Raynera vs.
Hiceta a dark area; the respondents’ negligence was
Topic: CONCEPT OF COMPLETE DEFENSE
FACTS:
 Petitioner Edna Raynera was the widow of
Reynaldo Raynera and the mother and legal
guardian of the minors Rianna and Reianne
 Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla
were the owner and driver, respectively, of an
Isuzu truck-trailer, involved in the accident.
 March 23, 1989, at about 2am:
- Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home.
He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the
southbound lane of East Service Road,
Cupang, Muntinlupa.
- The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him
at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The truck
was loaded with two (2) metal sheets
extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the
left and three (3) feet on the right. There
were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35
watts each, on both sides of the metal
plates.
- The asphalt road was not well lighted.
- At some point on the road, Reynaldo
Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left
rear portion of the trucktrailer, which was
without tail lights.
- Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained
head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D.
Lucelo rushed him to the Parañaque
Medical Center.
- Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending
physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, pronounced
Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
 At the time of his death, Reynaldo was the
manager of the Engineering Department,
Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation; 32 y/o;
had a life expectancy of 65 y/o; annual net
earnings of not less than P73,500
 Heirs of deceased demanded from respondents
payment of damages arising from the death of
Reynaldo Raynera as a result of the vehicular
accident
 Respondents refused to pay the claims
 Petitioners filed with RTC Manila a complaint for
damages against respondents owner and driver
of Isuzu truck
- Sought recovery of damages for the death
of Raynera caused by the negligent
operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime
on the highway, without tail lights
 Respondents:
- Truck was travelling slowly on the service
road, not parked improperly at a dark
portion of the road, with no tail lights,
license plate and early warning device
 TC: in favor of petitioners; found respondents
negligent because the truck had no license
plate and tail lights; there were only 2 pairs of
red lights, 50 watts each, on both sides of the
steel plates; the truck was improperly parked in
the immediate and proximate cause of
Raynera’s death; reduced responsibility of
respondents by 20% on account of victim’s own
negligence
 Respondents appealed to CA
 CA: Raynera’s bumping into the left rear portion
of the truck was the proximate cause of his
death, and consequently, absolved respondents
from liability
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were
negligent; If so, whether such negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo
Raynera
HELD: NO. “Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something,
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”
Proximate cause is “that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.”
During the trial, it was established that the truck had no
tail lights. The photographs taken of the scene of the
accident showed that there were no tail lights or license
plates installed on the Isuzu truck. Instead, what were
installed were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the steel
plates, and one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck.
With regard to the rear of the truck, the photos taken
and the sketch in the spot report proved that there were
no tail lights.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate,
respondents’ truck was visible in the highway. It was
traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30
kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of
the highway, because the cargo they were hauling
posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with
the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No.
4136), respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of
the steel plates, as the vehicle’s cargo load extended
beyond the bed or body thereof.
We find that the direct cause of the accident was
the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the
truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the
vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation.
His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable
him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing
the service road where the prescribed speed limit was
less than that in the highway.
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that
two pairs of 50watts bulbs were on top of the steel
plates, which were visible from a distance of 100
meters. Virgilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle
where he was on board, he saw the truck and its cargo
of iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters. In light
of these circumstances, an accident could have been
easily avoided, unless the victim had been driving too
fast and did not exercise due care and prudence
demanded of him under the circumstances.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles “who bump the
rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause
of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.”
The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver
of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he
is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
STEPHEN CANG VS HERMINIA CULLEN
Topic: CONCEPT OF COMPLETE DEFENSE
FACTS:
 This case was about a claim for damages
which was precipitated by a vehicular accident
involving a taxicab owned by (petitioner)
Stephen Cang and driven by (petitioner)
George Nardo, and a motorcycle owned by
(respondent) Herminia Cullen and driven by
Guillermo Saycon.
 Saycon was driving the Honda motorcycle,
occupying the middle portion of the outer
lane. The taxi, on the other hand, was
traveling on the inner lane and slightly behind,
but to the left of the motorcycle.
 Respondent alleged that the taxi veered to the
right and sideswiped the motorcycle, then
attempted to speed away.
