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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 08-md-01916-KAM

IN RE: CHIQUITA BRANDS

INTERNATIONAL, INC. ALIEN
TORTS STATUTE AND
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION
__________________________________________/

This Order relates to:

ATS ACTIONS
__________________________________________/

08-80465-CIV-MARRA (D.C. Action) (Does 1-144)

__________________________________________/

Memorandum in Response to Attorney Collingsworth's Motion

to Sever Claims of Doe 46 [DE 2322], and in Support of Cross-Motion
to Disqualify Collingsworth from Representing Does 1-144

Paul Wolf, DC Bar #480285

Attorney for Plaintiffs
PO Box 21840
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 431-6986
paulwolf@yahoo.com

March 27, 2019

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... i.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................ 5

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 5

A. The stipulation entered into by Wolf and Collingsworth isn't binding

on the Court. .................................................................................................. 5

B. Does 1-144 have chosen Paul Wolf as their attorney, and are entitled
to counsel of their choice. ............................................................................. 7

C. If Collingsworth ever had power of representation, he abandoned

Does 1-144 by never contacting them. .......................................................... 8

1. Collingsworth was terminated from Conrad & Scherer, LLP,

and stopped working with Wolf over ten years ago. ......................... 9

D. Collingsworth and Conrad & Scherer have bribed key witnesses

in this case and others. .................................................................................. 10

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1993) ....................................... 5

Cadet v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 853 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1042 (2018) ......................................................................... 8

Cole v. Ruidoso Municipal Schools, 43 F.3d 1373 (10th Cir.1994) ........................ 11

Drummond v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP, 885 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2018) ................ 11

Hermann v. Gutter Guard, Inc., 199 Fed. App’x 745 (11th Cir. 2006) ................... 10

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) .................................................................. 8

Kirchner, Moore Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 940, 1970 WL2264 (1970),

aff'd, 448 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1971) ........................................................................ 6

In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 2003) .............................................. 7, 10

In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.1992) ............................................ 11

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) ................................................................ 8

Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012) ................................................................... 8-9

Meat Price Investigators Ass’n v. Spencer Foods, Inc.,

572 F.2d 163 (8th Cir.1978) ...................................................................................... 11

McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983) ...................... 7

Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988) ........................................................................... 5

Noel Shows, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 327 (11th Cir.1983) ............................ 6

Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d 1299 (MDAL 1998) ................................................ 11

Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Ciba Seeds, 933 F.Supp. 514 (M.D.N.C.1996) ............. 10

Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980) ......................... 7

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) .................................................................... 7

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Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731 F.Supp. 724 (E.D.Va.1990) ........... 10

United States v. One 1978 Bell Jet Ran. Helicopter,

707 F.2d 461 (11th Cir. 1983) ................................................................................... 6

STATUTES

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) .................. 8

LOCAL RULES

S.D. Fla. L.R. 11.1 (d) (3) .......................................................................................... 4

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Rule 1.5 B (e) of the D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility .............................. 10

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INTRODUCTION

Attorney Collingsworth's Motion to Sever the Claim of Doe 46 should be considered after

the Court determines who has power of representation over the first 142 plaintiffs. 1 We recently

scanned 2,148 pages of documents in our files from 139 of the first 142 plaintiffs. 2 See Exhibit 1,

attached hereto, Declaration of Paul Wolf, Esq. Plaintiffs are producing them to Chiquita and

separately filing them under seal, pursuant to the Court's Order, DE 2144. To the best of my

knowledge, neither Mr. Collingsworth nor Conrad & Scherer, LLP have ever had any contact with

these individuals, other than Does 46 and 135, whom Conrad & Scherer contacted without telling

us, and brought to Florida for depositions.3

On my trip to Colombia for this case, I took the cases of 142 victims of both the AUC and

the FARC, during the times when Chiquita was paying each group. Unlike other plaintiffs'

counsel, I didn't believe that Chiquita's liability would be limited to the 1997-2004 range of

payments described in detail in the Factual Proffer.4 Many of the first 144 cases involved FARC

murders, which were described as such in the complaint.5 Mr. Collingsworth and/or Conrad &

Scherer apparently included them in their bellwether pool, and one of the FARC-committed

1
The cases of Does 102, 103, 104 are anomalous. They are three different murder cases
represented by the same plaintiff. I had believed that the first complaint contained 173 murder
cases, brought by 144 plaintiffs, but in fact there were only 142 plaintiffs in this complaint. Wolf
Decl. at ¶16.
2
After twelve years of copying and backing up these files to various laptops and USB drives, the
files of three cases were corrupted, including those of Does 71, 77, and 143. I have hard copies of
them in storage in Colorado. Wolf Decl. at ¶15.
3
See Counsel's Motion to Enjoin Conrad & Scherer, DE 1925.
4
The documents later uncovered by the National Security Archive, then in discovery in the Julin
case, have proven me right. Chiquita paid whichever illegal groups wanted money from them,
which depended on where those groups exercised control.
5
The following cases of Does 1-144 were also committed by the FARC, rather than the AUC:
Doe 32, 37, 38, 58, 62, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 94, 96, 98, 102, 103,
104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 115, 121, 123, 125, 129, 132, 133 and 140. That is 38 out of the first
173 cases, or about 20%.
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murders was selected. Now Mr. Collingsworth doesn't want it to be a bellwether case, 6 and Conrad

& Scherer, LLP isn't mentioned in his motion.

The bellwether selection process wasn't statistical, but appears designed to produce

examples of the strongest (plaintiff-selected) and weakest (defendant-selected) cases in a pool of

over 7500. In our Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, we described three

simple fact patterns, supported by the expert testimony of the FBI case agent in the criminal case,

to show how each murder could be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Sealed Exhibit

4 to Opposition. DE 2535. In our Revised Statement of Facts, we listed them as Facts Not

Genuinely in Dispute, since Chiquita hasn't developed any evidence to the contrary. The

bellwether cases should represent common situations that simplify summary judgment

determinations of the thousands of other cases, and resolve as many issues as possible before trial.

It may be that the Doe 46 case is too different from the others to be useful in the bellwether process.

In that case, it should just be replaced by another case chosen by Chiquita (who presumably chose

Doe 46).

If Mr. Collingsworth doesn't want to litigate the facts of Doe 46's case, then I should be

able to. Hundreds of Plaintiffs in the Does 1-2146 Complaint are for cases occurring between

1995-1996, which also require additional payment evidence, similar to what was developed in

Julin. These cases, at least,7 will require litigation of Chiquita's payments to illegal groups before

6
Collingsworth would like the jury to hear that Chiquita paid the AUC, but not that Chiquita also
paid the FARC. This is only half the truth, and appears intended to prove that Chiquita was in a
conspiracy with the AUC against the FARC. However, the whole truth is that Chiquita paid all
these groups because it was the easiest solution for them. Once the AUC took over Uraba, Chiquita
received protection from them against the FARC.
7
I still represent 254 victims of the FARC, in case 11-80405-CIV-MARRA, whose claims have
never been dismissed. If the Court finds that Ohio had the most significant relationship and applied
the Ohio wrongful death statute, that statute would import the Colombian statute of limitations
For certain crimes associated with the internal conflict, Colombian law has no statute of
limitations.
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1997. If Collingsworth believes these FARC-committed cases will harm his others, then he has a

conflict of interest.

However, instead of just severing this single case, the Court should determine who has

power of representation over Does 1-144, and sever Does 1-144 from Mr. Collingsworth's 1500+

other cases, so that I can have them remanded back to the District of Columbia for trial. Although

I stipulated that Attorney Collingsworth (not Conrad & Scherer) would be lead counsel in that

complaint, neither has done anything to establish an attorney client relationship with the plaintiffs

since. The clients believe that I am their lawyer. The Court may determine representation based

on evidence of the plaintiffs' wishes, and whom they've been working with for the last twelve

years.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the outset of this MDL proceeding, Attorney Terrence Collingsworth, at that time a

managing member of Conrad & Scherer, and Attorney Paul Wolf submitted competing

applications for designation as lead counsel to Does 1-144. Each acknowledged a joint

representation agreement between them as to this client pool, while disagreeing on designation of

lead counsel. Ultimately, the Court designated Collingsworth, then of Conrad Scherer, as lead

counsel for Does 1-144, based in part on a written stipulation approving the designation signed by

me . See DE 1201, 124, 125, 136, 137, 144 and 147.

