CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW I
I. DEFINITION AND SOURCES
A. DEFINITION
Criminal law is that branch or division of law
which defines crimes, treats of their nature, and
provides for their punishment.
B. STATE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH
CRIMES
1. SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW
(REYES)
a. The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and its
amendments
b. Special penal laws passed by the Philippine
Commission, Philippine Assembly, Philippine
Legislature, National Assembly, the Congress
of the Philippines, and the Batasang
Pambansa.
c. Penal Presidential Decrees issued during
Martial Law.
1987 Constitution Article II, Section 5
Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people
of the blessings of democracy.
1987 Constitution Article VI, Section 1
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
People v. Santiago
43 Phil 124 (1922)
Facts: Santiago was driving an automobile at a
high speed notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass
a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side
of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where
there were two boys standing. He ran over Parondo who
was instantly killed as a result of the accident. Santiago
was convicted by the lower court of the crime of
homicide by reckless imprudence. The accused appealed
challenging the validity of Act No. 2886 which amended
General Order No. 58 (which provides that all
prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of
the United States against the persons charged with the
offenses), claiming that the legislature is not authorized
to amend the latter because its provisions have the
character of Constitutional Law. Sec. 2 of Act No. 2866
contains that ―all prosecutions for public offenses shall
be in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands
against the person charged with the offense.‖
Held: The procedure in criminal matters is not
incorporated in the Constitution of the States, but is left
in the hands of the legislature, so it that it falls within
the realm of public statutory law.
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The states, as part of police power, have a
large measure of discretion in creating and defining
criminal offenses. It is urged that the right to prosecute
and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty, but by
reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in the
suppression of crimes, such power is delegated to
subordinate government subdivisions such as territories.
The Philippine Legislature by virtue of the Jones Law,
like other territories of the US, has the power to define
and punish crimes. The present government of the
Philippines created by the U.S. Congress is autonomous.
It is within the power of the legislature to prescribe the
form of the criminal complaint as long as the
constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of
the nature of the accusation is not violated.
U.S. v. Pablo
35 Phil 94 (1916)
Facts: Pablo, a policeman, arrested Dato who
was found in a vacant lot where a jueteng game was
conducted. He presented a memorandum to his chief
claiming that he saw Malicsi and Rodrigo leaving the
area. However, during the trial, he changed his
statement and claimed that he did not see Malicsi nor
Rodrigo leaving the area. As a result, the two accused
were acquitted. Pablo was charged with the crime of
perjury and was convicted under Act. No. 1697. It was
claimed that the Act repealed the provisions of the Penal
Code relative to perjury, and the last provision of the
Administrative Code repealed the Act, thus, there is no
penal sanction for the crime of false testimony or
perjury.
Held: Notwithstanding that Act No. 1697 has
been interpreted by this court in its decisions to have
repealed provisions of the Penal Code relating to false
testimony, it did not expressly repeal the pertinent
provisions of the Penal Code. Also, the Administrative
Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, did not
expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code.
Hence, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to
perjury remain in force. The reason behind such
interpretation is that crimes should not go unpunished
or be freely committed without punishment of any kind.
People v. Siton
600 SCRA 476 (2009)
Facts: Siton and Sagarano were charged with Vagrancy
as defined in Article 202 (2) for ―loitering about public or
semi-public buildings or places or trampling or
wandering about the country or the streets without
visible means of support;‖ The accused filed a motion to
quash the information alleging that Article 202(2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
Held: Article 202 (2) is a public order law.
These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards
of decency, morality and civility in human society. These
laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times,
and today, they have also come to be associated with
the struggle to improve the citizens quality of life, which
is guaranteed by our Constitution. Criminally, public
order laws encompass a whole range of acts from public
indecencies and immoralities, to public nuisances, to
disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal
by their offensiveness to societys basic sensibilities and
their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of
society. The dangerous streets must surrender to
orderly society.
It must not be forgotten that police power is
an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined

as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for
the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its
scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals,
and the general welfare.
Quinto v. Andres
453 SCRA 511 (2005)
Facts: Quinto and Garcia were invited by Andres and
Pacheco to fish inside a drainage culvert. Quinto went
inside the drainage system with Pacheco and Andres
while Garcia stayed outside. After a while, the dead
body of Quinto was carried out by Andres. The body of
Quinto was buried without autopsy and no criminal
complaint was filed by the deceased‘s relatives. The NBI
conducted an investigation and found that Quinto
sustained head injuries and the cause of death was
drowning. An information for Homicide was filed against
Andres and Pacheco. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals held that the accused did not commit the
criminal acts complained of.
Issue: Whether or not the accused can still be held
civilly liable despite acquittal in the criminal charge.
