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Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Technological Forecasting & Social Change

A spatial-temporal vulnerability assessment to support the building of


community resilience against power outage impacts
Thomas Münzberg ⁎, Marcus Wiens, Frank Schultmann
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Power outages are among the most serious Critical Infrastructure (CI) disruptions and require effective disaster
Received 22 March 2016 management with collaboration of affected CI providers and disaster management authorities. To support build-
Received in revised form 30 September 2016 ing community resilience, we introduce a vulnerability assessment which allows an enhanced spatial-temporal
Accepted 30 November 2016
understanding of initial power outage impacts. Using the assessment enables planers to better identify which
Available online 3 January 2017
and when CIs become vulnerable and how important they are in comparison to other CIs before the overall crisis
Keywords:
situation escalates and unmanageable cascading effects occur. The assessment addresses the initial phase of a
Decision making power outage and corresponding early measures of local risk and crisis management organizations according
Spatial-temporal vulnerability assessment to the German disaster management system. The assessment is an indicator-based approach which is extended
Monte-Carlo simulation to consider time-depending effects through time-referenced demand and the depletion of Coping Capacity Re-
Delphi survey sources (CCR). The estimation of the relevance of CIs regarding the provision of vital services and products is ad-
Community resilience building dressed by a modified Delphi method. In addition, an expert survey was conducted to shed light on the evaluation
Power outages of coping resources. In this paper, we describe the components of the assessment and propose different aggrega-
tion approaches which each enhances the understanding of spatial-temporal impacts of a power outage, and,
hence, increases the forecasting capability for disaster management authorities. For demonstration purposes,
the assessment is implemented for the case of the city of Mannheim, Germany.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.

1. Introduction the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and
functions” (UNISDR, 2009). In the present paper, the theory of vulnera-
Within the Energiewende, the German electricity system is bility is a theoretical concept that is used as a functional measure instru-
experiencing a historic turnaround towards a more sustainable, more ment to enhance resilience. Vulnerability expresses the degree a region
efficient, and smarter energy system, including renewable and low-car- or CI can be affected by a power outage. It is a measure of the CI service
bon energy generation. However, the change also implies new and un- losses due to a power outage taking into account criticality and resil-
known risks. As a consequence, the risks accompanying power outages ience of (potentially) exposed CIs.
became an even more important issue in disaster planning. For disaster In order to measure and enhance community resilience against
management, the electric power grid is already the most “critical” infra- power outage impacts, several substantial challenges have to be faced.
structure, since all Critical Infrastructures (CIs) (e.g. hospitals, pharma- The following list is a non-concluding enumeration of the challenges
cies, General Practitioners (GP), etc.) depend on a reliable electricity that will be discussed in the following sections in detail:
supply (see, e.g., der Vleuten and Lagendijk, 2010; Kröger, 2008; Luiijf
et al., 2009; Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016). ­ Disaster management authorities have to plan for the accompanying
According to the Sendai Framework, the United Nation (UN) empha- risks of missing CI services taking into account spatial-temporal
sizes the strategic target to reduce disruptions of basic services and to characteristics of power outage exposed CIs and citizens. Therefore,
strengthen the resilience of communities (UNISDR, 2015). Making com- planning tools are required, which in particular allow analyzing
munities more resilient against the impacts of power outages means to the impacts on local level.
increase “the ability […] to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover ­ Each CI provider is responsible for its own disaster preparation.
from the effects […] in a timely and efficient manner, including through However, an effective disaster management planning can only be
ensured by a joint collaboration between CI providers and the re-
⁎ Corresponding author at: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Postfach 3640, 76021
sponsible disaster management authorities. Effective planning is
Karlsruhe, Germany. based on a harmonized and well-arranged coping approach. The
E-mail address: Thomas.muenzberg@kit.edu (T. Münzberg). problems here are the heterogeneous interests of CI providers and

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.11.027
0040-1625/© 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.
100 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

disaster management authorities which results in a missing compa- collaboration between CI providers and disaster management authori-
rability of impacts. This makes it difficult to generate a common un- ties are discussed in detail from a practical perspective in this section.
derstanding of the potential local power outage consequences for a
comprehensive decision base that is acceptable by all stakeholders. 2.1. Disaster management of power outage impacts
­ The vast majority of power outages last for a maximum of several
hours. Already in such short disruption periods the consequences As the German disaster management system is organized in a federal
can be severe in particular with regard to the provision of CI services. manner, each of the more than 400 local disaster management author-
The underlying danger is within interdependencies between the CIs ities has to manage the impacts of a power outage in the region for
which allow propagation of failures into other CI systems (domino which they are in charge. Following the German incident command sys-
ad cascading effects). Therefore, it is essential to understand the ini- tem (SKK, 1999), a crisis management group for major incidents is
tial impacts on CIs, to identify which and when CIs become vulnera- established in each city or county to manage any kind of disaster. Each
ble, which amount of CI service lost has to be avoided and how crisis management group consists of the administrative crisis manage-
important the individual CIs are in comparison to other CIs before ment team (“Verwaltungsstab”) and an operational crisis management
the overall crisis situation escalates. The vulnerability paths have to team (“Führungsstab”). The group members come from the local fire
be identified and, as far as possible and appropriate, be managed be- brigade, the local administrative departments, and the disaster manage-
fore uncontrollable cascading effects arise. ment authority. There are also special advisers (“Fachberater”) who rep-
­ The decisive point of leverage for building community resilience is resent aid organizations and CI providers, for instance. In the remainder
the management of the initial and direct effects on CIs, although re- of this paper, we always understand the members of the crisis manage-
silience comprises of preparing, adsorbing, and recovering from ad- ment group as decision makers and end users of the assessment results.
verse consequences of a power outage. In addition, the initial and According to the planning for power outages, the decision makers'
direct effects imply immediate sufferings that require instantaneous focus lies on the upcoming situation of a disaster (Ryan, 2013). In partic-
attention. The management of these impacts provide the most ular CIs services should be kept continuous to the greatest possible ex-
prompt effective and feasible basis to build resilience. tent. The longer a disruption lasts and the more important and
vulnerable the exposed CIs are, the more probable are life-threatening
risks. The general life-threatening impacts are well-known and many
To facilitate the enhancement of community resilience, we propose a publications cover the causal relation (see, e.g., Hiete et al., 2010;
spatial-temporal vulnerability assessment. The vulnerability assess- Petermann et al., 2010; Klinger et al., 2014; Berariu et al., 2015;
ment should allow an improved disaster risk governance by providing Castillo, 2014; Barata et al., 2005; Nakayama et al., 2014; Wong et al.,
a better understanding of the initial impacts of a power outage taking 2007; Zubin et al., 2007). However, academic research which estab-
into account the individual characteristics of CIs. The assessment aims lishes the link between electricity supply and resilience is still seen as
at estimating the reduction or loss of CI services in a certain city or coun- insufficient (Kinn and Abbott, 2014). The information about potential
ty under the impacts of a power outage. To this end, the assessment al- escalations is often vague, generic, and does not take into account the
lows for a systematic and structured evaluation of the exposure of unique specifications of a certain city or county. The requested decisive
people and CIs, their coping capacities, and their criticality in discrete information for disaster planning is about which and when a CI becomes
time steps. On this basis, time-depending effects can be assessed, vul- vulnerable and how important an individual CI is in comparison to other
nerability paths can be identified, and determined forecasting is possi- CIs during a power outage. The current foresight capacity of the disaster
ble. The assessment results should foster investments for mitigating management authorities is often not sufficient to predict the concrete
and minimizing disaster risks triggered by power outages and strength- spatial-temporal impacts in the way required for an effective disaster
en the collaboration between CI providers and disaster management risk management and contingency planning.
authorities. The spatial-temporal impacts in turn depend on the individual char-
The assessment is based on a multi-indicator approach. A Delphi sur- acteristics of a CI. The CIs have different Coping Capacity Resources
vey and decision maker evaluations are conducted to define weights (CCR) whereby the ability to absorb the adverse effects and to maintain
and parameter values. The spatial-temporal vulnerabilities of districts a vital supply for the population during a power outage varies. In addi-
and CIs are determined by aggregation taking into account the charac- tion, the CIs differ in its importance for the population. The importance
teristics of the affected CIs. Specific attributes of a present or potential depends on the CI's services and products, the size of the CI, and the day-
power outage scenario can be considered. time of the power outage. As a consequence, the CIs do not suffer in the
This paper is structured as follows: The abovementioned challenges same way and at the same time. To ensure a comparability, the specific
for enhancing community resilience in the context of power outages are character of each CI has to be put into relation with the characteristics of
discussed in the second section. In the third section we briefly present other CIs.
the current state of the research in simulating power outage impacts. The knowledge about how a power outage escalates and the compa-
In the fourth section, we introduce the development of the spatial-tem- rability of exposed CIs can enhance the resilience in different ways. In
poral vulnerability assessment. In the fifth section, the introduced as- general, it is not possible to determine the point in time at which the sit-
sessment is applied to an exemplary case. The use case and its results uation suddenly becomes life-threatening. Being aware of this tipping
are described and discussed. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis of vary- point is very important in disaster planning, because until this point
ing weighting values is conducted and the outcome of different coping the affected CI provider and population may rely on their own self-help-
strategies are calculated to demonstrate the benefits of the assessment. ing capacity without any additional assistance from emergency and di-
The paper closes with critical remarks and a conclusion in the last saster management units. Furthermore, it is essential to have spatial-
section. temporal information about the impacts to ensure an appropriate and
proper intervention (Ryan, 2013; Quarantelli, 1997). By this knowledge,
weak and vulnerable CIs can be identified and the corresponding CI pro-
2. Challenges in enhancing community resilience vider can be motivated to invest more in CCRs. During a power outage,
the disaster management authorities can concentrate their activities to
The core challenges for enhancing community resilience are already the CIs which have higher vulnerability values or are more important
enumerated in Section 1. However, it is necessary to provide a compre- for the population as other CIs. During a present power outage, knowing
hensive overview about the underlying problems, decision makers, and the tipping point enables warnings and further preparations which may
decision situations. To do so, the disaster management planning and the lead to a better resistance. Sometimes the disaster management
T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118 101

