Rule 115
1. G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968
ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.
FACTS:
 Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo
Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro
Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias"Lory"
Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.
 An information was filed that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon
City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the
consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle
above-described.
Version of the prosecution of what happened:
 Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird (car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee answered
yes. On November 12, Chavez met Sumilang and informed about the car. The two
went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a
wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and,
after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would
then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent
was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his
Thunderbird.
 Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee on November 14. They agreed on the price
and went to Binondo to meet Dy Sun Hiok Lim which is the registered owner of the
car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man
approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the
Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be
brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of
sale of the car to the note bearer.
 The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not locate
Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked,
found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much
later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Chavez,
Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at
Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to
Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the
transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in
the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in
Caloocan.
Version of Romeo Sumilang:
 Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been
identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.
Trial Court
 On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City
 During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked Roger Chavez to be the first
witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused
answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal
on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness
on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there should be any question that is
incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court
will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the
question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the assurance that the court will
not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him.
 In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station.
The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a
price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for him
with a down payment of P10,000.00.
 On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car
was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got
P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He immediately
gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery.
It was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese
who would be the vendor.
 At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated.
There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual who warned that Chavez was a
"smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A
certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans,
Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez and also by Pascual and
Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. This receipt was offered as an exhibit by the
prosecution and by Sumilang. Johnson Lee turned over to Sumilang the deed of sale,
the registration papers and the keys to the car.
 Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a
film shooting he saw Asistio who liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered
to buy it from him for P22,500.00 and Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio
tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the next day
after negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance could be paid,
the car was impounded.
Ruling of the trial court and CA:
 The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, he was thus cleared. So was
Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's
theory of conspiracy was discounted. As to the other accused, the court found no case against
Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was
also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any
defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self-confessed culprit"
Chavez filed an appeal. The counsel of Chavez Atty. Marquez was ordered to file brief but she
failed. Instead she sent filed a written detailed information and also stating that if she were
allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the factual findings of the court below
but will show however that its conclusion is erroneous. CA dismissed said appeal. On June 21,
1968, the Court of Appeals, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by
virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to
the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
Hence the petition for habeas corpus.
Issue:
I. WOR the consritutional right of the accsed against self incrimination was
violated.
II. WOR the petition for habeas corpus is the right recourse of the accused
Held:
I. Petitioner claims that there was a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction; that he be
relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115,
Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be
exempt from being a witness against himself.
The Court held that such right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is
left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and
substantive right. Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against
his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure,
directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of
which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise
of his own free, genuine will. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote
the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates
to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity
for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force
testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.
In the case, petitioner was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify
for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege
of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But
petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the
prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and
that defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The
cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus
peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an
accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.
With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate
himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he
has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not
offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If
petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury
or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony
is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed
participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt
had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it abundantly
clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the
first day of the trial.
There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal,
and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty
of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have
waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence
II. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is
traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally
restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results
in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent
conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of
conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by
the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals
does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already
final.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of
Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
The Court stated that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are
divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and
all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. ... "
Supreme Court decision:
Petition granted. The Court rendered judgment directing the respondent Warden of the City Jail
of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner to
discharge him from custody.
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2. People vs Ayson
G.R. No. 85215, July 07, 1989
Facts: Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL). It having allegedly come to light that he was involved
in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets,[1] the PAL management notified him
of an investigation to be conducted into the matter on February 9, 1986. On the
day before the investigation, February 8, 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten note which stated that he was willing to settle irregularities
allegedly charged vs him in the amount of P76,000.
At the investigation on February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager
in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent
Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop
Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the
Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were
taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had
not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings,
that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on
paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by)
shame;" that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise ** to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in
the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same
place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop
stewardess ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as
he in fact afterwards did). No compromise agreement was reached, much less
consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos
charging him with the crime of estafa
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer
of evidence dated June 21, 1988,1 which included "the (above mentioned)
statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at
PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well
as his "handwritten admission ** given on February 8, 1986," also above
referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The respondent Judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of
the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are
worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared
Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of
accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket
Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager * * since it does
not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and
gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also
declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by
accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 ** for the same reason
stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the
accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in declaring inadmissible
Exhibits A and K.
Held: Yes. He erred.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any
sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood,
prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities
in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights
of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the
inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions
posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986
and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter
been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him
as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he
sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the investigation,
offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and
even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that
the so-called “Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation,
that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation
against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at
the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought
against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be
informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial
investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements,
whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely
so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or
committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
IMPORTANT:
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section
12 of the same Article III.1
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding.2 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself."
