

The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do
so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very
likely — that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor
and have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by
presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will
never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I,
pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291
Fed. 129).

Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover,
some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that
municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A España
Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his
death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B"
residence certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public,
was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the
deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital,
on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San
Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers
of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the
deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and
would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from
appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in
Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At
any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong
when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said
decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.

The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and
refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its
resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:

Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever
action oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of the
oppositors has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this
case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the
jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P.
10, t. s. n.)

In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before
appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their
filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the
deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's
objection thereto stating:

Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are
now trying to prove the status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is
your contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I
allowed you to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will
sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not
yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)

Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent,
because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they
were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves
unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew
from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand,
he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the
decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order
appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to
the authority of the court.

What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower
court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the
jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-
examination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and
the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel:
"Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the
status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of
the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my
stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason
that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these
proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they
were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the
purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand,
which was, and is, a fact.

At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object
to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their
alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil
Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court
should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection
with the issue under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears
that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition
of appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late
Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge,
pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order
dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953,
on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953,
Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first
marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the
pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953.
This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not
pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first
taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of
Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could
not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law,
merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is
denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially,
said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in
the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first
instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent
jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts
— but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the
Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident
decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have
properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more
courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was
filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana
Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the
said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and
the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it
should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with
costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.

Francisco Carreon for petitioners.

Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate
of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba,
presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that
the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon
all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado
G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore,
prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule,
and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she
has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May
17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the
original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna
and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation
that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to
the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was
opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at
the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest
of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to
take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well
as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B.
Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the
order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the
court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she
is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia
G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before
before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of
Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the
special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons
which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate;
and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G.
Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss,
Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, subject only to the previous qualification made by
1

the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with
the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the
latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of
August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and
personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her
name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had
already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to
reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the
failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the
place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further
held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the
estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the
authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and
also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa
B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second,
holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit
an inventory of the assets of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of
November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the
issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e)
delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar
issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well
as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B.
Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate;
and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or
"married to Amado Garcia."

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
2

residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented
the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death
his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the
questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental
petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19,
1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule,
and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith
elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10,
1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as
special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
the office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975.
She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision
of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of
Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court
until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the
Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and
Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3,
1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had
already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an
order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations"
in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari
with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to
restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
issued on February 9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-
42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition
therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this
is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor,
or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at
the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court
to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a
matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
4

subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power
or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given
cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs
the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases
though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does
not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may
thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for
lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at
once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of
numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not
constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it
is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate
of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the
actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule
that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
7

of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
8
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
9

domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No
10

particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely
stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the
petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the
quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as
"property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non
sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate
presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last
residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G.
Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate
is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death
12

certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also
by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained
three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12,
1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring
part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that
Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that
objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the
case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the
jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on
the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the
decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is

another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving
spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
13
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis
for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the
14

probate court. That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
15

personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be
taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong for the judge to
16

consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special
administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial
interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the
17

right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering
the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property
may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado
G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation
whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of
any successional rights. On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
19

appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such

appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is
appointed, the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the
20

decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in
the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with
21

sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January
8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B.
Garcia. In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
22

the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B.
Banaticla as his spouse. Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a
23

woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, this25

Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the
instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of
justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of
Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the
records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to
her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is
hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502
and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.