 That as a result of the collision, Saycon was
seriously injured.
 Petitioners claimed that it was the motorcycle
that bumped into the taxi.
 Respondent, as employer, paid all of Saycon’s
hospital and medical expenses. That due to
the injuries of Saycon, he was unable to work.
So she filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners.
PETITIONERS’ ANSWER
- That Nardo was not driving the taxi as Cang’s
employee, but that Nardo was leasing the taxi
from him. That Nardo did not sideswipe the
motorcycle driven by Saycon, nor did Nardo speed
away after the incident. They maintained that
Nardo’s taxo was on its proper lane and that it was
the motorcycle that veered into Nardo’s lane and
bumped the taxi.
- Petitioner also claimed that Saycon was driving
the motorcycle without any protective protective
headgear and that the latter was not authorized to
drive the motorcycle since he only had a student’s
permit.
 RTC – ruled in Cang and Nardo’s favor
 Court of Appeals – Reversed RTC’s ruling.
 Petitioners now seek reversal of the CA
decision. They argue that CA erred in
reversing the judgment rendered by the Trial
Court; giving credence to the eyewitness’
testimony of Ike Aldemita that petitioner
Nardo had overtaken the motorcycle driven by
Saycon and therefore, was the negligent party.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners was negligent and should be
held liable for the damages sustained by respondent’s
driver.
RULING: NO. RTC correctly disregarded the
testimony of Aldemita.
The court cannot fail to notice the uncontroverted
allegation of Nardo during his testimony that Aldemita
was not the person (multicab driver) he saw during
the time of the accident. He claimed that the person
who testified in court was not the driver of the
multicab who was at the scene of the accident that
night.
The court found that Aldemita’s testimony was as
uncertain and filled with so many inconsistencies. The
court believes in either two possibilities – Aldemita did
not really actually and exactly see the whole incident
or he was lying through his teeth. Thus the court
cannot give weight to his testimony.
That (petitioner) Nardo appeared to be consistent,
sincere and certain in his statements. He appeared to
be acknowledgeable in his work as a driver. He
conveyed a degree of credibility when he testified. The
court gave more appreciation to his testimonies.
That it was not the taxi that bumped the motorcycle.
It was the motorcycle that bumped the taxi. That at
the time of the accident, Saycon, the driver of the
motorcycle, did not have a license but only had a
student driver’s permit. That Saycon was not wearing
the proper protective headgear and was speeding.
Section 30 of RA 4136, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code provides that
“xxx No student driver shall operate a motor
vehicle unless possessed a valid student-driver’s
permit and accompanied by a duly licensed
driver”
Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the
time of the accident. Corrollarily, Article 2185 of the
Civil Code states that:
“Unless there is a proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation.”
Saycon was negligent. In the first place, he should not
have been driving alone. The law clearly requires that
the holder of a student-driver’s permit should be
accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating
a motor vehicle. There is the matter of not wearing a
helmet and the fact that he was speeding. All these
prove that he was negligent.
ARTICLE 2179 Civil Code provides: “ When the
plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.”
The Court gave more credence to Nardo’s version of
the accident that he was on his proper lane, that he
was not speeding, and that it was the motorcycle that
bumped into his taxi. The Court had established that
the accident was caused wholly by Saycon’s
negligence. It held that the injuries and damages
suffered by Cullen and Saycon were not due to the
acts of petitioners but due to their own negligence and
recklessness.
Lastly, when an employee causes damage due to his
own negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that his employer
is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family, Thus, in the
selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. With respect to the
supervision of employees, employers must formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof.
The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a
student’s permit is, proof that Cullen was negligent-
either she did not know that he only had a student’s
permit or she allowed him to drive alone knowing this
deficiency. That she failed to exercise the diligence
required of her as an employer is supervising her
employee.
That Saycon, who caused the accident and, as such,
he cannot recover indemnity for his injury. On the
other hand, respondent, as Saycon’s employer, was
also negligent and failed to exercise the degree of
diligence required in supervising her employee. She
cannot recover from petitioners what she paid for the
treatment if her employee’s injuries.