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.3 It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry."4 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right
to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to
which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually
put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at
the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving
a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer
questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer
to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on
the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not
impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against
self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that everyone is presumed to know the
law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of
things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the
character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.5
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the
protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived,
expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.1
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or
better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation
for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police
authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in
the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil,
criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an
offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,2 a decision described
as an “earthquake in the world of law enforcement."3
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense" --
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right;4
2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him;5 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of ** (these rights) shall be
inadmissible in evidence.6
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3. SPOUSES TELAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 95026, October 4, 1991
SARMIENTO, J:
FACTS: The petitioner Pedro is a retired government employee and high school
graduate who settled in 1973 on a property abutting the national highway in
Guibang, Gamu, Isabela.
When the government needed the land, Pedro was compelled to transfer his
residence to the other side of the national highway on a lot owned by Luciano Sia
where he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a month.
Because the lot was en route to the shrine of Our Lady of Guibang which was
frequented by pilgrims, Pedro set up business enterprises such as a vulcanizing shop
and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins, the herein private respondents
Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and Virginia Telan followed suit by setting up
their own eatery within the same lot.
The spouses Telan received a Notice to Vacate from the Development Bank of the
Philippines. This was followed by a letter from Virginia herself, reiterating the said
demand. Apparently Vicente and Virginia had executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared by the spouses Telan.
Meanwhile Roberto Telan was able to secure a Certificate of Title in his name over
the contested lot.
With the new Transfer Certificate of Title, Roberto and the spouses Vicente and
Virginia filed a complaint denominated as Accion Publiciana against the petitioners,
Spouses Pedro and Angelina Telan.
At this point, petitioner spouses hired the services of Atty. Antonio Paguiran to
defend them in the suit.
The lower court awarded the possession of the property in question to Roberto and
Spouses Vicente and Virginia Telan
Pedro and Angelina informed Atty. Paguiran that they wanted to appeal the case, but
since Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA asked another
person to sign for them.
In the course of their eatery business, petitioner ANGELINA TELAN became
acquainted with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a "lawyer." Having no
counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked "Atty. Palma" to handle their
case. He consented and the petitioners paid his "lawyer's fees."
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which considered the appeal
interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for failure . . . to file an appeal
brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the Rules
of Court."
The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came to
know about it when somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at Ilagan informed
PEDRO TELAN about the Court of Appeals' Resolution.
PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no longer be found.
PEDRO engaged the services of the new counsel, Peter Donnely A. Barot, who filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Attached Appellants' Brief. Atty.
Barot assisted PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of
Attorneys with the Bar Confidant's Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal
Case No. 38990 for Estafa against "Atty. Palma." By now PEDRO had realized that
"Atty. Palma" was a fake.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court was filed by the spouses
PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN with an Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts
to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process.
RULING: THE PETITIONERS HAD NOT BEEN ACCORDED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
BECAUSE THEY LOST THEIR RIGHT TO APPEAL WHEN THEY WERE DEPRIVED OF THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of
law because they lost their right to appeal when they were deprived of the right to
counsel.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially
so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in
danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the
bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus,
even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the
accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil
cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty
but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of
losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a
modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. To demand
as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right
would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may
be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but
because he does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case
of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way,
with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the
right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in
the pursuit of the appeal.
This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse
anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart.
Curiously, the counsel of the private respondents, ROBERTO TELAN and spouses
VICENTE and VIRGINIA, would still insist that the petitioners, spouses PEDRO and
ANGELINA TELAN, had lost their right to appeal because of the negligence of their
counsel, referring to "Atty. Palma."
A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a
litigation even by the attorney's mistake or negligence in procedural technique. But
how can there be negligence by the counsel in the case at bar when the "lawyer",
"Atty. Palma," turned out to be fake? The Affidavit of the petitioner PEDRO TELAN,
the sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar Confidant's Office and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the submitted records of Criminal Case No. 389-90 more
than sufficiently establish the existence of an Ernesto Palma who misrepresented
himself as a lawyer.[23]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R. CV No. 20786 are
hereby REINSTATED and the respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to give DUE
COURSE to the appeal and to decide the same on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
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4. Galman vs Pamaran (web)
G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985
Facts: In order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing
and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the
killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact
Finding Board aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public hearings
wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced
documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in
response to an invitation issued by the board. Among those who testified and
produced evidence before the board are the respondents in this petition.
Respondents contend that their individual testimonies before said board should
not be admitted in evidence and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence
for the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by the Sandiganbayan
contending that their testimonies could not be excluded because the immunity
was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against
self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board.
Issue: 1. WON the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke
their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in
evidence.