Held: Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. The civil liability of such person established
in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused,
and indemnification for consequential damages. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. With the
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the
civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him
from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.
The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution,
reparation or indemnification of the private offended
party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of
the delictual or felonious act of the accused
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action
that the act or omission from where the civil liability
may arise does not exist.
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial
court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the
civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the
petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents
for damages.
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2. LIMITATIONS TO STATE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH
CRIMES
1987 Constitution, Art. III
Sec.1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec.14. No person shall be held to answer for
a criminal offense without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.
Sec.18. No person shall be detained solely by
reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.
Sec.19. Excessive fines shall not be imposed,
nor cruel degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Sec.20. No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Sec.22. No ex post facto law or bill of
attainder shall be enacted.
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 115
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to
the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The
accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial
pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless
his presence is specifically ordered by the court for
purposes of identification. The absence of the accused
without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had
notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be
present thereat. When an accused under custody
escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to
be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody
over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently
appears to the court that he can properly protect his
right without the assistance of counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but
subject to cross-examination on matters covered by
direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a
witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may
utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness
who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable
to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to
cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to
secure the attendance of witnesses and production of
other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the
manner prescribed by law.
Civil Code, Article 2
Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.
Pesigan v. Angeles
129 SCRA 174 (1984)
Facts: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan were
transporting carabaos in the evening of April 2, 1982
from Camarines Sur to Batangas when the carabaos
were confiscated purportedly in accordance with E.O.
No. 626-A, which prohibits transportation of carabao and
carabeef from one province to another.
Held: The E.O. should not be enforced against
the Pesigans because it is a penal regulation (because of
its confiscation and forfeiture provision) and was
published only in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982.
Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be
informed of that provision by means of publication in the
Gazette before violators of the executive order can be
bound thereby. The summary confiscation was not in
order. The carabaos must be returned. However, the
Pesigans cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas
because they are now bound by the said E.O.
Tañada v. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Facts: The petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish or cause the publication of various P.D.‘s, E.O.‘s,
LOI‘s etc. invoking the Constitutional right of the people
to information on matters of public concern.
Held: The publication of all presidential
issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. It is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents. The Court therefore declares that
presidential issuances of general application which have
not been published shall have no force and effect.
However, the implementation of the PDs prior to its
publication is an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
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From the report submitted by the clerk of court, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented by the government.
C. BASIC PRINCIPLES
Criminal law has three main characteristics: 1)
general, 2) territorial, and 3) prospective.
1. GENERALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
Civil Code, Article 14
Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all those who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.
The criminal law of the country governs and applies to
all persons in Philippine Territory, regardless of
nationality, age, gender or other personal
circumstances.
Example: An American who visits the Philippines in order
to kill his Filipina girlfriend because of extreme jealousy
is still liable for murder although he is a foreigner.
General Rule: The jurisdiction of the civil courts is not
affected by the military character of the accused.
 Civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
general court-martial over soldiers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines even in times
of war, provided that in the place of the
commission of the crime no hostilities are in
progress and civil courts are functioning.
 When the military court takes cognizance of
the case involving a person subject to military
law, the Articles of War apply, not the RPC or
other penal laws.
 The prosecution of an accused before a court-
martial is a bar to another prosecution of the
accused for the same offense.
 Offenders accused of war crimes are triable by
military commission. A military commission has
jurisdiction even if actual hostilities have
ceased as long as a technical state of war
continues.
a. Exceptions to the general application of
criminal law
Art. 2, RPC, ―Except as provided in the treaties
or laws of preferential application…‖
Art. 14, Civil Code, ―…subject to the principles
of public international law and to treaty stipulations.‖
i. Treaty Stipulations
An example of a treaty or treaty stipulation is the Bases
Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the US
on March 14, 1947 and expired on Sept. 16, 1991.
Another example would be the VFA signed on Feb. 10,
1998 where the Philippines agreed that:
a. US military authorities shall have the
right to exercise within the Philippines all

criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred
on them by the military law of the US over US
personnel in RP;
b. US authorities exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over US personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating to the
security of the US punishable under the law of
the US, but not under the laws of RP;
c. US military authorities shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over US
personnel subject to the military law of the US
in relation to: (1) offenses solely against the
property or security of the US or offenses
solely against the property or person of US
personnel; and (2) offenses arising out of any
act or omission done in performance of official
duty.
ii. Laws of Preferential Application
Parliamentary Immunity under Section 11, Article
VI of the Constitution- Members of Congress are
immune from arrest for all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment while Congress is in
session.