M. H. RAKES VS. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND
PACIFIC COMPANY
-gaddi-
TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Rakes- one of a gang of eight black laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard near the Malecon in Manila. Claims that
one hand car was used in this work.
* Atlantic- proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so
that the ends of the rails projected beyond the
cars both in front and behind.
* The rails are secured to the cars without side pieces
or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
* Rakes- contends that the men were either in the rear
of the car or at its sides.
* Atlantic- contends that some of them were also in
front, hauling by a rope.
* At a certain spot, the track sagged, the tie broke, the
car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught
the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards
amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant company is liable.
YES. *The cause of the sagging of the track and the
breaking of the tie, which was the immediate occasion
of the accident, is found by the trial court to have been
the recent typhoon. A fellow-workman of the plaintiff
swears that the day before the accident, he called the
attention of McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked him
to have it repaired. However, no effort was made to
repair the injury at the time of the occurrence.
*It is contended by the defendant, as its first
defense to the action, that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which
the official criminally responsible must be made
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily
to him.
*This reasoning misconceived Art. 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code. Nowhere in our general statutes is the
employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain
safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation falls
under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. Civil
liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal
nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly
provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable
for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that
the injured party should seek out a third person
criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
* Contractual obligation exists in this case and therefore
binds the employer to provide safe appliances for the
use of the employee. It was the duty of the defendant
to build and to maintain its track in reasonably sound
condition, so as to protect its workingmen from
unnecessary danger. It is plain that it failed in its
duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred.
Consequently, the negligence of the defendant is
established.
* Another contention of the defense is that the
injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to his
employment and, as such, one assumed by him.
* It is evident that this cannot be the case if the
occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or
to duly inspect it, for the employee is not presumed
to have stipulated that the employer might neglect his
legal duty. Nor may it be excused upon the ground that
the negligence leading to the accident was that of a
fellow-servant of the injured man. It is not apparent to
us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the
defendant from the performance of its duty nor impose
upon the plaintiff the consequences of an act or
omission not his own. This doctrine, known as "the
fellow-servant rule," we are not disposed to
introduce into our jurisprudence.
Ramos V. CA (1999)
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
Lessons Applicable: Personal Injury and Death (Torts
and Damages)
Laws Applicable:
FACTS: June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-
year old robust woman underwent on an operation to
the stone at her gall bladder removed after being
tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation
performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged
a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the
anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after
the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband
that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra.
Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was held
by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the
Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center together with her husband went down with her
to the operating room.
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15
P.M. Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish
and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr.
Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that
something is wrong.
When she went back she saw Erlinda in
a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken
to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for
a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25
and she was since then comatosed.
She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence
of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes. She
was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse
cerebral parenchymal damage"
Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr.
Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual
monthly expenses totalling to P632,000 as of April 15,
1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral
damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of
suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid
bills of P93,542.25 plus interest
ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages
HELD: YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and
solidarily against private respondents the following: 1)
P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date
of promulgation plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00
up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or
miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages,
3) P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000
exemplary damages and P100,000 attorney's fees;
and, 5) the costs of the suit.
The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases presents a question of law since it is
a judicial function to determine whether a certain set
of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a
given inference.
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff,
the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed
with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence - applicable in this case
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in
a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves
the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment
As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez
failed to properly intubate the patient according to
witness Herminda
With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is
satisfied with her testimony
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first
time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional
negligence and professional irresponsibility
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must
have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter
about which he or she is to testify, either by the study
of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical
experience.
Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated
that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug
reaction to the short-acting barbiturate was not
accepted as expert opinion
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to
exercise the proper authority in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols
Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a
different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late
for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little
or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that
he was remiss in his professional duties towards his
patient
 private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real
control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patient's condition, the control exercised, the
hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all
fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-
employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages.
 Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
 temperate damages can and should be awarded
on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of
such cases, no incompatibility arises when both
actual and temperate damages are provided for.
The reason is that these damages cover two
distinct phases.
 They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at
home without the aid of professionals, for
anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under
the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in
temperate damages would therefore be
reasonable.
 the damage done to her would not only be
permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the
physiologic changes which her body would
normally undergo through the years.
 Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the
incident occurred. She has been in a comatose
state for over fourteen years now
 Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility
of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury
and suffering in this case is clearly a real one.
Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be
appropriate.
 Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in
the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded.
Considering the length and nature of the instant
suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees
valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.
NAPOCOR vs. Heirs of Casionan (2008)
TOPIC: CONCEPT OF INCOMPLETE DEFENSE OR
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENC
Petitioner: Installed the sagging electrical
transmission lines
Respondents: Parents of Deceased Noble Casionan
TOPIC: CONCEPT OF INCOMPLETE DEFENSE OR
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
FACTS: Deceased Noble Casionan worked as a pocket
miner. Petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical
transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some
of the transmission lines sagged and dangled, and
posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed
to the danger of electrocution. Verbal and written
requests were sent to NPC to institute safety measures
to protect users of the trail.
Noble and his co-pocket miner carried one pole on his
shoulder. A buzzing sound was heard when the tip of
Nobles pole touched the wire then Nobles fell on the
ground. The cause of death was found to be cardiac
arrest due to electrocution.
Respondents filed a claim for damages against the
NPC.
NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the safety
of the high-tension transmission lines. If Noble did die
by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence.
RTC: defendant NPC guilty of Negligence
(Quasi-Delict) the negligence of NPC in maintaining
the high-tension wires was established by
preponderance of evidence (by several requests and
demands that their transmission lines were dangling
and sagging)
CA: RTC Decision affirmed
Issue: WON Petitioner was negligent? YES. “But even
if We walk the extra mile, the finding of liability on the
part of petitioner must stay.” - SC
Relevant Issue:
WON the award for damages should be
deleted/mitigated in view of the contributory
negligence of the victim? NO. The deceased was not
negligent.
RULING:
Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to
properly maintain the wires by attributing negligence to
the victim.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
this Court held that the responsibility of maintaining the
rails for the purpose of preventing derailment accidents
belonged to the company. The company should not
have been negligent in ascertaining that the rails were
fully connected than to wait until a life was lost due to
an accident.
 In Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, this Court
1. ruled that the violation of a statute is not
Negligence Contributory sufficient to hold that the violation was
Negligence the proximate cause of the injury, unless
the very injury that happened was precisely
The failure to observe, [the] conduct on the what was intended to be prevented by the
for the protection of part of the injured statute.
the interest of party, contributing as
another person, that a legal cause to the
degree of care, harm he has suffered,
YAMDA VS MNL RAILROAD
precaution, and which falls below the
vigilance which the standard which he is
circumstances justly required to conform for Yamada vs. Manila Railroad & Bachrach Garage
demand, whereby such his own protection.
other person suffers 33 Phil. 11
injury.

Contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is
partly responsible for his own injury should not Facts: The plaintiffs with three
be entitled to recover damages in full but must companions hired an automobile from
bear the consequences of his own negligence. the defendant Bachrach Garage &
Taxicab Co. for a trip to Cavite Viejo.
If indeed there was contributory negligence on the The automobile was hired by the
part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the driver of the taxicab company. On the
award for damages. This is in consonance with the return trip to Manila, while crossing
Civil Code provision that liability will be mitigated in the tracks of the railroad company,
consideration of the contributory negligence of the the automobile was struck by the train
injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code: and the plaintiffs were injured.
Plaintiffs sued both the railroad and
When the plaintiff’s own the taxicab companies. The lower
negligence was the immediate and court absolved the railroad company
proximate cause of his injury, he and condemned the taxicab company
cannot recover damages. But if his to pay damages to the plaintiff.
negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the 
injury being the defendants lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover The question was whether the driver
damages, but the courts shall mitigate of the car was negligent and in the
the damages to be awarded. affirmative whether the employer
owner of the car was responsible in
To hold a person as having contributed to his
damages to the plaintiffs.
injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his
injuries in disregard of warnings or signs 
on an impending danger to health and body.
