FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-
II BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., AND REGHIS ROMERO II, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
FACTS: At the time the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan was issued, Smokey Mountain was a wasteland in Balut, Tondo, Manila, where numerous Filipinos resided in subhuman conditions, collecting items that may have some monetary value from the garbage. Pursuant to such issuance, the National Housing Authority (NHA) prepared the feasibility studies of the Smokey Mountain low-cost housing project which resulted in the formulation of the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10. The NHA then entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) for such project. However, as a preliminary step in the project implementation, consultations and dialogues were conducted with the settlers of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite Area. As a result the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) published on April 29 and May 12, 1993 as required by the Environmental Management Bureau of DENR, the evaluation of the DENR, and the recommendations from other government agencies, it was discovered that design changes and additional work have to be undertaken to successfully implement the Project. Thus, on February 21, 1994, the parties entered into another agreement denominated as the Amended and Restated JVA which delineated the different phases of the Project. Phase I of the Project involves the construction of temporary housing units for the current residents of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite, the clearing and leveling- off of the dumpsite, and the construction of medium-rise low-cost housing units at the cleared and leveled dumpsite. Phase II of the Project involves the construction of an incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite. ISSUE: Whether or not Phase II of the project is valid. HELD: No. On June 23, 1999, the Legislature passed the Clean Air Act. The Act made the establishment of an incinerator illegal and effectively barred the implementation of the planned incinerator project under Phase II. Thus, the off-site disposal of the garbage at the Smokey Mountain became necessary. Based on the issues raised in this petition, the Court finds that the March 19, 1993 JVA between NHA and RBI and the SMDRP embodied in the JVA, the subsequent amendments to the JVA and all other agreements signed and executed in relation to it, including, but not limited to, the September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Agreement and the agreement on Phase I of the Project as well as all other transactions which emanated from the Project, have been shown to be valid, legal, and constitutional. Phase II however has been struck down by the Clean Air Act.
GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION AND JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA, G.R. NO. 163663, June 30, 2006
FACTS: In 1994, Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 was issued
by then President Fidel V. Ramos creating an Executive Committee to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in San Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Cavite under the Build- Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site. It subsequently entered into a partnership with Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name JANCOM Environmental Corporation. On February 12, 1997, the aforementioned Executive Committee declared JANCOM as the sole complying bidder for the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site. On December 19, 1997, a Contract for the BOT Implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal Site was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM. On March 5, 1998, President Ramos endorsed the contract submitted to him to then incoming President Joseph E. Estrada. Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefor the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non- availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees. MMDA also called for bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management. ISSUE: Whether or not the GMMSWMC Resolution and MMDA’s act of calling for new bids is valid. HELD: Yes. Although the contract between JANCOM and the Republic is a perfected one, it is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President. Since the contract covers only 3,000 tons of garbage per day while Metro Manila generates at least 6,000 tons of solid waste a day, MMDA may properly bid out the other 3,000 tons of solid waste to other interested groups or entities. Moreover, the amended agreement which requires JANCOM to make adjustments in the Contract in accordance with existing environmental laws and other relevant concerns, and thereafter forward the Amended Agreement for signature and approval by the President is not yet perfected. While there was an initial offer made, there was no acceptance.
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD AND DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, G.R. NO. 158290, October 23, 2006
FACTS: Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) - complex
mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions - have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts. Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs. To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of propane and butane, is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749 or the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel may be issued by the Court. HELD: No. A writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of Natural Gas Vehicles based on the results of the DOTC surveys. Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. It is the firm belief of the Court that it is timely to reaffirm the premium they have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
AZUCENA O. SALALIMA vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 146360, May 20, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner’s husband, Juancho S. Salalima, was employed for
twenty-nine years as a route helper and subsequently as route salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Incorporated. In 1989, during an annual company medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed with minimal pulmonary tuberculosis. His illness remained stationary until October 1994 when Juancho was confined at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital to undergo section biopsy. His biopsy revealed that he had “Adenocarcinoma, poorly differentiated, metastatic”. Consequently, he underwent chemotherapy at the Makati Medical Center. On February 1, 1995, he was found to be suffering from pneumonia. On February 14, 1995, he was confined at the Makati Medical Center. He died two days later on February 16, 1995 due to “Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs with widespread metastasis to Neck, Brain, Peritoneal Cavity, Paracaval Lymph Nodes, Abscen; Acute Renal Failure; Septicemia; Upper Gastrointestinal Bleeding”. A claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his surviving wife with the Social Security System (SSS). Her petition was denied on the ground that Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs (Cancer of the Lungs) had no causal relationship with Juancho’s job as a route salesman. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioner brought the case to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), but the ECC relied upon the Quality Assurance Medical Report prepared by Dr. Ma. Victoria M. Abesamis for the SSS stating that Juancho’s exposure to smog and dust is not associated with the development of lung cancer. Petitioner cited that Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act provides for a comprehensive pollution control policy that mainly concentrates on the prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically proven deleterious effect on the health of individuals. ISSUE: Whether or not Juancho’s death is due to air pollution so as to entitle the petitioner to claim death benefits. HELD: Yes. Medical books list the etiology of lung cancers as follows: cigarette smoking, occupational exposure, air pollution, and other factors such as preexisting lung damage and genetic influences. The respondent government agencies failed to take into consideration Juancho’s medical history in their assessment of the claim for benefits filed by petitioner. For a considerable stretch of Juancho’s stay at Coca- Cola, he was found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. Several months before his demise, he was diagnosed with Adenocarcinoma of the lungs. A little over two weeks before his death, Juancho was afflicted with pneumonia. The obvious deduction is that Juancho, from the time he acquired pulmonary tuberculosis until his passing away, was predisposed to varied lung diseases. It escapes reason as well as one’s sense of equity that Juancho’s heirs should now be denied compensation (death) benefits for the sole reason that his illness immediately before he died was not compensable in his line of work. The picture becomes more absurd when we consider that had Juancho died a few years earlier, when the diagnosis on him revealed only pulmonary tuberculosis, his heirs would not perhaps be going through this arduous path to claim their benefits. Denying petitioner’s claim is tantamount to punishing them for Juancho’s death of a graver illness.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Movants- Intervenors