authorities and energy utilities can coordinate a small amount of mobile information about missing common pictures in collaborative foresight
emergency power units. By using spatial-temporal information, these see e.g. Weber et al., 2015, about the importance of a common under-
units can be distributed to the CIs or districts in an adequate and reason- standing see e.g. Laakso and Palomäki, 2013). However, a common un-
able way. Spatial-temporal information is also requested in those cases, derstanding is necessary to ensure a harmonized and well-arranged
in which CIs or regions need to be prioritized. This applies exemplary disaster management planning. This can only be achieved by an early
during load reduction situations (load shedding) when districts have involvement of the actors (ibid.) and by a joint collaboration in particu-
to be disconnected from the supply to stabilize the electricity grid lar between CI providers and the responsible disaster management au-
(Münzberg et al., 2013). After a power outage, the districts are restored thorities (for collaborations in disaster management see e.g. Turoff et al.,
step by step. In such situations, a ranking of districts could help speed up 2004). This is also important regarding the data about the CI's character-
the recovery of the most important CIs, minimizing the outage duration istics. This data can only be collected in a trustful collaboration between
of vulnerable CIs and making them available to the population more the CI provider and the authorities. To ensure a successful implementa-
quickly (prioritized recovery). This helps to ensure a recovery in an ef- tion of the assessment, it is important to keep the effort for the data col-
fective manner. lection in an appropriate and reasonable relation to the gain resulting
from the assessment results. A too extensive data collection would in-
2.2. Collaboration between CI providers and disaster management hibit practical implementation of the assessment.
authorities
3. Simulation and assessments of power outages impacts
The disaster management authorities aim at a continuous supply of
CI services during a power outage. In Germany, CIs are legally defined Although research activities on simulation and assessing power out-
as organizations or institutions which provide vital services and prod- age impacts have significantly increased in the last decades, there is still
ucts to the population (see, e.g., BMI, 2011). There is a commonly used a need for tools for disaster management (see e.g. Pescaroli and
but not legally defined list of CI sectors and branches (ibid.). Although Alexander, 2016). In this section, a brief overview on the current state
the CI sector definition is an arrangement between the Federation of research should be provided. This includes discussion views into CI
(“Bund”) and the federal states (“Länder”), it is characterized by the interdependencies, cascading effects, the theory of value of lost load,
high-level management of the German federal authority for civil protec- and spatial-temporal vulnerability assessments.
tion that operationally is not in charge of disaster management on local
level. The definition is in accordance with the EU Council Directive 3.1. CI interdependencies and cascading effects
2008/114/EC on a common approach for the identification and designa-
tion of European Critical Infrastructures (ECI). From this perspective, CIs In the last decade, many models and simulations were developed to
are mainly understood as large-scale/wide-area CIs and supra-regional obtain a clearer understanding of the role of interdependencies in net-
networks of national relevance (e.g. electricity transmission grids, ship- work systems and among large-scale CIs. This is motivated by the con-
ping traffic, medical supply, etc.). However, in the majority cities and cerns about cascading effects which are based on the toppling domino
counties only some components of large-scale CIs are located. This theory. The toppling domino theory suggest that an initiating event
might be one reason why the local disaster management authorities like a CI disruption sets a sequence of disruption on other CIs (Luiijf et
are rather focused on local CIs like hospitals, dialysis clinics, and al., 2009; Van Eeten et al., 2011; Kadri et al., 2014; Pescaroli and
pharmacies. Alexander, 2016). In this way, a failure in one CI can propagate through
In Germany, local CIs have not yet been defined precisely, but repre- multiple escalation levels so primary, secondary, and tertiary cascading
sent basic services in the understanding of the UNISDR (UNISDR, 2015). effects can occur (Kadri et al., 2014). To describe the cascading intercon-
They can be found in every city and county in varying number and size. nections, some authors additionally distinguishes between cascade ini-
They are often irregularly distributed in a city and county. A compre- tiating and cascade resulting events (e.g. Luiijf et al., 2009).
hensive and well-defined list of concrete facilities of local CIs is still Many CI interdependency models and simulations can be found in
missing in Germany. Many local disaster management authorities com- literature that address the dependence understanding of Rinaldi et al.
pile so called local CI Cadaster/Land Register (“KRITIS-Kataster”) with (2001) who distinguishes between (i) physical dependencies, (ii)
data about the local CIs (e.g. contact person, location, size, hazardous cyber dependencies, (iii) geographical dependencies, and (iv) logical
properties, emergency back-up power capability, fuel tank capacity, dependencies. The models and simulations were developed in several
emergency power infeed capability). We also learned from a number projects, such as DIESIS (Rome et al., 2009; Usov et al., 2010), I2Sim
of discussions with representatives of disaster management authorities (Marti et al., 2008), IRRIIS (Klein et al., 2008), CIPS/DSS (Bush et al.,
that there might be additional important facilities and assets which do 2005), or CARVER2. The predominated used modelling methods are
not fully fit in with the CI definition (i.e. with the definition of both agent-based modelling (e.g. Casalicchio et al., 2008; Casalicchio et al.,
large-scale and local CIs), but are very important to disaster risk man- 2010; Bagheri et al., 2007), system dynamics (e.g. Min et al., 2007;
agement. These are special facilities that often have an inherent in- Cavallini et al., 2014), Bayesian (e.g. Di Giorgio and Liberati, 2012; Jha
creased hazard potential. These are, for instance, crematories and Keel, 2012), and input-output modelling (e.g. Haimes et al., 2005;
(infection risks), large venues (used for evacuations), or plants working Oliva et al., 2011; Setola et al., 2013). Reviews of the projects, more in-
with hazardous materials (CBRN risks). Generally and from the practical sights, and the classification of CI interdependency methods, models
and legal perspectives, only the local disaster management authorities and simulations are provided by e.g. Ouyang (2014), Pederson et al.
can decide whether components of large-scale CIs, local CIs or other fa- (2006), Yusta et al. (2011), Theoharidou et al. (2011) and Eusgeld et
cilities should be considered in the vulnerability assessment. In this al. (2008), Giannopoulos et al. (2012).
paper, we focus on local CIs and provide preliminary suggestions for a In the context of disaster management, such models and simulations
list of local CIs in the further development of the vulnerability are still faced with a deep-seated and substantive reservations by the
assessment. decision makers. The causes of these reservations can be find in the di-
Regarding the disaster preparation, each CI provider and citizen has verging purposes of the models, the necessary extensive data collection,
its specific interests and preferences. Each is responsible for its own di- the time consuming modelling extent, the difficult interpretability of
saster preparation. This sometimes results in variously interpretations complex model output which is often not possible without the modeler,
of the potential consequences due to the missing comparability of im- the often too abstract and unspecific results which frequently do not
pacts. It is difficult to generate a holistic, common, and comprehensive provide enough reasoning and insights, and the fact that CI disruptions
understanding of the potential power outage consequences (for more rarely cascade deeply in practice.
102 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

The purpose of the majority of CI interdependency models and sim- of the empirical studies of cascading effects, this means in particular to
ulations is to enhance network resilience and to mitigate or reduce the analyze the directional paths for secondary cascading events that may
probability of interruptions in a particular CI, one or multiple CI sectors are initiated by a power outage. The proposed assessment is addressing
or a network of CIs. To use these models and simulations, a large amount this with an emphasis on electricity dependencies and on the potential
of heterogeneous data and assumptions is required (for deeper discus- cascading resulting events of a power outage.
sion, see e.g. Kozik et al., 2015). The collection of the necessary data is
often time-consuming and then sometimes still incomplete. In some 3.2. The value of lost load in disaster management
cases, historical and empirical data are used in combination with expert
surveys to model CI interdependencies (Stergiopoulos et al., 2016). In The most popular approach for assessing the consequences of power
practice, however the CI providers and scientists have no or only limited outages is the Value of Lost Load (VoLL) (for a general overview, see
access to detailed data on interdependencies. The actual challenge is to Billinton, 2001; Billinton et al., 1993; Ajodhia et al., 2002). The VoLL is
provide decision support approaches based on a limited amount of data an estimation of the customer's willingness to pay for avoiding a
that are easy to collect without vast experience by the disaster manage- power outage, which implies the monetary value of electricity lost for
ment authorities. a concrete hour and customer. Some studies particularly focus on the
Even though CI interdependency models and simulations are usually conditions in Germany (see, e.g., Praktiknjo, 2016; Piaszeck et al.,
very complex, their results have a high level of abstraction that focuses 2013; Growitsch et al., 2013). Although VoLL analysis provides informa-
on a general CI protection rather than a concrete design of an effective tion about power outage consequences, there are multiple reasons why
disaster management. With all remarkable efforts of the available the use of VoLL analysis results can be recommended for disaster man-
models and simulations, their findings are often too general and vague agement with certain limitations only. So far, studies to estimate the
for the purposes of disaster management. They frequently address a VoLL have addressed industrial and economic sectors, households, and
too high management level and, hence, do not sufficiently consider in- the purposes of the energy and electricity sector exclusively. It was
dividual structures of a certain region. Often, high-level/wide-area CIs not possible to find a study of VoLL of CIs and CI sectors. This is probably
are addressed instead of local CIs. This makes it extreme difficult to un- due to the results of a VoLL analysis that reaches its limits when consid-
derstand the role of particular facilities or to derive and identify appro- ering non-monetary, immaterial, and social implications of the loss of
priate coping measures. There is still no single “silver bullet” approach (CI) services. Another reason why VoLL analyses are still infeasible in di-
(Kröger and Nan, 2014; Kröger, 2008) and still a need for appropriate saster management is that the VoLL analyses are focused on the value of
analysis tools for the purposes of disaster management (Pescaroli and industrial sectors or households in certain cities (“kreisfreie Stadt”) and
Alexander, 2016). counties (“Landkreis”). The results are usually regionalized in a macro-
Some results from empirical studies about cascading effects are re- scopic way. For an effective disaster management, a higher resolution is
markable because their findings are in contrast to the toppling domino requested. But the necessary data on the municipal level are often lack-
theory. Luiijf et al. (2009) and Van Eeten et al. (2011) found that cascad- ing. In addition, the VoLL can estimate the consequences of short-term
ing events occur more frequently as expected. Interestingly, the over- losses of some hours to a very limited extent. Consequently, some of
whelming majority of cascading effects are caused by disruptions in the methods (see, e.g., Leahy and Tol, 2011; Growitsch et al., 2013; de
the energy and telecom sectors. Only very exceedingly isolated cascad- Nooij et al., 2007, de Nooij et al., 2009) use electricity (use) or load pro-
ing events were caused due to other CIs. This is not surprising as many files of consumers to estimate an hourly VoLL. In this way, outage costs
theoretical analysis (e.g. Laugé et al., 2015; Stergiopoulos et al., 2016; can be computed as a function of time. The resulting hourly VoLL is used,
Buldyrev et al., 2010; Setola et al., 2009) and other empirical analysis for instance, in reducing the monetary consequences of load reduction
(e.g. Kunz et al., 2013; Luiijf et al., 2009; Van Eeten et al., 2011; Blake processes (see, e.g., Khujadze, 2014; Praktiknjo, 2016; Conejo et al.,
et al., 2013) have shown that the most of the CI services rely on electric- 2010). However, only the extension by load profiles is not enough for
ity and on the information and communication infrastructures. Through taking into account further dynamic changes triggered by power out-
this, both events have high potentials for becoming a cascade initiating ages. This makes the VoLL still inappropriate in particular for estima-
event. The empirical studies have also shown that domino events do tions which address the impacts of a disruption lasting several hours.
rarely cascade deeply (Luiijf et al. (2009) and Van Eeten et al., 2011).
In 2009, for instance, Luiijf et al. analyzed more than 1700 CI disruptions 3.3. Spatial-temporal vulnerability assessments
and discovered that only 24% of the disruptions caused resulting cascad-
ing effects in other CI services. Four per cent of the total CI disruptions Vulnerability assessments are widely used in disaster management
escalated in secondary events and only 0.22% in tertiary cascade events. to estimate harms (Birkmann and Wisner, 2006) and to identify weak-
Although it is not clear whether coping measures were effective in other nesses in the preparation stage (Bogardi, 2004). Vulnerability is gener-
cascading events or other cascading events were simply not be report- ally recognized as an unobservable phenomenon (Moss et al., 2001;
ed, the findings indicate that CI disruption do not frequently cascade Patt et al., 2009). Therefore, different theoretical concepts were devel-
deeply. This result is in sharp contrast with the predominated domino oped which use varying definitions for the term “vulnerability” (for
theory and also point out that cascading effects should not be overstated more insights on the definitions of vulnerability see also Thywissen,
or exaggerated. 2006; Manyena, 2006; Hufschmidt, 2011).
Whether a power outage become a cascade initiating event or not is Generally, vulnerability is understood as an inherent character of a
mainly depending on the outage duration and the characteristics of the system to suffer from adverse effects under the impact of hazards (e.g.
exposed CIs. For an effective disaster management, the individual struc- see Thywissen, 2006; Cardona, 1999; Birkmann and Wisner, 2006). De-
ture and characteristics of specific local CIs have to be taken into ac- pending on the theory concept and the specific context, discipline, haz-
count. Weak points in a certain region have to be identified, counter ard, and assessment purpose, the vulnerability of a system is often
measures compared, and stakeholder collaboration fostered. Related derived from dimensions of e.g. exposure, threats, element at risks, sus-
to the complex challenge of modelling the functionalities of CIs, ceptibility, criticality, and/or CCRs (see, e.g. Birkmann, 2006; Villagrán
Pescaroli and Alexander (2016) recommend to rather analyze potential de León, 2006). These are frequently measured indirectly by indicators
escalation points and the sensitive nodes that may generate secondary and indicator frameworks (see e.g. Kasperson et al., 1995; Brooks,
resulting events. They suggest to “shift attention from risk scenarios 2003; Adger, 2006).
based on hazard to vulnerability scenarios” based on paths for cascading The measurability is often difficult because of lacking or uncertain
events. Such a shift would stress the role of identification of tipping data. Data can be obtained empirically, by simulation or modelling or
points of disruptions and the amplification of crises. Given the findings from expert estimations. To deal with lacking or uncertain data, Fuzzy
T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118 103

