Fmea Air Diving System SDS 8 System Amaniaga

AIR DIVING SYSTEM
SDS 8 SYSTEM
INFORMATION PAKAGE
UTS SUBSEA DIVING DIVISION
AIR DIVING SYSTEM 8 INFORMATION PACKAGE
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TABLE OF CONTENT
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………… ………………………………….2
1. SDS 8 – TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS……………………………………….3
2. SDS 8 – FMEA.…………………………………………………………………………4
3. SDS 8 – EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURE..……………………5
4. SDS 8 – UMBILICAL LENGTH LIMITATION.……………………………….7
5. SDS 8 – PROPOSED LAY OUT……………………..……………………………9
6. SDS 8 – EQUIPMENT, MAJOR LOADOUT LIST & STANDARD………
INVENTORY LIST….…………………………………….……….…….10
7. SDS 8 – IMCA D023 AUDIT CLOSED OUT REPORT…………….…….13
8. SDS 8 – ELECTRICAL LOAD ANALYSIS FOR AIR SPREAD.….……….14
UNDERWATER TECHNOLOGY SERVICES (S) PTE LTD
Mailing Address: P O Box 205, Jurong Point Post Office, Singapore 916407
Office & Workshop: 35 Pioneer Road, Unit J8 Singapore 628503
Tel: 65 68624634/ 65 68618006/ 65 68623609/ 65 68982293 Fax: 65 68632865
E-mail: Enquiries@underwatertechnologyservices.com
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AIR SPREAD

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AIR SPREAD
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
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1. SDS 8 – TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS – AIR SPREAD

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Introduction
Underwater Technology Services operates Air Diving systems to support construction and
installation work as well as specific underwater projects such as repair and recovery. All systems are
modular in design and can be configured to accommodate specific working platforms and capacity
requirements. UTS Diving Systems all meet the most stringent IMCA and ACDI design standards.
GENERAL SYSTEM
Air Systems are supplied with main container components and the diver LARS systems. This
configuration makes the system easily road transportable and particularly useful for
mobilizations where deck space is at a premium. The system comprises of:
 Diving Control Unit/ Deck Decompression Chamber (DDC) 20’x8’ container – 1 20ft
container
 Electro Hydropower Pack
 Electrical HP Compressor 1 10ft container
 Electrical LP Compressor
 Diver Launch and Recovery System complete with baskets
The basic system is dispatched fully equipped for general diving operations with diver’s
equipment, diving helmets with cameras, bail-out bottles, tools and general maintenance
supplies.
Additional equipment is available on a project to project basis.

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GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS
DIVE CONTROL/ DDC CONTAINER
Dive Control DDC

Panel: 3 Diver Chamber: Twin Lock/ Med Lock
Depth Limit: 50 meters (IMCA) Depth Limit: 70 meters
Air Supply: 1 L.P. Electric Air Compressor Capacity: 2 Man
1 H.P. Electric Compressor Size: 1.3 meter Diameter
1 H.P. Air Bank Configuration: Skid Mounted
(Containerized)
Communications: 2 Amron Air Radios Pressurization Supply: 1 L.P. Supply
1 External PA 1 H.P. Supply
Video: 2 Diver Helmet Cameras Chamber Comms: 1 Powered Two Way
2 Deck Observation 1 Sound powered
Analyzation: 1 Oxygen
1 Carbon Dioxide
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SYSTEM

2 X Low Pressure Electric Compressors 2 X Skid Mounted “A” Frame – for 1 or 2 divers
1 x Diesel Low Pressure Compressor 1 x Primary Air Supply
1 x High Pressure Electric Compressor 1 x Emergency Air Supply
1 x Quad Medical Oxygen (external) 2 x “Man-riding” Tuggers
1 x Quad H.P. Air (external) 2 x Secondary Recovery Systems
DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS
Dive Control
The Dive Control van can consist of Dive Control/ DDC combination container. All Dive Control containers are
air conditioned/ insulated and serve as the command and control center during air diving operations.
The dive control panel will support three air divers.
Each Dive Panel has three breathing gas supplies available. This configuration allows the standby diver to be
supplied independently at all times.
L.P. Air Supply # 1

L.P. Air Supply # 2
H.P. Air Bank # 1
Diving Operations can be safely carried out using Air or Nitrox as the working breathing medium.
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The Dive Control is fitted with an automatic audio-visual low pressure alarm system, set at 100psi, on the
down-stream side of the panels.
The Dive Control is fitted with large windows to allow the Diving Supervisor a clear view of operations on deck
at all times. Additionally there is a P.A. System fitted to provide direct voice communications with the surface
support team and external lighting for night safety.
The Div ing Control, and the D.D.C. Control, have been designed and built to comply fully with the
internationally recognized safety guidelines, as laid down by
A.0.D.C. / l.M.C.A. 052 International Revision

Diving Equipment Systems Inspection Guidance Note
D.E.S.l.G.N.
l.M.C.A. D 018
The Initial and Periodic Examination, Testing and Certification of Diving Plant and Equipment
The Design of the Diving System was also carried out with ease of operation in mind, in order to provide the
Diving Supervisor with the best possible working environment.
The environment is fully air conditioned.
Power Supplies
All circuits are fed from the main power source through an independent distribution box. All subsidiary circuits
are stepped down and rectified as required. All circuits are independently protected against earth leakage. All
electrical supplies comply fully with the internationally recognized standards.
Code of Practice for the Safe Use of Electricity Underwater- A.O.D.C. 035
The Divers Communications Systems have automatic back-up power provided by trickle charged Gel Cell
batteries housed within the 12v DC power supply unit.
Automatic cut-in Emergency overhead lighting is provided to serve the Diving Control and the area of the Deck
Decompression Chamber.
A 630amp dipole knife switch, for underwater Oxygen-Arc cutting and/or welding is fitted in the Diving
Control, within easy reach of, and under the direct control of, the Diving Supervisor. The knife switch is
shrouded for operator safety.
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Divers Hat Mounted Colored T.V. Camera System
Introduction
The system was designed and manufactured by Underwater Technology Services.
The Subtec camera system consists of four main components:
Fibron Camera umbilical

Topside Camera and light container
Diver hat mounted camera
Diver hat mounted light
Umbilicals
All camera umbilicals are, Fibron manufactured, Fibrovision cables,

terminated at the divers end by 4-pin underwater mateable E.O.
connectors. The connection to the controller is made by Amphenol plug.
Topside Control Unit
The topside camera and light controller is powered by 220-240v AC and consists of two power supplies. The
first is a 12v regulated supply for the camera and the second is a current sensing, voltage limiting, variable DC
supply, this incorporates an R.C.D. device for the variable intensity lamp circuit.
Power status lights, fuses and controls are mounted on the front panel, the umbilical connection and the video
signal out, are at the rear.
Deck Decompression Chamber
The D.D.C. is built into Diving System container and is a 1.3m/ 52" diameter skid mounted, twin lock chamber,
the main chamber is served by a medical I equipment lock fitted with a mechanical interlock.
The D.D.C. is permanently served by two independent sources of gas for pressurization.
L.P. Air Supply #1 and a back up L.P. supply

H. P. Air Bank # 1
All High Pressure supplies are regulated by Tescom regulators before being fed to the chamber.
The B.l.B.S. supplies, Medical Oxygen or Therapeutic Mix, are pressure reduced at source, supplies are fed
through three B.l.B.S. in the main lock and two B.l.B.S. in the outer lock. All B.l.B.S. are plumbed to dump
externally to the chamber and the container.
High Oxygen content gas quads (greater than 25%) will be stored externally, adjacent to the supply
penetrators. Allowing safe storage of quads whilst ensuring the shortest practical whip runs.
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All High Oxygen content gas quads will be reduced directly at the King valves. No high pressure, high PP02,
gas shall be run at any time, on any mobilization.
A Carbon Dioxide scrubber is fitted in the D.D.C. main lock.
A Digital Hi-Lo alarmed oxygen analyzer is permanently plumbed and panel mounted, to allow continuous
monitoring of the chamber atmosphere in either lock.
All exhausts are plumbed externally to the Chamber Room for safety reasons.
Panel mounted, powered, two way communications are provided to both locks with an additional passive,
sound powered system serving the main lock.
Ancillary Equipment
The air diving system ancillary equipment consists of an 8' x 10' container housing two, L.P. electrically driven
5120 Quincy diving compressors and air volume tanks. Also housed is an electrically driven Bauer K-14/15 H.P.
compressor.
All electrical circuits are fed from the main power source through an independent distribution box. All
subsidiary circuits are stepped down and rectified as required. All circuits are independently protected against
earth leakage. All electrical supplies comply fully with the internationally recognized standards.
All compressors are well vented and cooled by means of a ventilation fan built into the container and have
internal and external lights fitted for night safety.
First aid and fire fighting equipment are located inside the container.
As stand alone ancillary equipment, a Lister diesel driven 5120 L.P. air compressor is supplied as a back up to
the electric compressors. Also supplied are 1-16 bottle quad of H.P. air for stand by diver supply and an
additional 16 bottle quad of Oxygen for the recompression chamber.
Diving Stores and Tools
The diving store container is a 20' x 8' air conditioned container which contains a small work shop and tools for
dive gear and equipment maintenance and gear/tool storage for project provisions.
These containers house all diver worn equipment including bail-out bottles, hats, wet suits, boots, gloves etc.
These units can also serve as a diver changing room.
Additional provisions include hydraulic equipment, rigging equipment, safety equipment, dive systems spares,
and addition project specific tooling.
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2. SDS 8 – FEMA
FAILURE MODE & EFFECTS ANALYSIS
AIR DIVING SYSTEM
SDS 8
INFORMATION PAKAGE
©Copyright\
Document Type Internal Audit

Document Owner Diving Operations Manager
Document Custodian Equipment Manager
Controlled Copy I O I Uncontrolled Copy I
Revision Description Prep. Check App Date

By By By Issued
A FMEA Document
Failure Mode Effects Analysis Doc. No. SDS - 08
Revision A
UTS Surface Dive System Approved By Craig Staggs
Revision of Change
Rev Description Page No. Date
A Compilation of FMEA Document All
Failure Mode Effects Analysis Doc. No.
Revision
UTS Surface Dive System Approved By
TABLE OF CONTENT
1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….4
1.1 Overview…………………………………………………………………………………4
1.2 Objective…………………………………………………………………………………4
1.3 Scope……………………………………………..……………………………………….4
1.4 Periodic Verification…………………………………..……………………………4
1.5 Document Maintenance………………………………………………………….4
2 System Description………………………………………………………………….5
2.1 General……………………………………….…………………………………………..5
2.2 Electrical Power……………………………………………………………………….5
2.3 Air Supply…………………………………………………………………………………5
2.4 Life Support Equipment……………………………………………….…………..5
3 Change Control…………………………………………………………………………6
3.1 Overview………………………………………………………………………………….6
3.2 Change Management……………………………………………………………….6
4 Risk Assessment……………………………………………………………………….7
4.1 Risk Assessment Matrix Description…………………………………………7
4.2 Assessment FMEA Matrix Sheets……………………………………………..8
APPENDIX 1 SYSTEM INDEX……………………………………………………………9
APPENDIX 2 CHANGE CONTROL FORM………………………………………..10
APPENDIX 3 FMEA MATRIX ASSESSMENT…………………………………….13
Revision
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
UTS as an active member of IMCA has adopted the guidance relating to failure modes and
effects analysis as detailed in the IMCA Document
1.2 Objective
The objective of this FMEA is to identify the effects to the integrity of the diving system or
other related systems and welfare of the personnel in the event of a system or component
failure as detailed within this document.
1.3 Scope
Scope of this documented is limited to the analysis and effects to the UTS Surface Dive
System 11 and associated equipment.
1.4 Periodic Verification
The FMEA is a live document and will be verified by suitably competent UTS employees
during the mobilization of the saturation system and through each project life cycle.
Changes will be made through the use of the Change Management Control Form which will
be forwarded to the Document Custodian to aid traceability and accountability of FMEA
system updates.
1.5 Document Maintenance
This document will be maintained by the Document Custodian. The internal based server
document will be the controlled version. Revisions to the document will be distributed in
accordance with Company policies and procedures to all relevant parties.
Copies or extracts of this document are uncontrolled copies unless marked to the contrary.
Revision
2 System Description
2.1 General
UTS Air Diving System can be broken down into the following main components:
 System 1 Air Dive Control Container/ Life Support Equipment System 2 Deck
Decompression Chamber Container
 System 3 Divers Launch & Recovery System (LARS) System 4 Divers Personnel
Equipment
 System 5 Air Compressor Container System 6 Industrial Compressor
2.2 Electrical Power
 Primary Supply - 420/440 VAC power supply is required to the electrical distribution
panel.
 Secondary Supply - 420/440 VAC power supply is required to the electrical distribution
panel
2.3 Air Supply
 Air supply is provided by two independent 5120 Electric Driven Compressors. Back up
Supply for the divers and to the DDC is with the use of an H.P. storage Quad.
 Air supply for the Lars is provided by t w o industrial 390cfm air compressor placed on
deck.
2.4 Life Support Equipment
 Three diver air panel which provides main air supply controls and air pressure
monitoring, secondary supply controls, communications, diver depth monitoring and
diver mounted video.
 Divers umbilical consists of 4 major components, main gas supply line, communications
cable, pnuemo fathometer line and a camera cable)
Revision
3 Change Control
3.1 Overview
If the FMEA is not maintained regularly and systematically, due to changes in operating
procedures, modifications to equipment etc. the FMEA will quickly become out of date.
3.2 Change Management
A Change Control management form can be found in Appendix 1 of this document.