An example of a law of preferential application would be
R.A. No. 75, which penalizes acts which would impair
the proper observance by the Republic and inhabitants
of the Philippines of the immunities, rights, and
privileges of duly accredited foreign diplomatic
representatives in the Philippines.
R.A. No. 75 exempts from arrest and imprisonment, as
well as from distrain, seizure or attachment of property,
Public Ministers, Ambassadors and Domestic Servants of
Ambassadors and Public Ministers except (a) when such
person is a citizen or an inhabitant of the Philippines and
the writ issued against him is founded upon a debt
contracted before he entered such service; or (b) when
said domestic servant is not registered with the DFA.
Warship Rule – a foreign country‘s warship is
considered an extension of the territory of the country
that it represents. Similar with an embassy, it cannot be
subject to the laws of another country. (Reyes, p. 30)
iii. Principles of Public International
Law
Persons exempt from the operation of our criminal laws
by virtue of the principles of public international law
(1) Sovereigns and other chiefs of state.
(2) Ambassadors, ministers, plenipotentiary,
ministers resident, and charges d‘affaires.
• a consul is not entitled to the privileges
and immunities of an ambassador or
minister (Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63
Phil. 250).
• under the Constitution, members of
Congress are not liable for libel or slander
in connection with any speech delivered
on the floor of the house during regular or
special session.
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U.S. v. Sweet
1 Phil 18 (1901)
Facts: Sweet was an employee of the US army
in the Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of war for
which he was charged with the crime of physical
injuries. Sweet interposed the defense that the fact that
he was an employee of the US military authorities
deprived the court of the jurisdiction to try and punish
him.
Held: The case is open to the application of the
general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before them for trial,
unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary.
Liang v. People
355 SCRA 125
Facts: Petitioner is an economist working at
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against his
colleague. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested by virtue
of a warrant. After fixing petitioner‘s bail, the MeTC
judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
processes under Section 45 of the Agreement between
ADB and the Philippine Government. As a result, the
MeTC judge dismissed the criminal case without notice
to the prosecution.
Held: Petitioner is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of
the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in ―official
capacity.‖ Slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement as the same was
not committed in the performance of petitioner‘s official
duty.
2. TERRITORIALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
1987 Constitution, Article I
The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domain including the
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines.
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as
provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced
not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but
also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a
Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or
currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and

securities issued by the Government of the Philippine
Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees,
should commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against
national security and the law of nations, defined in Title
One of Book Two of this Code.
The RPC has therefore territorial and extraterritorial
application. The maritime zone extends to three miles
from the outermost coastline. Beyond that is the ―high
seas‖ which is outside the territorial waters of the
Philippines.
a. Crimes committed aboard merchant
vessels (RPC, Art. [1])
 The RPC is applied to Philippine vessels if the
crime is committed while the ship is treading:
• Philippine waters (intra-territorial
application), or
• The High Seas (waters NOT under the
jurisdiction of any State)
[extraterritorial application]
 Note: the country of registry determines the
nationality of the vessel, not its ownership.
• Example: a murder committed by a
Filipino seaman aboard a Filipino-
owned vessel registered in China
while it is sailing the high seas is not
cognizable by Philippine Courts, but
the courts of China.
 There are two rules as to jurisdiction over
crimes committed aboard merchant vessels
while in the territorial waters of another
country:
• French Rule – It is the flag or nationality
of the vessel which determines jurisdiction
unless the crime violates the peace and
order of the host country.
• English Rule – The location or situs of
the crime determines jurisdiction unless
the crime merely relates to the internal
management of the vessel.
 The Philippine adheres to the English Rule.
 Disorders which disturb only the peace of the
ship or those on board are to be dealt with
exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of
the ship, but those which disturb the public
peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the
offenders punished by the proper authorities of
the local jurisdiction.
 Smoking opium aboard a foreign vessel in
Philippine waters constitutes a breach of public
order because it causes such drug to produce
its pernicious effects within our territory
(People v. Wong Cheng, G.R. No. L-18924, 19
October 1922).
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 Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board foreign warships
in territorial waters. Warships are always
reputed to be the territory of the country to
which they belong and cannot be subjected to
the laws of another state (U.S. v. Fowler, 1
Phil. 614).
 The Philippines subscribes to the
Absolute Theory of Aerial Jurisdiction
that the subjacent state has complete
jurisdiction only to the innocent passage
by aircraft of a foreign country.