Held: The driver was negligent when
IN THIS CASE: the trail where Noble was he did not reduce his speed upon
electrocuted was regularly used by members nearing the railroad crossing to
of the community. There were no warning determine whether there was an
signs to inform passersby of the impending oncoming train.
danger to their lives should they accidentally
touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail
was the only viable way from Dalicon to The defendant also contended that even if the driver
Itogon. was negligent, still it was not liable since it had

Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply
doing what was ordinary routine to other
workers in the area.
RE: WON he is negligent because deceased was
engaging in pocket mining prohibited by DENR?
NO NEGLIGENCE PER SE
performed its duty to the plaintiffs when it furnished a
suitable and proper car and selected a driver who had
been with the company for five or six years and who
had not had an accident or misadventure before. The
Supreme Court, however, held that “it was the duty of
the company not only to furnish a suitable and proper
care and select a competent operator, but also to
supervise and, where necessary, instruct him
properly.” Defendant taxicab company was held liable
to the plaintiffs.
COMMERCIAL INTL BANK VS CA
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL
BANK (formerly INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND
AMERICA) V. COURT OF APPEALS and FORD
PHILIPPINES, INC. and CITIBANK, N.A.
[G.R. No. 121413. January 29, 2001] (350 SCRA
446)
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions arose from the action
filed by BIR against Citibank and PCIBank for the
recovery of the amount of Citibank Check Numbers SN-
10597 and 16508. Said checks, both crossed checks
were alleged to have been negotiated fraudulently by
an organized syndicate between and among two
employees of Ford (General Ledger Accountant and his
assistant), and PCIBank officers.
It was established that instead of paying the
crossed checks, containing two diagonal lines on its
upper left corner between which were written the words
payable to the payees account only, to the CIR for the
settlement of the appropriate quarterly percentage
taxes of Ford, the checks were diverted and encashed
for the eventual distribution among the members of the
syndicate. Citibank Check No. SN-10597 amounted to
P5,851,706.37, while Citibank Check No. SN-16508
amounted to P6,311,591.73.
It was found that the pro-manager of San Andres
Branch of PCIBank, Remberto Castro, received Citibank
Check Numbers SN 10597 and 16508. He passed the
checks to a co-conspirator, an Assistant Manager of
PCIBanks Meralco Branch, who helped Castro open a
Checking account of a fictitious person named Reynaldo
Reyes. Castro deposited a worthless Bank of America
Check in exactly the same amount of Ford checks. The
syndicate tampered with the checks and succeeded in
replacing the worthless checks and the eventual
encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 and
16508. The PCIBank Pro-manager, Castro, and his co-
conspirator Assistant Manager apparently performed
their activities using facilities in their official capacity or
authority but for their personal and private gain or
benefit.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that PCIBank had no official act in the ordinary course
of business that would attribute to it the case of the
embezzlement of Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597
and 16508, because PCIBank did not actually receive
nor hold the two Ford checks at all. Neither is there any
proof that defendant PCIBank contributed any official or
conscious participation in the process of the
embezzlement. The Court is convinced that the
switching operation (involving the checks while in
transit for clearing) were the clandestine or hidden
actuations performed by the members of the syndicate
in their own personal, covert and private capacity and
done without the knowledge of the defendant PCIBank.
The evidence on record shows that Citibank as
drawee bank was likewise negligent in the performance
of its duties. Citibank failed to establish that its payment
of Fords checks were made in due course and legally in
order. It likewise appears that although the employees
of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an
organized syndicate, their actions were not the
proximate cause of encashing the checks.
ISSUE:
Has petitioner Ford the right to recover from the
collecting bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank
(Citibank) the value of the checks intended as payment
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue?
HELD:
YES. The mere fact that the forgery was
committed by a drawer-payors confidential employee or
agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual
facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the
forged paper upon the bank, does NOT entitle the bank
to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of
some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer.
This rule likewise applies to the checks fraudulently
negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees
who hold them in their possession.
In this case, there was no evidence presented
confirming the conscious participation of PCIBank in the
embezzlement. As a general rule, however, a banking
corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts
and declarations of its officers or agents within the
course and scope of their employment. A bank will be
held liable for the negligence of its officers or agents
when acting within the course and scope of their
employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its
officers even as regards that species of tort of which
malice is an essential element. In this case, we find a
situation where the PCIBank appears also to be the
victim of the scheme hatched by a syndicate in which
its own management employees had participated.
