PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

MELISSA CHUA
G.R. No. 187052 ; 13 September 2012

PONENTE: Villarama, Jr.

SUBJECT: (4) Estafa, Illegal Recruitment in large scale

FACTS:

Within the period of 29 July 2002 up to 20 August 2002, accused personally met the
complainants individually and on separate dates where she represented herself to have
the capacity to contract, enlist and transport the complainants as Filipino Overseas
Workers, particularly Taiwan. She personally received various amounts as placement
fees in consideration for their overseas employment and personally issued receipts to
the complainants. Accused represented herself that she is an employee of Gate
International (Golden Gate) Office located in Paragon Tower, Ermita, Manila. She also
assured them that the earlier complainants would be able to pay their placement fees
then the earlier that they could leave. After the complainants completed payment of
their placement fees, they were made to sign a contract containing stipulations as to
salary and conditions of work. On several occasions thereafter, they returned to
appellant’s office to follow-up on their application. After several visits, however, they
noticed that all the properties of Golden Gate in its Paragon Tower Office were already
gone. Thus, the complainants filed a complaint for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa
against the accused. During trial, accused denied that she was the one who recruited the
complainants and that she is merely a cashier of Golden Gate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the crime of Illegal
Recruitment and Four (4) Estafa

HELD:

Yes, the accused cannot escape liability by conveniently limiting her participation
as a cashier of Golden Gate. Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No.
8042 are unequivocal that illegal recruitment may or may not be for profit. It is
immaterial, therefore, whether appellant remitted the placement fees to the agency’s
treasurer or appropriated them. The same provision likewise provides that the persons
criminally liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories.
Just the same, therefore, appellant can be held liable as a principal by direct
participation since she personally undertook the recruitment of private complainants
without a license or authority to do so.

It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for

both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business
or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud.

However, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the presence
of the third and fourth elements of estafa as to the case of private complainant Ursulum.
While Ursulum claims that he delivered to the accused some amounts, he failed to
produce receipts to substantiate the same. Instead, Ursulum relies only on ten text
messages allegedly sent by the accused as evidence of their transaction. Said text
messages alone does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was
able to obtain an amount from Ursulum as a result of her false pretenses.

Unlike in illegal recruitment where profit is immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires
a clear showing that the offended party parted with his money or property upon the
offender’s false pretenses, and suffered damage thereby. In every criminal prosecution,
the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and
the complicity or participation of the accused.32 It is imperative, therefore, that damage
as an element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) be proved as conclusively as
the offense itself. The failure of the prosecution to discharge this burden concerning
the estafa allegedly committed against Ursulum warrants the acquittal of appellant on
the said charge.