On December 18, 2015, Conrad Scherer filed a Motion for Substitution of Counsel, seeking

to substitute "International Rights Advocates" in place of Conrad & Scherer, LLP as counsel for

Plaintiffs Does 1-144,. DE 965. As grounds, the motion stated that Attorney Terrence

Collingsworth, appearing for Conrad & Scherer as one of several counsel of record for Plaintiffs

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in this action, had left the firm and assumed employment at International Rights Advocates. 8 Id.

By Order entered January 14, 2016, the Court denied the motion without prejudice due to Conrad

Scherer’s failure to comply with the client notice requirements of S.D. Fla. L.R. 11.1 (d) (3) [DE

989]. On March 3, 2016, Conrad & Scherer filed a renewed motion to withdraw, stating that it

was in the process of implementing a plan to notify all Plaintiffs of the proposed substitution via

a joint letter issued by Conrad Scherer and Terrence Collingsworth [DE 1011].

In its final report [DE 328] and reply brief [DE 340], Conrad Scherer stated that it did not

deliver notice to Does 1-144, nor does it have contact information for any individuals in this group,

the control of which is reportedly claimed by Attorney Paul Wolf. See Order, DE 1201 at 3.

Conrad Scherer also asked to be excused of any obligation to notify this group in light of the

authority asserted by undersigned counsel. Order, id. at 3 n 1. Although the Court has denied two

motions to withdraw by Conrad & Scherer, they have not joined in Collingsworth's motion to

sever. Conrad & Scherer, LLP contacted two of Does 1-144 and brought them to Florida for

depositions, but their relationship to Collingsworth at this time is unclear.

On October 5, 2018, the court issued a paperless order granting Plaintiffs' [1959] Motion

for Leave to File Evidence of Representation of Does 1-144 Under Seal. DE 2144. Counsel would

have filed this motion earlier, but it has taken time to organize the 2,148 pages of exhibits, and

some documents could still not be located. However, since the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to

remand with leave to refile the motion after summary judgment motions have been decided, the

time is ripe to determine the fate of these plaintiffs.

8
Does 1-144 contend that International Rights Advocates has been an alter ego of Conrad &
Scherer, although their current relationship is unclear.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court has discretion whether to set aside the stipulation between counsel that

Collingsworth would be "lead counsel" for Does 1-144, and should set it aside because

Collingsworth has never established an attorney-client relationship with any of them, despite

nearly 12 years of litigation. Collingsworth and Wolf have not really communicated in the last ten

years, and have certainly not worked together on these cases. Wolf is submitting 2,148 pages of

contracts and client documents for these cases and filing them under seal. It is up to the client,

not the attorney, who will represent her.

Conrad & Scherer have no power of representation, have tried to withdraw from the

Chiquita case twice, and haven't joined in Collingsworth's Motion to Sever the Claim of Doe 46.

None of the 2,148 pages of documents in Sealed Exhibits 1-7 refer to Conrad & Scherer at all.

This is because Collingsworth started working for Conrad & Scherer after I had already met with

the first clients and filed the first complaint. Any transfer of or change in the representation must

be done with the informed consent of the client, which Conrad & Scherer never attempted to do.