Logic (e.g. Claudio et al., 2011; Akgun et al., 2010), Monte-Carlo simula- where r ∈ Districts = {1, 2, … , g} and g number of districts in a city or
tion (e.g. Perdikaris et al., 2011), probabilistic approaches (e.g. Blauhut county.
et al., 2015) or Delphi surveys (e.g. Bañuls et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2013) Fig. 1 shows the general assessment's aggregation framework. Each
are frequently used. CIi , r , u is defined according to their individual number i, to their assign-
The indicator values are aggregated to vulnerability indices by sim- ment to the district r where it is located, and to their respective CI type
ple sums, weighted sums of normalized indicator values or multiplica- u. For each CIi , r , u a CI Vulnerability Index is calculated using a mea-
tion of the indicator values. From a methodological point of view, this surement for the CI's criticality and coping capacity. The criticality of a
is approach is similar to multi-attributive value theory. The selection CI is measured by the Relevance Criticality Weight, the Size Criticality In-
of the indicators and their aggregation depends on the assessment pur- dicator, and the Time Dependent Criticality Indicator. A Coping Capacity
pose and have to be chosen with care. Depletion Indicator is used to take into account the CI's coping capacity.
Recently, there is a growing number of vulnerability assessments The Relevance Criticality Weight and Size Criticality Indicator are static
which allow an assessing of spatial-temporal impacts of hazards. This values and do not change over time. The Time Dependent Criticality Indi-
makes it possible to assess long-term changes such as from the impacts cator and the Coping Capacity Depletion Indicator are time dependent
of climate change (see, e.g., Aubrecht et al., 2013; Gaillard, 2010) or of and change during an ongoing power outage. A detailed explanation
sea level rises (e.g. Sahin and Mohamed, 2010; Sobiech, 2013) but also and derivation of the CI vulnerability measuring will be provided in
of short-term or time specific vulnerability changes such as the time-de- the upcoming sections.
pending earthquake risks (e.g. Debnath, 2013) or flood risks (e.g. Each CI has an individual role in the entire CI system of a city or
Rodríguez-Gaviria and Botero-Fernández, 2013). county. Depending on the CI's criticality, a missing service from a certain
CI can have a severe impact in the entire city or county. To reflect this,
the vulnerability measurement assesses the vulnerability of one CI in re-
4. Developing a spatial-temporal vulnerability assessment
lation to the characteristics of all other CIs in the city or county. The re-
lation addresses the relevance of the CI type (measured by the
In this section we introduce and discuss the development of the spa-
Relevance Criticality Weight) and the size of the certain CI in relation
tial-temporal vulnerability assessment. We firstly give a brief overview
to other CIs from the same CI type (measured by the Size Criticality In-
about the general theory and the components of the assessment. The
dicator). Through this, the amount of a CI's vulnerability index also ex-
components will then be discussed thereafter in detail.
presses the criticality of the CI for the whole city or county. Temporal-
spatial analyses are realized by the calculation of district vulnerability
4.1. The basic theory of the spatial-temporal vulnerability assessment indexes. This index is an aggregation of vulnerability indexes of those
CIs that are located in the district under consideration. This aggregation
As partly mentioned before, we understand the spatial-temporal allows temporal analysis based on the calculation of vulnerability values
vulnerability as a measure of the potential sufferings of a population for different point in times during a power outage. For analyzing spatial
in a certain city or county under the effects of a reduction or loss of CI effects, the district's vulnerability index displays the consequences of a
services caused by a power outage. The assessment aims at estimating power outage for the entire city which are caused by the missing or re-
the vulnerability of districts of a certain city or county by focusing on duced services of the CIs located in the respective district. Higher dis-
the exposure of CIs which are located in the districts. tricts vulnerability values mean that the CIs suffering from the effects
In a city or county under consideration, there are l CIs, where each CI of a power outage in the certain districts have a high criticality to the en-
has an individual number i ∈ Infrastructures = {1,2, … , l}. For the fur- tire CI system.
ther assessment, it is important to categorize and assign CIs into differ- The assessment can be used before and during a power outage. For
ent CI types. As discussed before, there is no comprehensive and well- both application contexts, a power outage scenario has to be defined.
defined list of concrete facilities of local CIs in Germany. However, CI A power outage can affect different areas, vary in its duration, and hap-
types can be found as attributes in CI Cadasters. Their determination is pen at any type of day (weekend, working day, etc.) and daytime. The
derived from the German laws for disaster management, civil protec- effects of a present power outage can be analyzed by using the scenario
tion, and emergency legislation. Fig. 3 displays a list of types for local attributes of its starting time. In the disaster preparation and mitigation
CIs that can be find in nearly every city or county. This list is non-ex- phase, a reasonable reference power outage scenario is requested. The
haustive but provides an adequate basis for a discussion for decision definition of this reference scenario is discussed in the upcoming
makers about what CI types should be considered in the assessment. section.
Some of the CI types may be excluded. As already discussed, there are The general structure and approach of the assessment is displayed in
sometimes cases of facilities that are very specific for a city or county Fig. 2. The figure shows the assessment processes, how the decision
and from great practical interest although an assignment into the makers are generally involved, and the origin of necessary data.
given CI categories is not possible. Such facilities have, for instance, an Adequate preparations are necessary before the vulnerability as-
inherent increased hazard potential. The assessment is flexible to create sessment can be conducted. Depending on whether the assessment
new CI types and, hence, allow an integration of such special facilities. should facilitate preparedness/mitigation or response/recovery ac-
Finally, the decision on which CI types should be taken into account is tivities, the attributes of a reference power outage scenario or attrib-
up to the decision makers. uted of a present power outage (event scenario) have to be
The selected CIs that should be considered in the assessment determined by the decision makers. This also includes the selection
are assigned to the respective CI types CI_type u where u of CI types that should be analyzed in the assessment. Thus, the
∈ Types = {1, 2, … , h} and h number of CI types taken into account. boundary conditions for conducting the assessment are defined by
All hospitals, for instance, are assigned to the CI type “hospitals”, the decision makers.
all pharmacies to the CI type “pharmacies”. It is not always suffi- A minimum of data about the characteristics of CIs is necessary. The
cient to consider all CI types in a single assessment. To enhance decision makers have to provide attributes about the CI's locations, the
sector specific insights or to focus on a particular aspects, it can sizes, and the coping capacities. Usually, these data is provided by the
be useful to conduct multiple assessment runs. local CI Cadasters which substantially reduces the efforts for data
The CIs are usually irregularly distributed in a city or county. This collection.
causes different impacts depending on which geographical regions are The assessment is based on two estimations of decision makers. First
affected by a power outage and which local CIs are located in the affect- is the evaluation of coping capacity depletion and the second is the eval-
ed regions. The considered city or county consists of multiple districtr, uation of CI type relevancies. The evaluations are integrated in the
104 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

Fig. 1. The general assessment's aggregation framework of indicators and weights to calculate CI and district vulnerability indexes.

assessment by the Relevance Criticality Weight and the Coping Capacity 4.2. Definition of a reference power outage scenario
Depletion Indicator.
The results of the assessment are aggregated outputs. Usually, the Although the simulation provides valuable insights, the accurate
first assessment run considers a baseline scenario in which no addition- prediction of power outage consequences is timely limited to the initial
al coping measures are taken into account. In further assessment runs, period. The reason for this is that power outages are, like any other di-
coping strategies could be applied. Multiple strategies can be considered saster, exceptions to the rules (Turoff et al., 2004). However, the pro-
by the decision makers. The benefit of the strategies can be measured posed approach is pre-deterministic and rule-based which makes it
and compared by the updated aggregated output. impossible to predict unforeseen developments which will particular
We believe that the general structure of the assessment is compara- arise the longer the outage lasts. The longer a power outage lasts, the
tively simple. The low efforts for data collection, the strong concentra- more unpredictable and exceptional is the situation and the less it is
tion on four parameters, and the integration of the decision maker's possible to make reliable forecasts. Thus, only initial impacts are suffi-
estimations allow rapid implementation and a well understanding of ciently predictable. To effectively disaster planning, it is necessary to de-
the results. However, the conduct itself and the evaluation request de- fine a reference scenario of a power outage which is relevant,
tailed methodological knowledge and skills. In particular exploration reasonable, and still allows for an assessment based on pre-
and integration of the decision maker's estimations are demanding determinations.
and can lead to an overextension of the decision makers. It can be suit- Past power outages demonstrated that a disruption of electricity
able that the decision makers are consulted by an analyst and modera- supply can happen any time, expose areas of various sizes, and last
tor who leads them through the whole assessment process. from seconds to days (see, e.g. Anagnostatos et al., 2013; UTCE, 2007;
However, the provision of the assessment results alone will not der Vleuten and Lagendijk, 2010; Howell, 2012). According to the size
reach a higher level of resilience. Based on the results, it is only possible of the area that is exposed to a power outage, it is appropriate to consid-
to identify strengths, weaknesses, and lacks of preparations. However, er the worst case in which the entire city or county is affected in the ref-
such results motivates for investing in CCRs, facilitate the disaster erence scenario. The definition of the duration is a balance between a
planning processes, and can lead to appropriate activities to enhance too short and a too long outage. From a practical point of view, the du-
the resilience of CIs. ration must be suitable to address the initial impacts of a power outage.