A bank holding out its officers and agents as
worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by
the frauds these officers or agents were enabled to
perpetrate in the apparent course of their employment;
nor will it be permitted to shirk its responsibility for such
frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank
therefrom. For the general rule is that a bank is liable
for the fraudulent acts or representations of an officer
or agent acting within the course and apparent scope of
his employment or authority. And if an officer or
employee of a bank, in his official capacity, receives
money to satisfy an evidence of indebtedness lodged
with his bank for collection, the bank is liable for his
misappropriation of such sum.
Citibank must likewise answer for the damages
incurred by Ford on Citibank Checks Numbers SN 10597
and 16508, because of the contractual relationship
existing between the two. Citibank, as the drawee bank
breached its contractual obligation with Ford and such
degree of culpability contributed to the damage caused
to the latter.
PCIBank and Citibank are thus liable for and must
share the loss, (concerning the proceeds of Citibank
Check Numbers SN 10597 and 16508 totaling
P12,163,298.10) on a fifty-fifty ratio.
TAYLOR VS MANILA ELECTRIC
Taylor V. Manila Electric Railroad And Light Co.(1910)
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
Lessons Applicable:
Elements of quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
 September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David
Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical
engineer, more mature than the average boy of
his age, and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose
of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant,
who and promised to make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine
 After leaving the power house where they had
asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the
open space in the neighborhood of the place
where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces
 they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating
caps scattered on the ground
 These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which
it may be discharged by the use of electricity
 They are intended for use in the explosion of
blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power
 the boys picked up all they could find, hung them
on stick, of which each took end, and carried them
home
 After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to
Manuel's home
 The boys then made a series of experiments with
the caps
 trust the ends of the wires into an electric light
socket - no result
 break the cap with a stone - failed
 opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding
that it was filled with a yellowish substance they
got matches
 David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents
 An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three
 Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a
match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck
 Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
 David was struck in the face by several particles of
the metal capsule, one of which injured his right
eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its
removal by the surgeons
 Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Company liable
ISSUE:
1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila
Electric Railroad And Light Company liable - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
sufficiently proved that they employed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to avoid the damage - NO
HELD: reversing the judgment of the court below
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding
article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother,
is liable for the damages caused by the minors who
live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise
are equally liable for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when
the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the
damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have
been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of
explosive substances which may not have been placed
in a safe and proper place.
 in order to establish his right to a recovery, must
establish by competent evidence:
1. Damages to the plaintiff
2. Negligence by act or omission of which
defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
3. The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
 while we hold that the entry upon the property
without express invitation or permission would not
have relieved Manila Electric from responsibility for
injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if
such injury were attributable to his negligence, the
negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the
injury received
 cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
 Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the
injuries thus incurred
 2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months
at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland
transports. Later he took up work in his father's
office, learning mechanical drawing and
mechanical engineering. About a month after his
accident he obtained employment as a mechanical
draftsman and continued in that employment for 6
months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears
that he was a boy of more than average
intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally
and physically than most boys of 15
 The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion, as described by
Jessie who even ran away
 True, he may not have known and probably did
not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the
contents of the cap, and of course he did not
anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred;
but he well knew that a more or less dangerous
explosion might be expected from his act, and yet
he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced
the explosion. It would be going far to say that
"according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that defendant
or anyone else should be held civilly responsible
for injuries incurred by him under such
circumstances.
 The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor
can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care
and precaution in the commission of such acts;
and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps
impossible so to do, for in the very nature of
things the question of negligence necessarily
depends on the ability of the minor to understand
the character of his own acts and their
consequences
 he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that
degree of caution which would have avoided the
injury which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be held
to have been the direct and immediate result of
his own willful and reckless act, so that while it
may be true that these injuries would not have
been incurred but for the negligence act of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident
which inflicted the injury
 rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa
sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire
 just thing is that a man should suffer the damage
which comes to him through his own fault, and
that he can not demand reparation therefor from
another
 Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven
by him who alleges it.
