START OF 2ND BATCH

1. Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 483, G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

Doctrine:
Civil Law; Action; Damages; To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff.—However, the mere fact
that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant,
and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the harm which results from the injury and
damages are the compensation awarded for the damage suffered.—There is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.

To maintain an action for injuries, plaintiff must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff.—In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which
the defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by
the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state
that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.

The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong.—Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage
or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no
cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.
The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong.

In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must not only be hurtful, but
also wrongful.—In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that
act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many
cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without
sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the
damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.

Civil Law; Article 21, Civil Code; Principle of Abuse of Right; Requisites.—In the case at bar, although
there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners
could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of
right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

There is no cause of action for lawful acts done by one person on his property although such acts
incidentally caused damage or loss to another.—A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment
of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually
applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his
own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an
unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of
property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as
fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the
inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.

One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may
cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor.—The proper exercise of a lawful
right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage
to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful
purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the
latter’s favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give
no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful
end by lawful means.

Facts: Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other
immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property. One
of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe fence in the
apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses.
Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire passageway, therefore, the passageway was
enclosed.

Petitioners claim that they built the wall in order to protect their persons and their property from their
intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that an easement be created.

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court by
awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages (p30,000.00) and exemplary damages
(p10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized
rentals on the property due to the adobe wall restricting access.

Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper

Ruling: The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. The award of damages was based solely on
the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals
when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway, but the mere
fact of loss does not give rise right to recover damages.

To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

For the plaintiff to maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that it
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff. The basis for the awarding of
tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. In order that the law
will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must
be damnum et injuria.

Respondents committed no abuse of right in setting up the fence for the following requisites were not
present:
 The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy;
 The acts should be willful.
 There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

Their act of constructing the fence was a valid exercise of their rights as owners and the law recognizes
that they have the right to enjoy and dispose the thing without other limitations than that established
by law.

At the time, when they constructed the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. As a general rule,
therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and
proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such
damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.

2. Phil. School of Business Administration vs. Court of Appeals

205 SCRA 729, G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

Doctrine:
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that the damage should have been
caused by pupils or students of the educational institution.—Article 2180, in conjunction with Article
2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the
afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In
all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist
in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.

Facts: Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable for the death of
Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student who was stabbed while on the premises of PSBA by
elements from outside the school. Private respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging
the school and its officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during, and
after the attack on the victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were denied by the trial court.
CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180 (in loco
parentis)
Whether or not the application of the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre-existing contract

Ruling: The SC did not agree with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law
(Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while
in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated,
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school could have been made
liable.

IS PSBA EXCULPATED FROM LIABILITY?

It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. Moreover, there is that “built-in” obligation to provide students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. The school must ensure
that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent
the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos,
the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is bound to another
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art. 21 of the Civil Code comes to mind, so that
should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and violative of Art. 21, then there is a
cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos had been
breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures.

3. Air France vs. Carrascoso

18 SCRA 155, No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

Doctrine:
Common carriers; Contracts; First class tickets.—A written document speaks a uniform language; the
spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between
passenger and air carrier, adherence to the terms of a ticket is desirable.

Same; Damages; Moral damages; Trial; Bad faith in breach of contract of carriage.—Where at the
start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard that he intended to prove that, while
sitting in the plane in Bangkok, the respondent was ousted .by petitioner's manager, who gave his seat
to a white man, and evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without
objection on the part of the petitioner, it is therefore unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there
is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the
complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.

Same; Exemplary damages.—The New Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept.

Same; Attorney's fees.—The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages
justifies a similar judgment for attorney's fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt
that it is but just and equitable that attorneys’ fees be given. We do not intend to break tradition that
discretion well exercised—as it was here—should not be disturbed.

Facts: On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.

When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager],
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"
and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary
damages.

Issue: Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he
was entitled to the damages awarded.

Ruling: Yes to both. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from
petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and
complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but
that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It
will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in
the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a
schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language;
that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between
passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower
courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. Why, then,
was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if another had a
better right to the seat?

To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that
there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is
there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to
establish the relation between the parties.

But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to
whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right
to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary
damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

4. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals

237 SCRA 761, G.R. No. 112576 (CA-GR CV No. 26571) October 26, 1994

Doctrine:
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every
kind of obligation is demandable.—Clearly, petitioner bank was remiss in its duty and obligation to
treat private respondents’ account with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of
their relationship. The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. It must bear the blame
for failing to discover the mistake of its employee despite the established procedure requiring bank
papers to pass through bank personnel whose duty it is to check and countercheck them for possible
errors. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is
demandable.

The bank’s negligence although not have been attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless, it
caused serious anxiety, embarassment and humiliation to private respondents.—While the bank’s
negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless, it caused serious
anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled to recover
reasonable moral damages.

Damage to private respondents’ reputation and social standing entitles them to moral damages.—The
damage to private respondents’ reputation and social standing entitles them to moral damages. Moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Temperate or moderate damages
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that there has been
such loss.

Moral and temperate damages are not awarded to penalize the petitioner but to compensate the
respondents for injuries suffered as a result of the former’s fault and negligence.—Moral and temperate
damages which are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation are not awarded to penalize the petitioner
but to compensate the respondents for injuries suffered as a result of the former’s fault and negligence,
taking into account the latter’s credit and social standing in the banking community, particularly since
this is the very first time such humiliation has befallen private respondents. The amount of such losses
need not be established with exactitude, precisely due to their nature.

Facts: Isabel Katigbak, president and owner of 65% shares of Rural Bank of Padre Garcia, Inc., maintains
current accounts with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. MBTC received from Central Bank a credit
memo that its demand deposit account was credited with P304k for the account of RBPG, representing
loans granted by the CB. On the basis of credit memo, Katigbak issued several checks against its account
with MBTC, two of which were payable to Dr. and Mrs. Roque.

The checks were deposited with Philippine Banking Corp. however the same bounced when they were
forwarded to MBTC. It was twice dishonored. Dr. Roque went to RBPG for the bounced checks. RBPG
paid Dr. Roque an amount of P50k representing the checks. Katigbak, who was on vacation in Hongkong
with her family, received overseas call from Mrs. Maris Katigbak-San Juan at her residence in Makati
that Mr. Dungo, Asst. Cashier of MBTC, berating her about the bounced checks and saying “Nag-issue
kayo ng tseke, wala naming pondo”.

Mrs. San Juan was instructed by Katigbak to check and verify regarding the credit memo of CB for P304K
in favor of RBPG as she was certain that the checks were covered by the credit memo. Mrs. San Juan
another insulting phone call from Mr. Dungo (“Bakit kayo nag-iisue ng tseke na wala namang pondo,
P300K na”). He also brushed aside the request to check and verify the credit memo, telling her
sarcastically that he was very sure that no such credit memo existed. Katigbak had to cut short her
vacation and went back home. She then called MBTC and she was able to talk to Mr. Dungo who
arrogantly said “Bakit kayo magagalit, wala naman kayog pondo?” This shocked Katigbak which caused
her blood pressure to rise to a dangerous level and she had to undergo medical treatment at the Makati
Medical Center for two days.

MBTC did not only dishonored the check, it also issued four debit memos representing service and
penalty charges for the returned checks. Katigbak filed the civil case in RTC Lipa against MBTC for
damages. RTC rendered decision in favor of petitioner. The same was affirmed by CA with deletion as to
temperate damages, and deduction as to amount of moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents RBPG and Isabel Rodriguez are legally entitled to moral
damages and attorney’s fees because of the negligent act of MBTC

Ruling: Yes. The case at bench was instituted to seek damages caused by the dishonor through
negligence of respondent bank’s checks which were actually sufficiently funded, and the insults from
petitioner bank’s officer directed against private respondent Isabel R. Katigbak.

There is no merit in petitioner’s argument that it should not be considered negligent, much less be held
liable for damages on account of inadvertence of its bank employee as Art. 1173 of the Civil Code only
requires it to exercise the diligence of a good pater familias. The dishonoring of the respondent’s checks
committed through negligence by the petitioner was rectified nine days after receipt of the credit
memo. MBTC was remiss in its duty and obligation to treat private respondent account with the highest
degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The bank is under the obligation to
treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is demandable.

While the bank’s negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless, it
caused serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to private respondents for which they are
entitled to recover reasonable moral damages. Insult was added to injury by petitioner bank’s issuance
of debit memoranda representing service and penalty charges for the returned checks, not to mention
the insulting remarks from its Asst. Cashier. Moral and temperate damages which are not susceptible of
pecuniary estimation are not awarded to penalize the petitioner but to compensate the respondents
from injuries suffered as a result of the former’s fault and negligence.

The carelessness of petitioner bank, aggravated by the lack of promptness in repairing the error and the
arrogant attitude of the bank officer handling the matter, justifies the grant of moral damages, which
are clearly not excessive and unconscionable. AFFIRMED.

5. Elcano vs. Hill

77 SCRA 98, No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

Doctrine:
Civil law; Damages; Quasi-delicts; The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character, whether voluntary or negligent.—Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon
a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia—that the concurrence of the Penal Code
and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplates only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts—deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so
limited, but that in fact is actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a
case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here
at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations “which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter 11, Title XV of
this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)” And it is precisely the underlined qualification, “not punishable
by law,” that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of
the letter of the law that “killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life” hence, the ruling that “(W)e will
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or causi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.” And so, because Justice Bocobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted
that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, “not
punishable by law,” thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.

A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim do not recover damages on both
scores.—. . . It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
him.

The vicarious liability of the parents on account of a delict committed by their minor child is not
extinguished by the fact that said, child who is Hiring with and dependent upon said parents is
married.—Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald’s emancipation by marriage on
the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. . . . . It must be borne in
mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue
or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id.,
Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a
minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent, (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in Our considered
view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty.
Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.

Facts: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). At the time of the occurrence,
Reginald Hill was married and was living with and getting subsistence from his father, Marvin Hill. Elcano
filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with
mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his father, Marvin Hill, for damages based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the
criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son
is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

Marvin Hill filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against
him, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
The trial court initially denied his motion but subsequently ordered the dismissal of the case when a
motion for reconsideration was filed. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though
a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married?

Ruling: 1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case.

In Barredo vs. Garcia, it was held that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
 “Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be idemnified only through the principle of civil
liability arising from a crime.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium."

A civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted from a criminal act.
As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. Yes. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327,
Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were
of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the
other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does
not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.
(See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
6. Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
191 SCRA 195, G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Doctrine:
Quasi-delicts; Elements of quasi-delict.—A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows
that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.

There is an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners; Case at bar.—Clearly, from petitioners’ complaint, the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and
the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be
the basis for the recovery of damages.

The recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence and the causal connection between
the act and the damage, with no preexisting contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.—While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the
public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact ramains that
petitioners’ complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of
the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and
the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover
damages on both scores.—Article 2176, whenever it refers to “fault or negligence”, covers not only acts
“not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary.

The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.—In the case of
Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from a delict or crime—a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrele vant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where
the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which
is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of
respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed,
which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against officers and directors of the respondent
corporation for destruction by means of inundation. Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners
filed a civil case against respondent corporation for damages before the same court.

Respondent corporation filed motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action until after judgment in the
criminal case. Trial court dismissed the civil case and the Appellate Court affirmed such decision. Hence,
this petition for certiorari. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in
dismissing civil case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.

Issue: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held
civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.