Fig. 2. Visualization of the vulnerability assessment structure.


T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118 105

However, a definition of a too long outage duration (e.g. several days 4.3.1. Relevance Criticality Weight
and weeks) may result in an unpredictable situation development. As already mentioned before, the CIs can be assigned to different CI
Based on this considerations, we propose a reference scenario as an out- types such as hospitals, GPs, pharmacies, etc. The CI types differ in
age which affects the entire city or county with an outage duration of their relevance for providing vital products and services to the popula-
one and a half day (or, in other words, 36 h corresponding to tion. In the multi-attributive value theory, this is expressed by weights
2160 min). However, decision makers are enabled to define other refer- (for more information see e.g. Belton and Stewart (2002)).
ence scenarios. Beside the reference scenario, the decision makers may There are multiple ways to determine values for the weights (for a
define other scenarios which may are also from interest. For an en- review see e.g. Zardari et al., 2015; Riabacke et al., 2012). In our case,
hanced understanding it may also be interesting to vary the starting the determination should be based on the estimations of decision
time, the duration, and/or the districts which are affected by a power makers. Due to there are multiple decision makers involved, an appro-
outage, for instance. priate group weighting method has to be selected carefully. Because of
the high number of CI types, the little experience of the decision makers
in using weighting methods, and the high number of decision makers
4.3. Criticality of critical infrastructures involved we selected the direct weighting technique as one of the
most practical weighting method in this Delphi evaluation.
The criticality of a CI can be measured through several dimensions. In this paper, we used a modified Delphi evaluation to rate the CI
We limited the dimensions to the smallest reasonable number of type relevancies (for general Delphi evaluation see, e.g., Dalkey and
three dimensions. The three dimensions still allow profound insights Helmer (1963), Linstone and Turoff (1975)). Traditionally, a Delphi
at simultaneous reduced expenses for modelling and data collection. evaluation aims at aggregating and discussing evaluations of the same
This comparatively simplifies the vulnerability assessment and ensures decision makers in multiple rounds until a consensus is reached. This or-
a better interpretation and comprehension of the results. igin approach is modified to ensure a higher level of practical orienta-
The first criticality dimension addresses the assignment of a CI to a tion, better acceptance of the assessment results by decision makers,
specific CI type. The CI types differ in their relevance for providing and greater legal certainty when exercising an administrative discre-
vital products and services to the population. As an example, the disrup- tion. The modified structure is displayed in Fig. 3 and consists of mini-
tion of a hospital is more severe for the population than the disruption mum two rounds.
of a GP or a pharmacy. This dimension is considered by the Relevance In each round a panel of decision makers evaluate weights for the CI
Criticality Weight. As this dimension refers to different types of CIs, we types. Deviating from the traditional approach, the panels of decision
also call this property “inter-criticality”. The second criticality dimen- makers in the first and the second round are not the same. In the first
sion is related to the size of a CI. CIs that are larger than others of the round, we asked a couple of decision makers from different cities and
same type supply products to a higher amount of customers and are for estimating the relevancies of CI types. The decision makers are com-
therefore more critical. Hence, a disruption of a larger CI have more ing from different cities or counties and each is in charge for managing
fatal impacts than a disruption of a smaller infrastructure. This dimen- power outage impacts in their area of responsibility. We are asked them
sion is considered by the Size Criticality Indicator and also understood separately and anonymously to evaluate each CI type of the set of CI
as “intra-criticality” of CIs of the same type. The third criticality dimen- types with respect to its importance for supplying the population with
sion refers to the daytime at which a CI is exposed to a power outage. vital services and products. As the decision makers' judgements are in-
Some CIs are operated only during the day or the population's demand dependent of a concrete city or county, the intermediate summary of
for the CIs fluctuates over daytime. To consider this, we introduce the the first round provides a general statement without taking into account
Time Dependent Criticality Indicator. The following sections will describe local specifications. Then, the intermediate summary of the first round is
how all of these dimensions are operated. used in a second round to support those decision makers who are in

Fig. 3. Structure of the modified Delphi evaluation for determining the CI type relevancies.
106 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

charge of disaster management of the city or county under consider- important decision support for those decision makers who are in charge
ation. Like in practice, these decision makers have to discuss the weights of a city or county and analyze the results in the second round of the
in face-to-face meetings and have to find a consensus for the value they Delphi method. The decision makers of the second round can then dis-
determine for each CI type. In this second round, they are allowed to use cuss and analyze the intermediate summary taking account the individ-
the intermediate summary or to revise it taking into account their ual structure and characteristics of the CIs in their city or county. They
knowledge of the concrete CIs, their experience, preferences, and can relate their decision on relevance rates to the certain representative
knowledge about local disaster risks. This revision allows for a change results of the first round or revise the previous evaluation, if objective
of the previous weights as well as for the inclusion or exclusion of CI reasons exist that make a change necessary. Compared to the practice
types. The direct weighting technique is used to determine the weights. of today in which the decision makers do not use a systematic and struc-
The direct weighting is based on importance weighting scores wscore u ture approach to rate CIs, the Delphi approach allow a determination of
which represent the importance of each CI type. The score varies be- weights which is less arbitrary or random and, hence, can also better
tween 0 for no importance and 100 for high importance. The considered withstand critical judicial reviews. In the second round of the Delphi es-
set of CI type and the role of CI importance were discussed with the de- timation, the decision makers from a certain city or district are also free
cision makers in workshops. Using a standardized questionnaire, each to exclude some of the proposed CI types or to include new ones, where
decision maker of the first round was asked to rate each CI type without necessary.
considering other aspects, such as the potential CI size, its CCRs or the Ideally, the second round results in a consensus of importance
time of exposure. weighting scores wscore
u for each CI type u. For the further calculation,
We used two workshops to launch the first round of the Delphi eval- it is necessary to fulfil the condition that the sum of every weight is 1.
uation. In 2014, a first workshop took place which was accessible to any This is done by a linear normalization of the importance weighting
representative who were responsible for disaster management in a Ger- scores and results using a normalized relevance criticality weight wRelev
u
man city or county. The workshop had the main purpose to verify the with
list of relevant CI types. Eleven decision makers participated. In a second
workshop, all disaster management authorities of the 44 cities and wscore
wRelev
u ¼ Xh u ð1Þ
counties in the federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg were invited to
wscore
u¼1 u
send representatives who are in charge of preparation for and coping
with the effects of power outages in their area or responsibility. 31 de-
cision makers participated in the second workshop. From both work- Besides the second round and the further consensus debate with the
shops, 32 responses of the participants were analyzed. The decision makers in charge, it is also possible to integrate the uncertainty
intermediate summary is displayed in Fig. 4. from the intermediate summary into the further calculations. This re-
Fig. 4 shows the intermediate results from the first round which ex- sults in an advanced understanding of the possible variance of the as-
presses the expert estimations of the pre-defined set of CI types. It dis- sessment outcome. An exclusion of CI types is still possible. In this
plays how the responses for each CI types are distributed over a case, the determination of the importance weighting factor wRelev u de-
smaller or larger. The box plots illustrates how the majority of decision pends on the combination of the importance weighting scores wscore u
makers evaluate the CI types. It represents a general statement about which each can be assumed as a statistical distribution. This can be
the importance of CI types from a larger number of decision makers. solved by Monte Carlo simulations using a sample statistical distribution
The result was neither discussed with the decision makers nor changed (for more information of uncertainty handling using Monte Carlo simu-
in the first round and, consequently, the result has wide empirical vari- lation see, e.g. Bertsch, 2008). Each score is sampled by its statistical dis-
ance. The empirical variance indicates common or different understand- tribution based on the intermediate summary. In each simulation a new
ings of a CI type's importance. In the second round, this uncertainty is an random combination of importance weighting scores is formed and

Fig. 4. Intermediate summary of the importance weighting scores of CI types in a boxplot diagram based 32 evaluations from representatives of different disaster management authorities
in the first round of the Delphi evaluation.
T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118 107

normalized. By conducting multiple simulations, it is possible to gener- those of pharmacies), periodic shift operations (like those in hospitals)
ate a normalized relevance criticality weight wRelev
u which fully capture or the human circadian rhythm (like the day-night-cycle). There are
the uncertainties in weights. higher load periods during a day in which more processes are activated
and other operations are underway to provide services and products.
4.3.2. Size Criticality Indicator Accordingly, there also is a smaller demand indicated during those pe-
Depending on the local structure of the city or county under consid- riods of a day in which the load course is relatively low. This implies
eration, there are multiple CIs of the same CI type or only one or no CI of that a power outage in the period with low values of the load course
a CI type. If there are multiple CIs of the same type, they may also have would lead to minor adverse impacts compared to those that occur in
different sizes. The number and the sizes of CIs from the same type in a time periods with a higher load level. In this way, the intraday load
certain district are a dimension of criticality. To consider this, we intro- course represents daytime-specific changes of the demand of vital ser-
duce a CI type-specific Size Criticality Indicator to include this dimen- vices and products, the susceptibility to damage, losses, and expected
sions into the aggregation of the Vulnerability Index Value. The but potentially lacking supply of CI functionalities and, hence, a day-
indicator is measured by a CI-specific size attribute ai,r,u. time-depending criticality.
If multiple CIs of a CI type have similar sizes, it is sufficient to use the The load course represent the electricity consumption for all process
total number of CIs of the same type in a city or county. This, for in- of a facility. In a CI facility, these processes can be those for the core ser-
stance, applies to pharmacies, because pharmacies in Germany have vices and productions but also for supporting tasks. The processes have
nearly similar floor spaces and numbers of customers. Consequently, different criticalities for keeping the CI services, have different demands
for pharmacies further differentiations are not necessary. In other on electricity, are conducted at different times at a day (process sched-
cases the size of CIs of a CI type vary greatly. The larger the CI, the uling), and depend on each other (process interactions). These could be
more important is it for the provision of vital services and products. included in a vulnerability assessment by further micro models of single
This, for instance, applies to hospitals, for which a higher degree of dif- CI facilities. We are convinced, that this is not practical because this ap-
ferentiation is necessary, because the hospital sizes vary. For each of proach request many data which collection is time consuming and in
such kinds of CI type a specific attribute ai , r , u has to be defined. An ad- some cases probably not sufficient at the moment. It also would lead
equate sufficient size indicator of hospitals is the number of hospital to higher efforts in CI modelling and generates new uncertainties
beds. This is similar for dialysis clinics or nursing beds. which are difficult to handle. These are the reasons why it is reasonable
Table 1 displays a proposal for some selected CI-specific attributes and proper to see a CI as one common unit comprises of all its processes.
for some CI types which may need a size differentiation, if multiple CIs We assume, that a CI can only operate correctly without an undesired
of the same CI type are located in the considered city or county. reduction or loss of CI services, if all types of processes work and are suf-
The CI-specific Size Criticality Indicator Si , r , u is calculated by a lin- ficiently supplied by electricity.
ear normalization taking into account all attributes values of all CIs of In estimating the vulnerability, the integration of intraday load
the same CI type u with u ∈ V = {1, 2, … , h} courses allows to consider the level of demand at the time at which a
power outage starts. Although the intraday load course represents nor-
ai;r;u mal day-to-day conditions, specific demand changes that occur in the
Si;r;u ¼ Xl Xg ∀u ∈ Types ð2Þ
aftermath of a power outage are not displayed by load courses. Due to
i¼1
a
r¼1 i;r;u this limitation, indicating the vulnerability through an intraday load
course is useful for measuring the short run effects of power disruptions.
The attribute values are obtained from statistical, census or descrip- It can be assumed that in the beginning of an unexpected power outage
tive data provided by the local statistical offices, local disaster manage- the affected customers are not able to adjust their demand. In this initial
ment authorities, or own surveys. In the short-term perspective of a few situation, we assume that the impairments corresponds to the load
weeks, these values will not change and are highly precise. Hence, it is course. This may change after a couple of days of an ongoing power out-
reasonable to ignore the uncertainty of these data. However, the data age. The longer an outage takes, the more significantly does the demand
display a situation at a discrete point in time which can change during deviate from normal conditions. For considering long-term power out-
the years. To ensure the validity of the model in the future, the attribute ages, the use of load courses for impact estimations is not suitable.
values have to be updated periodically. There are multiple ways to collect load course data. Sometimes, facil-
ity operators track their electricity consumption and generate daily load
4.3.3. Time dependent criticality indicator courses. In these cases, it might be possible to analyze the data and gen-
Electricity is consumed by customers in various and individual in- erate representative load courses for working days, Saturdays, and Sun-
tensities throughout a day. Regularly, the variation of customer-specific days that are specific of the considered CI. However, this way of data
consumption during a day is expressed by intraday load course of elec- collection is very time–consuming because of the high number of CIs
trical power in a resolution of 15 min. Intraday load characteristics rep- in a city or county. In addition, the success depends on cooperation
resent typical loads over time for the processes that are executed during with the CI provider. Safety concerns and data protection may reduce
a day at a CI facility. The processes correspond to business hours (like the willingness to cooperate. Another way to collect load course data
is the use of data from forecasting techniques. There are multiple tech-
niques in literature that allow for a precise forecast of load courses,
Table 1 which is very important in planning and operating electric utilities (Fi-
CI type and CI-specific attributes ai,r,u.
scher, Härtl, and Wille-Haussmann, 2015; Piwko et al. 2005). The tech-
CI type u Name of CI type CI type-specific attributes ai, r,u niques use historic data or synthetically generated data. Both
1 Hospitals Number of hospital beds techniques use statistic evaluations. In doing so, the customer's behav-
4 Shelters for refugees and homeless Number of beds ior is taken into account, which is influenced, for instance, by time,
5 Dialysis clinics Number of dialysis beds day, season, weather, and random effects. Reviews of forecast tech-
6 Nursing homes Number of care beds
niques and the associated expenditure are provided by e.g. Hippert et
7 Assisted living Number of beds
14 Ambulance stations Number of staff per shift al. (2001), Alfares and Nazeeruddin (2002), Taylor and McSharry
15 Fire stations Number of staff per shift (2008), Singh et al. (2012).
16 Police stations Number of staff per shift Up to now, the load courses of relatively small systems like house-
17 Correctional facilities Number of prisoners holds, retail shops and offices, and minor segments of customer clusters
21 Drinking water facilities Liters per day
have been represented as so-called standard load profiles (SLPs) or as
108 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

synthetically generated profiles. SLPs are based on evaluations of histor- fuel consumption. However, the CCR is regularly designed for constant
ical data and are references for a typically reasonable and accurate load full-load operation. Often, load banks and protective switches are
course. They are representative of facilities of the same kind. In Germa- installed to prevent engines and equipment from being damaged during
ny, SLPs are provided by local distribution grid providers or federal asso- overload and underload operations. For this reason, it can be assumed
ciations like the BDEW (German Association of Energy and Water that the CCR is consumed constantly, even in times during a power out-
Industries). SLPs are available for all CI types on the local level. age in which processes are reduced, rescheduled or skipped.
SLPs represent an intraday load course with a time-depending elec- The vulnerability can be expressed by a CCR depletion function
trical load value YDaySaisonu(tstep) for a CI type u of a particular day type Ck(tstep) for a CI k for different time steps tstep. The function implies an
(working day, Saturday, Sunday) and season (summer, winter, spring, evaluation of vulnerability that is derived from the CC depletion and
autumn). The SLP displays a load in a resolution of 15 min. Therefore, the loss of operational abilities. The function expresses a score between
the load value refers to a discrete point in time tstep with 0 for full CCR or not vulnerable and 1 for fully depleted CCR or highly
step= 1 , … , 96. vulnerable for different CCR consumptions. If CCR is implemented, the
For the modelling of a daytime-depending CI criticality, a normalized score 0 is reached in the beginning of a power outage, because enough
value is necessary, which varies between 0 for no load and no criticality CCR is available to absorb the adverse effects. The score 1 is reached at
and 100 for maximum load and maximum criticality. We propose a sim- the point in time tCC i . After this point, the CCR is fully exhausted and
ple normalization function LoadDaySaisonu(tstep) with respect to the reaches the score 1:
maximum load of the intraday load phase maxYDaySaisonu({t1, … , t96}): 8
  < 0 if t step −t CCR ¼0
    i
C i t step ¼ Depl t if t step bt CCR ð4Þ
Saison   Y Saison
Day u t step : i step i
LoadDay t step ¼ ð3Þ 1 else
u
maxY Saison
Day u ðft 1 ; …; t 96 gÞ

In the baseline scenario, a refilling of the CCR is not considered. The


Meanwhile, the use of SLPs has been criticized by some researchers, vulnerability increase up to the point in time tCCR expresses a subjective
such as Hayn et al. (2014), who point out that the ongoing transforma- perception. The increase depends on how decision makers percept and
tion process of electricity systems and changed consumer behaviors are evaluate the CCR consumption rate. It could be expressed by different
not adequately taken into account by SLPs. To overcome these weak- types of depletion graphs Deplk(tstep), which may be linear, quadratic,
nesses, bottom-up load models are used with raising popularity and exponential or of another type. To determine a depletion graph
(ibid.). Such models aim at providing synthetically generated profiles Depli(tstep), another decision maker survey using a standardized ques-
and take into account multiple parameters like consumer's behaviors, tionnaire was conducted during the second workshop mentioned
attitudes, lifestyles, statistical data like census data, and the capacity de- before.
mand of used electric appliances at different times of a day. The increas- As it is not possible to ask the decision makers for depletion graphs
ing trend of using bottom-up load models is also pushed by the for every possible ΔTCCRi and every CI type, the survey is simplified to
availability of new technologies for metering electricity consumption. consider the vulnerability level for those time steps in which 25, 50,
Those technologies emerged in the past years (Neenan and Hemphill, and 75% of the CCR is consumed. The decision makers were asked to es-
2008). The use of bottom-up load models may provide additional op- timate vulnerability for these three time steps using a score between 0
portunities to estimate intraday load course-triggered vulnerability in for not vulnerable and 1 for highly vulnerable.
the future, but for the moment, the number of synthetically generated The estimations of the decision maker vary and result in a specific
profiles for CI types is not sufficient. distribution for each considered time step. This distribution is used to
express the uncertainty of the subjective evaluations of the vulnerability
4.4. Coping capacity resource depletion indicator increase depending on the CC consumption rate.
This uncertainty can be integrated into vulnerability modelling by
Some CI providers use emergency power units or batteries to contin- using a Monte-Carlo simulation. For this purpose, the distributions for
ue their business even in the situation of a power outage. However, the each time steps have to be aggregated to functions that represent the
loading capacity of batteries or the volume of fuel tanks for generators is vulnerability increase for the whole period and for different probabili-
restricted. Continued supply is limited in time, although these CCRs en- ties. To do so, quantiles are defined for each distribution of the three
able the provider to absorb adverse effects of a power outage. Batteries considered time steps. Including the fixed values for the further time
and fuel tanks can be recharged and refilled. However, in the first in- steps t0 and tCCR with Depli(t0) = 0 and Depli(tCCR i ) = 1, a regression
stance the model should focus on the baseline scenario without any fur- function for each quantile can be derived. Each regression function
ther response measures. then allows for the calculation of a vulnerability value for each time
The more batteries discharge and the more the filling level of the fuel step. To conduct the Monte-Carlo simulation, each regression is sam-
tanks drops, the more CCR is consumed and the lower is the ability to pled by its probability distribution. Random variables are used that fol-
cope with the adverse effects (communicating with others, refilling low a discrete distribution of the regression.
CCR, preparing for a full disruption, preparing evacuation, etc.). Because
of the depletion of CCR, the vulnerability of the considered CI increases 4.5. Spatial-temporal vulnerability aggregation
with the duration of a power outage. The vulnerability increase depends
on how long the CCR can last, which is expressed by ΔTCCR i . At the time The weights and indicators are aggregated to indexes. The CI Vulner-
tCCR with tCC = t0 + ΔTCCR i in which the CC is fully depleted, the CI fa- ability Index VulnCIi , r , u(tstep) expresses how a CI suffers at a specific

cilities are at high risk to break down, to suffer damage, and to lose per- time step during a power outage taking into account the CI's Size Criti-
formance in providing vital services and products to the population. cality Indicator, Time Dependent Criticality Indicator, and Coping Capac-
Until this point in time, recharging or refueling, the recovery of the pri- ity Resource Depletion Indicator. It is calculated by a multiplicative
mary electricity supply or alternative measures that keep a population aggregation:
supplied are required.
CI     Saison  
The increase in the CI's vulnerability depends on the speed at which Vulni;r;u t step ¼ C i t step  LoadDay u t step  Si;r;u ∀i ∈ Infrastructure ð5Þ
CCR is depleted. Whether the CCR ability comes from a battery or a
power unit with a fuel tank, the CC can be operated under overload, nor- The District Vulnerability Index Vulnidistrict
, r , u (tstep) is aggregated by the
mal load, and underload conditions. This may lead to different speeds of weighted sum of the CI Vulnerability Index Values of those CIs which are
T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118 109

located in the considered district r and the corresponding CI-type-spe- considered. (Table 2). Relating to the Delphi discourse and the
cific Relevance Criticality Weight: weighting process discussed before, we skip the second Delphi
round and use the intermediate summary of the first round in this
district   CI  
h h
demonstration. This approach allows for taking into account the
Vulnr t step ¼ ∑ ∑ Vulni;r;u t step wRelev
u ∀ r∈ Districts ð6Þ
i¼1 u¼1 weights' uncertainties. Although all values relating to the locations,
the sizes, and the preparation levels of the considered CIs are avail-
The CI Vulnerability Index Values and the District Vulnerability able, we slightly changed the size values and the preparation levels
Index Values are computed for 15-minutemin time steps for the consid- of the considered CIs in this paper for secrecy and privacy reasons.
ered power outage scenario. The sequence of values for multiple time
steps expresses a time series that display vulnerability profiles. The pro- 5.2. Assessment results for the reference power outage scenario
files show the development of the vulnerability for the duration of the
considered power outage scenario. Based on the simulation of all possible scenario parameter combina-
In the third step, the function for the vulnerability profiles can also tions, it was possible to identify the combination with the highest vul-
be used to calculate a static Resilience Value R which represent a com- nerability integral. In the considered case, this is a power outage that
parable time-independent metric for the resilience of a city or county lasts two working days starting at 8 o'clock a.m. in a winter season.
taking into account all CI Vulnerability Index values. According to For this worst case scenario, we calculated the aggregated vulnerability
Bruneau et al. (2003), Zobel and Khansa (2014), and Pant et al. values for each city district (Fig. 5) and the overall vulnerability value for
(2014), the resilience can be defined as the sum of all integrals of in- the whole city (Fig. 6). In addition, we calculated the vulnerability
verse District Vulnerability Index values that includes all temporal vul- values of all hospitals for a more detailed analysis of CIs of the same
nerability values of CI facilities for the period under consideration that type.
lasts from t0 as the beginning of a power outage to tp, the point in In Fig. 6, the districts' vulnerability profiles express the assessment
time where the period under consideration ends: results for the worst case scenario. The vulnerability course is calculated
Z in 15-minutemin time steps. The increasing of the districts' vulnerabil-
tp h i
district 
g
ities imply the level of loss or at least reduction of the quality of supply
Rðα Þ ¼ ∑ 1−Vulnr t step dt ð7Þ
r¼1 t0 of vital services and products of CIs for the population. In Fig. 7, the re-
sults are also shown in a Geographic Information System (GIS) for se-
In this way, resilience values can be calculated for the baseline sce- lected time steps.
nario and additional scenarios α in which the level of preparation for The vulnerability profiles display a slight vulnerability increase in
different CI facilities is changed. The result enhances insight into the most districts in the first hours of the power outage. In most districts,
role of CCR in disaster planning. We propose a rescaling of the resilience the values reach a plateau with relatively high values from 11 a.m. to
values to scale the range in [0, 1]: 5 p.m. For this period, the districts can be distinguished into two groups:
One group of districts with relatively high values (comprising
Rðα Þ Lindenhof, Innenstadt/Jungbusch, Neckarstadt-Ost, Schwetzingerstadt/
R0ðα Þ ¼ Z tp ð8Þ
Oststadt) and one group with relatively moderate or low values (e.g.
1 dt
t0 Sandhofen, Wallstadt, Seckenheim, Friedrichsfeld etc.). Although the
vulnerability values of the first group are comparatively high, the values
This allows for a better comparison of the resilience from different significantly increase in the further course of time. Hence, the period can
scenarios α. In the following section, we apply the proposed approach be understood as a retarding effect. The retarding effect and the level of
to a use case. the plateau are determined by the CIs which have a relatively high level
of preparation. In the aftermath of the retarding effect, the vulnerability
5. Case study of all districts decreases to a very low plateau from 00:00 a.m. to 5 a.m.
of the next morning. This effect is mainly caused by the relatively low
5.1. The City of Mannheim and its CIs level of demands for CI products and services at night times. The effect
is determined by the load courses which reflect a relatively low level
The results of an application of an exemplary vulnerability of CI operations for this period.
assessment are shown and discussed in this section to demonstrate In the next morning from 5:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., the vulnerabilities
the benefits and limits of the vulnerability assessment. The of the districts of the first group dramatically increase (Fig. 8). This in-
assessment is applied to the city of Mannheim, Germany, and aims crease represents a significant change of the situations in the districts,
at assessing the six central (Innenstadt/Jungbusch, Neckarstadt- but also in the whole city. This period can be understood as a tipping
West, Neckarstadt-Ost, Schwetzingerstadt/Oststadt, Lindenhof, and point. The tipping point is determined by the increasing demand for CI
Neuostheim/Neuhermsheim) and eleven peripheral city districts. services and products, but also by the CCRs which is fully depleted in
For demonstration purposes, we are interested in the impacts of most CIs. Hence, nearly no resources are available at the CIs to adsorb
the reference power outage scenario. The assessment is focused on the effect of the tipping point. In the further course of the second day,
the impacts to the CI facilities in the health sector and on households. the vulnerability has to peaks which are separated by the slightly
Hence, 256 individual facilities and app. 176.000 households are lower demand at midday. Later, at about 7 p.m., the course collapse
again although the most CIs run out of CCRs. This effect is mainly caused
Table 2 by the decreasing demand at the night time.
Types and numbers of considered CIs in the use case. The individual vulnerability profile of each district can also be
assessed. This is particularly important in cases of anomalies of the vul-
CI type u Types Number of facilities per type
nerability course. As an example, the profile of the district Neckarstadt-
1 Hospitals 5
Ost reaches the highest values compared to the other profiles. A more
2 GPs 109
3 Pharmacies 93 detailed view of the vulnerability profile, including its uncertainty and
5 Dialysis clinics 6 the CI types which influence the course, is worthwhile. Fig. 10 shows
6 Nursing homes 30 the profile which has a relatively small uncertainty. The profile is also
7 Assisted living 13 characterized by a comparatively small vulnerability plateau on the
27 Households 176.539
first day, a slight decrease during night time, and a dramatic increase
110 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

Fig. 5. Cumulative overall Vulnerability Index Value representing the vulnerability of the whole city of Mannheim expressed by the mean value and its simple standard deviation for the
considered time steps.

on the next morning with much higher values than on the day before. A The spatial-temporal vulnerability values and their variabilities can
special characteristic is a second peak on the second day after the tip- be compared using the vulnerability integral calculation. Fig. 11 displays
ping point effect. This second peak is the highest of all vulnerability the comparison of the vulnerability integrals of all districts for the stan-
values of the other districts and mainly caused by the vulnerability pro- dard reference scenario, the selected starting time, and the considered
file of the hospital that is situated in Neckarstadt-Ost. type of days for which the power outage lasts. The result shows that
In Fig. 10, the vulnerability profile of the district Neckarstadt-Ost is the vulnerability integrals of the districts Innenstadt/Jungbusch,
shown with the influence of CI types of the CIs that are situated in Neckarstadt-Ost, Schwetzingerstadt, and Lindenhof reach similar
Neckarstadt-Ost. Facilities for assisted living are not located in the dis- values. However, the degrees of variability are different. The highest
trict. It can be identified easily that the hospitals and dialysis clinics variability is seen for the vulnerability of the Neckarstadt-Ost.
are main drivers of the tipping point effect in the morning of the second
day. The vulnerability of the hospital in Neckarstadt-Ost increases near-
ly linearly. The vulnerability of the dialysis clinics starts to increase in 5.3. Sensitivity analyses
the next morning. In combination with the other CIs and their vulnera-
bility courses, the district's vulnerability escalates dramatically on the Sensitivity analyses aim at identifying the influences of parameter
second day. The second peak on the second day is mainly influenced variations on the final results. This frequently allows interesting find-
by the vulnerability increase of the hospital. ings on the robustness of the assessment results and the role of the

Fig. 6. Vulnerability profiles of each city district for a reference power outage lasting two working days in the winter season starting at 8 o'clock.
T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118 111

08:00 a.m. 18:30 p.m. 05:00 a.m. 05:00 p.m.

Fig. 7. GIS visualizations of the vulnerability for different time steps.

individual parameters. Both enhances the understanding of the poten- analysis in detail to demonstrate how sensitive analysis provide valu-
tial impacts and the assessment itself. able insights, although there also other types of analysis.
Referring to the proposed assessment, sensitivity analyses are possi- To analyze the sensitivity of weight changes, we use the Overall Vul-
ble. However, it is important to point out that there is no common assess- nerability Index OverallVuln which represent the sum of all integrals of
ment sensitivity. Each use case has its own sensitivity which depends on District Vulnerability Indexes taking into account all time steps under
the individual input parameter values. They are specific to the character- consideration:
istics of the considered CI's in the city or county under consideration. This Z
district  
g tp
makes the findings on sensitivity specific to the chosen use case. OverallVuln ¼ ∑ Vulnr t step dt ð9Þ
Multiple input parameter values can be changed and analyzed re- r¼1 t0
garding their impact to the final results. It is possible to consider value
changes of the Relevance Criticality Weight, the Size Criticality Indica- The calculation of the District Vulnerability Index Vulndistrict
r (tstep)
tor, the Coping Capacity Depletion Indicator, and the Time Dependent comprises the normalized relevance criticality weight which is in turn
Criticality Indicator. calculated by the absolute importance weighting score wscore
u . To identi-
The weights in multi-attributive assessments have generally great fy major influences on the variation of weight values, we exemplarily
influences on the final results. In addition, the Relevance Criticality assumed an extreme change of the importance weighting score of a CI
Weights are subjectively determined by expert estimations in the pro- type under consideration u_sens by minus 95% of the previous score
posed assessment. This makes the weight sensitivity one of the most in-
teresting aspect in the sensitivity analysis. We discuss this type of wuscore
sens
sens
¼ 0; 05wscore
u sens ð10Þ

06:00 a.m. 07:00 a.m. 08:00 a.m. 09:00 a.m.

Fig. 8. GIS visualizations of the vulnerability of each city district at different time steps during the turning point effect.
112 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

Fig. 9. Vulnerability profile of the city district Neckarstadt-Ost expressed by the mean value and its simple standard deviation for the considered time steps.

