Europe Faces Instability After the Cold War

Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War
Author(s): John J. Mearsheimer

Source: International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), pp. 5-56
Published by: The MIT Press
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Back to the Future JohnJ.Mearsheimer
Instabilityin Europe
Afterthe Cold War
The profoundchanges now underwayin Europe have been widely viewed

as harbingersof a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the
threatof war thathas hung over Europe formore than fourdecades is lifting.
Swords can now be beaten into ploughshares; harmonycan reignamong the
states and peoples of Europe. Central Europe, which long groaned under
the massive forces of the two militaryblocs, can convertits militarybases
into industrialparks, playgrounds,and condominiums. Scholars of security
affairscan stop their dreary quarrels over militarydoctrine and balance
assessments, and turn their attention to finding ways to prevent global
warming and preserve the ozone layer. European leaders can contemplate
how to spend peace dividends. So goes the common view.
This articleassesses this optimisticview by exploringin detail the conse-
quences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically,I examine the
effectsof a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end.
The Soviet Union withdraws all of its forcesfromEastern Europe, leaving
the states in that region fullyindependent. Voices are thereupon raised in
the United States, Britain,and Germany,arguingthatAmericanand British
militaryforcesin Germany have lost theirprincipalraisond'etre,and these
forcesare withdrawnfromthe Continent.NATO and the Warsaw Pact then
dissolve; they may persist on paper, but each ceases to functionas an alli-
ance.1 As a result,the bipolar structurethat has characterizedEurope since
This article emerged froma paper writtenfor a February 1990 conferenceat Ditchley Park,
England, on the futureof Europe, organized by JamesCallaghan, Gerald Ford, ValeryGiscard
d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt. An abridged version of this article appears in the Atlantic,
August 1990. I am gratefulto RobertArt, Stacy Bergstrom,RichardBetts,Anne-Marie Burley,
Dale Copeland, Michael Desch, Markus Fischer, Henk Goemans, Joseph Grieco, Ted Hopf,
Craig Koerner,Andrew Kydd, Alicia Levine, JamesNolt, Roger Petersen,BarryPosen, Denny
Roy, JackSnyder,Ashley Tellis, Marc Trachtenberg,Stephen Van Evera, Andrew Wallace, and
Stephen Walt fortheirmost helpfulcomments.
JohnMearsheimer
is Professor
and ChairoftheDepartment
ofPoliticalScience,University
ofChicago.
1. There is considerable support withinNATO's highercircles,includingthe Bush administra-

tion, formaintainingNATO beyond the Cold War. NATO leaders have not clearlyarticulated
the concrete goals that NATO would serve in a post-Cold War Europe, but they appear to
conceive the futureNATO as a means forensuringGerman security,therebyremovingpossible
German motives foraggressive policies; and as a means to protectother NATO states against
International
Security,Summer 1990 (Vol. 15, No. 1)
C 1990 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.

International
Security15:1 | 6
the end of World War II is replaced by a multipolarstructure.In essence,

the Cold War we have known for almost half a centuryis over, and the
postwar order in Europe is ended.2
How would such a fundamentalchange affectthe prospects forpeace in
Europe?3Would it raise or lower the riskof war?
I argue that the prospects formajor crises and war in Europe are likelyto
increase markedlyif the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next
decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as
violentas the first45 years of this century,but would probablybe substan-
tiallymore prone to violence than the past 45 years.
This pessimisticconclusion restson the argumentthatthe distributionand
characterof militarypower are the rootcauses of war and peace. Specifically,
the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three
factors:the bipolar distributionof militarypower on the Continent;the rough
militaryequalitybetween the two statescomprisingthe two poles in Europe,
German aggression. However, the Germans, who now provide the largestportionof the Alli-
ance's standingforces,are likelyto resistsuch a role forNATO. A securitystructureof this sort
assumes thatGermanycannot be trustedand thatNATO must be maintainedto keep it in line.
A united Germany is not likely to accept forvery long a structurethat rests on this premise.
Germans accepted NATO throughoutthe Cold War because it secured Germany against the
Soviet threatthat developed in the wake of World War II. Withoutthat specificthreat,which
now appears to be diminishingrapidly,Germanyis likelyto rejectthe continued maintenance
of NATO as we know it.
2. I am not arguing that a complete end to the Cold War is inevitable;also quite likelyis an
intermediateoutcome, under which the status quo is substantiallymodified, but the main
outlinesof the currentorderremainin place. Specifically,the Soviet Union may withdrawmuch
of its forcefromEastern Europe, but leave significantforcesbehind. If so, NATO forcelevels
would probably shrink markedly,but NATO may continue to maintain significantforces in
Germany.Britainand the United States would withdrawsome but not all of theirtroops from
the Continent.If this outcome develops, the basic bipolar militarycompetitionthathas defined
the map of Europe throughoutthe Cold War will continue. I leave this scenario unexamined,
and instead explore what follows froma complete end to the Cold War in Europe because this
latterscenario is the less examined of the two, and because the consequences, and therefore
the desirability,ofcompletelyending the Cold War would stillremainan issue iftheintermediate
outcome occurred.
3. The impact of such a change on human rightsin Eastern Europe will not be considered
directlyin this article.Eastern Europeans have sufferedgreat hardship as a resultof the Soviet
occupation. The Soviets have imposed oppressive political regimes on the region, denying
EasternEuropeans basic freedoms.Soviet withdrawalfromEasternEurope will probablychange
that situationforthe better,although the change is likelyto be more of a mixed blessing than
most realize. First, it is not clear that communism will be promptlyreplaced in all Eastern
European countries with political systems that place a high premium on protectingminority
rightsand civilliberties.Second, the longstandingblood feuds among the nationalitiesin Eastern
Europe are likelyto re-emergein a niultipolarEurope, regardlessof the existingpoliticalorder.
If wars break out in Eastern Europe, human rightsare sure to suffer.

Backto theFuture| 7
the United States and the Soviet Union; and the factthat each superpower
was armed with a large nuclear arsenal.4 Domestic factorsalso affectthe
likelihood of war, and have helped cause the postwar peace. Most impor-
tantly,hyper-nationalismhelped cause the two world wars, and the decline
of nationalismin Europe since 1945 has contributedto the peacefulness of
the postwar world. However, factors of militarypower have been most
importantin shaping past events, and will remain centralin the future.
The departure of the superpowers fromCentral Europe would transform
Europe froma bipolar to a multipolarsystem.5Germany,France, Britain,
and perhaps Italywould assume major power status;the Soviet Union would
decline fromsuperpower status but would remaina major European power,
givingrise to a systemof fivemajor powers and a numberof lesser powers.
The resultingsystemwould sufferthe problems common to multipolarsys-
tems, and would thereforebe more prone to instability.6Power inequities
could also appear; if so, stabilitywould be underminedfurther.
The departure of the superpowers would also remove the large nuclear
arsenals they now maintainin Central Europe. This would remove the pac-
ifyingeffectthat these weapons have had on European politics. Four prin-
cipal scenarios are possible. Under the firstscenario, Europe would become
nuclear-free,thus eliminatinga centralpillar of order in the Cold War era.
Under the second scenario, the European statesdo not expand theirarsenals
to compensate for the departure of the superpowers' weapons. In a third
scenario, nuclear proliferationtakes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are
4. It is commonplace to characterizethe polarity-bipolar or multipolar-of the international

systemat large, not a specificregion. The focus in this article,however, is not on the global
distributionof power, but on the distributionof power in Europe. Polarityargumentscan be
used to assess the prospects forstabilityin a particularregion,provided the global and regional
balances are distinguished fromone another and the analysis is focused on the structureof
power in the relevantregion.
5. To qualifyas a pole in a global or regional system,a state must have a reasonable prospect
of defendingitselfagainst the leading state in the systemby its own efforts.The United States
and the Soviet Union have enjoyed clear militarysuperiorityover other European states, and
all non-European states, throughoutthe Cold War; hence they have formedthe two poles of
both the global and European systems.What is happening to change thisis thatboth the Soviet
Union and the United States are moving forcesout of Central Europe, which makes it more
difficultfor them to project power on the Continentand thus weakens theirinfluencethere;
and reducing the size of those forces,leaving them less militarypower to project. Because of
its proximityto Europe, the Soviet Union will remain a pole in the European systemas long as
it retainssubstantialmilitaryforcesop its own territory. The United States can remaina pole in
Europe only if it retainsthe capacityto project significantmilitarypower into Central Europe.
6. Stabilityis simplydefined as the absence of wars and major crises.

International
Security15:1 | 8
taken to dampen the many dangers inherentin the proliferation process. All
threeof these scenarios would raise serious risksof war.
In the fourthand least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferatein
Europe, but the process is well-managed by the currentnuclear powers.
They take steps to deter preventivestrikeson emergingnuclear powers, to
set boundaries on the proliferationprocess by extendingsecurityumbrellas
over the neighbors of emerging nuclear powers, to help emergingnuclear
powers build secure deterrentforces,and to discourage themfromdeploying
counterforcesystemsthatthreatentheirneighbors'deterrents.This outcome
probablyprovides the best hope formaintainingpeace in Europe. However,
it would stillbe more dangerous than the world of 1945-90. Moreover,it is
not likelythat proliferationwould be well-managed.
Three counter-argumentsmightbe advanced against this pessimistic set
of predictionsof Europe's future.The firstargumentholds that the peace
will be preserved by the effectsof the liberal internationaleconomic order
that has evolved since World War II. The second rests on the observation
thatliberaldemocracies veryseldom fightwars against each other,and holds
that the past spread of democracy in Europe has bolstered peace, and that
the ongoing democratizationof Eastern Europe makes war still less likely.
The thirdargumentmaintainsthatEuropeans have learned fromtheirdisas-
trous experiencesin this centurythatwar, whetherconventionalor nuclear,
is so costlythat it is no longer a sensible option forstates.
But the theories behind these argumentsare flawed, as I explain; hence
theirpredictionof peace in a multipolarEurope is flawed as well.
Three principal policy prescriptionsfollow fromthis analysis. First, the
United States should encourage a process of limitednuclear proliferationin
Europe. Specifically,Europe will be more stable ifGermanyacquires a secure
nuclear deterrent,but proliferationdoes not go beyond that point. Second,
the United States should not withdrawfullyfromEurope, even ifthe Soviet
Union pulls its forcesout of EasternEurope. Third,the United States should
take steps to forestallthe re-emergenceof hyper-nationalismin Europe.
METHODOLOGY: HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT EUROPE S FUTURE?

Predictionson the futurerisk of war and prescriptionsabout how best to
maintainpeace should rest on general theoriesabout the causes of war and
peace. This point is true forboth academics and policymakers.The latterare
seldom self-consciousin their uses of theory.Nevertheless, policymakers'

Backto theFutureI 9
views on the futureof Europe are shaped by theirimplicitpreferenceforone

theoryof internationalrelations over another. Our task, then, is to decide
which theories best explain the past, and will most directlyapply to the
future;and then to employ these theories to explore the consequences of
probable scenarios.
Specifically,we should firstsurveythe inventoryof internationalrelations
theoriesthatbear on the problem. What theoriesbest explain the period of
violence before the Cold War? What theoriesbest explain the peace of the
past 45 years?Are thereothertheoriesthatexplain littleabout pre-Cold War
Europe, or Cold War Europe, but are well-suitedforexplainingwhat is likely
to occur in a Europe withouta Soviet and Americanmilitarypresence?
Next, we should ask what these theories predict about the nature of
internationalpolitics in a post-Cold War multipolarEurope. Will the causes
of the postwar peace persist,will the causes of the two world wars return,
or will othercauses arise?
We can then assess whetherwe should expect the nextdecades to be more
peaceful, or at least as peaceful, as the past 45 years, or whetherthe future
is more likelyto resemble the first45 years of the century.We can also ask
what policy prescriptionsthese theoriessuggest.
The studyof internationalrelations,like the othersocial sciences, does not
yet resemble the hard sciences. Our stock of theories is spotty and often
poorly tested. The conditions required forthe operation of established the-
ories are oftenpoorlyunderstood. Moreover,politicalphenomena are highly
complex;hence precise politicalpredictionsare impossiblewithoutverypow-
erfultheoreticaltools, superior to those we now possess. As a result, all
politicalforecastingis bound to include some error.Those who venture to
predict,as I do here, should thereforeproceed with humility,take care not
to claim unwarranted confidence, and admit that later hindsightwill un-
doubtedlyreveal surprisesand mistakes.
Nevertheless, social science shouldofferpredictionson the occurrenceof
momentousand fluidevents like those now unfoldingin Europe. Predictions
can informpolicy discourse. They help even those who disagree to frame
theirideas, by clarifyingpoints of disagreement. Moreover, predictionsof
events soon to unfold provide the best tests of social science theories, by
making clear what it was that given theories have predicted about those
events. In short, the world can be used as a laboratoryto decide which
theoriesbest explain internationalpolitics. In this articleI employ the body

International
Security15:1 | 10
of theories that I find most persuasive to peer into the future. Time will
reveal whether these theoriesin facthave much power to explain interna-
tional politics.
The next section offersan explanation for the peacefulness of the post-
World War II order. The section thatfollowsargues thatthe end of the Cold
War is likelyto lead to a less stable Europe. Next comes an examinationof
the theories underlyingclaims that a multipolarEurope is likely to be as
peaceful,ifnot more peaceful,than Cold War Europe. The concludingsection
suggests policy implicationsthat follow frommy analysis.
Explainingthe"LongPeace"
The past 45 years representthe longestperiod of peace in European history.7

During these years Europe saw no major war, and only two minorconflicts
(the 1956 Soviet interventionin Hungary and the 1974 Greco-Turkishwar in
Cyprus). Neither conflictthreatenedto widen to other countries. The early
years of the Cold War (1945-63) were marked by a handful of major crises,
although none brought Europe to the brink of war. Since 1963, however,
therehave been no East-Westcrises in Europe. It has been difficult-ifnot
impossible-for the last two decades to findserious national securityanalysts
who have seen a real chance that the Soviet Union would attack Western
Europe.
The Cold War peace contrastssharplywith European politics during the
first45 years of this century,which saw two world wars, a handfulof minor
wars, and a number of crises that almost resulted in war. Some 50 million
Europeans were killed in the two world wars; in contrast,probablyno more
than 15,000 died in the two post-1945European conflicts.8Cold War Europe
is farmore peaceful than early twentieth-century Europe.
Both Europeans and Americans increasinglyassume that peace and calm
are the natural order of things in Europe and that the first45 years of this
century,not the most recent, were the aberration.This is understandable,
7. The term "long peace" was coined by JohnLewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of
Stabilityin the Postwar InternationalSystem,"International Security,
Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986),
pp. 99-142.
8. There were approximately10,000 battle deaths in the Russo-Hungarian War of October-
November 1956, and some 1500-5000 battledeaths in the July-August1974 war in Cyprus. See
Ruth Leger Sivard, WorldMilitaryand Social Expenditures 1989 (Washington,D.C.: World Priori-
ties, 1989), p. 22; and Melvin Small a'nd J. David Singer, Resortto Arms:International and Civil
Wars,1816-1980 (BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage, 1982), pp. 93-94.

Backto theFutureI 11
since Europe has been freeofwar forso long thatan ever-growingproportion

of the Westernpublic, born afterWorld War II, has no directexperiencewith
great-powerwar. However, this optimisticview is incorrect.
The European state systemhas been plagued with war since its inception.
Duringmuch of the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturieswar was underway
somewhereon the European Continent.9The nineteenthcenturyheld longer
periods of peace, but also several major wars and crises. The firsthalfof that
centurywitnessed the protractedand bloody Napoleonic Wars; later came
the CrimeanWar,and the Italian and Germanwars of unification.10 The wars
of 1914-45 continued this long historicalpattern.They representeda break
fromthe events of previous centuriesonly in the enormous increase in their
scale of destruction.
This era of warfarecame to an abrupt end with the conclusion of World
War II. A wholly new and remarkablypeaceful orderthen developed on the
Continent.
THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: MILITARY POWER AND STABILITY

What caused the era of violence before1945? Why has the postwar era been
so much more peaceful? The wars before1945 each had theirparticularand
unique causes, but the distributionof power in Europe-its multipolarity
and the imbalances of power that oftenoccurredamong the major states in
that multipolarsystem-was the crucial permissive condition that allowed
these particularcauses to operate. The peacefulness of the postwar era arose
forthreeprincipalreasons: the bipolarityof the distributionof power on the
Continent,the rough equality in militarypower between those two polar
states, and the appearance of nuclear weapons, which vastly expanded the
violence of war, making deterrencefarmore robust.11
9. For inventoriesof past wars, see JackS. Levy, WarIn theModernGreatPowerSystem,1495-

1975 (Lexington:UniversityPress of Kentucky,1983); and Small and Singer,Resortto Arms.
10. Europe saw no major war from1815-1853 and from1871-1914,two periods almost as long
as the 45 years of the Cold War. There is a crucialdistinction,however, between the Cold War
and these earlierperiods. Relationsamong the greatpowers deterioratedmarkedlyin the closing
years of the two earlier periods, leading in each case to a major war. On the other hand, the
Cold War order has become increasinglystable with the passage of time and thereis now no
serious threatof war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Europe would surely remain at
peace forthe foreseeable futureif the Cold War were to continue, a point that highlightsthe
exceptionalstabilityof the present European order.
11. The relativeimportanceof these'three factorscannot be stated precisely,but all three had
substantialimportance.

International
Security15:1 | 12
These factorsare aspects of the European state system-of the character

of militarypower and its distributionamong states-and not of the states
themselves.Thus the keys to war and peace lie more in the structureof the
internationalsystem than in the nature of the individual states. Domestic
factors-most notablyhyper-nationalism-also helped cause the wars of the
pre-1945era, and the domestic structuresof post-1945European states have
been moreconducive to peace, but these domesticfactorswere less important
than the characterand distributionof militarypower between states. More-
over, hyper-nationalismwas caused in large part by securitycompetition
among the European states, which compelled European elites to mobilize
publics to support national defense efforts;hence even this importantdo-
mesticfactorwas a more remote consequence of the internationalsystem.
Conflictis common among states because the internationalsystemcreates
powerfulincentives for aggression.12The root cause of the problem is the
anarchic nature of the internationalsystem. In anarchy there is no higher
body or sovereign that protectsstates fromone another. Hence each state
livingunder anarchyfaces the ever-presentpossibilitythatanotherstate will
use forceto harm or conquer it. Offensivemilitaryaction is always a threat
to all states in the system.
Anarchyhas two principalconsequences. First,thereis littleroom fortrust
among states because a statemay be unable to recoverifits trustis betrayed.
Second, each state must guarantee its own survivalsince no otheractorwill
provideits security.All otherstatesare potentialthreats,and no international
institutionis capable of enforcingorder or punishing powerfulaggressors.
States seek to survive under anarchy by maximizingtheirpower relative
to other states, in order to maintain the means for self-defense.Relative
power, not absolute levels of power, mattersmost to states. Thus, states seek
opportunitiesto weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative
power position. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumu-
late more power at the expense of rivals.
This competitiveworld is peaceful when it is obvious that the costs and
risksof going to war are high, and the benefitsof going to war are low. Two
aspects of militarypower are at the heart of this incentive structure:the
distributionof power between states, and the nature of the militarypower
12. The two classic works on this su1ject are Hans J. Morgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations:The
StruggleforPowerand Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theoryof
International
Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979).

Backto theFuture| 13
available to them. The distributionof power between states tells us how

well-positionedstates are to commit aggression, and whether other states
are able to check their aggression. This distributionis a functionof the
number of poles in the system, and their relative power. The nature of
militarypower directlyaffectsthe costs, risks,and benefitsof going to war.
If the militaryweaponry available guarantees that warfarewill be very de-
structive,statesare more likelyto be deterredby the cost of war.13 Ifavailable
weaponry favorsthe defense over the offense,aggressorsare more likelyto
be deterred by the futilityof aggression, and all states feel less need to
commit aggression, since they enjoy greater securityto begin with, and
thereforefeel less need to enhance theirsecurityby expansion.14 If available
weaponry tends to equalize the relative power of states, aggressors are
discouraged from going to war. If militaryweaponry makes it easier to
estimatethe relativepower of states, unwarrantedoptimismis discouraged
and wars of miscalculationare less likely.
One can establish that peace in Europe during the Cold War has resulted
frombipolarity,the approximatemilitarybalance between the superpowers,
and the presence of large numbersof nuclear weapons on both sides in three
ways: first,by showing that the general theorieson which it rests are valid;
second, by demonstratingthatthese theoriescan explain the conflictsof the
pre-1945era and the peace of the post-1945era; and third,by showing that
competingtheoriescannot account forthe postwar peace.
THE VIRTUES OF BIPOLARITY OVER MULTIPOLARITY. The two principal ar-
rangementsofpower possible among statesare bipolarityand multipolarity.15
13. The prospects fordeterrencecan also be affectedby crisisstabilitycalculations. See JohnJ.

Mearsheimer, "A StrategicMisstep: The MaritimeStrategyand Deterrence in Europe," Inter-
nationalSecurity,Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 6-8.
14. See RobertJervis,"Cooperation Under the SecurityDilemma," WorldPolitics,Vol. 30, No.
2 (January1978), pp. 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (unpub. PhD disser-
tation,Universityof Californiaat Berkeley,1984), chap. 3. As noted below, I believe that the
distinctionbetween offensiveand defensive weapons and, more generally,the concept of an
offense-defensebalance, is relevantat the nuclear level. However, I do not believe those ideas
are relevantat the conventionallevel. See JohnJ. Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca:
Cornell UniversityPress, 1983), pp. 25-27.
15. Hegemony represents a thirdpossible distribution.Under a hegemony there is only one
major power in the system. The rest are minorpowers that cannot challenge the major power,
but must act in accordance with the dictatesof the major power. Every state would like to gain
hegemony,because hegemony confersabundant security:no challengerposes a serious threat.
Hegemony is rarelyachieved, however,because power tends to be somewhat evenlydistributed
among states, because threatened states have strongincentivesto join togetherto thwartan
aspiring hegemon, and because 'the costs of expansion usually outrun the benefits before
domination is achieved, causing extension to become overextension. Hegemony has never

Security15:1 | 14
International
A bipolar systemis more peaceful forthreemain reasons. First,the number

of conflictdyads is fewer,leaving fewerpossibilitiesforwar. Second, deter-
rence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily
averted. Third, the prospects fordeterrenceare greaterbecause miscalcula-
tions of relativepower and of opponents' resolve are fewerand less likely.16
In a bipolar system two major powers dominate. The minorpowers find
it difficultto remain unattached to one of the major powers, because the
major powers generallydemand allegiance fromlesser states. (This is espe-
cially true in core geographical areas, less so in peripheralareas.) Further-
more,lesser stateshave littleopportunityto play the majorpowers offagainst
each other,because when great powers are fewerin number,the systemis
more rigid. As a result, lesser states are hard-pressed to preserve their
autonomy.
In a multipolarsystem,by contrast,threeor more major powers dominate.
Minorpowers in such a systemhave considerableflexibility regardingalliance
partnersand can opt to be freefloaters.The exactformofa multipolarsystem
can vary markedly,depending on the number of major and minor powers
in the system,and theirgeographical arrangement.
A bipolar system has only one dyad across which war mightbreak out:
only two major powers contend with one another, and the minor powers
are not likely to be in a position to attack each other. A multipolarsystem
has many potential conflictsituations.Major power dyads are more numer-
ous, each posing the potential for conflict.Conflictcould also erupt across
dyads involving major and minor powers. Dyads between minor powers
could also lead to war. Therefore,ceterisparibus,war is more likely in a
multipolarsystemthan a bipolar one.
Wars in a multipolarworld involvingjust minorpowers or only one major
power are not likely to be as devastating as a conflictbetween two major
characterizedthe European state systemat any point since it arose in the seventeenthcentury,
and thereis no prospectforhegemonyin the foreseeablefuture;hence hegemonyis not relevant
to assessing the prospects forpeace in Europe.
16. The key works on bipolarityand multipolarityinclude Thomas J. Christensen and Jack
Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: PredictingAlliance Patternsin Multipolarity,"Inter-
nationalOrganization,Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Karl W. Deutsch and J.David
Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and InternationalStability,"WorldPolitics,Vol. 16, No. 3
(April 1964), pp. 390-406; Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity,Multipolarity,and the Future,"
JournalofConflictResolution,Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 1966), pp. 314-327; Kenneth N. Waltz,
"The Stabilityof a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; and
Waltz, Theoryof International Politics,chap. 8. My conclusions about bipolarityare similar to
Waltz's, although there are importantdifferencesin our explanations,as will be seen below.

Backto theFuture115
powers. However, local wars tend to widen and escalate. Hence there is
always a chance that a small war will triggera general conflict.
Deterrenceis more difficultin a multipolarworld because power imbal-
ances are commonplace, and when power is unbalanced, the strongbecome
hard to deter.17 Power imbalances can lead to conflictin two ways. First,two
states can gang up to attack a third state. Second, a major power might
simplybully a weaker power in a one-on-one encounter,using its superior
strengthto coerce or defeat the minorstate.18
Balance of power dynamics can countersuch power imbalances, but only
iftheyoperate efficiently.19No statecan dominateanother,eitherby ganging
up or by bullying,if the others coalesce firmlyagainst it, but problems of
geography or coordination often hinder the formationof such coalitions.204
These hindrancesmay disappear in wartime,but are prevalentin peacetime,
and can cause deterrencefailure,even where an efficient coalitionwill even-
tuallyformto defeat the aggressor on the battlefield.
First,geography sometimes preventsbalancing states fromputtingmean-
ingfulpressure on a potential aggressor. For example, a major power may
not be able to put effectivemilitarypressure on a state threateningto cause
trouble,because bufferstates lie in between.
In addition, balancing in a multipolarworld must also surmountdifficult
coordinationproblems. Four phenomena make coordinationdifficult.First,
alliances provide collectivegoods, hence allies face the formidabledilemmas
of collectiveaction. Specifically,each state may tryto shiftalliance burdens
onto the shoulders of its putative allies. Such "buck-passing" is a common
featureof alliance politics.21 It is most common when the number of states
17. Although a balance of power is more likely to produce deterrencethan an imbalance of

power, a balance of power between states does not guarantee thatdeterrencewill obtain. States
sometimes find innovative militarystrategiesthat allow them to win on the battlefield,even
withoutmarkedadvantage in the balance of raw militarycapabilities.Furthermore,the broader
political forces that move a state towards war sometimes force leaders to pursue very risky
militarystrategies,impelling states to challenge opponents of equal or even superior strength.
See Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence,especially chap. 2.
18. This discussion of polarityassumes thatthe militarystrengthof the major powers is roughly
equal. The consequences of power asymmetriesamong great powers is discussed below.
19. See Stephen M. Walt, The OriginsofAlliances(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1987); and
Waltz, TheoryofInternational Politics,pp. 123-128.
20. One exceptionbears mention:gangingup is stillpossible under multipolarity in the restricted
case where thereare only threepowers in the system,and thus no allies available forthe victim
state.
21. See Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Reviewof
Economicsand Statistics,Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279; and BarryR. Posen, The

International
Security15:1 116
required to forman effectiveblockingcoalitionis large. Second, a state faced

with two potentialadversariesmightconclude thata protractedwar between
those adversaries would weaken both, even if one side triumphed;hence it
may stay on the sidelines, hoping therebyto improve its power position
relativeto each of the combatants.(This strategycan fail,however, if one of
the warringstates quickly conquers the other and ends up more powerful,
not less powerful,than before the war.) Third, some states may opt out of
the balancing process because theybelieve that theywill not be targetedby
the aggressor, failingto recognize that they face danger until afterthe ag-
gressor has won some initial victories. Fourth, diplomacy is an uncertain
process, and thus it can take time to build a defensivecoalition. A potential
aggressormay conclude thatit can succeed at aggressionbeforethe coalition
is completed, and furthermay be prompted to exploit the window of op-
portunitythat this situationpresentsbeforeit closes.22
Ifthese problemsof geographyand coordinationare severe, statescan lose
faithin the balancing process. If so, theybecome more likelyto bandwagon
with the aggressor, since solitary resistance is futile.23Thus factors that
weaken the balancing process can generatesnowball effectsthatweaken the
process stillfurther.
The third major problem with multipolaritylies in its tendency to foster
miscalculation of the resolve of opposing individual states, and of the
strengthof opposing coalitions.
War is more likely when a state underestimatesthe willingness of an
opposing state to stand firmon issues of difference.It then may push the
otherstate too far,expectingthe otherto concede, when in factthe opponent
will choose to fight.Such miscalculationis more likelyunder multipolarity
because the shape of the internationalorder tends to remain fluid, due to
the tendencyof coalitions to shift.As a result,the international"rules of the
road"-norms of state behavior,and agreed divisions of territorial rightsand
other privileges-tend to change constantly.No sooner are the rules of a
given adversarialrelationshipworked out, thanthatrelationshipmay become
a friendship,a new adversarial relationshipmay emerge with a previous
SourcesofMilitaryDoctrine:France,Britain,and GermanybetweentheWorldWars (Ithaca: Cornell

UniversityPress, 1984).
22. Domestic political considerations can also sometimes impede balancing behavior. For ex-
ample, Britainand France were reluctantto ally with the Soviet Union in the 1930s because of
theirdeep-seated antipathyto communism.
23. See Walt, OriginsofAlliances,pp. 28-32, 173-178.

friendor neutral,and new rules must be established. Under these circum-

stances,one state may unwittinglypush anothertoo far,because ambiguities
as to national rightsand obligationsleave a wider range of issues on which
a statemay miscalculateanother's resolve. Norms of statebehavior can come
to be broadly understood and accepted by all states, even in multipolarity,
just as basic norms of diplomaticconduct became generallyaccepted by the
European powers during the eighteenthcentury.Nevertheless, a well-de-
fineddivision of rightsis generallymore difficult when the numberof states
is large, and relationsamong them are in flux,as is the case with multipo-
larity.
War is also more likely when states underestimatethe relativepower of
an opposing coalition, either because they underestimatethe number of
stateswho will oppose them,or because theyexaggeratethe numberof allies
who will fighton theirown side.24Such errorsare more likelyin a system
of many states, since states then must accuratelypredict the behavior of
manystates,not just one, in orderto calculatethe balance of power between
coalitions.
A bipolar systemis superiorto a multipolarsystemon all of these dimen-
sions. Bullyingand ganging up are unknown, since only two actorscompete.
Hence the power asymmetriesproduced by bullyingand gangingup are also
unknown. When balancing is required, it is achieved efficiently. States can
balance by either internal means-military buildup-or external means-
diplomacy and alliances. Under multipolaritystates tend to balance by ex-
ternal means; under bipolaritythey are compelled to use internalmeans.
Internalmeans are more fullyunder state control,hence are more efficient,
and are more certain to produce real balance.25The problems that attend
effortsto balance by diplomatic methods-geographic complications and
coordinationdifficulties-arebypassed. Finally,miscalculationis less likely
than in a multipolar world. States are less likely to miscalculate others'
resolve,because the rules of the road withthe main opponent become settled
over time, leading both parties to recognize the limitsbeyond which they
cannot push the other. States also cannot miscalculate the membershipof
the opposing coalition,since each side faces only one main enemy. Simplicity
breeds certainty;certaintybolsterspeace.
24. This point is the centralthemeofWaltz, "The Stabilityofa BipolarWorld." Also see Geoffrey
Blainey,TheCauses ofWar (New York: Free Press, 1973), chap. 3.
25. Noting the greaterefficiencyof internalover externalbalancing is Waltz, TheoryofInterna-
tionalPolitics,pp. 163, 168.

International
Security15:1 | 18
There are no empirical studies that provide conclusive evidence of the

effectsof bipolarityand multipolarityon the likelihoodof war. This undoubt-
edly reflectsthe difficultyof the task: fromits beginning until 1945, the
European state system was multipolar,leaving this historybarren of com-
parisons thatwould reveal the differingeffectsofmultipolarityand bipolarity.
Earlierhistorydoes affordsome apparent examples of bipolar systems,in-
cluding some that were warlike-Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage-
but this historyis inconclusive, because it is sketchyand incomplete and
thereforedoes not offerenough detail to validate the comparisons. Lacking
a comprehensive survey of history,we cannot progress beyond offering
examples pro and con, withoutknowing which set of examples best repre-
sents the universe of cases. As a result the case made here stops short of
empiricaldemonstration,and rests chieflyon deduction. However, I believe
that this deductive case provides a sound basis foraccepting the argument
thatbipolarityis more peaceful than multipolarity; the deductivelogic seems
compelling,and there is no obvious historicalevidence that cuts against it.
I show below that the ideas developed here apply to events in twentieth
centuryEurope, both beforeand after1945.
THE VIRTUES OF EQUALITY OF POWER OVER INEQUALITY. Power can be more
or less equally distributedamong the major powers of both bipolar and
multipolarsystems.Both systemsare more peacefulwhen equalityis greatest
among the poles. Power inequalities invite war by increasingthe potential
for successful aggression; hence war is minimized when inequalities are
least.26
How should the degree of equalityin the distributionof power in a system
be assessed? Under bipolarity,the overall equality of the systemis simplya
functionof the balance of power between the two poles-an equal balance
creates an equal system, a skewed balance produces an unequal system.
Under multipolaritythe focus is on the power balance between the two
leading states in the system, but the power ratios across other potential
conflictdyads also matter.The net system equality is an aggregate of the
degree of equalityamong all of the poles. However, most generalwars under
multipolarityhave arisen fromwars ofhegemonythathave pittedthe leading
state-an aspiring hegemon-against the othermajor powers in the system.
Such wars are most probable when a leading state emerges, and can hope
26. This discussion does not encompass the situationwhere power asymmetriesare so great
that one state emerges as a hegemon. See note 15.

Backto theFuture 19
to defeateach of the others if it can isolate them. This patterncharacterized

the wars that grew fromthe attemptsat hegemony by Charles V, Philip II,
Louis XIV, Revolutionaryand Napoleonic France, WilhelmineGermany,and
Nazi Germany.27Hence the ratiobetween the leader and its nearest compet-
itor-in bipolarityor multipolarity-has more effecton the stabilityof the
systemthan do otherratios, and is thereforethe key ratiothatdescribes the
equalityof the system. Close equality in this ratiolowers the riskof war.
The polarityof an internationalsystemand the degree of power equality
of the system are related: bipolar systems tend more toward equality, be-
cause, as noted above, states are then compelled to balance by internal
methods, and internalbalancing is more efficientthan externalbalancing.
Specifically,the number-two state in a bipolar system can only hope to
balance against the leader by mobilizingits own resourcesto reduce the gap
between the two, since it has no potential major alliance partners. On the
other hand, the second-strongeststate in a multipolarsystem can seek se-
curitythroughalliances with others, and may be tempted to pass the buck
to them, instead of building up its own strength.Externalbalancing of this
sort is especially attractivebecause it is cheap and fast. However, such
behavior leaves intact the power gap between the two leading states, and
thusleaves in place the dangers thatsuch a power gap creates.Hence another
source of stabilityunder bipolaritylies in the greatertendencyforits poles
to be equal.
THE VIRTUES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. Deterrence is most likely to hold
when the costs and risks of going to war are obviously great. The more
horriblethe prospect of war, the less likelyit is to occur. Deterrenceis also
most robustwhen conquest is most difficult. Aggressorsthen are more likely
to be deterredby the futilityof expansion, and all states feel less compelled
to expand to increase their security,making them easier to deter because
theyare less compelled to commitaggression.
27. This point is the centraltheme of Ludwig Dehio, ThePrecariousBalance:FourCenturiesofthe

EuropeanPowerStruggle,trans. Charles Fullman (New York: Knopf, 1962). Also see Randolph
M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International
Conflict,1815-1965,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol. 78, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 1057-
1069. The two lengthyperiods of peace in the nineteenthcentury(see note 10 above) were
mainlycaused by the equal distributionof power among the major European states. Specifically,
there was no aspiring hegemon in Europe for most of these two periods. France, the most
powerfulstatein Europe at the beginningof the nineteenthcentury,soon declined to a position
of rough equality with its chief competitors,while Germany only emerged as a potential
hegemon in the early twentiethcentury.

International
Security15:1 | 20
Nuclear weapons favorpeace on both counts. They are weapons of mass

destruction,and would produce horrendousdevastationifused in any num-
bers. Moreover,ifboth sides' nucleararsenals are secure fromattack,creating
a mutually assured retaliation capability (mutual assured destruction or
MAD), nuclear weapons make conquest more difficult; internationalconflicts
revertfromtests of capabilityand will to purer tests of will, won by the side
willing to run greaterrisks and pay greatercosts. This gives defendersthe
advantage, because defenders usually value their freedom more than ag-
gressorsvalue new conquests. Thus nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent:
they guarantee high costs, and are more useful for self-defensethan for
aggression.28
In addition, nuclear weapons affectthe degree of equality in the system.
Specifically,the situation created by MAD bolsterspeace by moving power
relationsamong statestoward equality.States thatpossess nuclear deterrents
can stand up to one another, even if theirnuclear arsenals vary greatlyin
size, as long as both sides' nuclear arsenals are secure from attack. This
situationof closer equality has the stabilizingeffectsnoted above.
Finally,MAD also bolsterspeace by clarifyingthe relativepower of states
and coalitions.29States can stillmiscalculateeach other's will, but miscalcu-
lations of relativecapabilityare less likely,since nuclear capabilitiesare not
elastic to the specific size and characteristicsof forces; once an assured
destructioncapabilityis achieved, furtherincrementsof nuclear power have
littlestrategicimportance.Hence errorsin assessing these specificcharacter-
isticshave littleeffect.Errorsin predictingmembershipin war coalitionsalso
have less effect,since unforeseenadditions or subtractionsfromsuch coal-
itions will not influencewar outcomes unless they produce a huge change
in the nuclear balance enough to give one side meaningfulnuclear superi-
ority.
THE DANGERS OF HYPER-NATIONALISM. Nationalism is best defined as a set
of political beliefs which holds that a nation-a body of individuals with
characteristicsthat purportedlydistinguish them fromother individuals-
28. Works developing the argument that nuclear weapons are essentiallydefensive in nature
are Shai Feldman, IsraeliNuclearDeterrence: A Strategyforthe1980s (New York: Columbia Uni-
versityPress, 1982), pp. 45-49; Stephen Van Evera, 'Why Europe Matters,Why the ThirdWorld
Doesn't: American Grand Strategyafterthe Cold War," JournalofStrategicStudies,Vol. 13, No.
2 (June 1990, forthcoming);and Vaq Evera, "Causes of War," chap. 13.
29. See Feldman, IsraeliNuclearDeterrence,pp. 50-52; and Van Evera, "Causes of War," pp. 697-
699.

should have its own state.30Although nationalistsoftenbelieve that their

nation is unique or special, this conclusion does not necessarilymean that
theythinktheyare superiorto otherpeoples, merelythattheytake pride in
theirown nation.
However, this benevolent nationalism frequentlyturns into ugly hyper-
nationalism-the belief that other nations or nation-statesare both inferior
and threateningand must thereforebe dealt withharshly.In the past, hyper-
nationalismamong European states has arisen largelybecause most Euro-
pean states are nation-states-states comprisedof one principalnation-and
these nation-statesexist in an anarchic world, under constant threatfrom
otherstates. In such a situationpeople who love theirown nation and state
can develop an attitude of contemptand loathing toward the nations who
inhabitopposing states. The problemis exacerbatedby the factthatpolitical
elites oftenfeel compelled to portrayadversarynations in the most negative
way so as to mobilize public support fornational securitypolicies.
Malevolent nationalism is most likelyto develop under militarysystems
thatrequirerelianceon mass armies; the statemay exploitnationalistappeals
to mobilize its citizenryforthe sacrificesrequired to sustain large standing
armies. On the otherhand, hyper-nationalism is least likelywhen states can
rely on small professional armies, or on complex high-technologymilitary
organizations that do not require vast manpower. For this reason nuclear
weapons work to dampen nationalism,since they shiftthe basis of military
power away frompure relianceon mass armies, and toward greaterreliance
on smallerhigh-technologyorganizations.
In sum, hyper-nationalismis the most importantdomestic cause of war,
although it is still a second-orderforcein world politics. Furthermore,its
causes lie largelyin the internationalsystem.
THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: EVIDENCE

The historicalrecord shows a perfectcorrelationbetween bipolarity,equality
of militarypower, and nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the long
peace, on the otherhand. When an equal bipolarityarose and nuclear weap-
ons appeared, peace broke out. This correlationsuggests that the bipolarity
30. This definitionis drawn fromErnest Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism(Ithaca: Cornell Uni-

versityPress, 1983), which is an excellent study of the origins of nationalism. Nevertheless,
Gellnerpays littleattentionto how nationalismturnsinto a malevolentforcethatcontributesto
instabilityin the internationalsystem.

Security15:1 | 22
International
theory,the equality theory,and the nuclear theoryof the long peace are all
valid. However, correlationalone does not prove causation. Other factors
stillmay account forthe long peace. One way to rule out this possibilityis
to enumerate what the three theories predict about both the pre-war and
postwar eras, and then to ask ifthese predictionscame truein detail during
those different periods.
BEFORE THE COLD WAR. The dangers of multipolarityare highlightedby
events before both world wars. The existence of many dyads of potential
conflictprovided many possible ways to light the fuse to war in Europe.
Diplomacy before World War I involved intense interactionsamong five
major powers (Britain,France, Russia, Austria-Hungary,and Germany),and
two minor powers (Serbia, and Belgium). At least six significantadversarial
relationshipsemerged: Germanyversus Britain,France,Russia, and Belgium;
and Austria-Hungaryversus Serbia and Russia. Before World War II five
major powers (Britain,France, the Soviet Union, Germany,and Italy) and
seven minor powers (Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary,
Romania, and Finland) interacted.These relationsproduced some thirteen
important conflicts: Germany versus Britain, France, the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria; Italy versus Britainand France; the
Soviet Union versus Finland and Poland; Czechoslovakia versus Poland and
Hungary; and Romania versus Hungary. This multiplicityof conflictsmade
the outbreak of war inherentlymore likely. Moreover, many of the state
interestsat issue in each of these conflictswere interconnected,raising the
riskthat any single conflictthat turnedviolentwould triggera general war,
as happened in both 1914 and 1939.
Before World War II Germany was able to gang up with others against
some minorstates, and to bully othersinto joining with it. In 1939 Germany
bolstered its power by ganging up with Poland and Hungary to partition
Czechoslovakia, and then ganged up with the Soviet Union against Poland.
In 1938 Germanybullied the Czechs into surrenderingthe Sudetenland, and
also bullied the Austrians into complete surrender.31By these successes
Germany expanded its power, leaving it far strongerthan its immediate
neighbors,and therebymaking deterrencemuch harder.
German power could have been countered before both world wars had
the otherEuropean powers balanced efficiently against Germany.If so, Ger-
31. Austria is not a pure case of bullying;therewas also considerable pro-Germansupport in

Austria during the late 1930s.

BacktotheFuture| 23
many might have been deterred, and war prevented on both occasions.
However, the other powers twice failed to do so. Before 1914 the scope of
this failure was less pronounced; France and Russia balanced forcefully
against Germany,while only Britainfailedto commitfirmlyagainst Germany
beforewar began.32
Before1939,failureto balance was farmorewidespread.33The Soviet Union
failed to aid Czechoslovakia against Germanyin 1938, partlyforgeographic
reasons: they shared no common border,leaving the Soviets with no direct
access to Czech territory.France failedto give effectiveaid to the Czechs and
Poles, partlybecause French militarydoctrinewas defensivelyoriented,but
also because France had no direct access to Czech or Polish territory, and
thereforecould not easily deploy forcesto bolsterCzech and Polish defenses.
Britainand France each passed the buck by transferring the cost of deter-
ringGermanyonto the other,therebyweakening theircombined effort.The
Soviet Union, with the Molotov-RibbentropPact, sought to turnthe German
armieswestward, hoping thattheywould become bogged down in a war of
attritionsimilar to World War I on the Western Front. Some of the minor
European powers, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the
Scandinavian states, passed the buck to the major powers by standing on
the sidelines during the crises of 1938 and 1939.
Britainand the United States failedto recognize thattheywere threatened
by Germany until late in the game-1939 for Britain,1940 for the United
States-and they thereforefailed to take an early stand. When they finally
recognized the danger posed by Germany and resolved to respond, they
lacked appropriatemilitaryforces.Britaincould not pose a significant military
threatto Germanyuntil afterit built up its own militaryforcesand coordi-
nated itsplans and doctrinewithitsFrenchand Polish allies. In the meantime
32. Britain'sfailureto commititselfexplicitlyto a Continentalwar before the JulyCrisis was

probablya mistake of great proportions.There is evidence that the German chancellor,Beth-
mann-Hollweg,triedto stop the slide towards war once it became apparent that Britainwould
fightwith France and Russia against Germany,turninga Continentalwar into a world war. See
Imanuel Geiss, ed., July1914: The Outbreakof theFirst WorldWar (New York: Norton, 1967),
chap. 7. Had the Germans clearlyunderstood Britishintentionsbefore the crisis, they might
have displayed much greatercaution in the early stages of the crisis,when it was stillpossible
to avoid war.
33. See WilliamsonMurray,The Changein theEuropeanBalanceofPower,1938-1939: The Path to
Ruin(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984); Posen, SourcesofMilitaryDoctrine;and Arnold
Wolfers,Britainand FrancebetweenTwo WYars: Conflicting ofPeacefromVersaillesto World
Strategies
WarII (New York: Norton, 1968); and BarryR. Posen, "CompetingImages of the Soviet Union,"
WorldPolitics,Vol. 39, No. 4 (July1987), pp. 579-597.

International
Security15:1 | 24
deterrencefailed. The United States did not launch a significantmilitary

buildup until afterthe war broke out.
Multipolarityalso created conditionsthatpermittedserious miscalculation
before both world wars, which encouraged German aggression on both
occasions. Before 1914, Germany was not certainof Britishopposition if it
reached forcontinentalhegemony,and Germanycompletelyfailedto foresee
thatthe United States would eventuallymove to containit. In 1939,Germany
hoped that France and Britainwould stand aside as it conquered Poland,
and again failed to foreseeeventual Americanentryinto the war. As a result
Germanyexaggeratedits prospectsforsuccess. This undermineddeterrence
by encouragingGerman adventurism.
In sum, the events leading up to the world wars amply illustratethe risks
that arise in a multipolarworld. Deterrencewas undermined in both cases
by phenomena that are more common under a multipolarrather than a
bipolar distributionof power.34
Deterrencewas also difficultbeforeboth wars because power was distrib-
uted asymmetricallyamong the major European powers. Specifically,Ger-
many was markedlystrongerthan any of its immediate neighbors. In 1914
Germanyclearlyheld militarysuperiorityover all of its European rivals;only
togetherwere theyable to defeatit, and then only with Americanhelp. 1939
is a more ambiguous case. The resultsof the war reveal thatthe Soviet Union
had the capacity to stand up to Germany,but this was not apparent at the
beginning of the war. Hitler was confidentthat Germanywould defeat the
Soviet Union, and this confidencewas key to his decision to attackin 1941.
Finally,the events leading up to both world wars also illustratethe risks
that arise in a world of pure conventionaldeterrencein which weapons of
mass destructionare absent. World War I broke out partlybecause all of the
importantstates believed that the costs of war would be small, and that
successfuloffensewas feasible.35BeforeWorld War II these beliefswere less
widespread, but had the same effect.36The lesser powers thoughtwar would
34. The problems associated with multipolaritywere also common in Europe before 1900.
Consider,forexample, thatinefficient balancingresultedin the collapse ofthe firstfourcoalitions
arrayedagainst Napoleonic France. See Steven T. Ross, EuropeanDiplomaticHistory,1789-1815:
FranceAgainstEurope(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969).
35. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensiveand the Origins of the FirstWorld War,"
International
Security,Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. Also see JackSnyder,TheIdeology
oftheOffensive:
MilitaryDecision-Making and theDisastersof1914 (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress,
1984).
36. Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence,chaps. 3-4.

be costly and conquest difficult,but the leaders of the strongeststate-

Germany-saw the prospect of cheap victory,and this beliefwas enough to
destroy deterrenceand produce war. Had nuclear weapons existed, these
beliefswould have been undercut,removinga key conditionthat permitted
both wars.
What was the role of internalGerman politicsin causing the world wars?
So far I have focused on aspects of the internationalsystem surrounding
Germany. This focus reflectsmy view that systemicfactorswere more im-
portant.But German domestic politicaland social developmentsalso played
a significantrole, contributingto the aggressivecharacterof German foreign
policy. Specifically,German societywas infectedwith a virulentnationalism
between 1870 and 1945 thatlaid the basis forexpansionistforeignpolicies.37
However, two points should be borne in mind. First, German hyper-
nationalismwas in partfueledby Germany'spronounced sense ofinsecurity,
which reflectedGermany's vulnerablelocation at the centerof Europe, with
relativelyopen borders on both sides. These geographicfactsmade German
security problems especially acute; this situation gave German elites a
uniquely strong motive to mobilize their public for war, which they did
largelyby fanningnationalism.Thus even Germanhyper-nationalismcan be
ascribed in part to the nature of the pre-1945internationalsystem.
Second, the horrorof Germany'smurderousconduct duringWorld War II
should be distinguished from the scope of the aggressiveness of German
foreignpolicy.38Germany was indeed aggressive, but not unprecedentedly
so. Other states have aspired to hegemonyin Europe, and sparked wars by
theirefforts;Germanywas merelythe latest to attemptto convertdominant
into hegemonic power. What was unique about Germany's conduct was its
policy of mass murder toward many of the peoples of Europe. The causes
of this murderous policy should not be conflatedwith the causes of the two
37. See Ludwig Dehio, Germanyand WorldPoliticsin theTwentieth trans.Dieter Pevsner

Century,
(New York: Norton, 1967); FritzFischer,WarofIllusions:GermanPoliciesfrom1911 to 1914, trans.
Marian Jackson (New York: Norton, 1975); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German
Antagonism,1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980), chap. 18; Hans Kohn, The Mind of
Germany:TheEducationofa Nation(New York: Harper Torchbook,1965), chaps. 7-12; and Louis
L. Snyder,GermanNationalism:The Tragedyofa People(Harrisburg,Pa.: Telegraph Press, 1952).
38. There is a voluminous literatureon the German killingmachine in World War II. Among
the best overviews of the subject are Ian Kershaw, TheNazi Dictatorship:Problemsand Perspectives
ofInterpretation,
2nd ed. (London: Arnold, 1989), chaps. 5, 8, 9; HenryL. Mason, "Imponderables
of the Holocaust," WorldPolitics,Vol. 34, No. 1 (October 1981), pp. 90-113; and Mason, "Im-
plementingthe Final Solution: The Ordinary Regulating of the Extraordinary,"WorldPolitics,
Vol. 40, No. 4 (July1988), pp. 542-569.

International
Security15:1 | 26
world wars. The policy of murder arose chieflyfromdomestic sources; the

wars arose mainlyfromaspects of the distributionand characterof power in
Europe.
THE COLD WAR RECORD. The European state systemabruptlyshiftedfrom
multipolarto bipolar after 1945. Three factorswere responsible: the near-
completedestructionof German power, the growthof Soviet power, and the
permanentAmerican commitmentto the European Continent. The weak-
ening of the German Reich was accomplished by allied occupation and dis-
memberment.Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia, and parts of West Prussia
and Brandenburgwere given to other countries,the Sudetenland was re-
turned to Czechoslovakia, and Austria was restoredto independence. The
rest of the German Reich was divided into two countries, East and West
Germany,which became enemies. This reductionof Germanpower, coupled
withthe physicalpresence of Americanand Soviet militarymightin the heart
of Europe, eliminatedthe threatof German aggression.39
Meanwhile the Soviet Union extended its power westward, becoming the
dominantpower on the Continentand one of the two strongestpowers in
the world. There is no reason to think that the Soviets would not have
reached forcontinentalhegemony,as the Spanish, French,and Germans did
earlier,had theybelieved theycould win a hegemonic war. But the Soviets,
unlike their predecessors, made no attempt to gain hegemony by force,
leaving Europe in peace.
Bipolaritysupplies part of the reason. Bipolaritymade Europe a simpler
place in which only one point of friction-theEast-Westconflict-had to be
managed to avoid war. The two blocs encompassed most of Europe, leaving
fewunprotectedweak statesforthe Soviets to conquer. As a resultthe Soviets
have had few targetsto bully. They have also been unable to gang up on the
few states that are unprotected,because theirWest-blocadversaryhas been
theironly potentialganging-up partner.
Bipolarityalso leftless room formiscalculationof both resolve and capa-
bility.During the firstfifteenyears of the Cold War, the rules of the road for
the conflictwere not yet established, giving rise to several serious crises.
However, over time each side gained a clear sense of how farit could push
the other,and what the other would not tolerate.A set of rules came to be
agreed upon: an understandingon the division of rightsin Austria, Berlin,
39. See Anton W. DePorte, EuropebetiveentheSuperpowers:

The EnduringBalance,2nd ed. (New
Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1986).

BacktotheFuture| 27
and elsewhere in Europe; a proscriptionon secretunilateralre-deployment

of large nuclearforcesto areas contiguousto the opponent; mutual toleration
of reconnaissance satellites; agreement on rules of peacetime engagement
between naval forces; and so forth.The absence of serious crises during
1963-90 was due in part to the growthof such agreementson the rightsof
both sides, and the rules of conduct. These could develop in large part
because the systemwas bipolar in character.Bipolaritymeant that the same
two statesremained adversaries fora long period, givingthem timeto learn
how to manage theirconflictwithout war. By contrast,a multipolarworld
of shiftingcoalitions would repeatedly have forced adversaries to re-learn
how theiropponents definedinterests,reach new accords on the division of
rights,and establish new rules of competitiveconduct.
Bipolarityalso left less room to miscalculate the relative strengthof the
opposing coalitions. The composition of possible war coalitions has been
clear because only two blocs have existed, each led by an overwhelmingly
dominant power that could discipline its members. Either side could have
miscalculatedits relativemilitarystrength,but bipolarityremoved ambiguity
about relativestrengthof adversarial coalitions arising fromdiplomaticun-
certainties.
The East-Westmilitarybalance in Europe has been roughlyequal through-
out the Cold War, which has furtherbolstered stability.This approximate
paritystrengtheneddeterrenceby ensuringthatno statewas temptedto use
force to exploit a power advantage. Parityresulted partlyfrombipolarity:
because the two blocs already encompassed all the states of Europe, both
sides have balanced mainly by internalratherthan externalmeans. These
more efficientmeans have produced a more nearlyequal balance.
Nuclear weapons also played a key role in preventingwar in post-World
War II Europe.
Westernelites on both sides of the Atlanticquicklyrecognizedthatnuclear
weapons were vastly destructiveand that theirwidespread use in Europe
would cause unprecedented devastation. The famous CarteBlancheexercises
conducted in Germanyin 1955 made it manifestlyclear thata nuclear war in
Europe would involve fargreatercosts than anotherWorldWar II.40 Accord-
ingly, Western policymakers rarely suggested that nuclear war could be
"won," and instead emphasized the horrorsthatwould attend nuclear war.
40. See Hans Speier, GermanRearmament and AtomicWar:TheViewsofGermanMilitaryand Political

Leaders(Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957), chap. 10.

International
Security15:1 | 28
Moreover, they have understood that conventionalwar could well escalate

to the nuclear level, and have in factbased NATO strategyon that reality.
Soviet leaders also recognized the horrendous results that a nuclear war
would produce.41Some Soviet militaryofficershave asserted that victoryis
possible in nuclearwar, but even theyhave acknowledged thatsuch a victory
would be Pyrrhic.Soviet civilians have generallyargued that victoryis im-
possible. Furthermore,the Soviets long maintained that it was not possible
to fighta purely conventionalwar in Europe, and that conventionalvictory
would only prompt the loser to engage in nuclear escalation.42 The Soviets
later granted more possibilitythat a conventionalwar mightbe controlled,
but stillrecognized that escalation is likely.43Under Gorbachev, Soviet mili-
tarythinkinghas placed even greateremphasis on the need to avoid nuclear
war and devoted more attentionto the dangers of inadvertentnuclear war.44
Officialrhetoricaside, policymakerson both sides have also behaved very
cautiouslyin the presence of nuclear weapons. There is not a single case of
a leader brandishing nuclear weapons during a crisis, or behaving as if
nuclearwar mightbe a viable option forsolvingimportantpoliticalproblems.
On the contrary,policymakershave never gone beyond nuclear threatsof a
very subtle sort, and have shown great caution when the possibility of
nuclear confrontationhas emerged.45This cautious conduct has lowered the
riskof war.
Nuclear weapons also imposed an equality and clarityon the power rela-
tions between the superpowers. This equality and clarityrepresented a
41. See RobertL. Arnett,"Soviet AttitudesTowards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They
Can Win?" Journalof StrategicStudies,Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1979), pp. 172-191; and David
Holloway, The SovietUnionand theArmsRace (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1983).
42. Thus Nikita Khrushchevexplained, "Now thatthe big countrieshave thermonuclearweap-
ons at theirdisposal, theyare sure to resortto those weapons iftheybegin to lose a war fought
with conventionalmeans. If it ever comes down to a question of whetheror not to face defeat,
there is sure to be someone who will be in favorof pushing the button,and the missiles will
begin to fly."Nikita Khrushchev,Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. by
StrobeTalbott(New York: Bantam, 1976), pp. 603-604.
43. See James M. McConnell, "Shiftsin Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of MilitaryDevel-
opment," WorldPolitics,Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 1985), pp. 317-343.
44. See Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New PoliticalThinking
on Security,"InternationalSecurity,Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 134-138.
45. See Hannes Adomeit, SovietRisk-taking and CrisisBehavior:A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); RichardK. Betts,NuclearBlackmail and NuclearBalance(Wash-
ington,D.C.: Brookings,1987); and McGeorge Bundy,Dangerand Survival:ChoicesabouttheBomb
in theFirstFiftyYears(New York: Random House, 1988). Also see JosephS. Nye, Jr.,"Nuclear
Learning and U.S.-Soviet SecurityReg'imes,"International Organization,Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer
1987), pp. 371-402.

marked change fromthe earlier non-nuclearworld, in which sharp power

inequalitiesand miscalculationsof relativepower were common.46
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union have exhib-
ited markedlyless hyper-nationalismthan did the European powers before
1945. AfterWorldWar II, nationalismdeclined sharplywithinEurope, partly
because the occupation forces took active steps to dampen it,47and also
because the European states, no longer providing theirown security,now
lacked the incentive to purvey hyper-nationalismin order to bolster public
support for national defense. More importantly,however, the locus of Eu-
ropean politicsshiftedto the United States and the Soviet Union-two states
that,each forits own reasons, had not exhibitednationalismof the virulent
type found earlierin Europe. Nor has nationalismbecome virulentin either
superpower during the Cold War. In part this reflectsthe greaterstabilityof
the postwar order, arising from bipolarity,militaryequality, and nuclear
weapons; with less expectation of war, neither superpower has faced the
need to mobilize its population for war. It also reflectsa second effectof
nuclear weapons: they have reduced the importance of mass armies for
preservingsovereignty,thus diminishingthe importanceof maintaininga
hyper-nationalizedpool of manpower.
THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

The claim that bipolarity,equality, and nuclear weapons have been largely
responsible for the stabilityof the past 45 years is furtherstrengthenedby
the absence of persuasive competingexplanations. Two of the most popular
theories of peace-economic liberalismand peace-loving democracies-arenot
relevaintto the issue at hand.
Economic liberalism,which posits that a liberal economic order bolsters
peace (discussed in more detail below), cannotexplainthe stabilityofpostwar
Europe, because therehas been littleeconomic exchange between the Soviet
Union and the West over the past 45 years. Although economic flows be-
46. Some expertsacknowledge that nuclear weapons had deterrentvalue in the early decades
of the Cold War, but maintain that they had lost theirdeterrentvalue by,the mid-1960swhen
the Soviets finallyacquired the capabilityto retaliatemassivelyagainst the Americanhomeland.
I rejectthis argumentand have outlined my views in JohnJ. Mearsheimer,"Nuclear Weapons
and Deterrencein Europe," International Security,Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter1984/85),pp. 19-46.
47. See Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of NationalisticHistoryin the West, 1900-1970,"Journal
of Contemporary History,Vol. 8, No. 1 (January1973), pp. 77-100; and E.H. Dance, Historythe
Betrayer (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

Security15:1 130
International
tween Easternand WesternEurope have been somewhat greater,in no sense

has all of Europe been encompassed by a liberaleconomic order.
The peace-loving democracies theory (also discussed below) holds that
democracies do not go to war against other democracies,but concedes that
democracies are not especially pacificwhen facingauthoritarianstates. This
theory cannot account for post-World War II stabilitybecause the Soviet
Union and its allies in Eastern Europe have not been democraticover the
past 45 years.
A thirdtheoryof peace, obsolescence ofwar,proposes thatmodern conven-
tional war had become so deadly by the twentiethcenturythat it was no
longerpossible to thinkofwar as a sensiblemeans to achieve nationalgoals.48
It took the two world wars to drive this point home, but by 1945 it was clear
that large-scale conventional war had become irrationaland morallyunac-
ceptable, like institutionssuch as slaveryand dueling. Thus, even without
nuclear weapons, statesmen in the Cold War would not seriously have
countenancedwar, which had become an anachronism.This theory,it should
be emphasized, does not ascribe the absence of war to nuclear weapons, but
instead points to the horrorsof modern conventionalwar.
This argument probably provides the most persuasive alternativeexpla-
nation for the stabilityof the Cold War, but it is not convincing on close
inspection. The factthat World War II occurredcasts serious doubt on this
theory;ifany war could have convincedEuropeans to forswearconventional
war, it should have been World War I, with its vast casualties. There is no
doubt that conventionalwar among modern states could devastate the par-
ticipants. Nevertheless, this explanation misses one crucial differencebe-
tween nuclear and conventionalwar, a differencethat explains why war is
still a viable option for states. Proponents of this theory assume that all
conventional wars are protractedand bloody wars of attrition,like World
War I on the Western front.However, it is possible to score a quick and
decisive victoryin a conventionalwar and avoid the devastationthatusually
attends a protractedconventionalwar.49Conventional war can be won; nu-
clear war cannot be, since neitherside can escape devastationby the other,
regardless of the outcome on the battlefield.Thus, the incentivesto avoid
48. This theoryis most clearlyarticulatedby JohnE. Mueller, RetreatfromDoomsday:The Obso-

lescenceofMajor War(New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A
Review Essay," International
Security,Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64.
49. See Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence,chaps. 1-2.

war are far greaterin a nuclear than a conventionalworld, making nuclear

deterrencemuch more robust than conventionaldeterrence.50
Predicting
theFuture:The Balkanization
ofEurope?
What new order will emerge in Europe if the Soviets and Americans with-
draw to theirhomelands and the Cold War orderdissolves? What character-
isticswill it have? How dangerous will it be?
It is certainthatbipolaritywill disappear, and multipolarity
will emerge in
the new European order. The other two dimensions of the new order-the
distributionof power among the major states,and the distributionof nuclear
weapons among them-are not pre-determined,and several possible ar-
rangements could develop. The probable stabilityof these arrangements
would vary markedly.This section examines the scope of the dangers that
each arrangementwould present,and the likelihoodthat each will emerge.
The distributionand deploymentpatternsof nuclear weapons in the new
Europe is the least certain,and probablythe most important,elementof the
new order. Accordingly,this section proceeds by exploringthe characterof
the fourprincipalnuclearworlds thatmightdevelop: a denuclearizedEurope,
continuationof the currentpatternsof nuclear ownership, and nuclear pro-
liferationeitherwell- or ill-managed.
The best new order would incorporatethe limited,managed proliferation
of nuclear weapons. This would be more dangerous than the currentorder,
but considerablysaferthan 1900-45. The worstorderwould be a non-nuclear
Europe in which power inequities emerge between the principal poles of
power. This orderwould be more dangerous than the currentworld, perhaps
almost as dangerous as the world before 1945. Continuationof the current
50. German decision-makingin the early years of World War II underscores this point. See
Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence,chap. 4. The Germans were well aware fromtheirexpe-
rience in World War I that conventional war among major powers could have devastating
consequences. Nevertheless, they decided threetimes to launch major land offensives:Poland
(1939); France (1940); and the Soviet Union (1941). In each case, the Germans believed thatthey
could win a quick and decisive victoryand avoid a costlyprotractedwar like WorldWar I. Their
calculations proved correctagainst Poland and France. They were wrong about the Soviets,
who thwartedtheirblitzkriegand eventuallyplayed the centralrole in bringingdown the Third
Reich. The Germans surely would have been deterredfromattackingthe Soviet Union if they
had foreseen the consequences. However, the key point is that they saw some possibilityof
winningan easy and relativelycheap victoryagainst the Red Army.That option is not available
in a nuclear war.

Security15:1 132
International
pattern, or mismanaged proliferation,would be worse than the world of

today,but saferthan the pre-1945world.
EUROPE WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Some Europeans and Americans seek to eliminate nuclear weapons from
Europe, and would replace the Cold War order with a wholly non-nuclear
order. Constructingthis nuclear-freeEurope would require Britain,France
and the Soviet Union to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. Proponents
believe that a Europe withoutnuclear weapons would be the most peaceful
possible arrangement;in fact,however, a nuclear-freeEurope would be the
most dangerous among possible post-Cold War orders. The pacifyingeffects
of nuclear weapons-the securitythey provide, the caution they generate,
therough equalitytheyimpose, and the clarityofrelativepower theycreate-
would be lost. Peace would then depend on the other dimensions of the
new order-the numberof poles, and the distributionof power among them.
However, the new order will certainlybe multipolar,and may be unequal;
hence the systemmay be very prone to violence. The structureof power in
Europe would look much like it did between the world wars, and it could
well produce similarresults.
The two most powerful states in post-Cold War Europe would probably
be Germany and the Soviet Union. They would be physicallyseparated by
a band of small, independent states in Eastern Europe. Not much would
change in Western Europe, although the states in that area would have to
be concerned about a possible German threaton theireastern flank.
The potential for conflictin this system would be considerable. There
would be many possible dyads across which war mightbreak out. Power
imbalances would be commonplace as a result of the opportunities this
systemwould present forbullyingand ganging up. There would be consid-
erable opportunityfor miscalculation. The problem of containing German
power would emerge once again, but the configurationof power in Europe
would make it difficultto forman effectivecounterbalancingcoalition, for
much the same reason that an effectivecounterbalancingcoalition failed to
formin the 1930s. Eventually the problem of containingthe Soviet Union
could also re-emerge.Finally,conflictsmay eruptin EasternEurope, provid-
ing the vortexthat could pull othersinto a wider confrontation.
A reunifiedGermany would be surrounded by weaker states that would
find it difficultto balance against German aggression. Without forces sta-
tioned in states adjacent to Germany,neitherthe Soviets nor the Americans

would be in a good position to help them contain German power. Further-

more, those small states lyingbetween Germanyand the Soviet Union might
fearthe Soviets as much as the Germans, and hence may not be disposed to
cooperate with the Soviets to deter German aggression. This problemin fact
arose in the 1930s, and 45 years of Soviet occupation in the interimhave
done nothingto ease East European fearsof a Soviet militarypresence. Thus,
scenarios in which Germany uses militaryforceagainst Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, or even Austria become possible.
The Soviet Union also mighteventuallythreatenthe new statusquo. Soviet
withdrawalfromEastern Europe does not mean that the Soviets will never
feel compelled to returnto Eastern Europe. The historicalrecord provides
abundant instances of Russian or Soviet involvementin Eastern Europe.
Indeed, the Russian presence in Eastern Europe has surged and ebbed re-
peatedly over the past few centuries.51 Thus, Soviet withdrawalnow hardly
guarantees a permanentexit.
Conflictbetween Eastern European states is also likely to produce insta-
bilityin a multipolarEurope. There has been no war among the states in
thatregion during the Cold War because the Soviets have tightlycontrolled
them. This point is illustratedby the serious tensionsthatnow existbetween
Hungary and Romania over Romanian treatmentof the Hungarian minority
in Transylvania,a region that previouslybelonged to Hungary and stillhas
roughly2 million Hungarians living withinits borders. Were it not forthe
Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, this conflictcould have broughtRomania
and Hungary to war by now, and it may bringthem to war in the future.52
This will not be the only danger spot within Eastern Europe if the Soviet
empire crumbles.5
Warfarein Eastern Europe would cause great sufferingto Eastern Euro-
peans. It also mightwiden to include the major powers, because theywould
51. See, interalia: Ivo J. Lederer,ed., RussianForeignPolicy:Essaysin HistoricalPerspective

(New
Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1962); Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky,Russia and Europe,1825-1878
(Ann Arbor,Mich.: George Wahr Publishing,1954); and Marc Raeff,ImperialRussia, 1682-1825:
The ComingofAge ofModernRussia (New York: Knopf, 1971), chap. 2.
52. To get a sense of the antipathybetween Hungaryand Romania over thisissue, see Witnesses
to CulturalGenocide:First-HandReportson Romania'sMinorityPoliciesToday(New York: American
TransylvanianFederation and the CommitteeforHuman Rightsin Romania, 1979). The March
1990 clashes between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in TfrguMures (Romanian Transyl-
vania) indicate the potentialforsavage violence thatis inherentin these ethnicconflicts.
53. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-CommunistNationalism," ForeignAffairs,Vol. 68, No. 5
(Winter-1989/1990),pp. 1-13; and Mark Kramer,"Beyond the BrezhnevDoctrine:A New Era in
Soviet-EastEuropean Relations?" International Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter1989/90),pp. 51-
Security,
54.

International
Security15:1 134
be drawn to competeforinfluencein thatregion,especiallyifdisordercreated

fluid politics that offeredopportunitiesfor wider influence,or threatened
defeat for friendlystates. During the Cold War, both superpowers were
drawn into Third World conflictsacross the globe, oftenin distant areas of
littlestrategicimportance. Eastern Europe is directlyadjacent to both the
Soviet Union and Germany, and has considerable economic and strategic
importance;thus trouble in Eastern Europe could offereven greatertemp-
tations to these powers than past conflictsin the Third World offeredthe
superpowers. Furthermore,because the results of local conflictswill be
largelydeterminedby the relative success of each partyin findingexternal
allies, Eastern European states will have strongincentivesto drag the major
powers into theirlocal conflicts.54 Thus both push and pull considerations
would operate to enmesh outside powers in local Eastern European w%ars.
Miscalculation is also likely to be a problem in a multipolarEurope. For
example, the new order might well witness shiftingpatterns of conflict,
leaving insufficient timeforadversariesto develop agreed divisions of rights
and agreed rules of interaction,or constantlyforcingthem to re-establish
new agreementsand rules as old antagonismsfade and new ones arise. It is
not likelythatcircumstanceswould allow the developmentof a robust set of
agreementsof the sortthathave stabilizedthe Cold War since 1963. Instead,
Europe would resemble the pattern of the early Cold War, in which the
absence of rules led to repeated crises. In addition, the multipolarcharacter
of the systemis likelyto give rise to miscalculationregardingthe strengthof
the opposing coalitions.
It is difficultto predictthe precise balance of conventionalmilitarypower
thatwould emergebetween the two largestpowers in post-Cold War Europe,
especially since the futureof Soviet power is now hard to forecast.The Soviet
Union might recover its strengthsoon afterwithdrawingfromCentral Eu-
rope; if so, Soviet power would overmatchGerman power. Or centrifugal
national forces may pull the Soviet Union apart, leaving no remnantstate
that is the equal of a united Germany.55What seems most likely is that
54. The new prime ministerof Hungary, JozsefAntall, has already spoken of the need for a
"European solution" to the problem of Romania's treatmentof Hungarians in Transylvania.
Celestine Bohlen, "Victorin Hungary Sees '45 as the Best of Times," New YorkTimes,April 10,
1990, p. A8.
55. This articlefocuses on how changes in the strengthof Soviet power and retractionof the
Soviet empire would affectthe prospects for stabilityin Europe. However, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, a scenario not explored here in any detail, would raise dangers that would
be differentfromand in addition to those discussed here.

Germanyand the Soviet Union might emerge as powers of roughly equal

strength.The firsttwo scenarios, with theirmarked inequalitybetween the
two leading powers, would be especiallyworrisome,althoughthereis cause
forconcerneven if Soviet and German power are balanced.
Resurgenthyper-nationalismwill probablypose less danger than the prob-
lems described above, but some nationalism is likely to resurfacein the
absence of the Cold War and may provide additional incentivesforwar. A
non-nuclearEurope is likelyto be especially troubledby nationalism,since
securityin such an order will largelybe provided by mass armies, which
oftencannot be maintained withoutinfusingsocieties with hyper-national-
ism. The problem is likelyto be most acute in Eastern Europe, but there is
also potentialfortroublein Germany.The Germans have generallydone an
admirablejob combattingnationalismover the past 45 years, and in remem-
beringthe dark side of theirpast. Nevertheless,worrisomeportentsare now
visible; of greatestconcern, some prominentGermans have latelyadvised a
returnto greaternationalismin historicaleducation.56Moreover,nationalism
will be exacerbatedby the unresolved borderdisputes thatwill be uncovered
by the retreatof American and Soviet power. Especially prominentis thatof
the border between Germany and Poland, which some Germans would
change in Germany's favor.
However, it seems veryunlikelythatEurope will actuallybe denuclearized,
despite the present strengthof anti-nuclearfeelingin Europe. For example,
it is unlikelythat the French, in the absence of America's protectivecover
and faced with a newly unified Germany,would get rid of their nuclear
weapons. Also, the Soviets surelywould remainconcerned about balancing
the Americannuclear deterrent,and will thereforeretaina deterrentof their
own.
THE CURRENT OWNERSHIP PATTERN CONTINUES

A more plausible order for post-Cold War Europe is one in which Britain,
Franceand the Soviet Union keep theirnuclearweapons, but no new nuclear
powers emerge in Europe. This scenario sees a nuclear-freezone in Central
Europe, but leaves nuclear weapons on the European flanks.
56. Aspects of this story are recounted in Richard J. Evans, In Hitler'sShadow: WestGerman
Historiansand theAttemptto EscapefromtheNazi Past (New York: Pantheon, 1989). A study of
past German effortsto mischaracterizehistoryis Holger H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic
Self-Censorshipin Germany Afterthe Great War," International Security,Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall
1987), pp. 5-44.

International
Security15:1 | 36
This scenario, too, also seems unlikely,since the non-nuclear states will
have substantialincentivesto acquire theirown nuclear weapons. Germany
would probablynot need nuclear weapons to deter a conventionalattackby
its neighbors,since neitherthe Frenchnor any of the EasternEuropean states
would be capable of defeatinga reunifiedGermanyin a conventionalwar.
The Soviet Union would be Germany's only legitimateconventionalthreat,
but as long as the states of Eastern Europe remained independent, Soviet
ground forceswould be blocked froma directattack.The Germans,however,
mightnot be willing to rely on the Poles or the Czechs to provide a barrier
and might instead see nuclear weapons as the best way to deter a Soviet
conventionalattack into Central Europe. The Germans mightchoose to go
nuclear to protectthemselves fromblackmail by other nuclear powers. Fi-
nally,given thatGermanywould have greatereconomic strengththan Britain
or France, it mightthereforeseek nuclearweapons to raise its militarystatus
to a level commensuratewith its economic status.
The minor powers of Eastern Europe would have strong incentives to
acquire nuclear weapons. Withoutnuclearweapons, these EasternEuropean
states would be open to nuclear blackmailfromthe Soviet Union and, if it
acquired nuclear weapons, fromGermany.No Eastern European state could
match the conventional strengthof Germany or the Soviet Union, which
gives these minorpowers a powerfulincentiveto acquire a nuclear deterrent,
even if the major powers had none. In short,a continuationof the current
patternof ownership withoutproliferationseems unlikely.
How stable would this orderbe? The continuedpresence of nuclear weap-
ons in Europe would have some pacifyingeffects.Nuclear weapons would
induce greater caution in their owners, give the nuclear powers greater
security,tend to equalize the relativepower of states thatpossess them,and
reduce the risk of miscalculation.However, these benefitswould be limited
if nuclear weapons did not proliferatebeyond theircurrentowners, forfour
main reasons.
First,the caution and the securitythatnuclear weapons impose would be
missing fromthe vast center of Europe. The entireregion between France
and the Soviet Union, extendingfromthe Arcticin the northto the Medi-
terranean in the south, and comprising some eighteen significantstates,
would become a large zone therebymade "safe" forconventionalwar. Sec-
ond, asymmetricalpower relations would be bound to develop, between
nuclear and non-nuclear states and among non-nuclear states, raising the
dangers that attend such asymmetries. Third, the risk of miscalculation

would rise, reflectingthe multipolarcharacterof this systemand the absence

of nuclear weapons from a large portion of it. A durable agreed political
orderwould be hard to build because politicalcoalitionswould tend to shift
over time,causing miscalculationsof resolve between adversaries. The rela-
tive strengthof potentialwar coalitions would be hard to calculate because
coalitionstrengthwould depend heavily on the vagaries of diplomacy. Such
uncertaintiesabout relative capabilitieswould be mitigatedin conflictsthat
arose among nuclear powers: nuclear weapons tend to equalize power even
among statesor coalitionsof widely disparateresources,and thus to diminish
the importance of additions or defections from each coalition. However,
uncertaintywould still be acute among the many states that would remain
non-nuclear. Fourth, the conventionally-armedstates of Central Europe
would depend for their securityon mass armies, giving them an incentive
to infuse their societies with dangerous nationalism in order to maintain
public support fornational defense efforts.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, WELL-MANAGED OR OTHERWISE

The most likely scenario in the wake of the Cold War is furthernuclear
proliferation in Europe. This outcome is laden with dangers, but also might
provide the best hope formaintainingstabilityon the Continent.Its effects
depend greatlyon how it is managed. Mismanaged proliferationcould pro-
duce disaster, while well-managed proliferationcould produce an order
nearlyas stable as the currentorder. Unfortunately, however, any prolifer-
ation is likelyto be mismanaged.
Four principaldangers could arise ifproliferationis not properlymanaged.
First,the proliferationprocess itselfcould give the existingnuclear powers
strongincentives to use forceto prevent theirnon-nuclearneighbors from
gaining nuclear weapons, much as Israel used force to preempt Iraq from
acquiringa nuclear capability.
Second, even afterproliferationwas completed, a stable nuclear competi-
tion mightnot emerge between the new nuclear states. The lesser European
powers mightlack the resources needed to make theirnuclear forcessurviv-
able; if the emergingnuclear forceswere vulnerable, this could create first-
strikeincentivesand attendantcrisisinstability.Because theireconomies are
farsmaller,they would not be able to develop arsenals as large as those of
the major powers; arsenals of small absolute size mightthus be vulnerable.
Furthermore, expanse deprivesthemofpossible basing
theirlack of territorial
modes, such as mobile missile basing, that would secure their deterrents.