Ruling: YES. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the
parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual
and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
7. Dulay vs. Court of Appeals
243 SCRA 220, G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

Doctrine:
Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.—Contrary to the theory of private
respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. On
March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code cannot lie since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued
that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability.

Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees.

On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss
and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did
not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any
negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the
performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of
the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere
conclusions of law.

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s
act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.

Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability
is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary
civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may
therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent
SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express
reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private
respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a
quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature
of the petitioner's cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not the right to recover damages under Article 2176 of the NCC is limited to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence

Ruling: An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners
herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.

Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article
33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case
(supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is
charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged
with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both

The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits.
This decision is immediately executory.

8. Gan vs. Court of Appeals

165 SCRA 378, No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
Doctrine:
Criminal Law; Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence; Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Test for
Determining Negligence Resulting in Injury or Damages; Failure to take precautions to avoid the
mischievous results of a person’s course of action constitutes negligence.—The test for determining
whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.

Emergency Rule, Defined.—A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. “Under
that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence,
if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

Facts: Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of
house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one
side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven
by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming
from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of
it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision with
the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of
the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north,
pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney
to move forward hitting the rear of the parked truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota
Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front parts, and the truck
sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of Isidoro Casino was immediately
brought to the hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.

Issue: Did the CA erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly towards her, she
should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should have also
stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a pedestrian?

Ruling: Yes. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury
or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of
the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take
precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.

Applying the emergency rule (as defined above), petitioner is not guilty of the crime. The amount of
time afforded to the petitioner to react to the situation she was in should be taken into account for it is
undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the
situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the
least possible harm to herself and to others.

Under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too much
from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to
extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle.
Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal
conditions. The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence.
She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerful instinct of
self-preservation.

Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal
limits. We therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case
at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident
under consideration.

9. Mandarin Villa, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

257 SCRA 538, G.R. No. 119850 June 20, 1996

Doctrine:
Negligence; Test for determining existence of negligence.—The test for determining the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

Facts: Atty. Clodualdo de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at petitioner’s restaurant, the Mandarin
Villa Seafiood Village. After dinner the waiter handed him the bill in the amount of P2,658.50. Atty. De
Jesus offered to pay through his BANKARD credit card. The card was accepted however after validation
the waiter returned and audibly informed Atty. De Jesus that his credit card had expired. Atty. De Jesus
replied saying that the same is about to expire on September 1990 as embossed on its face. Atty. De
Jesus and his two guests went to cashier to verify again the card. The computer said “CARD EXPIRED”.
They then returned to their table. Prof. Lirag, another guest, uttered the following remarks: “ Clody, may
problema ba? Baka kailangang maghugas na kame ng pinggan?”. He then left to get his BPI Express
Credit card from his car. The same was honored and accepted. After the incident, he instituted the civil
suit for damages against BANKARD and petitioner. The trial court ordered the defendants to pay Atty.
De Jesus jointly and severally for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. The CA modified
the decision finding petitioner solely liable for the damages, reduced the monetary award for moral and
exemplary damages, and deleting the award for attorney’s fees.

Issue: WON petitioner was negligent; If negligent, WON such negligence was the proximate cause of
private respondent’s damage.

Ruling: YES. Petitioner, however, argues that private respondent’s own negligence in not bringing with
him sufficient cash was the proximate cause of his damage. It likewise sought exculpation by contending
that the remark of Professor Lirag is a supervening event and at the same time the proximate cause of
private respondent’s injury.

We find this contention also devoid of merit. While it is true that private respondent did not have
sufficient cash on hand when he hosted a dinner at petitioner’s restaurant, this fact alone does not
constitute negligence on his part. Neither can it be claimed that the same was the proximate cause of
private respondent’s damage. We take judicial notice of the current practice among major
establishments, petitioner included, to accept payment by means of credit cards in lieu of cash. Thus,
petitioner accepted private respondent’s BPI Express Credit Card after verifying its validity, a fact which
all the more refutes petitioner’s imputation of negligence on the private respondent.

test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The Point
of Sale Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow must follow under the
circumstances provides:
CARD EXPIRED
1. check expiry date on card,
2. if unexpired, refer to CB,
2.1 if valid, honor up to maximum of SPL only,
2.2 if in CB as Lost, do procedures 2a to 2e.
2.3 if in CB as Suspended/Cancelled, do not honor the card,
3. if expired, do not honor the card.

Cleary, it has not yet expired in October 1989, when the same was wrongfully dishonored. Hence,
petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
used in the same situation and as such petitioner is guilty of negligence.

The humiliation and embarrassment of the private respondent was brought about not by such remark of
Prof. Lirag but by the fact of dishonor by petitioner of credit card. The remark of Prof. Lirag served only
to aggravate the embarrassment then felt by Atty. De Jesus albeit silently within himself. The appeal is
DISMISSED.

10. Vergara vs. Court of Appeals (DONE)

154 SCRA 564, No. L-77679 September 30, 1987

Doctrine:
Torts; Damages; Quasi-delict; Requisites of a quasi-delict— These requisites of a quasi-delict are: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for
whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.

Negligence; Common Carriers; Defective brakes cannot be considered fortuitous in character.—A

mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be considered as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the
defects were curable and the accident preventable.

Presumption of negligence must be over-come by evidence.—The petitioner failed to adduce any

evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and
supervision of his driver.

