G.R. No.

127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,

vs.

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT

BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD
OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

FACTS:

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that:

1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,

2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

HELD:
The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with
basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said order. The
broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy
in clear and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures
the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services.

Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN, ANGEL C. MAYOR-ALGO, JR.,
MARY ANN CORPUZ-MANALAC AND JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in their capacity as Chairman and Members
of the Panel, respectively, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Marquez received an Order from respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to produce several
bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at the bank where
petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are involved in a case pending with the
Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo. It appears that a certain
George Trivinio purchased trail managers check and deposited some of it to an account maintained at petitioner’s
branch. Petitioner after meeting with the FFIB Panel to ensure the veracity of the checks agreed to the in camera
inspection. Petitioner being unable to readily identify the accounts in question, the Ombudsman issued an order
directing petitioner to produce the bank documents. Thus, petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the
court due to the clear conflict between RA 6770 and RA 1405. Meanwhile, FFIB moved to cite petitioner in
contempt before the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the accounts is an allowable exception
of R.A. No. 1405.

Ruling: NO.
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against
Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement
between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
We rule that before an in-camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter
of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must
be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the
pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to
fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there
was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
*In contrast to Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan. Interestingly, time is of the essence. A different ruling in Ejercito was
enunciated because there was already a pending investigation months before the ruling made in this case as to
the exemption in the power of the Ombudsman.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

Facts:
This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu City; wherein, the students involved posted pictures on
their Facebook account of them wearing wearing no shirt, but only brassieres from waist up. Said photos were
taken while they were changing into their swimsuits for a beach party. The said photos were reported to the STC’s
computer teacher, named Mylene Rheza Escudero. Escudero asked several of her students to show her other
photos of Julia and Julianne, above-mentioned graduating students, they saw photos of: them along the streets of
Cebu wearing clothing which shows their black brassieres; them drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside
a bar; and that their Facebook accounts were accessible to any Facebook user.
Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the school authorities. The students involved were
investigated and were barred to attend their high school graduation rites which is experienced by a person once
in their lifetime. Heartless.
A case was filed against the STC and its officials for Injunction and Damages. Injunction as to the order of the
school not to allow the poor children to attend their graduation rites. A petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data was also filed. Petitioners (Parents of the students involved) assert that the privacy of the children were
unlawfully invaded. Since the Facebook accounts of the children are set at “Friends Only”; That the photos were
owned by the ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Old hag, however, violated this
by saving digital copies and subsequently showed them to the STC’s officials.
RTC issued the writ and directed the respondents to file their verified written return within 5 working days from
service of the writ.
Respondent denied the petitioners allegation, among others, because there can be no violation of their right to
privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data.

ISSUE:
Whether the writ of habeas data is a proper remedy?

Decision: No.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

PURPOSE:

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom
of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY CONFINED TO CASES OF EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate
family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or
collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, a variance of habeas data situations, would not have
been made.

It is designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.

RESPONDENT CONTENDS THAT IT IS NOT AN ENTITY ENGAGED IN THE GATHERING, COLLETING OR

STORING OF DATA OR INFORMATION REGARDING THE PERSON, FAMILY, HOME AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE AGGRIEVED PARTY. -THIS IS ERRONEOUS.

Such individual need not be in the business of such.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. To “engage” means “to do or take
part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What
matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Regularity is immaterial.

THREE STRANDS OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY:

Locational/Situational

Informational (case at bar)

Decisional
RIGHT TO PRIVACY WAS NOT VIOLATED because:

Facebook has privacy safeguard tools.

Utilization of this tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his right to informational
privacy.

That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolsters the petitioners’ contention. It is well
emphasized at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer
be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.

The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless
of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
G.R. No. 132231 March 31, 1998

EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the Constitution:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and
local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent
provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provision) of the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of
office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution;

4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential
and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title “Commission on
Elections” of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to
synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are
not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of
November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways
and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and
if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for
its amendment or revision.

On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that the question
is political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is
an advisory opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen
contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending
process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the instant petition?

HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to SolGen’s contention, the issue
in this case is justiciable rather than political. And even if the question were political in nature, it would still come
within the Court’s power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding the
challenge to the petitioner’s standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have no legal standing,
the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the “transcendental importance” of the issue
being raised herein.
MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the
de-synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of
“synchronization” in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official first
elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these
incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have
been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that “it is not
competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority
to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time”.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office
of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the
second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and
seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056
provides for a different campaign period, as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and

c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and
municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.
G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:
COMELEC issued a Resolution restraining ABS-CBN or any other groups from conducting exit survey during the
elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President. The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL).

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining survey polls infringes the Freedom of Speech and of the Press.

HELD:
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of
the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the COMELEC cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting
clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized
— can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may
be prescribed by the COMELEC so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls,
without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the
dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. The Court cannot support
any ruling or order “the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech.” When faced
with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate
to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor
of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s power to regulate should not be
antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak
and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing

business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features news- worthy items of information including election surveys Petitioners brought this action for prohibition
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it
wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels
and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last
day of the elections on May 14,2001

ISSUE:
WON §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press.

HELD:
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of §5.4? The United States Supreme
Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently
justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4]
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-
based from content neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of such laws." is
noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet
criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest
makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election
survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4
actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same
subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers
Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting
restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test,
namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated,
§5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak
or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these
aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression,
when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speechbecause of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest
sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999

ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents.

FACTS:
During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House
Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government
agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the
objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for
presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around
P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private
organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants. 2 On 28 February 1989, at the
organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director.
As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference.
Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his
column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without
naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned.
Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the dates they were published Issue :

ISSUE:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel

HELD:
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found
in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications
containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention
justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments
or remarks To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense
in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. A reading of the
imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the
latter's official conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and
functions of his position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the FNCLT in order
to generate interest in the conference, and the management and coordination of the various activities of the
conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence. These are matters about which the
public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the conference itself. Generally,
malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the
presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao
herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true motive
of his conduct
G.R. No. 118971 September 15, 1999

RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 40, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some
37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza
regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting
with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper
reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the following exerpts of
the news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished were supposed allegations
by Vasquez that (1) “nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote
ng lupa”; (2) ang mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project
manager at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang
lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. x x x”
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter’s
statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the atual malice standard in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in prosecutions for
criminal libel.

HELD:

The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in criminal prosecutions for libel.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that
petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good
motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised
Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

Libel was used as a form of harassment:

Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the charges against complainant, it would
appear that complainant filed this case to harass petitioner.

It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly offensive news report,
namely, the editorial staff and the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the
petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his clients who have nothing to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and
THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.

FACTS:
On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view.

The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted
for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against
it form “Team Buhay”:
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter

Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie

Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis Party List Ang Pamilya

Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise, COMELEC will be constrained
to file an election offense against the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.

HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey any religious
doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of
the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech.
On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay”
according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of
expression protected by our fundamental law. There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen
the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government
actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should
thus be protected and encouraged.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.

Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.

Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian
abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation and prevent
people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. Free speech
must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression
of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they
are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”