International
Security15:1 | 38
Several are landlocked, so they could not base nuclear weapons at sea, the
most secure basing mode used by the superpowers. Moreover, their close
proximityto one anotherdeprives them of warningtime,and thus of basing
schemes thatexploitwarningto achieve invulnerability, such as by the quick
launch of alert bombers. Finally, the emergingnuclear powers might also
lack the resources required to develop secure command and control and
adequate safetyprocedures forweapons management,thus raising the risk
of accidental launch, or of terroristseizure and use of nuclear weapons.
Third,the elitesand publics of the emergingnuclearEuropean statesmight
not quickly develop doctrinesand attitudesthat reflecta grasp of the dev-
astating consequences and basic unwinnabilityof nuclear war. There will
probably be voices in post-Cold War Europe arguing that limited nuclear
war is feasible, and that nuclear wars can be foughtand won. These claims
mightbe taken seriouslyin states thathave not had much directexperience
with the nuclear revolution.
Fourth,widespread proliferationwould increase the numberof fingerson
the nuclear trigger,which in turnwould increase the likelihoodthatnuclear
weapons could be fireddue to accident,unauthorized use, terroristseizure,
or irrationaldecision-making.
If these problems are not resolved, proliferation would presentgrave dan-
gers. However, the existingnuclear powers can take steps to reduce these
dangers. They can help deter preventiveattack on emergingnuclear states
by extending securityguarantees. They can provide technicalassistance to
help newly nuclear-armedpowers to secure theirdeterrents.And they can
help socialize emerging nuclear societies to understand the nature of the
forces they are acquiring. Proliferationmanaged in this manner can help
bolsterpeace.
How broadly should nuclear weapons be permittedto spread? It would
be best ifproliferation were extendedto Germanybut notbeyond.57Germany
has a large economic base, and can thereforesustain a secure nuclear force.
Moreover, Germany will feel insecure without nuclear weapons; and Ger-
many's great conventional strengthgives it significantcapacity to disturb
Europe if it feels insecure. Other states-especially in Eastern Europe-may
also want nuclear weapons, but it would be best to preventfurtherprolif-
eration.The reasons are, as noted above, thatthese states may be unable to
57. See David Garnham, "ExtendingDeterrencewith German Nuclear Weapons," International

Security,
Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 96-110.

secure theirnuclear deterrents,and the unlimitedspread of nuclearweapons

raises the risk of terroristseizure or possession by states led by irrational
elites. However, ifthe broader spread of nuclear weapons proves impossible
to preventwithouttakingextremesteps, the existingnuclear powers should
let the process happen, while doing theirbest to channel it in safe directions.
However, even if proliferationwere well-managed, significantdangers
would remain. Ifall the major powers in Europe possessed nuclearweapons,
historysuggests thattheywould stillcompete forinfluenceamong the lesser
powers and be drawn into lesser-powerconflicts.The superpowers, despite
the securitythat their huge nuclear arsenals provide, have competed in-
tenselyforinfluencein remote,strategically unimportantareas such as South
Asia, Southeast Asia, and CentralAmerica. The European powers are likely
to exhibitthe same competitiveconduct, especially in Eastern Europe, even
if theypossess secure nuclear deterrents.
The possibilityof ganging up would remain: several nuclear states could
join against a solitarynuclear state, perhaps aggregatingenough strengthto
overwhelm its deterrent.Nuclear states also mightbully theirnon-nuclear
neighbors.This problem is mitigatedifunbounded proliferation takes place,
leaving few non-nuclearstates subject to bullyingby the nuclear states, but
such widespread proliferationraises risksof its own, as noted above.
Well-managed proliferationwould reduce the danger that states might
miscalculatethe relativestrengthof coalitions,since nuclear weapons clarify
the relativepower of all states, and diminishthe importanceof unforeseen
additions and defections from alliances. However, the risk remains that
resolve will be miscalculated, because patterns of conflictare likely to be
somewhat fluid in a multipolarEurope, thus precluding the establishment
of well-definedspheres of rightsand rules of conduct.
Unbounded proliferation,even if it is well-managed, will raise the risks
that appear when there are many fingerson the nuclear trigger-accident,
unauthorized or irrationaluse, or terroristseizure.
In any case, it is not likely that proliferationwill be well-managed. The
nuclear powers cannot easily work to manage proliferation while at the same
time resistingit; there is a natural tension between the two goals. But they
have several motives to resist. The established nuclear powers will be reluc-
tantto give the new nuclear powers technicalhelp in building secure deter-
rents,because it runs against the grain of state behavior to transfermilitary
power to others, and because of the fear that sensitive militarytechnology
could be turned against the donor state if that technology were further

Security15:1 | 40
International
transferredto its adversaries. The nuclear powers will also be reluctantto

undermine the legitimacyof the 1968 Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty by
allowing any signatoriesto acquire nuclear weapons, since this could open
the floodgatesto the wider proliferationthattheyseek to avoid, even ifthey
would otherwise favorvery limitedproliferation.For these reasons the nu-
clear powers are more likely to spend their energy tryingto thwart the
process of proliferation,ratherthan managing it.
Proliferationcan be more easily managed if it occurs during a period of
relativeinternationalcalm. Proliferationthatoccurredduringa time of crisis
would be especially dangerous, since states in conflictwith the emerging
nuclear powers would then have a strongincentiveto interruptthe process
by force. However, proliferationis likelynot to begin until the outbreak of
crisis,because there will be significantdomestic opposition to proliferation
withinthe potentialnuclear powers, as well as significantexternalresistance
fromthe establishednuclear powers. Hence it may requirea crisisto motivate
the potential nuclear powers to pay the domestic and internationalcosts of
moving to build a nuclear force.Thus, proliferation is more likelyto happen
under disadvantageous internationalconditionsthan in a period of calm.
Finally,there are limitsto the abilityof the established nuclear powers to
assist small emergingnuclearpowers to build secure deterrents.For example,
small landlocked powers cannot be given access to sea-based deterrentsor
land-mobile missile systems requiringvast expanses of land; these are geo-
graphicproblems thattechnologycannot erase. Thereforeeven ifthe existing
nuclear powers move to manage the proliferationprocess early and wisely,
thatprocess stillmay raise dangers that theycannot control.
TheoriesthatPredictPeace
Alternative
Many students of European politics will reject my pessimistic analysis of

post-Cold War Europe and instead argue that a multipolarEurope is likely
to be at least as peaceful as the present order. Three specificscenarios fora
peaceful futurehave been advanced. Each rests on a well-knowntheoryof
internationalrelations. However, each of these theoriesis flawed and thus
cannot serve as the basis for reliable predictions of a peaceful order in a
multipolarEurope; hence the hopefulscenariostheysupportlack plausibility.
Under the firstoptimistic scenario, even a non-nuclear Europe would
remain peaceful because Europeans recognize that even a conventionalwar

would be horrific.Sobered by history,national leaders will take greatcare to

avoid war. This scenario rests on the "obsolescence of war" theory.
Although modern conventionalwar can certainlybe verycostly,thereare
several flaws in this argument.There is no systematicevidence demonstrat-
ing that Europeans believe war is obsolete. However, even if it were widely
believed in Europe that war is no longer thinkable,attitudescould change.
Public opinion on national securityissues is notoriouslyfickleand responsive
to elite manipulation and world events. Moreover, only one countryneed
decide war is thinkableto make war possible again. Finally,it is possible that
a conventionalwar could be foughtand won withoutsufferinggrave losses,
and elites who saw this possibilitycould believe war is a viable option.
Under the second optimisticscenario, the existingEuropean Community
(EC) grows strongerwith time, a development heralded by the Single Eu-
ropean Act, designed to create a unifiedWesternEuropean marketby 1992.
A strongEC then ensures that this economic order remains open and pros-
perous, and the open and prosperous characterof the European economy
keeps the states of WesternEurope cooperatingwith each other.In thisview,
the present EC structuregrows stronger,but not larger. Therefore,while
conflictmightemergein EasternEurope, the threatofan aggressiveGermany
would be removed by enmeshing the newly unifiedGerman state deeply in
the EC. The theoryunderpinningthis scenario is "economic liberalism."
A variantof this second scenario posits thatthe EC will spread to include
EasternEurope and possibly the Soviet Union, bringingprosperityand peace
to these regions as well.58Some also maintainthat the EC is likelyto be so
successfulin the decade ahead that it will develop into a state apparatus: a
unified Western European super-statewould emerge and Germany would
be subsumed in it. At some futurepoint, the remainderof Europe would be
incorporatedinto that super-state. Either way, suggest the proponents of
this second scenario and its variants,peace will be bolstered.
Under the third scenario, war is avoided because many European states
have become democratic since the early twentiethcentury,and liberal de-
mocraciessimplydo not fightagainst each other.At a minimum,the presence
of liberal democracies in Western Europe renders that half of Europe free
fromarmed conflict.At a maximum,as democracyspreads to EasternEurope
and the Soviet Union, it bolsters peace among these states, and between
Security,Vol. 14, No. 4

58. JackSnyder, "AvertingAnarchy in the New Europe," International
(Spring 1990), pp. 5-41.

Security15:1 | 42
International
these states and WesternEurope. This scenario is based on the theorythat

can be called "peace-loving democracies."
ECONOMIC LIBERALISM
THE LOGIC OF THE THEORY. Economic liberalismrejectsthe notion that the
prospects for peace are tightlylinked to calculations about militarypower,
and posits instead thatstabilityis mainlya functionofinternationaleconomic
considerations.It assumes thatmodern states are primarilymotivatedby the
desire to achieve prosperity,and that national leaders place the material
welfare of their publics above all other considerations,including security.
This is especially true of liberal democracies,where policymakersare under
special pressure to ensure the economic well-being of their populations.59
Thus, the key to achieving peace is establishmentof an internationaleco-
nomic systemthat fostersprosperityforall states.
The taprootof stability,accordingto this theory,is the creationand main-
tenance of a liberal economic order that allows free economic exchange
between states. Such an orderworks to dampen conflictand enhance political
cooperationin threeways.60
First,it makes states more prosperous; this bolsters peace because pros-
perous states are more economicallysatisfied,and satisfiedstates are more
59. This point about liberal democracies highlightsthe fact that economic liberalismand the
theoryof peace-loving democracies are oftenlinked in the writingsof internationalrelations
scholars. The basis of the linkage is what each theoryhas to say about peoples' motives. The
claim thatindividuals mainly desire materialprosperity,centralto economic liberalism,meshes
nicely with the belief that the citizenryare a powerfulforceagainst war, which, as discussed
below, is centralto the theoryof peace-loving democracies.
60. The threeexplanationsdiscussed here reston threeofthe mostprominenttheoriesadvanced
in the internationalpoliticaleconomy (IPE) literature.These threeare usually treatedas distinct
theoriesand are given various labels. However, theyshare importantcommon elements. Hence,
for purposes of parsimony, I treat them as three strands of one general theory: economic
liberalism. A caveat is in order. The IPE literatureoften fails to state its theories in a clear
fashion,makingthemdifficult to evaluate. Thus, I have construedthese theoriesfromsometimes
opaque writingsthat might be open to contraryinterpretations.My descriptionof economic
liberalismis drawn from the following works, which are among the best of the IPE genre:
Richard N. Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policies in the Seventies," World
Politics,Vol. 24, No. 2 (January1972), pp. 158-181; ErnstB. Haas, "Technology,Pluralism,and
the New Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,ed., International Regionalism(Boston: Little,Brown,
1968), pp. 149-176; Robert0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,Powerand Interdependence: World
Politicsin Transition
(Boston: Little,Brown, 1977); Robert0. Keohane, AfterHegemony: Cooperation
and Discordin the WorldPoliticalEconomy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984); David
Mitrany,A WorkingPeace System(Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1966); Edward L. Morse, "The
Transformationof Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization,"
WorldPolitics,Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 371-392; and Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of
theTradingState:Commerce and Conquestin theModernWorld(New York: Basic Books, 1986).

peaceful. Many wars are waged to gain or preserve wealth, but states have
less motiveforsuch wars if they are already wealthy.Wealthysocieties also
stand to lose more if theirsocieties are laid waste by war. For both reasons
theyavoid war.
Moreover,the prosperityspawned by economic liberalismfeeds itself,by
promotinginternationalinstitutionsthat fostergreaterliberalism,which in
turn promotes still greaterprosperity.To functionsmoothly,a liberal eco-
nomic order requires internationalregimes or institutions,such as the EC,
the General Agreementon Tariffsand Trade (GATT), and the International
MonetaryFund (IMF). These institutionsperformtwo limitedbut important
functions.First,theyhelp statesto verifythatpartnerskeep theircooperative
commitments.Second, they provide resources to governmentsexperiencing
short-termproblems arising from their exposure to internationalmarkets,
and by doing so they allow states to eschew beggar-thy-neighbor policies
thatmightotherwiseunderminethe existingeconomic order. Once in place,
these institutionsand regimes bolster economic cooperation, hence bolster
prosperity.They also bolster themselves: once in existence they cause the
expansion of theirown size and influence,by provingtheirworthand selling
themselves to states and publics. And as their power grows they become
betterable to promotecooperation,which promotesgreaterprosperity,which
furtherbolsterstheirprestigeand influence.In essence, a benevolent spiral-
like relationshipsets in between cooperation-promoting regimes and pros-
perity,in which each feeds the other.
Second, a liberaleconomic orderfosterseconomic interdependenceamong
states. Interdependence is defined as a situation in which two states are
mutuallyvulnerable; each is a hostage of the otherin the economic realm.61
When interdependenceis high, this theoryholds, thereis less temptationto
cheat or behave aggressively towards other states because all states could
retaliate. Interdependence allows states to compel each other to cooperate
on economic matters,much as mutual assured destructionallows nuclear
powers to compel each other to respect theirsecurity.All states are forced
by the othersto act as partnersin the provisionof materialcomfortfortheir
home publics.
Third,some theoristsargue thatwith ever-increasingpoliticalcooperation,
internationalregimes will become so powerful that they will assume an
61. See KennethN. Waltz, "The MythofNational Interdependence,"in Charles P. Kindelberger,

ed., TheInternational
Corporation(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 205-223.