Facts: The cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to
the center line to overtake the tricycle and the car on the other side of the road tried to avoid the
collision but unfortunately the driver of the car lost control of his car causing it to collide with a private
jeep and the cargo truck went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then
another bicycle; and then the cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff. The driver of the
cargo truck applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the
claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective breaks cannot be considered as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

Ruling: It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the
case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of
which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may be deduced
from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was
travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to
the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo
truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo truck, he
applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the
petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in character.
Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

11. Ongsiako vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

152 SCRA 627, No. L-69901 July 31, 1987

Facts: This case arose from a collision between the car being driven by the petitioner and the jeep of
Robert Ha on December 30, 1981, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. at MacArthur Highway, in
Moncada, Tarlac. The petitioner had a companion, Leon Miguel Heras, who was seated beside him.
Robert Ha was at the wheel of his vehicle, which had seven other passengers. It appears that the
petitioner was south-bound, toward Manila, and the jeep was coming from the opposite direction; that
a Philippine Rabbit bus ahead of the jeep swerved into the petitioner's lane to overtake and bypass a
tricycle; and that as a result of this sudden move, the petitioner, to avoid a head-on collision,
immediately veered his car to the shoulder of the highway. The car went out of control when it hit the
soft shoulder, moved back diagonally across the cemented highway, then collided with Ha's jeep,
damaging it and causing multiple injuries to its passengers. The Philippine Rabbit bus sped away. The
Philippine Rabbit bus sped away. Trial Court held that petitioner was 150 meters away from the bus, the
Supreme Court found through evidence that the distance is not 150 meters but 150 feet.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is both criminally and civilly liable.

Ruling: While the quantum of proof necessary for conviction has not been established, there is, in our
view, a preponderance of evidence to hold the petitioner liable in damages for the injuries sustained by
the victims of this accident. Although it is really doubtful that he was criminally negligent, we find there
is enough evidence to sustain the conclusion that a little more caution and discretion on his part in
reacting to the threat of a head-on collision with the oncoming bus, could have avoided the unfortunate
accident. For this shortcoming, we hold him liable for the hospitalization expenses and unearned
salaries of the victims as itemized by the trial court and affirmed by the respondent court. We absolve
him, however, from the payment of moral damages and so reduce his total civil liability to P46,131.04.

We apply here the doctrine announced in the recent case of People v. Ligon, where the accused was
acquitted of the crime of homicide f or lack of clear and convincing proof that he had criminally caused a
cigarette vendor to fall to his death from the jeep where he was hanging onto. Nevertheless, from the
totality of the facts presented, we declared there was a preponderance of evidence to hold the accused
liable in damages for the tragic mishap that befell the victim. We make a similar finding in this case and
hold the petitioner civilly answerable for his quasi-delict.

12. Amado Picart v. Frank Smith, Jr., (DONE)

G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918 (Arevalo, Maria Lourdes Isabel)

DOCTRINE: The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of the
person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born
of this foresight, is the constitutive fact in negligence.
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by
an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had
gotten halfway across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive
blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the
road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by
the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was
that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so
doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony
was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he
had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body
across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
The CFI of La Union absolved Smith of liability. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence.

RULING: YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this foresight, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guard against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case, negligence is clearly established.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would have recognized that the course which
he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the
rider as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances, the law imposed on Smith
the duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as already stated, Smith was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since
the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.

13. Glan People's Lumber and Hardware vs. IAC

173 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 70493 May 18, 1989

Doctrine:
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias, the
physical facts would still absolve him of any actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of
the last clear chance. ___ Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of
Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his
designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts, either expressly found by the
Intermediate Appellate Court or which may be deemed conceded for lack of any dispute, would still
absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear
chance.

Facts: Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached
a bridge going towards the direction of Davao City. At about that time, the cargo truck, Zacarias coming
from the opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing
the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while
Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left
side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,\ was extensively damaged. After
the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of
the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road.

A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo against the
driver and owners of the cargo truck with the CFI of Bohol.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint “for insufficiency of evidence”

The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on the plaintiffs’ appeal, reversing
the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias to be negligent and his negligence “gave rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and solidary.”
It therefore ordered “the defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the plaintiffs

The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for a reversal of the judgment of the
IAC which, it is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established facts

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case

Ruling: Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming
some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane,
incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable
responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance.

Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other’s vehicle from a distance of
150 meters. The truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From
these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has
appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty
meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which
he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those
circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right
to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability today
as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar
state of facts.

Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer (and co-petitioner)
George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports the latter’s additional defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be
undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record which has not been controverted.

14. Phil.Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

189 SCRA 158, G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990

Doctrine:
Civil Law; Contracts; Torts and damages; Doctrine of last clear chance applies in a suit between the
owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles, not where the passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce contractual obligations.—We reiterate that “*t+he principle about the ‘last clear
chance’ would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles.
It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on
the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” This was Our ruling in Anuran, et al.
v. Buño, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224. Thus, the respondent court
erred in applying said doctrine.

Carrier, presumed at fault or negligent, the moment a passenger dies or is injured.—In culpa contractual,
the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed
extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the
death or injury of the passenger was due to a forfuitous event.

Accident caused either by defects in the automobile or negligence of driver, not a caso fortuito.—In any
event, “[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his
destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its
driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carrier’s liability for damages.

Facts: At 11am on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda
Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by
spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas with their families for P 24.00.
Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney detached
causing it to run in an unbalanced position. Driver Manalo stepped on the brake, causing the jeepney to
make a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the opposite lane of the road (the jeepney's front
faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going)). The
jeepney occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of
vehicles coming from the north.

Petitioner Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines claims that almost immediately after the sudden U-turn the bus
bumped the right rear portion of the jeep. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the bus stopped a
few minutes before hitting the jeepney. Either way, as a result of the collision, three passengers of the
jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney
passengers sustained physical injuries.

A criminal complaint was filed against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. The case against delos
Reyes (driver of Phil. Rabbit) was dismissed for insufficieny of evidence. Manalo (jeepney driver),
however, was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.

3 complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of Pangasinan. (1) Spouses Casiano
Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan. (2) Spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda
Meriales. And (3) spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento sued as heirs of Adelaida Estomo. All
three cases impleaded spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo (jeepney owners), Rabbit and delos
Reyes as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo
on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their
culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as
additional defendant in the first case only.

