PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L.
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and
ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
FACTS:
The car driven by Augusto Ramos (son of co-plaintiff Placido
Ramos) collided with the truck of PEPSI, driven by the driver
and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio. As a result, the Ramoses
sued Bonifacio and Pepsi.
The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared that
PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved that it exercised the
due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered
to pay the plaintiffs damages.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court, but absolved PEPSI-COLA from
liability, finding that it sufficiently proved due diligence in the
selection of its driver Bonifacio. In its decision, CA stated the
basis for its decision:
“The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel
manager of defendant company, was to the effect that
defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop
in the production department; that when he was hired as a
driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background,
asking him to submit clearances, previous experience,
physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool
house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of:
first, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving
examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the
defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. Our
Supreme Court had put it down as a rule that ‘In order that the
defendant may be considered as having exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's
license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and
record of service.’ Defendant Company has taken all these
steps.”
ISSUE: Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the
selection of its employee.
HELD:
The appellants contended that Añasco, being PEPSI-COLA's
employee, is a biased and an interested witness. This is a
question of fact, and the SC would not disturb the findings of
CA.
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question
is raised as to due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-
COLA of its driver. Article 2180 points out that the owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
the occasion of their functions. This responsibility shall cease
when the employers prove that they observed the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-
COLA shall be relieved from liability (rebuttable presumption
of negligence).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars
M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1 in that at the time of the
collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000
kgms., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or
beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a
rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the driver.
There is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-
vision mirror.
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par.
(b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law, alleging that
the truck exceeded the dimensions allowed. It is not enough
that the width of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A;
in addition, it must also appear that there was no special
permit granted under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that
vital factual link is missing. There was no proof much less any
finding to that effect.
We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine
of respondent superior. We cannot however, abandon the
Bahia ruling without going against the explicit mandate of the
law. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against
all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil
Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease
once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely
clarified what that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in
the selection and supervision of the driver-employee.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an
employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his
employees. The former is made responsible for failing to
properly and diligently select and supervise his erring
employees. We do not — and have never — followed the
respondent superior rule.8 So, the American rulings cited by
petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are not
authoritative here.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby denied.
Filamer v. IAC
Facts: Funtecha was a working student of Filamer Christian
Institute. Being a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer, he was considered an employee
even if he was assigned to clean the premises for just
2 hours every day.
Allan Masa, the son of Filamer’s president Mr.
Agustin Masa, was the official driver of the school’s
vehicle. Since Funtecha and Allan lived in the same
house, Funtecha, holder of a student driver’s license,
requested Allan to take over the vehicle and drive it
home. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to
Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating
a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road
was clear. A fast moving truck with glaring lights
nearly hit them so they swerved to the right to avoid
collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they
did not stop to check. Unfortunately, their jeep
swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan
who was walking in his lane in the direction against
vehicular traffic, and hit him.
The heirs of Kapunan filed an action against Filamer
for damages. In its defense, Filamer alleged that
Funtecha acted outside of his scope of his authority.
Therefore, it was only Funtecha who was liable and
not Filamer.
Issue: Whether or not Filamer Christian Institute is liable
for the acts of Funtecha
Held: Yes, Filamer is liable for the acts of Funtecha.
Ratio: In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle
home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a
"frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for
which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.
Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that
the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel
was one done for and in behalf of his employer for
which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the
scope of his janitorial duties. He need not have an
official appointment for a driver's position in order
that the petitioner may be held responsible for his
grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit
of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was
not the school driver or was not acting within the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the
petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption that there was negligence on its part
either in the selection of a servant or employee, or
in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed
to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan.
What does supervision of employee include?
It includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of its employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his employees.
Was there any showing that Filamer provided rules and
regulations?
None.
Therefore:
Petitioner Filamer has an obligation to pay damages
for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle. The liability of Filamer is
primary and solidary. It has, however, recourse
against the negligent employee for whatever damages
it has paid.
FULL TEXT
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and
POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., respondents.
The private respondents assert that the circumstances
obtaining in the present case call for the application of Article
2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an
employee of the petitioner. The private respondents maintain
that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse
against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the
time of the incident, the servant was performing an act in
furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner.
Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a
joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found
by the trial court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders
its decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision
penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in
by Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon.
Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court decision which ordered the payment of the
P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation
policy, P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00 litigation and
actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney's fees.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a
part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was,
in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned
to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the
morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the
driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle
while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is
significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the
house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa.
Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed
free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian
Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after
driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and
viewing that the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-
79) According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with
glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the
right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound
as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did
not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards
the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his
lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.
Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to
the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.)
in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a
security guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that
there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after
driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had
to go back to school and then drive home using the same
vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school
president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in
furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job
demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to
fetch students in the morning of the next school day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school
president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven
home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that
the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's
possession of a student driver's license and his desire to
undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the
direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having
a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the
service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R.
577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for
World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124
SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering
wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for
which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial
duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks"
for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an
employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account
of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950])
Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived
some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive
liability of the employer is determined by answering the
question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the
accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's
business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437
[1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the
Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only
for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions
of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly,
Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by
which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on
what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on
payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and
inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage
as far as compliance with the substantive labor provisions on
working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of
the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the
distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of
the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
against a working student of a school and against the school
itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on
conditions of employment between an alleged employee and
an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a
person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence,
the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the
primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability
under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case
an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or
reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position
to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia
v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not
have an official appointment for a driver's position in order
that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the
time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the
relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part
either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof
of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father
of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation

of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v.
Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction,
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987])

An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the

necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act
indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set
forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its
employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not
the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the
Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive
the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to
prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees
against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.

The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for

injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha
drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil.
768, 772 [1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petitioner
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the
vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees.
(Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v. Fabros, 93
SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176
SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v.
Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is,
under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the
employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee
for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep,

Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case
for damages. This is quite understandable considering that as
far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan,
was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the
vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to
drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to
suffer without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for
the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving
chore for the petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose
of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it
is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs
were able to establish the existence of employer-employee
relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the
fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an
independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the
CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and
SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S.
LIMON, vs.
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents BASILIO
TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO
FACTS:
Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at Marymount
School, an academic institution operated and maintained by
Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found
himself locked inside the boy’s comfort room in Marymount.
He started to panic so he banged and kicked the door and
yelled for help. No help arrived. He then decided to open the
window to call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy
went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was
hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple
physical injuries. He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil
action against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors
which includes the Spouses Limon. They claim that the school
was negligent for not installing iron grills at the window of the
boy’s comfort room. CLC, in its defense, maintained that there
was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the
door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or
negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the
due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure
the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. The
trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The respondents
proceeded their appeal to the Court of Appeals who affirmed
the trial court’s ruling in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s
accidental fall.
RULING:
YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred.
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to
it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in
working condition. The fact that a student had to go through
the window, instead of the door, shows that something was
wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on the
window, petitioners contend that there was no such
requirement under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is
that such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was
approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within
reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not
functioning.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the
family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the
toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use the
window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the
circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a
finding of liability on petitioners’ part.
Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is
being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s
liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on
the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors
are properly maintained. The Court’s pronouncement that
Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get
out using the door, negates petitioners’ other contention that
the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy’s own
negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the
product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any intervening cause, that originated from CLC’s own
negligence

In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to

provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its
students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door
knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2)
failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy
fell from. During trial, it was found that the lock was
defective. The architect witness testified that he did not verify
if the doorknob at the comfort room was actually put in place.
Further, the fact that Timothy fell out through the window
shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That
sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with
the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1)
the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference
that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained
of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
MERCURY DRUG VS HUANG
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the
registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck with
plate number PRE 641 (truck). It has in its employ petitioner
Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard
and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen
Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan with
plate number PTT 775 (car).
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December
20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within the municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was
driving the car, weighing 1,450 kg., while petitioner Del
Rosario was driving the truck, weighing 14,058 kg. Both were
traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the
general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was
on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane
to its right, when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and
slammed into the front right side of the car. The collision
hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun
around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a
lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally
stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a
Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His drivers license had been
confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for
reckless driving.
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent
Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord,
head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent
Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and
requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross
negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and
petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident was respondent Stephen
Huangs recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he
was driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped
the trucks front right tire. The truck then swerved to the left,
smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and
stopped on the other side of the highway. The car likewise
crossed over the center island and landed on the same portion
of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims that it
exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of all its employees.
The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29, 2004,
found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and
severally liable to pay respondents actual, compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
1. WON DEL ROSARIO IS NEGLIGENT?
2. WON MERCURY DRUG IS LIABLE?
RULING
1. YES! The evidence does not support petitioners claim that
at the time of the accident, the truck was at the left inner lane
and that it was respondent Stephen Huangs car, at its right,
which bumped the right front side of the truck. Firstly,
petitioner Del Rosario could not precisely tell which part of
the truck was hit by the car, [6] despite the fact that the truck
was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the car. Petitioner Del
Rosario could not also explain why the car landed on the
opposite lane of C-5 which was on its left side. He said that
the car did not pass in front of him after it hit him or under
him or over him or behind him. [7] If the truck were really at the
left lane and the car were at its right, and the car hit the truck
at its front right side, the car would not have landed on the
opposite side, but would have been thrown to the right side of
the C-5 Highway. Noteworthy on this issue is the testimony of
Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an expert in the field of
physics. He conducted a study based on the following
assumptions provided by respondents:
1. Two vehicles collided;
2. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than the
other;
3. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at
the same speed of about 85 to 90 kilometers per hour;
4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left
lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right.
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the
lighter vehicle hits the right front portion of the heavier
vehicle, the general direction of the light vehicle after the
impact would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle, not the
other way around. The truck, he opined, is more difficult to
move as it is heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which
would move to the right of, and away from the truck. Thus,
there is very little chance that the car will move towards the
opposite side, i.e., to the left of the truck.
Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the same
assumptions except that the car is on the left side of the truck,
in accordance with the testimony of respondent Stephen
Huang. Dr. Daza concluded that the general direction of the
car after impact would be to the left of the truck. In this
situation, the middle island against which the car was pinned
would slow down the car, and enable the truck to catch up and
hit the car again, before running over it.[8]
To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the damages
that the truck sustained at its front right side. The attempt does
not impress. The photographs presented were taken a month
after the accident, and Rogelio Pantua, the automechanic who
repaired the truck and authenticated the photographs, admitted
that there were damages also on the left side of the truck.[9]
Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further admitted that after
the impact, he lost control of the truck and failed to apply his
brakes. Considering that the car was smaller and lighter than
the six-wheeler truck, the impact allegedly caused by the car
when it hit the truck could not possibly be so great to cause
petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on the
brakes.
We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The evidence proves
petitioner Del Rosarios negligence as the direct and proximate
cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Stephen
Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario failed to do what a reasonable
and prudent man would have done under the circumstances.
2. YES
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior
recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with
the employee.[11]
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family, both in the selection of the employee and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the
selection of its prospective employees, the employer is
required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. [12] With respect to the
supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish compliance with these requirements, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.[13]
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented
testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According to
Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager
of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take
theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological
examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however,
Mrs. Caamicadmitted that he took the driving tests and
psychological examination when he applied for the position of
Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position
of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del
Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a
truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted
on the motor skills development, perceptual speed, visual
attention, depth visualization, eye and hand coordination and
steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police
clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario
attended only three driving seminars on June 30,
2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only
seminar he attended before the accident which occurred in
1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide
for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the accident,
petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than
thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified
that she does not know of any company policy requiring back-
up drivers for long trips.[14]
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it
exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over
its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner
Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a
TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the
incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was
not suspended or reprimanded.[15] No disciplinary action
whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We
therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has
failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee,
petitioner Del Rosario.
Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at
the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo St. and
Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at
the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose
was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses.
The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs
of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner
of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in charge of its
operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the
petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and
that there was due care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees.
Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin
of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as
to presume negligence on the part of the respondents.
Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or
transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present:
(a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant
or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct
which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In
the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of
respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned
the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have
known how the fire started were respondents and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care. The negligence of the employees was
the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course
of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are
entitled to the award for damages.
VICENTE LAMIS and SANDIGAN PROTECTIVE &
INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., petitioners, vs.
DAVID Y. ONG, respondent.
FACTS:
Sandigan Protective and Investigation Agency, Inc.
(Sandigan), petitioner, was the security agency providing
security services at the Manila Chinese Cemetery. The visiting
hours were at 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Sandigan instructed the
security guards not to allow any one to enter the cemetery
from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
On September 20, 1994, Vicente Lamis, also a petitioner,
was the guard assigned at the south gate of the cemetery for
the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. slot.
Around 3:00 in the morning, a Mitsubishi Lancer, with a
PSM 679 plate, driven by David Y. Ong, herein respondent,
arrived at the south gate of the cemetery. He beeped his car
and continued doing so, but Lamis did not open the gate.
Eventually, he went outside the gate and informed respondent
that being beyond visiting hours, he cannot enter the cemetery.
Suddenly, respondent accelerated the speed of his car, trying to
enter the cemetery. This irked Lamis. He closed the gate and
took a shot gun entrusted to him by one of the roving guards.
About thirty minutes thereafter, respondents car returned
at full speed toward the closed gate where Lamis was
standing. He fired a warning shot but respondent did not stop
his car. Lamis fired another warning shot. Respondent then
alighted from his car. Seeing it was closed, he got inside the
car, but before he could do so, Lamis shot him, hitting his
right arm, left hip, and right waist. He managed to drive to the
Chinese General Hospital where he was examined and treated.
Thereafter, the hospital guard reported the incident to the
police who immediately conducted an investigation.
Petitioner Sandigan conducted its own investigation but
did not turn over to the police the firearm used by Lamis.
Subsequently, Sandigan paid Lamis mother the amount
spent for his medical expenses. Meanwhile, he was given
another job but he absented from work without leave. Thus, he
was suspended and eventually dismissed from the service.
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila a complaint for frustrated
homicide against Lamis, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-J-
27836.
ISSUES: 1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY HELD PETITIONER SANDIGAN LIABLE
DESPITE THE FACT THAT SANDIGAN EXERCISED DUE
DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
ITS SECURITY GUARDS.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS, DESPITE LACK
OF BASIS TO SUPPORT ANY FINDING OF LIABILITY
AGAINST PETITIONERS, CORRECTLY AWARDED
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.
RULING:
 Anent the first and second issues, petitioners contend mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that: (a) petitioner wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
Lamis did not act in self-defense, and (b) petitioner Sandigan injury unjustly caused by the defendants wrongful acts.
[10]
failed to prove that it exercised due diligence in the selection Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount
and supervision of its security guards. must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of
the suffering inflicted.[11] Moral damages are not intended to
The first two issues are obviously questions of fact. impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, [12] neither to enrich the
Certainly, such matters mainly require a calibration of the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[13] There is no hard-
evidence or a determination of the credibility of the witnesses and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and
presented by the parties and the existence and relevancy of reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are given
and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[3] discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation
The well-entrenched rule is that questions of fact may that it should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.
[14]
not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of We hold that an award to respondent of P30,000.00, instead
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as this of P500,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
recourse is generally confined to questions of law.[4] Under Likewise, we are convinced that the award of exemplary
the said Rule, the jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought damages should be reduced from P300,000.00 to P25,000.00.
to it is limited to the review and rectification of errors of law Such damages are imposed not to enrich the claimant and
committed by the lower court. impoverish the defendant but to serve as a deterrent against, or
Moreover, it is doctrinally settled that where the trial as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.[15]
courts factual findings are adopted and affirmed by the Court Finally, an award of P20,000.00 as attorneys fee is
of Appeals, as in this case, the same are final and conclusive deemed sufficient considering that the suit involved is merely
and may not be reviewed by this Court. [5] It bears emphasis for damages. Attorneys fee may be awarded when a party is
that in the appreciation of evidence, the Appellate Court compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest
accords due deference to the trial courts factual findings by reason of an unjustified act of the other party, [16] as in the
because the latter had the opportunity to observe the demeanor present case.
of the witnesses when they testified during the trial and,
therefore, is in a better position to determine their credibility. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
[6]
Thus, we find no compelling reason to overturn the factual Decision dated March 13, 2001 and Resolution dated June 28,
findings and conclusion of law by the Court of Appeals 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61034 are
relative to the first and second issues. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that
petitioners are ordered to pay respondent (a) P30,000.00 as
With respect to the third issue, petitioners maintain that moral damages, (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
there is no legal basis for the trial courts award of damages. (c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fee. Costs against petitioners.
As earlier stated, the trial court found that Lamis act of
shooting the respondent was deliberate and intentional, hence,
both petitioners are jointly and solidarily liable to respondent
for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that Whoever by
an act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x
x x. The obligation imposed by this Article is demandable not
only for ones own wrongful acts or omissions, but also for
those persons for whom one is responsible.[7] Thus, petitioner
Sandigan, being the employer of petitioner Lamis, is likewise
liable for damages caused by the latter.[8]
As stated earlier, petitioner Sandigan already paid the
medical expenses (or actual damages) incurred by respondent.
We find, however, that the trial court erred in awarding to
respondent moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00,
exemplary damages of P300,000.00 and attorneys fee in the
amount of P50,000.00. These amounts are quite excessive. We
have held that although the trial court is given the discretion to
determine the amount of such damages, the appellate court
may modify or change the amount awarded when it is
inordinate,[9] as in this case.
It bears stressing that the award of moral damages is
meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering,

Cerezo vs Tuazon
FACTS:
Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger
bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga. The driver of the
tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs.
Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo,
and bus driver Foronda.
According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was
driving on the proper lane. There was a "Slow Down" sign
which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias
summons was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the
Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.
In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction because there was no service of
summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his
right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the
criminal action.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages
HELD:
Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based
on criminal law but on quasi-delict under the Civil Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising
from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or may give rise to an
action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved
party may choose between the two remedies. An action based
on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal
action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability
arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-
delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a
quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of
the action.
Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180:
Employer's liability.
Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs.
Cerezo's contention. An indispensable party is one whose
interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and
without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.
However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for
quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary liability on
the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for
the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for
the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation
of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation
of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
and the other is not even a necessary party because complete
relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over
Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from
Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is
primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a
delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as
contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by
law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character
and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180
originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an
employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer
has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing
or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law
condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary
capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer
is also civilly liable directly and separate for his own civil
negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and
supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's
liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.
The action can be brought directly against the person
responsible (for another) without including the author of the
act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by
the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot
be instituted till after the judgment against he author of the act
or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; action
for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal
action.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the
subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence
of the employee as provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the
employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the
aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are
established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then
the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-
delict, which is separate and independent from an action based
on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the filing of a
separate civil action. The purpose of allowing the filing the of
an independent action based on quasi-delict against the
employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.