ARGUMENT

A. The stipulation entered into by Wolf and Collingsworth isn't binding on the Court.

While stipulations aren't to be set aside lightly, courts have broad discretion in determining

whether to hold a party to a stipulation. Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988). In Morrison, the parties had stipulated to an amount of

liquidated damages that wasn't calculated correctly. The 11th Circuit upheld the district court's

relieving the defendant of the burden of the stipulation. Similarly, in Blohm v. Commissioner,

994 F.2d 1542, 1552 (11th Cir. 1993), the government moved for relief from the binding effect of

pre-trial stipulations of fact, arguing that the evidence didn't support the stipulations. Noting that

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it wasn't bound by facts contrary to evidence in the record, and relying on Kirchner, Moore Co. v.

Commissioner, 54 T.C. 940, 1970 WL 2264 (1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1971), the trial

court granted the motion, which was upheld on appeal.

A stipulation by the parties to a lawsuit as to questions of law isn't binding on the trial

court, and may not even be relevant. United States v. One 1978 Bell Jet Ran. Helicopter, 707 F.2d

461 (11th Cir. 1983). In Noel Shows, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 327 (11th Cir.1983), the trial

court excluded evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as cumulative and confusing to the

jury, even though the parties had stipulated it was admissibile. The 11th Circuit found that the

admissibility of evidence was a question of law, and that the stipulation between the parties wasn't

binding on the court. The Court of Appeals then analyzed the admissibility of the evidence and

ruled on the legal issue on the merits.

Here, the question of power of representation over Does 1-144 is primarily a question of

fact. Sealed Exhibits 1-7 demonstrate that each of Does 1-144 have signed an agreement with Paul

Wolf in 2007. Mr. Collingsworth's name appears on the agreeements, but he didn't sign them,

didn't meet with the clients, and can't read Spanish. Most of the case files in Sealed Exhibits 1-7

contain other documents as well, and subsequent contracts showing that Wolf and his staff have

had an enduring relationship with these plaintiffs over the past 12 years. Wolf is unaware that

Collingsworth has ever met any of them. 9

There is also a legal question, which is whether power of representation is transferrable or

assignable. It is not, without the client's informed consent. For this reason, Conrad & Scherer

9
When I made a similar comment about Conrad & Scherer, LLP, they filed two Rule 11 motions
against me, which the Court denied. Conrad & Scherer then disclosed they had contacted two of
Does 1-144, which I didn't know before, and brought them to Florida for depositions. Conrad &
Scherer claim that Collingsworth no longer works for them and I don't know if Collingsworth was
involved in with these two plaintiffs.
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have never had any power of representation, to take the depositions of Doe 46 and Doe 135, which

were done without even notifying me.

B. Does 1-144 have chosen Paul Wolf as their attorney, and are entitled to counsel of
their choice.

A party is presumptively entitled to counsel of her choice. In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d

941, 961 (11th Cir. 2003). The right to choose one's own counsel arises in the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel implied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Powell v. Alabama,

287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1117 (5th Cir.

1980) (recognizing that due process guarantee of right to counsel extends to civil as well as

criminal proceedings). However, "[w]hile the right to counsel is fundamental, there is no absolute

right to a particular lawyer," McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1262 n. 21 (5th

Cir. 1983). “Because a party is presumptively entitled to the counsel of his choice, that right may

be overridden only if ‘compelling reasons’ exist.”

Here, undersigned counsel has personally met with each and every one of Does 1-144.

Terry Collingsworth and Conrad & Scherer have met with, at most two of them, who were brought

to Florida for depositions without telling me.10 As proof, 2148 pages of documents are being filed

under seal, and are listed at Exhibit 1, attached hereto. For each case, there is a scan of the original

retainer agreement signed by Attorney Wolf and each client. None of these agreements even

mention Conrad & Scherer. They mention myself, Terrence Collingsworth and Bob Childs, an

attorney I have never met, who was supposed to fund the litigation. Collingsworth's name

appearing on these contracts doesn't create an attorney-client relationship. Conrad & Scherer have

no power of representation because retainer agreements for legal services are not assignable.

10
I discovered this only after Conrad & Scherer filed two Motions for Rule 11 Sanctions against
me, for erroneously stating that they hadn't met any of Does 1-144.
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Collingsworth's purported transfer of power of representation to Conrad & Scherer, LLP was done

without Does 1-144's informed consent.