The trial court ruled in favour of then plaintiffs, finding defendants negligent and having breached the
contract of carriage with their passengers and ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs
damages.

The IAC reversed the ruling of the trial court, applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2)
the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident
unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test (which concluded that bus
driver delos Reyes, NOT jeepney driver Manalo, was negligent).

Issue: Who are liable for the death and injuries of the passenger? - Trial court decision reinstated with
modification. Only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc.
are liable to the victims or their heirs.

Ruling: The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit between the owners and drivers of
the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

The IAC erred in applying the presumption that the driver who bumps the rear of another vehicle is
guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. This presumption is based
on the responsibility given to a rear vehicle of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear
vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it. Such
presumption is rebutted by the evidence that shows that the jeepney, which was then traveling on the
eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a
sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of
impact. (Basically, the U-turn was sudden and delos Reyes could not have reasonably anticipated it even
though he was the rear vehicle)

Likewise, the bus cannot be made liable under the substantial factor test (that if the actor's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should
have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable). Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the bus was travelling within the speed
limit allowed in highways. He also had only a few seconds to react to the situation. To require delos
Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there
were no options available to him to have avoided the collision.

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of jeepney driver Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New
Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua,
the police who arrived on the scene, his (Manalo's) conviction and the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur supra. Spouses Mangune and Carreon alleged that their mechanic regularly maintains the
jeepney and on the day before the collision, the mechanic actually checked the vehicle and even
tightened the bolts, thus the incident was caused by a caso fortuito. The SC upheld the trial court’s
findings that "in an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to
his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its
driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers’ liability.

The SC modified the decision holding spouses Mangune and Carreon jointly and severally liable with
Manalo. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the
contract of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the
event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible to the passenger, even if such breach
be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the
contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, that would make
the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the
share which corresponds to the driver contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New
Civil Code.

15. McKee vs. IAC (DONE)

GR No. 68102, July 16, 1992. (Dela Cruz, Jovy Noriette)

DOCTRINE: Negligence; The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi¬delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. —As We
held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi¬delict is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And,
as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “in the case of independent
civil action under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction,
would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action.

In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang would
have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.—What
remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not
be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would have
been entirely different if the petitioners’ cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which
case private respondents’ liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang
would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.

Definition of negligence—Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: “x x x Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black’s Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(T)he failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’
Emergency Rule- “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.—

Definition of proximate cause—Proximate cause has been defined as: “x x x ‘that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.”

Doctrine of last clear chance; The doctrine states that the contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party.—Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence
of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered
in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver’s negligence in
failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was in law the proxi¬mate cause of the
collision; Employers directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.

FACTS: It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between
Angeles City and SanFernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and
her minor children, Christopher, George, andKim, as well as Kim’s babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San
Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a Ford Escort.

Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was
headed in the opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to Manila. The
cargo truck was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10
metric tons. As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys
suddenly ran from the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to
swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on, applied his brakes,
and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and collided with
the cargo truck. The collision occurred on the bridge. The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver,
Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in
the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort,
received physical injuries from the collision. An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging
him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property.
He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information.
The conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the
denial by the SC of his Petition for Review. Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and
children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to
Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben
Galang – Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were
eventually consolidated. The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages
and attorney’s fees. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was
based on its finding that it was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the
accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and
upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and the
collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Galang’s negligence caused the collision.

2. Whether or not Tayag and Manalo are liable for damages.

RULING: 1. Yes. The lower court held that Jose Koh was negligent for improperly invading the lane of the
truck. This is unwarranted because it is manifest that no negligence can be imputed to Koh. In Picart vs.
Smith (37 Phil 809, 813) the Court held that: The test by which to determine the existence of negligence
in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence. It is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to
Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite
lane. The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running
at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. The truck
driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the testimony of Araceli Koh McKee which was
duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures
and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting
accident.

2. Yes. It was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which
was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

16. Pantranco North Express, Inc. V. Maricar Baesa

G.R. 79050-51, November 14, 1989 (Cañas, Melanie Mei)

DOCTRINE: Last Clear Chance; The doctrine of the last clear chance simply means that the negligence of
a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the
latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it
is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One
cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the
existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of
the impending danger.

FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico
spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic
in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses.
While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding PANTRANCO
bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and
collided with it.

As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico, died,
and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for
damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.

PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver.
CA upheld RTC in favor of Baesa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to
avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence.

RULING: NO. Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant
liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim for damages.

For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly has the
last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of
due care, have been aware of it. There is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he
did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed
that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the
opposite direction.

Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision,
he had no opportunity to avoid it.
Last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered.

17. Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals

269 SCRA 695, G.R. No. 97626 March 14, 1997
Doctrine:
Civil Law; Negligence; Elements of a Quasi-delict.—There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would do.—Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The seventy-
eight (78)-yearold, yet still relevant, case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of
the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that.

Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Definition Of.—Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,
reiterated in the case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, defines proximate cause as “that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. x x x.” In this case, absent
the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms.
Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.

Facts: The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the private respondent Rommel’s Marketing
Corporation (RMC for brevity), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to
recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippine
Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its
current account with said bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited
to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the
petitioner bank.

Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in
connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his
secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to
RMC’s account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husband’s
account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by
PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.

Issue: What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not checking his monthly
statements or the bank’s negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?
Ruling: The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips
prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation
of deposit slips, original or duplicate.

The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its
bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the latter’s
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to
misappropriate the funds, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her husband’s current
account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts wherein she had deposited
them, had it not been for the bank teller’s aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.

Essence of the Doctrine of “Last Clear Chance.”—Furthermore, under the doctrine of “last clear chance”
(also referred to, at times as “supervening negligence” or as “dis-covered peril”), petitioner bank was
indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does
not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against
liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the
company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller,
had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing
their self-imposed validation procedure.