2. WON the right against self incrimination extends to testimonies given
before the Agrava board and not to an investigating officer
Held: 1. NO. The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and
purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining
the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more
importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally
responsible therefore so that they may be brought before the bar of
justice.
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar
investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of
the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately,
their conviction.
In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will
include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors
and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are
summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation
is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order
to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the
assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and
extent of his participation therein.
This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the
right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They
have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain
of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being
placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their
very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness
against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and
protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to
remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself)
were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so
testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune
from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.
2. YES. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is
sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere
forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of
the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person
facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and
liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the
balance.
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other
import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other
than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify
against himself" applies to the herein private respondents
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in
its strictest sense, a criminal case.
Immunity Statutes:
1. One which grants “Use Immunity” - prohibits use of witness'
compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with
the criminal prosecution of the witness.
2. One which grants “Transactional Immunity” - grants immunity to the
witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates.
It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity
statutes (Use Immunity). It grants merely immunity from use of any
statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution
by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing
evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution
notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination.
He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and
nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being
prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. The
dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that
private respondents should have been informed of their rights to
remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by
them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the
pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no
obligation to so inform them.
The provision on self incrimination renders inadmissible any
confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier discussed,
this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to
admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an
accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense.
Summary:
 As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders
inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot
be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form
of IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of
P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he
can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional
right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired
results — the private respondents had all testified without offer of
immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The
only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it
in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold,
therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to
testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies
compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same
law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be
made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination
which the same law practically strips away from the witness.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that while the right to cross-
examination is an essential part of due process, the same may however be
waived as the private respondent have done when they allowed an
unreasonable length of time to lapse from the inception of the opportunity to
cross-examine before availing themselves of such right and likewise when
they failed to exhaust other remedies to secure the exercise of such right.
The appeal is well-taken.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
5. [G.R. No. 46039. August 30, 1938.]
ELIAS ESGUERRA, Petitioner, v. SIXTO DE LA COSTA, Judge
of First Instance of Rizal, Respondent.
M. A. Zarcal and Elias Esguerra, for Petitioner.
Solicitor-General Tuason, for respondent Judge.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This petition for mandamus was filed by the petitioner to compel
the respondent judge to dismiss finally the information filed in
criminal case No. 10546 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
to cancel the bond put up for his temporary release, with the costs
de oficio.
On August 29, 1936, the chief of police of the municipality of
Cainta, Province of Rizal, filed a complaint against the petitioner
charging him with having committed the crime of abuse of chastity.
The case was docketed as criminal case No. 588 of the said justice
of the peace court. The complaint alleged that on or about August
29, 1936, in the said municipality, the petitioner willfully and
unlawfully committed lascivious acts upon the person of Luzonica
Zapanta, against her will, by forcibly embracing her, kissing her
and touching her breast and private parts. The petitioner was
arrested and thereafter temporarily released upon filing a bond for
P1,000. Having waived the preliminary investigation, the case was
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where it was
docketed as criminal case No. 10140. On September 10, 1936, the
provincial fiscal put in a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
that the compliant was not signed by the offended party or her
parents, and on the 29th of the same month the Court of First
Instance dismissed the case. On October 8, 1936, Raymundo
Zapanta, father of the alleged offended party Luzonica Zapanta,
filed another complaint in the justice of the peace court of Cainta
against the same petitioner charging him with the same offense.
The complaint alleged the same facts, namely, that on or about
August 29, 1936, in the said municipality, the petitioner willfully,
unlawfully and forcibly embraced and kissed Luzonica Zapanta,
touching her private parts for the purpose of satisfying his
lascivious desires. The case was docketed as No. 594 of the said
justice of the peace court. The petitioner was again arrested and
thereafter temporarily released upon filing a bond for P1,000.
Having waived the preliminary investigation, the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance provincial fiscal thereupon
filed an information against the petitioner charging him with the
same facts constituting the crime of abuse of chastity under article
336 of the Revised Penal Code. On March 23, 1937 the petitioner
was arraigned in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and he pleaded
"not guilty." On June 22d of the same year the case was heard and
the witnesses for both parties were called. The judge presiding
over the Court of First Instance directed preliminary questions to
be offended party Luzonica Zapanta and the latter stated that she
was more than seventeen years but less than eighteen. In view
thereof, the judge dismissed the case and canceled the bond
posted by the petitioner, with the costs de oficio. According to the
order, the dismissal by the judge was based upon the doctrine laid
down by the Court of Appeals in People v. Cosme Mapotol
published in the Official Gazette of May 20, 1937. On the same
date, June 22, 1937, the offended party again lodged a complaint
in the justice of peace court of Cainta charging the petitioner with
the commission of the same offense of abuse of chastity. The
complaint alleged the same facts set out in the two complaints
previously filed. The case was docketed as criminal case No. 600 of
the justice of the peace court of Cainta. The petitioner was arrested
and thereafter temporarily released upon a bond of P1,000 filed by
him. He waived the preliminary investigation and the case was
elevated to the Court of First Instance and there docketed with No.
10546. The provincial fiscal filed in this last case a new information
alleging the same facts and charging the petitioner with the same
offense of abuse of chastity defined and punished by article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code. It was in this last case where counsel for
the petitioner answered in writing that the latter is in double
jeopardy and asked for the dismissal of the case because the
petitioner had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial and was
the victim of malicious and arbitrary persecution. By order of
November 15, 1937 the respondent judge denied the motion to
dismiss and this denial brought about the present petition.
The petitioner contends that he is in double jeopardy, that he has
been deprived of his right to a speedy trial, and that he is being
unjustifiably persecuted by the alleged offended party.
3. It appears that in less than one year the petitioner was
criminally prosecuted for the alleged offense of abuse was
chastity in the justice of the peace court of the municipality
of Cainta, Rizal. As a result of the complaints filed against
him he was arrested three times, and to enjoy temporary
liberty while awaiting trial, he had to put up three bonds for
the sum of P1,000 each. If the last attempt to prosecute the
petitioner is not stopped, uncertainty and the consequent
inconveniences and worries would continue to assail him.
Article III, section 1, No. 17, of the Constitution provides
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused is entitled to
have a speedy and public trial. Section 15, No. 7, of General
Orders, No. 58 also provides that in all criminal prosecutions
the defendant shall be entitled to have a speedy and public
trial. If the petitioner was indeed guilty of the offense
imputed to him, he was at any rate entitled to a prompt and
public trial free from arbitrary and vexatious delays. We
have repeatedly held that there is a positive remedy for
cases of violation of the constitutional right of the accused
to a speedy trial. An accused who is deprived of his
fundamental right to be tried promptly is entitled to ask that
he be released, if detained, or that the case against him be
finally dismissed (Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil., 650;
In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U. S. v. Fox
[1880], 3 Mont., 512; Kalaw v. Apostol and Alcazar, 38 Off.
Gaz., 464; People v. Castañeda and Fernandez, 35 Off.
Gaz., 1269).
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
6. GREGORIO N. GARCIA v. FELIX DOMINGO, GR No. L-30104, 1973-07-
25
Facts:
GARCIA
It was alleged and admitted in the petition... t... here were commenced,...
eight (8) criminal actions against respondents
"The... trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the
accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia."
Then came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen (14)
days of trial... the accused were at all times represented by their respective
counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of
the accusations filed at their clients' instance.
It is worthy of note... that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and
Carbonnel had not objected to - or pointed out - any supposed irregularity in
the proceedings thus far;... etition for certiorari was filed with respondent
Judge:
Edgard... o Calo and Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel... a petition for
certiorari... and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction
[alleging jurisdictional def... ects]
After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him "declaring that 'the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated,
adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the
trial of these cases lasting... several weeks were held exclusively in
chambers and not in the court room open to the public';"
Issues:
was there any persuasive showing of a violation of the constitutional
guarantee of a public trial
Ruling:
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the
parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned
chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as
violative of this right?
The answer must be... in the negative
. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the
There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted
that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of
those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any
transgression of this right. Courtrooms... are not of uniform dimensions.
Some are smaller than others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it
suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could
"have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no... matter with what
offense he may be charged."... r... eference may also be made to the
undisputed fact that at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of
the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen
There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent
Judge to assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly
public. If it were otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of
words. To the extent then that the... conclusion reached by him was
motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional
command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe.
Further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was
unjustified. An objective... appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts
would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily
calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the
relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for
a... less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is
much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is
remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen
primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the... bar more
considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally
expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may
come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the persons in court
alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would... run the risk of being unjust,
unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did happen
here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than
in the usual place that the trial took place
Principles:
The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does
it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where
language is to be given a literal... application. There is no ambiguity in the
words employed. The trial must be public.
It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner
a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted
with regularity and not tainted... with any impropriety.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Rule 116
7. G.R. No. 192898 : January 31, 2011
SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD,
PETITIONERS, VS. VICTOR ANG, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate
City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. Petitioners the
filed with the DOJ a motion for review.
On March 3, 2009 the prosecutor then filed the information with the MTcC who
later on ordered the petitioners to file their counter affidavit.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest [5]
praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the
pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ. The MTCC granted the
motion subject to par c, section 11 rule 116 and set their arraignment on
September 10, 2009.
