G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014 A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares ₱490,000.

00
located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent. A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00 3

located at Sabang Baler, Aurora

DECISION

PEREZ, J.: 3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria ₱750,000.00

Aurora, Aurora
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 USA
December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora,
Branch 96.
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
The factual antecedents are as follow:
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 City, California
December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United
States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship.
They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T. $550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May
1993. David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a Furniture and furnishings $3,000
nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
in the USA:
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00
PHILIPPINES
Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
Bank of America Cash Deposit
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00
located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
Manila (Sampaloc property)

Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00 4

Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. ₱400,000.00
located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein
secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was
about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of
the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in
2001. In December 2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million. According to
Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with
Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias
Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that
David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the
amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall
renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties
situated in the Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale
of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for
divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The
California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly
entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of
her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA. 7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003
Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the same.
She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the
Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in
favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia
from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and
₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage
was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include
the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including
attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership. 9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment
and marital infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in
favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A.
and the same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T.
Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of
the latter’s property rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the
₱2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of
the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including
interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were
chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and
presumptive legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared
DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the
Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras
only, with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole
ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the
divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,
United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24,
2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles
be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the
preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children
with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said
properties.Their share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to
them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of each year,
starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner
Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome
and Jena, her two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income from these
properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first
half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent
David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to
their income from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana
shall take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in
her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be
increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his financial
capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc
property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent
David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the
respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall be
deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in
their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a
copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the
custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook
can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-
fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be
shouldered by them individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover
their legal and personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage,
the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage
issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005.
Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial
court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute
community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and
custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal
property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property
regime as absolute community of property because they did not execute any
marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article
75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the
doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court
cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof
of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall
under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the
absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her
children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove
abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she
is praying for considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the
USA. Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the
Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the children’s presumptive
legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver
or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the
equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with
respect to the common children’s presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered
both spouses to each pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of
the assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora
Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in
paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering
the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to
them by petitioner annually within the first half of January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each
ordered to pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena,
as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of
the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler,
Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit shall be
made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and
the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a
quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-
fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) the amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the
proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local
civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office,
Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and
Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have
recognized the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him
because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence
before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine
properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that
the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who
own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of
divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in
the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed
the bond of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 13 we stated
that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine
courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official
publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record
is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law
on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on
certification where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American
citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree
duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In
this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the
divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did
with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is
entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the
divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made
before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided
that the modification isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances provided
in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property
on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by
the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply
with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final
judgment against the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of
the decree ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case
to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of
the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above,
must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other
when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning
spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period
of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and
stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several
times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has
been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations
between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004
when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for
dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their
relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid
causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of
property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court
erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of
properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable.
First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to
the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends
that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was
once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of
David in the Consent for Operation form.20Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one
year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should
be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134
to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the
absolute community regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute
its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties,
the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe
spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of
being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall
adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision
with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of
the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be
limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share
of the spouses in the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as
the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court
explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the
Sampaloc property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the
redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community
property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption
money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence.
Only the amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be
charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as
municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,
expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not
deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David
shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or
in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of
the father and of the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the
share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David
and Leticia should each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive
legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders 1 dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v.
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503,
for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19,
1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at
the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. 4 At that time, their son was
only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to
the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to
their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent
to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. 9 Respondent
and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at
Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section
5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to
which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20
thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial
support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition. 18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2)
prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed
Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that
the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and
accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating
respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 195 23 of the Family
Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally
applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor
children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order 25 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced
earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its
ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national
law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to
his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his
alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A.
9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such
support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists
against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant
petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court,
consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may
be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This
latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the
instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court
clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first
mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the
response thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a
given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support
his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question
of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and
omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family
rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case,
therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as
a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of
the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in
the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of
courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the
existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support
his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights
and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family
rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to
which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article
15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente
v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if
the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be
the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained
in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in
view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce
Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable
to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed
on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not
disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that
such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in
light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said
foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall
not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for
the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer
liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San
Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should
no longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made
liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to
give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct
by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot
limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the
woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we
find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in
relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support
his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not
admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the
instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall
prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262
is a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand
the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010
and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court
in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section
5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of
the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in
this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of
Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not,
of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article 413
of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of
the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
"gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to
dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative
to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding
because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said
that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of
this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x
x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza
v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in
Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section
529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal"
of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in
such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of
the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the
civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure
to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons"
in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words,
"[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited
review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution
of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in
the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of
law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage
include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any
case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one
who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention
of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue
on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a
court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition
for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of
the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in
the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in
the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which
declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage
on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition
of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon
City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision 1 and October 12,
2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43,
in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a
judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April
25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the
trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the
allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and
after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by
the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce
Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her
daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former
Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not
appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is
no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already
dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the
said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden
surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to
be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined
that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination
of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. 7 ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was
dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the
marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules
exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines,
which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued
on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a
second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted
by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts
to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our
courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his
or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because
he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case
where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen
and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court
and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order
that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued
his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who
exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to
reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but
it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not
to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are
not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled
the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit
for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in
this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to
render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and
to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On
his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada
court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if
the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in
the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his
own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from
Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared
the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national,
void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife
of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of
law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage
included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.
x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly
filed for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition
before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the
petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,
et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA
for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve
the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When
this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one
of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe
fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and
the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from
the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law,
but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is,
therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in
the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there
should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is
free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed
by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact,
the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature
only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification
and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice,
such classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties,
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. 46 If
a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press,
assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand,
what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides
individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle
applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of
law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic
cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained
abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree
obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality
in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a
Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if
based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In
filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be
governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that
Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the
severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism
now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance
of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in
detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's
case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn
to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of
good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable
presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that
a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in
was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute
any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or
she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they
are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not
for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national.
In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt
to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise,
such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless,
it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G.
Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be
understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make
this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My
intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not
necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce,
my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery
on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act
No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the
authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce
Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable,
and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the
Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and
Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in
the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303
entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on
Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill,
the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified
or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious
or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in
the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than
one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the
spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife
bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a
child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2)
years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce
based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated
as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the
other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be
serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the
time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly
improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the
Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or
transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for
absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary
to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as
an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government
can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus
establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country. 77While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in
total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside
from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation
s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.
In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate,
the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No
9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012").Moreover, in protecting
and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the
Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every
human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If
We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that
he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of
the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to
suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few
of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are
to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the
principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution
is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. 83 Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full
human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a
marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v.
San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a
way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words
of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for
decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that
it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. 89 The fact
of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued
by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of
Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the
Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject
Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese
Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court. 94 As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit
an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power
of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18,
2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court
of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant
to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are
also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections
to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.