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Movant-Intervenor
FACTS: In an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance reclassified a particular area in Manila from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies. On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil companies. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance passed is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated as may be clearly read from Sec. 16 of the Local Government Code. The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution. This ordinance was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government, i.e., the promotion of the general welfare. Based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail. CLEAN WATER ACT
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 127, CALOOCAN CITY, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., CITY MAYOR OF CALOOCAN AND/OR THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994
FACTS: On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our
Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. As a result, on December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop, and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. This was pursuant to an investigation, monitoring, and test sampling of the leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 failed to settle the problem. After an investigation by the LLDA, it issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991 order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area. On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite. ISSUE: Whether or not the Cease and Desist order is valid. HELD: Yes. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon, and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration, and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to make, alter, or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution. The immediate response to the demands of the necessities of protecting vital public interests gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution. The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.
RICHARD HIZON, et al. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.119619, December 13, 1996
FACTS: In response to reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal
waters of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing. On September 30, 1992, the Task Force reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by muro ami within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police and members of the Task Force immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain. In the course of thereof, the police saw two foreigners in the captain’s deck whose passports were mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew, and the fishermen to the City for further investigation. October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random samples of fish from the fish cage of the boat for laboratory examination. The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) head office. After some tests, it was found that the specimen gave positive result to Sodium Cyanide, a violent poison. Thereafter, the fishermen were charged with the crime of Illegal Fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance. ISSUE: Whether or not the fishermen were guilty of Illegal Fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance. HELD: No. The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious, or poisonous substances. The statutory prima facie presumption is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing if it is discovered that the substances and the contaminated fish are found in their possession or in their fishing boat. This presumption however was disputed when another test was made by another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila. The test presented a conflicting finding with the first test conducted noting that the specimen from the later test was gathered from the same source as the previous one. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. Moreover, it is suspicious that the apprehending officers stated that the boat was illegally fishing by muro ami when muro ami needs two hundred fishermen to execute. This is made with the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surrounding the net. In this case, what the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997
FACTS: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied. Subsequently, Emiliano Navarro filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was denied on the ground that the property formed part of the public domain, but upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes. On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. The Director of Lands filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in- interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic. Navarro filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he had already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond. ISSUE: Whether or not the accretion is part of the public domain. HELD: Yes. The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948. It is undisputed that in front of Pascual’s land on the northern side is the disputed land where in 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined Pascual’s own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Article 4 thereof provides that lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof. In this light, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENERIO P. VERGARA,
ERNESTO T. CUESTA, JR., PEDRO G. DAGAÑO AND BERNARDO P. CUESTA, ACCUSED. RENERIO P. VERGARA, G.R. No. 110286, April 02, 1997
FACTS: On 04 July 1992, a team composed of deputized Fish Warden
and President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association, Police Officers, and a Fish Examiner of the Department of Agriculture were on board a pumpboat on preventive patrol along the municipal waters of Palo, Leyte, when they chanced upon a blue-colored fishing boat. The boat had on board appellant Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused. They were on parallel course toward the general direction of Samar. Momentarily, the team saw appellant throw into the sea a bottle known in the locality as badil containing ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on top which, when ignited and thrown into the water, could explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and various species of fish within a certain radius. Approximately three seconds after appellant had thrown the badil into the sea, the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with their gear while Dagaño and Cuesta, Jr., stayed on board to tend to the air hose for the divers. The team then approached and boarded the fishing boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or filled with about a kilo of bolinao fish scooped from under the water. Having been caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended and taken by the patrol team to the Bantay-Dagat station at Baras, and later to the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of bolinao, were impounded. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crime of Violation of Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058. HELD: Yes. Section 33 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058 states that it shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity. The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.
GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA