1. BERGONIA VS. MERRERA [A.C. No. 5024.

February 20, 2003]

FACTS: Spouses Parayno instituted an action to recover properties from Sps. Bergonia, who, Merrera was their counsel.
Then, RTC rendered a decision in favor of Paraynos. Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC decision. Respondent, as
counsel, received a Notice to File Brief on December 17, 1997. Acting on his Motion for extension to file the appellant's
brief, the CA in its February 18, 1998 minute Resolution granted hire until March 17, 1998 to do so. Even before the first
extension had lapsed, however, he again filed an Urgent Second Motion for extension to file brief, praying that he be given
until April 16, 1998 to submit the required pleading. The CA again granted his Second Motion. Eventually, the deadline,
which had already been extended twice, lapsed without his filing the appellant's brief. Hence, the CA, upon motion of the
appellees, dismissed the appeal in its June 25, 1998 Resolution. Long story short, when required to file appellant's brief,
twice he motioned and twice he was granted extensions of time to comply with the Order. Respondent, however, failed
to abide by the given deadline. Hence, as complainant's appeal was dismissed, complainant filed the instant administrative
case.

ISSUE: WON, Atty. Merrera violated Canons 12 and 18

HELD: Yes. A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good faith and with a genuine intent to file the required
pleading within the extended period. In granting the request, the court acts on the presumption that the applicant has a
justifiable reason for failing to comply with the period allowed. Without this implied trust, the motion for extension will
be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or thwart the appealed decision. The motion will thus be regarded as a means of
preventing the judgment from attaining finality and execution and of enabling the movant to trifle with procedure and
mock the administration of justice. The granting of his two Motions implied that he had been given ample time either to
finish researching his case or to withdraw his appeal. Yet, he still failed to file the required brief. Those who file motions
for extension in bad faith misuse the legal process, obstruct justice, and thus become liable to disciplinary action.

Respondent claims that he never planted false hopes in the mind of complainant. However, he should have promptly
informed and dissuade complainant, or withdraw the appeal instead of filing several motions for extension of time to file
the appellant's brief.

2. ALLIED BANKING CORP. VS. CA AND GALANIDA [G.R. No. 144412. November 18, 2003.]
FACTS: Respondent Galanida was dismissed as an employee by the Petitioner for refusing to transfer to another bank.
NLRC thru LA Almirante rendered a decision in favor of Galanida after Respondent’s counsel quoted from Dosch vs. NLRC,
but substituted a portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus. Petitioner thus appealed the decision
and assailed the legal basis of the decision.

ISSUE: WON, it is proper to cite a SCRA syllabus

HELD: No. The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work
of the Court, nor does it state this Court's decision. The syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his
understanding of the decision. In this case, Atty. Durano and LA Almirante deliberately made the quote from the SCRA
syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision for authority. It is the duty of
all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately.

3. DE LEON VS. CASTELO [A.C. No. 8620. January 12, 2011.]

FACTS: De Leon was a voluntary intervenor in a case between the Government and Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, who
was counseled by the Respondent, involving the correction of Transfer Certificates of Title. Petitioner filed a disbarment
against Respondent for violation of Lawyer’s Oath and Canons 1 and 10 for dishonesty and falsification in causing to appear
that his clients have participated in a proceeding (filing of the Answers) when they did not in fact so participate; in fact,
they could not have so participated because they were already dead as of that time. Respondent also committed the crime
of Use of Falsified Documents, by submitting the said falsified Answers in the judicial proceedings. In his Answer, the
respondent claimed that he represented William and Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu.

ISSUE: WON, Atty. Castelo violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Canons 1 and 10

HELD: No. A plain reading of the Respondent’s pleadings indicates that the respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, and that the properties involved were already sold to Leonardo C. Lim and William
C. Lim. Respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, and
in the clarification and submission, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased. Even granting, for
the sake of argument, that any of the respondent's pleadings might have created any impression that the Spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu were still living, the respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when
he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners and that the actual owners needed to be substituted in lieu of said
spouses, the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became
immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer
living. His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons interested in the
litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, supra, bear out in
its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist
that the respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any other party. DISMISSED.

4. IN RE FERRER [A.C. No. 8037. February 17, 2016.]

FACTS: Mayor Garciano removed Vallesteros from payroll. Then, Vallestero, Vice Mayor, and other Sangguniang Bayan
members filed complaint against Garciano and other municipal officials, demanding to pay their respective salaries. The
RTC ordered to release the funds and pay Vallestero's salaries and other benefits. Garciano, thru counsel Atty. Ferrer, filed
a petition to the CA, raffled to 3rd Division but on the same day, they filed before the 11th Division and moved to withdraw
the 1st Petition. 3rd Division dismissed the 2nd for violation of the rule against forum citing Petitioners in direct contempt
with a fine of P2,000.00. In his Comment, Ferrer states that he acted in good faith in the simultaneous filing of the 2nd
Petition and the Motion to withdraw the 1st Petition and adds that by filing the Motion to withdraw the First Petition on
the same day as the filing of the Second Petition, he substantially complied with the rule against forum shopping, and that
there was no violation of the rule against forum shopping because the 1st and 2nd Petitions were not filed before different
tribunals.

ISSUE: WON, Atty. Ferrer is guilty of Forum Shopping.

HELD: Yes. Court affirmed the findings of CA and IBP. Court cited Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides
for Rule for Forum Shopping. Court also cited Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc. where it ruled that there is
forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, explained further
in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company that a forum shopping is (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having
been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action, but with different prayers. Court emphasized that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum
shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions (Dy v. Mandy
Commodities Co, Inc.). Respondent filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer. All
the elements necessary for the commission of forum shopping are present. Respondent must be reminded that the
withdrawal of any case, when it has been duly filed and docketed with a court, rests upon the discretion of the court, and
not at the behest of litigants. Once a case is filed before a court and the court accepts the case, the case is considered
pending and is subject to that court's jurisdiction. As a lawyer, respondent is expected to anticipate the possibility of being
held liable for forum shopping. He is expected to be aware of actions constituting forum shopping. The Lawyers' Oath that
respondent took exhorts him not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid or consent to the same." SUSPENDED and STERNLY WARNED.

5. IN RE LETTER OF UP FACULTY ON ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND

MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT [A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011.]
FACTS: Atty. Harry Roque and Bagares filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary
on the ground of plagiarism.

ISSUE:

HELD:

6. ABIERA VS. MACEDA [A.M. No. RTJ-91-660. June 30, 1994.]

FACTS: Abiera is appearing as a counsel before RTC Br. 12 of Antique where Maceda is the judge. In a hearing, Abiera
asked the Court Interpreter to a second call because he would first attend the trial of another case in Br. 11 of the same
court but after such call, neither Abiera nor his clients appeared. As a result, respondent judge declared that plaintiffs
were deemed to have waived further presentation of their evidence (August 20 Order). The next day, Abiera explained
that his failure to appear was due to the lengthy cross-examination in the Br. 11. Complainant filed motion for
reconsideration of the August 20 Order but was denied, as well as his request for the suspension of proceeding to secure
a copy of the August 20 Order. Then, Atty. Abiera assailed the validity of the August 20 Order and that such Order
contained words that are indecent and unbecoming a member of the judiciary. Complainant further charged Maceda of
dishonesty and serious inefficiency for declaring that he had no pending unresolved civil and criminal cases when in fact
he had eight (8) civil cases and ten (10) criminal cases unresolved. Respondent judge, in his answer, maintains that
complainant's effort to trifle with the judicial proceedings must not be tolerated since complainant had already obtained
seventeen (17) postponements. On the second cause of action, respondent judge states that most, if not all, of the subject
cases mentioned in the complaint were inherited from his predecessor. CA ordered Maceda to pay a fine of P20,000 for
unlawfully suspending Abiera from the practice of law and, that he be exonerated from the charge of gross dishonesty
and serious inefficiency for allegedly failing to decide cases within the prescribed period.

