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Cockpit Automation - Advantages

and Safety Challenges
Article Information

Category: Human Behaviour

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Content source: SKYbrary

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Contents
1 Introduction
2 Automation Advantages and Disadvantages
3 Flight Crew - Automation Interaction Issues
4 Automation Dependency
 4.1 Safety Issues
4.2 Solutions

5 Other Potential Improvement Options

6 Accident and Serious Incident Examples
7 Related Articles
8 Further Reading

Introduction
Modern aircraft are increasingly reliant on automation for safe and
efficient operation. However, automation also has the potential to cause
significant incidents when misunderstood or mishandled. Furthermore,
automation may result in an aircraft developing an undesirable state from
which it is difficult or impossible to recover using traditional hand flying
techniques.

Automation Advantages and Disadvantages

Increases passenger comfort;
Improved flight path control and reduced weather minima;
Systems monitoring displays coupled with diagnostic assistance
systems (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM)
(/index.php/ECAM)/Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System
(EICAS) (/index.php/EICAS)) support enhanced pilots’ and
maintenance staff’s understanding of aircraft system states.
However, when faced with a complex failure event, such as the
Airbus 380 engine break-up after take off from Singapore (2010)
(/index.php/A388,_en-route_Batam_Island_Indonesia,_2010), the
normally ‘simple to understand’ failure information can swamp the
crew and either hinder diagnosis or distract the crew from the
principle task of FLY THE AIRCRAFT;
Automation can relieve pilots from repetitive or non-rewarding tasks
for which humans are less suited, though it invariably changes the
 pilots’ active involvement in operating the aircraft into a monitoring
role, which humans are particularly poor at doing effectively or for
long periods. As an example, pilots who invariably fly with
Autothrottle (AT) engaged can quickly lose the habit of scanning
speed indications. Therfore, when the AT disengages, either by design
or following a malfunction, the pilots will not notice or react to even
large speed deviations. (Amsterdam B737-800 in 2009
(/index.php/B738,_vicinity_Amsterdam_Netherlands,_2009))
Good automation reduces workload (/index.php/Pilot_Workload),
frees attentional resources to focus on other tasks but the need to
‘manage’ the automation, particularly when involving data entry or
retrieval through a key-pad, places additional tasks on the pilot that
can also increase pilot workload. In contrast, poor automation can
reduce the operators’ situational awareness and create significant
workload challenges when systems fail.

Flight Crew - Automation Interaction

Issues
Basic manual and cognitive flying skills can decline because of lack
of practice and feel for the aircraft. This is exacerbated if operators
actively discourage flight crew from manual flying or limit the manual
modes they may use – e.g. prohibiting manual flying with Auto-
Throttle disengaged;
Unexpected automation behavior: un-commanded disengagement
caused by a system failure resulting in mode reversion or
inappropriate mode engagement by the pilot may lead to adverse
consequences;
Pilots interacting with automation can be distracted from flying the
aircraft; selection of modes, annunciation of modes, flight director
commands may be given more importance than values of pitch,
power, roll and yaw and so attending to automation can distract the
flight/crew pilots from monitoring flight path;
Flight crews may spend too much time trying to understand the
origin, conditions, or causes of an alarm or of multiple alarms, which
may distract them from other priority tasks and from flying the
aircraft;
Short notice changes by ATC requiring reprogramming of a departure
or landing runway are potentially hazardous due to the possibility of
incorrect data entry and crosschecking in a time critical situation.
This creates intense workload. Reducing the level of automation in
such circumstances to basic modes such as Heading Select, Flight
Level Change can buy the space and time to re-programme FMS as
and if required.
Diagnostic systems are limited with regard to dealing with multiple
failures, with unexpected problems and with situations requiring
deviations from Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs
(/index.php/SOP));
Unanticipated situations requiring manual override of automation are
difficult to understand and manage, can create a surprise or startle
effect, and can induce peaks of workload and stress
(/index.php/Stress). Unless the crew has been correctly trained and
is adequately practiced in handling such situations, flight deck
workload levels can reach the point where crew co-operation
becomes severely challenged. Good training in surprise and startle
can be effective. UK CAA CAP 737 (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshel
f/books/3199.pdf) Chapter 7 ‘ Surprise & Startle’ shows how simple
linear rules can buy crews the time to reduce startle by providing the
comfort of a simple routine to bring us back to the task;
For highly automated aircraft, problems may occur when
transitioning to degraded modes (e.g. multiple failures requiring
manual or less automated flight);
Data entry errors (either mistakes or typing errors) made when using
Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs (/index.php/EFB)) in addition to avionics
systems may have critical consequences; errors may be more
difficult to prevent and detect as there is no system check of the
consistency of the computed or entered values and technology gives
a certain sense of confidence (if the data entered in the machine are
 accepted, they should be OK);
In critical situations following disconnection or failure of the
automation, the alarm system only indicates the condition met but
not the action to take (although the action that the flight crew must
take to regain control is known);
It may be difficult to understand the situation and to gain/regain
control when automation reaches the limit of its operation domain
and disconnects or in case of automation failure;
When automation fails or disconnects, the tasks allocated to the
pilots / flight crews may fall beyond their capabilities, individually
and or as a team;
Flight crew may not be sufficiently informed of automation failures or
malfunctions or of their effects.

Automation Dependency
Automation Dependency has commonly been described as a situation in
which pilots who routinely fly aircraft with automated systems are only
fully confident in their ability to control the trajectory of their aircraft
when using the full functionality of such systems. Such a lack of
confidence usually stems from a combination of inadequate knowledge of
the automated systems themselves unless all are employed and a lack of
manual flying and aircraft management competence.

Safety Issues
Two problems arise directly from automation dependency:

Firstly, affected pilots are reluctant to voluntarily reduce the extent

to which they use full automation capability to deal with any
situation - routine or abnormal - which arises.
Secondly, if the full automation capability is for some reason no
longer available or it is considered that it is no longer capable of
delivering the required aircraft control, then the tendency is to seek
 to partially retain the use of automated systems rather than revert to
wholly manual aircraft trajectory control. The effect of both is often a
loss of situational awareness triggered by task saturation for both
pilots. The consequence of this is frequently a reduction in the
extent to which the PM is able to effectively monitor the actions of
the PF.

Solutions
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are understandably oriented
towards maximum use of automation in the interests of efficiency as well
as safety. However, they must be flexible enough to allow pilots to elect
to fly without automation or with partial automation in order to maintain
their competence between recurrent simulator training sessions. This is
particularly important if AOC holders with ATQP Approval are permitted to
extend the normal six month interval between such sessions. OFDM
programmes which capture close to 100% of flights can be used to track
the extent to which full automation is used. SOPs should also make it
clear when it is expected that pilots’ response will include reducing the
level of automation beyond any un-commanded reduction which may have
already occurred.

Pilot Training must:

ensure that a sufficient understanding of both the basis for

automated system functionality and its partial as well as full use is
fully understood.
ensure that pilots are able to understand the importance of
monitoring the expected function of automation so that in the event
their incorrect inputs or malfunction have unexpected consequences,
timely corrective action can be taken
ensure pilots can ‘identify and use the appropriate level of
automation for the task in hand’. For example:

In the cruise, highest levels of automation using FMC for

navigation and flight path control is a great reducer of workload.
 Trying to use the FMC to control the flightpath in the terminal
area to cope with rapid changes to the required flight path can
so saturate the crew with tasks it can lead to overload &
devastating loss of SA. (Cali Columbia?)
Recovering from undesired deviations from the required flight
path or excursions may require prompt disengagement of AP-FD
systems and accurate manual handling to recover the situation.
The Autothrottle (A/T) must be seen as part of the overall
automation system. Pilots must be able to competently fly the
aircraft with or without it engaged just as they would be
expected to be able to fly the aircraft with or without the
Autopilot (AP).

Other Potential Improvement Options

The “EASA Automation Policy: Bridging Design and Training Principles” lists
the following:

Improve basic airmanship and manual flying skills of pilots;

Improve recurrent training and testing practices with regard to
automation management;
Improve the Multi Crew Cooperation (MCC) concept and training
(instruction and testing) practices to better address automation
management; 'Note': European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
(/index.php/EASA) has already planned to improve Crew Resource
Management (Crew Resource Management (/index.php/CRM))
guidance - Rule Making Task RMT.0411 (OPS.094).
Improve the Competence Based Training (CBT) and Evidence Based
Training (EBT) approaches to better address automation
management;
Develop automation policies specific to aircraft types and variants to
account for differences regarding automation and flight path
management;
Improve the Multi-crew Pilot Licence (MPL) (/index.php/Multi-
crew_Pilot_Licence_(MPL)) programme to better address automation
management;
Manufacturers are to publish automation philosophies and policies,
generic and specific to aircraft types and variants, for communication
to the training (instructors and trainees) and operations
communities;
Require transition training to include an understanding of the
differences in philosophy when moving from one manufacturer’s
aircraft to another (e.g. Airbus/ Boeing) It is easy in some aircraft to
maintain a tactile connection, by resting hands on Thrust Levers/
Control Column, to what the auto flight system is commanding. In
other aircraft one has to read and interpret mode indicators/
instruments;
Improve air operators’ automation policies / provide guidance for the
improvement of air operators’ automation policies;
Consider introducing requirements regarding flight deck software
customisation (e.g. electronic checklists and procedures, Flight
Warning Systems) and enhancing the approval of safety critical
functions of Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) or introducing this approval
in the frame of aircraft certification;
Transfer the certification assumptions regarding flight crew
competences required to safely fly the aircraft to the training and
operations communities through appropriate means such as the
Operational Suitability Data (OSD);
Review Certification Specifications (CS) and Acceptable Means of
Compliance (AMC) 25.1302 “Installed Systems and Equipment for Use
by the Flight Crew”, 25.1322 “Flight Crew Alerting” and CS 25.1329
“Flight Guidance System” with regard to automation management,
and the assumptions made regarding the flight crew capabilities
required to take appropriate action;
Extend the applicability of CS and AMC 25.1302 and CS and AMC
25.1322 to Part 23 (Normal, Utility, Aerobatic and Commuter
Aeroplanes), Part 29 (Large Rotorcraft) and Part 27 (Small Rotorcraft).
Accident and Serious Incident Examples
Automation Confusion: The following are just a few examples of confusion
arising from mismanagement of automation which had serious or
potentially serious consequences for a serviceable aeroplane:

B777-200 San Francisco (2013)

(/index.php/B772,_San_Francisco_CA_USA,_2013) - The crew failed to
notice that mismanagement of the aircraft during an approach, using
an unfamiliar level of automation in preference to the visual
approach for which they had been cleared, had resulted in the A/T
setting thrust to idle. They then delayed a decision to initiate a go
around until it was no longer possible.
A340-300 Paris CDG (2012)
(/index.php/A343,_vicinity_Paris_CDG_France,_2012) - Crew confusion
and near loss of control when the automatics were allowed to
capture a false ILS GS lobe during a Cat 3 approach at Paris CDG in
IMC.
A320 Tel Aviv (2012) (/index.php/A320,_vicinity_Tel_Aviv_Israel,_2012) -
The crew comprehensively mismanaged the automation both during
the approach and during the go around which, subsequently, became
necessary. The Investigation identified significant issues with the
crew understanding of automation.
B737-800 Amsterdam (2009)
(/index.php/B738,_vicinity_Amsterdam_Netherlands,_2009) - The
crew failed to notice that they were attempting to fly the approach
with thrust at idle and their attempt at a last minute recovery was
mismanaged.

Related Articles
Situational Awareness (/index.php/Situational_Awareness)
Crew Resource Management (/index.php?
title=Crew_Resource_Management&action=edit&redlink=1)
 Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) (/index.php/ECAM)
Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS)
(/index.php/EICAS)
Human Machine Interface (HMI)
(/index.php/Human_Machine_Interface_(HMI))

see also the presentations from the 2015 Safety Forum - Automation and
Safety (/index.php/Portal:Automation_and_Safety)

Further Reading
AV-2016-013: Enhanced FAA oversight could reduce hazards
associated with increased use of flight deck automation (http://www.
skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3314.pdf), FAA - Office of Inspector
General Audit Report, 7 January 2016.
EASA Automation Policy: Bridging Design and Training Principles (http
://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2356.pdf)
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 6, Operation of
Aircraft, Part I - International Commercial Transport - Aeroplanes,
Appendix 2
ICAO Human Factors Training Manual (Doc 9683)
ICAO Human Factors Digest No. 5, Operational Implications of
Automation in Advanced Technology Flight Decks (Circular 234)
CAA CAP737 Chapter 7 (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/31
99.pdf), December 2016.
Optimum Use of Automation (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/bo
oks/190.pdf), Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note (2006)
Crew Reliance on Automation (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/b
ooks/2872.pdf), UK CAA Paper (2004)
Managing Automation or Managing Aircraft Flight Path: How does
Operational Policy Need to Evolve? (http://www.skybrary.aero/booksh
elf/books/3324.pdf); Dr Kathy Abbott - presentation to IASS 2015,
November 2015.
OIG Audit Report: Enhanced FAA Oversight Could Reduce Hazards
Associated With Increased Use of Flight Deck Automation (http://ww
 w.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4077.pdf), 2016
Design for Humans (https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4194.
pdf), Steven Shorrock, Safeguard January/February 2018, Feb 2018
EHEST HE 9 - Automation and Flight Path Management. Training
Leaflet for Helicopter Pilots and Instructors (https://www.skybrary.aer
o/bookshelf/books/4451.pdf), EASA, September 2015; reviews the
basics of automation and provides principles for optimal use of
automation and flight path management for rotorcraft.
Helioffshore Automation Guidance (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshe
lf/books/4236.pdf); effective use of automation in multi crew
helicopters and advocates SOPs based on it. V1.0 Published
December 2016.

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