The Overall Vulnerability Index is then calculated using the changed Mannheim, a change may lead to different results of the vulnerability
importance weighting score for the CI type under consideration. The ex- profiles of districts.
treme adjustment enables the identification of key drivers for vulnera- There are further multiple ways to change input parameters and to
bility and resilience in a city (see Fig. 12). analyze the sensitivity on the final results. An evaluation about changes
Fig. 12 shows the changes of the Overall Vulnerability Index after on the Relevance Criticality Weight and the Coping Capacity Depletion
importance weighting scores of one CI type have been modified by Indicator, for instance, is also possible through the use of the Monte-
minus 95% of the initial weight value. The results show the median Carlo simulation. Usually, the Monte-Carlo simulation allows the con-
values and the simple standard deviations. For some CI types, such as sideration of uncertainty. However, the results also inherently provide
hospitals and households, the resulting overall vulnerability increased. information about the sensitivity of changes in the final result (see
This means that a minor assumed relevance of these CI types would Figs. 5, 9, and 11).
lead to higher vulnerability values. Hence, these CI types can be identi- Another aspect is the change of values of the Size Criticality Indica-
fied as resilience drivers. In contrast to this, the resulting overall vulner- tor. The Size Criticality Indicator is a relation of the size of a certain CI
ability of pharmacies is smaller compared to the results of the baseline. and the sizes of the CIs from the same type. Through this, there is either
Hence, pharmacies can be identified as vulnerability drivers in this use a change in the overall vulnerability nor in the resilience. The changes
case. It should be noted that although a change of the other CI types can only be identified by focusing on the results of individual CIs or
has no high impact on the overall vulnerability integral for the city of the districts. However, a change of this indicator values is not possible

Fig. 10. Vulnerability profile of the district Neckarstadt-Ost in the form of a stacked bar chart displaying the values for different CI types.
T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118 113

Fig. 11. Normalized vulnerability integrals for the city district taking into account variability through simple standard deviations.

during an assessment, in practice. Insights about the sensitivity have Indicator. In the following section, we calculate three sample threat sce-
therefore only limited implications. narios and their potential impacts. In addition, we select five fictitious
The Influence of value changes of the Coping Capacity Depletion In- preparation strategies and calculate their outcomes for demonstration
dicator is from great interest for disaster management. This addresses purposes. Each calculation run is defined as one scenario which starts
the closing of gaps in preparation and may helps to identify the CI's with the first minute of the considered power outage.
and district which have high influence on the overall resilience because A power outage can affect the whole city, but also only some dis-
of a lack or sufficiency of coping capacity. To consider this, it is also pos- tricts. It is also possible that the power outage starts at another time.
sible to conduct what-if analyses which are discussed in the next In this way, outage scenarios can vary regarding the spatial expansion
section. and time. While retaining the reference power outage, we exemplarily
assess the results of sample threat scenarios described in Table 3.
5.4. Comparing strategies by “what-if” analyses The overall vulnerability profiles for the scenarios a, b, and c are
displayed in Fig. 13. For the disaster management authorities, the results
The vulnerability assessment also allows for a comparison of threat allow to adjust the response activities referring to the divergent spatial-
scenarios and alternative preparation strategies. Since this is realized temporal effects of the individual scenario. The results show that a
inter alia by changing input parameters for the CCRs, this can also be un- power outage which affects the central districts would lead to higher
derstood as a sensitivity analysis of the Coping Capacity Depletion vulnerability values in comparison to a power outage which only affects

Fig. 12. Sensitivity analysis to display the influence of variations of the importance weighting score for a CI type under consideration. The figure shows the change of the Overall
Vulnerability Index after the importance weighting score was changed by minus 95% compared to the baseline score.
114 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

Table 3 Table 4
Description of sample threat scenarios. Scenario description of sample strategies.

Scenario α Description Scenario Description


α
Baseline Worst case power outage scenario affects all districts.
It starts at 8 a.m. and lasts two working days in winter. Baseline Worst case power outage scenario affects all districts.
Scenario a A power outage affects all central districts. It starts at 8 a.m. and lasts two working days in winter.
It starts at 8 a.m. and lasts two working days in winter. Scenario All CIs are enabled to keep their business operated for at least 6 h
Scenario b A power outage affects all peripheral districts. d during a power outage
It starts at 8 a.m. and lasts two working days in winter. Scenario All CIs are enabled to keep their business operated for at least 12 h
Scenario c A power outage affects all districts. e during a power outage
It starts at 6 p.m. and lasts two working days in winter. Scenario All CIs which are located in the central districts are enabled to keep
f their business operated for at least 18 h during a power outage
Scenario All CIs which are located in the central districts are enabled to keep
g their business operated for at least 12 h during a power outage.
All CIs which are located in the peripheral districts are enabled to keep
the peripheral districts. The fact can be taken into account in the disaster their business operated for at least 6 h during a power outage.
preparedness policy making process or in designing standard operation Scenario All nursing homes and facilities for assisted living are enabled to keep
procedures which address the initial disaster response reaction to h their business operated for at least 24 h during a power outage.
power outages. The results of the scenario c expresses the sensitivity re-
ferring to the starting time of a power outage. Scenario c starts at 6 p.m.
and the first outage hours are in the night time. Corresponding to the
low level of demand at this time, the vulnerability reaches comparative- scenario e in which all CIs are enabled to keep their business for 12 h.
ly low values. Unlike to the baseline scenario, there is only a single esca- The course is also lower and the escalation considerably weaken com-
lation which occur earlier. However, the vulnerability values in scenario pared to the baseline scenario. Interestingly, a similar effect occurs in
c are slightly lower because there are still some CCRs available. scenario g in which all CIs located in the central districts are enabled
The decision makers may consider different preparation strategies. to keep their business operated for at least 12 h and all CIs which are lo-
We exemplarily selected five fictitious preparation strategies, each of cated in the peripheral districts are enabled to keep their business for at
which is to enhance the resilience in dealing with the effects of a least 6 h. If only the CIs located in the central districts focused and en-
power outage by enhanced CCRs (Table 4). The scenarios are applied abled to keep their business for at least 18 h like in scenario f, the vulner-
for the reference power outage starting at 8 a.m. and lasting two work- ability course is higher in the beginning of the outage. However, the
ing days in the winter season. further course is slightly lower as in the scenarios d and g. In scenario
The vulnerability profiles of the scenarios d, e, f, g, and h are shown h, a CCR adjustment for specific CI types was conducted. The results
in Fig. 14. The results of the scenario display a change in the vulnerabil- show, that the course is on a lower extant but still on the same course
ity course of the first hours. as the baseline scenario. The scenario results are interesting demonstra-
The core finding of the vulnerability profiles in Fig. 13 is that the sce- tions of the considerable spatial influences of the CIs that are located in
nario courses are depended and very sensitive on the CCRs of the affect- the central or peripheral districts.
ed CIs. The CIs vulnerability profiles escalate to a lower extant or are Such scenario comparisons provide important insights for the di-
delayed in comparison with the baseline scenario if the CI are enabled saster management authorities. The temporal impacts of changed
to keep their operations at least for 6 or 12 h. Through this, the courses preparation levels of CIs are visualized. The different benefits are
crosses in some cases. Afterwards this duration, the vulnerability paths transparent. Moreover, “what-if” analysis allow simulations and
are the same as in the baseline scenario. comparisons of different preparation scenarios for certain CI types
In scenario d, for instance, all CIs are enabled to keep their business like demonstrated in scenario h. This also allows testing and under-
for six hours minimum. The vulnerability nearly increase linearly till standing the role of CI types on the overall vulnerability of a city or
the sixth outage hour and then takes the same course of the baseline county, but also enables multi-level scenarios in which regions
scenario afterwards. In comparison to the baseline scenario, there is from different character (e.g. central/peripheral) can be summarized
no first vulnerability peak after 4 h in scenario d. This also applies in and assessed together.

Fig. 13. Vulnerability profiles for the scenarios a, b, and c. Fig. 14. Vulnerability profiles for the scenarios d, e, f, g, and h.
T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118 115

