SIMON vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the
same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union,
the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of
speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due
process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public
office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the
right to an education, employment, and social services.

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can
only be recognized and protected by it.

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his
natural birth, right, innate and inalienable

The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring — (t)o those (rights) that belong to every
citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected
with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community.
Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed
in a civil action.

Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to
hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-
vis the management of government.

RUBI vs PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a
refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never
can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others
to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II
Webster's Works, p. 393.)

Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what
one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)

Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of
the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)

Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person
is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not
exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself
would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under
the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to
others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of
his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government — especially of any
free government existing under a written Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of that will.
But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the
safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the
pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)

Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)

Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to
Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such
restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities
including epochmaking decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right
of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to
contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are
ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277;
Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs.
Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258,
261.)

One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It
is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law."
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily
subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever
the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights
which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The
Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order
and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power

"due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society."

"Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or
newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of
law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . .
"first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third,
that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth,
that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling
Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What
is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and
necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.)

CARINO vs CHR
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out,
to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,

determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment
on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ." 31

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG vs OLALIA

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction,
and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. [8] It is not a
criminal proceeding. [9] Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is
not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition. [10] It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations. [11] It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee. [12] Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. [13] Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime
and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.

CALALANG vs WILLIAMS

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is “neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments
on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”

MMDA vs CROMB

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. [8] A
ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. [9] It
connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. [10]
Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

OPOSA vs FACTORAN
A cause of action is defined as: . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

ABERCA vs VER

Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages,
jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties
have been violated?

Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We
agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to
principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article
32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for
the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5
acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that
he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the
constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled
people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous
or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it
would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by
the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

ORDONEZ vs VINARAO

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty upon a verified petition setting forth:

1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty;
2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;
3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and
4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised
Rules of Court).

MANGILA vs PANGILINAN

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is
that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the
writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of
liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal
restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure
freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit
and prosecutes a case in that court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or
on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of
whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is
not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in
the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for
the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the
cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus
does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is
alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved
is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be
denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative writ which
does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is,
however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof.

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the
detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled
however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out
on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with
jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.

Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs MANALO

Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. [75] On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and
action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(emphasis supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion

CASTILLO vs CRUZ

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

Tapuz v. Del Rosario: To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as
a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and
to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security,
as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary
character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every
petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
RAZON vs TAGITIS

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.

Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.

The victims of enforced disappearances were called the desaparecidos, which literally means
the disappeared ones. [87] In general, there are three different kinds of disappearance cases: 1)
those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again; 2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an
appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are
unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody
until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and 3) those of victims of
salvaging who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their
totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce
our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at
hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

RODRIGUEZ vs MACAPAGAL ARROYO

Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice
or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may
order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of
keeping and securing their safety.

If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this

Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate
family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

Command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by

subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict. [78] Although originally used for ascertaining criminal
complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for
human rights abuses.

Rubrico: It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats,
may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility
doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at

most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the
duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court
to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights
covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be
pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a
prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if
there be any.

DE LIMA vs GATDULA

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ
of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits,
the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the
required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or
the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1âwphi1 It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.
Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo."