Constitutional Law 1 Part 3

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY.
ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019
XII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

1. COMMON PROVISIONS
a. Brillantes v Yorac
(G.R. No. 93867. December 18, 1990)
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
A coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission which
would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently, he has to vacate his chairmanship over the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Respondent, Haydee Yorac, was then appointed by the
president as acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections in place of Davide. The petitioner
challenged such appointment in view of the status of the Commission on Elections as an independent
constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "In
no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity."
The petitioner also contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the
intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Haydee Yorac as acting Chairman of COMELEC by the
president is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, it violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of the
Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the
exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari
by the Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines. In addition, choosing the acting Chairman, the members would be guided by seniority
rule and the basis was for them and not the President to make. The situation could have been handled
by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however well-meaning.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of
the President of the Philippines.
DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019
b. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
[G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002.]
CARPIO, J p:
FACTS:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of
the Education Information Department (EID). The Chairperson then renewed the appointment of
petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On February 15, 2001, Commissioner
Rufino S. B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a "Temporary"
capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, respondent
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and two others as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term
of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. The appointees took their oath of office and
assumed their respective position. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on
Appointments their ad interim appointments for confirmations. However, the Commission on
Appointments did not act on said appointments. President Arroyo then renewed their ad interim
appointments to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2,
2008. They took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted their
appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the
Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President
Macapagal Arroyo renewed again their ad interim appointments to the same positions. The Office of
the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.
They took their oaths of office anew.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed

designating Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.
Respondents reassignment of petitioner was questioned for its failure to consult the Commissioner-
in-Charge of the EID regarding such reassignment. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her
relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. Petitioner cited Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period..."
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration contending that under Resolution of the COMELEC
that “to appoint, hire new employees or new positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when
necessary in the effective performance of its mandated functions during the prohibited period,
provided that the changes in the assignment of its field personnel within the thirty-day period before
election day shall be effected after due notice and hearing.” Petitioner appealed the denial of her
request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc and an administrative and criminal complaint
with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)
of the Omnibus Election Code.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner led the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason,
as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal as
Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. In the meantime, President
Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners, respectively, for a term of seven years expiring
on February 2, 2008. They all took their oaths of office anew.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary

appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
2. Whether or not the renewal of ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the
same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution;
3. Whether or not removal of petitioner from her position and her is illegal and without authority,
having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body.
RULING:
1. No. Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows: “… In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” However, an ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. An
ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment of Congress,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President
can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without
basis. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by her
in her sound judgment. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or
extend, an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the
Constitution grants her that power. The President's power to extend ad interim appointments may
indeed briefly put the appointee at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers. This
situation, however, is only for a short period, from the time of issuance of the ad in t e rim appointment
until the Commission on Appointments gives or withholds its consent. The Constitution itself sanctions
this situation, as a trade-off against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also
part of the check-and-balance under the separation of powers, as a trade-off against the evil of
granting the President absolute and sole power to appoint. The Constitution has wisely subjected the
President's appointing power to the checking power of the legislature.
2. No. Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows: “The Chairman and
the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last members for
three years, without reappointment.” There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is
a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the
appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by
the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the
appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval
is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President
can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment,
but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the
appointment. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that
has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the
session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. It is well settled in
this jurisdiction and under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment
can be considered again if the President renews the appointment. The prohibition on reappointment
in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad
interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim
appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not
because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A
bypassed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is
no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will
not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years. The phrase "without
reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office. However, an
ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not
constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it
lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.
3. No. The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In
the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the
COMELEC en banc. Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of the Revised Administrative
Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested with the following power: "Make temporary
assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service
Law.”
c. Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management

(G.R. No. 191672, July 22, 2005)
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus seeks to
compel the Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to release the balance of its budget
for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
By petitioner's claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office
by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all
sources of funds are considered, amount to P285,660,790.44. 1 It complains, however, that the total
fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during the Fiscal year 2002 was only
P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its "no
report, no release" policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of
the documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No.
478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds.
Respondent also proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of petitioner's
budget was not on account of any failure on petitioner's part to submit the required reports; rather, it
was due to a shortfall in revenues.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Department of Budget and Management intentionally withheld the
budget of Civil Service Commission on the ground of “no report, no release”.
RULING:
NO. "No report, no release" policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with
fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices
possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution.
Respecting respondent's justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to
a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally
unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that
does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution.
If respondent's theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and
regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month
12 that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not
rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate.
d. Funa v. The Chairman, Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
On January 11, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman
of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission on Appointments then confirmed Duque's
appointment on February 3, 2010.
On Feb. 22, 2010, Pres. Arroyo issued Executive Order no. 864, which designated the
inclusion of the Chairman of the CSC in the Board of Trustees/Directors, as an ex-officio member, of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHILHEALTH), Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) and the Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF).
Hence, this petition—challenging the designation of respondent Duque. Petitioner posits that
EO 864 and Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon
members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment. In their
comment, respondents maintain that the prohibition against holding any other office or employment
under Sec. 2, Art. IX-A, of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities. Moreover, the mandatory tenor of Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I-
A, Book V of EO 292 clearly indicates that the CSC Chairman’s membership in the governing bodies
mentioned therein merely imposes additional duties and functions as an incident and necessary
consequence of his appointment as CSC Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 and EO 864 are unconstitutional?
RULING:
Petition is partially granted. YES, EO 864 is unconstitutional for having been designated
Duque, in an ex officio capacity, as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. But this court upholds the constitutionality of Sec. 14, Chapter 3,
Title I-A, Book V of EO 292.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although their respective functions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such
functions. To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among
others, imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and
disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to wit:
1. Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;

2. Engaging in the practice of any profession;
3. Engaging in the active management and control of any business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of his office; and
4. Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification. The court finds it imperative to interpret the
disqualification in relation to Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. IX-B of the Constitution. As pronounced in Civil
Liberties Union v. The Exec. Sec., Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees while Sec. 13, Art. VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants. Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet
position, Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. IX-B. He
can hold any other office or employment in the government during his tenure if such holding is allowed
by law or the primary functions of his position.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 clearly provided that the CSC Chairman's
membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government
entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development, employment status,
rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based on this, the Court finds
no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the
career development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the primary functions
of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairman's membership
therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his position as such. Accordingly, the
constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
However, Duque’s designation as Board member of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
is in not in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and the condition laid down in Section 14, Chapter
3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their
respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were
created. While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect
the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate
powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether
personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions,
which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. The Court also notes that Duque's
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles
him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex
officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must,
therefore, be held unconstitutional.
e. Gaminde vs. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000)
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
The President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, CSC on June 11, 1993. On September 7, 1993, Commission on Appointment
confirmed the appointment stating that pursuant to the provisions of existing laws petitioner’s term
will expire on February 2, 1999.
Petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term
of office. In a letter dated April 7, 1998, opined that petitioner’s term would expire on February 2,
2000.
Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on
whether or not Commissioner Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their appointment on February 2, 1999.
Consequently, CSC Resident Felipe issued notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit the
salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 2,
1999.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. The Commission
on Audit affirmed the proprietary of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner’s term of
office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the
expiration date on February 2, 1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an
extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, Commission on Audit denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner of CSC to which she was
appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on
February 2, 2000, as claimed by her.
RULING:
The term of office of Gaminde as Commissioner of CSC, under an appointment extended
to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999. However,
she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her
salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit
erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments including that of her co-terminous
staff.
The decisions of the Commission on Audit are reversed as they disallow the salaries and
emoluments of Commissioner Gaminde and her co-terminous staff during her tenure as de facto
officer from February 2, 1999, until February 2, 2000.
f. Estrella v COMELEC
(G. R. No. 160465. 27 May 2004)
CARPIO MORALES, J :|||
FACTS:
Romeo M. Estrella sought the nullification of the November 5, 2003 Status Quo
Ante Order issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in EAC No. A-10-2002,
"Romeo M. Estrella v. Rolando F. Salvador," directing the "parties to maintain the status quo
ante order, which is the condition prevailing before the issuance" by the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos of a writ of execution for the enforcement of said court's decision declaring petitioner as the
duly elected mayor of Baliwag, Bulacan.|
Commissioner Lantion, voluntarily inhibited while the case was pending in the Second
Division, he was then substituted by Commissioner Bora. In the COMELEC En Banc Status Quo
Ante Order, Commissioner Lantion stated in his handwriting that "his previous voluntary inhibition is
only in the SPR cases and not in the EAC" and that "as further agreed in the Second Division, [he]
will not participate in the Division deliberations but will vote when the case is elevated [to the] en
banc.”
ISSUE: Whether Comissioner Lantion who previously inhibited in a Division participate when the case
is elevated en banc.
RULING:
The court abandoned the doctrine laid down in the Cua case and holds that the COMELEC En
Banc shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of "all its members," and NOT
majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon.||
Private respondent argues that "[f]ollowing the doctrine laid out in Cua, three (3) votes would
have been sufficient to constitute a majority to carry the decision of the COMELEC En Banc as
provided by the Constitution and the appropriate rules."||
Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from Section 7, Article IX-A of
the Constitution which provides:
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. . . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its
members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of
statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional provision
states "all of its members," without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
g. DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC

(G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001)
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position in Mayor of
Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBC for brevity), petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts of
Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and coercion committed in said
precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied petitioner’s objections and
proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the
petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns from 3
precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested
returns and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. After moving (in a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC) to declare Dumayas’ proclamation invalid, Bernal filed a case
for quo warranto against him. The Court dismissed Dumayas’ petition, which claimed that by filing the
quo warranto Bernal had abandoned his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned the motions he had
filed with respondent Commission.
RULING:
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier
filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the
protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this rule is that once the competent tribunal
has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative
thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent
confusion and conflict of authority.
Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as where: (a)
the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (c)
what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul
a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made
without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (e) the
proclamation was null and void.
h. Sevilla, Jr. v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 203833; March 19, 2013)
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat,
Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. The
Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes. So led an
election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and
irregularities in all the protested precincts. So pinpointed 20% of the total number of the protested
precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of the ballots. Following the recount of the ballots in
the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dismissing the election protest. So led a
motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay
the appeal fee within the reglementary period. The MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on
the ground that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No. 07-04-15-SC.
In response, So led a petition for certiorari with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the MeTC Judge.
The Comelec Second Division granted So's petition. It held that certiorari can be granted
despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority, as in the case before it. It also ruled that the assailed Order was fraught with
infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the ballots and was couched in general terms: “these
are not written by one person observing the different strokes, slant, spacing, size and indentation of
handwriting and the variance in writing.”
The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the Comelec Second Division's ruling in its
October 6, 2012 Resolution denying the motion of reconsideration for lack of merit. It ruled that where
the dismissal was capricious, certiorari lies as the petition challenges not the correctness but the
validity of the order of dismissal.
Sevilla argues that Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it entertained So's petition
despite its loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the court a quo's dismissal order became
final and executory due to So's wrong choice of remedy. Instead of filing an appeal within 5 days from
receipt of the Order and paying the required appeal fee, So led a motion for reconsideration — a
prohibited pleading that did not stop the running of the prescriptive period to file an appeal. He also
emphasizes that So's petition for certiorari should not have been given due course since it is not a
substitute for an appeal and may only be allowed if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
He also contends that the dismissal was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the
MeTC Judge complied with the rules; she made clear, specfic and detailed explanations pertaining
to the specific strokes, figures or letters showing that the ballots had been written by one person.
Granting that the decision was tainted with errors, certiorari would still not lie because a mere error
of judgment is not synonymous with grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, a liberal application of the rules
cannot be made to a petition which offers no explanation for the non-observance of the rules.
The respondent contends that the petition was filed prematurely. He emphasizes that the
October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc was not a majority decision considering that
three Commissioners voted for the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the three others voted
to grant the same. So notes that the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution was deliberated upon only
by six (6) Commissioners because the 7th Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the President
at that time. Considering that the October 6, 2012 Resolution was not a majority decision by the
Comelec en banc, So prays for the dismissal of the petition so that it can be remanded to the Comelec
for a rehearing by a full and complete Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the election protest was proper.
RULING:
No. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "[e]ach Commission shall decide
by a majority vote of all its members decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution." Comelec
provided in Section 5 (a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc.
While the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to have armed the
Comelec Second Division's Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla's motion for reconsideration, the
equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting
is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid
pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec. Based on the 3-3 voting,
the Comelec en banc did not sustain the Comelec Second Division's findings on the basis of the three
concurring votes by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and Yusoph; conversely, it also did not overturn
the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the three dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes,
Commissioner Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim, as either side was short of one (1) vote to obtain a
majority decision. The vote of four members must always be attained in order to decide, irrespective
of the number of Commissioners in attendance. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the assailed
October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except to convey
that the Comelec failed to reach a decision and that further action is required.
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the
Comelec en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing
where parties are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments
and convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their case. In the present case, it
appears from the records that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a rehearing of the case
in view of the filing in the interim of the present petition for certiorari by Sevilla.
i. Alvarez vs. COMELEC

(G.R No. 142527, March 1, 2001)
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
On May 12, 1997, petitioner Arsenio Alvarez, with 590 votes, was proclaimed Punong Barangay of
Doña Aurora, Quezon City, his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes.
Private respondent filed an election protest in the Metropolitan Trial Court claiming irregularities in
the reading and appreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After a recount of the
ballots in the contested precincts, the Trial Court ruled that the private respondent won the election,
garnering 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes. On appeal, the COMELEC’s Second Division
ruled that private respondent won over petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed.
The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the
Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal. Petitioner brought before the
Supreme Court this petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioner and affirming the Resolution of its Second Division
alleging that the COMELEC En Banc granted the respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal
when the appeal was no longer pending, thus the motion had become obsolete and unenforceable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely acted
on the Motion for Execution pending appeal.
RULING:
We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a motion
for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended
the execution of the resolution of the Second Division. Appropriately then, the division must act on
the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second Division resolved both petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and private respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Correspondingly, we do not find that the COMELEC
abused its discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal. Petition is DISMISSED, and the
En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC is AFFIRMED.
j. Aratuc v. COMELEC
(88 SCRA 251, February 8, 1979)
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
The instant proceedings were the sequels to the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the
suspension of canvass being undertaken by respondent Board in Cotabato City. Petitioners, Tomatic
Aratuc et al. are candidates for representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa who had joined
together under the Kunsensiya ng Bayan, which, however was not registered as a political party of
group under P.D. No. 1296 of the 1976 Election Code.
A panel headed by the Commissioner of Elections, Hon. Venancio Duque, conducted

hearings of the complaints of the petitioners regarding the alleged discrepancies in the election
records in all the voting centers of Lanao Del Sur, City of Marawi, eight towns in Lanao Del Norte, ten
towns in North Cotabato and eleven towns in Sultan Kudarat. On 15 May 1978, the COMELEC lifted
its order of suspension and brought the resumption of canvass in Manila.
On 11 July 1978, respondent Board declared the result of the voting and terminated its
canvass. Petitioners brought the resolution of the Board to the COMELEC. COMELEC issued a
resolution on August 30, 1978 stating that “a) It will have to go deeper into the examination of the
voting records and registration records” and to interview the concerned party regarding the
statements to confirm that the voting took place on April 7, 1978.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
No. The actuations of the COMELEC are final, executory and inappealable, however, the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari in accordance with the Rules of
Court and Section 2 paragraph 1. Article X of the 1939 Constitution. A review includes digging
into the merits and errors of judgment, while a certiorari only deals with cases with grave abuse
of discretion.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
sustaining the board of canvassers, for what appears to have been referred to is the resumption
only of the canvass, which does not include the repetition and setting aside of the canvass in
Cotabato City. They are errors of judgment, which are not reviewable in certiorari, so long as they
are founded on substantial evidence. The records are not clear as to the number of these voting
centers.
k. Loong v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 133676. April 14, 1999)
PUNO, J:
FACTS:
Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 on December 22, 1997 prescribing the adoption of an
automated election system. The new system was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose
Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in
Sulu. On May 12, 1998 discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the
mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata due to a misalignment of the ovals opposite the
names of the candidates in the local ballots. Local ballots in 5 other municipalities were rejected by
the automated machines as well because the ballots had the wrong sequence code. Respondent
Tan, who was one of the candidates for governor, and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. requested and
recommended a manual counting of the votes instead. On May 13, 1998 COMELEC approved the
request and recommendations of respondent Tan and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. On 14 May 1998, all parties
concerned with the local election were furnished with the copies of the resolution of COMELEC
approving the manual count in a meeting held by Atty. Tolentino, Jr. to discuss the implementation of
the resolution. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796
laying down the rules for the manual count. On May 18, 1998, petitioner filed his objection to Minute
Resolution No. 98-1796. Nonetheless, COMELEC started the manual count on the same date, May
18, 1998.
On May 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He contended that: (a) COMELEC issued Minute Resolution Nos. 98-
1747, 98-1750, and 98-1798 without prior notice and hearing to him; (b) the order for manual counting
violated R.A. No. 8436; (c) manual counting gave "opportunity to the following election cheating.”
After the manual recount, private respondent Tan was declared govern-elect, while petitioner
came in third.
On June 23, 1998, the SC required the respondents to file their Comment to the petition and
directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition." The
vice-governor elect was allowed to temporarily discharge the powers and functions of governor. On
September 25, 1998, the Court heard the parties in oral argument which was followed by the
submission of their written memoranda.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions?
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count?
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?

2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it
ordered a manual count?
(Additional) 3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it
is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
1. The SC holds that certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. Section 7, Article IX (A) of
the 1987 Constitution states that "unless provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." The SC has interpreted this provision to mean
final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers. Contrariwise, administrative orders of the COMELEC are not, as a general
rule, subjects of a petition for certiorari. The main issue in the case at bar is whether the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion when it ordered a manual count of the 1998 Sulu local elections. A
resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation
to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election . . ." The issue is not
only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffused with significance to the entire nation.
It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondent and the intervenor to the position
of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court.
2. The COMELEC order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical. These failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province
with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act decisively in view of the fast deteriorating
peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes. The military and the police
authorities unanimously recommended manual counting to preserve peace and order. An automated
count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of
the electorate. Its aftermath could have been a bloodbath. COMELEC avoided this imminent
probability by ordering a manual count of the votes.
Basis for manual count
Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436 provides for what to do when the systems breakdown in the counting
center which directs the COMELEC to use a different machine to resume the counting. However, as
the facts show, it was inutile for the COMELEC to use other machines to count the local votes in Sulu
since the errors in counting were due to the misprinting of ovals and the use of wrong sequence codes
in the local ballots. The errors were not machine-related. Needless to state, to grant petitioner's prayer
to continue the machine count of the local ballots will certainly result in an erroneous count and
subvert the will of the electorate.
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting
is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. The SC holds, however, that the vacuum
in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article
IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, the SC Court has not been stingy in defining the parameters of powers of
COMELEC in the conduct of our elections. In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual
count was not only reasonable, it was the only way to count the decisive local votes in the six
(6) municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is that by means
of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined.
Due process
The SC also finds that petitioner Loong and intervenor were not denied due process. In a
memorandum by Atty. Tolentino, Jr. it clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose
the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written
position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated
machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end. The
evidence is clear that the integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when they were transferred
from Sulu to Manila and when they were manually counted. As shown by the Tolentino, Jr.
memorandum, representatives of the political parties escorted the transfer of ballots from Sulu to
PICC. Indeed, in his May 14, 1992 letter to Atty. Tolentino, Jr., petitioner Tupay Loong himself
submitted the names of his representatives who would accompany the ballot boxes and other election
paraphernalia. The ballot boxes were consistently under the watchful eyes of the parties'
representatives. The parties' watchers again accompanied the transfer of the ballot boxes from PICC
to the public schools of Pasay City where the ballots were counted. After the counting, they once
more escorted the return of the ballot boxes to PICC.
Reliability of results of manual counting
Petitioner’s charge that the ballots could have been tampered with before the manual counting is
totally unfounded. The evidence also reveals that the result of the manual count is reliable. From
beginning to end, the manual counting was done with the watchers of the parties concerned in
attendance. Thereafter, the certificates of canvass were prepared and signed by the City/Municipal
Board of Canvassers composed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Secretary. They were also
signed by the parties' watchers. The correctness of the manual count cannot therefore be doubted.
There was no need for an expert to count the votes. The naked eye could see the check marks
opposite the big ovals. Indeed, nobody complained that the votes could not be read and counted.
(Additional) 3. The court cannot order a special election unless demanded by exceptional
circumstances. Thus, the plea for the SC to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is
completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. To begin with, the plea for
a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to the SC. The grounds for failure of
election — force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes — clearly involve questions of
fact. It is for this reason that they can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice
and hearing to the parties. In the case at bar, petitioner never asked the COMELEC en banc to call
for a special election in Sulu. Even in his original petition with this Court, petitioner did not pray for a
special election. His plea for a special election is a mere afterthought. Too late in the day and too
unprocedural. Worse, the grounds for failure of election are inexistent.
l. Reyes V. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999)
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
The TLRC Executive Committee created a Provident Fund for the purpose of augmenting
the retirement benefits of the officers and employees of TLRC. The Provident Fund’s sources were
from contributions of each member consisting of 2% of its gross monthly salary and TLRC’s or the
government’s counterpart share equivalent to 10% of the member’s gross monthly salaray,
earnings of the fund and others.
On 3 June 1993, the Corporate Auditor (Adelaida S. Flores) suspended the transfer of funds
from TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991. Auditor Flores held that under Par. 5.4
of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, Rules and Regulations issued under R.A. 6758, fringe
benefits were allowed provided that statutory authority covered such grant of benefits. In this case,
there is no law authorizing the grant of fringe benefits to TLRC officers and employees.
Furthermore, all Provident Funds are covered by R.A. 4537, to which TLRC may not qualify.
The TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 93-2-21, discontinuing
the collection of contributions for the Fund from both the TLRC and the members.
Corporate Auditor Flores issued Notice of Disallowance No. 93-003, disallowing in audit the
amount of P11,065,715.84, representing the government's share paid to the TLRC Provident Fund
refunded to members, covering the period 1990 to 1991, including all amounts that may have been
transferred to the Fund after 1991.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit but it denied the appeal
per Decision No. 95-571. It ruled that the government’s share in the Provident Fund must be
reverted to the TLRC and not be given to the employees. Moreover, it held that since the primary
purpose of the Provident Fund was not realized or attained due to its discontinuance and
dissolution, then the employees were not entittled to the government’s share in the Fund.
In addition, petitioner further contends that the dissolution of the Provident Fund does not
render illegal distribution of the government’s share to the members. Reyes avers that when TLRC
made its contributions to the Provident Fund, it had divested itself of the ownership of whatever
contributions it gave. the money contributed to the Fund became a trust fund for the benefit of the
members. Upon the dissolution of the Fund, the legal and equitable titles were merged in the
members, as beneficiaries. He asserts that the members have a vested right, not only on their own
contributions, but to the government share as well. He claims that since the Fund's pretermination or
dissolution was not due to the members' fault, then it would be unfair and greatly prejudicial to deprive
them of the government share to which they are entitled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. The Commission on Audit did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the
distribution of the government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members. There was
no merit to petitioner's claim that the members of the Provident Fund acquired a vested right over
the government contributions. A vested right is perfect in itself, not dependent upon a contingency.
The government contributions were subject to the condition that the funds would be used to
augment the retirement and fringe benefits of TLRC employees.
As correctly pointed out by the COA in its decision, the government contributions were made
on the condition that the same would be used to augment the retirement and other benefits of the
TLRC employees. Since the purpose was not attained due to the question on the validity of the
Fund, then the employees are not entitled to claim the government share disbursed as its
counterpart contribution to the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the use of public funds
outside the specific purpose for which the funds were appropriated.
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the
Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.
Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or final order of the Commission
on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65. However,
the petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to this
Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution. The
judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or
appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this
Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is
not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Audit.
m. Mahinay v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 152457 , April 30, 2008)
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
On June 10, 1998, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through Officer-in-charge
Jesus S. Sirios, charged its employee, petitioner Rodolfo R. Mahinay, for receiving unofficial fees
from FRITZ Logistics Phils. Inc. by reason of his office and in consideration of the latter's rendering
escort service to FRITZ' trucks from Baguio City to Manila and vice-versa.
Allegedly, the said conduct of petitioner was in violation of Sec. 46 (b) (9), Chapter 6, Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to Sec. 22 (i), Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations. In an Answer, the petitioner admitted receiving the fees from
FRITZ and he further contends that there was no bad faith on their part in receiving those fees nor
with any intention of enriching themselves.
Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor presented his line witness, Mr. Jerry H. Stehmeier who
testified that the "extra amount" of P300 was in fact actually received by petitioner, who exacted the
same from FRITZ, for escorting their "trucks all the way to the airport or all the way to our FRITZ office
in Manila".
On January 8, 1999, the PEZA held that all the elements of the offense charged were present
in the case. The Authority finds him guilty with a penalty of forced resignation without prejudice to the
grant of mnetary and other fringe benefits.
The petitioner’s motion was denied by PEZA.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC. However, the CSC upheld the PEZA's decision, but modified
the penalty of forced resignation to dismissal from the service in accordance with Sec. 52 (A.9), Rule
IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and Sec. 22 (i), 7 Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Motion for reconsideration by the petitioner was denied by the CSC. Thereafter, series of
motion and petitions were also denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that the petition for certiorari was made to
substitute a lost appeal because while a petition for review under Rule 43 wasavailable, it was not an
adequate remedy for petitioner considering that he was dismissed from the service on June 9, 1999
by PEZA even before the case was appealed to the Civil Service on June 22, 1999.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal by way of special civil action for certiorari.
RULING:
No. The petitioner’s contention lacks merit. As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the
proper mode of appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for
review filed with the CA. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may
be resorted to only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, th court held that “where appeal
is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal
(including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence
or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari
is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.”
The Court is aware of instances when the special civil action of certiorari may be resorted to
despite the availability of an appeal, such as when public welfare and the advancement of public
policy dictate; when the broader interests of justice so require; when the writs issued are null; and
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. However, the
circumstances in this case do not warrant the application of the exception to the general rule provided
by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The CA, therefore, properly denied petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition
for Certiorari, which in effect dismissed his Petition for Certiorari.
n. Abella v. Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. 152574, 17 November 2004)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department
Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of
Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and
Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated
April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility for said position. EHTISC
"It appears, however, that on May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum
Circular No. 21, series of 1994, the pertinent provisions of which read:
I. Positions Covered by the Career Executive Service

(b) In addition to the above identified positions and other positions of the same category which had
been previously classified and included in the CES, all other third level positions of equivalent
category in all branches and instrumentalities of the national government, including government
owned and controlled corporations with original charters are embraced within the Career Executive
Service provided that they meet the following criteria:
1. the position is a career position;

2. the position is above division chief level
3. the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive or
managerial functions.
II. Status of Appointment of Incumbents of Positions Included Under the Coverage of the CES.
Incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive Service positions for the
􏰀rst time pursuant to this Resolution who hold permanent appointments thereto shall remain
under permanent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion or transfer to
other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary
status in said other CES positions until they qualify.'
Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) on a contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent
employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said
appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Ordinance No. III, it
was disapproved on the ground that petitioner's eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised
by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner lacks the personality to question the disapproval by
respondent office of petitioner's appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and
Employment Center, SBMA.
b. Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner is not the real party in interest to question the disapproval
by respondent office of petitioner's appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and
Employment Center, SBMA.
c. Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in dismissing petitioner's appeal on a mere technicality considering that petitioner

is questioning the constitutionality of respondent office' issuance of Section 4 of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994, which deprived petitioner his property right without
due process of law."
RULING:
a. Petitioner has legal personality to question the disapproval of his appointment by the
respondent office.
If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger's part, then more so should petitioner
be allowed to contest the CSC Order disapproving his appointment. Clearly, he was
prejudiced by the disapproval, since he could not continue his office. Although petitioner had
no vested right to the position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary to this
point, he should be granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal stake in
the outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied his
permanent appointment.
b. Petitioner is the real party in interest to question the disapproval of his appointment by the
respondent office
The appointee is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC disapproval,
because he is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he
would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment
would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.
c. Respondent Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s
appeal
The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner's ELM eligibility. He was appointed to a CES
position; however, his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the
requirements of the position, which in petitioner's case was a CSEE.
The government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to remain
in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment
years later as department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply
with the eligibility prescribed at the time for that position.
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment.
The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve
the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an
appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee's
possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification.
In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions
to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the position he was appointed to.
2. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

a. Scope
i. National Service Corporation v. NLRC

(G.R. No. 69870. November 29, 1988)
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case seeking to review the decision of the Third Division of National
Labor Relations Commission dated 28 November 1984 and its resolution dated 16 January 1985
denying motions for reconsideration of said decision.
Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a

domestic corporation which provides security guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other
similar manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. Sometime before
7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of Finance and
Special Project and Evaluation Department of NASECO, stemming from her non-compliance with
Lloren's memorandum. Said charges alleged that Credo did not comply with Lloren's instructions to
place some corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment; and when Credo
was called by Lloren to his office to explain, Credo showed resentment and behaved in a scandalous
manner by shouting and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of her co-employees. On 7
November 1983, Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General Manager of
NASECO, to explain her side before Perez and NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs in
connection with the administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting, on the same date,
Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. This compelled Credo to file a complaint
before Arbitration Branch against NASECO for placing her on forced leave, without due process.
Likewise, while Credo was on forced leave, NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated
and evaluated a number of past acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her. The committee
recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. Perez called Credo again to explain
her side; however, due to her failure to do so, she was handed a Notice of Termination. Hence, Credo
filed a supplemental complaint in her earlier complaint for illegal dismissal alleging absence of just or
authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. The Arbitration Branch
dismissed Credo's complaint; however, NASECO was directed to pay Credo separation pay.
Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission which rendered a
decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position and dismissing Credo's claim
for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Thus, this recourse instituted by both parties.
NASECO claims that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement because as a
government corporation, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. In support of this argument, NASECO cites NHC vs.
Juco where the Court held that "there should no longer be any question at this time that employees
of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service
rules and regulations.
ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
YES. The 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon which NHC vs.
Juco is based. The situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by the
Court in the NHC case appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional provision
that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter;
and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or
controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled

corporations under the general corporation law. This is clear from the proceedings of the framers of
the Constitution which added the term "with original charters", meaning, those were created by law,
by an act of Congress, or by special law, and not under the general corporation law. As it is resolved
that the 1987 Constitution governs this case, NLRC has therefore jurisdiction to accord relief to the
parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a
government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.
ii. Juco v. NLRC