C. If Collingsworth ever had power of representation, he abandoned Does 1-144 by never

contacting them.

In contrast, with the exceptions of Does 46 and 135, neither Attorney Collingsworth nor

Conrad & Scherer, LLP, have ever met with any of Does 1-144. Any power of representation that

my initial retainer agreements might have conferred Mr. Collingsworth were abandoned by

Collingsworth by never contacting the plaintiffs in the last twelve years.

In Cadet v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 853 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 2017), cert.

denied, 138 S. Ct. 1042 (2018), the 11th Circuit considered en banc the question of whether an

attorney's failure to file a habeas corpus petition within the one-year time period allowed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), could be attributed to the

client in the absence of a real attorney client relationsip. The court analyzed three Supreme Court

decisions that treat this common mistake; Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007), Holland v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010), and Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 283 (2012). Although

counsel in Cadet had failed to respond to all of his client's letters, it did not amount to an "effective

abandonment of the attorney-client relationship.” Id. at 18-22. The Court found this standard,

"effective abandonment," cited in these three Supreme Court cases governed whether equitable

tolling would apply to counsel's failure to file the petition on time.

The petitioner in Holland had “urged that attorney negligence was not the gravamen of his

complaint.” Maples, 565 U.S. at 282 (discussing Holland). Abandonment was. Id. Holland had

“asserted that his lawyer had detached himself from any trust relationship with [him] ... [and had]

abandoned [him]....” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Maples Court thereby characterized

Holland as a case of attorney abandonment, not one of gross negligence, emphasizing that it had

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involved “counsel’s near-total failure to communicate with petitioner or to respond to petitioner’s

many inquiries and requests over a period of several years.” Id. (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 659

(Alito, J., concurring)). “[U]under well-settled principles of agency law,” a client “bears the risk

of negligent conduct on the part of his [attorney]” and, for that reason, is ordinarily bound by

counsel’s failure to meet a filing deadline. Id. at 280–81. The Court held, however, that “[a]

markedly different situation is presented ... when an attorney abandons his client without notice”

and thereby “sever[s] the principal-agent relationship,” at which point counsel’s “acts or omissions

. . . cannot fairly be attributed to [the client].” Id. at 281. The Maples court adopted Justice Alito’s

view that “under agency principles, a client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an

attorney who has abandoned him...” Id. at 282-283. The Supreme Court then analyzed “whether

Maples ha[d] shown that his attorneys of record abandoned him, thereby supplying the

‘extraordinary circumstances beyond his control’ necessary to lift the state procedural bar to his

federal petition.” Id. at 283. In Cadet, the 11th Circuit analyzed these cases in detail, id. at *10-

22, but found that the attorney had persistently misunderstood the statute, rather than forgetting

about the deadline or abandoning the client. In the absence of a real attorney client relationship,

none of Collingsworth's acts in Does 1-144s' names can be attributed to them.

1. Collingsworth was terminated from Conrad & Scherer, LLP, and stopped
working with Wolf over ten years ago.

When two attorneys agree to jointly represent a client, their relationship in that case is the

same as the relationship between partners in a law firm. If one of the lawyers should then join a

different law firm, it is as though he had left his previous law firm (the joint representation).

Whether he can take the old firm's clients with him to the new firm ultimately depends on the

client.

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Rule 1.5 B (e) of the D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility states that when lawyers

not in the same firm jointly represent a client, the client must be advised in writing of the identity

of the lawyers who will participate in the representation and give informed consent. "Conrad

Scherer admits it has no contact information, yet does not indicate what efforts it has made to

secure this information from Attorney Wolf, who it identifies as a repository of this information.

... By its own admission, it has taken no steps to notify Does 1-144, nor has it taken any affirmative

action to secure relevant contact information from Mr. Wolf." DE 1201 at 7. Although the Court

wrote this in 2016, other than for two bellwether plaintiffs who appeared in Florida, it remains true

today.