5.5. Implication to resilience building process and decision support The assessment and its results can also be used during a particular
power outage in the disaster response and recovery phases. If the as-
The proposed assessment can have beneficial implications for the re- sessment is already implemented the assessment provides forecast ca-
silience building process. The assessment results allow decision makers pabilities which enable a better reaction to an ongoing power outage.
to identify the specific temporal development of CI's and district's vul- In this way it can be used as decision support. The scenario characteris-
nerabilities during a power outage in a city or county under consider- tics are known during an ongoing power outage. This makes it possible
ation. The CIs located in a city or county are evaluated regarding their to estimate the specific initial spatial-temporal consequences for a pres-
specific preparation level, social relevance, and size. The parameter un- ent power outage. The assessment results can used for the development
certainties due to variation of parameter values are expressed in the as- of action plans but also in all cases in which it is necessary to prioritize
sessment results. Temporal consequences of different power outage CIs or districts. The evaluation of CI's and district's susceptibility and
scenarios can be simulated and assessed. The results display the prog- criticality enables to identify those CIs and districts which should be bet-
ress of vulnerability, its peaks and tipping points. The assessment out- ter protected against a power outage or restored as soon as possible
comes can be visualized by diagrams and geographic information after an outage event. The resulting prioritization is helpful in cases in
systems. The spatial insight about the outage effects is enhanced by which a limited amount of mobile emergency power units are available
the underlying evaluation of individual CI's characteristics and spatial and have to be distributed among the affected CIs and districts. In other
what-if analysis. The CI's characteristics and the potential outage effects cases of power outages it is still possible to supply some CIs or some dis-
are placed in relation to the function of the entire CI system. The spatial tricts of a town or county with a limited amount of electricity. In these
aggregation of the CI's vulnerability values and the spatial what-if anal- cases, the CIs or districts can be ranked for a prioritized electricity sup-
ysis facilitate comparisons of regional power outage consequences that ply. In other cases such as load shedding procedures, it is necessary to
have impacts to the whole city or county. select districts which have to be decoupled from the electricity grid to
The assessment's findings provide valuable insights and can assist ensure network stability. By using the results of the vulnerability assess-
decision making processes during the disaster mitigation and prepared- ment, it is possible to identify those regions that have no CIs or CIs with
ness phase. The outcome of the assessment clearly point out the influ- low criticality and which are less susceptible for the consequences of a
ence of certain CIs and CI types to the vulnerability progress. On the power outage. A vulnerability based ranking of districts can provide a
one hand side, this helps CI providers in better reflecting their role in list with those districts which should be decoupled and be affected by
the entire CI system of a city or county. It is possible to compare the a power outage first. Depending on the cause of a power outage, a prior-
preparation levels of CIs from the same type which may also motivate itization is also sometimes necessary in the recovery phase. After a
some CI providers to invest into more CCRs. On the other hand, the di- power outage it is often the case that districts are successively recoupled
saster management authorities can identify lacks of preparation and to a recovered electricity grid. There are also cases in which electrical
the most vulnerable CIs and districts. This may also increase their effec- substations have to be restored and for this purpose manually recoupled
tiveness because it is possible to concentrate all mitigation activities at to the grid. Since these procedures are very time consuming and the af-
the highest vulnerable CIs and regions instead of giving too much atten- fected CI should not be kept longer without electricity than necessary,
tion on CIs that are less relevant. In this way, the vulnerability assess- the assessment results can provide a prioritization and a list of districts
ment results provide transparency and foster the building of resilience. which should be restored first. In all cases in which prioritizations are a
The CI specific knowledge about the temporal vulnerability and the helpful decision support, the assessment results can be used to enhance
district specific spatial-temporal findings can also be used in designing resilience of CIs and through this of cities or counties.
standardized and appropriated reactions to a power outage. The simula-
tion and assessment result help to define suitable and specific initial re- 6. Critical remarks and conclusion
sponse actions. In this way, standard operation procedures, contingency
plans, and backup strategies can be refined by using the assessment In this paper, we introduced an indicator-based spatial-temporal
results. vulnerability assessment to enable crisis management groups, disaster
A favorable gain of the assessment is the integration of data from CI management authorities, and CI providers to enhance their understand-
providers and of decision maker's estimations. Both facilitate the collab- ing of the initial impacts of a power outage. The assessment results pro-
oration between CI providers and disaster management authorities. To vide insights into the resilience of certain CIs and districts, and, hence,
conduct an assessment, it is necessary that CI providers supply disaster allow for simulating the effectiveness of considered preparation and re-
management authorities with essential information about their infra- sponse. The implementation of the assessment was demonstrated for
structures. Due to the construction of assessment, the exchange of the CIs of the health sector in the city of Mannheim. We demonstrated
data is structured and reduced to a comparatively minor expense for that the findings are valuable in providing an enhanced spatial-tempo-
data collection. The decision maker's estimations on CI's importance ral understanding and in facilitating decision processes. The assessment
and CCR depletion are included in the assessment by a Delphi like col- can also be applied to other cities and districts. The proposed assess-
laboration technique. In this way, different and sometimes conflicting ment considers the legal situation in Germany (regional focus, focus
views can be considered systematically. The integration of decision on local CIs, selection of decision makers). If the assessment is applied
maker's estimation makes it possible to create a comprehensive and to regions in other countries, there might be slight adjustments neces-
common picture about the impacts of a power outages, the potential sary according to the legal regulations. If desired by the decision makers,
lacks in disaster planning, and potential losses and reductions of CI ser- also other CIs can be stressed. The assessment is generally easy to apply
vices during a power outage. because only a few data about the local CIs is requested which is often
Another problem in the mitigation and preparedness phase is that it publicly available or can be collected by the disaster management au-
is unknown on what type of day and at which daytime the next severe thorities in charge with calculable expense.
power outage starts and how long it will lasts. However, a concrete sce- The vulnerability assessment takes into account the location of po-
nario is necessary for disaster planning. This is solved by the definition tentially affected CIs, their criticality for providing vital services and
of a reference power outage scenario that represents a reasonable case products to the population, and their CCRs which allow them to contin-
of a power outage. The definition of a reference scenario allows to calcu- ue the CI operations during a power outage for a short time (Coping Ca-
late the worst case of a power outage. The day types and the starting pacity Resource Depletion Indicator). The criticality has three
time of the worst case are very important findings for the development dimensions: The relevance weights of CI types (Relevance Criticality
of disaster plans. The recognition can also raise the awareness for power Weight), the CI size (Size Criticality Indicator), and the time-depending
outage consequences within the activities of risk communication. demand of CIs (Time Dependent Criticality Indicator). We limited the
116 T. Münzberg et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 99–118

dimensions of criticality to the smallest reasonable number. Additional stocks could be refilled, and processes that rely highly on electricity can
criticality dimensions and adjustments of the used indicators could pro- be prematurely shutdown to avoid further damages, etc. However,
vide slightly more concrete or detailed results, but this would also re- there is no data available how warnings influence the resilience of CIs
quest more data and would lead to higher efforts in conducting the and the population and, hence, this is difficult to integrate.
vulnerability assessment. The proposed assessment is of course still no “silver bullet”. It can
The weighting process for the definition of relevance weights is of neither forecast the unpredictable nor solve all problems in disaster
crucial importance and requires a group decision. In practice, the rele- planning for a power outage. There are always aspects which cannot
vance weights are often defined subjectively and random way. We pro- be tackled. In this case, this applies, for instance, for the coordination
posed a modified Delphi survey, which provides a more systematic and of fuel for the emergency power units during a power outage, aspects
better structured definition of the relevance weights. In the first round of the occurrence probability of power outages, CI's recovery capabilities
of the Delphi survey, two workshops were conducted, during which de- or the CI interdependencies. In combination with other models and
cision makers from different disaster management authorities were analysis approaches which address these issues, additional insights are
asked to weigh the relevance of CI types using a questionnaire and the possible.
direct weighting method. The resulting intermediate summary displays The main added value of the vulnerability assessment is its straight-
the weight value dispersions for the considered CI types and, hence, is a forward approach that can be easily applied to any city or county with a
helpful means for those decision makers who apply the vulnerability as- manageable effort. Through this, it is possible to increase the communi-
sessment in a certain city or county in the second round. Using the inter- ty disaster resilience according to the aims of the UN Sendai Framework.
mediate summary in the weight definition process produces a higher
legal certainty. This also minimizes ambiguity in the consensus finding
process. However, it is still possible to adjust weights, if necessary in Acknowledgement
the second round.
To consider the sizes of CIs we proposed a CI-type specific attribute. The work is embedded in the Helmholtz Association's (HGF) portfo-
A CI's attribute value is linearly normalized referring to the sum of all lio project “Security Research” and the critical infrastructure protection
CI's attributes from the same type. Also other normalization could be ap- activities of the Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction
plied. In addition, there might be other or more attributes for one CI type Technologies (CEDIM) of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT).
which are also suited for measuring the CI's sizes but may also enhance The HGF's and CEDIM's financial support of the work is gratefully ac-
the efforts in implementing the assessment. knowledged. We would like to thank all participants of the mentioned
According to the Time Dependent Criticality Indicator, we assumed workshops for their collaboration and dedicated support. Some of the
that a CI can only work correctly if all processes are supplied with the re- figures above show maps made by using QGIS (more information about
quested electricity. The current approach, the indicator values are de- the Open Source Geospatial Foundation Project see http://qgis.osgeo.
rived from SLPs which have a temporal resolution of the results of org) and data derived from ©OpenStreetMap for visualizing the assess-
15 min. From a practical point of view, also lower resolution from 30 ment results.
to 60 min would also be appropriate. More research is needed to identi-
fy the most suitable temporal granularity of results. The use of SLPs do References
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Thomas Münzberg is a research associate at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT).
ropean federated simulation network for critical infrastructures. Proceedings of the
He studied Engineering with the specification on Disaster Management and Safety
SISO European Simulation Interoperability Workshop, pp. 139–146.
Engineering and received his Master of Science at the Technical University of Cologne.
Ryan, M., 2013. Planning in the emergency operations center. Technol. Forecast. Soc.
His research interests include risk, vulnerability, and resilience analyses and the develop-
Chang. 80 (2013), 1725–1731.
ment of decision support tools to assist disaster management authorities and critical
Sahin, O., Mohamed, S., 2010. Coastal vulnerability to sea level rise: a spatio-temporal de-
infrastructure providers in managing disruptions of lifelines (esp. power outages and food
cision making tool. Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Conference on Indus-
supply). He is lecturer for risk analysis and disaster preparedness and a researcher at the
trial Engineering and Engineering Management, 29 Oct–31 Oct 2010, Xiamen, China.
Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology (CEDIM) which is part
Setola, R., De Porcellinis, S., Sforna, M., 2009. Critical infrastructure dependency assess-
of the IRDR International Centres of Excellence on Critical Infrastructures and Strategic
ment using the input–output inoperability model. Int. J. Crit. Infrastruct. Prot. 2 (4),
Planning (IRDR ICoE-CISP). Thomas Münzberg is member of the German Red Cross and
170–178 (December 2009).
has further practical experiences in disaster management as Emergency Medical Techni-
Setola, R., Oliva, G., Conte, F., 2013. Time-varying input-output inoperability model.
cian and Rescue Squad Leader for Medical Services.
J. Infrastruct. Syst. 19 (1):47–57 (2012). 10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X.0000099.
Singh, A.K., Ibraheem, I., Khatoon, S., Muazzam, M., Chaturvedi, D.K., 2012. Load forecast-
Marcus Wiens is head of the research group on risk management at the Institute of Indus-
ing techniques and methodologies: a review. 2nd International Conference on Power,
trial Production (IIP) at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) and research fellow of the
Control and Embedded Systems, Allahabad (978-1-4673-1049-9/12).
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (VA Tech) in Blacksburg. He studied
Sobiech, C., 2013. Agent-based Simulation of Vulnerability Dynamics. A Case Study of the
Economics at the Universities of Bayreuth, Dijon and Saarbrücken and received his Ph.D.
German North Sea Coast, 2013. Springer Theses.
in Economics at the Bundeswehr University Munich. His fields of research are systemic
Ständige Konferenz für Katastrophenvorsorge und Katastrophenschutz (SKK), 1999.
risk management, behavioral economics, decision theory, game theory and experimental
Führung und Leitung im Einsatz. Führungssystem, Köln.
economics. He is member of the German Operation Research Society and researcher at the
Stergiopoulos, G., Kotzanikolaou, P., Theocharidou, M., Lykou, G., Gritzalis, D., 2016. Time-
Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology (CEDIM).
based critical infrastructure dependency analysis for large-scale and cross-sectoral
failures. Int. J. Crit. Infrastruct. Prot. 12:46–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2015.
Frank Schultmann is Professor at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany,
12.002 (ISSN 1874-5482, March).
and the Director of the KIT's Institute for Industrial Production (IIP) and the French-
Taylor, J.W., McSharry, P.E., 2008. Short-term load forecasting methods: an evaluation
German Institute for Environmental Research (DFIU). He studied Industrial Engineering
based on European data. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 22 (2213–2219), 2008.
and Management at the University of Karlsruhe (now KIT), completing his doctorate
Theoharidou, M., Kotzanikolaou, P., Gritzalis, D., 2011. Risk assessment methodology for
and Habilitation at the Faculty of Economics and Business Engineering. Prior to his present
interdependent critical infrastructures. Int. J. Risk Assess. Manag.
positions he was Professor at the University of Koblenz-Landau and at the University of
Thywissen, K., 2006. Components of risk: a comparative glossary. Publication Series of
Siegen. His research interests include sustainable production and logistics, decision sup-
UNU-EHS, Source 2.
port, supply chain management and optimization, systems modelling, project manage-
Turoff, M., Chumer, M., Van de Walle, B., Yao, X., 2004. The design of a Dynamic Emergen-
ment, technology assessment and construction management.
cy Response Management Information System (DERMIS). J. Inf. Technol. Theory Appl.
5 (4), 1–35 (2004).
Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UTCE), 2007. Final Report Sys-
tem Disturbance on 4 November 2006. Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission
of Electricity (UTCE).

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