(G.R. No. 98107, August 18, 1997)
HERMOSISA, JR., J.
FACTS:
Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC)
from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for
having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On March 25, 1977,
Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On
September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground
that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the case to the NLRC which
rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then
appealed the NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the
Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of
dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal
dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.
CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary
mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC
filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which
reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is
not governed by the Labor Code.
RULING:
Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled
corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National
Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that employees of government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation
Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been
supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or
controlled corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National
Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of
NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in
place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means
that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as
distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had
been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded
from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the
case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in
1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of
Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred
percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former
corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National
Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation.
Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law,
it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are
subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade
Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation, where the
SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it
being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore,
the Court previously ruled that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have
the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of
a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.
iii. Liban v Gordon

(G.R. No. 175352 January 18, 2011)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Dante Liban, Reynald Bernardo, and Salvador Viari are officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. Richard Gordon is the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC). Liban filed with the SC a Petition to Declare Richard Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. This petition was brought about by the election of Gordon as the
Chairman of the PNRC while he was a Senator.
They claim that by accepting the chairmanship, Gordon has ceased to be a Senator as provided for
in Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the Constitution and cited Camporedondo v. NLRC where the SC held that
PNRC is a GOCC, and the case of Flores v. Drilon where the SC held that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office, then
Gordon contends that Liban don’t have standing to file this petition.
As quo warranto
He cites Sec. 5, Rule 66 of the Civil Procedure which states that only a person claiming to
be entitled to a public office unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo warranto. If the
same is one for quo warranto, the petition is barred by prescription. (1 year after the cause of public
officers’ forfeiture of office).
As a taxpayer’s suit
He claims that Liban cannot raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim that
they suffered some actual/threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act. Also, taxpayers
are allowed to sue only when (1) there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds; (2) public
money is used for an improper purpose; (3) or where taxpayers seek to restrain respondent from
enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of public funds.
As a declaratory relief
SC has no jurisdiction since the original jurisdiction lies with the RTC. Moreover, Gordon
contends that PNRC is not a GOCC and that the constitutional prohibition does not apply in this
case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Liban has legal standing to file this petition
2. Whether or not the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a GOCC
RULING:
1. No, they do not have legal standing to file.
SC held that Liban et al. does not have standing to file this petition. According to Sec. 1, Rule 66
of Rules of Court, “an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
xxx (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his office; xxx” Hence, Liban filed an action for usurpation of public office against
Gordon, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his public office. Such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under the above-mentioned
provision.
Under Sec. 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he
claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring
the action in his own name. In this case, Liban does not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
Gordon. Clearly, they do not have no standing to file this petition.
2. No. PNRC is a private organization performing public functions.
SC discussed the creation of the PNRC. PNRC was created when President Roxas signed RA
95 (PNRC Charter), in compliance to the Geneva Convention. PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded,
voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality,
race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides 6 major services:
Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social
Services and Voluntary Service. It is a member of the National Society of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of
reference for all members of the Movement. As a member National Society of the Movement, it has
the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement and in order to be
recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous, neural, and independent must
operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement. The reason for this
autonomy is fundamental. To ensure its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot
be owned or controlled by the government. The State does not own the PNRC. It does not have
government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the State. It is financed primarily by
contributions from private individuals and private entities.
The State does not control the PNRC—only 6 out of the 30 members of the PNRC Board of
Governors are appointed by the President. This leaves 24 out of the 30 (80%) not appointed by the
President and is elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC.The President does
not appoint the Chairman of PNRC, thus does not hold a government office or employment.
SC held that PNRC is not government-owned but is privately owned because a GOCC must be
owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital
stock must be owned by the government.
b. Disqualification
i. Flores v. Drilon
(G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993)
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
R.A. 7227, or the Bases Conversion & Development Act (BCDA), provides in Sec. 13 (d) that
an Administrator to the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) shall be appointed by the President
and, in a proviso attached to the section, that for the first year of the SBMA’s operations, the Mayor
of Olongapo City, Zambales, shall serve as the Administrator. Under this section, then Mayor Richard
J. Gordon was appointed as Administrator.
Petitioners, as taxpayers and employees of the U.S. military base in Subic, assail the proviso
of Sec. 13(d), as it violates Sec. 7(1), Art. IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure”. Since Gordon is holding an elected office and the Administrator of the
SBMA is a public office, Gordon’s appointment, according to petitioners, clearly violate the
Constitution.
Respondents argue that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the
appointment of an elective official to another public office if allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his elective office. In addition, they also claim that the office of Administrator of the SBMA is ex
officio to the office of Mayor of Olongapo City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mayor Gordon’s appointment, pursuant to Sec. 13(d) of RA 7227, violates the
prohibition of Sec. 7(1), Art. IX-B of the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. As the Mayor of Olongapo City is an elected position, Gordon clearly falls under the strict
prohibition of Sec. 7(1), Art. IX-B. The language of Sec. 7(1) stemmed from the intent of the framers
of the Constitution to prevent the possibility of an elective official neglecting their constituents in their
pursuit of a higher office. Sec. 94 of the LGC cannot prevail over this constitutional prohibition, for it
goes against the clear and strict language of Sec. 7(1).
With regards to the claim that the Administrator of the SBMA is ex officio to the office of the
Mayor of Olongapo City, this is without basis, for Sec. 13(d)’s use of the phrase “shall be appointed”
shows the intent of Congress to make the position of Administrator an appointive position, not an ex-
officio position. Indeed, if it were the intent of Congress to make the SBMA Administrator ex officio to
the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo city, they would have used the phrase “shall be ex officio to…”
instead of “shall be appointed...”
Because Mayor Gordon cannot be appointed as SBMA Administrator, it must also be

concluded that the assailed proviso of Sec 13(d) of RA 7227, wherein Congress effectively sanctioned
the invalid appointment of Mayor Gordon in the first place, must also be seen as unconstitutional, for
its irreconcilability with Sec. 7(1), Art. IX-B.
ii. Funa v. Ermita

(G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Bautista as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport
of Department of Transportation and Communications. Following the resignation of then MARINA
Administrator, Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Secretary. Funa filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of
Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or
employment. Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and
MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution, and contends that those
positions do not provide for ex-officio capacities. He further contends that even if Bautista's
appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such
designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition. Section 13 Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not enumerate temporariness as one of the exceptions thereto. And since a
temporary designation does not have a maximum duration, it can go on for months or years. In effect,
the temporary appointment/designation can effectively circumvent the prohibition.
Allowing undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to occupy other government posts would

let them feast on choice government positions. Thus, in case of vacancy where no permanent
appointment could as yet be made, the remedy would be to designate 1 of the 2 Deputy
Administrators as the Acting Administrator. Such would be the logical course, the said officers being
in a better position in terms of knowledge and experience to run the agency in a temporary capacity.
Should none of them merit the President's confidence, then the practical remedy would be for
Undersecretary Bautista to first resign as Undersecretary in order to qualify her as Administrator of
MARINA. As to whether she in fact does not receive or has waived any remuneration, the same does
not matter because remuneration is not an element in determining whether there has been a violation
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He also asserts the incompatibility between the 2
posts, the reason is that with respect to the affairs in the maritime industry, the recommendations of
the MARINA may be the subject of counter or opposing recommendations from the Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with
the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.
RULING:
Yes. Petition granted. Petitioner’s designation as MARINA OIC, in a concurrent capacity as
DOTC Undersecretary is declared unconstitutional for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution and therefore, null and void.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the “the President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure”. The disqualification laid down is aimed at
preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Such laudable
intent of the law will be defeated and rendered sterile if we are to adopt the semantics of respondents.
It would open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification
of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the President's power of appointment in
the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled
corporations.
iii. Funa v. Agra

(G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the designation of Hon. Alberto Agra,
then the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently as the Acting Solicitor General. Petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution.
Agra represents that on 12 January 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel
when Pres. Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General
Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; and that on 5 March 2010, Pres.
Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had
meanwhile resigned; that he then relinquished his position of Government Corporate Counsel; and
that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting
Solicitor General.
Petitioner contends that although the appointments challenged were in acting or temporary
capacities, the prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VII does not distinguish between an appointment or
designation of a Member of the Cabinet in an acting capacity and in a permanent capacity. He further
emphasized that the position of the Solicitor General is not an ex officio position in relation to the
position of the Secretary of Justice.
Respondents contend that Agra's concurrent designations as the Acting Secretary of Justice
and Acting Solicitor General were only in a temporary capacity, the only effect of which was to confer
additional duties to him. Thus, as the Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice, Agra
was not "holding" both offices in the strict constitutional sense. They argue that an appointment, to
be covered by the constitutional prohibition, must be regular and permanent, instead of a mere
designation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple
offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?
RULING:
Petition Granted. The designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a
concurrent capacity with his position as the Acting Solicitor General is null and void for being
unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Agra was
declared as a de facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice.
A relevant and complementing provision is Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B of the Constitution which
provides that, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”
To differentiate, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants. Since the evident purpose of the framers is to impose a stricter prohibitions on the
aforementioned officials, the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the Constitution at Sec. 13, Art.
VIII must be given literal interpretation and refer only to the instances cited in the Constitution. Being
designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by the ban. Hence, Agra could not hold any
other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, as the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided. Also, Agra's designation as the Acting Secretary
of Justice was not in an ex-officio capacity, which he would have been validly authorized to
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence
of holding the other.
Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer for the entire period of his tenure
as the Acting Secretary of Justice. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally
appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. Agra was a de facto officer during
his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice. A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from
one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive officer, and whose appointment
is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties
under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular
or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. The acts of the de facto officer are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.
iv. Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
On January 11, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Duque
as Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque's appointment on
February 3, 2010.
On February 22, 2010, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864) or known
as the “inclusion of the chairman of the civil service commission in the board of trustees/directors of
the government service insurance system, Philippine health insurance corporation, employees'
compensation commission and the home development mutual fund”.
Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or

Trustees of the following government-owned or government-controlled corporations
(GOCCs): (a) GSIS; (b) PHILHEALTH; (c) ECC; and (d) HDMF.
On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen
and lawyer, filed the petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, for the designation of Duque
as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being
clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the
CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions.
RULING:
No. In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be
considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs.
A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose
term of office has not expired.
v. Public Interest Center v. Elma

(G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J:
FACTS:
Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his
tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He
accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They
contend that the appointments contravene Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible
offices.
Elma alleged that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given the rank of
Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be
applied in his case. This provision, according to him, would allow a public officer to hold multiple
positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary
functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists a close relation
between the two positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of
either position would allow respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions. He further
add that the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of CPLC.
RULING:
No. The concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. An incompatibility exists
between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving
independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments
and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency
under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the
review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own
actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his
impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the
prohibition against holding incompatible offices.
vi. National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004)
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
This petition for review seeks to annul the two decisions of respondent Commission on Audit
(COA) dated July 26,2001 and January 30,2003, affirming the September 21,1998 ruling of the
National Government Audit Office (NGAO), which in turn upheld Auditor Ernesto C. Eulalia’s order
disallowing the payment of honoraria to the representatives of petitioner’s ex officio members, per
COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created by then

President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. NAC is tasked to receive, process and
review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular
members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior
and Local Government as ex officio members.
It turns out that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex-officio
members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning
December 12,1994.
However, on October 15,1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment
of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12,1994 to
June 27,1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-308.
Meanwhile, on April 28,1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 which included the
new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347, which was approved by then
President Joseph Estrada on October 19,1999. Section 1, Rule II thereof emphasized that The ex
officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall
be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked the said Administrative Order in assailing before the COA the rulings of the
resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio members’
representatives, to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether or not said official representatives of NAC ex officio members may be entitled to per
diem, honoraria or any allowance.
RULING:
No. The Court held that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence.
The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance
whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members’ official representatives.
The Court also emphasized that the NAC ex officio members’ representatives are not exempt
from the general prohibition because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or
position and authorizing additional compensation therefore.
Sections 54 and 56 of the Administrative Code of 1987 reiterate the constitutional prohibition,
specifically Sections 7 and 8 of Article IX-B, against multiple positions in the government and receiving
addition or double compensation.
Finally, as the Court ruled in Civil Liberties Union, cabinet secretaries including their deputies
and assistants who hold positions in ex officio capacities are proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
to their principal offices.
Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and
were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem,
honorarium, allowance of some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution.
c. Security of Tenure
i. General v Roco
(G.R. Nos. 143366 & 143524, January 29, 2001)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
FACTS:
Respondent Ramon Roco was appointed by then President Fidel Ramos on August 26, 1996
as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Region V, a position equivalent to
CES rank level V. Subsequently, then President Joseph Estrada re-appointed him to the same position
on February 8, 1999. In both cases, 1996 and 1999, he was not a CES eligible. However, during his
incumbency, or on August 13, 1999, the Career Executive Service Board conferred him CES eligibility.
On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis General, who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by
President Estrada to the same position being occupied by respondent. Pursuant thereto, DOTC
Undersecretary Herminio Coloma, Jr., as Officer-in-Charge of the Department, issued a Memorandum
directing petitioner General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent Roco to report
to the Office of the Secretary "for further instructions." Petitioner General assumed the office on
September 16, 1999.
Respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto against the petitioner,
which was subsequently affirmed by the court. Petitioner, who was later joined by the Solicitor General
on behalf of the Executive Secretary in this consolidated case, filed for a petition for review and prayed
for the maintenance of the status quo ante.
ISSUE: Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire security of tenure.
RULING:
No, the petition was granted. A brief summary of the pertinent provisions of the Civil Service
Law is outlined below to illuminate the necessary requirements to acquire security of tenure.
Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292), provides:
(1)Permanent status. — A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.
In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a permanent
appointment is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board, thus:
Career Executive Service Eligibility

Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and the
inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles…
Appointment to CES Rank

Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the
Board an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a
CES rank is made by the President upon the recommendation of the Board. This process completes
the official's membership in the CES and most importantly, confers on him security of tenure in the
CES.
…The appropriate CESO rank to which a CES eligible may be appointed depends on two major
qualification criteria, namely: (1) level of managerial responsibility; and, (2) performance.
…As a general rule, a CES eligible will be recommended for appointment to the rank equivalent of the
level of his managerial responsibility if his performance rating is Satisfactory or higher. If the
performance rating is Outstanding, he will be recommended one rank higher than his level of
managerial responsibility.
So also, pertinent provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, read:

c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made
by the President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such
appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to higher ranks which
qualify the incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and
equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The President
may however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible;
provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he qualifies in such examination.
xxx xxx xxx
e. Assignments Reassignments and Transfers. Depending upon their ranks, members of the Service
shall be assigned to occupy positions of undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Board on the basis of the
members' functional expertise.
Therefore, these two requisites must concur in order that an employee in the career executive
service may attain security of tenure: (a) CES eligibility; and (b) Appointment to the appropriate CES
rank.
Furthermore, security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and
second-level employees in the civil service), refers only to rank and not to the office or to the position
to which they may be appointed; a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned
from one position to another without losing his rank. A CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if
assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank
and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies.
In the present case, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES
eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank for the office he temporarily occupied so he
cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly
reassigned to other positions in the career executive service. Thus, in Achacoso v. Macaraig, the
Court held that:
It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the
requirement for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed."
Hence, the respondent has no security of tenure based on the aforementioned facts. However,
his temporary appointment is an exception to the rule because a personnel may be appointed in an
acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.
The law also allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible under the Integrated
Reorganization Plan - Section C, subject to the attainment of said eligibility, in the same manner
that the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES rank (CES rank level
V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary capacity. Moreover,
under the mobility and flexibility principles of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, CES personnel
may be reassigned or transferred from one position to another.
ii. Villaluz v. Zaldivar

(G.R. No. L-22754, December 31, 1965)
Bautista Angelo, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Oce with payment
of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964. He alleged that he was nominated
as chief of said oce on May 20, 1958 and two days thereafter his nomination was conrmed by the
Commission on Appointments; that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath of oce as such after having
been informed of his nomination by then Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson;
that in a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines by Congressman
Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the Committee on Good Government of the House of
Representatives, the latter informed the former of the ndings made by his Committee concerning
alleged gross mismanagement and ineciency committed by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office.
On February 15, 1960, the then Executive Secretary Natalio P . Castillo suspended petitioner
as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Oce, having thereupon created an investigating committee
with the only purpose of investigating the charges against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon,
and to undertake the investigation a prosecution panel was created headed by Special Prosecutor
Emilio A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said committee submitted its report to the President
of the Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from
oce of petitioner; that as a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his
place as acting administrator; and that, after having been ocially notied of his removal, petitioner led
a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this was denied, he led the instant
petition before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the removal unconstitutional
RULING:
No. The petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from
office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that "the power to
remove is inherent in the power to appoint" as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 2260.
The Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative
charges led against petitioner because the authority of said Commissioner to pass upon questions of
suspension, separation, or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and
employees in the classified service to which classification petitioner does not belong.
iii. Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz

(G.R. No. 78946, April 15, 1988)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of
Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue Medical Center) by then Minister of
Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Center, Jesus C. Azurin. As Chief of Clinics,
petitioner exercised direct control and supervision over all heads of departments in the Medical
Center.
In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center retitled the position of Chief of Clinics
to Assistant Director for Professional Services. In partial implementation of this new set-up,
respondent Dr. Adriano de la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, issued Hospital Order No. 30, Series of
1986, on 8 August 1986, designating petitioner as Assistant Director of Professional Services. As
such, she continued to exercise direct control and supervision over all heads of departments in the
Medical Center.
On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119 known as the "Reorganization Act of the
Ministry of Health" was promulgated.
On 29 May 1987, respondent De la Paz, as Medical Center Chief issued Hospital Order 21
and 22, which he designated respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then Medical Specialist I, as Assistant
Director for Professional Services whereby petitioner was relieved of her present duties and
responsibilities as she will be transferred to the Research Office. Said order was purportedly issued
"in the interest of the hospital service."
Petitioner filed a letter-protest with respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing copies to

respondents De la Paz and Aguila, as well as to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman
of the Government Reorganization Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent De la Paz has the power or authority to issue the two Hospital
Orders in question.
RULING:
No. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities attached to
the Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and employees, like
petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the Medical Center Chief. The latter's function is
confined to recommendation.
Respondent Medical Center Chiefs argument that petitioner was not appointed but was
merely transferred in the interest of the public service to the Research Office pursuant to Section 24
(c) of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines will not alter the
situation.
Even a transfer requires an appointment, which is beyond the authority of respondent Medical
Center Chief to extend. Besides, the transfer was without petitioner's consent, was tantamount to
removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid and without any legal effect. A removal without
cause is violative of the Constitutional guarantee that "no officer or employee of the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for the cause provided by law."
Petitioner's "designation" as Assistant Director for Professional Services on 8 August 1986 in

accordance with the organizational structure of the Department of Health under Hospital Order No.
30, Series of 1986, issued by respondent Medical Center Chief did not make her occupancy of that
position temporary in character. It bears stressing that the positions of Chief of Clinics and Assistant
Director for Professional Services are basically one and the same except for the change in
nomenclature. Petitioner's permanent appointment on 1 May 1985 to the position of Chief of Clinics,
therefore, remained effective.
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on 30
January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity
and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The
occupancy of a position in a hold over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would
have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2 February
1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al. vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra,
et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of
tenure govern.
And while it may be that the designation of respondent Aguila as Assistant Director for
Professional Services and the relief of petitioner from the said position were not disapproved by
respondent Secretary of Health, it by no means implies that the questioned acts of respondent
Medical Center Chief were approved by the former official.
iv. De la Llana v. Alba

(G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982)
FERNANDO,C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes," the same being
contrary to the security of tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates from the judiciary
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts except the
occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good faith in its enactment and characterize as
undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when
the reorganization shall be deemed completed.
The Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack
on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was constitutional.
RULING:
After an intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case, the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been
shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in answer to a pressing and urgent need for a major
reorganization of the judiciary; that the attendant abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause
their incumbents to cease from holding office does not impair the independence of the judiciary
and the security of tenure guarantee as incumbent justices and judges with good performance
and clean records can be named anew in legal contemplation without interruption in the continuity
of their service; that the provision granting the President authority to fix the compensation and
allowances of the Justices and judges survives the test of undue delegation of legislative power,
a standard having been clearly adopted therefor; that the reorganization provided by the
challenged Act will be carried out in accordance with the President's constitutional duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, and the judiciary's commitment to guard constitutional
rights.
v. Dario vs. Mison

(G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989)
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3,
"DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE
PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION,
AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION." Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and
all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES
AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION."
Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization had generated, and
prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of personnel,"
On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs
officials. A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices
of separation.
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF
TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22was signed into law. Under Section 9, thereof:
Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have
been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as
the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario, was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the
Bureau of Customs until his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau until his separation
directed by Commissioner Mison.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in venous ports of the Philippines,
say, on the other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau of
Customs and that since there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be validly
dismissed from the service.
The records also show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners are invalidly dismissed from the service.
2. Whether or not Republic Act No. 6656 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1. Yes, petitioners are invalidly dismissed from service.
The Court distinguished removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue
of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove
redundancy of functions. In the latter case, it held that the Government is obliged to prove good faith.
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of
tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise
not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio.
There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions,

or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from

the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause
and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law.
The Court is not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a reorganization under the
transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But it held that such a reorganization should be subject
to the criterion of good faith.
2. No, Republic Act No. 6656 is not unconstitutional.
Although the Charter's transitory provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations
thereunder must nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about
automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked.
However, although the statute itself recognizes removals without cause, it also acknowledges
the possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of tenure. For
this reason, the statute has installed safeguards.
vi. Cabagnot v Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. 93511, June 3, 1993)
ROMERO, J:
FACTS:
A new organizational structure and staffing pattern of the provincial government of Aklan was
approved by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration.
Thereafter, twenty-one (21) aggrieved employees of the provincial government of Aklan,

jointly appealed to petitioner Governor Cabagnot. They prayed that they be appointed to the positions
they applied for to which they are eligible. They likewise sent the petitioner individual letters reiterating
their qualifications and praying for reconsideration of their new appointments, which were positions
lower in rank than their positions prior to the reorganization. Petitioner denied their plea.
Out of the original twenty-one (21) protestants only seventeen (17), private respondents
herein, instituted a collective appeal before the Civil Service Regional Office. Respondent Civil
Service Commission (CSC) found that a wide disparity existed between the former positions held by
private respondents and the positions proposed for them by petitioner even if equivalent positions
were available. The CSC declared that the private respondents were demoted. Moreover, it declared
that the petitioner violated Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6656 (“An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure
of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization”) which
provides preference for appointment of permanent employees to new positions or if there are not
enough comparable ones, to positions next lower in rank.
Thus, the CSC ordered that private respondents who were demoted to be immediately
appointed and restored to their positions or positions of comparable or equivalent rank, with back
salaries reckoned from the dates they should properly have been appointed.
In the present petition, Cabagnot argues that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion because
they encroached on her power to appoint. The petitioner also stresses the fact that since private
respondents would be receiving the same rate of salary they were receiving before the reorganization,
they are not demoted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering to reinstate the
demoted employees.
RULING:
No. The CSC committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering that the private respondents
be reinstated. The CSC is not revoking any appointment made by petitioner. It is merely ordering the
reinstatement of private respondents whom it found to have been demoted or terminated.
The Court agreed with the finding of the CSC that as a result of the reorganization of the
provincial government of Aklan, the private respondents have been demoted. By having the private
petitioners assigned to positions which are lower than those they previously held, or which, though of
equivalent salary grade and step, drastically changes the nature of their work without a showing of
the existence of a valid cause for such demotion, is in effect a removal, which must be determined
after due notice and hearing. The court also ruled that there is a demotion even if the employees were
allowed to receive the same salary as their previous position.
Section I of Rep. Act No. 6656 declares as the policy of the State, the protection of the security
of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the reorganization of the various agencies of the
government. Section 2 of the said Act requires prior determination of a valid cause after due notice
and hearing before any officer or employee in the career service can be removed, or demoted.
It is within the power of the CSC to order the reinstatement of government employees who
have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to
implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the
present case, the orders of the CSC is indubitably in the performance of its constitutional task of
protecting and strengthening the civil service.
vii. Civil Service Commission v Dacoycoy

(G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999)
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
George P. Suan, Vice-President of Citizens Crime Watch, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar,
filed with petitioner Civil Service Commission (CSC) a complaint against respondent, the Vocational
School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade, Allen, Northern Samar, for habitual
drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. After investigation, the CSC found respondent guilty only of
nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons as driver and utility worker of
the school and their assignment under respondent's immediate supervision and control.
Consequently, the CSC dismissed respondent from the service. Respondent filed a special civil action
for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the decision of the CSC ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two
sons; hence, he was not guilty of nepotism. The appellate court further ruled that it is "the person who
recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is the property party to appeal the suit.
RULING:
SC agreed with Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of
nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission
and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge nor
the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the
Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously
prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, it is now expressly abandoned and overruled
extant jurisprudence that "the phrase 'party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or
dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the
respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, it is now
overruled that prior decisions holding the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v.
Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service
Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more
recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.
viii. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991.]
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987 which allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that, "The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution
hold any other office or employment during their tenure..” then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez,
construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which provides that
“Unless otherwise provided by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government….”, rendered Opinion No. 73, series of
1987, declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies and assistant secretaries may hold other public
office, including membership in the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for
in the Constitution or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective
positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, two days before
Congress convened on July 27, 1987, promulgated Executive Order No. 284.
The Solicitor General counters that DOJ Opinion No. 73 is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm,"
and that EO No. 284, promulgated pursuant to said opinion is consequently constitutional. In sum,
the constitutionality of EO No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that
it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. Petitioners
further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B applies to officers
and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be
extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants. Public respondents, on the other hand,
maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII
makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the appointive officials mentioned
therein are concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VII of the Constitution makes reference to
Sec. 7, par. 2 of Article IX-B.
RULING:
NO. Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of
multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it t to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article
VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution itself. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in
the government or elsewhere is concerned. It is notable that Sec. 7 provides the disqualifications to
hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government
and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the
wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure, meaning such prohibition is all-embracing
and covers both public and private office or employment.
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family,
which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the
Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase
would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the
Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government
during their tenure. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself.
ix. Canonizado v. Aguirre

(G.R. No. 133132, February 15, 2001)
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:
FACTS:
On Martch 6, 1998 Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551), otherwise known as the "Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998," by virtue of which petitioners herein, who
were all members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), were separated from office.
Petitioners claim that such law violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
Under RA 6975, the members of the NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres, Alexis
C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong. Dula Torres was first
appointed to the NAPOLCOM on January 8, 1991 for a six year term. He was reappointed on January
23, 1997 for another six years. Canonizado was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the
unexpired term of another Commissioner which ended on December 31, 1995. On August 23, 1995,
Canonizado was re-appointed for another six years. Pureza was appointed on January 2, 1997 for a
similar term of six years. Respondent Adiong's appointment to the NAPOLCOM was issued on July
23, 1996. None of their terms had expired at the time the amendatory law was passed.
RA 8551 declared that the terms of the current Commissioners were deemed as expired upon
its effectivity. Pursuant thereto, President Ramos appointed Romeo L. Cairme on March 11, 1998 as
a member of the NAPOLCOM for a full six year term. On the same date, Adiong, was given a term
extension of two years since he had served less than two years of his previous term. Cairme and
Adiong both took their oaths of office on April 6, 1998. Completing the membership of the
NAPOLCOM are Leo S. Magahum and Cleofe M. Factoran, who were appointed by President Estrada
on June 30, 1998 and who took their oaths of office on July 2, 1998.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ removal from office by virtue of R.A. 8551 violates their security
of tenure.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the removal of petitioners was unconstitutional since Republic Act
No. 6715 did not expressly or impliedly abolish the offices of petitioners, there being no irreconcilable
inconsistency in the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' offices under the old law and the
new law.
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that office is vacant. While
it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it cannot be conceded the
power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or
holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It
cannot be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested
with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or
emoluments.
c. Partisan Political Activity
i. Cailles v. Bonifacio
(G.R. No. 45937, February 25, 1938)
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner instituted this quo warranto action for the purpose of ousting the respondent from
the office of provincial governor of Laguna. It is contended that at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy and was elected to office, the respondent was a captain in the reserve force of the
Philippine Army and, for this reason, is ineligible to that office.
Two grounds are advanced in support of this contention:

