Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared that BENGZON, J.P., J.:
PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved that it exercised the
due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars
damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1 in that at the time of the
to pay the plaintiffs damages. collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000
kgms., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a
the decision of the trial court, but absolved PEPSI-COLA from rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the driver.
liability, finding that it sufficiently proved due diligence in the There is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-
selection of its driver Bonifacio. In its decision, CA stated the vision mirror.
basis for its decision:
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par.
“The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law, alleging that
manager of defendant company, was to the effect that the truck exceeded the dimensions allowed. It is not enough
defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop that the width of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A;
in the production department; that when he was hired as a in addition, it must also appear that there was no special
driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, permit granted under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that
asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, vital factual link is missing. There was no proof much less any
physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool finding to that effect.
house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of:
first, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine
examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the of respondent superior. We cannot however, abandon the
defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. Our Bahia ruling without going against the explicit mandate of the
Supreme Court had put it down as a rule that ‘In order that the law. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against
defendant may be considered as having exercised all the all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil
diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good
license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely
employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and clarified what that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in
record of service.’ Defendant Company has taken all these the selection and supervision of the driver-employee.
steps.”
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an
ISSUE: Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his
selection of its employee. employees. The former is made responsible for failing to
properly and diligently select and supervise his erring
HELD: employees. We do not — and have never — followed the
respondent superior rule.8 So, the American rulings cited by
The appellants contended that Añasco, being PEPSI-COLA's petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are not
employee, is a biased and an interested witness. This is a authoritative here.
question of fact, and the SC would not disturb the findings of
CA. In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby denied.
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question
is raised as to due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-
COLA of its driver. Article 2180 points out that the owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
Filamer v. IAC either in the selection of a servant or employee, or
in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed
to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its
Facts: Funtecha was a working student of Filamer Christian employees Funtecha and Allan.
Institute. Being a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer, he was considered an employee
even if he was assigned to clean the premises for just What does supervision of employee include?
2 hours every day.
It includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of its employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the
Allan Masa, the son of Filamer’s president Mr.
employer has relations through his employees.
Agustin Masa, was the official driver of the school’s
vehicle. Since Funtecha and Allan lived in the same
Was there any showing that Filamer provided rules and
house, Funtecha, holder of a student driver’s license,
regulations?
requested Allan to take over the vehicle and drive it
home. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to
None.
Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating
a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road
Therefore:
was clear. A fast moving truck with glaring lights
nearly hit them so they swerved to the right to avoid
Petitioner Filamer has an obligation to pay damages
collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they
Funtecha drove the vehicle. The liability of Filamer is
did not stop to check. Unfortunately, their jeep
primary and solidary. It has, however, recourse
swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan
against the negligent employee for whatever damages
who was walking in his lane in the direction against
it has paid.
vehicular traffic, and hit him.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of
security guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the
there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of
driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
to go back to school and then drive home using the same instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
vehicle. against a working student of a school and against the school
itself.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school
president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on
furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job conditions of employment between an alleged employee and
demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
fetch students in the morning of the next school day. damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a
person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence,
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the
president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the
home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability
possession of a student driver's license and his desire to under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms. There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case
an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are
direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position
a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not
577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for have an official appointment for a driver's position in order
World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly
SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the
conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.
wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the
relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part
either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof
of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father
of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set
forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its
employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not
the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the
Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive
the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to
prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees
against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent 2. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than the
Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, other;
head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent 3. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at
Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and the same speed of about 85 to 90 kilometers per hour;
requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.
4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right.
negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and
petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its lighter vehicle hits the right front portion of the heavier
driver. vehicle, the general direction of the light vehicle after the
impact would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle, not the
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and other way around. The truck, he opined, is more difficult to
proximate cause of the accident was respondent Stephen move as it is heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which
Huangs recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he would move to the right of, and away from the truck. Thus,
was driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped there is very little chance that the car will move towards the
the trucks front right tire. The truck then swerved to the left, opposite side, i.e., to the left of the truck.
smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and
stopped on the other side of the highway. The car likewise Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the same
crossed over the center island and landed on the same portion assumptions except that the car is on the left side of the truck,
of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims that it in accordance with the testimony of respondent Stephen
exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the Huang. Dr. Daza concluded that the general direction of the
selection and supervision of all its employees. car after impact would be to the left of the truck. In this
situation, the middle island against which the car was pinned
The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29, 2004, would slow down the car, and enable the truck to catch up and
found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and hit the car again, before running over it.[8]
severally liable to pay respondents actual, compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the damages
expenses. that the truck sustained at its front right side. The attempt does
not impress. The photographs presented were taken a month In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented
after the accident, and Rogelio Pantua, the automechanic who testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According to
repaired the truck and authenticated the photographs, admitted Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager
that there were damages also on the left side of the truck.[9] of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take
theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological
Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further admitted that after examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however,
the impact, he lost control of the truck and failed to apply his Mrs. Caamicadmitted that he took the driving tests and
brakes. Considering that the car was smaller and lighter than psychological examination when he applied for the position of
the six-wheeler truck, the impact allegedly caused by the car Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position
when it hit the truck could not possibly be so great to cause of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del
petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on the Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a
brakes. truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted
on the motor skills development, perceptual speed, visual
We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of attention, depth visualization, eye and hand coordination and
the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The evidence proves steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police
petitioner Del Rosarios negligence as the direct and proximate clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario
cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Stephen attended only three driving seminars on June 30,
Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario failed to do what a reasonable 2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only
and prudent man would have done under the circumstances. seminar he attended before the accident which occurred in
1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
2. YES
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the accident,
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a that she does not know of any company policy requiring back-
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. up drivers for long trips.[14]
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner
xxx Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a
TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their not suspended or reprimanded.[15] No disciplinary action
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We
employed or on the occasion of their functions. therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has
failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due
xxx
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee,
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil petitioner Del Rosario.
Code is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior
recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with
the employee.[11]
RULING:
Anent the first and second issues, petitioners contend mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that: (a) petitioner wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
Lamis did not act in self-defense, and (b) petitioner Sandigan injury unjustly caused by the defendants wrongful acts.
[10]
failed to prove that it exercised due diligence in the selection Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount
and supervision of its security guards. must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of
the suffering inflicted.[11] Moral damages are not intended to
The first two issues are obviously questions of fact. impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, [12] neither to enrich the
Certainly, such matters mainly require a calibration of the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[13] There is no hard-
evidence or a determination of the credibility of the witnesses and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and
presented by the parties and the existence and relevancy of reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are given
and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[3] discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation
The well-entrenched rule is that questions of fact may that it should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.
[14]
not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of We hold that an award to respondent of P30,000.00, instead
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as this of P500,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
recourse is generally confined to questions of law.[4] Under Likewise, we are convinced that the award of exemplary
the said Rule, the jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought damages should be reduced from P300,000.00 to P25,000.00.
to it is limited to the review and rectification of errors of law Such damages are imposed not to enrich the claimant and
committed by the lower court. impoverish the defendant but to serve as a deterrent against, or
Moreover, it is doctrinally settled that where the trial as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.[15]
courts factual findings are adopted and affirmed by the Court Finally, an award of P20,000.00 as attorneys fee is
of Appeals, as in this case, the same are final and conclusive deemed sufficient considering that the suit involved is merely
and may not be reviewed by this Court. [5] It bears emphasis for damages. Attorneys fee may be awarded when a party is
that in the appreciation of evidence, the Appellate Court compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest
accords due deference to the trial courts factual findings by reason of an unjustified act of the other party, [16] as in the
because the latter had the opportunity to observe the demeanor present case.
of the witnesses when they testified during the trial and,
therefore, is in a better position to determine their credibility. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
[6]
Thus, we find no compelling reason to overturn the factual Decision dated March 13, 2001 and Resolution dated June 28,
findings and conclusion of law by the Court of Appeals 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61034 are
relative to the first and second issues. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that
petitioners are ordered to pay respondent (a) P30,000.00 as
With respect to the third issue, petitioners maintain that moral damages, (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
there is no legal basis for the trial courts award of damages. (c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fee. Costs against petitioners.
As earlier stated, the trial court found that Lamis act of
shooting the respondent was deliberate and intentional, hence,
both petitioners are jointly and solidarily liable to respondent
for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that Whoever by
an act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x
x x. The obligation imposed by this Article is demandable not
only for ones own wrongful acts or omissions, but also for
those persons for whom one is responsible.[7] Thus, petitioner
Sandigan, being the employer of petitioner Lamis, is likewise
liable for damages caused by the latter.[8]
As stated earlier, petitioner Sandigan already paid the
medical expenses (or actual damages) incurred by respondent.
We find, however, that the trial court erred in awarding to
respondent moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00,
exemplary damages of P300,000.00 and attorneys fee in the
amount of P50,000.00. These amounts are quite excessive. We
have held that although the trial court is given the discretion to
determine the amount of such damages, the appellate court
may modify or change the amount awarded when it is
inordinate,[9] as in this case.
It bears stressing that the award of moral damages is
meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering,
of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
and the other is not even a necessary party because complete
Cerezo vs Tuazon relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over
Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from
FACTS: Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is
bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga. The driver of the primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a
tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as
Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by
and bus driver Foronda. law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character
and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180
According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
driving on the proper lane. There was a "Slow Down" sign aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an
which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer
summons was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing
Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law
condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary
In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer
not acquire jurisdiction because there was no service of is also civilly liable directly and separate for his own civil
summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and
right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's
criminal action. liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.