A petition for certiorari was then made to the RTC who held that the MTCC
judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of
one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with
the DOJ.
The petitioners then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari
essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only
a general rule.
Issue: WON the motion for review is a ground for suspension of arraignment.
Held:
Yes. SC granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for
review on certiorari.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided,
that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway,[10] the Court explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court
is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with
the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the
petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed.
This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
8. SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 257 of Parañaque and MA. FE F.
BARREIRO, respondents.
FACTS:
The City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an information for estafa against Ma.
Fe Barreiro, herein private respondent, based on the complaint filed by Solar
Team Entertainment, Inc., herein petitioner.
Before the scheduled arraignment on August 5, 1999 could take place,
respondent judge Rolando How issued an order resetting the arraignment on
the ground that private respondent had filed an appeal with the Department
of Justice. The case was further reset twice but before the scheduled hearing
on November 18, 1999, private respondent again asked for the deferment of
the arraignment. Due to this motion, respondent judge issued an order
further deferring the arraignment until such time that the appeal with the DOJ
is resolved. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to the order, but the
same was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus questioning
the orders issued by respondent judge regarding the indefinite suspension of
the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary
of Justice has been resolved. Petitioner further submits that this instant
petition raises "a pure question of law of first impression" since "it involves
the application and interpretation of a law of very recent vintage, namely
Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998."
Petitioner mainly relies on Section 7 of said law that states that:
"SECTION 7.Time Limit Between Filing of Information and
Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. — The
arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the information, or from the date the
accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in
which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. .
. ."
By issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the
arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice has been resolved.
HELD: Yes. Petition devoid of merit. The Court ruled that the decision to
suspend arraignment to await the resolution of appeal with the Secretary of
Justice is an exercise of such discretion. A court can defer to the authority of
the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not
sufficient ground existed to file information. This is in line with the
pronouncement in the Crespo case that courts cannot interfere with the
prosecutor's discretion over criminal prosecution. Thus, public respondent
did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the arraignment
of private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
We are not unmindful of the principle that while the right to a speedy trial
secures rights to the defendant, it does not preclude the rights of public
justice. However, in this case, petitioner as private complainant in the
criminal case, cannot deprive private respondent, accused therein, of her
right to avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in a criminal case. The
immediate arraignment of private respondent would have then proscribed her
right as accused to appeal the resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of
Justice since Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice if the accused/appellant has already been
arraigned. Hence, in this case, the order suspending the arraignment of
private respondent merely allowed private respondent to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to her as accused in the criminal case
before the court could proceed to a full-blown trial. Conversely, in case the
resolution is for the dismissal of the information, the offended party in the
criminal case, herein petitioner, can appeal the adverse resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court aptly pointed
out that: "the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an
accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said
motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's
finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such
resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the
Department of Justice." The fact that public respondent issued the assailed
order suspending the arraignment of private respondent before the "Motion
to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent could be heard is not tantamount
to grave abuse of discretion. It was well within the power of public
respondent to grant the continuance since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 clearly confers this authority.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
9. LETICIA I. KUMMER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 174461. September 11, 2013
Facts:
An information was filed against petitioner Leticia Kummer and her son, Johan,
a minor, for homicide. According to the prosecution's evidence, on June 19,
1988 Jesus Mallo, the victim, accompanied by Amiel Malana went to the house
of Kummer. When Kummer opened the door, her son Johan shot Mallo twice.
Kummer denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her
children were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988.
The prosecution filed an information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against
the petitioner and Johan. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits
accordingly followed.
Meanwhile, the prosecutor made some amendment in the date of the
complaint that was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of
only one month.
Both RTC and Court of Appeals found both the petitioner and Johan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Petitioner questioned the
sufficiency of prosecution’s evidence. She claimed that she was not arraigned
on the amended information for which she was convicted.
Issue: Whether or not the change in the date of commission of crime requires
formal amendment of complaint
Ruling: No. The change in the date of the commission of the crime, where
the disparity is not great, is merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment
is required.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a
complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and
provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint
or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all
parties, especially the offended party.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the
case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19,
1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that
consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above,
the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal
amendment — it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the
essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the
new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense
under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact,
the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect
to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment
was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
10. [G.R. NO. 177742 : December 17, 2008]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSELITO
A. LOPIT, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-2003
The undersigned accuses [accused-appellant], a detention prisoner
at the PNP of Tabuk, of the crime of RAPE, defined and penalized
under Republic Act Numbered 8353, committed as follows:
That on or about September 5, 2003 at San Julian, Tabuk, Kalinga,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
through force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her daughter
[AAA], who is a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On November 4, 2003, accused-appellant, duly assisted by Atty.
Marcelino K. Wacas of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), entered a
plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case Nos. 85-2003, 86-2003 and
87-2003.7
On November 10, 2003, the PAO lawyer verbally moved to be
relieved as counsel for accused-appellant and with the latter's
concurrence, the motion was granted. In his stead, Atty. Daniel
Dapeg of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Legal Aid Pilot
Project was appointed as accused-appellant's counsel de oficio.8
During the pre-trial conference held on November 12, 2003,
accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, manifested his desire to
plea-bargain. In open court, he expressed willingness to plead
guilty in Criminal Case No. 85-2003, on the condition that the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 86-2003 and 87-2003 be
withdrawn. Victim AAA, assisted by her mother BBB and the
provincial prosecutor, expressed her conformity thereto.9
Thus, accused-appellant entered a new plea of "guilty" to the crime
of rape in Criminal Case No. 85-2003.10 This was done with the
assistance of counsel de oficio and after the trial court conducted
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of the accused-appellant's plea.
Thereafter, the trial court commenced with the reception of
evidence to prove accused-appellant's guilt and degree of
culpability.
The prosecution presented the victim AAA and her mother BBB as
witnesses, while accused-appellant testified on his own defense.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its Decision on November 28,
2003 imposing upon the accused-appellant the supreme penalty of
death thus:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape attendant the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances of minority and
relationship, victim [AAA] being 15 years old and daughter of
[accused-appellant] and hereby sentences the said accused the
supreme penalty of death and to indemnify minor
victim P75,000.00, by way of civil indemnity, moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages, plus cost.
Transmit the record of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Supreme Court of the Philippines for review.
SO ORDERED.11
The records of these cases were forwarded to this Court for
automatic review, in view of the death penalty imposed.
In our Resolution12 of August 10, 2004, We accepted the appeal
and directed the Chief, Judicial Records Office, to send notices to
the parties to file their respective briefs and to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to confirm the detention of the accused at
the National Penitentiary. Accused-appellant filed his Appellant's
Brief13 on April 11, 2005, while the People, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief14 on May 31,
2005.
The prosecution, through the testimonies of the victim (AAA) and
witness (BBB), the victim's mother, established the following facts:
[AAA], then fourteen (14) years old having been born on October
2, 1988, is the daughter of the [accused-appellant] and BBB, a
barangay midwife; they were married on May 10, 1986. On
September 5, 2003 at around 2:00 in the afternoon, [AAA], a third
year high school student at Tabuk National High School was in their
house together with her mentally retarded sister CCC. At that time,
their mother [BBB] was in San Julian Elementary School. Suddenly
[AAA]'s father [accused-appellant], a farmer, arrived drunk and
forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. She
struggled but her efforts were in vain since [accused-appellant]
was strong. [Accused-appellant] removed his pants and pinned the
victim on the bed, pulled down her pants and inserted his penis
into her vagina. [AAA] cried. After doing the bestial act, [accused-
appellant] left but not before threatening [AAA] that he would kill
her, her mother and siblings if she reported the matter. As further
testified by the victim, she had been sleeping with her father on
the cement floor of their unfinished house for some time and that
her father started staying with them only in 2002 since he had
been staying in Laguna as a soldier in the Philippine Army.
Terrified and disgusted by what happened to her, the victim left
home on September 10, 2003. She stayed in the house of Rita
Carbonel in San Francisco, Tabuk, Kalinga. On September 11,
2003, [BBB] came looking for her and it was only then that the
victim revealed the sexual assaults committed by her father.
Without delay, [BBB] accompanied her daughter to the police
headquarters where the victim's statement was taken.
[BBB] testified that she and [accused-appellant] were married on
May 10, 1986 at Calanasan, Cagayan. Although she did not present
any document to prove such assertion nor did she expressly and
categorically state that [accused-appellant] was the victim's father,
the victim repeatedly referred to [accused-appellant] as her father
all throughout her testimony. Their relationship was never refuted
by the [accused-appellant] who in fact admitted in open court that
[AAA] was one of his daughters.
In his Brief, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court gravely
erred in imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Before delving into the main issue of the case, it is necessary to
determine whether the trial court has satisfied the requirement as
mandated by Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
Explicitly, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
Under the foregoing Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial
court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the
court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of
the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences
thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if
he desires.18
 The undersigned accuses [accused-appellant], a detention prisoner
at the PNP of Tabuk, of the crime of RAPE, defined and penalized
under Republic Act Numbered 8353, committed as follows:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
That on or about September 5, 2003 at San Julian, Tabuk, Kalinga,
11. EN BANC and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
through force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
[G.R. NO. 177742 : December 17, 2008] unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her daughter
[AAA], who is a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, against her will.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSELITO
A. LOPIT, Accused-Appellant. CONTRARY TO LAW.6

DECISION On November 4, 2003, accused-appellant, duly assisted by Atty.