1.The alleged disqualification of the respondent under section 431 of the Election Law and
section 2071 of the Administrative Code; and
2.The alleged prohibition against him as member of the armed forces under section 2 of Article
XI of the Constitution and section 449 of the Election Law.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not respondent is ineligible to the office of provincial governor of Laguna to
which he has been elected?
2.Whether or not respondent is prohibited from engaging in political or electoral activities
except to vote under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the constitution?
RULING:
No. Respondent is not ineligible to the office of the provincial governor of Laguna and is not
prohibited from engaging in political or electoral activities—specifically holding an elective public
office.
Section 2, Article XI, of the Constitution is read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Officers and employees in the Civil Service, including members of the armed forces,
shall not engage directly or indirectly in partisan political activities or take part in any election
except to vote."
The provision prohibits members of the armed forces from engaging in any partisan political
activity, or otherwise taking part in any election except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini grant or
confer upon them the right of suffrage. It permits the exercise of the right to vote only if such right is
granted by law. As section 431 of the Election Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233,
disqualifies from voting only members in the active service of the Philippine Army and no claim is
made that this discrimination is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the respondent, being in
the reserve force, is not disqualified from voting. Stated otherwise, the respondent being a qualified
elector and the possession by him of the other qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial
office not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the office of provincial governor to which he has
been elected. The first ground on the petition is, therefore, without merit.
Moreover, the provision dictates that there is an existing prohibition against officers and
employees of the Civil Service from engaging in political or electoral activities except to vote, for the
reason that public officers and employees in the Civil Service are servants of the State and not the
agents of any political group. Members of the armed forces are included in the prohibition but it
extends only to those in the active service.
ii. de los Santos vs. Yatco

(G.R. No. L-13932, December 24, 1959)
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his
previous order for execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is
being occupied by Fernando Mendoñez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to the
petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall
be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendoñez for failure
to pay as per agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land
back. Defendant Mendoñez moved for postponement to give both parties sufficient time to come to
an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It was settled by both parties that
Mendoñez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner
refused to abide with their agreement and now asking for a higher amount of money for payment.
Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco quashed said order
hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
RULING:
The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him
especially when it was improvidently issued. There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since the
defendant made an opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal agreement that amended
the compromise hence the execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The consequent
ability of the defendant to meet his obligations by securing a GSIS loan also justifies the court’s refusal
to eject him from the premises by an execution.
Article IX (B), Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according
to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination. (3) No officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (4)
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees. (6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be
provided by law.
d. Right to Self-Organization
i. SSS Employees’ Association v. Court of Appeals

(175 SCRA 686)
CORTES, J:
FACTS:
Members of the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union’s demands.
This prompted SSS to file a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the SSSEA. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction
over the matter.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the
case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of
the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore
they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which
had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employees of the SSS have the right to strike.
RULING:
In the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of
the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)].
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition
also includes the right to strike.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only.
Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[tlhe right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)] explained:
I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed this
amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it
does not mean that because they have the right to organize, they also have
the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about
organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone
will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to
form associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the
strikes coming from employees exercising government functions, that
could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which
will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in
Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the
government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but they are
prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice- President is
unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve this resolution, it
carries with it the right to strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of
fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee on Social Justice
because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We know that this
problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody in the government to
strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go
on strike? What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is
a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the
right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180
where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the
SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created
under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870
& 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition
the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit
of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those
which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service
may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private
sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule
III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to
Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof.
ii. JACINTO V COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. They
incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged. DECS Sec. Cariño
immediately issued a return-to-work order, but it was ignored by petitioners. Sec. Cariño issued formal
charges and preventive suspension orders against them. They were administratively charged with
gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-
to-work directives; etc. During the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the
charges against them. As a consequence, Sec. Cariño, in his decisions found them guilty as charged
and imposed the penalty of dismissal except Jacinto and Agustin who were meted only six (6) months
suspension.
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): dismissed the appeals for lack of merit
CSC: set aside the Orders of the MSPB; found the petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto) guilty
of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; imposed upon them the penalty of six (6)
months suspension without pay; and automatically reinstated them to the service without payment of
back salaries; the CSC found her guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations;
imposed upon her the penalty of reprimand; and automatically reinstated her in the service without
payment of back salaries. CA Affirmed decision of CSC
ISSUE: Whether civil servants are guilty of grave misconduct in participating in mass actions.
RULING:
Yes. The terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes. Workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right to strike, the Constitution itself
qualifies its exercise with the proviso “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the
state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. The Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed.
The teachers have given cause for their suspension, for being absent in their classes and
joining in the mass actions. They were not fully innocent of the charges against them although they
were eventually found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and not
grave misconduct or other offense warranting their dismissal from the service; “being found liable for
a lesser offense is not equivalent to exoneration.” In the case of Merlinda Jacinto, there was a finding
that there was no proof that she joined the unlawful mass actions.
3. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
a. Composition and Qualification
i. CAYETANO v MONSOD
(G.R. No. 100113; September 3, 1991)
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April
25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years based on
the bio-data submitted by Monsod to the Commission on Appointments. He claims that Monsod has
never practiced law except for an alleged one-year period after passing the bar examinations when
he worked in his father's law firm.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years.
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod
worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the underprivileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod possessed the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
RULING:
Yes. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences
as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
The provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer
or involve actual practice of law outside the Commission, this is interpreted as to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the Commission are using their legal knowledge or legal
talent in their respective work within Commission, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission.
Furthermore, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise
of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
has been clearly shown.
ii. Gaminde vs. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000)
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
The President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, CSC on June 11, 1993. On September 7, 1993, Commission on Appointment
confirmed the appointment stating that pursuant to the provisions of existing laws petitioner’s term
will expire on February 2, 1999.
Petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term
of office. In a letter dated April 7, 1998, opined that petitioner’s term would expire on February 2,
2000.
Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on
whether or not Commissioner Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their appointment on February 2, 1999.
Consequently, CSC Resident Felipe issued notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit the
salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 2,
1999.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. The Commission
on Audit affirmed the proprietary of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner’s term of
office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the
expiration date on February 2, 1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an
extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, Commission on Audit denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner of CSC to which she was
appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on
February 2, 2000, as claimed by her.
RULING:
The term of office of Gaminde as Commissioner of CSC, under an appointment extended
to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999. However,
she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her
salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit
erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments including that of her co-terminous
staff.
The decisions of the Commission on Audit are reversed as they disallow the salaries and
emoluments of Commissioner Gaminde and her co-terminous staff during her tenure as de facto
officer from February 2, 1999, until February 2, 2000.
b. Decisions
i. Estrella v. Commision on Elections

(G.R. 160465, May 27, 2004)
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
In the petition for certiorari filed on November 5, 2003, petitioner Romeo M. Estrella sought
for the nullification of the Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc in Romeo Estrella v. Rolando F. Salvador directing the parties to maintain status quo ante
order for the enforcement of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos’s decision in declaring petitioner as
the elected mayor of Baliwag, Bulacan.
Five among the seven members of the COMELEC participated in the issuance of the said
order, namely, Commissioners Benjamin Abalos, Sr., Luzviminda Tangcangco, Ruffino S.B. Javier,
Ressureccion Z. Borra and Ralph C. Lantion. Four voted for the issuance of the order while Borra
dissented.
Hence, respondent Rolando F. Salvador seeks reconsideration from the Court’s Resolution
of April 28, 2004. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that three votes would
be sufficient to constitute the majority in carrying the COMELEC’s decision En Banc as provided by
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not three members would suffice to constitute the majority for the decision En
Banc of the COMELEC in the Status Quo Ante Order.
RULING:
No. Excluding Lantion’s vote from the questioned resolution, the COMELEC resolution would
only leave out just three votes out of all seven members. The COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case
or matter brought to it by a majority vote of all its members. The Constitution is clear that all members
should constitute the majority vote, not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations.
It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are crouched upon express the
objective sought to be attained. Hence, the phrase “all of its members” should be interpreted as such.
ii. Sevilla Jr. v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 202833, 19 March 2013)

BRION, J:
FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat,
Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On
October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner, with a winning
margin of 628 votes over So's. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with the MeTC on
the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested
precincts. So also prayed for a manual recount of the votes.
Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order
dated May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. On May 9, 2011, So filed a motion for
reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal
fee within the reglementary period. On May 17, 2011, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration
on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant. So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31,
2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults
the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that in the appreciation of ballots, there should be a clear
and distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a certain group of ballots should be
considered as having been written by one or two persons. The Comelec Second Division granted
So's petition The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the Comelec Second Division's ruling.
Sevilla argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it entertained So's
petition despite its loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the court a quo's dismissal order
became final and executory due to So's wrong choice of remedy and when it gave due course to the
petition of So given that certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal and may only be allowed if there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
ISSUE: W/N the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the petition for
certiorari.
RULING:
SC dismissed petition for having been prematurely filed and remands the case back to the
COMELEC for appropriate action.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc's Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority
decision required by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Section 7, Article IX-
A of the Constitution requires that "[e]ach Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution." Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Comelec provided in Section 5
(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc. The SC has previously ruled that a majority
vote requires a vote of four (4) members of the Comelec en banc. In the present case, while the
resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to have affirmed the Comelec Second Division's
Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla's motion for reconsideration, the equally divided voting
between three Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the majority
vote that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of
the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc. The vote of four (4) members must
always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of the number of Commissioners in attendance.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, the assailed resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect
whatsoever except to convey that the Comelec failed to reach a decision and that further action is
required.
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the
Comelec en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing
where parties are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments
and convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their case. The SC thus finds that
a remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply with the rehearing requirement
of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
c. Powers
i. Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. 192289, January 8, 2013)
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy in the May 10, 2010 elections to run as
Vice-Mayor of Datu-Unsay. Thereafter, Acting Election Officer and respondent Rolan G. Buagas,
forwarded the names of 20 candidates who were not registered voters therein, which included
petitioner’s name to the COMELEC’s Law Department.
A Memorandum dated December 1, 2009 was brought to the attention of the COMELEC by
the Law Deparment. It included the names of 56 candidates who were not registered voters,
running for various posts in Maguindanao and Davao del sur. The Law Department recommended
the retention of the said names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for the COMELEC to motu
propio institute actions against them for disqualification and for violation of election laws.
The COMELEC issued the herein assailed December 22, 2009 Resolution aproving, but
with modification, the Law Department’s recommendation in the following:
1. To disqualify the foregoing candidates for not being registered voters of the
respective municipalitites where they seek to be elected without prejudice to their filing of an
opposition within 2 days from publication.
2. To file election offense cases against said candidates for violation of Sec. 74 in
relation to Sec. 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Ibrahim and the 50 other candidates assail the Resolution dated December 22, 2009. In the
Petition, it was stated that some of those affected by the said Resolution had previously participated
as candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections. It was stressed that they should have been
disqualified if indeed they were not registered voters. Moreover, the candidates also emphasized
that they are in fact permanent residents and were domiciled at the place where they sought to be
elected.
COMELEC denied the Petition/Opposition by assailing Resolution dated May 6, 2010,

declaring that Ibrahim, among other candidates, were not registered voters of Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao. The certification was issued in the performance of official duty, hence the
presumption of regularity attached to it in the absence of contrary evidence. Ibrahim and company
failed to adduce evidence proving their allegations.
In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not
yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty
race in Datu Unsay. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired
by Buagas, suspended Ibrahim's proclamation on the basis of Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
Argument in Support of the Instant Petition

Ibrahim posits that the MBOC is a ministerial body created merely "to take the returns as
made from the different voting precincts, add them up and declare the result." The OSG
emphasizes that similarly, Ibrahim was disqualified as a candidate without prior notice and hearing
and he was given the chance to file an opposition only after the issuance of the Resolution dated
December 22, 2009.
The COMELEC’s Contentions

The COMELEC assails as improper Ibrahim's immediate resort to the instant Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Despite the issuance of the herein assailed
resolutions, Ibrahim's name was not stricken off from the certified list of candidates during the May
10, 2010 elections and the votes cast for him were counted. Hence, no actual prejudice was caused
upon him as the COMELEC did not even direct the MBOC to suspend his proclamation. It was the
MBOC's ruling which resulted to the suspension of his proclamation. Such being the case, Ibrahim
should have instead filed a pre-proclamation controversy before the COMELEC anchored on the
supposed illegality of the MBOC's proceedings. Section 241 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), defines pre- proclamation controversies as
referring to any questions "pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised . . . in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns."
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6,
2010.
RULING:
Yes. The COMELEC is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay.
Section 3 , Article IX of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the
denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is
thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the
COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this case where the
cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer
regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en
banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division
because it denies due process to the candidate.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions,
ordered Ibrahim's disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet .
Let it be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which
should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered
voter of Datu Unsay disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed
misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of
the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the
COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter,
which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to
one of its divisions.
The MBOC has no authority to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation especially since the herein
assailed resolutions, upon which the suspension was anchored, were issued by the COMELEC
en banc outside the ambit of its jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the MBOC motu propio suspended
Ibrahim's proclamation when the issue of the latter's eligibility is a matter which the board has no
authority to resolve. Further, under Section 6 of R.A. 6646, the COMELEC and not the MBOC
has the authority to order the suspension of a winning candidates's proclamation. Such
suspension can only be ordered upon the motion of a complainant or intervenor relative to a case
for disqualification, or a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy pending
before the COMELEC, and only when the evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong.
Besides, the COMELEC en banc itself could not have properly ordered Ibrahim's disqualification
because in taking cognizance of the matter, it had already exceeded its jurisdiction.
ii. Jaramilla v. Commission on Election (COMELEC)

(G.R. No. 155717 , October 23, 2003)
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Suyat and petitioner both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan in 1the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. In the tabulated
results, petitioner was ranked number seven and respondent Suyat was ranked number nine. Upon
review, it was discovered that petitioner was credited fifty votes more than what he actually obtained.
If the entry were to be corrected, petitioner would be ranked number nine and respondent Suyat
would be ranked number eight. Respondent Suyat filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene, which the latter treated
as a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. The COMELEC en banc granted the motion/petition.
In contention, the petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition for certiorari with prayer
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction ascribing grave abuse of discretion to public
respondent COMELEC in issuing its en banc resolution dated October 24, 2002.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC en banc may take cognizance of the Petition for Correction of
Manifest Errors.
HELD:
Yes. Article IX-C of the Constitution states in part that: "Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections
may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall
be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. " As stated in the provision, and in line with the Court's recent
pronouncement in Milla v. Balmores-Laxa, election cases including pre-proclamation controversies
should first be heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the commission en
banc if a motion for reconsideration of the division is filed. It must be noted however that this provision
applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and
not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions. This doctrine was laid out in
Castromayor v. COMELEC, and reiterated in subsequent cases. Accordingly, when the case
demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions, such as the correction
of a manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of votes,
the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections.
In this case, the Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar alleges an
erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an
error in the tabulation of the results, which merely requires a clerical correction without the necessity
of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative power
of the COMELEC. Hence, COMELEC En Banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the
aforesaid petition.
iii. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC

(380 Phil. 780, January 28, 2000)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Resolution No. 98-1419 was issued by respondent Commission on Elections on 21 April 1998,
which states
“RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS- CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same."
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast]
immediately." 2 The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec
count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It
also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
ISSUE:
1. Mootness and prematurity of the case, because of petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration
of the assailed Comelec Resolution; and
2. Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of the Minute Resolution No.
98- 1419 enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from
conducting exit polls during the May 11 elections;
HELD:
1. The case is not moot and premature; To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only
twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on
May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for
reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not
only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to
this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.
2. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98- 1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is
hereby nullified and set aside.
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or group of

individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking
randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their
ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to
give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the
electorate voted.
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press. No law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls.
In relation to the limitations in claiming the freedom of speech concept, the question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." The freedoms of speech and of the press should
all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant
to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage
First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so
that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or
view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par
with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to whom the
electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled
individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are
exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the
results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court on May 9, 1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98- 1419 issued by
the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
iv. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
On 21 February 2013, petitioner Diocese of Bacolod posted two tarpaulins, approximately six
feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size, on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" and the second tarpaulin contains the heading
"Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-
RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote
on the adoption of RA 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of
the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it
form "Team Buhay".
The private respondent Atty. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City,
issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials and ordered the tarpaulin's removal within three days
from receipt for being oversized that is beyond the size requirement of two feet (2') by three feet (3').
On 25 February 2013, petitioners replied requesting, among others, that petitioner Bishop be given a
definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and that pending this case and
the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain. On 27 February 2013, COMELEC
Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department,
however, was silent on the remedies available to petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech,
petitioners initiated this case praying that, among others, the notice and letter of respondents be
declared as unconstitutional and void, and permanently restrain respondents from enforcing them or
any other similar order. Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violate their fundamental right to freedom of expression. For their part, respondents cite the
Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they have the power to regulate
the tarpaulin. Furthermore, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject
to their regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus,
the assailed notice and letter ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has power to regulate the said tarpaulins.
2. Whether or not the said tarpaulins constitute election propaganda.
RULING:
1. NO. While it is true that COMELEC has, including the regulation of campaign materials,
certain powers embodied in the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence, all of these pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates; neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
2. NO. Election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with
candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties
for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political
parties maintain within the authorized expenses limitation. The tarpaulin was not paid for by any
candidate or political party. There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the
persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the
tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. While the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club case limiting on the right to free
speech during election period, however, that case does not apply as most of the petitioners were
electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in this case.
The Supreme Court further distinguished between political and commercial speech. Political
speech refers to speech "both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue," "foster[ing] informed and civic-minded deliberation." On the other hand, commercial
speech has been defined as speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."
While the content of the tarpaulin is, however, a political speech which may have influence in the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.
v. Lokin v COMELEC
(G.R. No. 193808. June 26, 2012)
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
On 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution expunging the Certificate
of Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives of the party-list group known as
Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC). The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution,
prompting Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita F. Planas to file the present Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners
allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing both Resolutions, praying
that they be recognized as the legitimate nominees of CIBAC party-list, and that petitioner Lokin, Jr.
be proclaimed as the CIBAC party-list representative to the House of Representatives.
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.)
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the
platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the country's public
service. Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized,
respondents filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Expunge from the Records and/or for
Disqualification," seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla
had misrepresented herself as "acting secretary general," when she was not even a member of
CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by
the party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the
Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the party's Certificate of
Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial
courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
2. Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing
respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
RULING:
1. No. Even as petitioners insisted on the purely intra-corporate nature of the conflict between
"CIBAC Foundation" and the CIBAC Sectoral Party, they submitted their Certificate of Nomination
and Manifestation of Intent to participate in the party-list elections. Precisely, petitioners were
seeking the COMELEC's approval of their eligibility to participate in the upcoming party-list elections.
In effect, they invoke its authority under the Party-List System Act. Contrary to their stance that the
present dispute stemmed from an intra-corporate matter, their submissions even recognize the
COMELEC's constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. More specifically, as one of its constitutional
functions, the COMELEC is also tasked to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government." In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly
settled that the COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary
tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties.
2. No. Contrary to petitioners' stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the

COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc. The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derla's
alleged authority as "acting secretary-general" was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any
supporting evidence. Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was a member
of CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to submit its Certificate of Nomination.
This was clearly explained In the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and
clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the
COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary
requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members of the party.
Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the affiliation of the so-
called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered with COMELEC.
Petitioners cannot draw authority from the Board of Trustees of the SEC registered entity,
because the Constitution of CIBAC expressly mandates that it is the National Council, as the
governing body of CIBAC, that has the power to formulate the policies, plans, and programs of the
Party, and to issue decisions and resolutions binding on party members and officers. Contrary to
petitioners' allegations, the National Council of CIBAC has not become defunct, and has certainly
not been replaced by the Board of Trustees of the SEC-registered entity. The COMELEC carefully
perused the documents of the organization and outlined the process followed by the National
Council before it complied with its task of choosing the party's nominees.
vi. Cagas v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 209185 October 25, 2013)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with
Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same province,
House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451
was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of
Davao Occidental.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in
this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a
plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty
(60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC
suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the
13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC
decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28
October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to
amend or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who can
do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the
creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay
Elections.
HELD:
No. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite
beyond the schedule prescribed by law. The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a
province. Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject
to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and
municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local
executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that
will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise by the people of their
sovereignty. After the legislative branch’s enactment of a law to create, divide, merge or alter the
boundaries of a local government unit or units, the people in the local government unit or units directly
affected vote in a plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the change.
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is in
contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8, 4, Article VII.
The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix date of elections is legislative in nature, which is
shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election
of local government officials.
vii. National Press Club v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992)
Feliciano, J.
FACTS:
R.A. 6646 was enacted in 1988 to reform certain aspects of the electoral system. Sec. 11(b)
of the law provides that no mass media franchise may provide, either at a price or free of charge,
print space or airtime for campaign purposes, except as provided in Sections 90 & 92 of Batas
Pambansa 881, wherein the same shall be provided to COMELEC.
Petitioners, who are a collection of mass media organizations, argued that Sec. 11(b) impedes
on their role and duty to provide information and insight regarding the candidates for the 1992
elections. They also claimed that Sec. 11(b) violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression, as it targets a particular kind of content and imposes criminal penalties on the publication
of that content. Finally, petitioners asserted that because the section provides a substantial limit as
to where media based campaigning may be published, the section also deprived the voters of
information regarding issues relevant to the upcoming election and where the candidates stand on
these issues.
COMELEC responded, saying that the assailed section is constitutional, as the section is an
exercise of their power to “regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises for the operation of media
of communication and information”, as provided in Sec. 4, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 11(b) of RA 6646 is constitutional as an exercise of Sec. 4, Art. IX-C.
RULING:
Yes. The goal of the prohibition of Sec. 11(b) is to equalize, as far as it is practical, those
candidates with substantial funds with which to run their campaigns and those candidates without
such vast resources at their disposal. It is also to be noted that the power vested to COMELEC in
Sec. 4, Art IX-C is for the purpose of “ensuring equal opportunity, time and space” in the use of mass
media by candidates with the ultimate goal of “providing free, orderly, honest peaceful and credible
elections”. It must also be said that the prohibition of Sec. 11(b) also serves to provide “equal access
to opportunities for public service”, as guaranteed by Art. II, Sec. 26. The presumption of the
petitioners that certain freedoms will be violated by Sec. 11(b) does not automatically mean that the
section itself is unconstitutional, when the above provisions are taken into consideration. Indeed, the
freedoms of speech, expression and of the press should not be seen as having no limits. In the
context of COMELEC’s power under Sec. 4, Art. IX-C, it would be impossible for COMELEC to
exercise this power without inevitably impeding on these freedoms.
In order for it to be made unconstitutional, Sec. 11(b) must be shown to broadly impede on
the above freedoms. However, the language of the section show that the same is limited in three
aspects.
First, the section, as an exercise of Sec. 4, Art IX-C, only applies during the election period,
which is defined by Sec. 9 of the same Article as the period from 90 days before the election to 30
days after the election. Second, Sec. 11(b) only prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air
time for campaign purposes. The section does not prevent the reporting of news related to the election
by mass media franchises. Nor does it expressly forbid the publication of opinion pieces regarding
the issues relevant to the elections, the candidates and their programs so long as these pieces are
not in fact political ads paid for by a particular candidate. And third, as mentioned in Sec. 11(b) itself,
COMELEC is exempt from the prohibition in that print space and air time may be donated to or
purchased by COMELEC in compliance with BP 881, which also requires that COMELEC distribute
in an equitable manner to all candidates the acquired print space and air time. Should there be
incidents wherein certain candidates have not been provided with equal time and space by
COMELEC, these candidates will have access to appropriate judicial remedies provided by the
Supreme Court. However, it must be presumed at this time that COMELEC will provide equal print
space and air time among all candidates.
Given these three limitations, it is shown that though Sec. 11(b) of RA 6646 does appear to
impede upon the rights of the candidates. However, as stated in the preceding paragraphs, these
impediments are for the purpose of fulfilling the objectives of Art. IX-C, Sec. 4 and Art. II, Sec. 26. As
discussed in the previous paragraph, Sec. 11(b) is limited in its scope and application. Thus, Sec.
11(b) does not broadly violate the rights of the candidates, the mass media franchises and the voters
in general and the same is a valid exercise of Sec. 4, Art. IX-C.
viii. Chavez v Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004)
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Chavez authorized 96º North, a clothing company, to use his name and
imagine. He also signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing
Corporation and another corporation involved in the amusement nd video games business, G-Box.
Three billboards were set which showed petitioner. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa.
Respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520 in which Section 32 therein provides that
all propaganda materials and all advertisements showing the imagine or mentioning the name of a
person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office
shall be immediately removed within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules,
otherwise, he and the radio station, print media, or television station shall be presumed to have
conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner
was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC. A petition for prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was filed by Chavez, asking the Court to enjoin the
COMELEC from enforcing Section 32 of Resolution No 6520.
Petitioner asked that the COMLEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision as it
allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power;
(3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to
overbreadth.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is valid and constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is valid and constitutional.
1. It is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause

Neither is Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 a gross violation of the non-impairment clause.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State
has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Contracts affecting public interest
contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it
entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against
the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
2. It is a valid exercise of Police Power

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the
people. The COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time and space. The
COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the
display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public
office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more
opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who
do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial
products as image models.
3. It is not in the nature of an ex-post facto law

Petitioner claims it is in the nature of an ex post facto law, making an individual criminally
liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said
advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose name or
image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus
Election Code. However, it lacks persuasiveness. Nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision
that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
4. It is not contrary to the Fair Elections Act

According to petitioner, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He
claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of
election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioner's
argument is not tenable. The assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election
propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much
as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining
undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.
5. It is not invalid due to overbreadth

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional
principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State
regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms. There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and
advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable
limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning
and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid
on the ground of overbreadth.
ix. Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995)
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. assails the constitutional validity of resolution No. 2772
along with the directive by the COMELEC dated 22 March 1995. Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers.
On 2 March 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772, providing for a COMELEC
Space, which is a free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of
general circulation in every province or city.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the Philippine Press Institute, Inc. asks to declare
COMELEC resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC can compel the members of print media to donate COMELEC
Space.
HELD:
NO. To compel print media companies to donate "COMELEC space" amounts to "taking" of
private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of print space here sought to be
effected may first be appraised under the public of expropriation of private personal property for public
use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here:
one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity
for the taking has not been shown by respondent COMELEC. It has not been suggested that the members
of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to COMELEC for election purposes.
Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of COMELEC to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that COMELEC has been
granted the power of imminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws
by COMELEC must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use it, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for "COMELEC space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily
giving free print space to COMELEC for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section
2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers,
against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for COMELEC
purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even
if read as compelling publishers to "donate" "COMELEC space," may be sustained as a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged
consideration on their part. First, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of
COMELEC) to show that the police power - essentially a power of legislation - has been constitutionally
delegated to respondent Commission. Second, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the
legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant
case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of
existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without
regard the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in different parts
of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to
demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the
COMELEC and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated
response to such necessity available to COMELEC. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the State.
x. SWS v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioner SWS states that it
wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and
local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly.
Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish
election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes
a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of
surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election
day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting
process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is
imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from
writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election.
Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the
results of election surveys which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in Section 5.4 of R.A. No.
9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the
prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a
rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral
process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is
narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of
expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the
national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit
election survey results but only require timeliness. Respondent claims that in National Press
Club v. COMELEC, a total ban on political advertisements, with candidates being merely allocated
broadcast time during the so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this
Court. In contrast, according to respondent, it states that the prohibition in Section 5.4 of R.A. No.
9006 is much more limited.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 5.4 of RA 9006 is constitutional.
RULING:
No. It is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is
a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for
a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
The test that was employed to determine the constitutionality of Section 5.4 of RA 9006 is
the O’Brien test which goes as follows: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O'Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of
the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, Section 5.4
actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators,
armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect, Section 5.4 shows a bias for a particular
subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. The
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.".
Thus, the prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only
for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the
curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total
suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of
fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a
local election.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the

suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, Section 5.4
nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater
than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, Section 5.4 aims at the
prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or
"losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas."
Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of
the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing
unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils.
Thus, the petition for prohibition is granted and Section 5.4 of RA 9006 is unconstitutional.
xi. Sanidad v. Comelec

(G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990)
MEDIALDEA, J:
FACTS:
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The
Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution
No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad,
who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER,
a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality
of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists,
commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by
petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
Rather, it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media
during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional
RULING:
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants
issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are
ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder
may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or
television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality,
who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during
the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or
commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other
candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite.
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
xii. GMA Network v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 205357, September 2,2014)
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
These petitions question certain regulations promulgated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and local elections dealing with political
advertisements. Said petitions assail the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate
airtime allowed to candidates and political parties, as well as the requirements related thereto, such
as the need to report it and the sanctions imposed for violations.
These five petitions raise the issue of the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast to radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively.
Petitioners contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates
freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative
to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forthcoming elections.
However, respondent COMELEC maintains that total aggregate airtime limit is in accordance
with R.A. No. 9006 as this would truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to
media during elections. Respondent herein sees this as an avenue of levelling the playing field
between the poor and rich candidates/political parties.
Moreover, the COMELEC’s issuance of the assailed Resolution is in accordance with Section
4, Article IX(C) of the Constitution which vests on the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate,
during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass media.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions
is unconstitutional
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. The respondent’s reason for imposing the “aggregate-based”
airtime limits—levelling the playing field—does not constitute a compelling state interest which would
justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philiosophies, platforms and programs of government.
The Court further emphasized that even a slight increase in television exposure can
significantly boost a candidate’s popularity, name recall and electability. If that be so, then drastically
curtailing the ability of a candidate to effectively reach out to the electorate would unjustifiably curtail
his freedom to speak as a means of connecting with the people.
xiii. Sison v COMELEC

(G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999)
ROMERO, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Peter Sison filed a petition to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or
proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections while the election returns were being
canvassed by the Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before the winning candidates were
proclaimed. It was supposedly filed pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended) on the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud and acts
analogous thereto which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election returns and
in the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect."
While the petition was pending before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the City
Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the winning
candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition before
it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) that
the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 7166.
Hence, this petition for certiorari to impugn the resolution of respondent COMELEC alleging
that the minutes of the canvassing committee of the City Board of Canvassers were, by themselves,
sufficient evidence to support the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of public respondent COMELEC.
RULING:
No. At the start, Sison filed his petition under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code regarding
failure of elections but he later builds his case as a pre-proclamation controversy which is covered by
Sections 241-248 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7166.
In any case, petitioner's case would not prosper on any of the remedies he aims to pursue.
Recently, in Matalam v. Commission on Elections, the Court declared that a pre-proclamation
controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of
elections, founded as they are on different grounds.
Under the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of
elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the
election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after
the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. The Court found nothing that could support an action for
declaration of failure of elections. The petitioner never alleged at all that elections were either not held
or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect lacked any substantive support to
describe just exactly how the failure to elect came about. On the other hand, with regards to pre-
proclamation controversy, it is only limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The reason for the limitations in the said election law is that pre-proclamation
controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and
proclamation be delayed as little as possible.
However, with the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested, a pre-
proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the more appropriate remedies being a
regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto. Paragraph 3 of the COMELEC's Omnibus
Resolution No. 3049 (Omnibus Resolution on Pending Cases) dated June 29, 1998, clearly stated
that "All other pre-proclamation cases . . . shall be deemed terminated pursuant to Section 16, R.A.
7166 which refers to the termination of pre-proclamation cases when the term of the office involved
has already begun, which is precisely what obtains here.
In response petitioner stated that his petition is one of those cases which should have
remained active pursuant to paragraph 4 thereof. However, the exception only applies to petitions
for disqualification, failure of elections or analogous cases and not to pre-proclamation
controversies such as the present case.
xiv. Soliva v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 141723, April 20, 2001)
Kapunan, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners and private respondents vied for local posts in Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR),
Agusan del Norte during the 1998 elections. Petitioners belonged to LakasNUCD party, while private
respondents ran under the Laban ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) banner.
After election day, all the LAKAS candidates were proclaimed as winning candidates. Six days
after that respondent Bacquial filed a petitions to declare a failure of elections due to “massive fraud,
terrorism, ballot switching, stuffing of ballot boxes, delivery of ballot boxes by petitioner Soliva, his
wife and men from several precincts to the supposed canvassing area, failure of the counting of votes
in the precincts or polling places, and other anomalies or irregularities. Baludio, one of Soliva’s men,
allegedly attempted to assassinate Bacquial when he was about to cast his vote. This petition was
amended to include the other candidates under LAMMP.
COMELEC granted the petition and declared a failure of elections in RTR. COMELEC
likewise declared the proclamation of winners to be null and void. COMELEC called for a special
election.
Petitioners filed this present petition for certiorari and prohibition attributing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of, jurisdiction to COMELEC, when, without any formal
proceedings and absent any formal presentation of evidence and witnesses, it declared a failure of
elections. SolGen maintains that the declaration is proper because of the grounds stated by private
respondents.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC erred in declaring a failure of election in the entire municipality of RTR
RULING:
The COMELEC did not err, did not commit grave abuse of discretion; the petition was
dismissed.
The 1987 Constitution vested upon the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws
and regulations of the conduct of elections as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions
affecting elections, except the question as to the right to vote. (plenary – full, entire, complete)
Section 4 of RA 7166 provide that the postponement, declaration of failure of elections and
the calling of special elections shall be decided by COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates 3 instances when the COMELEC may
declare a failure of election and call for the holding of a special election: o when the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed due to force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous cases o when the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of voting o when after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect.
The SC agrees with the findings of COMELEC that there was a failure of election. The
counting of the votes and the canvassing of election returns were clearly attended by fraud,
intimidation, terrorism and harassment. Findings of fact of administrative bodies charged with a
specific field of expertise are afforded great weight and respect by the courts.
Petitioners did not assail the claim that the counting of votes was transferred from the polling
place to the multi-purpose gymnasium without the knowledge of private respondents. They were done
without the accredited watchers or duly authorized representatives of private respondents.
They likewise did not deny that the transfer of the counting was without the authority of
COMELEC as required by law. The provisions in COMELEC resolution no. 2971 state that the
counting of votes should be in the polling place and conducting without interruption, and that if the
counting of votes were to be transferred to a safer place, it should be effected through an unanimous
approval of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and concurred by the majority of watchers present.
These sections were violated. These provisions emphasize the need to safeguard the popular will.
Petitioners did not submit any counter affidavits to rebut the sworn statements submitted by
the witnesses for the private respondents. The elections cannot be accorded regularity and validity.
The circumstances constitute a failure of election, and thus, COMELEC is empowered to annul the
election and call for a special election.
xv. Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. 192474, June 26, 2012)
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo Jalosjos ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While
serving as Mayor, he bought a house and lot in Brgy. Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, and
renovated the same. After a while, he began occupying the house.
After eight months, Jalosjos applied with the Election Regulatory Board of Ipil, Zamboanga to
transfer his voter’s record to Precint 005iF of Brgy. Veterans Village. Respondent Dan Erasmo
opposed the application. ERB approved Jalosjos application and denied Erasmo’s opposition. He
then filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters of Precint 0051F before
MCTC. MCTC rendered its decision in favor of Erasmo, since Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile
in Tampilisan since he is still the Mayor there.
Jalosjos appealed to RTC and the RTC affirmed the MCTC decision.
Jalosjos elevated the issue to the CA through a petition for certiorari, with an application for
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary injuction. On November 2009, CA granted his application. On
Nov. 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his COC for the representative of 2 nd district of Zamboanga Sibugay for
May 10, 2010 National Election because of that Erasmo file a Petition to deny his COC before
COMELEC due to material representation when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. COMELEC dismissed Erasmo’s petition due to insufficiency in form and substance. While
Erasmo’s Motion for Reconsideration was pending in COMELEC En Banc, election took place and
Jalosjos won as the Representative of Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
On June 3, 2010, granted Erasmo’s motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos
ineligible to seek election as rep of 2 nd district of Sibugay because Jalosjos did not satisfy the
residency requirement since he was still mayor of Tampilisan. Jalosjos and Erasmos came up to this
court on certiorari. Jalosjos challenges Comelec’s finding that he didn’t meet the residency
requirement. Erasmo assails the COMELEC en banc, failure to annul Jalosjos’ proclamation as
elected Representative of 2nd district. The court ordered the consolidation of 3 related petitions. OSG
sought the dismissal of Erasmo’s petition and grant of that Jalosjos since all such petitions deal with
the latter qualifications as proclaimed representative of 2 nd district. OSG claims that jurisdiction over
this issue lies with HRET.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the question of
Jalosjos residency qualification for running for the position of Representative of the Second District
of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has
assumed the discharge of that office.
RULING:
COMELEC’s power includes power to decide all questions affecting powers but with
limitations. It does not extend to contest relating to election, returns and qualifications. The
constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the HRET. COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction when it still passed the issue of Jalosjos qualification when he was already declared
winner.
On Election Day of 2010, the COMELEC en banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal from
the 2nd division dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there existed no final
judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought.
The last standing official action in his case before Election Day was the ruling of the
COMELEC’s 2nd division that allowed his name to stay on the list. Any issue regarding his qualification
is for HRET to decide. GR No. 192474- COMELEC EN BANC exceeded in jurisdiction in declaring
Jalosjos ineligible since COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over his case.
Petition by Erasmos: GR No.192704 and 193566- questions the validity of Jalosjos

registration is void. The court cannot usurp the power vested by constitution solely to HRET.
xvi. Reyes v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 207264. June 25, 2013.)
PEREZ, J .:
FACTS:
Petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of
the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque.
On October 31, 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to
Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the
petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations. On March 27, 2013, the
COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April28,
2013. On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18,2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On
June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same
day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of
June 30, 2013. According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was
duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has
the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of the members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner
and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of Marinduque.
RULING:
COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation, (2)
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the House of Representatives yet
as she has not assumed office yet. Also, the 2 nd requirement was not validly complied with as a
valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives and (2) in open
session. Here, although she made the oath before the Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication
that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the
required oath of office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged
and proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as having to be done with grave abuse of
discretion, the grave abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
The court finds that the petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that the
grave abuse of discretion exists.
xvii. Cawasa vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 150469, July 3, 2002)
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
During the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner Jun Rascal Cawasa and private respondent
Adbulmalik M. Manamparan were among the candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Nunungan,
Lanao del Norte.
Out of the forty (40) precincts in Nunungan, only thirty-six (36) functioned, as there was a
failure of election in the remaining four (4) precincts.
After canvassing the election returns from the 36 precincts, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Nunungan deferred the proclamation of all winning candidates due to the failure of the
said 4 precincts to function. Special elections were set on May 30, 2001 considering that the number
of registered voters in the remaining four precincts would affect the election results.
The venue of the special elections was transferred to the adjacent municipalities of Sultan
Naga Dimaporo and Sapad in lieu of the regular polling places located in barangays Bangko,
Cabasaran and Liangan. Military personnel were also appointed as members of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI for brevity) in the 4 precincts.
During the May 14, 2001 regular elections, the lead of petitioner Cawasa was eighty six (86).
After the May 30, 2001 special elections, private respondent Manamparan overcame the margin with
a lead of 297 votes. Petitioner Cawasa was proclaimed mayor of Nunungan and his co-petitioners
Maasiral Dampa, H. Ackil Mamantuc, Momolawan Macali, Andar Tali, Allan Sanayon and Amin
Sangaran were also proclaimed as councilors of Nunungan.
Private respondent Manamparan filed an appeal and petition to annul the proclamation of
petitioner Cawasa.
On October 24, 2001, the Comelec en banc promulgated a resolution annulling the results of
the special elections of the 4 precincts.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the transfer of the polling places to the adjacent municipalities is legal;
2. Whether or not the appointment of military personnel as members of the board of
election inspectors is legal
RULING:
1. No, the transfer of the polling places to the adjacent municipalities is not legal.
Section 154 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as the requirements for polling places are
concerned, states that no designation of polling places shall be changed except upon written petition
of the majority of the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of
the Commission upon prior notice and hearing.
As clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the
preceding regular election. However, changes may be initiated by written petition of the majority of the
voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the Comelec after
notice and hearing. But ultimately, it is the Comelec which determines whether a change is necessary
after notice and hearing.
2. No, the appointment of military personnel as members of the board of election inspectors
is not legal.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6646 which modified Section 164 of the Omnibus Election
Code clearly states that the BEI shall be composed of a chairman and two members, all of whom are
public school teachers. If there are not enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools,
employees in the civil service or other citizens of known probity and competence may be appointed.
Nothing in petitioners’ pleadings would even suggest that the substitution was made for cause
and after hearing.
xviii. Dumarpa v COMELEC

(G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013)
PEREZ, J:
FACTS:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declared a total failure of elections in seven (7)
municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao, and Kapai, which are
situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur.
The conduct of special elections in the seven (7) municipalities was originally scheduled for
29 May 2010 but was reset to 3 June 2010 for several reasons. For instance, there were precincts in
eight (8) other municipalities aside from the said seven (7) municipalities where there were also failure
of elections. The results of the elections, due to the failure in the said municipalities, would affect the
elections not only in the provincial but also in the municipal level.
Subsequently, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8965 (“Guidelines and Procedures in the
Conduct of Special Elections in Some Areas Where There are Failure of Elections during the Conduct
of the [10 May 2010] National Elections”) which provided, among others, the constitution of Special
Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and Clustering of Precincts in Section 12.
Petitioner Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur of the
said national elections. A day before the scheduled special elections, Dumarpa led the instant petition
alleging that the provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and on the constitution of
SBEIs (Section 4) will affect the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom
petitioner to certain defeat, if its implementation is not restrained or prohibited. Dumarpa objects to
the re-clustering of precincts, only for the Municipality of Masiu, because it was undertaken: (1)
without notice and hearing to the candidates affected; (2) in less than thirty days before the conduct
of the special elections; and (3) the polling place was reduced from 21 to only 3 voting centers which
Dumarpa's opponent, Representative Hussin Pangandaman, controls.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, in issuing Sections 12 and 4 of Resolution No. 8965.
RULING:
No. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8965, in the exercise of its plenary powers as enshrined
in the Constitution. Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution provides that COMELEC has the
broad power to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” COMELEC carries with it all necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Thus, COMELEC has the authority to effect the re-clustering of precincts when necessary to prevent
failure of election and to promote free, orderly, and honest elections.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8965, containing the assailed provisions on re-clustering of the
precincts and the designation of special board of election inspectors, was issued precisely because
of the total failure of elections in several municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Sur. Plainly, it is
precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of elections in the said fifteen (15) municipalities
in the province of Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC issued the said Resolution No. 8965.
The COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best position to assess the
actual condition prevailing in that area and to make judgment calls based thereon. COMELEC has to
make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of the
voters. In the performance of its duties, COMELEC must be given considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal
or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be inferred with. In the process, the actions of
COMELEC, even though debatable, cannot be interfered with by the Court.
4. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
a. Orocio v Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 75959. August 31, 1992)
DAVIDE JR., J.:
FACTS:
On May 25, 1982 an accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant of the National Power
Corporation (NPC). Based on the accident report, tube leaks were confirmed at 2:30 am. The tubes
were drained and prepared for repair by maintenance personnel. By 8:45 am the system was declared
safe for repair. From that time on until 11:10 work ensued, until the plug from the leaking tube gave
way. The leaking tube spew hot steam and water, injuring two personnel making the repairs. One of
the men injured, Domingo Abodizo, was a contractual janitor employed by OP Landrito’s General
Services (OPLGS), NPC’s janitorial contractor. His hospitalization expenses amounted to P53,
802.26. NPC initially advanced this amount by setting it up as an account receivable from OPLGS
deducted on a staggered basis from the latter's billings against NPC until the same was fully satisfied.
Subsequently OPLGS requested for a refund of the said amount. NPC’s Legal Services Division
Chief, Orocio, found negligence on their part (quasi-delict), he therefore recommended the
reimbursement to OPLGS of the said amount. But later on it was disallowed by the COA. COA made
certain officers of NPC liable for the disallowance (approving authority, chief accountant, etc),
including Orocio.
ISSUE:
(1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied upon for the disbursement in
question, preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in post-audit such disbursement?
(2) Has the General Counsel of the COA the authority to decide a motion to reconsider the
disallowance in question?
RULING:
1. NPC as a government-owned corporation is under the COA's audit power. Under the 1973
Constitution, which was the Constitution in force at the time the disallowance in question was made,
the COA had the power to, inter alia, examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and
regulations, all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations; and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds or property.
The 1987 Constitution preserves this power and function and grants the COA:". . . exclusive
authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties."
Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more active role and
invested it with broader and more extensive powers. These were not meant to make it a toothless
tiger, but a dynamic, effective, efficient and independent watchdog of the Government.
In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as

the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not
be bound by the opinion of the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been
the basis for the questioned disbursement.
In the instant case, on the basis of the pertinent documents attached to the pleadings, the
COA auditor had every reason to believe that the disbursement of P53,802.26 by the NPC as a refund
to the OPLGS for the hospitalization expenses of Abodizo, on the theory that the NPC was actually
liable under the law on quasi-delict, as determined by the petitions, was irregular, if not illegal. On the
contrary, in its letter of 30 August 1982, the OPLGS admitted that the "incident was purely accidental
in nature," but that "considering that the accident took place within the premises of the NPC and the
cause of which was the Tube leaks of HPH 5B, which was still undergoing repair, it is but proper that
cost of hospital bills and other expenses incurred by MR. DOMINGO ABODIZO be shouldered by the
National Power Corporation."
2. The COA, both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is a collegial body. It must resolve
cases presented to it as such. Its General Counsel cannot act for the Commission for he is not even
a Commissioner thereof. He can only offer legal advice or render an opinion in order to aid the COA
in the resolution of a case or a legal question.
b. OSMEÑA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

[G.R. No. 110045. November 29, 1994.]
NARVASA, C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner as Mayor of the City of Cebu seeks nullification of the Decision of respondent
Commission on Audit disallowing the amount of P30,000.00 appropriated by the City of Cebu relative
to a compromise agreement entered into in a Civil Case brought by the de la Cerna Spouses of the
Regional Trial Court which compromise was in due course embodied in a judgment of the Court
rendered. The controversy had its origin in the stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo de la
Cerna, the son of the aforementioned de la Cerna Spouses, in the afternoon of September 6, 1985.
He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately expired in the evening of that same
day due to severe loss of blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it not
for the "ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff"
of the Medical Center.
The de la Cerna Spouses instituted a recovery of damages in the RTC with the City of Cebu
as one of the defendants which, according to the complaint, "operates, maintains, and manages the
Cebu City Medical Center". After the action had been pending for some time, negotiations for an
amicable settlement were commenced. Since the compromise agreement included a provision for
the payment of the sum of P30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu, the agreement was
submitted to the Sanggunian of the City, which ratified the same. It authorized "the City Budget
Officer, Cebu City, to include in Supplemental Budget No. IV of the City . . . for the year 1989 the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS for financial assistance to the parents of the
late Reynaldo de la Cerna. The agreement was also submitted to the Regional Trial Court which
rendered a judgment "finding the same to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy" and
enjoining the parties "to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof. About eleven months
later, however, respondent Commission on Audit disallowed the "financial assistance" thus granted
to the spouses de la Cerna, in its Decision No. 1364, which stated that, “It is not within the powers of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu to provide, either under the general welfare clause or even on
humanitarian grounds, monetary assistance that would promote the economic condition and private
interests of certain individuals only.”
The City of Cebu led a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 1991, but as already
stated, the same was "denied due course" by respondent Commission in its Decision No. 2773
because the motion was led more than a year after receipt by the City government of notice of its
Decision No. 364. In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña has come to this Court
ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COA and its Members in so disallowing the city's
appropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil suit
against the City, embodied in due course in the Trial Court's judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COA committed grave abuse of discretion disallowing the
appropriation for the exhaustion of the compromise agreement.
RULING:
YES. The Court believes that public respondents' disallowance of the appropriation is indeed
tainted by grave abuse of discretion and should be correspondingly rectified. The Court believes that
respondent COA grievously misconstrued the undertaking of Cebu City to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs
of the deceased Reynaldo de la Cerna. For some reason, perhaps partly because of the imprecise
phraseology of the Sangguniang Panlungsod’s resolution, respondent considered that undertaking
as simply furnishing "monetary assistance that would promote the economic condition and private
interests of certain individuals only, and that said financial assistance definitely having no causal
relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the community. The appropriation of P30,000.00
was considered by respondent out of context; it was construed as intended only to promote the private
interests of the de la Cerna family, as merely a form of financial assistance to a bereaved family
without causal relation to the general welfare of the community. In truth, as respondent was well
aware, the appropriation was a part of the package agreed upon by all the parties in Civil Case No.
4275 of the Cebu RTC for the amicable settlement of the controversy; it may not be considered
independently of said amicable settlement; it would be meaningless unless considered in the context
of the compromise of the case. The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement
of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto, are indubitably
within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is
involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by
law. Obviously, respondent refused to take account of the foregoing legal principles in relation to the
antecedents of the provision in the supplemental budget of the City for payment of P30,000.00. It
failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the consideration, not merely for the settlement of a
claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy, and constituted one of the "reciprocal
concessions" which the law considers "the very heart and life of every compromise.
It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by, and embodied in the
judgment of, the Court, which pronounced it "to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy"
and enjoined the parties "to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof." his judicial
compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties, including the City of Cebu. It is enforceable
by execution, as above stressed. There was no reason whatever to object to it, much less disallow
any disbursement therein stipulated. It should have been approved as a matter of course.
c. TESDA v. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Upon post audit, the TESDA audit team leader discovered that for the calendar years 2004-
2007, TESDA paid EME twice each year to its officials from two sources: (1) the General fund for
locally-funded projects, and (2) the Technical Education and Skills Development Project (TESDP)
Fund for the foreign-assisted projects.
On 15 May 2008, the audit team issued Notice of Disallowance No. 08-002-101 (04- 06)
disallowing the payment of EME amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in excess of the amount
allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. In addition, the EME were disbursed to TESDA officials whose
positions were not of equivalent ranks as authorized by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), contrary to the provisions of the 2004- 2007 GAAs. Notice of Disallowance No. 08-002-101
(04-06) indicated the persons liable for the excessive payment of EME: the approving officers, payees
and the accountants.
On 4 July 2008, TESDA, through its then Director-General Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., filed
an Appeal Memorandum arguing that the 2004-2007 GAAs and the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual allowed the grant of EME from both the General Fund and the TESDP Fund provided
the legal ceiling was not exceeded for each fund. According to TESDA, the General Fund and the
TESDP Fund are distinct from each other, and TESDA officials who were designated as project
officers concurrently with their regular functions were entitled to separate EME from both funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commission on Audit gravely erred in disallowing the payments made by
TESDA to its officials of their EME from both general and TESDP fund.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public funds, with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. The COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the
exercise of its constitutional duty and the Court generally sustains its decisions in recognition of its
expertise in the laws it is entrusted to enforce.
The GAA provisions are clear that the EME shall not exceed the amounts fixed in the GAA.
The GAA provisions are also clear that only the officials named in the GAA, the officers of equivalent
rank as may be authorized by the DBM, and the offices under them are entitled to claim EME not
exceeding the amount provided in the GAA.
The COA merely complied with its mandate when it disallowed the EME that were reimbursed
to officers who were not entitled to the EME, or who received EME in excess of the allowable amount.
When the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, there should be no room for interpretation but
only its application.
d. Gonzales v. Provincial Auditor of Iloilo

(G.R. No. L-20568, December 28, 1964)
ZALDIVAR, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Gonzales was appointed Assistant on Complaints and Investigation, Office
of the Governor, by Governor Jose C. Zulueta of Iloilo, effective July 1, 1961, with compensation at
the rate of P250.00 a month. At the time of his appointment the petitioner was holding the Office of
Municipal Councilor of Lambunao, Iloilo, and he had not resigned from said office as he had accepted
the appointment in the office of the Governor.
On July 31, 1961, petitioner presented a voucher covering his salary as Assistant on
Complaints and Investigation for July 1961 in the amount of P250.00 to the respondent Provincial
Auditor of Iloilo for audit, but said respondent refused to pass it in audit for the reason that the
petitioner continued to hold office as Councilor of Lambunao and so he may not be legally appointed
Assistant in the Office of the Governor with compensation payable from the provincial funds. The
respondent Provincial Auditor reasoned out that said appointment was in violation of the provisions
of Sec. 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code as construed by the Secretary of Justice in his
Opinion No. 121, Series of 1951.
On August 2, 1961 petitioner appealed to the Auditor General the action of the respondent
Provincial Auditor denying to pass in audit his salary voucher for the month of July 1961. On
November 26, 1961, the Auditor General upheld the action of the respondent.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued to serve as such Assistant until December 31, 1961, when
he resigned. Upon his resignation, the petitioner prepared a salary voucher for P1,500.00 covering
his salary for six months from July 1, 1961 to December 31, 1961 and presented to the respondent
the said voucher but the respondent verbally informed the petitioner that he (respondent) would deny
audit of the voucher for the same reason that he denied audit of the salary voucher for P250.00
covering the salary for July 1961.
On August 11, 1961, while acting as such Assistant in the Office of the Governor, petitioner
obtained a cash advance of P200.00 from the office of the Provincial Treasurer for travelling expenses
within the province in connection with his duties. When the petitioner sought the liquidation of the said
cash advance by submitting a voucher for per diems the respondent Provincial Auditor, on June 5,
1962, again refused to pass said voucher in audit on the same ground that he refused to pass in audit
the salary vouchers aforementioned. Because of the Refusal by the respondent Provincial Auditor to
pass in audit the voucher covering the per diems and settlement of the cash advance, the Provincial
Treasurer also refused to pay the claim of the petitioner for per diems.
Instead of appealing to the office of the President of the Philippines the decision of the Auditor
General upholding the action of respondent Provincial Auditor, the petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The petitioner alleged that the respondent Provincial
Auditor, in refusing to pass in audit the said vouchers for salaries and per diems was unlawfully
neglecting the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his
office.
The Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo, in representation of the respondent Provincial Auditor, filed an
answer, and alleged that petitioner being a duly elected municipal councilor of Lambunao, Iloilo, and,
acting as such from July 1, 1961 to December 31, 1961, he could not at the same time legally assume
the office of Assistant on Complaints and Investigation in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Iloilo
without violating Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, and consequently the petitioner
was not entitled to collect his salary as such Assistant in the Office of the Governor.
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo denied the petition for mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus.
RULING:
Yes. The lower court did not err in dismissing the petition.
The rule, that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been
exhausted and that special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if
superior administrative officers could grant relief, is squarely applicable to the present case.
Petitioner was a personnel in the government service when he claimed for payment of his
salary. When the respondent Provincial Auditor refused to pass in audit his salary voucher, the
petitioner appealed to the Auditor General. The matter of passing in audit a salary voucher is not a
ministerial function. The Auditor General exercises a discretion or a quasi-judicial power when he
acts on whether to pass a salary voucher in audit or not. Certainly the Auditor General has the power
to look into the question of whether the person claiming salary payment is entitled to the salary or
not. The Auditor General may err. The decision of the Auditor General is appealable to the President
of the Philippines. When the Auditor General sustained the action of the respondent Provincial Auditor
of Iloilo in refusing to pass in audit the salary voucher of the petitioner, what he should have done,
being then a government employee, was to appeal to the President from the decision of the Auditor
General. This the petitioner did not do. Instead he filed the present action for mandamus in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo. The step taken by the petitioner was not in accordance with the procedure
provided by law. The petitioner had still a recourse open to him, and that was to appeal to the
President of the Philippines.
e. Guevara vs. Gimenez

(G.R. No. L-17171. January 30, 1965)
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, acting for and in
behalf thereof, asked petitioner to cooperate with the legal counsel of the Central Bank in defending
the same and its Monetary Board in a civil case.
Accordingly petitioner entered his appearance as counsel for the respondents in said case
and argued therein, verbally and in writing. The Governor presented to the Board and the latter
approved by unanimous vote, the designation of Judge Guillermo Guevara as counsel to collaborate
with the Legal Counsel of the Central Bank. The Board also authorized the Governor to arrange with
Judge Guevera the amount of fee which the latter will charge the Central Bank for handling the said
cases. Prior thereto the latter had sent to the Central Bank his bill for the retainer's fee of P10, 000.
The Bank Auditor sought advice thereon from the Auditor General, who stated that he would
not object to the retainer's fees, provided that its payment was made in installments. With the
understanding that, "in case there is no appeal from the CFI decision, the balance will be paid in full",
once, presumably, the decision has become final. As regards the P300 per diem, the Auditor General
express however, the belief that it is "excessive and may be allowed in audit".
Hence, the present action for mandamus to compel respondent to approve payment of
petitioner's retainer fee and his per diem aggregating P3,300, for the 11 hearings attended by him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Auditor General has the authority to disapprove the expenditures he
deemed unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable.
RULING:
The Auditor General has no mandate to disapprove expenditures which in his opinion
excessive and extravagant. Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General, in connection
with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property
pertaining to, or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article XI,
section 2, of the Constitution).
Such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a
given purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity
with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been
delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and
whether payment therefore has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or
bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to
approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion
or authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was
unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable.
If he entertains such belief, he may do so more than discharge the duty imposed upon him by
the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), "to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer
expenditures of funds or Property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant". This duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such
expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefore, would bring to the attention of the
aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse action thus taken by the General
Auditing office, and, hence, render the imposition of said duty unnecessary.
f. Feliciano v Commission on Audit

(G. R. No. 147402. 10 June 2003
CARPIO, J:
FACTS:
A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of LMWD.
Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999 requesting payment of auditing
fees. Petitioner, the General Manager of Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) informing COA’s
Regional Director that the water district could not pay the auditing fees citing Sections 6 and 20
of Presidential Decree 198 ("PD 198"), as well as Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 ("RA 6758")
as basis.
Petitioner wrote COA through the Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing fees
LMWD previously paid to COA. COA Chairman Celso D. Gangan's Resolution dated 3 January 2000
denied petitioners requests. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which
COA denied.
ISSUES: Whether a Local Water District ("LWD") created under PD 198, as amended, is a
government-owned or controlled corporation subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA.
RULING:
Yes. The Constitution and existing laws mandate COA to audit all government agencies,
including government-owned and controlled corporations ("GOCCs") with original charters. An LWD
is a GOCC with an original charter. Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides for COA's
audit jurisdiction, as follows:
SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority
and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust
by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions
and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system
of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct
the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such
period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The COA's audit jurisdiction extends not only to government "agencies or instrumentalities,"
but also to "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" as well as "other
government-owned or controlled corporations" without original charters.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations

through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that
Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-
owned or controlled.
Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created under
the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that "[A]ll corporations organized under this
code shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation . . .." LWDs
have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no
stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor
appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office.
LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter. Since under
the Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations may have special charters, LWDs
can validly exist only if they are government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are private
corporations with a special charter is to admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm.
The constitutional criterion on the exercise of COA's audit jurisdiction depends on the
government's ownership or control of a corporation. The nature of the corporation, whether it is
private, quasi-public, or public is immaterial.
The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over "government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters," as well as "government-owned or controlled corporations" without
original charters. GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA pre-audit, while GOCCs without
original charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original charters refer to corporations
created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by the government. The nature or
purpose of the corporation is not material in determining COA's audit jurisdiction. Neither is the
manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or special law.
The determining factor of COA's audit jurisdiction is government ownership or control of the
corporation.
Petitioner argues that PD 198 expressly prohibits COA auditors, or any government auditor
for that matter, from auditing LWDs. Petitioner asserts that this is the import of the second sentence
of Section 20 of PD 198 when it states that "[A]uditing shall be performed by a certified public
accountant not in the government service."
PD 198 cannot prevail over the Constitution. No amount of clever legislation can exclude
GOCCs like LWDs from COA's audit jurisdiction. No amount of clever legislation can exclude GOCCs
like LWDs from COA's audit jurisdiction. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution outlaws any
scheme or devise to escape COA's audit jurisdiction, thus:
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution added Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution precisely to
annul provisions of Presidential Decrees, like that of Section 20 of PD 198, that exempt GOCCs from
COA audit.
Petitioner also claims that the auditing fees COA charges LWDs for audit services violate
the prohibition in Section 18 of RA 6758.
Petitioner's claim has no basis.

Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits COA personnel from receiving any kind of compensation from
any government entity except "compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations and
contributions." Thus, RA 6758 itself recognizes an exception to the statutory ban on COA personnel
receiving compensation from GOCCs.
COA may charge GOCCs "actual audit cost" but GOCCs must pay the same directly to COA
and not to COA auditors. Petitioner has not alleged that COA charges LWDs auditing fees in
excess of COA's "actual audit cost." Neither has petitioner alleged that the auditing fees are paid by
LWDs directly to individual COA auditors. Thus, petitioner's contention must fail.
g. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private auditing
firm for calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident
auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose services were
unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary.
On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of the DBP's contract
with Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four months earlier on March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairman's
covering handwritten note sought the COA's concurrence to the contract.
During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for concurrence, the DBP paid the
billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.14 despite the objection of the COA. On
October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman issued a Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding
the following persons personally liable for such payment:
ISSUE: Whether or not public corporations under the jurisdiction of the COA employ private auditors.
RULING:
The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA enjoys the
sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies, including the DBP. The
COA contends this is similar to its sole and exclusive authority, under the second paragraph of the
same Section, to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including
rules on the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of government agencies. The bare language
of Section 2, however, shows that the COA's power under the first paragraph is not declared
exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive."
The qualifying word "exclusive" in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to
the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is intended to refer
only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated, and not to a phrase distantly located in
another paragraph or sub-section.26 Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it
appears, without the word "exclusive", signifying that non-COA auditors can also examine and audit
government agencies. Besides, the framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the word
"exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external
auditors.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's
power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define the
scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures
is exclusive.
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the
COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-
passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination
and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual
scrutiny of a COA audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point
to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and
audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow
independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there
is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is
privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The letter-decision of the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit dated August 29, 1988, and the letter-decision promulgated by the Commission
on Audit en banc dated May 20, 1989, are hereby SET ASIDE, and the temporary restraining order
issued by the court enjoining respondent Commission on Audit from enforcing the said decisions is
hereby made PERMANENT.
h. Edmundo C. Sambeli, doing business as ECS Enterprises v. Province of Isabela,

Provincial Treasurer of Isabela and Commission on Audit
(G.R. No. 92279; June 18, 1992)
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
On October 2, 1987, an agreement was entered into by and between the Province of Isabela
and ECS Enterprises for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels and 1 set
of radio communication equipment. Out of the items to be delivered, a partial delivery of 150 units of
wheelbarrows and 419 pieces of shovels were made on November 11, 1987 for the total price of
P380,538.60. The Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only 50% or P190,338.20 "pending
receipt of the reply to the query to the Price Evaluation Division, COA, Technical Staff Office, Quezon
City."
A second delivery of 150 units of wheelbarrows and 418 pieces of shovels was made on
December 1, 1987, and payment of P190,200.00 or 50% of P380,400.00 was allowed by the
Provincial Auditor, bringing the total payments made to P380,538.20 or 50% of P761,077.20 (the total
cost of 300 units of wheelbarrows and 837 pieces of shovels).
Based on the findings of the Price Evaluation Division, COA Technical Service Office, Quezon
City, the Provincial Auditor advised the Provincial Treasurer in his letter that an overprice in the total
amount of P619,042.20 exists out of the total price of P761,077.20 offered by ECS Enterprises or an
overpayment of P195,893.10.
The President/General Manager of ECS Enterprises in his letter to the Provincial Treasurer
made no comment on the overpricing but instead proposed 10% deduction on the unpaid balance.
The Provincial auditor forwarded the matter to the COA Regional Director who formally endorsed the
stand of the Provincial Auditor.
ECS Enterprises appealed to the respondent Commission on Audit. In a letter, the

Commission denied the appeal and affirmed the position of the Provincial Auditor and the COA
Regional Director.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the COA as not valid. It contends that the contract of sale has
not only been perfected between the Province of Isabela and petitioner but delivery has been made
by it with the corresponding partial payment by the Province of Isabela. Thus, it is allegedly incumbent
upon COA to authorize the payment of the balance because to act otherwise will constitute an
impairment of contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disallowance made by COA is constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully
protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or
uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On the proposition that improper or wasteful
spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being highly irregular or
unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign people's will, it
behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto.
i. Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit

(G.R. 103309, November 27 1992)
Campos,Jr J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the Northern
Luzon Regional Center covering the provinces of Rizal up to Batanes. As such he was issued a
government vehicle with plate number SCC 387. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in the Board
Resolution No. 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of transportation allowance, the
petitioner, in addition to the use of government vehicle, claimed his transportation allowance for the
month of January 1989. On May 31, 1990, the petitioner received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable
dated April 17, 1990 from respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing
P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance. In a letter to the said Regional Auditor
dated June 18, 1990, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the disallowance of the claim for
transportation allowance. The Regional Auditor denied petitioner's motion in a letter dated June 27,
1990. Petitioner appealed this denial to the Commission on Audit at Quezon City, which denied do
due course.
ISSUE: Whether such denial to give due course to the appeal of herein petitioner constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
RULING:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
If We will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts
pertaining to this particular expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this
government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering inutile this
Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the
proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property.
The factual finding of the Commission that petitioner was indeed assigned a government,
vehicle is conclusive upon this Court. The petitioner faults respondent Regional Auditor for relying on
her serious doubts as to the nature of the use of the vehicle assigned to petitioner as basis for the
disallowance. Such issue is immaterial in the case at bar for the COA circular, in prohibiting the use
of motor vehicles by officials receiving transportation allowance, is categorical. The use of
government motor vehicle and the claim for transportation allowance are mutually exclusive. It is on
this basis that the P1,250.00 transportation allowance was disallowed.
Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner on Audit disallowing the petitioner's claim for
transportation allowance does not indicate a grave abuse of discretion which will warrant setting aside
and nullifying the said COA ruling.
j. De Jesus v. Commission on Audit

(G.R. 149154, June 10, 2003)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari was filed praying for the annulment of the Decision being issued on
September 20, 2000, and a Resolution dated July 5, 2001 by the Commission on Audit, affirming the
disallowance of payment of salaries and bonuses to members of the interim Board of Directors of the
Catbalogan Water District.
An auditing team from the COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of the
Catbalogan Water District (CWD) in Catbalgan, Samar. Between May to December 1997 and April
to June 1998, the auditing team discovered that the CWD interim Board of Directors granted benefits
for themselves such as Representation and Transportation Allowance, Rice Allowance, Productivity
Incentive Bonus, Anniversary Bonus, Year-End Bonus and cash gifts. These were authorized under
Resolution No. 313 of 1995 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).
On October 1, 1998, the auditing team issued two notices of disallowance being received by
petitioners on the ground that it violates Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198 (PD 198). Thus,
petitioners filed a petition to the COA, which was denied.
On July 5, 2001, the COA also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the members of the CWD Board cannot receive compensation and other benefits in addition to
the per diems or what was allowed by PD 198.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess
jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. The COA is simply exercising its duty under the Constitution, which is to examine and
audit disbursements of publics within the limitations of the law. The Constitution has vested the
COA the authority to determine whether government entities are complying with laws and
regulations in the disbursement of government funds in order to prevent the illegal or irregular
disbursement of such funds. The Commission also has the authority to investigate the directors,
officials or employees of government-owned and controlled corporations as to whether or not they
are entitled to receive such benefits under the law. In this case, water districts are under the
jurisdiction of the COA.
k. Funa v. Manila Economic Cultural Office

(G.R. No. 193462, 4 February 2014)
PEREZ, J:
FACTS:
The Philippines formally ended its official diplomatic relations with the government in Taiwan on 9
June 1975, when the country and the People’s Republic of China (PROC) expressed mutual
recognition thru the Joint Communiqué of the Government of the Republic of the PH and the
Government of the PROC (Joint Communiqué). Under the Joint Communiqué, the Philippines
categorically stated its adherence to the One China policy of the PROC. The PH however maintained
unofficial relations with Taiwan on a “people-to-people” basis. Maintaining ties with Taiwan that is
permissible by the terms of the Joint Communiqué, however, necessarily required the Philippines,
and Taiwan, to course any such relations thru offices outside of the official or governmental organs.
The Manila Economic Cultural Office (MECO) was organized on 16 December 1997 as a non-
stock, non-profit corporation under Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 or the Corporation Code. One of its
purposes, as stated in in its articles of incorporation, is to establish and develop the commercial and
industrial interests of Filipino nationals here and abroad, and assist on all measures designed to
promote and maintain the trade relations of the country with the citizens of other foreign countries.
From the moment it was incorporated, the MECO became the corporate entity "entrusted" by the
Philippine government with the responsibility of fostering "friendly" and "unofficial" relations with the
people of Taiwan, particularly in the areas of trade, economic cooperation, investment, cultural,
scientific and educational exchanges. To enable it to carry out such responsibility, the MECO was
"authorized" by the government to perform certain "consular and other functions" that relates to the
promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan.
On 23 Aug 2010, petitioner requested a copy of the latest financial and audit report of the
MECO from the Commission on Audit (COA), invoking his constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. On 25 Aug 2010 COA Assistant Commissioner Jaime P. Naranjo issued a
memorandum concerning the petitioner’s request and revealed that the MECO was not among the
agencies audited by any of the three clusters of the corporate government sector.
On 8 Sept 2010, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus impleading both the COA and MECO. The
petitioner posits that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA is neglecting its duty
under Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide
GOCC or government instrumentality. Petitioner filed the suit in his capacities as "taxpayer,
concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar and law book author."
According to petitioner, the MECO possesses all the essential characteristics of a GOCC and
an instrumentality under the Executive Order No. (EO) 292, s. 1987 or the Administrative Code: it is
a non-stock corporation vested with governmental functions relating to public needs; it is controlled
by the government thru a board of directors appointed by the President of the Philippines; and while
not integrated within the executive departmental framework, it is nonetheless under the operational
and policy supervision of the DTI.
The MECO denies the petitioner's claim that it is a GOCC or a government instrumentality.
While performing public functions, the MECO maintains that it is not owned or controlled by the
government, and its funds are private funds. The MECO emphasizes that categorizing it as a GOCC
or a government instrumentality can potentially violate the country's commitment to the One China
policy of the PROC.
The COA, on the other hand, advances that the mandamus petition ought to be dismissed on
procedural grounds and on the ground of mootness. The COA argues that the mandamus petition
suffers from the following procedural defects; that the petitioner lacks locus standi to bring the suit
and that the petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The COA argues that
the instant petition already became moot when COA Chairperson Maria Gracia M. Pulido-Tan (Pulido-
Tan) issued Office Order No. 2011- 698 on 6 October 2011 wherein Chairperson Pulido-Tan directed
a team of auditors to proceed to Taiwan, specifically for the purpose of auditing the accounts of the
MECO.
ISSUES:
1. W/N MECO is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) or government
instrumentality?
2. W/N the accounts of the MECO is subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA?
3. W/N petition should be dismissed on its procedural issues (mootness, no locus standi, disregard
for the principle of hierarchy of courts)?
RULING:
1. The MECO is a not a GOCC or a government instrumentality. Records disclose that the MECO
was incorporated as a non-stock corporation under the Corporation Code on 16 December 1977. The
MECO seeks to promote the general interests of the Filipino people in a foreign land. The functions
of the MECO, in other words, are of the kind that would otherwise be performed by the Philippines'
own diplomatic and consular organs, if not only for the government's acquiescence that they instead
be exercised by the MECO. Evidently, the functions vested in the MECO are impressed with a public
aspect. Organization as a non-stock corporation and the mere performance of functions with a public
aspect, however, are not by themselves sufficient to consider the MECO as a GOCC. In order to
qualify as a GOCC, a corporation must also, if not more importantly, be owned by the government.
The fact of the incorporation of the MECO under the Corporation Code is key. It is clear that
the MECO is uniquely situated as compared with other private corporations. From its over-reaching
corporate objectives, its special duty and authority to exercise certain consular functions, up to the
oversight by the executive department over its operations — all the while maintaining its legal status
as a non-governmental entity — the MECO is, for all intents and purposes, sui generis.
*Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by reason of

some "special function or jurisdiction" they perform or exercise, are allotted "operational autonomy"
and are "not integrated within the department framework. " Government-Owned or -Controlled
Corporation (GOCC) refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly
or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least a majority of its
outstanding capital stock.
2. Certain accounts of the MECO may be audited by the COA. Despite being a non-governmental
entity, the MECO may still be audited with respect to the "verification fees" for overseas employment
documents that the latter collects from Taiwanese employers on behalf of the DOLE. The MECO is
mandated to remit to the national government a portion of such "verification fees,” since these fees
are receivables of the DOLE. The "verification fees" mentioned here refers to the "service fee for the
verification of overseas employment contracts, recruitment agreement or special powers of attorney"
that the DOLE was authorized to collect under Section 7 of EO No. 1022
The MECO is also authorized to collect "consular fees" from the exercise of its delegated
consular functions. The "consular fees," are, without question, derived from the exercise by the MECO
of consular functions — functions it performs by and only through special authority from the
government. The authority behind "consular fees" is Section 2 (6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. The said
section authorizes the MECO to collect "reasonable fees" for its performance of the following consular
functions.
The MECO handles government funds in the form of the "verification fees" it collects on behalf
of the DOLE and the "consular fees" it collects under Section 2 (6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence,
under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such "verification fees"
and "consular fees" should be audited by the COA.
Section 14 (1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit accounts
of non-governmental entities "required to pay . . . or have government share" but only with respect to
"funds . . . coming from or through the government." This provision of law perfectly fits the MECO.
The MECO receives the “verification fees” and “consular fees” through the government, having been
derived from the exercise of consular functions entrusted to them by the government.
3. The SC believes that the mandamus petition was able to craft substantial issues presupposing the
commission of a grave violation of the constitution and involving a paramount public interest which
need to be resolved despite mootness. The SC also believes that the case before them is dangerously
capable of being repeated yet evading review. Therefore the SC should not dismiss the petition on
the ground of mootness.
The SC sustains the petitioner’s standing, as a concerned citizen, to file the mandamus
petition. The instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance, involved as they are with the
performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly neglected by the COA.
In view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the mandamus petition, the
SC waives the principle of hierarchy of courts in favor of a resolution on the merits.
l. Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J..:
FACTS:
The BSP seeks that the COA be prohibited from implementing its June 18, 2002 Decision, its
February 21, 2007 Resolution, as well as all other issuances arising therefrom, and that all of the
foregoing be rendered null and void.
This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011 on August 19, 1999 ("the COA
Resolution"), with the subject "Defining the Commission's policy with respect to the audit of the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines." In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was
created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor
Relations Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was
a "government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution";
and that "the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987
Administrative Code." The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2 (1),
Article IX (D). The COA Resolution elaborates that:
….. to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, and express an opinion on whether the 􏰀nancial
statements which include the Balance Sheet, the Income Statement and the Statement of
Cash Flows present fairly its financial position and results of operations. SECATH
….. that for purposes of audit supervision, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines shall be classified
among the government corporations belonging to the Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and
Research Sector under the Corporate Audit Office I, to be audited, similar to the subsidiary
corporations, by employing the team audit approach.
Thereafter, the BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter dated, November
26, 1999 and signed by the BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay. It stated the position of the
BSP elaborating that it is not subject to the Commission’s jursidiction. The letter was further justified
as it refered to Republic Act No. 7278 which amended the BSP’s charter explaining its alteration of
the composition of the National Executive Board of the BSP.
Also the BSP respectfully believes that the BSP is not "appropriately regarded as a
government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code" as stated in the COA resolution. As
defined by Section 2(10) of the said code, instrumentality refers to "any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter." The BSP is not an entity administering
special funds as it is not even included in the DECS National Budget.
Furthermore, it is also argued that the BSP is not an “agency” of the Government. The 1987
Administrative Code, merely referred the BSP as an “attached agency” of the DECS as distinguished
from an actual ine agency of departments that are included in the National Budget, therefore,
BSP further contends that it is neither a unit of Government nor a bureau which refers to any principal
subdivision or unit of any department.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BSP falls under the COA’s audit jurisdiction.
RULING:
Yes. the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA's audit
jurisdiction. The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936),
entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
and to Define its Powers and Purposes" created the BSP as a "public corporation" to serve the
following public interest or purpose:
Sec. 3. The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote through organization and
cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for themselves and
others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness
and responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values,
using the method which are in common use by boy scouts.
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical

personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16,
notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government
owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another
distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as "public
corporations." These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the
government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but
to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or
Offices.
Regarding the COA's jurisdiction over the BSP, Section 8 of its amended charter allows
the BSP to receive contributions or donations from the government. Section 8 reads:
Section 8. Any donation or contribution which from time to time may be made to the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
branches, offices, agencies or instrumentalities shall be expended by the Executive
Board in pursuance of this Act.
Historically, the BSP had been subjected to government audit in so far as public funds had
been infused thereto. However, this practice should not preclude the exercise of the audit
jurisdiction of COA, clearly set forth under the Constitution, which pertinently provides:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and
offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous
state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which
are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity. . . . .
Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a
government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by
the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter.
m. Bagatsing v. Commission on Privatization

(G.R. No. 112399 , July 14, 1995)
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." .ESSO became a wholly-owned company of
the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC. PETRON owns
the largest, most modern complex refinery in the Philippines. It is listed as the No. 1 corporation in
terms of assets and income in the Philippines in 1993.
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her

legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to raise
revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector by creating the
committee on privatization. The Government can then concentrate on the delivery of basic services
and the performance of vital public functions.
The Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON as part
of the Energy Sector Action Plan. PNOC Board of Directors passed are solution authorizing the
company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong
Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory services to be rendered to PETRON. The
Petron Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized a privatization strategy
with 40% of the shares to be sold to a strategic partner and 20% to the general public The President
approved the 40%-40%-20%privatization strategy of PETRON.
The invitation to bid was published in several newspapers of general circulation, both local
and foreign. The PNOC Board of Directors then passed Resolution No. 866, S. 1993, declaring
ARAMCO the winning bidder. PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement, the two
companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 112399 sought: (1) to nullify the bidding conducted for
the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron Corporation
(PETRON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest
bidder and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The petition for prohibition and
certiorari in G.R. No. 115994 sought to annul the sale of the same block of PETRON shares subject
of the petition in G.R. No. 112399.
ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its person, alleging
that it is a foreign company organized under the laws of the Netherlands, that it is not doing nor
licensed to do business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain an office or a business
address in and has not appointed a resident agent for the Philippines.
The petitioners contended that they filed the action in their capacity as members of the
Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public bidding was a failed bidding tainted with haste and arbitrariness
because there was only one offeror.
RULING:
On the claim that there was a failed bidding, petitioners contend that there were only three
bidders. One of them, PETRONAS, submitted a bid lower than the floor price while a second, failed
to pre-qualify. Citing Section v-2-a of COA Circular No. 89-296 dated January 27, 1989, they argue
that where only one bidder qualifies, there is a failure of public auction (G. R. No. 115994, Rollo, p.
22). When a failure of bidding takes place is defined in Circular No. 89-296 of the Commission on
Audit, which prescribes the "Audit Guidelines on the Divestment or Disposal of Property and other
Assets of the National Government Agencies and Instrumentalities, Local Government Units and
Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations and their Subsidiaries." Under said COA Circular,
there is a failure of bidding when: (1) there is only one offeror; or (2) when all the offers are non-
complying or unacceptable.
In this case, there were three offerors: SAUDI ARAMCO, PeETRONAS and WESTMONT.
While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid below the floor price and
WESTMONT for technical reasons, not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding
under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be disqualified. Petitioners urge that in effect there was
only one bidder and that it cannot be said that there was a competition on "an equal footing" (G.R.
No. 112399, Rollo, p. 122). But the COA Circular does not speak of accepted bids but of offerors,
without distinction as to whether they were disqualified.
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by
government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned bidding.
The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the interpretation
by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.
The case of Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, 175 SCRA 701 (1989), relied
upon by petitioner, is inappropriate. In said case, there was only one offeror in the bidding. The Court
said: "if there is only one participating bidder, the bidding is noncompetitive and, hence, falls short of
the requirement. There would, in fact, be no bidding at all since, obviously, the lone participant cannot
compete against himself.
n. Nacion v. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 204757 17 March 2005)
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
From October 16, 2001 to September 15, 2003, Nacion was assigned by the COA to the
Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System (MWSS) as State Auditor V. On June 27, 2011, when
Nacion was already holding the position of Director IV of COA, National Government Sector, a formal
charge against her was issued by COA Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido Tan (Chairperson Tan) for
acts found to be committed when she was still with the MWSS. The pertinent portions of the charge
read:
The Administrative Case Evaluation Report dated June 21, 2011 of the Fraud Audit and
Investigation Office (FAIO), Legal Services Sector (LSS) as well as the Investigation Report submitted
by the Team from the FAIO disclosed the following reprehensible actions:
1. Receiving benefits and/or bonuses from MWSS in the total amount of P73,542.00 from 1999-
2003[;]
2. Availing of the MWSS Housing Project;
3. Availing of the Multi-Purpose Loan Program — Car Loan.
In her A􏰀davit/Answer to Formal Charge, Nacion admitted that she availed of the MWSS
Housing Project and thus, was awarded a 300-square-meter lot at the MWSS Employees Corporate
Office Housing Project in Novaliches, Quezon City. This was covered by an Individual Notice of Award
dated April 8, 2003 issued by the MWSS Corporate Office Multi-Purpose Cooperative Housing
Project. The cost of the lot was P500.00 per sq.m. or a total of P150,000.00, exclusive of development
cost and miscellaneous expenses. Nacion invoked an honest belief that she could avail of the benefit
given the absence of any prohibition thereon upon COA personnel. COA Resolution No. 2004-005,
which prohibited COA employees from availing of all forms of loan, monetary benefits or any form of
credit assistance from agencies under their audit jurisdiction, was issued only on July 27, 2004.
Nacion admitted that she also availed of the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program — Car Loan,
upon an honest belief that she was not prohibited from doing so. She emphasized that her car
purchase was not subsidized. She was obligated to pay in full the principal amount of the loan, plus
interest and incidental expenses like registration fees and insurance premiums.
Nacion, however, denied having received bonuses and benefits from MWSS
Section 18 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, which specifically prohibits COA personnel from receiving
salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, local
government unit, government-owned and -controlled corporations and government financial
institutions, except those compensation paid directly by the COA out of its appropriations and
contributions. The COA emphasized that even the availment of all forms of loan was already
prohibited prior to the issuance of COA Resolution No. 2004- 005, being already proscribed by
Executive Order No. 292 and the Code of Ethics for Government Auditors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion guilty of grave
misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.
RULING:
COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding Atty. Nacion guilty of grave
misconduct and violation of office rules and regulations.
Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is
not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.
Also, the essence of due process is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense.
The Court finds no violation of Nacion's right to due process. As the Office of the Solicitor
General correctly argued, the constitution of a separate fact-finding team specifically for Nacion's
case was not necessary for the satisfaction of such right.
The power of the COA to discipline its officials then could not be limited by the procedure
being insisted upon by Nacion. Neither is the authority of the Chairperson to commence the action
through the issuance of the formal charge restricted by the requirement of a prior written complaint.
As may be gleaned from the cited provision, a written complaint under oath is demanded only when
the administrative case is commenced by a person other than the COA Chairperson.
It was undisputed that Nacion, despite a chance, did not request for such formal investigation,
a circumstance that the COA later considered as mitigating. In any case, she was still accorded before
the COA a reasonable opportunity to present her defenses, through her answer to the formal charge
and eventually, motion for reconsideration of the COA's decision. Three separate acts were found to
have been committed by Nacion, all sufficient to support the COA's finding of grave misconduct and
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. AE
R.A. No. 6758, specifically Section 18 thereof which provides:
Section 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel and of Other Agencies. —
In order to preserve the independence and integrity of the Commission on Audit (COA), its officials
and employees are prohibited from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other
emoluments from any government entity, local government unit, and government- owned and
controlled corporations, and government financial institution, except those compensation paid directly
by the COA out of its appropriations and contributions.
Nacion benefited from the subject car and housing programs. Her acquisition of the car might
not be subsidized by MWSS, but the low three- tier interest rates ranging from 0-60 extended to her
by the agency was clearly to her advantage.
XIII. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. IMPEACHMENT
a. Corona vs. Senate of the Philippines

(G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On 12 December 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a
verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the
Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session
and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.
On 13 December 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an
impeachment court the following day. On 15 December 2011, petitioner received a copy of the
complaint charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft
and corruption. On 26 December 2011, petitioner filed his Answer assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by
which the impeachment complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately
transmitted to the Senate. He prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the
requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all
the articles of impeachment.
On 16 January 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines, acting as an Impeachment Court,

commenced trial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioner's motion for a preliminary hearing was
denied. On 27 January 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a resolution allowing the Prosecution
to introduce evidence, and another resolution granting the prosecution's request for subpoena
directed to the officers of two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and
dollar currencies.
On 8 February 2012, petitioner filed this petition arguing that the Impeachment Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, among others,
it issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner's alleged bank accounts as requested by the
prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act. Respondents maintain that subjecting
the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment.
Respondents contend that the issues raised are issues that do not concern, or allege any violation
of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate's sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these
constitutional limitations, Supreme Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over
the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings
ISSUE: Whether or not matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings are subject to a
judicial review of the Supreme Court.
RULING:
YES. Given that impeachment is concededly political in character, the precise role of the
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning
of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government.
Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if
tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness. In Francisco, Jr. v. HOR, we ruled that the power of judicial
review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. HOR Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the
question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner
Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar
provision.
HOWEVER, while matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings are subject to
a judicial review, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more
than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict
and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the
process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to
appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates
shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by
supervening events and his own acts.
b. IN RE FIRST INDORSEMENT FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ

(A.M. No. 88-4-5433. April 15, 1988)
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M.
Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-
complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in
view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. One of these is an anonymous letter
by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and
asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this."
The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M Gonzales a copy of the per
curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled
"Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss
the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same
Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan.
Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr.
Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative
Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading
as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied
with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Supreme Court Justice may be disbarred during his term of office.
RULING:
No. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before
the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal
from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
Another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar
and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a
complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect
be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may
be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI
(2) of the Constitution. The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification
to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this
convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law.
c. Francisco v House of Representatives

(G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003)
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint (1st impeachment complaint) was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and 7 Associate Justices for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes”. On October
22, 2003, the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for being insufficient in
substance, although it was sufficient in form. On October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint or 4 months and 3 weeks since the filing
thereof, a 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the House’s Secretary General by
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/ Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.
Due to the events that took place, several instant petitions were filed against the House of
Representatives, mostly contending that the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates Article XI Section 5 of the Constitution that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be INITIATED against the same official more than once within a period of one
year”; and that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 12th Congress are unconstitutional as well.
The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the present Constitution, contending
that the term " initiate" does not mean "to file", and concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as
the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the 7 Associate Justices had not
been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate".
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
3 ways to file an impeachment complaint:
1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or

2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member (of the House of
Representatives); or
3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules (of the 12th Congress)
Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated:
1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance; or
2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance; or
3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12 th
Congress are unconstitutional
2. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution
RULING:
1. Yes.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing." The word
"initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it."Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do: to begin, to commence, or set going.
The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
on Justice. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. The
Constitution provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case
to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in
the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated.
An impeachment proceeding takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps:
(1) the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by
a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and
(4) the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms
a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-
third of all the members.
(5) If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an
impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the
Senate as impeachment court.
Therefore, the impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified

complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow. Thus, Section 3 (5) that says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year," means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action.
2. Yes.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second
impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within
a one-year period.
d. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice

(G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2010, before the opening of the next Congress, a group led by Risa Hontiveros-
Baraquel, filed an impeachment complaint against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez. The
complaint was included in the House’s order of business on August 2. On August 3, another
impeachment complaint against Ombudsman Gutierrez was filed by a group led by Renato Reyes,
Jr., Secretary-General of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan. This complaint was also included in the
House’s order of business on August 11. On the same day, both complaints were referred to the
House Committee on Justice (Committee). The Committee, on September 1, found the two
complaints to be sufficient in form while on September 7, the Committee found the complaints to be
sufficient in substance. The complaints allege Gutierrez’s culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust in several instances.
The Ombudsman assailed the findings of the Committee, alleging that in taking cognizance
of the two impeachment complaints, the Committee violated the prohibition of Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution, which provided that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year”. According to petitioner, when the group of
Hontiveros filed the first complaint on July 22, that should have started the 1 year ban on a second
impeachment complaint referred to the Committee. She also assails the “belated” referral of the
Hontiveros complaint, saying that Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion because the referral
didn’t occur within 10 days of filing. Between July 22 and August 2, 11 days had elapsed. Thus,
petitioner claims that Sec. 3(2) wasn’t followed.
As a rebuttal, the Committee argued that the initiation of an impeachment complaint bans the
filing of a second complaint when the first complaint has been voted on by a third of all members of
the House. The group of Reyes argued that the 1 year ban starts when the Articles of Impeachment
have been transmitted to the Senate.
ISSUE/S:
1. When does the 1 year ban on a second impeachment complaint begin?
2. Was the Hontiveros complaint timely referred to the committee in accordance with the Constitution?
3. Is the impeachment complaint of the Reyes group valid?
RULING:
1. The 1 year ban mandated in Sec. 3(5), Art. XI begins with the filing of the 1st impeachment
complaint and ends with the referral of the complaint to the Committee. This has been held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives. The actions stated by the
respondents are performed after the initiation of the impeachment complaint.
2. As mentioned in Sec. 3(2), Art. XI, Congress should refer the impeachment complaint to the proper
Committee within 3 session days after the complaint has been included in the House’s order of
business, the latter action being done within 10 days of the filing of the complaint. If the complaint
was filed while Congress was not in session, the above 10 day period will start to run when a new
session has opened. In this case, the Congress opened a new session 4 days after the Hontiveros
complaint was filed, or on July 26. As this complaint was referred on August 2, or just 7 days after the
new session opened, the complaint was timely referred to in accordance with Sec. 3(2), Art XI.
3. Yes. The ban of Sec. 3(5) pertains to a second impeachment proceeding. As mentioned above,
the ban starts when a first impeachment complaint has been referred to the Committee on Justice.
Gutierrez’s assertion that the mere filing of the complaint will start the 1 year ban would destroy the
integrity of the impeachment process. Under this scenario, a filed complaint that is bereft of factual
basis would bar any other complaints that have the benefit of being substantiated by evidence to be
dismissed outright just because the former was filed first. Such an overemphasis on the timing of
filing of the complaint will also heavily burden the complainants, whose efforts at gathering evidence
for their complaint will go to waste when a first complaint against the same official has been filed.
Neither is it correct to say, as the Committee and the Reyes group claim, that the 1 year ban
shall start, at the very least, after the Committee has made its report on the impeachment complaint.
To consider this as the correct interpretation would lead to a barrage of impeachment complaints that
will undoubtedly hamper the House’s ability to perform its functions. This interpretation would also
defeat the purposes of the prohibition, which are to prevent the impeachable officers from being
harassed by multiple impeachment complaints and to allow Congress to perform its regular functions.
For the purpose of declaring that an impeachment complaint has been initiated, it is the House
as a whole, in a public session, which has the power to make such a declaration. No single House
official, be they the Speaker or the chamber’s secretary-general, nor a single group of members of
the House, such as a House committee, has the constitutional mandate to dictate themselves when
the steps of the impeachment complaint’s initiation are taken.
It is to be noted that the 2 complaints were referred to the Committee at the same time and
on the same date, August 11. While there would be a violation of Sec. 3(5) if one of the two complaints
were to be referred before the other, the Constitution itself is silent on the validity of a House
Committee examining multiple impeachment complaints that have been simultaneously referred to
the same. As such, there is effectively only one impeachment proceeding, in the event that multiple
impeachment complaints have been simultaneously referred by the House to the proper committee.
Thus, the second impeachment complaint of the Reyes group is valid.
e. Republic of the Philippines v Sereno

(G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2008)
TIJAM, J:
FACTS:
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law (UP COL), initially as a temporary faculty member from 1986 to 1991 and
thereafter, as a permanent faculty member until she resigned in 2006. While being employed at the
UP COL from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was also employed as legal counsel of the Republic in
two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and as a Deputy Commissioner of the
Commissioner on Human Rights.
Out of her 20 years of employment from 1986 to 2006, only nine (9) Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of The Human Resources Development Office
of U.P. (UP HRDO). The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno while the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has certified to the existence of only one SALN. In sum, for 20 years
of service in UP COL, eleven (11) SALNs were recovered and no SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006
when she was employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was there a SALN filed when she
resigned from U.P. as of June 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of
August 2010.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice by President Benigno Aquino III
(President Aquino III). In 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant due to former Chief
Justice Renato Corona’s ouster, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among
which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as
of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector.
The JBC took note of 10 missing SALNs that should’ve been filed by Sereno from the period
of 1986 to 2006. However, Senator Francis Escudero, a member of the JBC, testified that Sereno was
his law professor at UP COL and they were required to submit SALNs during those years.
The JBC announced a time extension for the requirements due to the lacking documents of
some applicants and further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.”
Sereno expressed in a letter to the JBC that since she resigned from UP COL in 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as an applicant from the private sector so she only
submitted three (3) SALNs which were from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno
likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than
15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the
clearance issued by UP HRDO and Civil Service Commission (CSC) should be taken in her favor.
However, there was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed
Chief Justice by President Aquino III.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno,
alleging that Sereno’s SALNs were tainted with false information. The House of Representatives
proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Diosdado
Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other
inconsistencies were also found in some of her SALNs.
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
requesting that the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno on behalf of the
Republic. The OSG invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed
the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto against Sereno.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto while an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
2. Whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is through impeachment.
3. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding violates the principle of separation of
powers.
4. Whether the petition should be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
5. Whether the filing of SALNs is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief
Justice.
6. Whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of the
respondent.
7. Whether Sereno is a de facto officer.
RULING:
1. Yes. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs (in this
case – quo warranto) is allowed when the issue is of transcendental importance and has far-reaching
implications, and in this case, direct resort to the SC is justified. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty.
Furthermore, quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as
these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation,
filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Impeachment is a political process to vindicate a violation of
the public’s trust by a public official who holds his office validly while quo warranto involves a judicial
determination of the legality of an official’s appointment or election based on predetermined rules; the
former assails an official’s acts in the exercise of his functions while the latter assails that the official
had no right to the office to begin with.
2. No. The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not prohibit a quo warranto
action against impeachable officers due to the phrase “may be removed from office.” The permissive
term “may” denotes discretion and indicative of other options for an action. According to American
jurisprudence, “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit
prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this
express provision.”
The applicability of the grounds for impeachment necessitates that an official validly holds
office while these don’t apply to an official whose title or right to the office is being assailed as void ab
initio.
3. No. To reiterate, quo warranto assails acts or omissions committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office; such a remedy would render
the appointment or election invalid if the official was found unqualified. On the other hand,
impeachment attacks acts or omissions by an official in the exercise of his office but there’s no
question as to the validity of the official’s position. Hence, if the court found no evidence to render an
official’s office void ab initio then the impeachment could still proceed.
4. No, the one-year prescriptive period for quo warranto is applied in cases where private
individuals are asserting their right of office, unlike in the instant case where no private individual
claims the office of the Chief Justice. The government itself commenced the present petition for quo
warranto, furthermore, prescription does not lie in this case because quo warranto serves to end a
continuous usurpation. Since this is an action on behalf of the Republic, the legal maxim nullum
tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government applies in the present case.
5. Yes. The JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion,
is neither absolute nor unlimited. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. Therefore, the qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by
the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated
to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to
sound moral and ethical standards. Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” The filing of SALNs is also required by RA 3019 and RA
6713. Failure to comply with these requirements is “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which
may result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even
provides that a violation of this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine,
disqualification to hold public office may also be imposed.
6. Yes. On June 4, 2012, in the JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition
of the requirement of SALNs to avoid another incident similar to the ouster of former Chief Justice
Corona. Sereno’s failure to comply with this requirement properly and promptly while also submitting
untruthful, incomplete, and inaccurate SALNs amounts to dishonesty and a clear violation of the public
trust given to a public office. Hence, Sereno failed to qualify for nomination so she should not have
been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination, or appointed to begin with.
7. Yes. As a result of the aforementioned findings, Sereno is a de facto officer. She held the
position of Chief Justice unlawfully and should be removed through quo warranto. In effect, she did
never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified.
2. SANDIGANBAYAN
a. Macalino v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 140900-140200, February 6, 2003)
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and Head of the Loans
Administration and Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC).
The Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan two cases, estafa through falsification of
official documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents.
The first filed information alleged that the petitioner conspired with his wife, the owner of
Wacker Marketing, deceitfully defrauded the PNCC by making it appear that the demand draft worth
Nine Hundred Eighty Three Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-two & 11/100 Pesos (P983,682.11) was
for his wife’s company and not that of Bankers Trust Company, which was the real payee for the draft.
The second information again alleged that the petitioner used his position to again alter the supposed
payee, from Interbank to Wacker Marketing, for a check worth Two Million Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P2,250,000.00).
The Special Prosecutor from the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that petitioner was a public
officer and was to be held accountable for his actions. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he
is not a public officer, since the PNCC is not a government owned or controlled corporation. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, falls under the definition of a public
officer
RULING:
No. The petitioner, being an employee of the PNCC, is not considered as a public officer. A
public officer includes public officials and employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporation with original
charters.
Further, the 1987 Constitution, together with Republic Act No. 6770, provides that the Office
of the Ombudsman can act only against public officials or employees of the Government. Inasmuch
as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporations,
its follows that petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is not a public officer. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the petitioner.
b. Lacson v. Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999)
MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
That on or about May 18, 1995, in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines, the
accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR
INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring,
with intent to kill and using firearms, with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of
their superior strengths, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF
SUPT. PANFILO M .LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP.
GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3
WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG, committing the acts
in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police, are charged herein
as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
herein at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18,
1995.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case of the accused PNP Officers?
RULING:
No. Because of the failure to show in the amended information that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP Officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the
close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the
offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. In
this case there is no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal
accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim
and then killed the latter while in their custody. Thus, the Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer
the Criminal Cases to the RTC of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said
cases.
c. Binay v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. Nos. 120681-83; October 1, 1999)
KAPUNAN, J:
FACTS:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
The Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations
against petitioner, Mayor Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code
(Illegal Use of Public Funds), and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (giving undue
favor to private parties). The informations alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were
committed in 1987 during petitioner’s incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro
Manila. Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the cases filed against him.
G.R. No. 128136

Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save
for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay’s co-petitioners are officials of the same
municipality. Two complaints were raised against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of
R.A. No. 3019 for overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of
the San Pascual Central School which informations were filed before the RTC of Batangas City. While
another complaint on the same matter was eventually filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
moved to quash the Criminal Case filed before the Sandiganbayan on the grounds that the same
complaints has already been filed with the RTC. The proceedings of both cases were suspended by
the Sandiganbayan and the RTC pending resolution of the Binay case as to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject cases.
2. In GR No. 128136, whether the filing of information with the RTC effectively ousted the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case and estopped the respondents from filing an
information before the latter; and whether the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan
constitutes double jeopardy.
RULING:
1. The court ruled that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases. R.A. No.
7975 (took effect on May 16, 1995) as amended by RA. 8249 (took effect on February 8, 1997)
specified that the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases involving violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code when the
principal accused includes officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade “27” and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) with enumeration as to officials specifically
included. Even if the municipal mayor is not specifically included in the list and despite the fact that
the actual salary received is not equivalent to grade 27, the court ruled that the classification of salary
grades should not be based on the actual amount of salary received but on the nature of the functions
performed by the official concerned - the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification
requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position. It is the official’s Grade that determines
his or her salary, not the other way around.
In the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades prepared by the DBM
lists the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27. Petitioners, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code also settles the matter as it
provides that municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to
Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758.
2. The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan was not ousted of its jurisdiction even if the information
was first filed in the RTC since the latter did not have jurisdiction in the first place as provided in R.A.
7975. Estoppel could not also be invoked because jurisdiction is determined by law and not by the
consent or agreement of the parties. The court has previously ruled that a filing of a complaint with
one court does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same with the competent court. This does not
amount to forum shopping since the only authority of the first court was to dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction. By estoppel, it means that the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of
the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced
with an adverse decision. Also, the filing of another complaint with the Sandiganbayan does not also
amount to double jeopardy because there can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a
plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. The remedy should have been for the petitioner to move the
quashal of information for lack of jurisdiction.
The consolidated petitions were DISMISSED.

d. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 11053, August 4,1994)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was
filed against him and two other public officers for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper
in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). Petitioner was
arraigned on January 5, 1993, where he entered a plea of “not guilty”.
However, on January 25,1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for
petitioner’s suspension, citing Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides that any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Meanwhile, petitioner contends that suspending a public officer is a mindless and

meaningless exercise, and it was imposed without regard to the spirit and intent of the law upon which
it is based. He added that his suspension will injure not only him ,the public official concerned, but
the entire electorate as well.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s contention and ordered his suspension
from office for a period of 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in suspending petitioner as Governor in

accordance with Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
RULING:
Yes. It is now settled that Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of
that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property is filed.
The Court also held that the fact that petitioner’s preventive suspension may deprive the
people of Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient
basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who
has likewise been elected by them, will act as a governor.
3. OMBUDSMAN
a. Gonzales v Office of the President

(G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J:
FACTS:
Two petitions have been consolidated because they raise a common thread of issues relating
to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office petitioners who claim the protective
cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong — the Office of the
Ombudsman. In G.R. No 196231, a petition for Certiorari was filed, assailing on jurisdictional grounds
the Decision rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460, dismissing petitioner
Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon
a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8 (2)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the
President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before the PNP-NCR
against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and 4 others before the Office of
the City Prosecutor. While the cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the
National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently the case for Grave Misconduct was lodged
against the police officers, and the case was approved by the Ombudsman upon the recommendation
of Gonzales and they were dismissed.
On November 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The pleadings and the records
of the case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor
Officer Garcia, who released a draft Order on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate
superior, Director Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's
office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner
endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Gutierrez, in
whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-
load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident wherein 8 HongKong
nationals and also Mendoza died, a public outcry resulted against the blundering of officials which
then resulted to the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC), tasked to
determine accountability for the incident. However, petitioner as well as the Ombudsman herself,
refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is
an independent constitutional body.
IIRC eventually identi􏰀ed Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its
Report, IIRC found that Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than 9 months without any justi􏰀cation, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary
cases within 5 days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto.
The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. They also found
Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales to commit serious disregard of due
process, manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further
implementation of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved
motion for reconsideration.
The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to Gonzales be referred to the Office of
the President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation
of the proper administrative proceedings. The OP instituted a Formal Charge against petitioner for
Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section
22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service
Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. He was then found guilty and dismissed from service. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has no constitutional or valid statutory authority to
subject petitioner to an administrative investigation and thereafter order his removal as deputy
Ombudsman
RULING:
It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative
investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people
against inept and corrupt government officers and employees, and is subsumed under the broad
powers "explicitly conferred" upon it by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770. Petitioners cannot
insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8 (2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
The claim that Section 8 (2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. Their independence was intended to free them from political
considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. It is political and
It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to
escape administrative discipline.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questions acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Even if there was inordinate delay
in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained failure on petitioner's part to
supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and
malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust. The tragic hostage-taking incident
was the result of of several unfortunate events including system failure of government response. It
cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do for the
quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition thereof.
The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon
him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of
neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a
betrayal of public trust.
b. Gonzales v. Office of the President

(G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)
Brion, J.:
FACTS:
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending,
the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case
for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers
in the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor
was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been
substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses
charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of
the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the
recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his
fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his
colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for
final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza
hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt
to have himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight
HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza,
a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident
through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9)
months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions
for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The
inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition. G.R.
No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia
and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail
holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the government,
represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's
approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA
compliant with jurisprudential guidelines
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with
nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his
culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted
public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on
Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the
dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against
her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts
and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
which are violations under the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from
office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-
created Office of the Ombudsman.
RULING:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively
is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception
only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners
cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority
over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these
two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress
had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over
petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest
intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic
Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise
the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without
in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his
Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the
Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment
under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing
with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By
enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of
any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment. The Power of the
President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to
Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's
constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity
and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into
abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly
of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent
disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting
the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not
resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations
in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures
for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more
than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short
of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the
PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor
cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount
to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned
agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the
Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned
over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his
statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration
thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of
petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social
ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as
he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention
or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed
and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal
of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal
of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious
kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust. The Office of the President is vested with statutory
authority to proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of
any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act.
c. Camanag v. Guerrero
(G.R.. No. 121017. February 17, 1997)
HERMOSISIMA JR., J.:
FACTS:
On August 2, 1993, the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) issued the Table of
Results of those who failed the May 1993 Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure Examinations.
Petitioner Olivia B. Camanag was listed as having failed with a general average of 50.00%.
However, on December 15, 1993, petitioner in accomplishing her Personal Data sheet as
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) indicated that she passed the May, 1993 Board
Examinations with a rating of 75.42%.
An anonymous letter was sent to PRC Chairman Hermogenes P. Pobre claiming that certain
BIR employees allegedly passed the CPA Licensure Exams under anomalous circumstances.
Petitioner claimed to have received what was purportedly a 'Certified True Copy' of her passing rating
sheet, allegedly signed by PRC Acting Assistant Chief Leandro O. Ordenes (Mr. Leandro O. Ordenes
is actually the Records Officer of the PRC).
PRC Chairman Pobre wrote Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez that certain BIR employees did
not actually pass the CPA licensure examinations. Associate Ombudsman Investigator (AOI) Joaquin
S. Bumanlag set the fact-finding investigation of the matter on October 11, 1994 at 10:00 a.m. He
also issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Chief of the BIR Personnel Division.
On December 1, 1994, AOI Bumanglag concluded his fact-finding investigation with a Report
finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
AOI Bumanglag recommended a preliminary investigation to be conducted on the case, and at the
same time, he executed under oath the corresponding affidavit-complaint against petitioner.
Ombudsman Investigator (OI) Rainier C. Almazan, acting on the said affidavit-complaint, directed
petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit.
While the preliminary investigation was ongoing before the City Prosecutor, petitioner filed a
motion to reset preliminary investigation, Motion to Issue Subpoena and Subpoena Duces Tecum to
Leandro Ordenes [OIC, Records Section] and Ernesto Jaurique [Exec. Director]; and a
Comment/Manifestation stating, among others, that 'another round of preliminary investigation should
be conducted by the City Prosecutor.'
At any rate, the preliminary investigation conducted by the City Prosecutor yielded additional
evidence of falsification against petitioner, to wit:
Ordenes' Certification, and the Table of Results-Failed, CPA Licensure Exams, both
submitted by the PRC showing that petitioner did flunk the CPA Licensure Exam of May, 1993.
ISSUE: Whether or not sections 15 and 17 of RA 6770 (empowering the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigations of matters and/or referred to it) is null and void for being violative of the
provisions of the Constitution.
RULING:
No. The Ombudsman Act (RA 6770) clearly empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute individuals on matters/complaints referred to it or filed
before the said government agencies. But, the vesting of powers to the Office of the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigations and to directly undertake criminal prosecutions, petitioner argues,
is totally bereft of any constitutional basis.
The Court upheld the validity of the grant of the prosecutorial powers on the Ombudsman in
Acop v Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, under the 1987 Constitution, particularly under
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI, may be validly empowered with prosecutorial functions by the
legislature, and they did when it passed the Ombudsman Act.
d. Quimpo v. Tanodbayan
(G.R. No. 72553. December 2, 1986.)
MELENCIO-HERRERA,J .:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with respondent Tanodbayan a complaint against private respondents for the
violation of Republic Act No. 3091 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Petitioner alleged that Admiral Adjusters and Surveyors, Inc. (AASI), of which he was he
president, was engaged by Petrophil Corporation to render survey services for one (1) year from
March 1, 1982 to February 28, 1983; that upon the expiration of the contract, it was renewed for
another period of one (1) year March 1, 1983 to February 2, 1984; that sometime in October, 1983,
private respondents Danny Remo and Greg Dimaano, as analyst and manager, respectively, of the
Bulk Distribution Department and MPED of Petrophil Corporation, caused the withholding of the fees
due AASI and required AASI to submit an explanation of the losses caused by leaking valves as
reflected in AASI’s survey reports; that despite AASI’s explanation, private respondents private
respondents still refused to release payments and even threatened to forfeit AASI’s performance
bond and claim damages and losses from AASI; that despite AASI’s submission of several
explanations, private respondents refused to release the fees amounting to P147,300.00.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the Complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction of the
Tanodbayan, which motion was opposed by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not PETROPHIL Corporation, a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC), is a government-owned or controlled corporation, whose employees fall under Tanodbayan
jurisdiction.
RULING:
Employees of PETROPHIL Corporation fall under Tanodbayan jurisdiction.
It has to be conceded that PETROPHIL was not created by law. As the incumbent Solicitor
General has pointed out, it was originally created as a private corporation under the Corporation
Law with the name Standard Vacuum Oil Company (STANVAC). STANVAC was taken over by
Esso Philippines, which was in turn, bought by Esso Eastern Standard. Eventually Esso Eastern
Standard was purchased by the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC), and its corporate
name was changed to Petrophil Corporation.
While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally “created” as a government-owned or

controlled corporation, after it was acquired by PNOC, which was a government-owned or
controlled corporation. PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private
status. It is now funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to perform
functions related to government programs and policies on oil, a vital commodity in the economic
life of a nation. It was acquired not temporarily but as permanently adjunct to perform essential
government or government-related functions, as the marketing arm of the PNOC to assist the
latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum products to ensure and maintain an adequate
and stable supply.
It should make no substantial difference that it was not “created” as a government-owned

or controlled corporation. What is decisive is that it has since been acquired by the Government
to perform the functions related to government programs and policies on oil.
Thus the meaning given to “government-owned or controlled corporations” for the purposes
of the civil service provision should likewise apply for purpose of the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan
provision, otherwise, incongruity would result, and a government-owned or controlled corporation

could create as many subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code as it wishes, which would
then be free from strict accountability and could escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided for
by law. This device was liberally made use of during the past regime to the detriment of budgetary
restraints and of fiscal accountability by “private” corporations thus created.
e. Leyson vs Ombudsman
(G.R. No. 134990, April 27, 2000)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a domestic
corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one (1)-year contract with
Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT)
and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk.
Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement provided a three
(3)-month advance notice was given to the other party.
However, in August 1996, or prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies’ new
President, respondent Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite advance
notice. The CIIF companies engaged the services of another vessel.
On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and
CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt
practices.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint based on the ground that the case is a simple
breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular court. It held that it has
no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract entered into by
CIIF and ITTC. Besides the entities involved are private corporations (over) which the Ombudsman
has no jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman in
dismissing the complaint.
RULING:
No, there is no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman.
Par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 gave three (3)
requisites for the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation", namely,
First, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation;
Second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature; and,
Third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized
as stock corporations. The below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the
definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. There is also no showing that
GRANEXPORT and/ or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature. The Court thus concluded that the CIIF companies
are private corporations not within the scope of the Ombudsman jurisdiction.
f. Khan v Office of the Ombudsman