18. Achevara vs. Ramos

601 SCRA 270, G.R. No. 175172 September 29, 2009

Doctrine: Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Foreseeability is the fundamental
test of negligence.—Foresee-ability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant
must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that
certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the
opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-
type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the rightmost portion
of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-
type jeep pass before proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. The Court of Appeals
correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such
precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances
and which proximately caused injury to another.

An ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would
encounter on the road at risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle; Gross negligence is the
absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property.—
The Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on
the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be putting himself and other
vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the
circumstances, a prudent man would have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped
using it until it was repaired. Ramos was, therefore, grossly negligent in continuing to drive on the
highway the mechanically defective jeep, which later encroached on the opposite lane and bumped the
passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to
amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply where the party charged
is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at
hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.—The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a
situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant—who had
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so—is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. However, the
doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.

Where the gross negligence of one driver and the inexcusable negligence of another driver were the
proximate cause of the vehicular accident, the heirs of the latter cannot recover damages pursuant to
Article 2179 of the Civil Code.—In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise
reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular
accident. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez
were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to
Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

Facts: Arnulfo Ramos died in a vehicular accident that happened at the national highway along Candon,
Ilocos Sur. Elvira Ramos and her two minor children, filed a Complaint for damages under Article 2176
against Cresencia Achevara (operator of passenger jeep), Alfredo Achevara (husband of the operator
and as administrator of the conjugal partnership properties of the Sps Achevara) and Benigno Valdez
(driver) for the death of her husband Arnulfo Ramos.

It was alleged in the complaint that Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the
national highway in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner; that he tried to overtake a motorcycle,
causing his passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by
Arnulfo Ramos. Injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his death. It was alleged that Crescencia
Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of
the passenger jeep. Trial court held that the doctrine of last clear chance, as contended by Ramos, was
applicable to this case. CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or Achevera are liable to Ramos

Ruling: Ramos version of the vehicular accident was rebutted by Acheverra. Testimony of Alfredo
Gamera, that the vehicular accident occurred because the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez tried
to overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 and encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep, which
resulted in the collision, was refuted by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, who testified that the passenger jeep
did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the one following behind the passenger jeep.
Gamera also testified that the collision took place on the lane of the owner-type jeep, about 2 meters
east the center line of the national highway. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who investigated the
incident, found both vehicles on the western lane of the national highway. It is undeniable that the
collision took place on the western lane of the national highway or the lane of the passenger jeep driven
by Benigno Valdez. It was the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that encroached on the lane of
the passenger jeep.

Court also found Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the
highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he
would encounter on the road at risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the
circumstances, a prudent man would have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped
using it until it was repaired. Ramos‘ negligence in driving the owner-type jeep—despite knowledge of
its mechanical defect, and his failure to have it repaired first before driving, to prevent damage to life
and property—did not only constitute contributory negligence. Ramos‘ negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of the accident. Since foreseeability is the fundamental basis of negligence, Valdez
could not have foreseen that an accident might happen due to the mechanical defect in the vehicle of
Ramos. It was Ramos alone who fully knew and could foresee that an accident was likely to occur if he
drove his defective jeep, which indeed happened. Hence, the proximate cause of the vehicular accident
was the negligence of Ramos in driving a mechanically defective vehicle.

The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos
continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while
Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of
Ramos—perhaps because it still kept to its lane and Valdez did not know the extent of its mechanical
defect.

When the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at
hand and steered the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was
at this point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle, and that it was
Valdez who had the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep towards the
right shoulder of the road.

The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, but the defendant—who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm
and failed to do so—is made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff.

However, the doctrine does NOT apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and
the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered. Even if it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the
mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no
longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.

When the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered
his vehicle towards the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type jeep driven
by Ramos continued to move to the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. The
time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of
seconds, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
Both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily
prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo
Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular
accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179.

19. Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Mangalinao

G.R. Nos. 174089 & 174266, January 25, 2012

Doctrine: Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Emergency Rule; One who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.—The ‘Emergency Rule’ invoked by petitioners will not apply. Such
principle states: [O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night, Antonio should have been prudent to
reduce his speed and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it would be improbable
for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really could not avoid hitting it, prevent such
extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring evidence, he obviously failed to exercise proper
care in his driving.

Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is
nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused; Were a
registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer
the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially
for the damage or injury done.—Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself
from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the
actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the
damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused. It has already been explained: Were a
registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer
the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially
for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means
to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by
a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The
protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given
the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. x x x.

Facts: In 1990, while it was raining at night, 3 vehicles were traversing the 2-lane northbound NLEX.
Edurese was driving a Nissan Pathfinder with other passengers (including the Mangalinao spouses).
Before them on the outer lane was a Fuso
10-wheeler truck driven by Loreto (accompanied by truck helper Charlie). The Fuso was moving in an
erratic and swerving motion. Behind the Pathfinder was another 10-wheeler Isuzu truck driven by
Antonio (accompanied by Rodolfo).

Just when the Pathfinder was about to overtake the Fuso, the Fuso suddenly swerved to the left and cut
into the Pathfinder‘s lane. The Pathfinder hit the Fuso‘s left door and body which caused both vehicles
to stop in the expressway. What immediately followed was a pileup wherein the Isuzu 10-wheeler truck
crashed into the rear of the Pathfinder, despite Antonio stepping on the brakes. All the passengers in the
Pathfinder were killed. The truck drivers escapedserious injuries and death.

The minor orphaned heirs of the Mangalinao spouses demanded compensation from the truck owners
(Sonny and Orix) which was ignored. They filed a claim based on quasi-delict against the truck drivers
and the owners, imputing recklessness, negligence, and imprudence on the truck drivers for the deaths
of their sister and parents; while alleging that Sonny and Orix equally liable for failing to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their respective drivers.