HIDALGO VS BALANDAN
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et
al.- Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable
to bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water tanks) as well
as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.
FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages
in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario.
Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in
their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The
factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily
made because the gates were always open and there
was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks
didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when
Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank
inside the factory and began playing and swimming
inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of

the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a
cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia secondary to
drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the
parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages
due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive
nuisance is applicable in this case?
RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One
who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. American
Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance
doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water,
artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some
unusual condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks
themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the
petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First
Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES,
VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and
PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
-joy-
TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
FACTS:
A strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted
the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and
consequent flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had
abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to
recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called
Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-
law towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium,
of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look
after the merchandise therein that might have been
damaged. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. The certificate of death
prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of' death as
,'circulatory shock electrocution". An action for damages
was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the
aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer petitioner
advanced the theory, as a special defense, that the
deceased could have died simply either by drowning or
by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to
herself and not to petitioner.
Issue: W/N Petitioner not liable for the death of the
disease on the ground of negligence by the deceased
(W/N maxim Volenti non fit injuria applies)
Held:nawp
The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by
petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which
impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof
and brave the subsiding typhoon.
As testified by the witnesses, the deceased,
accompanied by the former two, were on their way to
the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the
goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish
her for exercising her right to protect her property
from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable
presumption that she assumed the risk of personal
injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a
person is excused from the force of the rule,
that when he voluntarily assents to a known
danger he must abide by the consequences, if
an emergency is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril or when he seeks
to rescue his endangered property . Clearly, an
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a
source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending
loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a
right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as
she was on her way to protect her merchandise.
Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be
barred from recovering damages as a result of the
death caused by petitioner's negligence
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
MR. & MRS. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT (gov’t-owned corp.)
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from
defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s
fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one
of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the
plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the
fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it
liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine
of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the
burden of proving that the damages is caused by the
fault/negligence of the person from whom the
damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the
burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards,
male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to
avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The
swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof
and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the
pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In
that, it appears that defendant has taken all the
necessary precautions to avoid/prevent
danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even
death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a
person who has the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for
the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong
has went to the big swimming pool w/o any
companion in violation of the rules and regulations of
the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it
appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for
help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying
all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to
life, it is clear that there is no room for the application
of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor
Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause
of his death.
spouses ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT
G.R. No. L-7664
August 29, 1958
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS: Defendant owns and operates three
recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters,
Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and
for which a nominal fee is charged . 14 year old
Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in one of
those pools.
Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was
drowned in one of its swimming pools but avers that
his death was caused by his own negligence or by
unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection of, and
supervision over, its employees and that it had
observed the diligence required by law under the
circumstances.
After trial, the lower court found that the action of
plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complaint
without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the
case on appeal directly to this Court because the
amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.
ISSUE:
1. WON the death of minor Dominador Ong can be
attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its
employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover
damages.
2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance could be used
against the respondent
HELD: decision is affirmed
The present action is governed by Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil Code. The first
article provides that “whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done.”
Such fault or negligence is called quasi-delict. Under
the second article, this obligation is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.
Since the present action is one for damages founded
on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is
that the person claiming damages has the burden of
proving that the damage is caused by the fault or
negligence of the person from whom the damage is
claimed, or of one of his employees.
NO
There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has
taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the
lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may
cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the
swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring
buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a
first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is
painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility.
There is on display in a conspicuous place within the
area certain rules and regulations governing the use of
the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all
trained as they had taken a course for that purpose
and were issued certificates of proficiency. …There is a
male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic
provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are
security guards who are available always in case of
emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor
Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the
employees of appellee did everything possible to bring
him back to life, from manual resuscitation to calling
for a doctor. All of the foregoing shows that appellee
has done what is humanly possible under the
circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that
reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.
2. We do not see how this doctrine may apply
considering that the record does not show how minor
Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing
the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his
elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to
drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on
nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless
body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance
simply means that the negligence of a claimant does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. Or, “As the doctrine
usually is stated, a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or
the negligence of a third person which is imputed to
his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences of the accident.”