(G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006)
CORONA, J:
FACTS:
Petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former officers of Philippine
Airlines (PAL), were charged before the Deputy Ombudsman with violation of Republic Act No. 3019
(the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and were accused for using their positions in PAL to secure
a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services
in which they were shareholders.
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint. They contended that the
Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private entity. The Deputy Ombudsman
denied the petitioners' omnibus motion to dismiss, ruling that although PAL was originally organized
as a private corporation, its controlling stock was later acquired by the government through the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Therefore, it became a government-owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC).
Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman which affirmed the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman. Petitioners, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, with a prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order, claiming that the respondent acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the investigation of the case against them
although they were officers of a private corporation and not public officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over GOCCs without original charter.
RULING:
No. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over GOCCS is confined only to those with original
charters. Based on Article XI, Section 13(2) of the 1987 Constitution, which states the powers and
duties of the Ombudsman, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction only over public
officials or employees of GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and
prosecute acts or omissions of the officials or employees of government corporations.
Therefore, although the government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact
remains that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could not be
investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman. The court defined the phrase "with original
charter" as "chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the
Corporation Code."
PAL, being originally a private corporation seeded by private capital and created under the
general corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article
XI, Section 13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Ombudsman is devoid of authority to
investigate or prosecute petitioners.
g. Orap v Sandiganbayan
(G.R. Nos. L-50508-11. October 11, 1985)
ESCOLIN, J.:
FACTS:
Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor
Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap, presiding judge of the Municipal Court of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information was duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison,
Chief Special Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan.
On April 17, 1979, fourth information was filed against petitioner, also for violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on
different occasions unlawfully and feloniously received and took various sums of money from several
persons in the Municipal Court of Mangatarem entitled, "People vs. Pepito F. Iglesias", for reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property.
Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations on the
ground that the officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the
Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the
respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the
reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied.
Hence, the instant recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a
complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to file the corresponding information before
the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same.
RULING:
The respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that the Tanodbayan has such authority. It is affirmed.
It is the petitioner's position that the Tanodbayan has no power to conduct preliminary investigations,
file informations and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant judicial staff. It is
submitted by petitioner that under the aforequoted Section 9(a) of the Tanodbayan Decree, the courts,
judges and other appurtenant judicial staff, among others, are beyond the reach of the Tanodbayan,
and that only administrative acts of agencies of the government, whether or not criminal in character,
are within the powers of said official.
The argument overlooks the fact that under the decree, the Tanodbayan functions not only as
an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As ombudsman, its investigatory powers are limited to
complaints initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section
9(a) of the law. To that extent, court agreed with petitioner's interpretation of the law that insofar as
administrative complaints are concerned, the courts, judges and their appurtenant judicial staff are
outside the Tanod bayan's investigatory power. The reason for such exclusion is quite evident: under
Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court that exercises administrative
supervision over all courts and their personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to which
administrative complaints involving judges and the court's personnel should be lodged.
As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is plenary and without exceptions.
Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief
Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct
and control the prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court
personnel he outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee
could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack
of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such
nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the
Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people
to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and
efficiency in the government service."
h. INTING v. TANOD-BAYAN
[G.R. Nos. 52446-48. May 15, 1980.]
ANTONIO, J.:
FACTS:
On December 9, 1977, petitioner endorsed to the City Fiscal of Davao complaints for perjury
against private-respondent Angelina S. Salcedo on the ground that in the latter's sworn Personal Data
Sheets where she knowingly and falsely indicated that she completed the one-year Secretarial
Science course at University of San Carlos in Cebu City from 1961 to 1962, although she was never
enrolled in, and neither did she complete the Secretarial Science course from, the University of San
Carlos. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the City Fiscal of Davao, through Special Counsel
Rodrigo R. Duterte, found a prima facie case for perjury and resolved to file three (3) separate counts
of perjury against respondent. Private respondent, through her counsel, interposed an appeal to the
Ministry of Justice for a review of the resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao, finding prima facie case
for perjury on three counts against her, and dismissing, for insufficiency of evidence. The Ministry of
Justice, however, forwarded the records of the appealed case to the Tanodbayan, pursuant to Section
10 (f) of Presidential Decree No. 1630, which vests on the latter the power to file and prosecute
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office.
The Tanodbayan reversed the resolution finding a prima facie case for perjury on three counts
against private-respondent and dismissing the cases of perjury, and sustained the resolution
dismissing private-respondent complaint against petitioner for alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and estafa thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner now questions the
jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, he alleges that the respondent Tanodbayan was without jurisdiction
to review and nullify the resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao, and in ordering the latter to secure
the dismissal of Criminal Cases because the powers of the Tanodbayan as prescribed in Section 10
of Presidential Decree No. 1630 are limited to: "(a)He may investigate, on complaint by any person
or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense
or not of any administrative agency including any government-owned or controlled corporation; xxx
xxx xxx "(f) He may file and prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has jurisdiction to review and nullify resolutions of the City
Fiscal and order the dismissal of Criminal Cases.
RULING:
YES. It is not true that the Tanodbayan's authority to file and prosecute is limited to civil and
administrative cases and in offenses made in relation to the office. Presidential Decree No. 1630
provides that "he may file and prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations in relation to their office.” The same decree also
provides that “If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other
person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall
conduct the necessary investigation and shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative
agency."
As correctly observed by the Tanodbayan, the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet,
being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in
the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected
with such employment and private respondent was already in the government service when the other
Personal Data Sheets, subject matter of the Information’s for perjury filed against her, were
accomplished by her. The Tanodbayan is an administrative body whose main purpose is to give effect
to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to
promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service.
i. Garcia v. Miro
(G.R. No. 148944, February 5, 2003)
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Alvin B. Garcia, as then mayor of Cebu City, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig on
May 7, 1998. F.E. Zuellig is the Philippine distributor of Bitumex, a brand name of an asphalt product.
The contract essentially provided that F.E. Zuellig shall be the exclusive supplier of asphalt for the
city's asphalt batching plant for a period of three years, from 1998 to 2001, with the initial delivery of
asphalt in September, 1998.
Newspaper accounts of the alleged anomalies on the subject contract started to surface in
the local media in March of 1999. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman, in a letter dated March 30, 1999,
required the Director of the Commission on Audit (COA) of Region VII to conduct a special audit. On
the same day, it likewise requested the City Administrator of the O4ce of the Mayor to submit
documents pertaining to the asphalt supply of the city and a copy of the subject contract.
Subsequently, petitioner was elected to a new term as mayor. The respondent Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas thereafter sought to hold him administratively liable on the aforesaid
contract and ordered him preventively suspended for six months. Petitioner came to us in an earlier
petition alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Special Prosecution Officer Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan of the Office of the Ombudsman was
assigned to conduct the inquiry docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. In his report, Special Prosecution
Officer Tagaan recommended that a criminal and an administrative complaint be @led against
petitioner Garcia and several others. On June 21, 1999, Tagaan filed an affidavit with the Graft
Investigation O4ce against petitioner Garcia and others for violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act
No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On August 16, 1999, the Office of the City Auditor filed with the Deputy Ombudsman its report
which was prepared by State Auditors Hilario S. Cabreros and Sulpicio C. Quejada, Jr. which found
that the transactions is highly questionable in view of the fact that payment[s] were made even if the
items were not yet delivered which is a clear case of advance payment in violation of existing law,
rules and regulations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ombudsman can initiate a preliminary investigation based on the COA special
audit report.
RULING:
Yes. The complaint being referred to by petitioner is the complaint filed in court in a criminal
case. For purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a
complaint "in any form or manner" is sufficient. Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution states that
the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on "complaints filed
in any form or manner against public officials or employees of Government."
j. Diaz v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 101202, March 8, 1993)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
1988. Meanwhile, Solicitor General Frank Chavez, then counsel for the PCGG in "American Inter-
Fashion vs. PCGG," filed a pleading, accusing Chairman Diaz with having lifted the sequestration on
American Inter-fashion, and accusing Diaz of corruption and ineptness. Diaz moved to strike out the
pleading for being untrue. Both Chavez and Diaz thereafter withdrew and resigned as counsel for the
PCGG and as chairman of the PCGG, respectively.
President Aquino ordered acting PCGG Chairman Azcuna to investigate Chavez' charges but
the investigation was not pressed. Moreover, the Ombudsman ordered Special Prosecutor Raul
Gonzales, with Prosecutors Jose J. Parentela, Jr. and Diana L. Dungca, to investigate the charges.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was likewise called upon to conduct an investigation involving
13 sequestered companies, among them Metro Port Service, Inc. (METRO PORT) and the American
Inter-Fashion (AIF), De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (DSA) and Glorious Sun Fashion
Garment Manufacturing Co., Inc. (GLORIOUS SUN). The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was joined
by the Ombudsman panel composed of Special Prosecutor Raul Gonzales and Tanodbayan Deputy
Spl. Prosecutors Jose G. De Ferrer, Jose Parentela, Jr. and Diana Dungca in hearing Chavez'
evidence consisting of the testimonies of 36 witnesses and volumes of documents. But while the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee issued an official report dismissing all charges, Parentela found
probable cause to conduct a preliminary investigation against the petitioner, with the approval of the
Ombudsman.
Prosecutor Parentela, Jr. submitted a report on the investigation to Ombudsman Conrado M.

Vasquez summarizing the evidence presented by the complainant (Chavez). Based on the report,
Ombudsman Vasquez issued a Memorandum addressed to the Office of the Spl. Prosecutor,
approving the recommendation to conduct a preliminary investigation against Diaz and others in ten
cases including those involving GLORIOUS SUN and METRO PORT.
In a resolution, prosecutor Parentela recommended the filing of an information against the

petitioner for violation of the Anti- Graft Law. It was later approved by the Ombudsman. On April 26,
1990, petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation and to disqualify the Ombudsman.
On June 27, 1990, the panel issued a Resolution in the METRO PORT case, finding a prima
facie case of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3, Paragraph (e), and recommending the filing of an
information against petitioner Diaz and Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista, which was
subsequently approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
On August 4, 1990, the petitioner and his co-accused, Bautista, filed a motion for
reinvestigation and a second motion to disqualify or inhibit Ombudsman Vasquez for alleged partiality.
But the motion for reinvestigation was denied by Special Prosecution Officer Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos.
In a resolution, the Ombudsman inhibited himself from taking part in the cases against the
petitioner. Later, an information in the METRO PORT case was filed against the petitioner and
Commissioner Bautista for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3, par. (e). Hence, this petition for certiorari
and prohibition alleging that respondent Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding
a prima facie case and filing an information for graft and corrupt practices against him on account of
his actuations in the METRO PORT case.
Meanwhile, another information charging the petitioner with violation of the Anti-Graft Law in
the AIF/DSA/GLORIOUS SUN case was filed by Parentela in the Sandiganbayan. However,
petitioner's motions to quash and for reinvestigation were denied. Thus, another relief was sought for
by the petitioner in this petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging now that “his right to due process
was violated because the preliminary investigation was made by the same persons who gathered the
evidence against him, hence, they did not possess the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge””.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the preliminary investigation conducted by respondent Spl. Prosecutor
Parentela should be set aside and the informations filed against the petitioner be annulled.
RULING:
No. Both the preliminary investigation which Parentela conducted and the information which
he filed in the Sandiganbayan are valid.
Petitioner's allegation that he was denied due process because the preliminary investigation
was conducted by the same persons who "gathered" the evidence against him is not correct. On
basis of the charges made by Chavez and the evidence which he presented at the joint investigation
conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Ombudsman panel, Parentela, with the
approval of the Ombudsman, decided to conduct a preliminary investigation to enable the petitioner
to refute the charges against him. Petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit and Chavez filed a reply.
Only after the investigating panel recommended the filing of information, which the Ombudsman
approved, did the petitioner and Commissioner Bautista ask for a reinvestigation which Special
Prosecution Officer Quiñones-Marcos denied. He then filed a motion to quash the information on the
theory that the preliminary investigation that was conducted by Special Prosecutor Parentela was null
and void for not having followed the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure and the doctrine in Cojuangco vs. PCGG. There is no merit in the contention.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, found that the preliminary investigation conducted by
Parentela substantially complied with Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
k. Acop vs. Office of the Ombudsman

(248 SCRA 566)
DAVIDE, Jr., J.:
FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, eleven suspected members of the notorious robbery gang, "Kuratong
Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with composite teams of the National Capital Regional
Command (NCRC), Traffic Management Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC), Central Police District Command (CPDC) and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC).
SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command (CIC) then made an expose',
stating that there was no shootout and that the "Kuratong Baleleng" members were victims of
summary execution.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) received the complaint of the relatives of the slain
suspected gang members, accusing the PACC, NCRC, TMC, CIC and CPDC of murder. Acting
Ombudsman Villa directed public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang to create a panel to
monitor the investigations being conducted by the Commission on Human Rights, the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Director for
Investigation regarding the alleged shootout.
The panel recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against petitioners and
all the participating personnel listed in the After Operations Report of the PNP. Casaclang then issued
the order directing petitioner[s] and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence within ten days from receipt thereof, which the petitioners failed to comply.
The petitioners instead filed a motion with Casaclang to suspend the preliminary investigation
against them pending resolution of the petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court. Casaclang
granted the motion, only to be reversed by Villa. Villa then took over "the direct supervision and
control of the preliminary investigation". The petitioners challenged the take-over, asserting that
neither the Ombudsman nor his Deputy may conduct preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman are authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations
2. Whether or not public respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Military Manuel Casaclang
committed grave abuse of discretion when he set the case for preliminary investigation and required
the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits before any preliminary evaluation of the complaint as
required by Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman.
RULING:
1. Yes. By express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, among the
functions of the Ombudsman are those other powers, functions or duties as may be provided by
law.
Through the passage of R.A. No. 6770, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was made an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, while the Ombudsman was granted the following
powers, among others:
a. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of such cases;
b. Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter
provided.
The petitioners have not proven any distinction between "the duty to investigate" and "the
power to conduct preliminary investigations"; neither have the petitioners established that the power
remains with the Tanodbayan, now the Special Prosecutor.
Deputy Ombudsman - Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution provides: SEC. 5. There is

hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive evidence
that such deputy is prohibited from performing other functions or duties affecting non-military
personnel. On the contrary, a review of the relevant Constitutional provisions reveals otherwise.
As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties" as Congress may prescribe through legislation. Therefore, nothing can prevent
Congress from giving the Ombudsman supervision and control over the Ombudsman's deputies, one
being the deputy for the military establishment.
2. The Court does not share the petitioners' view that Casaclang set the case for preliminary
investigation and required the petitioners to file their counter-affidavits without the conduct of a
preliminary evaluation of the complaint as required by the Rules of the Office of the Ombudsman. In
this case, no evidence to that effect was adduced. On the contrary, the Panel of Investigators
submitted its evaluation report on 8 June 1995, and it was only on 14 June 1995 that respondent
Casaclang issued the questioned order.
Moreover, the evaluation required is merely preliminary in nature and scope, not a detailed
inquiry. Likewise, the conduct of such evaluation involves the exercise of discretion which has not
been shown to be abused in the instant case.
l. Vasquez v Alinio
(271 SCRA 67)
BELLOSILLO, J:
FACTS:
Seeking justice for the killing of her husband Dionesio Odelmo and her father-in-law Jose
Odelmo on 31 December 1992, Corazon Odelmo appeared before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas on 12 February 1993 and filed a complaint for murder against
respondents..
After preliminary investigation the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman concluded that there was
probable cause to hold private respondents liable for the crime charged. Thus, in a resolution dated
10 August 1993 it recommended the filing of an Information for double murder against all of them
before the Sandiganbayan.
However upon review the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) appreciated the evidence
antithetically; it found that two (2) separate crimes of murder were committed but the commission
thereof was not in relation to the performance of the duties of private respondents. In view thereof it
recommended on 14 December 1993 the filing of two (2) separate Informations before the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City.
On 28 December 1993 the resolution of 14 December 1993 of the OSP modifying the
resolution of 10 August 1993 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman was approved by petitioner
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
Accordingly, on 17 January 1994 two (2) Informations were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Bago City, and on 18 January 1994 the corresponding warrants/orders of arrest were issued.
That same day private respondents filed a motion to recall warrants/orders of arrest on the ground
that they had not yet received copy of the complaint, neither had they been furnished by the Office of
the Ombudsman copy of the resolution of 14 December 1993, as required under Sec. 6, Rule
II, 1 of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman. They also posited that the Office
of the Ombudsman had no authority to file the Informations in view of its own finding that the crime
was not committed by the accused in relation to their office. The following day private respondents
filed a motion to quash the Informations based on lack of authority.
On 26 January 1994 respondent Judge found that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to
furnish private respondents copy of the resolution of 14 December 1993 depriving them of their right
to move for reconsideration or to elevate the matter to a higher office before the Informations were
filed. Consequently she ordered that the execution of the warrants/orders of arrest be held in
abeyance. For the same reason, she also granted the motion to quash the Informations.|||
The Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP moved for reconsideration insofar as
respondent Judge granted the motion to quash the Informations. It was argued that the failure to
furnish a copy of the resolution to private respondents was not an authorized ground to quash the
Informations under Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the
respondent judge should have followed the doctrine laid down in the Torralba case.
ISSUE: Whether it is in the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
illegal acts and omissions of public officers which respondent Judge did not pass upon.
RULING:
In Torralba the court found that the averments of petitioners that they had not been served
with copies of the final resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, the approved modified
memorandum of the Special Prosecution Officer as well as the special audit report were not
controverted. The inevitable conclusion then was that petitioners were not only effectively denied the
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration but were also deprived of their right to a full preliminary
investigation preparatory to the filing of the Informations against them. Nevertheless, the Court
emphasized that —
The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case . . . does not warrant

the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the proceedings already had.
Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by
deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold
in abeyance any further proceedings therein and to remand the case to the Office of
the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation, the outcome of
which shall then be indorsed to (the) Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action.
It is thus manifest that respondent Judge capriciously and whimsically ordered the quashing
of the Information notwithstanding our ruling in Torralba and Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court.
On the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to file the Informations before respondent
Judge, Sec. 15, of RA 6770, otherwise known a sthe Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases.
The court explained in Deloso v. Domingo, the nature, power and function of the Office of the
Ombudsman thus —
The clause 'any [illegal] act or omission of any public official' is broad enough
to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the
nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related
to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it
of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are
able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public
officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss
investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed
necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public
officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from
the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13
hereof, during his tenure of office' (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
m. Lastimosa v. Vasquez
(G.R. NO. 116801, APRIL 06, 1995)
Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative
complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of
Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The graft investigation officer assigned to the case found, after
investigation, no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended for the dismissal of the case.
However, upon review of the matter, Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the
recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Illustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the
Regional Trial Court. The case was then referred by the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Arturo
Mojica, to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the filing of appropriate information
with the RTC of Danao City. The same was eventually assigned to herein petition, First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.
On preliminary investigation, petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness had been
committed. With the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, an information for act of
lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo on July 4, 1994 with the MTC of Santa Fe.
Deputy Ombudsman Mojica wrote two letters to the Provincial Prosecutor inquiring on any
action taken on the referred case. And since no case for attempted rape had been filed, Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why
they should not be punished for contempt for “refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives” of the
Office of the Ombudsman. For this purpose, hearings were duly conducted. As a result, Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Gloria Lastimosa were placed under preventive suspension for a
period of six (6) months.
ISSUE:
A. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor
to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
B. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case against the mayor
because the crime was not committed in relation to a public office and whether it has
authority to place petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension.
RULING:
The court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act of omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. This power
has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official
regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise
from the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a
public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor,
is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for
assistance as provided in Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Even if the preliminary
investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the
nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the
Ombudsman. This is because under Section 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is
deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is
subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor's) decision.
Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish
for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather
than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. Neither is there any doubt as to the
power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave
misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in
the meantime under preventive suspension. Sections 21 & 24 of the same Act provides for this power.
Under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act, preventive suspension is warranted if evidence

against the public official is strong. As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, whether the evidence of guilt is
strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the
ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Given the attitude
displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case
may not be hampered. In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave
misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal
from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension. Under the
same provision of the law, it provides that the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay. Their
preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive
Suspension is DENIED.
n. Teresita G. Fabian v. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, in his capacity as Ombudsman; Hon. Jesus
F. Guerrero, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and Nestor V. Agustin
(G.R. No. 129742; September 16, 1998)
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Nestor V.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED)
when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office of
the Ombudsman. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including
those under the FMED, and Agustin, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private
respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning
the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when
petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint. It sought the dismissal of
private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his
preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under
the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of
grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the
law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman
Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the
aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting
out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his
"classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent
Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set
aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondent
from the administrative charges.
Petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
pertinently provides that — "In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within 10 days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court". However, she points
out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the
decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable.
The respondent submits that Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides,
among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is unconstitutional as it
infringes the constitutional proscription against laws increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court without its advice and consent.
RULING:
Yes. It violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give the
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden
the Court.
o. Coronel v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 149022. April 8, 2003)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Carmencita Coronel filed the instant petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
assailing the Decision of the Ombudsman dismissing her from the service as a Senior Accounting
Processor with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits and banning her from government
employment due to dishonesty for falsifying a receipt by making it appear that the luncheon bill she
had as the host of a meeting of the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and
Lanao del Sur and their advisors from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) was P1,213.00
when actually it was only P213.00. Her defense is on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman found that petitioner had acted dishonestly when she increased the amount
that she could reimburse by adding the necessary numeral and punctuation mark on the subject cash
invoice before she filed for reimbursement of the meal expenses incurred. Petitioner argued that the
Ombudsman's finding of falsification was based on an unauthenticated photocopy of the alleged
duplicate original receipt, which has no probative value. The Solicitor General, however, asked that
the petition be dismissed contending, among others, that petitioner should have filed her petition with
the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court, in accordance with its ruling that appeals from the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the present petition.
RULING:
Yes. In Fabian vs. Ombudsman Desierto, the Court ruled that appeals from the decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review under the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Afterwards, the Court issued Circular A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC which provides
that "any appeal by way of petition for review from a decision or final resolution or order of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such decision, resolution or
order filed with the Court after March 15, 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but
must be forthwith denied or dismissed, respectively." It stressed that the rules of procedure are merely
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is
always within the Court's power to suspend the rules. According to the Court, if petitioner's allegations
were true, then the Ombudsman's fatal error will remain uncorrected. Consequently, petitioner will
suffer grave injustice and will be banned for life to seek reemployment in any government office or its
instrumentalities. The Court will not hesitate to relax the Rules in the interest of substantial justice if
there was a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of
the Rules. Due to this ruling, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
p. Uy v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. Nos. 105965-10970, March 20, 2001)
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto filed a Motion for Further Clarification regarding the Court’s
ruling in its decision dated 9 August, 1999 and resolution dated 22 February, 2000. Both pertaining
to the prosecutor power of the Ombudsman extending only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction
of regular courts.
On 9 August 1999, the Court stated in its decision that it is the prosecutor and not the
Ombudsman who has the authority to file information against the petitioner in the regional court, for
he only exercise his prosecutor powers in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman only extends to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan?
RULING:
No. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on complaints against officers and
employees of the government and to enforce administrative, civil and criminal liability in these
cases. It is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by regular courts and the Sandiganbayan.
The power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and investigate pertains to any act or omission
of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. Thus, the exercise of the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is compatible with his duty to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officers and employees.
q. Laurel v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002)
KAPUNAN, J:
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued A.O. No. 233 “constituting a committee for the preparation
of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998." Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos
reconstituted the committee and renamed the committee as the “National Centennial Commission
(NCC).” He appointed Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel to chair the commission. The NCC was
tasked to “take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress.” Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation
(EXPOCORP) was created and Petitioner was among the 9 EXPOCORP incorporators, who were
also its first 9 directors. Petition was elected EXPOCORP Chief Executive Officer.
A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities
and the petitioner was implicated. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated the alleged
anomalies and recommended for "the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel,
chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of
centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in
the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the
absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the
scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of
the said contracts all in violation . . . of the anti-graft law."
President Joseph Estrada created an ad hoc and independent citizen’s committee to

investigate the alleged anomalies as well which also recommended "the further investigation by the
Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of," among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for
violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,
and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and
the ad hoc committee by Pres. Estrada were referred to the fact-finding and intelligence bureau of the
office of the ombudsman. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman,
the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied,
hence this petition for certiorari. The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and
contended that he is not a public officer since EXPOCORP is a private corporation and that the NCC
was not a public office, and he, both as chairman of the NCC and EXPOCORP was not a “public
officer.”
A temporary restraining order, commanding respondents to desist from filing any information
before the Sadiganbayan or any court against the petition was issued by the court on Sept 24, 2001.
On Nov 14, 2001, the court heard the parties in oral argument.
ISSUE: W/N Laurel was a public officer?
RULING:
Laurel was a public officer when he was chair of the NCC because the NCC is a public office.
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized

authority on the subject. The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, a public office
is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer. Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some
of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining
whether a position is a public office or not.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance." The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested, created the NCC by
executive order. Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the country's economic development,
especially in Central Luzon. The Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of
our nation after centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation
of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and
sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our history and
reinvigorate our patriotism.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner,
as its Chair, is a public officer. That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his
tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the
nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the
office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office
and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC
Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of
profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office,
nonetheless. Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "ad-hoc body"
make said commission less of a public office.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore,
a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a
public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner's position as
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently,
his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as
NCC Chair.
Petitioner also contends that since he did not receive any compensation for his services as
NCC or EXPOCORP chair, he is not a public officer as defined in R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) and is therefore, beyond jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The SC held that the
question whether petitioner is a public officer under R.A. No. 3019 involved the appreciation of
evidence and interpretation of law, matter that are best resolved at a trial court. It bears noting that
under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), one may be considered a "public official" whether or not one receives
compensation. Granting that petitioner did not receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he
received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of compensation. Notably, under the
by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and compensation. However, the SC settled
that the proceeding was not the proper forum to settle the issues lest they preempt the trial court from
resolving them.
The petition was dismissed, and the preliminary injunction issued in the court’s resolution dated
Sept. 24, 2001 was lifted.
r. Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors

(G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004)
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by
respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano.
After a thorough investigation, a crime of coup d'etat was committed by military personnel who
occupied Oakwood on the 27th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, II. The
said crime was committed as follows:
In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the military
rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their
withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and they are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National
Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they believe is the only program that would solve
the ills of society
The Sworn Statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil elaborated the discussion which concluded
that there must be use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP. The
affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of
the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary
investigation.
On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a
Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed
acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ,
that has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge
be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of
the case considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying
that the proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.
Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for cetiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-/Director Eduardo Matillano and
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel
in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 on he ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction
to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him falls exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a
Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate
the charge of coup d'etat against him.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner;
RULING:
Yes. The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating
agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage,
from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of
cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the
conduct of their investigations
Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, states that:

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would
have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead,
paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.
The power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against any public
officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or
their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact
that all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is
a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to
conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as
the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the
Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the
Natividad case as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate
the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first
place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was
not published is not plausible.
s. Olairez v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 148030 , March 10, 2003)
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Tenoria instituted an action before National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for illegal dismissal against against Combate Clinic, St. Peter Thelmo Drug, Mercury Drug
Aparri Branch, Dr. Valeriano Combate and Mrs. Hedy Combate, hereinafter collectively referred to as
Mercury Drug, et al., which was assigned to petitioner Olairez. Olairez dismissed Tenoria's complaint
for lack of merit, but Tenoria appealed to the NLRC which, in a decision promulgated on 25 May 1995,
vacated the order of dismissal and entered another judgment. When the case became due for
execution, a pre-execution conference was conducted. The petitioner originally ordered the
reinstatement of Tenoria with no backwages as the same was already earned in her employ with
other company. Tenoria assailed the order before the NLRC, which the latter granted and, thus,
another order was issued by Olairez granting a P310,000.00 backwages to Tenoria.
Meanwhile, on 06 March 2000, Tenoria filed a case for violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
docketed OMB-1-00-0436, against Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez, Dr. Valeriano Combate in his
capacity as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and Hedy Combate
in her capacity as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calamaniugan, Cagayan. In a resolution,
dated 29 November 2000, Graft Investigator Casihan-Dumlao, with the concurrence of Director
Nocos, recommended the dismissal of the case against the Combates and the filing, however, of an
information against Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
case against the petitioner was approved and filed with the Sandiganbayan by the Ombudsman. His
motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation having been denied, Olairez file this petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Ombudsman in this case could be assailed due to grave abuse
of discretion.
RULING:
Yes. Almost invariably, the Court has respected the assessment of the Ombudsman on the
determination of the existence or absence of probable cause. It is basically within his sound judgment
to evaluate whether, given the facts and circumstances before him, a criminal case should or should
not be filed. Thus, it has been consistently held that it is not for this Court to review the Ombudsman's
paramount discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before his office.
In Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, the Court has ratiocinated that "the rule is based not only
upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the
same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant." There is, however, one
important exception to the above rule, and it would be when grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Ombudsman in either prosecuting or dismissing a case before it is evident.
In this event, the act of the Ombudsman can justifiably be assailed. It is neither right nor just
to unnecessarily put to anxiety and anguish a person by an indictment for a crime that, on its face,
cannot stand. No useful purpose but only harm and undue concern can be achieved from an
unwarranted criminal prosecution. The resolution of the Ombudsman was set aside and the
Sandiganbayan was directed to dismiss the case against the petitioner.
t. People v. Velez
(G.R. No.138093, February 19, 2003)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ignacio Salmingo, a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Silay City,
􏰀led an affidavit-criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (for Visayas) charging
respondents with:
1. Installing and operating a rock crusher without the required Environmental Clearance Certificate
(ECC) from the DENR;
2. Incurring an overdraft against appropriation in the amount of P3.991M, in violation of Section 158
of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual;
3. Entering into a transaction that is grossly or manifestly disadvantageous to Silay City, in violation
of Sec. 3 (g) of RA No. 3019;
4. Malversation of P2.528M in violation of Art. 217 of the RPC; and 5. Technical Malversation of at
least P11.648M in violation of Sec.
305 (a) of the Local Government Code and Art. 220 of the RPC. 4 Salmingo alleged, inter alia,
in his affidavit-criminal complaint that:
“the respondent City Mayor, Edwin D. Velez, on January 05, 1995, requested the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Silay City for authority to enter into a loan agreement with the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for the purpose of purchasing a rock crusher (Annex 'B'). The SP of
Silay City then passed Resolution No. 563, giving such authority to Mayor Velez to negotiate for a
P10M loan from the LBP and to mortgage the City's patrimonial properties, among others. The
complainant pointed out that said SP Resolution No. 563 did not specify that the loan proceeds will
be used to procure a rock crusher, or for any other purpose. That the SP of Silay City also did not
officially approve any appropriation ordinance authorizing that any proposed LBP loan, or any other
fund of the Silay City local government, shall be used to purchase a rock crusher or related
equipment.“
The foregoing disbursements for the rock crusher project allegedly caused the Silay City local
government to incur an overdraft of P3.991M under the item of Capital Outlay — Office of the City
Mayor, as of June 30, 1995.
On November 27, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by respondents with the ratiocination that the filing of an Information before the
SB precluded said Office from still taking cognizance of said motion.
Salmingo contended that the SB did not order the O􏰀ce of the Ombudsman to reinvestigate
the case or to reconsider its July 28, 1997 Resolution but merely to take appropriate action. Hence,
he claims, the Office of the Ombudsman abused its discretion when it set aside its July 28, 1998
Resolution.
Salmingo contends that the SB violated Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 when it treated the
Joint Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation filed by respondents as a Motion for
Reconsideration under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 simply because the prosecution and
respondents had agreed to treat said motion merely as a motion for reconsideration under said law
and not a second motion for reconsideration of the July 28, 1997 Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman
The Office of the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it opposed the
memorandum of the Special Prosecutor dated July 30, 1998 and found no probable cause against
respondents and moved for the withdrawal of the Information and for the filing of another against the
City Engineer only.
ISSUE:
a. whether Salmingo is the proper party to file the present petition; and
b. whether the SB violated Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 when it treated the "Joint Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation" of respondents as a motion for reconsideration under
Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and when it granted the "Motion to Withdraw Information"
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman and dismissed Criminal Case No. 24307
RULING:
a. Salmingo is not the proper party as petitioner in this case. The Court has previously held that
the "party" referred to in the rule is the original party in the main case aggrieved by the order
or decision in the main case. Hence, only the aggrieved original party in the main case is the
only proper party as petitioner. The private complainant is the City of Silay while Salmingo is
merely a witness for the plaintiff.
b. The Sandiganbayan did not violate Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 when it treated the Motion
for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation of respondents as a motion for reconsideration under
Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 which reads:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of
the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The
motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one
motion for reconsideration.
While the Office of the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether an Information
should be withdrawn and a criminal case should be dismissed, and to move for the withdrawal of
such Information or dismissal of a criminal case, the final disposition of the said motion and of the
case is addressed to the sound discretion of the SB subject only to the caveat that the action of the
SB must not impair the substantial rights of the accused and of the right of the People to due process
of law. In this case, the Court holds that the SB acted in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion
in granting the motion of respondents and ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 24307.
u. Marquez vs. Desierto