Security15:1 | 44
International
independent lifeof theirown, eventuallygrowinginto a super-state.This is

a minorityview; most economicliberalsdo not argue thatregimescan become
so powerful that they can coerce states to act against their own narrow
interests.Instead most maintainthatregimesessentiallyreflectthe interests
of the states that created and maintain them, and remain subordinate to
other interestsof these states. However, the "growth to super-statehood"
view does representan importantstrandofthoughtamong economicliberals.
The main flawin thistheoryis thatthe principalassumptionunderpinning
it-that states are primarilymotivatedby the desire to achieve prosperity-
is wrong. States are surely concerned about prosperity,and thus economic
calculations are hardly trivialforthem. However, states operate in both an
internationalpolitical environmentand an internationaleconomic environ-
ment, and the formerdominates the latterin cases where the two systems
come into conflict.The reason is straightforward: the internationalpolitical
systemis anarchic, which means that each state must always be concerned
to ensure its own survival.Since a statecan have no highergoal than survival,
when push comes to shove, internationalpolitical considerations will be
paramount in the minds of decision-makers.
Proponentsof economic liberalismlargelyignore the effectsof anarchyon
state behavior and concentrateinstead on economic considerations. When
this omission is corrected,however, theirargumentscollapse, fortwo rea-
sons.
First,competitionforsecuritymakes it verydifficult forstatesto cooperate.
When securityis scarce, states become more concerned about relativegains
than absolute gains.62They ask of an exchange not, "will both of us gain?"
but instead, "who will gain more?"63When securityis scarce, they reject
even cooperation that would yield an absolute economic gain, if the other
state would gain more of the yield, fromfear that the other mightconvert
its gain to militarystrength,and then use this strengthto win by coercion
in later rounds.M4Cooperation is much easier to achieve if states worryonly
about absolute gains, as they are more likelyto do when securityis not so
62. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism,"InternationalOrganization,Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988),
pp. 485-507; and Grieco, CooperationamongNations:Europe,Americaand Non-Tariff Barriersto
Trade(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1990).
63. Waltz, TheoryofInternationalPolitics,p. 105.
64. It is importantto emphasize that because militarypower is in good part a functionof
economicmight,the consequences ofeconomic dealings among statessometimeshave important
securityimplications.

scarce. The goal then is simply to insure that the overall economic pie is
expandingand each stateis gettingat least some partofthe resultingbenefits.
However, anarchyguaranteesthatsecuritywill oftenbe scarce;thisheightens
states' concerns about relativegains, which makes cooperation difficultun-
less gains can be finelysliced to reflect,and thus not disturb,the current
balance of power.
In contrast to this view, economic liberals generally assume that states
worrylittleabout relativegains when designingcooperativeagreements,but
instead are concerned mainlyabout absolute gains. This assumption under-
lies their optimism over the prospects for internationalcooperation. How-
ever, it is not well-based: anarchy forces states to reject agreements that
resultin asymmetricalpayoffsthat shiftthe balance of power against them.
Second, interdependence is as likely to lead to conflictas cooperation,
because states will struggleto escape the vulnerabilitythatinterdependence
creates, in order to bolster their national security.States that depend on
others for criticaleconomic supplies will fear cutoffor blackmail in time of
crisisor war; theymay tryto extend politicalcontrolto the source of supply,
giving rise to conflictwith the source or with its other customers. Interde-
pendence, in other words, mightvery well lead to greatercompetition,not
to cooperation.65
Several otherconsiderations,independent of the consequences of anarchy,
also raise doubts about the claims of economic liberals.
First,economic interactionsbetween states often cause serious frictions,
even ifthe overallconsequences are positive. Therewill invariablybe winners
and losers within each state, and losers rarelyaccept defeat gracefully.In
modern states, where leaders have to pay carefulattentionto theirconstit-
65. There are numerous examples in the historicalrecordof vulnerable states pursuing aggres-
sive militarypolicies forthe purpose of achievingautarky.For example, thispatternof behavior
was reflectedin both Japan's and Germany's actions during the interwarperiod. On Japan, see
Michael A. Barnhart,JapanPreparesfor Total War: The Searchfor EconomicSecurity,1919-1941
(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1987); and James B. Crowley, Japan'sQuest for Autonomy
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1966). On Germany,see WilliamCarr,Arms,Autarkyand
Aggression:A Studyin GermanForeignPolicy,1933-39 (New York: Norton, 1973). It is also worth
noting that during the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970s, when it became apparent that the
United States was vulnerable to OPEC pressure, there was much talk in America about using
militaryforce to seize Arab oil fields. See, for example, Robert W. Tucker,"Oil: The Issue of
American Intervention,"Commentary, January1975, pp. 21-31; Miles Ignotus [said to be a
pseudonym forEdward Luttwak],"Seizing Arab Oil," Harpers,March 1975, pp. 45-62; and U.S.
Congress, House Committeeon InternationalRelations,Reporton Oil Fieldsas MilitaryObjectives:
A FeasibilityStudy,prepared by John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark, 94th Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice[U.S. GPO], August 21, 1975).

Security15:1 | 46
International
uents, losers can cause considerable trouble. Even in cases where only win-
ners are involved, there are sometimes squabbles over how the spoils are
divided. In a sense, then, expanding the networkof contactsamong states
increases the scope forinternationaldisagreementsamong them. They now
have more to squabble about.
Second, therewill be opportunitiesforblackmailand forbrinkmanshipin
a highlydynamiceconomic systemwhere statesare dependent on each other.
For example, although mutual vulnerabilitiesmay arise among states, it is
likelythat the actual levels of dependence will not be equal. The less vul-
nerable states would probablyhave greaterbargainingpower over the more
dependent states and mightattemptto coerce them into makingextravagant
concessions. Furthermore,differentpolitical systems, not to mention indi-
vidual leaders, have differentcapacities for engaging in tough bargaining
situations.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD. During two periods in the twentiethcentury,
Europe witnessed a liberal economic order with high levels of interdepend-
ence. Stabilityshould have obtained duringthose periods, accordingto eco-
nomic liberalism.
The firstcase clearly contradictsthe theory.The years between 1890 and
1914 were probably the time of greatesteconomic interdependencein Eu-
rope's history.Yet World War I broke out followingthis period.66
The second case covers the Cold War years. During this period there has
been much interdependence among the EC states, while relations among
these states have been very peaceful. This case, not surprisingly,is the
centerpieceof the economic liberals' argument.
The correlationin this second case does not mean, however, that inter-
dependence has caused cooperation among the Western democracies. It is
more likely that the prime cause was the Cold War, and that this was the
main reason that intra-ECrelationshave flourished.67 The Cold War caused
these resultsin two different but mutuallyreinforcingways.
First,old-fashionedbalance of power logic mandated cooperation among
the Western democracies. A powerful and potentially dangerous Soviet
66. See Richard N. Rosecrance, et al., "WhitherInterdependence?" International Organization,

Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 432-434.
67. This theme is reflectedin BarryBuzan, "Economic Structureand InternationalSecurity:The
Limits of the Liberal Case," International
Organization,Vol. 38, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 597-
624; RobertGilpin, U.S. Powerand theMultinationalCorporation: The PoliticalEconomyofForeign
DirectInvestment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and RobertA. Pollard, EconomicSecurityand the
OriginsoftheCold War,1945-1950 (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1985).

Union forcedthe Westerndemocraciesto band togetherto meet the common

threat.Britain,Germany,and France no longer worried about each other,
because all faced a greatermenace fromthe Soviets. This Soviet threatmuted
concernsabout relativegains arisingfromeconomic cooperation among the
EC states by giving each Western democracya vested interestin seeing its
alliance partnersgrow powerful, since each additional incrementof power
helped deter the Soviets. The Soviet threatalso muted relative-gainsfears
among WesternEuropean states by giving them all a powerfulincentiveto
avoid conflictwith each other while the Soviet Union loomed to the east,
ready to harvestthe gains of Westernquarrels. This gave each Westernstate
greater confidence that its Western partners would not turn their gains
against it, as long as these partnersbehaved rationally.
Second, America's hegemonic position in NATO, the militarycounterpart
to the EC, mitigatedthe effectsof anarchyon the Westerndemocracies and
facilitatedcooperation among them.68As emphasized, states do not trust
each otherin anarchyand theyhave incentivesto commitaggressionagainst
each other. America, however, not only provided protectionagainst the
Soviet threat,but also guaranteed that no EC state would aggress against
another. For example, France did not have to fear Germany as it rearmed,
because the American presence in Germany meant that the Germans were
not freeto attackanyone. Withthe United States servingas nightwatchman,
relative-gainsconcerns among the WesternEuropean states were mitigated
and, moreover,those states were willingto allow theireconomies to become
tightlyinterdependent.
In effect,relationsamong EC states were spared the effectsof anarchy-
fears about relative gains and an obsession with autonomy-because the
United States served as the ultimatearbiterwithinthe Alliance.
If the present Soviet threatto WesternEurope is removed, and American
forcesdepart forhome, relationsamong the EC stateswill be fundamentally
altered. Without a common Soviet threatand without the American night
watchman, Western European states will begin viewing each other with
greaterfear and suspicion, as they did forcenturiesbeforethe onset of the
Cold War. Consequently, they will worryabout the imbalances in gains as
well as the loss of autonomy that resultsfromcooperation.69Cooperation in
68. See JosefJoffe,"Europe's American Pacifier,"ForeignPolicy,No. 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 64-

82.
69. Consider, forexample, a situationwhere the European Communityis successfullyextended

International
Security15:1 | 48
thisnew orderwill be more difficult

than it has been in the Cold War. Conflict
will be more likely.
In sum, thereare good reasons forlooking with skepticismupon the claim
that peace can be maintainedin a multipolarEurope on the basis of a more
powerfulEC.
PEACE-LOVING DEMOCRACIES
The peace-loving democracies theory holds that domestic political factors,
not calculations about militarypower or the internationaleconomic system,
are the principaldeterminantof peace. Specifically,the argumentis thatthe
presence of liberal democracies in the internationalsystemwill help to pro-
duce a stable order.70The claim is not that democracies go to war less often
than authoritarianstates. In fact,the historicalrecordshows clearlythatsuch
is not the case.71 Instead, the argumentis thatdemocracies do not go to war
against otherdemocracies. Thus, democracymust spread to Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union to insure peace in post-Cold War Europe.
It is not certainthat democracywill take root among the states of Eastern
Europe or in the Soviet Union. They lack a strongtraditionof democracy;
institutionsthat can accommodate the growthof democracywill have to be
built fromscratch.That task will probablyprove to be difficult, especially in
an unstable Europe. But whether democracytakes root in the East matters
to include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and that over time all states achieve greater
prosperity.The Germans, however, do significantlybetterthan all other states. Hence their
relativepower position, which is already quite strong,begins to improve markedly.It is likely
that the French and the Soviets, just to name two states, would be deeply concerned by this
situation.
70. This theoryhas been recentlyarticulatedby Michael Doyle in threearticles:"Liberalismand
World Politics,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169;
"Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,"Philosophyand Public Affairs,Vol. 12, No. 3
(Summer1983), pp. 205-235; and "Kant, LiberalLegacies, and ForeignAffairs,Part2," Philosophy
and PublicAffairs,Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983), pp. 323-353. Doyle draws heavily on Immanuel
Kant's classic writingson the subject. This theoryalso provides the centralargumentin Francis
Fukuyama's widely publicized essay on "The End of History?"in The NationalInterest,No. 16
(Summer 1989), pp. 3-18. For an excellentcritiqueof the theory,see Samuel P. Huntington,
"No Exit: The Errorsof Endism," TheNationalInterest,No. 17 (Fall 1989), pp. 3-11.
71. There is a good empiricalliteratureon the relationshipbetween democracyand war. See,
forexample, Steve Chan, "Mirror,Mirroron the Wall . .. Are the FreerCountriesMore Pacific?"
Journalof ConflictResolution,Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617-648; Erich Weede, "De-
mocracyand War Involvement,"in ibid., pp. 649-664; Bruce M. Russettand R. JosephMonsen,
"Bureaucracyand PolyarchyAs Predictorsof Performance,"Comparative PoliticalStudies,Vol. 8,
No. 1 (April 1975), pp. 5-31; and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Pronenessof
Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," The Jerusalem Journalof International
Relations,Vol. 1, No. 4
(Summer 1976), pp. 50-69.

littleforstabilityin Europe, since the theoryof peace-loving democracies is

unsound.
THE LOGIC OF THE THEORY. Two explanations are offeredin support of the
claim that democracies do not go to war against one another.
First,some claim that authoritarianleaders are more prone to go to war
than leaders of democracies, because authoritarianleaders are not account-
able to theirpublics, which carrythe main burdens of war. In a democracy,
by contrast,the citizenrythat pays the price of war has greatersay in the
decision-makingprocess. The people, so the argumentgoes, are more hesi-
tant to starttrouble because it is they who pay the blood price; hence the
greatertheirpower, the fewerwars.
The second argumentrests on the claim that the citizens of liberal demo-
cracies respectpopular democraticrights-those of theirfellowcountrymen,
and those of individuals in other states. As a result they are reluctantto
wage war against other democracies,because theyview democraticgovern-
ments as more legitimatethan others, and are loath to impose a foreign
regime on a democraticstate by force. This would violate theirown demo-
craticprinciplesand values. Thus an inhibitionon war is introducedwhen
two democracies face each other that is missing in other internationalrela-
tionships.
The firstof these argumentsis flawed because it is not possible to sustain
the claim that the people in a democracyare especially sensitiveto the costs
of war and thereforeless willingthan authoritarianleaders to fightwars. In
fact,the historicalrecord shows that democracies are every bit as likely to
fightwars as are authoritarianstates.
Furthermore,mass publics, whetherdemocraticor not, can become deeply
imbued with nationalisticor religiousfervor,makingthem prone to support
aggression,regardless of costs. The widespread public support in post-rev-
olutionaryFrance forNapoleon's wars of aggression is just one example of
thisphenomenon. On the otherhand, authoritarianleaders are just as likely
as democraticpublics to fear going to war, because war tends to unleash
democraticforces that can undermine the regime.72War can impose high
costs on authoritarianleaders as well as on theircitizenries.
The second argument, which emphasizes the transnationalrespect for
democraticrightsamong democracies,restson a weaker factorthatis usually
72. See, for example, Stanislav Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of MilitaryDictator-
ships," JournalofStrategicStudies,Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 1980), pp. 3-10.

International
Security15:1 | 50
overriddenby otherfactorssuch as nationalismand religiousfundamental-

ism. There is also anotherproblemwiththe argument.The possibilityalways
exists that a democracy will revertto an authoritarianstate. This threatof
backslidingmeans that one democraticstate can never be sure that another
democraticstate will not change its stripesand turn on it sometime in the
future.Liberaldemocraciesmustthereforeworryabout relativepower among
themselves, which is tantamountto saying that each has an incentive to
consideraggression against the otherto forestallfuturetrouble.Lamentably,
it is not possible foreven liberal democracies to transcendanarchy.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD. Problems with the deductive logic aside, the his-
toricalrecord seems to offerstrong support for the theoryof peace-loving
democracies. There appears to have been no case where liberal democracies
foughtagainst each other. Although this evidence looks impressive at first
glance, closer examinationshows it to be indecisive. In fact,historyprovides
no clear test of the theory. Four evidentiaryproblems leave the issue in
doubt.
First,democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries,
and thus therehave not been many cases where two democracieswere in a
position to fightwith each other. Only three prominentcases are usually
cited: Britainand the United States (1832-present);Britainand France (1832-
49, 1871-1940); and the Westerndemocracies since 1945.
Second, thereare otherpersuasive explanationsforwhy war did not occur
in those three cases, and these competing explanations must be ruled out
beforethe peace-loving democracies theorycan be accepted. While relations
between the Britishand the Americans during the nineteenthcenturywere
hardly free of conflict,73 theirrelationsin the twentiethcenturywere quite
harmonious, and thus fit closely with how the theorywould expect two
democracies to behave towards each other. That harmony, however, can
easily be explained by the presence of a common threatthat forcedBritain
and the United States to work closelytogether.74Bothfaced a serious German
threatin the firstpart of the century,and a Soviet threatlater. The same
basic argumentapplies to France and Britain.While Franco-British relations
73. For a discussion of the hostile relationsthat existed between the United States and Britain
during the nineteenthcentury,see H.C. Allen, GreatBritainand theUnitedStates:A Historyof
Anglo-American Relations,1783-1952 (London: Odhams, 1954).
74. For a discussion of this rapprochement,see Stephen R. Rock, WhyPeace BreaksOut: Great
PowerRapprochement in HistoricalPerspective(Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press,
1989), chap. 2.

were not the best throughoutmost of the nineteenthcentury,75 they im-

around the turnof the centurywiththe rise ofa common
proved significantly
threat:Germany.76Finally,as noted above, the Soviet threatcan explain the
absence of war among the Westerndemocracies since 1945.
Third,itbears mentionthatseveral democracieshave come close to fighting
one another,which suggests that the absence of war may be due simply to
chance. France and Britainapproached war duringthe Fashoda crisisof 1898.
France and Weimar Germanymighthave come to blows over the Rhineland
duringthe 1920s, had Germanypossessed the militarystrengthto challenge
France. The United States has clashed witha numberof elected governments
in the Third World during the Cold War, including the Allende regime in
Chile and the Arbenz regimein Guatemala.
Lastly, some would classifyWilhelmine Germany as a democracy,or at
least a quasi-democracy;if so, World War I becomes a war among democra-
cies.77
Conclusion
This article argues that bipolarity,an equal militarybalance, and nuclear

weapons have fosteredpeace in Europe over the past 45 years. The Cold
War confrontationproduced these phenomena; thus the Cold War was prin-
cipally responsible fortransforming a historicallyviolent region into a very
peaceful place.
There is no doubt that the costs of the Cold War have been substantial.It
inflictedoppressive politicalregimeson the peoples of EasternEurope, who
were denied basic human rightsby theirforcedmembershipin the Soviet
75. For a good discussion of Franco-Britishrelationsduring the nineteenthcentury,see P.J.V.