D. Collingsworth and Conrad & Scherer have bribed key witnesses in this case and
others.

In certain circumstances, a lawyer may be disqualified from representing a client, even

without the client's consent. However, “[b]ecause a party is presumptively entitled to the counsel

of his choice, that right may be overridden only if ‘compelling reasons’ exist.” In re BellSouth

Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 961 (11th Cir. 2003). The standard governing a motion to disqualify is

derived from two sources of authority: the substance of the local rules of the court in which the

case appears, and federal common law. Hermann v. Gutter Guard, Inc., 199 Fed. App’x 745, 752

(11th Cir. 2006).

The right of a person to choose their own lawyer isn't absolute, and may be overcome in a

Motion for Disqualification by a showing that the chosen attorney falls short of the ethical or

professional standards of the legal community. Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731

F.Supp. 724, 729 (E.D.Va.1990) (“There must be a balance between the client’s free choice of

counsel and the maintenance of the highest ethical and professional standards in the legal

community.”); Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Ciba Seeds, 933 F.Supp. 514, 517 (M.D.N.C.1996)

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(“The guiding principle in considering a motion to disqualify counsel is safeguarding the integrity

of the court proceedings; the purpose of granting such motions is to eliminate the threat that the

litigation will be tainted.”). In Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d 1299 (MDAL 1998), the 11th Circuit

followed the reasoning of the 8th, that “three competing interests must be balanced: (1) the client’s

interest in being represented by counsel of its choice; (2) the opposing party’s interest in a trial

free from prejudice due to disclosures of confidential information; and (3) the public’s interest in

the scrupulous administration of justice.” Id. at 1304, quoting Meat Price Investigators Ass’n v.

Spencer Foods, Inc., 572 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir.1978). The 11th Circuit also noted that other

courts also use a similar test that considers a motion to disqualify by first looking at the rules

governing attorney conduct, and then considers those “‘in light of the public interest and the

litigants’ rights.’” Id., citing Cole v. Ruidoso Municipal Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th

Cir.1994) (quoting In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir.1992)). Here, the

misconduct goes beyond not contacting the plaintiffs for twelve years, and includes bribing

criminals in Colombian prisons, laundering money, and lying to the Alabama Court about the

payments. Drummond v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP, 885 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2018).

The Court denied Conrad & Scherer's second motion to withdraw, partly on the basis that

it was at that time unable to determine whether, in light of the bribery of Colombian paramilitary

witnesses, Collingsworth might be called as a witness and therefore be unable to serve as counsel.

"It is impossible to assess, before discovery on the witness payment issue is complete,
whether Mr. Collingsworth may become a potential witness in the case, or other potential
grounds for disqualification may evolve, developments which would plainly militate
against the proposed substitution. To be clear, the Court is making no finding and
expressing no opinion on misconduct of any kind attributable to Mr. Collingsworth or any
other party touching upon this issue at this juncture. The Court has simply concluded that,
until discovery on the witness payments issue in this case is completed, it is premature to
consider the proposed substitution." DE 1201 at 6.

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While Chiquita didn't seek to depose Collingsworth in this case, there are still grounds for

disqualification based on his conduct in this case and in Drummond. Without going into all these

details, Collingsworth was caught red-handed paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to

paramilitary witnesses in this case and in Drummond.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should GRANT Collingsworth's Motion to Sever, but

also sever the claims of all Does 1-144, and disqualify Collingworth from representing them.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Paul Wolf

_______________________
Paul Wolf, DC Bar #480285
Attorney for Plaintiffs
PO Box 21840
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 431-6986
fax: n/a
paulwolf@yahoo.com

March 27, 2019

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on this 27th day of March, 2019, I filed the foregoing document, and
all exhibits thereto, including Sealed Exhibits 1-7 filed under seal, with the Clerk of the Court
using the Court's Electronic Case Filing (ECF) system, which will send electronic notices to all
persons entitled to receive them.

/s/ Paul Wolf

_________________
Paul Wolf

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