ISSUE: WON, Judge Maceda is guilty of unlawfully suspending Abiera and failing to decide cases within the prescribed
period

HELD: No. As a general rule, the acts done by a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though erroneous. These acts become subject to disciplinary power only when they are attended by fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or bad faith. A re-evaluation of the case at bar presents no occasion for to depart from the general rule. Records
show that the case involved has long been pending presentation of plaintiffs' evidence. Yet, respondent judge has been
very lenient in granting motions for postponements to both counsel of the parties, more particularly to counsel for
plaintiffs. Of the 27 motions for postponement granted, 17 were filed by complainant as counsel for plaintiffs, four (4) by
agreement of the parties, one (1) by reason of the stenographic reporters' strike, and 4 by motion of defendants. Given
this factual backdrop, complainant's non-appearance at the hearing despite his previous commitment and his personal
request for a second call of the case inevitably pushed the patience of respondent judge to the limit. A hard look at
complainant's oversight also reveals that he was unprepared for the trial. The plaintiffs who were then his clients were
not even present in court as they were not informed by the counsel of the hearing. As regards the charge of gross
dishonesty and serious inefficiency, Court affirms the recommendation of the investigating justice that the same should
be dismissed for being baseless.

7. MADRID VS. DEALCA [A.C. No. 7474. September 9, 2014.]

FACTS: Atty. Dealca was appearing as a counsel in a case before the Court of Judge Madrid. Dealca moved to re-raffle the
case considering the adverse incidents between them, where he does not appear before the Judge, and the latter does
not also hear cases handled by him. Madrid denied the Motion for re-raffle through an Consequently, Madrid filed a
complaint citing Atty. Dealca's unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the
presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them. Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation which found a case where the Court referred to IBP for investigation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file
administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were
issued adversely to him and his clients. In compliance with such, IBP found 4 cases involving Dealca which are precipitated
by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies
available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against
the judges and personnel of the court, and IBP recommended for 6-month suspension, which was amended by IBP
Commissioner to be 1-year suspension for his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid, and dismiss the administrative case
involving Dealca’s frivolous filing of complaint against Court officers.

ISSUE: WON, (1) Atty. Dealca’s filing of frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility; and (2) he is guilty of unethical practice in
seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid

1. Yes. The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit." The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1. His being an officer of the court
should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. He must
guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court's duty to investigate and
uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits
that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission
to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the
unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary.
2. Yes. He violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 which provide that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts, and to promote con5dence in the fair administration of justice. Atty. Dealca's averment that Judge
Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard,
and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel.
Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only
Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Also, Dealca must proved based on clear and convincing evidence Judge
Madrid’s partiality. Thus, the presumption that Judge Madrid would be impartial suffices. SUSPENDED for 1 year.

9. IN RE ALMACEN VS. YAPTINCHAY [G.R. No. L-27654. February 18, 1970.]

FACTS: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of the defendant in Yaptinchay vs. Calero, where the RTC rendered an adverse
decision against his cause. Almacen filed for a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion
but failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. He appealed to CA but was denied, likewise with his
appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court through a minute resolution. Frustrated, Atty. Almacen filed "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," which contained insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
remarks against the Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional,
containing words “members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity”. Supreme Court did not
immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate.
Almacen, however, did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though he now argues that he chose not to.

ISSUE: WON, a disciplinary action should be taken against Atty. Almacen

HELD: Yes. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. But it is the cardinal condition of
all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action. Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate
criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known —
that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy
of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing
(which admittedly he did not). Since there is lack of notice in this regard, the Court cannot act upon said motion — for it
is nothing but a useless piece of paper. If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's
judgment, he has only himself to blame.