Rolo, EntenteCordiale:The Originsand Negotiationof theAnglo-French Agreements of 8 April1904
(New York: St. Martins, 1969), pp. 16-109.
76. Stephen Rock, who has examined the rapprochementbetween Britainand France, argues
that the principal motivatingforce behind theirimproved relations derived fromgeopolitical
considerations,not shared politicalbeliefs. See Rock, WhyPeace BreaksOut, chap. 4.
77. Doyle recognizes this problem and thus has a lengthyfootnotethat attemptsto deal with
it. See "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs[Part One]," pp. 216-217, n. 8. He argues
that "Germany was a liberal state under republican law for domestic issues," but that the
"emperor's active role in foreignaffairs. .. made imperialGermanya state divorced fromthe
control of its citizenryin foreignaffairs."However, an examination of the decision-making
process leading to World War I reveals that the emperor(WilhelmII) was not a primemover in
foreignaffairsand that he was no more bellicose than other members of the German elite,
includingthe leading civilianofficial,Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg.

International
Security15:1 | 52
empire. It consumed national wealth, by giving rise to large and costly

defense establishmentsin both East and West. It spawned bloody conflicts
in the Third World; these produced modest casualties forthe superpowers,
but large casualties forthe ThirdWorldnations. Nevertheless,the net human
and economic cost of the Cold War order has been farless than the cost of
the European order of 1900-45, with its vast violence and suffering.
A Cold War order without confrontationwould have been preferableto
the order that actually developed; then the peace that the Cold War order
produced could have been enjoyed withoutits attendantcosts. However, it
was East-Westenmitythatgave rise to the Cold War order;therewould have
been no bipolarity,no equality, and no large Soviet and American nuclear
forcesin Europe withoutit. The costs of the Cold War arose fromthe same
cause-East-West confrontation-as did its benefits.The good could not be
had withoutthe bad.
This articlefurtherargues that the demise of the Cold War order is likely
to increase the chances thatwar and major criseswill occur in Europe. Many
observers now suggest that a new age of peace is dawning; in fact the
opposite is true.
The implications of my analysis are straightforward, if paradoxical. The
West has an interestin maintainingpeace in Europe. It thereforehas an
interestin maintainingthe Cold War order,and hence has an interestin the
continuationof the Cold War confrontation;developments that threatento
end it are dangerous. The Cold War antagonismcould be continuedat lower
levels of East-Westtension than have prevailed in the past; hence the West
is not injured by relaxingEast-Westtension,but a complete end to the Cold
War would create more problems than it would solve.
The fate of the Cold War, however, is mainly in the hands of the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union is the only superpower thatcan seriouslythreaten
to overrun Europe; it is the Soviet threatthat provides the glue that holds
NATO together.Take away that offensivethreatand the United States is
likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it has
headed for fortyyears may disintegrate.This would bring to an end the
bipolar order that has characterizedEurope forthe past 45 years.
The foregoinganalysis suggests thatthe West paradoxicallyhas an interest
in the continued existence-ofa powerfulSoviet Union with substantialmili-
tary forces in Eastern Europe. Western interestsare wholly reversed from
those that Western leaders saw in the late 1940s: instead of seeking the
retractionof Soviet power, as the West did then, the West now should hope

that the Soviet Union retains at least some militaryforces in the Eastern
European region.
There is littlethe Americans or the WesternEuropeans can or are likelyto
do to perpetuate the Cold War, forthreereasons.
First,domesticpoliticalconsiderationspreclude such an approach. Western
leaders obviouslycannotbase nationalsecuritypolicyon the need to maintain
forcesin CentralEurope forthe purpose simplyof keeping the Soviets there.
The idea of deploying large forcesin order to bait the Soviets into an order-
keeping competition would be dismissed as bizarre, and contraryto the
general belief that ending the Cold War and removingthe Soviet yoke from
Eastern Europe would make the world saferand better.78
Second, the idea of propping up a decliningrivalruns counterto the basic
behaviorof states. States are principallyconcernedabout theirrelativepower
position in the system;hence, theylook foropportunitiesto take advantage
of each other. If anything,they preferto see adversaries decline, and thus
will do whatevertheycan to speed up the process and maximizethe distance
of the fall. In other words, states do not ask which distributionof power
best facilitatesstabilityand then do everythingpossible to build or maintain
such an order. Instead, they each tend to pursue the more narrow aim of
maximizingtheirpower advantage over potentialadversaries. The particular
internationalorder that resultsis simplya byproductof thatcompetition,as
illustratedby the originsof the Cold War orderin Europe. No stateintended
to createit. In fact,both the United States and the Soviet Union worked hard
in the early years of the Cold War to undermine each other's position in
Europe, which would have ended the bipolar order on the Continent. The
remarkablystable system that emerged in Europe in the late 1940s was the
unintended consequence of an intense competitionbetween the superpow-
ers.
Third, even if the Americans and the WesternEuropeans wanted to help
the Soviets maintaintheirstatus as a superpower,it is not apparent thatthey
could do so. The Soviet Union is leaving Eastern Europe and cuttingits
78. This point is illustratedby the 1976 controversyover the so-called "SonnenfeldtDoctrine."
Helmut Sonnenfeldt,an adviser to Secretaryof State Henry Kissinger,was reported to have
said in late 1975 that the United States should support Soviet dominationof Eastern Europe. It
was clear fromthe ensuing debate thatwhetheror not Sonnenfeldtin factmade such a claim,
no administrationcould publiclyadopt that position. See U.S. Congress, House Committeeon
InternationalRelations, Hearingson UnitedStatesNationalSecurityPolicyVis-a-VisEasternEurope
(The "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine"),94thCong., 2nd sess. (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GPO, April 12, 1976).

International
Security15:1 | 54
militaryforceslargelybecause its economy is foundering.It is not clear that

the Soviets themselves know how to fix their economy, and there is little
that Westerngovernmentscan do to help them solve theireconomic prob-
lems. The West can and should avoid doing malicious mischiefto the Soviet
economy, but at this juncture it is difficultto see how the West can have
significantpositive influence.79
The fact that the West cannot sustain the Cold War does not mean that
the United States should abandon all attemptsto preservethe currentorder.
The United States should do what it can to directevents toward avertinga
complete mutual superpower withdrawal from Europe. For instance, the
Americannegotiatingposition at the conventionalarms controltalks should
aim toward large mutual forcereductions,but should not contemplatecom-
plete mutual withdrawal. The Soviets may opt to withdraw all theirforces
unilaterallyanyway; thereis littlethe United States could do to preventthis.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
If complete Soviet withdrawalfromEastern Europe proves unavoidable, the
West faces the question of how to maintain peace in a multipolarEurope.
Three policy prescriptionsare in order.
First,the United States should encourage the limitedand carefullyman-
aged proliferationof nuclear weapons in Europe. The best hope foravoiding
war in post-Cold War Europe is nuclear deterrence;hence some nuclear
proliferation is necessaryto compensate forthe withdrawalof the Soviet and
American nuclear arsenals fromCentral Europe. Ideally, as I have argued,
nuclear weapons would spread to Germany,but to no other state.
Second, Britainand the United States, as well as the Continental states,
will have to balance activelyand efficientlyagainst any emergingaggressor
to offsetthe ganging up and bullyingproblemsthatare sure to arise in post-
Cold War Europe. Balancing in a multipolarsystem,however, is usually a
problem-riddenenterprise,eitherbecause of geographyor because of signif-
icant coordinationproblems. Nevertheless,two steps can be taken to maxi-
mize the prospects of efficientbalancing.
The initial measure concerns Britainand the United States, the two pro-
spectivebalancing states that,physicallyseparated fromthe Continent,may
79. For an optimisticassessment of h,ow the West can enhance Gorbachev's prospects of suc-
ceeding, see JackSnyder, "InternationalLeverage on Soviet Domestic Change," WorldPolitics,
Vol. 42, No. 1 (October 1989), pp. 1-30.

BacktotheFuture| 55
thus conclude that they have little interestin what happens there. They
would thenbe abandoning theirresponsibilitiesand, more importantly, their
interestsas off-shorebalancers. Both states' failureto balance against Ger-
many before the two world wars made war more likely in each case. It is
essential for peace in Europe that they not repeat theirpast mistakes, but
instead remain actively involved in maintainingthe balance of power in
Europe.
Specifically,both states must maintainmilitaryforcesthatcan be deployed
to the Continentto balance against states that threatento starta war. To do
this they must also socialize theirpublics to support a policy of continued
Continentalcommitment.Support forsuch a commitmentwill be more dif-
ficultto mobilize than in the past, because its principalpurpose would be to
preservepeace, ratherthan to preventan imminenthegemony,and the latter
is a simplergoal to explain publicly.Moreover,it is the basic nature of states
to focus on maximizing relative power, not on bolsteringstability,so this
prescriptionasks them to take on an unaccustomed task. Nevertheless, the
Britishand American stake in peace is real, especially since there is a sure
riskthat a European war mightinvolve large-scaleuse of nuclear weapons.
It should thereforebe possible for both countries to lead their publics to
recognize this interestand support policies thatprotectit.80
The other measure concerns American attitudes and actions toward the
Soviet Union. The Soviets may eventuallyreturnto theirpast expansionism
and threatento upset the status quo. If so, we are back to the Cold War; the
West should respond as quicklyand efficiently as it did the firsttime. How-
ever, the Soviets adhere to status quo policies, Soviet power could play a
if
key role in balancing against Germanyand in maintainingorder in Eastern
Europe. It is importantthat,in those cases where the Soviets are actingin a
balancingcapacity,the United States recognizethis,cooperate withits former
adversary,and not let residual distrustfromthe Cold War interferewith the
balancing process.
Third,a concertedeffortshould be made to keep hyper-nationalism at bay,
especially in Eastern Europe. This powerfulforcehas deep roots in Europe
and has contributedto the outbreakof past European conflicts.Nationalism
has been contained during the Cold War, but it is likelyto reemerge once
80. Advancing this argument is Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World
Doesn't."

International
Security15:1 | 56
Soviet and Americanforcesleave the heart of Europe.81It will be a forcefor

troubleunless it is curbed. The teaching of honest national historyis espe-
cially important,since the teaching of false chauvinist historyis the main
vehicle for spreading virulentnationalism. States that teach a dishonestly
self-exculpatingor self-glorifyinghistoryshould be publicly criticizedand
sanctioned.82
On this count it is especially importantthat relationsbetween Germany
and its neighbors be handled carefully.Many Germans rightlyfeel that
Germanyhas behaved veryresponsiblyfor45 years,and has made an honest
effortto rememberand make amends foran uglyperiod ofitspast. Therefore,
Germans quickly tire of lectures fromforeignersdemanding that they apol-
ogize once again for crimes committedbefore most of the currentGerman
population was born. On the otherhand, peoples who have sufferedat the
hands of the Germans cannot forgettheirenormous suffering, and inevitably
ask forrepeated assurance that the past will not be repeated. This dialogue
has the potential to spiral into mutual recriminationsthat could spark a
renewed sense of persecution among Germans, and with it, a rebirthof
German-nationalism.It is thereforeincumbenton all partiesin this discourse
to proceed with understandingand respect for one another's feelings and
experience.Specifically,others should not ask today's Germans to apologize
forcrimesthey did not commit,but Germans must understand that others'
ceaseless demands for reassurance have a legitimatebasis in history,and
should view these demands with patience and understanding.
None of these tasks will be easy to accomplish. In fact,I expect that the
bulk of my prescriptionswill not be followed; most run contraryto powerful
strainsof domesticAmericanand European opinion, and to the basic nature
of statebehavior. Moreover,even iftheyare followed,thiswill not guarantee
the peace in Europe. If the Cold War is trulybehind us, the stabilityof the
past 45 years is not likelyto be seen again in the coming decades.
81. On the evolution of nationalistichistory-teaching

in Europe see Kennedy, "The Decline of
NationalisticHistory,"and Dance, HistorytheBetrayer.
82. My thinkingon this matterhas been influencedby conversationswith Stephen Van Evera.


Europe Faces Instability After the Cold War

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Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War

Author(s): John J. Mearsheimer

This content downloaded from 141.213.236.110 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 19:30:58 PM

The profoundchanges now underwayin Europe have been widely viewed

1. There is considerable support withinNATO's highercircles,includingthe Bush administra-

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the end of World War II is replaced by a multipolarstructure.In essence,

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4. It is commonplace to characterizethe polarity-bipolar or multipolar-of the international

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METHODOLOGY: HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT EUROPE S FUTURE?

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views on the futureof Europe are shaped by theirimplicitpreferenceforone

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The past 45 years representthe longestperiod of peace in European history.7

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since Europe has been freeofwar forso long thatan ever-growingproportion

THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: MILITARY POWER AND STABILITY

9. For inventoriesof past wars, see JackS. Levy, WarIn theModernGreatPowerSystem,1495-

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These factorsare aspects of the European state system-of the character

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available to them. The distributionof power between states tells us how

13. The prospects fordeterrencecan also be affectedby crisisstabilitycalculations. See JohnJ.

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A bipolar systemis more peaceful forthreemain reasons. First,the number

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17. Although a balance of power is more likely to produce deterrencethan an imbalance of

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required to forman effectiveblockingcoalitionis large. Second, a state faced

SourcesofMilitaryDoctrine:France,Britain,and GermanybetweentheWorldWars (Ithaca: Cornell

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friendor neutral,and new rules must be established. Under these circum-

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There are no empirical studies that provide conclusive evidence of the

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to defeateach of the others if it can isolate them. This patterncharacterized

27. This point is the centraltheme of Ludwig Dehio, ThePrecariousBalance:FourCenturiesofthe

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Nuclear weapons favorpeace on both counts. They are weapons of mass

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should have its own state.30Although nationalistsoftenbelieve that their

THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: EVIDENCE

30. This definitionis drawn fromErnest Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism(Ithaca: Cornell Uni-

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31. Austria is not a pure case of bullying;therewas also considerable pro-Germansupport in

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32. Britain'sfailureto commititselfexplicitlyto a Continentalwar before the JulyCrisis was

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deterrencefailed. The United States did not launch a significantmilitary

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be costly and conquest difficult,but the leaders of the strongeststate-

37. See Ludwig Dehio, Germanyand WorldPoliticsin theTwentieth trans.Dieter Pevsner

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world wars. The policy of murder arose chieflyfromdomestic sources; the

39. See Anton W. DePorte, EuropebetiveentheSuperpowers:

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and elsewhere in Europe; a proscriptionon secretunilateralre-deployment

40. See Hans Speier, GermanRearmament and AtomicWar:TheViewsofGermanMilitaryand Political

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Moreover, they have understood that conventionalwar could well escalate

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