Revision
4 Risk Assessment
4.1 Risk Assessment Matrix Description
Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) standardizes the qualitative risk assessment and facilitates
the categorization of health, safety, environment and reputation risks.
Assessing the risk of a particular scenario should be done in sequence,

i.e. first the potential consequences are estimated and only thereafter the likelihood of
such consequences occurring are assigned
1 2 3 4 5
Consequence Increasing Probability
Severity
Incident Incident
Environment
Reputation
Never Incident Happens Happens

People
Assets
heard Has Several Several

of in Heard Occurred times per Times a
Industr of in in Our Year in our year in a
y Industry Company Company location
0 No Health
Effect No Damage
Injury 0$ No Effect No Impact 0 0 0 0 0
1 Slight
Health Slight
Effect Damage
Injury FAT 50,000$ Slight Effect Slight Impact 1 2 3 4 5
2 Minor
Health Minor
Effect Damage Minor Limited
Injury LTI <100,000 $ Effect Impact 2 4 6 8 10
3 Major
Health Localized
Effect Damage Localized Considerable
Injury LTI <500,000 $ Effect Impact 3 6 9 12 15
4 Major
PTD* or 1 Damage
–3 <1,000,000 Major National
Fatalities $ Effect Impact 4 8 12 16 20
5 Extensive
Multiple Damage Extensive International
Fatalities >1000,000 Effect Impact 5 10 15 20 25
PTD* Permanent Disability
Revision
Acceptable without further action required. However as part of

1–6 Low Risk the continuous improvement process a periodic review of the
task should be done to see if risk can be reduced further.
Medium risk is acceptable, but hazard (s) must be managed to

Medium Risk
14-Jul reduce the severity and or frequency of the hazardous events to
(ALARP)
ALARP.
This level of risk exposes the Company to intolerable losses to

15 - 25 High Risk People, Assets, Environment Reputation. Either this type of risk is
to be either eliminated or managed as a minimum to ALARP
4.2 Assessment FMEA Matrix Sheets
The FMEA assessment matrix sheets are enclosed as an attachment to Appendix 3 of this
document.
As mentioned in Section 1, item 1.4 this is a "Live" document and as such it is anticipated
and expected that new assessments will be performed as identified by the offshore site
team and project management team in addition to a review of those currently existing.
Index sheet as detailed in Appendix 1 provides the basis of the numbering system for each
unique FMEA assessment matrix sheet. Changes will e done in accordance with Section 3
Change Control Procedure to ensure the accuracy of the records will be reviewed at regular
intervals throughout the project life cycle. Control document is the server based system
Revision
APPENDIX 1 SYSTEM INDEX

Revision
APPENDIX 2 CHANGE CONTROL FORM

FMEA Change Control Management Procedure
Date:
Vessel:
FMEA CCMP Reference No.
System(s) Affected
Item(s) Affected
Is this change a result of an incident? Yes No
If ‘Yes’, Give date and description of incident
(details as given in incident report from vessel)
Reason for and Description of Change (Operational
or Technical):
What effect does the change have on the diving
system?
Does it affect the FMEA? Yes No
Has the FMEA been modified?
If ‘Yes’’, how has FMEA been modified? Yes No
Worksheets and FMEA report updated in line with

new system. FMEA now revision 03.
Recommendations passed to vessel and operations
dept.
If ‘’No’’ , Why not? N/A

Has a function test been carried out? Yes No
If ‘’Yes’’, reference FMEA trials test sheet number:

FMEA Change Control Management Procedure
Does this change also affect: 1) Operational manual? Y N
2) Emergency Operational Manual Y N
3) Maintenance manual Y N
If “Yes” have the following

documents been changed?: 1) Operational manual Y N
2) Emergency Operational Manual Y N
3) Maintenance manual Y N
N/A
If ‘’No’’, Why not?
Does this change also apply to other

company diving system? Y N
If ‘’yes’’, What action has been
taken? Informed technical department – new filtration systems to be put
in line on all bell which circuits.
Circulation List: Signed Date
 Dive Supt ……………………………… …………………………….

 Dive Supv ……………………………… …………………………….
 Dive Supv ……………………………… ……………………............
 LSS ……………………………… ……………………………
 LSS ……………………………… ……………………………
 Chief Engineer ……………………………… ……………………………
 Dive System technician ……………………………… ……………………………
Equipment Manager ……………………………… …………………………....
Diving Operations Manager ……………………………… ……………………………

Revision
APPENDIX 3 FMEA MATRIX ASSESSMENT

Appendix 3 Revision
FMEA Scenario Data Sheet: ADS-11
System 03 Bell Handling System

Sub System Air tuggers Bell Wire
Scenario Bell Wire Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation
Incident Several Happens

People
Assets
Never Has times per Several

heard of Heard Occurred Year in Times a
in of in in Our our year in a
Industry Industry Company Company location
0
No Health No Damage
Effect Injury 0$ No Effect No Impact 0 0 0 0 0
1 Slight
Health Slight
Effect Injury Damage Slight
FAT 50,000$ Effect Slight Impact 1 2 3 4 5
2 Minor
Health Minor
Effect Injury Damage Minor Limited
LTI <100,000 Effect Impact 2 4 6 8 10
3 Major
Health Localized
Effect Injury
LTI
Damage
<500,000
Localized
Effect
Considerable
Impact 3 6 O9 12 15
4 Major
PTD* or 1 – Damage Major National
3 Fatalities <1,000,000$ Effect Impact 4 8 12 16 20
5 Extensive
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
Illness / Injury: Possible 4 Environmental: 0 Unlikely 0
Asset Damage: Possible 3 Financial: 8 Spread Down Time 4
Severity Estimate: 4 Reputation: 6 Slight 5
Probability Estimate 2 Consequence Basis: 8 As assessed by FMEA Team
Probability Basis: 1 As assessed By FMEA Team
2.0 Site Management Considerations
1 Bell in Water Diver Out – Establish communications divers back to bell

2 Bell – In motion, raising or lowering bell over system and or water.
3 Diver intervention monitor and or hook up emergency crane wire. /Recover Bell
3. 0 Special Regulatory, Industry Guidance or Environment Conditions
I.D Regulatory / Industry Guidance I.D Environment

1 IMCA 1 Sea State
2 2
4.0 Worksheet
Detection Method: Observation
Component Possible Causes Effects of Failure: Existing Mitigation:

Failure
 Bell Wire  Mechanical damage  Unable to  Bell Wire and socket certified &
Failure to wire recover bell tested.
 Socket Failure  Diver and stage  Replace bell wire every 1 year
 Aging and non- dropping from  Clump weight and guide wires
lubricated wire deck to clump capable of lifting bell to interface
weight depth  Use second LARS to recover the
diver
 Hook up crane man-rider tugger
5.0 Additional Mitigation or Preventative Measures
I.D Description Status Resp. Party Closed Out

MM 1
MM 2
PM 1 Company Procedures √
PM 2 Company PMS System √
END
Appendix 3 Revision
System 03 Bell Handling System

Sub System Air Tuggers/ Wire Guide Wire/Clump Weight Winch
Scenario Winch Failure/ Hose Failure / Air Supply Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation

People
Assets

0
No Health No Damage
1 Slight
Health Slight
Effect Injury
FAT
Damage
50,000$
Slight
Effect Slight Impact 1 2O 3 4 5
2 Minor
Health Minor
3 Major
Health Localized
Effect Injury Damage Localized Considerable
4 Major
5 Extensive
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
1 Bell in Water – Recover bell

2 Diving Operations – No diving operations to be conducted until the problem satisfactorily rectified

1 IMCA 1
2 2
4.0 Worksheet

Failure
 Guide  Pneumatic System  Unable to  2 independent air supplies
Wire/ Failure launch/ recover  1 independent tuggers in loop
Clump  Winch motor clump weight.  Second LARS on site.
Weight Failure  Unable to utilize
Winch  Parting of the winch and launch the
Failure cable diver recovery
stage.

MM 1
MM 2
END
Appendix 3 Revision
System 04 Communications
Sub System Supv/ Diver Divers Communication
Scenario Power Failure/ Radio Failure / Equipment Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation

People
Assets

0
No Health No Damage
1 Slight
Health Slight
Effect Injury
FAT
Damage
50,000$
Slight
Effect Slight Impact 1 2 3O 4 5
2 Minor
Health Minor
3 Major
Health Localized
4 Major
5 Extensive
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
Illness / Injury: Possible 1 Environmental: Unlikely 0
Asset Damage: Possible 1 Financial: Spread Down Time 1
Severity Estimate: 1 Reputation: Slight 1
Probability Estimate 3 Consequence Basis: As assessed by FMEA Team
Probability Basis: As assessed By FMEA Team
1 Diving in Water/ Line pulls/ Recover diver to the stage/ Jump the stand by diver

1 IMCA 1 Sea State
2 2
4.0 Worksheet

Failure
 Comms to  Power Failure  Loss of  2 independent power supplies
Bell and  Radio Failure communications  2 independent radios at dive
Diver  Bell Equipment to the diver controls c/w battery back up
Failure  Abort the dive supply.
 Comms Cable  Regular function tests
Failure  Operational procedures
 Emergency procedures

MM 1
MM 2
END
Appendix 3 Revision
System 2 Communications
Sub System 1 Chamber Communications System
Scenario Power Failure/ Radio Failure / Wiring Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation

People
Assets

0
No Health No Damage
1 Slight
Health Slight
Effect Injury
FAT
Damage
50,000$
Slight
Effect Slight Impact 1 2 3O 4 5
2 Minor
Health Minor
3 Major
Health Localized
4 Major
5 Extensive
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
1
2

1 IMCA 1
2 2
4.0 Worksheet

Failure
 Chamber  Power Failure  Unable to  2 independent power supplies
Comms  Radio Failure communicate  2 independent radios at dive
 Wiring Failure with personnel controls c/w battery back up
 Speaking Failure in chamber supply.
 Sound powered phone
 Message board through the port
hole

MM 1
MM 2
END
Appendix 3 Revision
System 03 LARS Handling System

Sub System Air Tuggers Air Tugger Winch
Scenario Winch Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation

People
Assets

0
No Health No Damage
1 Slight
Health Slight
Effect Injury
FAT
Damage
50,000$
Slight
Effect Slight Impact 1 O2 3 4 5
2 Minor
Health Minor
3 Major
Health Localized
4 Major
5 Extensive
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
1 Turn on secondary air supply

2 Lower down second LARS and recover the diver

1 IMCA 1
2 2
4.0 Worksheet

Failure
 Main  Air System Failure  Unable to  Back up air winch motor
Winch  Winch Motor launch/recover  Clump weight and guide wire
Failure Failure Stage and Diver system for emergency recovery of
 Brake Failure  Winch Failure bell to surface.
occurs during  Man-Rider Winch in place on
lifting or crane for diving basket recovery
lowering over to deck
water.  Second LARS on site.

MM 1
MM 2
END
Appendix 3 Revision
System 1 Life Support Systems

Sub System Divers equipment Divers Umbilical
Scenario Mechanical Damage/ Raptured Hose/ Power Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation

People
Assets

0
No Health No Damage
1 Slight
Health Slight
FAT 50,000$ Effect Slight Impact 1 2 3 4 5
2 Minor
Health Minor
3 Major
Health Localized
4 Major
PTD* or 1 –
3 Fatalities
Damage
<1,000,000$
Major
Effect
National
Impact 4 8 O12 16 20
5 Extensive
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
1 Supervisor activates supply to Pneumo

2 Diver to activate his bail-out bottle and return to the stage
3 Jump Stand by diver to assist or locate primary diver

1 IMCA 1
2 2
4.0 Worksheet
Failure
 Main divers  Mechanical Damage  Loss of gas  Umbilical certified and tested
Umbilical  Burst Hoses supply to diver  Operational procedures
 Power Failure  Loss of comms  Emergency procedures
to diver  Bail out bottle worn by diver
 Loss of light  Standby diver
camera to diver
 Loss of pneumo
to diver

MM 1
MM 2
Appendix 3 Revision

END
System Electrical Electrical Power Failure

Sub System Air Dive Control/Air Compressor Container Diver Control/Air Compressors
Scenario Main Winch Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation

People
Assets

No Health No Damage
0 Effect Injury 0$ No Effect No Impact 0 0 0 0 0
Slight
Health Slight
1
Effect Injury
FAT
Damage
50,000$
Slight
Effect Slight Impact 1 O2 3 4 5
Minor
Health Minor
2 LTI <100,000 Effect Impact 2 4 6 8 10
Major
Health Localized
Major
4 3 Fatalities <1,000,000$ Effect Impact 4 8 12 16 20
Extensive
5 Fatalities >1000,000 Effect Impact 5 10 15 20 25
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
1 Turn on secondary HP air supply.

2 Recover the diver

1 IMCA 1
2 2
4.0 Worksheet

Failure
 Power  Mechanical Failure  Power shut off  All radios and lighting have
Failure  Fuel Supply to the battery back up
Disruption compressor  HP Air banks on line
container and  Diver recovery procedures
dive control  Diver worn Bail out

MM 1
MM 2
END
Appendix 3 Revision
System 05 Diver Air Supply

Sub System Air Dive Control Divers Air Compressor Failure
Scenario Mechanical Damage/Power Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation

People
Assets

No Health No Damage
Slight
Health Slight
1 FAT 50,000$ Effect Slight Impact 1 2 3 4 5
Minor
Health Minor
2
Effect Injury
LTI
Damage
<100,000
Minor
Effect
Limited
Impact 2 4 O6 8 10
Major
Health Localized
Major
Extensive
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
1 Supervisor activate HP back up supply

2 Diver to activate Bail-out as Needed
3 Diver to return to the stage

1 IMCA 1 Sea State
2 2
4.0 Worksheet
Failure
 Main Diver  Mechanical Damage  Loss of Air  HP Air Supply as Back Up
Umbilical  Burst Hoses supply to diver  Bail out bottle worn by diver
 Fitting comes off  Standby diver
the hose

MM 1
MM 2
END
Appendix 3 Revision
System 5 Industrial Compressors

Sub System Dive Launch & Recovery System Air Winch
Scenario Main Winch Failure
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Incident
Happens Incident
Environment
Reputation

People
Assets

No Health No Damage
Slight
Health Slight
1 FAT 50,000$ Effect Slight Impact 1 2 3 4 5
Minor
Health Minor
2
Effect Injury
LTI
Damage
<100,000
Minor
Effect
Limited
Impact 2 O4 6 8 10
Major
Health Localized
Major
Extensive
Appendix 3 Revision
1.0 Assessment
1 Turn on secondary air supply


1 IMCA 1
2 2
4.0 Worksheet

Failure
 Main  Air System Failure  Unable to  Back up air to winch motor
Industrial  Winch Motor launch/recover  Clump weight and guide wire
Air Failure Failure Stage and Diver system for emergency recovery of
 Brake Failure  Winch failure bell to surface
occurs during  Man-Rider Winch in place on
lifting or crane to connect to the diving
lowering over basket and recover to deck
water  Second LARS on site.

MM 1
MM 2
END
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3. SDS 8 – EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURE

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APPENDIX 1 TO SURFACE SUPPLIED DIVING – EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 2.12 EP -12

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Evacuation Procedure for an Air Diver Requiring Decompression.
1. Upon hearing the alarm for either fire or to abandon ship, notify he UTS Diving Superintendent
immediately and ensure a DMT is on deck at the air diving station.
2. An immediate and accurate assessment of the situation needs to be performed to decide the degree of
urgency. Ascertain the time needed to complete decompression or treatment and decide if it feasible.
Omitted decompression is the last resource and should be the sole responsibility of the Diving
Superintendent unless there is an immediate life threatening risk to the diver and the diving topside crew.
3. Once the decision has been made to omit decompression:

If the diver is in the water, recover the diver to deck in a controlled manner and put the diver on 100% O2
as soon as he is safely on deck.
If the diver is in chamber, surface the chamber with the diver breathing 100% O2 on the BIBS as quickly as
possible in a controlled manner. Upon exiting the chamber the diver must be put back on 100% O2
immediately.
4. The on shift lead diver and a designated member of the marine crew will prepare to launch the fast rescue
boat. (FRB).
5. The vessel medic will be contacted and all available portable oxygen cylinders and masks will be taken from
the hospital to the FRB. A portable O2 cylinder is to be kept in the air diving control van at all times.
6. Place the diver breathing O2 from the portable cylinder on the diver’s stretcher and transfer the diver to
the FRB by the safest possible route. Secure the diver on the stretcher in the FRB and proceed with the FRB
launch.
7. The FRB can carry 6 personnel which should include a marine crew coxswain, the patient, a Diver Medic and
the Air Diving Supervisor.
8. The FRB will then proceed to the nearest available hyperbaric chamber available.
______________________________________________________________________________________
4. SDS 8 – UMBILICAL LENGTH LIMITATION

DIVER BAIL-OUT TO
UMBILICAL LENGTH LIMITATION
TABLES
Bailout 3000 psi. 2500 psi 2000 psi 1500 psi.

Pressure 206 bar 172 bar 137 bar 103 bar
Diver Depth Max dive hose Max dive hose Max dive hose Max dive hose
length ft./ mtr length ft./ mtr. length ft./ mtr. length ft./ mtr.
25’ 916’/279 754’/229 592’/180 429’/130
50’ 636’/193 523’/159 410’/124 297’/90
75’ 487’/148 400’/121 313’/95 226’/68
100’ 394’/120 323’/98 252’/76 182’/55
125’ 330’/100 270’/82 211’/64 152’/46
150’ 284’/86 232’/70 181’/55 130’/39
200’ 221’/67 181’/55 140’/42 100’/30
250’ 180’/54 147’/44 114’/34 81’/24
300’ 152’/46 124’/37 95’/28 67’/20
350’ 131’/39 106’/32 82’/24 57’/17
400’ 114’/34 93’/28 71’/21 50’/15
450’ 102’/31 82’/24 63’/19 44’/13
500’ 92’/28 74’/22 56’/17 39’/11
550’ 83’/25 67’/20 51’/15 35’/10
600’ 76’/23 61’/18 46’/14 31’/9
 Table does not take DP thruster positions into account for dive umbilical length.
All DP umbilical length supersede umbilical lengths listed on this table.
 All calculations are for 80ft 3/ 12 liter bottles.
______________________________________________________________________________________
5. SDS 8 – PROPOSED LAY OUT

______________________________________________________________________________________
6. SDS 8 – EQUIPMENT, MAJOR LOADOUT LIST &

STANDARD INVENTORY LIST
Standard Air Diving Major Equipment Load Out
REF QTY DESCRIPTION IN OUT
1 1 8’X10’ COMPRESSOR VAN X
2 1 20’X8’ DIVE CONTROL/ CHAMBER VAN X
3 1 HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT X
4 2 LARS (LAUNCH AND RECOVERY UNIT) X
5 1 16 BOTTLE QUAD OF H.P. AIR X
6 1 16 BOTTLE QUAD OF H.P. OXYGEN X
______________________________________________________________________________________
7. SDS 8 – ELECTRICAL LOAD ANALYSIS FOR AIR SPREAD

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ELECTRICAL LOAD ANALYSIS FOR AIR SPREAD

_____________________________________________________________________________________
REVISION RECORD
C2 New Date
C1
REV Date Reason for Issue Equip. Manager Checked Endorsed
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1.0: 24VDC Power Consumption.
1.1: Chamber van DDC Panel.
Rated Running Total

No Item Qty
Ampere Ampere Ampere
1 Master & Back up Comms 2 0.05 0.05 0.1
2 Main lock & Entry lock lights 2 0.017 0.17 0.034
Total 0.067 0.067 0.134
Total Electricity Usage: 0.134A @ 24vdc.
1.2: Transformer 24VDC/4.2A
W=VI
W=24x4.2
= 100.8
W=VI
I=100.8
230
=0.438A
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2.0: 220VAC Power Consumption.
2.1: Control van (DB-2) 230VAC Electricity Usage
Rated Running Total