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big
swimming pool and it being apparent that he went
there without any companion in violation of one of the
regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools,
and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the
call for help as soon as his attention was called to it
and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at
the disposal of appellee had been put into play in
order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is
no room for the application of the doctrine now
invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application
of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be
said to have contributed to the injury.
Before closing, we wish to quote the following
observation of the trial court, which we find supported
by the evidence: “There is (also) a strong suggestion
coming from the expert evidence presented by both
parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where
the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he
might have hit or bumped his forehead against the
bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was
stunned, and which to his drowning.
LBC Air Cargo, Inc., et. al. vs. CA
G.R. No. 101683. 23 February 1995.
Petition for review of a decision of the CA reversing
that of the RTC and holding LBC and Tano liable.
Vitug, J.:
Facts: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio
Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki
motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along
a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the
same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner
herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When Tano was
approaching the airport entrance on his left, he saw
two vehicles racing against each other from the
opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited
for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the
visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano
started to make a sharp left turn and when he was
about to reach the center of the right lane, the
motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged
from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC
van. Monterola died.
Issue:WON the negligence of Monterola is the
proximate cause of the accident.
Ruling: The proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor
visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for
the dust to settle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear
chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling
along the lane where he was rightl supposd to be. The
incident occured in an instant. No apreciable time had
elapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clear
opportunity to avoid the collision. However, the
deceased was contributorily negligent in evidently
speeding.
The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory
negligence on the victim's part that warrants a
mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.
PANTRANCO VS BAESA
Pantranco North Express, Inc. V. Maricar Baesa (1989)
G.R. 79050-51 November 14, 1989
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and
Damages)
FACTS:
 Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses
and their son and 7 other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a
picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding
anniversary of the Baesa spouses
 While they were proceeding towards Malalam
River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to
Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
 As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for
their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico,
 died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar
Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions
for damages arising from quasi-delict against
PANTRANCO.
 PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a
proximate cause of the accident and invoked the
defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
 CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby
making David Ico who had the chance to avoid the
collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable
care and competence
HELD: NO.
 Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked
for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a
plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim for damages
 For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly
has the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with
exercise of due care, have been aware of it
 there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver
David Ico knew of the impending danger
 When he saw at a distance that the approaching
bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
shoulder on his right since he must have assumed
that the bus driver will return the bus to its own
lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form
the opposite direction
 Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived
the danger a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
 last clear chance doctrine can never apply where
the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered
GAN VS CA
Gan v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay
Boulevard on July 4, 1972. There were 2 vehicles
parked on the right side of the road. As the
petitioner approached the place where the vehicles
were parked, a vehicle from the opposite direction
tried to overtake another vehicle and encroached
the lane of her car. To avoid collision, the
petitioner swerved to the right and hit a
pedestrian. The pedestrian was pinned to the rear
of the parked jeepney, and died on arrival to the
hospital. Petitioner was found guilty of homicide
through reckless imprudence by the trial court.
The Corut of Appeals modified the decision and
found her guilty of homicide through simple
imprudence.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is negligent as to hold her
guilty for the death of the pedestrian
Held:
We reverse.
The test for determining whether or not a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to
the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution
against its mischievous results and the failure to do
so constitutes negligence. A corollary rule is what
is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under
that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place
of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." Applying the above test to the case at
bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of
Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide
The course of action suggested by the appellate
court would seem reasonable were it not for the
fact that such suggestion did not take into account
the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to
the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that
the suggested course of action presupposes
sufficient time for appellant to analyze the
situation confronting her and to ponder on which
of the different courses of action would result in
the least possible harm to herself and to others.
The appellate court is asking too much from a mere
mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye
had to exercise her best judgment to extricate
herself from a difficult and dangerous situation
caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle.
Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act
with all the coolness of a person under normal
conditions. The danger confronting petitioner was
real and imminent, threatening her very existence.
She had no opportunity for rational thinking but
only enough time to heed the very powerfull
instinct of self-preservation.

MCKEE VS IAC