(G.R. No. 135882. June 27, 2001)
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from Ombudsman Desierto to
produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts
maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch
manager. The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270, 240-020718, 245-30317-3 and
245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al.
On 26 May 1998, the FFIB panel met in conference with Marquez and Atty. Macalino at the
bank's main office in Makati City. The meeting was for the purpose of allowing Marquez and Atty.
Macalino to view the checks furnished by Traders Royal Bank. After convincing themselves of the
veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on 3 June 1998. However, on 4 June 1998, petitioner
wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that the accounts in question cannot readily be identified
and asked for time to respond to the order. The Ombudsman, responding to the request of the
petitioner for time to comply with the order, stated that the in camera inspection was already extended
twice from 13 May 1998 to 3 June 1998, thereby giving the bank enough time within which to
sufficiently comply with the order. Thus, on 16 June 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing
petitioner to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue.
On 10 July 1998, Marquez, together with Union Bank of the Philippines, filed a petition before
RTC Makati City, against the Ombudsman. Petitioner prayed for TRO because the Ombudsman and
other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank
documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on 16 June 1998, the Ombudsman issued
another order stating that unless petitioner appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested,
petitioner manager would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice. The petition
was, however, dismissed by RTC. Marquez then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On 21 August 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt that
compelled her to file an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt and reiterated that she had
no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how
she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA 1405, the law on
secrecy of bank deposits. Respondent Ombudsman panel set the incident for hearing on 7 September
1998. After hearing, the panel issued an order ordering petitioner and counsel to appear for a
continuation of the hearing of the contempt charges against her. On 10 September 1998, petitioner
filed with the Ombudsman a motion for reconsideration of the above order. Her motion was premised
on the fact that there was a pending case with the RTC which would determine whether obeying the
orders of the Ombudsman to produce bank documents would not violate any law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the orders of the Ombudsman to produce bank documents are valid.
RULING:
NO. The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts
with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at
the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et al. Supreme Court ruled that before an
in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case, not investigation, before a court
of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the
subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel
and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may
cover only the account identified in the pending case. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman
would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et al with the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the
bank account for inspection.
v. Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 160675. June 16, 2006)
CALLEJO, SR., J:
FACTS:
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass)
of the Revised Penal Code against herein Edmondo Arregadas, Nicomedes Armilla, et al., all
employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No.
VII, Banilad, Mandaue City.
It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the parcel of land
owned by the Corominas family without seeking permission from the latter or their representative and
despite the big "NO TRESPASSING" sign attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said
property. Armilla, et al. executed a joint counter-affidavit decrying the charge against them as
malicious, unfounded and untrue. By way of refutation, they alleged that they entered the Corominas
landholding pursuant to the Order dated 14 September 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 9 thereof, in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-17639 (entitled Republic of the
Philippines v. Larrazabal, et al.), involving a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title.
In compliance with the foregoing order, the DENR Regional Executive Director issued Travel
Order Nos. 99-10-19, 11-01, and 99-11-11 authorizing Armilla, et al. to "conduct relocation survey of
the corners of Proclamation No. 56, S-36 and Lot No. 18454, Cad. 12 Ext." The following day, the
DENR Survey Team, the members of the PNP and two barangay tanods of Sudlon II, Cebu City,
commenced the relocation survey.
For his part, Arregadas averred in his counter-affidavit that he was not part of the DENR
Survey Team tasked to relocate and monument the western boundary corners of the Sudlon National
Park. He met with the group briefly on 25 October 1999 but since then, he had not returned nor had
been physically present inside the said park or area that he had allegedly trespassed on. Hence, the
charge against him was baseless and malicious.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint in OMB-VIS-CRIM-99-1227

for lack of probable cause. However, in the administrative case (OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044), the Office
of the Ombudsman rendered the Decision dated 24 October 2001, finding that, except for Arregadas,
the other named DENR employees are guilty of simple misconduct and imposed on them the penalty
of suspension for one month. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by Armilla, et al. but the
same was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Armilla, et al. thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman in finding them guilty of simple misconduct and imposing
on them the penalty of one-month suspension. They alleged that they could not be guilty of simple
misconduct considering that they simply complied with a court order and directive of their superiors
for them to conduct a relocation survey of the Sudlon National Park.
The appellate court granted the petition of Armilla, et al. It affirmed the finding of the Office of
the Ombudsman that Armilla, et al. were guilty of simple misconduct. However, it ruled that the Office
of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing on them the penalty of
suspension for one month. Citing the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, the appellate
court declared that the Office of the Ombudsman's power is limited only to the recommendation of
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault. Accordingly, it has no power to impose the penalty of suspension on
Armilla, et al.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to suspend a public officer.
RULING:
Yes. In declaring that the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to recommend, but
not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault, the appellate court mainly relied on the following statement
made by the Court in Tapiador, which states that “the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss
the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under
Section 13, subparagraph 3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
"recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned”.
Reliance by the appellate court on the foregoing statement is misplaced. As correctly pointed
out by petitioner, the foregoing statement is mere obiter dictum. In fact, in Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, the Court categorically pronounced that the statement in Tapiador on the Ombudsman's
power "is, at best, merely an obiter dictum". Likewise, in Ledesma, the Court rejected the argument
that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It
cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which directs
the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned the removal, suspension
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the
term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision, construed together with the pertinent
provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within
the bounds of law.
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman's power to
impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer
or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The
exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court recognized that the foregoing enumeration is
not exclusive and that the framers of the Constitution had given Congress the leeway to prescribe,
by subsequent legislation, additional powers to the Ombudsman. In connection with their
administrative disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and his deputies are expressly given the power
to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges in accordance
with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, thus “the Ombudsman and his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him…”.
At this point, it is noted that the Office of the Ombudsman and the appellate court invariably
found respondents guilty of simple misconduct. The Court affirms this finding following the salutary
rule that factual findings of administrative bodies are accorded great respect by this Court.
w. Office of the Ombudsman v Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 168079 July 17, 2007)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with Ombudsman
against several DENR employees a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of
Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code. It was also treated as an administrative complaint for abuse
of authority and misconduct.
DENR entered without permission and despite a big "NO TRESPASSING" sign.
DENR claimed that there was an RTC order involving a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of title for them to conduct a relocation survey of the questioned lots and the Sudlon
National Park. They entered the property with some police and tanods and did their job. Then, the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint but found them guilty of simple misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of suspension for one month for the administrative case (except for
Arregadas who was a DENR employee but not part of the team and wasn’t even there.)
CA affirmed Ombudsman’s ruling finding that they were guilty of simple misconduct but
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering their suspension. Ombudsman does
not have power to suspend according to Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman: “Besides, assuming
arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly
dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID.
Under Section 13, subparagraph 3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
"recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.”
Therefore, Ombudsman’s power is limited only to the recommendation of the penalty of

removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found
to be at fault.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly
administrative penalties on public officials or employees
RULING:
Yes. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals: the Court categorically pronounced that the statement in
Tapiador on the Ombudsman’s power "is, at best, merely an obiter dictum" and, as such, "cannot
be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme Court."
Also in Ledesma, SC cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of
the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned
the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at
fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision, construed
together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
“Recommends” means that the implementation of the order of suspension be coursed through
the proper officer.
Moreover, Congress thus enacted Republic Act No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. It outlined the mandate and powers of the Ombudsman
on of which is that in connection with their administrative disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and
his deputies are expressly given the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees
facing administrative charges in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770. Sec. 25 lists
the penalties and makes reference to Presidential Decree No. 807. In that PD the penalties that may
be imposed by the disciplining authority in administrative disciplinary cases are removal from the
service, transfer, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an
amount not exceeding six months’ salary, or reprimand.
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority.
x. Office of the Ombudsman v. Madriaga

(G.R. No. 164316, September 27, 2006)
Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
The San Juan School Club (The Club) filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint
against Gertrudes Madriaga and Ana Marie Bernardo (respondents), the principal and a teacher of
the San Juan Elementary School respectively, for violation of R.A. 6713, or the “Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees”. It was alleged by the Club that after they
requested the financial statements of the school canteen, of which Bernardo was designated as
manager, both Bernardo and Madriaga failed to respond to their request within 15 days of receipt
thereof, as mandated by Sec. 5 of R.A. 6713.
After an investigation by Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Acuña, she found both respondents
guilty of violating R.A. 6713 and reprimanded the two for their misconduct. However, GIO Calderon
set aside Acuña’s ruling and also found the respondents guilty of “conduct grossly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service” and ordered the respondents to be suspended for 6 months.
The respondents filed for a writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that the
Office of the Ombudsman had no power to impose administrative sanctions on public officials. The
CA held that the Ombudsman only had the power to recommend sanctions to the proper disciplining
authority. In this case, it is the Department of Education (DepEd) which is empowered to impose the
sanctions recommended by the Ombudsman. In response to this, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
to reverse the CA’s ruling, asserting that Sec. 13(3), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act (R.A. 6770) empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to enforce its judgements on
all public officials, with the exception of the impeachable officials, members of Congress and
members of the Judiciary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman may punish the respondents.
RULING:
Yes. Sec. 13(3), Art. XI explicitly empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate a
complaint against any public official, recommend certain sanctions or actions and ensure compliance
therewith. Sec. 15(3) of the Ombudsman Act reiterates the Ombudsman’s power to ensure
compliance with its judgements, through an order to the proper disciplining authority. Given these
provisions, it was erroneous of the CA to rule that the Ombudsman’s judgements are merely a
recommendation and that it is within DepEd’s discretion to actually enforce the sanctions
recommended by the former. Clearly, the Ombudsman is empowered by law to compel DepEd to
place the respondents in suspension.
y. Ombudsman v. Apolonio
(G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012)
BRION, J:
FACTS:
Ombudsman seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and the resolution which
dismissed its Motion for Reconsideration through a petition for certiorari. The assailed decision
annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, finding Apolonio guilty of grave misconduct
and dishonesty.
Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive O􏰀cer of the National Book Development Board
(NBDB), wherein he supervised NBDB's Secretariat and managed its day-to-day affairs. NBDB's
Governing Board approved the conduct of a Team Building Seminar Workshop for its officers and
employees. Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued National Budget Circular No. 442,
prescribing a P900.00 limit for each participant per day in any seminar/workshop/conference
undertaken by any government agency. In compliance with the circular, the NBDB disbursed the
amount of P108,000.00 to cover the P1,800.00 allowance of the 60 employees for the two-day event.
Prior to the workshop, some employees/participants approached Apolonio to ask whether a

part of their allowance, instead of spending the entire amount on the seminar, could be given to them
as cash. He consulted Rogelio Montealto, then Finance and Administrative Chief of NBDB, about the
proposal and the possible legal repercussions of the proposal. Concluding the proposal to be legally
sound and in the spirit of the yuletide season, Apolonio approved the request. Thus, after the end of
the workshop, SM gift cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their approved
allowance.
Nicasio Marte, an NBDB Consultant, filed a complaint against Apolonio and Montealto before
the Ombudsman, alleging that Apolonio and Montealto committed grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the unauthorized purchase and disbursement
of the gift cheques. He also alleged that NBDB’s Governing Board never authorized the disbursement
of the funds for the purchase of the gift cheques and that the purchases were never stated in
Apolonio's liquidation report. Apolonio invoked good faith, having in mind the best welfare of the
employees who, in the first place, requested the use of part of the budget for distribution to the
employees. Graft Investigation Officer Plaridel Bohol found Apolonio and Montealto guilty of gross
misconduct and dishonesty, in addition to the charge of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. Consequently, and recommended that they be dismissed from the service. Acting
Ombudsman approved the findings of GIO Calderon and denied Apolonio’s motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman have the power to directly impose the penalty of removal
from office against public officials.
2. Whether or not Apolonio’s act constitute Grave Misconduct.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties, including
removal from office. The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman's power
to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it
recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court. Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, provided for the structural and functional
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his
deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil
and criminal liability of government officers and employees in every case where the evidence
warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
2. No. Apolonio is guilty of simple misconduct, not grave misconduct or conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. First, Dr. Apolonio's actions were not attended by a willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Although the Court agrees that his
acts contravene the provisions of Section 89 of PD 1445, otherwise known as the
"Government Auditing Code of the Philippines," such was not attended by a clear intent to
violate the law or a flagrant disregard of established rules. Second, the budget allocation for
the workshop was neither appropriated by law nor by ordinance since DBM National Budget
Circular No. 442 is not a law or an ordinance. Even if it had been, however, it must be noted
that DBM National Budget Circular No. 442 only prescribed the amounts to be used for any
workshop, conference or seminar. It did not appropriate the specific amounts to be used in
the event in question. Therefore, when Apolonio approved the purchase of the gift cheques
using a portion of the workshop's budget, her act did not amount to technical malversation.
The Court cannot likewise agree with the CA's findings that Dr. Apolonio's acts constitute
merely as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
z. Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
An administrative complaint filed by Gilda D. Daradal, a clerk in the Provincial Engineering
Office of Catbalogan, Samar, against private respondent Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial
Engineer of Samar, with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas) for Sexual
Harassment and Oppression.
According to Daradal, Quimbo ordered her detail to the Civil Service Commission in
Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the tasks of a male utility personnel. Further, her name was also
removed from the payroll of the personnel of the Provincial Engineering Office because of her refusal
to submit to his sexual advances.
Quimbo, on the other hand, asserts that the sexual harassment complaints were intended to
embarrass and ridicule him and that the change in Daradal’s details was validly exercised and under
his discretion.
The Ombudsman-Visayas had dismissed the case of sexual harassment but found Quimbo
guilty for oppression. He was suspended for six months. Quimbo had moved for reconsideration but
was denied. The case was brought up to the CA, wherein it was reversed because the Ombudsman
may only suggest the appropriate sanction but not impose them. The Ombudsman filed for
reconsideration for the decision of the CA; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the Ombudsman lacks
the power to directly impose penalties against erring public officials or employees
RULING:
Yes. The CA had gravely abused its discretion. The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose
administrative penalties against public officials or employees. As seen in the case of Ombudsman v.
Apolonio,
“The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman's power to impose these penalties, on
the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been
rejected by this Court.”
Further, Sec. 13 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis, underscoring and italicization in
the original.)
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, strengthens the
functions of the Ombudsman by giving it the authority to impose administrative penalties against
errant public servants. Such legislative act is intended to guide the Ombudsman in an active role
when it comes to the enforcement of the laws that on anti-graft and corruption practices and other
possible offenses that may be committed by public officers.
It must be understood that the intention of the legislature is to further strengthen the
Ombudsman by means of both, Sec. 13 of Art XI of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman
Act of 1989. These two must work hand in hand in order for the Ombudsman to be an “active
watchman” of public officials.
aa. Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan

(G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for three (3)
full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects
Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales' subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer. On
November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of the Ombudsman) received
a letter-complaint dated November 7, 2001 from People's Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to
investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the
amount of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped
down from office.
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares)
prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause against petitioners for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. Petitioners
alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information only when they
received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB. On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a
Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases
was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost 8 years since the
complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela's motion.
In a Resolution dated October 6, 2009, the SB denied petitioners' Motion to Quash for lack of
merit. It held that the preliminary investigation against petitioners was actually resolved by Cañares
on March 27, 2003, 1 year and 4 months from the date the complaint was filed, or in November 9,
2001. Complying with internal procedure, Cañares then prepared the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information for the recommendation of the Miro and eventually, the final approval of the Casimiro. As
these issuances had to undergo careful review and revision through the various levels of the said
office, the period of delay cannot be deemed as inordinate and as such, petitioners' constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the violation of petitioners right to speedy disposition, would result in their
acquittal.
RULING:
Yes. The SB's patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence surrounding
the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied the quashal of the
Information. By force of circumstances, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the criminal
case against petitioners be dismissed.
While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal of the
petitioners, it does not necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil liability,
assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the Province may opt to pursue. As
the institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should
create a system of accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved with reasonable
dispatch and to equally expose those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in
this case.
4. THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
a. Zaldivar v. Gonzales
(G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988)
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
In G.R. Nos. 79690-707 "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule 65,"
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to restrain the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing
of Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground that said cases were filed
by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution
which took effect on February 2, 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent
Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan.
In G.R. No. 80578, petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as the
first petition, prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting preliminary
investigations and filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and
to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
No. Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere
subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon
the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but
can only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue
subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the
Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he
is ordered to investigate.
It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman as
long as he has not been replaced, for the fact is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office
of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from the Office of
the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607 although concededly some of the powers of the two offices
are identical or similar. The Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the
position of Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.
b. Perez v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 166062, September 26,2006)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
A petition for Certiorari was filed questioning the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. This case
stemmed from a resolution dated 24 April 2001 when the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
resolved to file charges of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against petitioners San
Manuel, Pangasinan Mayor Salvador M. Perez and Municipal Treasurer Juanita Apostol. The
Information mentioned that the above-named accused conspired and confederated with one another
in committing the crime charged herein in relation to taking advantage of their official functions
through purchasing one (1) computer unit costing P120,000.00 acquisition by personal canvass which
is in violation of Sections 362 and 367 of R.A. 7160, thereby causing injury to the Municipality of San
Miguel,Pangasinan.
However, on 16 January 2002, prior to the scheduled arraignment, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation
alleging the discovery of new evidence which will change the outcome of the case if presented and
appreciated. It is stated herein that there is allegedly newly discovered evidence is included in the
reassessment by the auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) that, though the prices between the
subject computer and that canvassed by the COA are different, such difference is “not really that
material.”
Meanwhile, it was stated herein that the Information must be amended to reflect the manner
of the commission of the offense. The issue of overpricing must be referred to the appropriate office
for further fact-finding and probable administrative investigation for violation of COA rules and RA
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Special Prosecutor has the power to file informations without
delegation from the Ombudsman.
RULING:
No. The Ombudsman ordered in his Marginal note to “study whether the accused, assuming
arguendo that there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage of preference to the
seller of the subject computer” and “submit your recommendation the soonest”. However, it is
imperative that the recommendation be submitted to someone who has the authority to implement
such recommendation by authorizing the filing of the proper information. Whereas here, it is evident
that the Deputy Ombudsman and not the Special Prosecutor has the power to file information
pursuant to Office Order No. 40-05.
5. ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
a. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v Desierto

(G.R. No. 130140, October 25, 1999)
DAVIDE, JR., C.J:
FACTS:
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (COMMITTEE), with the Chairman
of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as Chairman; the Solicitor General as
Vice Chairman; and one representative each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department
of Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank,
Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. The Committee was directed to perform the following
functions:
1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers and
stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for granting the loans or who
influenced the grant thereof;
2. Identify the borrowers who were granted "friendly waivers," as well as the government officials who
granted these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers.
3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those loans, and to
recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the date
hereof.
On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the
COMMITTEE to "include in its investigation, inventory, and study all non-performing loans which shall
embrace both behest and non-behest loans." A behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest
loan in that while both may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may
involve criminal liability.
In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15

July 1993, the COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (PSI) of which the respondents
in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one corporations which obtained behest
loans.
In his instructions handwritten on the cover of the aforementioned Report, President Ramos
directed COMMITTEE Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo to, inter alia, "proceed with administrative
and judicial actions against the twenty-one firms (out of 21) in this batch with positive findings ASAP."
On March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed
with the COMMITTEE, filed with the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (OMBUDSMAN) a sworn
complaint against the Directors of PSI and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines
who approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 (Corrupt Practices of Public
Officers) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint, later docketed as OMB-0-96-0968, included allegations of multiple loans given
by DBP to Philippine Seeds, Inc. (PSI) for the latter’s benefit, the suspension of PSI’s foreclosure for
10 months, funds to finance PSI’s special projects, the subsequent non-implementation of PSI
foreclosures by virtue of then President Ferdinand Marcos' marginal notes dated April 1975, and the
involvement of Pacifico Marcos and Eduardo Romualdez, relatives of the late President Marcos, as
the principal stockholders and officers of PSI.
As a private entity, Philippine Seeds, Inc., did not deserve the concessions given it without
sufficient collateral for the loan and adequate capital to ensure not only the viability of its operations
but its ability to repay all its loans.
In the resolution dated 14 May 1996 and approved on 9 June 1996, the OMBUDSMAN
dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-96-0968 on the ground of prescription. Relying on People v.
Dinsay, a case decided by the Court of Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the questioned transactions
were evidenced by public instruments and were thus open for the perusal of the public, the prescriptive
period commenced to run from the time of the commission of the crime, not from the discovery thereof.
Reckoning the prescriptive period from 1969, 1970, 1975, and 1978, when the disputed transactions
were entered into.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in holding that the
prescriptive period in this case should be counted from the date of the grant of the behest loans
involved, and not from the date of discovery of the same by the committee.
RULING:
Yes. The COMMITTEE was correct in ruling that the right of the Republic of the Philippines to
recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the mandate of Section 15 of
Article XI of the Constitution, which provides:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees,
from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches,
or estoppel.
The Court agreed with the OMBUDSMAN that Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the
complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986.
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating
or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution
may be barred by prescription.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No.
3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period
is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because,
as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans."
This effectively hid the illegal transactions under the guise of regularity in public functions
notwithstanding the fact that the transactions were included in public instruments.
The COMMITTEE relied on the principle of "equitable tolling," which is based on the doctrine
"contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio," i.e., "no prescription shall run against a person
unable to bring an action." The COMMITTEE was unable to bring the action, for the cause therefor
was not known or reasonably known to it owing to the fact that (1) the loans, being behest, were
concealed; (2) both parties to the loan transactions were in conspiracy to perpetrate the fraud against
the State; and (3) the loans were granted at the time then President Marcos was at the threshold of
his authority when no one dared question, much less investigate, any of his orders.
Thus, the Court agreed with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of
the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
In People v. Duque, the Court stated: In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special
laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable
statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time, the prescription begins
to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or
acts.
In the case at bar, the OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed the complaint in Case No. OMB-0-
96-0968 without even requiring the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and solely on the
basis of the dates the alleged behest loans were granted, or the dates of the commission of the alleged
offense was committed.
Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal action should
commence from the discovery of the offense, the OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing outright Case No. OMB-0-96-0968. It should have first received the evidence
from the complainant and the respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue of the
date of discovery of the offense.
b. Jesus P. Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan

(G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010)
Roberto A. Abad, J.:
FACTS:
On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and Jesus P. Disini
(Disini) entered into an Immunity Agreement (the Immunity Agreement) under which Disini
undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and
documents they needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United
States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International
Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of
Commerce Court of Arbitration.
Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T. Disini (Herminio), as an executive in the
latter’s companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for
the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminio’s companies,
had been attended by anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart
from the two Westinghouse cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or
foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking
but 18 years later, upon the Republic’s application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena
against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents before that court in an action
that the Republic filed against Herminio.
Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The
Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify before it.
Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited
the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied
Disini’s motion to quash the subpoena.
Disini, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained that the
PCGG’s power to grant immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order 14 covered only immunity
from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing evidence in court. The
Republic argued that Disini’s immunity from testifying against Herminio contravened the state’s
policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President Marcos. The
Republic further argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement
which reads: “Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini’s obligation to provide truthful information
or testimony,” Disini, despite the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other
cases, was to “provide truthful information or testimony” in such other cases.
For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from
revoking the questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the authority to provide
such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that “(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.”
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity
Agreement
(2) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied Disini’s motion
to quash the subpoena.
RULING:
The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in determining
the extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of
criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the
prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed
by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government’s honesty and
fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain.
Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should hold the
Republic on to its promise. If Disini refuses to testify in those other cases as ordered by
Sandiganbayan, it was certain to result in prosecution for criminal contempt (a conduct directed
against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect), punishable
by a fine or imprisonment or both.
In criminal contempt, the proceedings are regarded as criminal and the rules of criminal
procedure apply. The grant, therefore, of immunity to Disini against being compelled to testify was
ultimately a grant of immunity from criminal prosecution, something that fell within the express
coverage of the immunity given him. The questioned immunity did not contravene the state’s
public policy respecting the recovery of illegally acquired wealth under the regime of former
President Marcos. The authority that adopted such policy, former President Corazon C. Aquino,
was the same authority that gave the PCGG the power to grant immunity to witnesses whom it
might use to recover illegally acquired wealth during that regime.
In the case of Tanchanco vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court regarded as valid and binding on
the government the immunity it gave former National Food Authority Administrator, Jesus
Tanchanco, for all “culpable acts of his during his service in the Marcos government,” which would
include possible prosecution for any illegal wealth that he might himself have acquired during that
service. The Court did not regard such immunity in contravention of the state policy on recovery
of ill-gotten wealth under the auspices of the Marcos regime. The last sentence in paragraph 3 of
the Immunity Agreement that enjoined Disini to “provide truthful information or testimony,” despite
the guarantee not to be compelled to testify against Herminio, merely emphasized the fact that
such concessions did not affect his obligation to “provide truthful information or testimony” in the
two Westinghouse cases.
The grant of immunity to Disini against being compelled to testify in “other cases” against
Herminio was quite clear and did not need any interpretation. The estoppel Disini invoked did not
have the effect, if recognized, of denying the state its right to recover whatever ill-gotten wealth
Herminio may have acquired under the Marcos regime. The action against Herminio could
continue, hampered only by the exclusion of Disini’s testimony. And there are other ways of
proving the existence of ill-gotten wealth. Although the government cannot be barred by estoppel
based on unauthorized acts of public officers, such principle cannot apply to this case since PCGG
acted within its authority when it provided Disini with a guarantee against having to testify in other
cases. A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual
consent. This applies with more reason in this case where Disini already complied with the terms
of the Immunity Agreement.
To allow the Republic to revoke the Immunity Agreement at this late stage would run afoul
of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits.
The Court should not allow the Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross Disini. The Immunity
Agreement was the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying to
get the best concessions out of it. The Republic did not have to enter into that agreement; it was
free not to. But when it did, it needed to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than
any one, the government should be fair. PCGG’s revocation of the questioned immunity and
Sandiganbayan’s denial of Disini’s motion to quash the subpoena were both annulled.

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DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY.

ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019

XII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed

1. Whether or not ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary

c. Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management

d. Funa v. The Chairman, Civil Service Commission

1. Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;

e. Gaminde vs. Commission on Audit

g. DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC

h. Sevilla, Jr. v. COMELEC

i. Alvarez vs. COMELEC

A panel headed by the Commissioner of Elections, Hon. Venancio Duque, conducted

2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?

2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?

ordered a manual count?

Basis for manual count

Reliability of results of manual counting

l. Reyes V. Commission on Audit

m. Mahinay v. Court of Appeals

The petitioner’s motion was denied by PEZA.

n. Abella v. Civil Service Commission

I. Positions Covered by the Career Executive Service

1. the position is a career position;

jurisdiction, in dismissing petitioner's appeal on a mere technicality considering that petitioner

2. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

i. National Service Corporation v. NLRC

Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a

ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled

ii. Juco v. NLRC

iii. Liban v Gordon

2. No. PNRC is a private organization performing public functions.

Because Mayor Gordon cannot be appointed as SBMA Administrator, it must also be

ii. Funa v. Ermita

Allowing undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to occupy other government posts would

iii. Funa v. Agra

iv. Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission

Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or

v. Public Interest Center v. Elma

vi. National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit

Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created by then

ISSUE: Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire security of tenure.

Career Executive Service Eligibility

Appointment to CES Rank

So also, pertinent provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, read:

ii. Villaluz v. Zaldivar

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal unconstitutional

iii. Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz

Petitioner filed a letter-protest with respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing copies to

Petitioner's "designation" as Assistant Director for Professional Services on 8 August 1986 in

iv. De la Llana v. Alba

ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was constitutional.

v. Dario vs. Mison

There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions,

Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from

2. No, Republic Act No. 6656 is not unconstitutional.

vi. Cabagnot v Civil Service Commission

Thereafter, twenty-one (21) aggrieved employees of the provincial government of Aklan,

vii. Civil Service Commission v Dacoycoy

viii. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ix. Canonizado v. Aguirre

c. Partisan Political Activity

Two grounds are advanced in support of this contention:

Section 2, Article XI, of the Constitution is read as follows:

ii. de los Santos vs. Yatco

i. SSS Employees’ Association v. Court of Appeals