Sonny and Antonio countered, attributing fault for the accident solely on Loreto‘s reckless driving of his
truck which suddenly stopped and slid across the highway. They claimed that Sonny had exercised the
expected diligence required of an employer; that Antonio had been all along driving with care; and, that
with the abrupt and unexpected collision of the vehicles before him and their precarious proximity, he
had no way of preventing his truck from hitting the Pathfinder.

The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the Mangalinao spouses, holding that both truck drivers are at fault
and should be held liable. Lucilo, who was driving the Fuso truck, was reckless when he caused the
swerving of his vehicle directly on the lane of the Pathfinder to his left. The Pathfinder had no way to
avoid a collision because it was about to pass the truck when suddenly blocked. On the other hand, the
Isuzu truck was practically tailgating the Pathfinder on the dark slippery highway such that when the
Pathfinder collided with the Fuso truck, it became inevitable for the Isuzu truck to crash into the
Pathfinder. So, de los Santos, the driver of the Isuzu truck was likewise reckless.

Issue: Whether Sonny, Antonio , and Orix are liable

Ruling: YES. With regard to the FUSO TRUCK, there is no doubt that the driver was negligent.
Testimonies stated that the Fuso had lost control, skidded to the left and blocked the way of the
Pathfinder, which was about to overtake. The Pathfinder had absolutely no chance to avoid the truck.
Instead of slowing down and moving towards the shoulder in the highway if it really needed to stop, it
was very negligent of Loreto to abruptly hit the brake in a major highway wherein vehicles are highly
likely to be at his rear. He opened himself up to a major danger and naturally, a collision was imminent.

Meanwhile, on the part of the ISUZU TRUCK, the court also found fault on their part. Based on the
testimony given by Antonio, the court made the conclusion that, indeed, Antonio was also guilty of the
mishap that occurred. Antonio, upon noticing the irregular way of driving of the Fuso truck, slowed
down his speed to about 50-60 km/h. However the smashed front of the Isuzu strongly indicates the
strong impact of the ramming of the rear of the Pathfinder that pinned its passengers. Furthermore,
Antonio admitted that despite stepping on the brakes, the Isuzu still suddenly smashed into the rear of
the Pathfinder causing extensive damage to it, as well as hitting the right side of the Fuso. These militate
against Antonio‘s claim that he was driving at a safe speed, that he had slowed down, and that he was 3
cars away.
Clearly, the Isuzu was not within the safe stopping distance to avoid the Pathfinder in case of
emergency. Thus, the Emergency Rule invoked WILL NOT APPLY. Such principle states: [O]ne who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night, Antonio should have been prudent to
reduce his speed and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it would be improbable
for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really could not avoid hitting it, prevent such
extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring evidence, he obviously failed to exercise proper
care in his driving.

Orix cannot also escape liability since he is the operator of the Fuso truck. Orix cannot point fingers at
the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180. Regardless of
whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless
primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused. It has already been
explained that where a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed
transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said
responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property
with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.

A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the
person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the
registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law
aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to
escape liability by disproving his ownership.

Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount
that they may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff, which Orix rightfully
acknowledged by filing a third-party complaint against the owner of the Fuso, Manuel.

20. Li, et.al. vs. Mangalino

GR No. 174266, January 25, 2012

See Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Mangalinao

21. National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

161 SCRA 334, No. L-47379, No. L-47481 May 16, 1988

Doctrine: Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Negligence; NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence
was the proximate cause of the loss and damage even though the typhoon was an act of God.—It is clear
from the appellate court’s decision that based on its findings of fact and that of the trial court’s,
petitioner NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only
at the height of typhoon “Welming” when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same
gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days
before it actually struck. And even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force
majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
damage. As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals (144 SCRA 596, 606–607): Thus, if
upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided
for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering
into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in
part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure
to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it was, and removed from the rules applicable to
the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174–1175). Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a
person concur s with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for
loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which the
loss or damage may have been occasioned. (Fish & Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v.
Milan, 49 O.G. 4379; Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45
Phil. 657)."

The question of whether or not there was negligence on the part of NPC is a question of fact which falls
within the jurisdiction of the CA.—Furthermore, the question of whether or not there was negligence on
the part of NPC is a question of fact which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and will not be disturbed by this Court unless the same is clearly unfounded, Thus, in Tolentino v. Court
of Appeals, (150 SCRA 26, 36) we ruled: “Moreover, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
generally final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court (Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890
[1983]. In fact it is settled that the Supreme Court is not supposed to weigh evidence but only to
determine its substantially (Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 100 SCRA 433 [1982] and will generally not disturb
said findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence (Aytona v. Court of appeals, 113 SCRA 575
[1985]; Collector of Customs of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3 [1985]. On the other
hand substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion (Philippine Metal Products, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 90
SCRA 135 [1979]; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 [1984]; Canete v. WCC, 136 SCRA 302
[1985])."

Facts: ECI executed a contract with NAWASA on Aug. 4, 1964, to construct the 2nd Ipo-
Bicti Tunnel in Norzagaray, Bulacan, complete it within 800 calendar days from the date the Contractor
receives the formal notice to proceed and to furnish all tools, labor, equipment, and materials needed.
The construction of the tunnel covered an area that included the Ipo river where the Ipo Dam (Angat
Hydro-electric Project and Dam) of defendant NPC is located.

On Nov. 4, 1967, typhoon “Welming” struck the project area and bringing with it heavy rains and
causing water in the reservoir of Angat Dam to rapidly rise, reaching the danger level of 212 m above
sea level. Thus to prevent overflow, NPC caused the opening of the spillway gates. The opening of the
gates caused an extraordinary large volume of water to rush out, hitting the installations and
construction works of ECI. Effectively washing away, damaging or destroying its stockpile of materials
and supplies, camp facilities, permanent structures and accessories.
The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the trial court that the maintainers of the dam opened
the gates when the typhoon was already at its height, when they knew full well that it was far safer to
open them gradually. The court also found that NPC had known of the coming of the typhoon 4 days
prior to it actually hitting the area. Thus, the trial court and the appellate court found NPC negligent and
held liable for the damages. Petitioner NPC contends that this CA decision is erroneous on the ground
that the destruction and loss of ECI’s equipment and facilities were due to force majeure, that the heavy
rains brought about by the typhoon was an extraordinary occurrence that they could not have foreseen.

On the other hand, ECI assails the CA’s reduction of the consequential damages awarded by the trial
court from P 333,200 to P 19K on the grounds that the appellate court had no basis in concluding that
ECI acquired a new Crawler-type crane and therefore, it only can claim rentals for the temporary use of
the leased crane for a period of one month; and that the award of P 4K a day or P 120K a month bonus is
justified since the period limitation on ECI's contract with NAWASA had dual effects, i.e., bonus for
earlier completion and liquidated damages for delayed performance; and in either case at the rate of P
4K daily. Thus, since NPC's negligence compelled work stoppage for a period of one month, the said
award of P 120K is justified.

Issue: 1. WON respondent CA erred in holding NPC liable for damages

2. WON CA erred in reducing the consequential damages from P 333,200 to P19,000

3. WON CA erred in eliminating exemplary damages

4. WON CA erred in reducing attorney’s fees from P 50K to P 30K

Ruling: No. Even though the typhoon was an act of God or force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability
because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

Ratio As held in Juan Nakpil & Sons v. CA, the act of God doctrine requires that the act must be
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies had no part therein. When the
effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be active intervention,
neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is humanized and therefore removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God.

Furthermore, this is question of fact which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the CA and will not be
disturbed by this Court unless it is clearly unfounded.

Ratio Findings of fact of the CA are generally final and conclusive upon the SC. It is settled that the SC is
not a trier of facts. It is not supposed to weigh evidence and will generally not disturb findings of fact
when supported by substantial evidence.

2. No. From the findings of the appellate court, while there was no categorical statement or admission
on the part of ECI that it bought a new crane to replace the damaged one, a sales contract was
presented to the effect that the new crane would be delivered to it by Asian Enterprises within 60 days
from the opening of the letter of credit at the cost of P 106,336.75. The offer was made by Asian
Enterprises a few days after the flood. Comparing the amount for a brand new crane and paying the
alleged amount of P 4K a day as rental for the use of a temporary crane, which use petitioner ECI alleged
to have lasted for a period of one year, thus, totaling P

120K plus the fact that there was already a sales contract between it and Asian Enterprises, there is no
reason why ECI should opt to rent a temporary crane for a period of one year. The appellate court also
found that the damaged crane was subsequently repaired and reactivated and the cost of repair was P
77K. Therefore, it included the said amount in the award of compensatory damages, but not the value of
the new crane. We do not find anything erroneous in the decision of the appellate court that the
consequential damages should represent only the service of the temporary crane for one month. A
contrary ruling would result in the unjust enrichment of ECI.

The P 120K bonus was also properly eliminated as the same was granted by the trial court on the
premise that it represented ECI's lost opportunity "to earn the one month bonus from NAWASA." The
loss or damage to ECI's equipment and facilities occurred more than 3 years or 1,170 days after the
execution of the contract, long after the stipulated deadline (within 800 calendar days) to finish the
construction.

No bonus, therefore, could have been possibly earned by ECI at that point in time. The supposed
liquidated damages for failure to finish the project within the stipulated period or the opposite of the
claim for bonus is not clearly presented in the records of these petitions. It is not shown that NAWASA
imposed them.

3. No. The appellate court found that there was no bad faith on the part of NPC and that neither can its
negligence be considered gross.

Ratio As was held in Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes, exemplary damages cannot be
awarded to private respondent because petitioner is not shown to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless or oppressive manner.

4. No. There are no compelling reasons to set aside the appellate court’s finding that the latter amount
suffices for the services rendered by ECI’s counsel. Disposition Petitions are both dismissed for lack of
merit

22. Africa vs. Caltex Phil Inc

16 SCRA 448, 454-456 [1966]

Doctrine: Presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.—Where the thing which
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care (45 C.J. 1193).

Torts; Quasi-delicts; Force majeure; Intervention of unforeseen and unexpected cause.—The

intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the
independent cause in the resulting injury. (MacAfee v. Traver’s Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)
Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses
Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo
Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners
failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and with
respect to the supervision of their employees

Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of Caltex.

Ruling: YES. In the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co., the defendant therein
disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence. The
CA overruled the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said: In case of non-
contractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the
proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant.

It is also a recognized principle that “where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured
person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendant‘s want of care.” And the burden of
evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. This rule is known by
the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself).

Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken.
On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from some act
of man. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who
knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.

In the report submitted by Captain Mariano of the Manila Police: ―The location is within a very busy
business district near the Obrero Market, a railroad crossing and very thickly populated neighborhood
where a great number of people mill around throughout the day until late at night. The passersby, those
waiting for buses or transportation, those waiting to cross the streets and others loafing around have to
occupy not only the sidewalks but also portion of the gasoline station itself. Whatever be the activities
of these people smoking or lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded and this constitute a secondary
hazard to its operation which in turn endangers the entire neighborhood to conflagration.

This gasoline service station is also used by its operator as a garage and repair shop for his fleet of
taxicabs numbering ten or more, adding another risk to the possible outbreak of fire at this already small
but crowded gasoline station. The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the
performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts reported, may
properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and
objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for
more stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under
ordinary circumstances.

Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without assistance, was transferring
the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said: ―Before loading
the underground tank there were no people, but while the loading was going on, there were people
who went to drink coca-cola at the coca-cola stand which is about a meter from the underground tank.
He added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the tanktruck to close the valve, and while he
had his back turned to the ―manhole‖ he heard someone shout ―fire. Even then the fire possibly
would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part
of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from
leaping over it