No Item Qty
1 Aircon 1 3.40 3.40 3.40
2 Lighting (36w) 2 0.20 0.20 0.40
3 Monitor 2 0.76 0.76 1.52
4 Recorder 2 0.16 0.16 0.32
5 Amcomm Radio 3 3.00 3.00 6.00
6 CCTV Camera 2 0.02 0.02 0.04
7 Spiltter 1 0.07 0.07 0.07
8 Communication JB 1 0.32 0.32 0.32
9 TV System 2 1.00 1.00 2
10 Air con 1 3.40 3.40 3.40
11 Lighting 4 0.20 0.20 0.80
12 UPS (DDC panel power) 1 2.30 2.30 2.3
13 Exit Light 1 0.05 0.05 0.05
Total 14.88 14.88 20.62
Total Electricity usage: @ 230VAC
3.0: 1Phase Power Consumption.
3.1: Machinery Van Main Panel (DB1) 230VAC Electricity Usage

(Launch or Recover Diver)
Rated Running Total

No Item Qty
1 Lighting (36w) 2 0.20 0.20 0.40
2 Outside Socket (Control Van) 1 40 28.84 28.84
3 Welding Switch Panel 1 2 2 N/A
4 Flood Light (500w) 3 2.72 2.72 8.16
5 Exhaust Fan 1 0.7 0.7 .7
6 Exit Light 1 0.05 0.05 0.05
Total 45.67 34.06 38.15
Note: When item is shown as N/A, it is not running during this phase of operations.
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(Diver in Water)
Rated Running Total

No Item Qty
1 Lighting 2 0.20 0.20 0.40
2 Outside Socket (Control Van) 1 40 28.84 28.84
3 Welding Switch Panel 1 2 2 2
4 Exhaust Fan 1 0.7 0.7 .7
5 Exit Light 1 0.05 0.05 0.05
Total 42.95 31.79 31.99
Total 230VAC Power Consumption – 31.99A
3Phase Power Consumption.

(Launch or Recover Diver)
Rated Running Total

No Item Qty
1 Hydraulic Power Pack 1 20 12 N/A
2 HP Compressor 1 30 18 N/A
3 LP Compressor -1 1 42.8 37.2 37.2
4 Transformer 440/230VAC 1 40 28.84 28.84
Total 132.8 96.02 66.04
Note: When item is shown as N/A, it is not running during this phase of operations.

(Diver in Water)
Rated Running Total

No Item Qty
1 Hydraulic Power Pack 1 20 12 N/A
2 HP Compressor 1 30 18 N/A
3 LP Compressor -1 1 42.8 37.2 37.2
4 Transformer 440/230VAC 1 40 28.84 28.84
Total 132.8 96.02 66.04
Total 440VAC Power Consumption – 66.04A

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4.0: Conclusion.
4.1: Transformer for 24VDC.
Required – 0.438A
Specification – 4.2A
4.2: Transformer for 440V-230VAC.
Required – 28.4A
Specification – 40A
4.3: Total power consumed.
Max Ampere consumed – 66.04A

LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SYSTEM (LARS)
SWL 1.5T Analysis Report
Document No.
PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED APPROVED

REV DATE DESCRIPTION CONTRACTOR COMPANY
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Launch and Recovery System (LARS) ◦ SWL 1.5 T ◦ Analysis Report

_____________________________________________________________________________________
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS SHEET
Revision Purpose List of updated/modified section if any

A Issued for Review Initial Issue
0 Issued for Construction Amended as per Global Comment
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Tabulation of Revised Pages
REVISION REVISION
SHEET SHEET
A B C 0 1 A B C 0 1
1 X
2 X
3 X
4 X
5 X
6 X
7 X
8 X
9 X
10 X
11 X
12 X
13 X
14 X
15 X
16 X
17 X
18 X
19 X
20 X
21 X
22 X
23 X
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….5
2. Reference.………………………………………………………….……………………5
3. Material Properties…………………………………….……………………………6
4. Load Calculation……………………………..……………………………………….7
5. Load Applied and Constrain………………………..……………………………7
6. Acceptance Criteria………………………………………………………………….8
7. Result and Conclusion………………………………………………………………8
8. NEI Nastran Analysis Report…………….…………………………………….10
9. Appendix Drawing………………………………………………….………………23
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1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Launch and Recovery System Analysis is to ensure the designs is
adequate to holding of 1.5 ton load.
Launch and Recovery System was designed a lso based on following load and load factor.
Launch and Recovery System details are shown in the drawings provided in append ix
(drawing)
In the strength analysis, the load applied i s described in section 7 (Page 12).
This model is analysis by following 1 group with 1 sub cases as per lifting arrangement,
The Finite Element Analysis has been carried out using structural analysis program
NeiFusion, and the boundary condition s is described in section 7 (Page 12).
The safety factor applied is 2 for static and then resulting stresses (von mises) 111 the
structure to be not more than 160 N/mm 2 for material grade A
2 REFERENCES
[1] API 2C
[2] NEiNastran engineering simulation software.

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3 MATERIAL PROPERTIES
Assumption All material structure of LARS is Mild Steel Grade A with

Density : 7.85 ton/ cu.m
Tensile Strength, Ultimate : 400-550 MPa
Tensile Strength, Yield (E) : 235 MPa
Elongation at Break : 20.0 % in 200 mm
23.0% in 50 mm
Bulk Modulus : 140 GPa
Shear Modulus (G) : 79.3 GPa
Material Size
UB : UB 200 x 200 x 4 1 .4 kg/m ,
Pad eye Plate Pipe : 20 mm
Pipe : Pipe 8” SCH 40, Pipe 4” SCH 40
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4 LOAD CALCULATION
Maximum load of LARS = 1500 kg

Safety Factor =2
Load Applied = 1.5 ton x 2
= 3 ton
= 30000 N
5 LOAD APPLIED & CONSTRAINT

Load Applied
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6 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
Materia l Yield Strength (N/mm2) Usage Factor Accepted Strength (N/mm2)

Grade A 235 1.5 160
7 RESULT AND CONCLUSION

The report documents design and analysis using NEiNastran engineering simulation
software. A linear static analysis was performed using the finite element model shown in the
figure below. The model is divided into 1 property group(s). The un its system is mm-N-s. The
units system is mm-N-s. Stress and the number of elements and nodes is given below.
Nodes & Elements
Model Nodes Elements Mesh Size
LARS 73170 218040 25mm
Result : Solid Von Misses
Subcase Type Of Material Analysis result Acceptance Result

(MPa) Criteria
Subcase 1 Grade A 218040 25mm PASS
All the stresses are within the limit, so the Analysis is confirmed that the structure
of Launch and Recovery System is adequate strength holding 1.5 T load.
Conclusion is PASS
Followings are FEA analysis report directly from NeiFusion.

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1 SUMMARY
The report documents design and analysis using NEiNastran engineering
simulation software. A linear static analysis was performed using the finite element model
shown in the figure below. The model is divided into 1 property group(s). The units system
is mm-N-s. The model consists of a total of 73170 nodes and 218040 elements.
2 ASSUMPTIONS
Displacements are small \r\n 2. Follower forces are ignored.
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3 MODEL DEFINITION
3.1 Group Definition
The model is divided into 1 property groups(s). Details for each group are given in Table 3.1.1.
1. The bounding box for all positioned bodies in the model measures 5024.0.0 by 2184.0 by 3837.0 mm along
the basic coordinate system x, y, and z axes, respectively.
2. The total mass of the model is 1.857 Te.
3. The model center of gravity is located at (5024.0, 2184.0, 3837.0) mm
Table 3.1.1 Group Definition
Property Volume
Material Bounding Box Mass (Te) Nodes Elements
Group (mm3)
5024.0, 2184.0,
SOLID 1 MAT 101 1.857 2.365E+08 73170 218040
3837.0
Table 3.1.2 Part Mass Properties
Property Center of Mass Moments of Inertia

Material Mass (Te)
Group (mm) (mm)
3.442E+06, 6.047E+06,
SOLID 1 MAT 101 1.857 754.5, 5.244, 587.1
4.937E+06
3.2 Contract Definition
The model contains 18 contact region(s).

Adaptive stiffness scaling is enabled.
Table 3.2. 1 Contact Definition
Name Type Contact Surface Normal Stiffness Penetration

Contact Region Surface 2 18042, Stiffness Unsymmetric
218041 Bi-Directional Slide Controlled
Surface 2 18043
Surface 2 18046
Contact Region Surface 2 1 8048, Stiffness Unsymmetric
Surface 2 18049
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Contact Region Surface 2 18051 , Stiffness Unsymmetric

Bi-Directional Slide
218050 Surface 2 18052 Controlled
Surface 2 18055
Surface 2 18058
Contact Region Surface 2 1 8060, Stiffness Unsymmetric
Surface 2 18061
3.3 Material Properties
3.3.1 Isotropic Material Definition
Material ID E G NU RHO ALPHA T-REF

101 2.0E+05 7.937E+04 0.26 7.85E-09 0.0 0.0
3.3.2 Anisotropic Shell Element Material Definition

No Data
3.3.3 Anisotropic Solid Element Material Definition

No data
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3.3.4 Orthotropic Shell Element Material Definition

No Data
3.3.5 Orthotropic Solid Element Material Definition

No data
3.3.6 Hypcrclastic Element Material Definition

No data
3.4 Mesh
The finite element mesh is shown in the figure below. The model consists of a tota l of 73 170 nodes
and 2 18040 elements
Property Property Aspect Recommen Taper Recomm Skew Recomen Warping Recommen
Group Type Ratio ded Limit Ratio en ded Angle ded Limit Angle ded Limit
Limit
SOLID 1 TET 8.83 100.0 0.0 0.0 1 .414 80.0 0.0 0.0
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4. Environment
4.1 Structural Loading

The finite element environments are shown in the figures below. Applied structural loading is
ummarized in Table 4. 1.1. Applied load vector resultants are defined in the basic coordinate system . Moments
are summed about location (0.0,0.0,0.0).
Table 4.1.1 Applied Load Vector Resultant
Resultant Force (N) Resultant Moment (N-mm)
Subcase XT YT ZT XR YR ZR
Subcase I -2.572E+04 2589.0 -4.444E+04 -8. I O I E+06 5.5 l 2E+07 7.9E+06
4.2 Structural Support

Reaction loads are summari zed in Table 4.2. 1. Reaction load vector resultants are defined in the
basic coordinate system. Moments are summed about location (0.0,0.0,0.0).
Table 4.2. 1 Reaction Load Vector Resultant
Resultant Force (N) Resultant Moment (N-mm)
Subcase 1 2.572E+04 -2589.0 4.444£+04 8. I 19E+06 -5.521E+07 -7.887E+06
5. Solution
The solution to the Environment defined in Section 4 applied to the Model defined in Section 3 is
given below. The program selected the PCGLSS linear solver. Total solution time was 132.0 seconds. The
largest solution error measure was l.668E-12 for SUBCASE l. The largest solid element relative stress
error was 0. 1489 for SUBCASE l. The result s are sunm1arized in the table(s) and figure(s) below.
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Table 5. 1.1 Displacement Summary
Minimum Maxmium
Subcase Displacement (mm)
Property Group Displacement (mm) Property Group
Subcase I 0.0 Pin Padeye 2 & 3-4 2.7 18 Pin Padeyc 2 & 3-4
Subcase I 0.0 Pin Padeye 2 & 3-3 2.7 18 Pin Padcyc 2 & 3-3
Subcase I 0.0 Pin Padeye 2 & 3-2 2.7 18 Pin Padeyc 2 & 3-2
Subcase I 0.0 Pin Padeye 2 & 3-1 2.7 18 Pin Padeye 2 & 3- 1
Subcase I 0.0 Pin Padeye 1-2 2.7 18 Pin Padeye 1-2
Subcase I 0.0 Pin Padeye 1-1 2.7 18 Pin Padeye l -1
Subcase I 0.0 pipe 2-2 2.7 18 pipe 2-2
Subcase I 0.0 pipe 1-1 2.7 18 pipe 1 -1
Subcase I 0.0 pipe 2- 1 2.7 18 pipe 2- 1
Subcase I 0.0 Lars- I 2.7 18 Lars- I
Subcase I 0.0 Lars SWL I 2.7 18 Lars SW L I
Table 5. 1.2 Peak Displacement Component Summary
Displacement Components (mm) Rotation Components (mm)
SUBCASE I 1 .038 2.7 1 6 1 .269 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 5. 1.3 Stress Result Summary
Minimum
Property Property Property
Subcase Principal (MPa) (MPa)
Group Group Group
Stress (MPa)
Pin Padeye 2 Pin Padeye 2 Pin Padeye 2
Subcase I -1 10.5 & 3-4 95.29 & 3-4 9 1 .02 & 3-4
Subcase I -1 10.5 & 3-3 95.29 & 3-3 91.02 & 3-3
Subcase I -1 10.5 & 3-2 95.29 & 3-2 91.02 & 3-2
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Subcase I -1 10.5 & 3-l 95.29 & 3-1 91.02 & 3-1
Pin Padeye I - Pin Padeye I - Pi n Padeye I -
Subcase I -1 10.5 2 95.29 2 91.02 2
Pin Padeye I - Pin Padeye 1 - Pin Padeye 1 -
Subcase I -1 10.5 l 95.29 1 91.02 I
Subcase I -1 10.5 pipe 2-2 95.29 pipe 2-2 91.02 pipe 2-2
Subease I - 1 10.5 pipe 1 - 1 95.29 pipe 1 -1 91.02 pipe 1-1
Subease I -1 10.5 pipe 2- 1 95.29 pipe 2-1 9 1.02 pipe 2-1
Subease I - 1 10.5 Lars- I 95.29 Lars- I 9 l.02 Lars- I
Subcase I -1 10.5 Lars SWL I 95.29 Lars SWL I 91.02 Lars SWL I
Table 5. 1.4 Solution Error Measure and the Relative Stress Error Summary
Solution Error Measure Shell Element Relative

Subcase Solid Element Relative
Stress Error Stress Error)
SUBCASE I 1.668E-12 0.1489
N/A
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6. Conclusion
A linear static analysis was performed using the NEiNastran Version 9.2.2.477 finite element solver
on the LARS SWL 1.5 T structure. The finite element model contained mainly Part I elements and consisted of
224541 degrees of freedom. 1 loading condition was analyzed. The maximum displacement was 2.718 mm
(load case Subcase 1 ). The maximum von Mises stress was 91.02 (load case Subcase 1).
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7. GLOSSARY
Aspect Ratio
Ratio of an element's longest side to its adjacent side.
Prevents contacting regions from separating or closing but permits sliding (zero coefficient of friction
Bounding Box
A three-dimensional cube aligned to the global x, y and z axes that exactly contains a body or assembly.
Follower Force
Loads that follow the motion of the structure as it deforms.
General Contact
Models standard nonlinear surface contact with friction if specified.
Relative Stress Error
A measure of mesh convergence (values greater than 0.01 may indicate that further mesh refinement is
required in areas with large stress gradients over a few elements).
Rough Contact
Nonlinear contact that allows separation and closure but does not permit sliding (infinite friction).
Skew Angle
The angle between the lines that join opposite midsides of a quadrilateral face.
Solution Error Measure
A measure of solution quality (values less than 1.0E-07 are generally considered acceptable).
Taper Ratio
The ratio of the areas on the two sides of a diagonal of a quadrilateral face.
Warping Angle
The extent to which a quadrilateral face deviates from being planar.
Welded Contact
Prevents contacting regions from sliding, separating, or closing.
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APPENDIX (DRAWING)
D306 - 02023 Launch and Recovery System (LARS) P1
P O Box 205, Jurong Point Post Office, Singapore 916407
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Document Title
Air LARS Load Test Procedure
Document
Document Class
B
Tel: 65 68624634/ 65 68618006/ 65 68623609/ 65 68982293 Fax: 65 68632865
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_____________________________________________________________________________________
RECORD OF AMENDMENT
Rev No Amended Section Description of Changes

Tel: 65 68624634/ 65 68618006/ 65 68623609/ 65 68982293 Fax: 65 68632865
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….4
1.1. Purpose…..………………………………………………………….……………………5
2. Load Test Procedure.………………………………….……………………………6
Tel: 65 68624634/ 65 68618006/ 65 68623609/ 65 68982293 Fax: 65 68632865
_____________________________________________________________________________________

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1 INTRODUCTION
This document gives guidance and direction for the load testing of the A frame arms as well as the main winch,
clump winch and braking system of both winches
1.1. PURPOSE
The purpose of this procedure is to demonstrate the Load Test Procedure of LARS main wire and clump weight
wire.
2 LOAD TEST PROCEDURE

The following steps for Load Test Procedure for Testing of LARS main wire and clump weight wire:
S/N Description Check
1 Disconnect main wire from basket.

At t ach (1) 1T lift bag and (1) 250 kg lift bag to eye of main wire, attach (1) 3m 5T sling in
2 same eye with ¾"s hackle as per photo below
3 Attach other end of sling to clump weight, choked to itself in center of clump weight
4 Attach trip line from bottom of bags to A frame
5 Lower clump weight so lift bags hanging from main wire
6 Fill li ft bags with sea water till weight is at 1.25 for dynamic test
7 Per form 1.25 dynamic test on main winch
8 Fill lift bags with sea water till weight is at 1.5 for static test
With main int ern al brake locked perform the static test on main winch at 1.5 and
9 ensure that it holds for 5 mins
To test the secondary brake you must unhook airline going to main brake and supply air
to line in order to keep the internal brake released so hand brake can be test ed, once it
10 has been secured and h and brake on and load applied hold for 5 mins.
Lowe r main lift wire below clump weight until slack, all weight now on clump weight
11 winch
With main internal brake locked perform the static test on clump winch at 1. 5 and
12 ensure that it holds for 5 mins
To test the secondary brake you must unhook airline going to main br ake and supply air to line in
order to keep the internal brake released so hand brake can be tested, once it has been secured
13 and hand brake on and load applied hold for 5 mins.
14 Drain bag till the weight is at 1.25 and perform dynamic test on clump winch
Once satisfied with winches and brakes on winches, lower clump weight and main lift wire
15 until trip line to "A" frame takes lo ad to dump seawater from lift bags.
16 Once lift bags are empty, recover to deck using trip line
Tel: 65 68624634/ 65 68618006/ 65 68623609/ 65 68982293 Fax: 65 68632865
_____________________________________________________________________________________

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17 De-rig and reattach main lifting wire to basket

Once complete ensure NOT is per formed on all critical welds, see below picture for guidance on
18 critical weld location on lars
19 Also NDT all tie down points from lars to deck

Fmea Air Diving System SDS 8 System Amaniaga

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AIR DIVING SYSTEM

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AIR SPREAD

1. SDS 8 – TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS – AIR SPREAD

Additional equipment is available on a project to project basis.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS – AIR SPREAD

DIVE CONTROL/ DDC CONTAINER

Dive Control DDC

ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SYSTEM

The dive control panel will support three air divers.

L.P. Air Supply # 1

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS – AIR SPREAD

A.0.D.C. / l.M.C.A. 052 International Revision

The environment is fully air conditioned.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS – AIR SPREAD

Divers Hat Mounted Colored T.V. Camera System

The Subtec camera system consists of four main components:

Fibron Camera umbilical

All camera umbilicals are, Fibron manufactured, Fibrovision cables,

Topside Control Unit

Deck Decompression Chamber

L.P. Air Supply #1 and a back up L.P. supply

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS – AIR SPREAD

A Carbon Dioxide scrubber is fitted in the D.D.C. main lock.

Diving Stores and Tools

Document Type Internal Audit

Revision Description Prep. Check App Date

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By Craig Staggs

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By

1.4 Periodic Verification

1.5 Document Maintenance

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By

2.2 Electrical Power

2.3 Air Supply

2.4 Life Support Equipment

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By

3.2 Change Management

A Change Control management form can be found in Appendix 1 of this document.

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By

4.1 Risk Assessment Matrix Description

Assessing the risk of a particular scenario should be done in sequence,

Never Incident Happens Happens

heard Has Several Several

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By

Acceptable without further action required. However as part of

Medium risk is acceptable, but hazard (s) must be managed to

This level of risk exposes the Company to intolerable losses to

4.2 Assessment FMEA Matrix Sheets

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By

APPENDIX 1 SYSTEM INDEX

UTS Surface Dive System Approved By

APPENDIX 2 CHANGE CONTROL FORM

Worksheets and FMEA report updated in line with

If ‘’No’’ , Why not? N/A

If ‘’Yes’’, reference FMEA trials test sheet number:

Does this change also affect: 1) Operational manual? Y N

2) Emergency Operational Manual Y N

If “Yes” have the following

2) Emergency Operational Manual Y N

Does this change also apply to other

Circulation List: Signed Date

 Dive Supt ……………………………… …………………………….