Marcelino K. Wacas of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), entered a
plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case Nos. 85-2003, 86-2003 and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
87-2003.7
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Court of
On November 10, 2003, the PAO lawyer verbally moved to be
Appeals (CA) dated June 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01896
relieved as counsel for accused-appellant and with the latter's
which affirmed, with modifications, the decision2 of the Regional
concurrence, the motion was granted. In his stead, Atty. Daniel
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, in
Dapeg of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Legal Aid Pilot
Criminal Case No. 85-2003, finding herein accused-appellant guilty
Project was appointed as accused-appellant's counsel de oficio.8
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape committed
against his own daughter and sentencing him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death. During the pre-trial conference held on November 12, 2003,
accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, manifested his desire to
plea-bargain. In open court, he expressed willingness to plead
Consistent with People v. Cabalquinto, 3 the Court withholds the
guilty in Criminal Case No. 85-2003, on the condition that the
real name of the rape victim. Instead, fictitious initials of AAA are
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 86-2003 and 87-2003 be
used to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances of the
withdrawn. Victim AAA, assisted by her mother BBB and the
victim or any other information tending to establish or compromise
provincial prosecutor, expressed her conformity thereto. 9
her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household
members, is not disclosed in this decision.4 In this regard, the
mother is referred to as BBB. Thus, accused-appellant entered a new plea of "guilty" to the crime
of rape in Criminal Case No. 85-2003.10 This was done with the
assistance of counsel de oficio and after the trial court conducted
In three (3) separate Informations5 dated September 15, 2003,
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
accused-appellant was charged with three (3) counts of rape
the consequences of the accused-appellant's plea.
committed against his own 14-year old daughter AAA on
September 5, 7, and 9, 2003. Except for the dates of the
commission of the crime, the Informations were identically worded, Thereafter, the trial court commenced with the reception of
thus: evidence to prove accused-appellant's guilt and degree of
culpability.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-2003
The prosecution presented the victim AAA and her mother BBB as
witnesses, while accused-appellant testified on his own defense.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its Decision on November 28,
2003 imposing upon the accused-appellant the supreme penalty of
death thus:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape attendant the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances of minority and
relationship, victim [AAA] being 15 years old and daughter of
[accused-appellant] and hereby sentences the said accused the
supreme penalty of death and to indemnify minor
victim P75,000.00, by way of civil indemnity, moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages, plus cost.
Transmit the record of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Supreme Court of the Philippines for review.
SO ORDERED. 11
The records of these cases were forwarded to this Court for
automatic review, in view of the death penalty imposed.
In our Resolution12 of August 10, 2004, We accepted the appeal
and directed the Chief, Judicial Records Office, to send notices to
the parties to file their respective briefs and to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to confirm the detention of the accused at
the National Penitentiary. Accused-appellant filed his Appellant's
Brief13 on April 11, 2005, while the People, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief14 on May 31,
2005.
Conformably with this Court's decision in People v.
Mateo,15 accused-appellant's appeal by way of automatic review
was transferred to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01896.
The prosecution, through the testimonies of the victim (AAA) and
witness (BBB), the victim's mother, established the following facts:
[AAA], then fourteen (14) years old having been born on October
2, 1988, is the daughter of the [accused-appellant] and BBB, a
barangay midwife; they were married on May 10, 1986. On
September 5, 2003 at around 2:00 in the afternoon, [AAA], a third
year high school student at Tabuk National High School was in their
house together with her mentally retarded sister CCC. At that time,
their mother [BBB] was in San Julian Elementary School. Suddenly
[AAA]'s father [accused-appellant], a farmer, arrived drunk and
forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. She
struggled but her efforts were in vain since [accused-appellant]
was strong. [Accused-appellant] removed his pants and pinned the
victim on the bed, pulled down her pants and inserted his penis
into her vagina. [AAA] cried. After doing the bestial act, [accused-
appellant] left but not before threatening [AAA] that he would kill
her, her mother and siblings if she reported the matter. As further
testified by the victim, she had been sleeping with her father on
the cement floor of their unfinished house for some time and that
her father started staying with them only in 2002 since he had
been staying in Laguna as a soldier in the Philippine Army.
Terrified and disgusted by what happened to her, the victim left
home on September 10, 2003. She stayed in the house of Rita
Carbonel in San Francisco, Tabuk, Kalinga. On September 11,
2003, [BBB] came looking for her and it was only then that the
victim revealed the sexual assaults committed by her father.
Without delay, [BBB] accompanied her daughter to the police
headquarters where the victim's statement was taken.
[BBB] testified that she and [accused-appellant] were married on
May 10, 1986 at Calanasan, Cagayan. Although she did not present
any document to prove such assertion nor did she expressly and
categorically state that [accused-appellant] was the victim's father,
the victim repeatedly referred to [accused-appellant] as her father
all throughout her testimony. Their relationship was never refuted
by the [accused-appellant] who in fact admitted in open court that
[AAA] was one of his daughters.
On the other hand, accused-appellant testified on his own version
of the events which transpired on September 5, 2003:
For his part, [accused-appellant] testified that on September 5,
2003, he came home drunk and fell asleep naked on the cemented
floor; that he was awakened when someone placed a mat and a
blanket for him. He thought that his daughter was his wife, so he
had sex with her. [Accused-appellant] manifested remorse and
declared that he pleaded guilty as he had no money to fight his
case also to secure a reduction of the penalty that will be imposed
on him.
On June 30, 2006, the CA promulgated the herein challenged
decision affirming in most part the decision of the trial court with
modification only in the amount of the award of moral and
exemplary damages. Pertinently, the CA decision reads in part:
With respect to the civil aspect of the crimes, We sustain the award
of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 since rape was
committed in its qualified form. However, the trial court's award
of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages must be modified. In line with existing jurisprudence, the
award of moral damages should be in the amount of P75,000.00,
without need of further proof. Likewise, exemplary damages is
reduced to P25,000.00 in line with existing jurisprudence.
A final note: Notwithstanding current moves for the abolition of the
death penalty, no legislation or rules have yet been promulgated
relative thereto as of the time of the writing of his Decision, hence
We are constrained to affirm the penalty imposed by the court a
quo which We find to be conformable to the facts and existing law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
reduced to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P25,000.00 or a
total of P175,000.00. Let the record of this case be elevated to the
Honorable Supreme Court for review pursuant to Rule 124, Section
13 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC.
SO ORDERED.
On April 23, 2007, the CA forwarded the records of the case to this
Court for automatic review.16
In the Resolution17 dated June 26, 2007, We required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs.
However, the parties filed separate manifestations stating that they
were waiving the filing of supplemental briefs and instead opted to
stand by their respective briefs filed with the CA.
In his Brief, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court gravely
erred in imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.
Before delving into the main issue of the case, it is necessary to
determine whether the trial court has satisfied the requirement as
mandated by Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
Explicitly, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
Under the foregoing Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial
court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the
court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of
the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences
thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if
he desires.18
We explained the rationale of the rule in People v. Albert,19 thus:
The rationale behind the rule is that courts must proceed with
more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form - -
death - -for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have
at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose then is to avoid
improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused when grave
crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the
court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully
understood the meaning, significance and consequences of his
plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would
aid the Supreme Court on appellate review in determining the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
propriety or impropriety of the plea.

It is not enough to inquire as to the voluntariness of the plea; the

court must explain fully to the accused that once convicted, he
could be meted the death penalty; that death is a single and
indivisible penalty and will be imposed regardless of any mitigating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the
felony. Thus, the importance of the court's obligation cannot be
overemphasized, for one cannot dispel the possibility that the
accused may have been led to believe that due to his voluntary
plea of guilty, he may be imposed a lesser penalty,20 which was
precisely what happened here.

The trial court proffered the following questions to accused-

appellant to determine the voluntariness and full comprehension of
his change of plea from "not guilty" to "guilty,"

Clearly, Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedure was not satisfactorily complied with. The trial court
should have taken the necessary measures to see to it that
accused-appellant really and freely comprehended the meaning,
full significance and consequences of his plea but it did not. It
failed to explain to accused-appellant that the penalty imposable
for the crime attended by the qualifying circumstance of minority
and filiation, as alleged in the Information against him, is death,
whether or not he pleads guilty and regardless of the presence of
other mitigating circumstances. Accused-appellant's justification
that he had no money to defend his case and his belief that the
penalty would be reduced if he pleaded guilty were not sufficient
reasons for the trial court to allow a change of plea from not guilty
to one of guilty. It was the duty of the judge to see to it that the
accused did not labor under this mistaken impression.

Still, the trial court's shortcomings will not necessarily result in

accused-appellant's acquittal. The evidence for the prosecution,
independently of accused-appellant's plea of guilty, adequately
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as charged in the
Informations. The testimony of the victim AAA is worthy of belief
and enough to convict accused-appellant. She testified in a candid,
straightforward and categorical manner. She narrated in open
court that on September 5, 2003, she was ravished by her own
father.