 Under this theory, if the crime is
committed in an aircraft, no matter how
high, as long as it can be established it is
within the Philippine atmosphere,
Philippine criminal law will govern (See:
R.A. No. 6235 or the Anti-Hijacking law).
b. When public officers or employees commit
an offense in the exercise of their
functions. (RPC, Art. [3])
 The Revised Penal Code governs if the crime
(whether or not in relation to the exercise of
public functions) was committed within the
Philippine Embassy or within the embassy
grounds in a foreign country. This is because
embassy grounds are considered an extension
of sovereignty. Thus, the crime is deemed to
have been committed in Philippine soil.
 Illustration: A Philippine consulate official who
is validly married here in the Philippines and
who marries again in a foreign country cannot
be prosecuted here for bigamy because this is
a crime not connected with his official duties.
However, if the second marriage was
celebrated within the Philippine embassy, he
may be prosecuted here since it is as if he
contracted the marriage here in the
Philippines.
c. Commit any of the crimes against national
security and the law of nations, defined in
Title One of Book Two of the Revised
Penal Code. (RPC, Art. [4])
Examples: Piracy, Treason, Espionage.
US v. Bull
15 Phil 7 (1910)
Facts: Norwegian steamship Standard docked in Manila
carrying cattle and other animals. It travelled from
Formosa without providing the animals with adequate
stalls as required by the laws. Instead, the animals were
tied by means of rings passed through their noses
causing the noses of the animals to be cruelly torn.
Some animals were tossed about upon the decks of the
vessel wounded, bruised and killed.
Held: The Philippines has jurisdiction over the offense.
When the vessel came within 3 miles from the coastline
embracing Manila Bay, the vessel is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. It is admitted by the most
thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant
vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a
foreign state they become subject to the local

jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the
country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.). The
Supreme Court of the United States has recently said
that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the
ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject
themselves to the laws which govern the ports they
visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as
in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U.
S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
U.S. v. Ah Sing
36 Phil 978 (1917)
Facts: Defendant is a subject of China who
bought eight cans of opium in Saigon and brought them
on board the steamship Shun Chang during the trip to
Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu,
the authorities in making the search found the 8 cans of
opium. Defendant admitted being the owner but did not
confess as to his purpose in buying the opium.
Held: Bringing opium in local territory even if it
is merely for personal use and does not leave the
foreign merchant vessel anchored in Philippine waters is
subject to local laws particularly under Sec. 4 Act. No.
2381 a.k.a. the Opium Law. Under said law, importation
includes merely bringing the drug from a foreign country
to Philippine port even if not landed.
Miquiabas v. Commanding General
80 Phil 626 (1948)
Facts: Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a
civilian employee of the US army. He has been charged
with disposing in the Port of Manila area things
belonging to the US army. He is under the custody of
Commanding General, Philippines-Ryukus command and
an appointed General Court Martial found him guilty and
sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.
Held: The General Court Martial has no
jurisdiction because the Port of Manila is not a base
under the Bases Agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the US. The Port area is merely a
temporary quarters. Also, a civilian employee cannot be
considered a member of the US Army as stated in the
agreement. Lastly, no waiver of jurisdiction can be made
either by the prosecuting attorney or by the Secretary of
Justice.
People v. Wong Cheng
46 Phil. 729 (1922)
Facts:Wong Cheng smoked opium aboard the English
merchant vessel Changsa while anchored 2 ½ miles
from the shores of Manila. Issue: Whether or not the
Philippines has jurisdiction over the offense
Held: The accused committed the offense within the
territorial waters of the Philippines, hence, the Philippine
Courts had jurisdiction.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular
matter in connection with International Law; to wit,
1. the French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels
should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction
they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory;
and
2. the English rule, based on the territorial
principle and followed in the United States,
according to which, crimes perpetrated under
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such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were
committed.
Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this
matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a
territory of the United States.
Evangelista v. People
G.R. No. 163267, 5 May 2010
Facts: Accused was charged of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms for bringing unlicensed
firearms from Abu Dhabi to the Philippines. He insisted
that since Dubai is outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines, our criminal laws are not applicable.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that in order
for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should have taken place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The
accomplishment by accused of the Customs Declaration
Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is ―very clear
evidence‖ that he was in possession of the subject
firearms when he entered the Philippines. Thus, since he
does not have any license for the firearms which were
proven to be in his possession when he arrived in the
Philippines, accused Evangelista‘s conviction was
affirmed.
3. PROSPECTIVITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
General Rule: Acts or omissions will only be subject to
a penal law if they are committed AFTER a penal law had
already taken effect.
An act or omission which has been committed before the
effectivity of a penal law could not be penalized by such
penal law because penal laws operate only
prospectively.
Art.21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall
be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior
to its commission.
Civil Code, Art. 4
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
Exception:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
Ex-Post Facto Law is prohibited
Ex post facto law is prohibited. Ex post facto law is one
that is specifically made to retroact to cover acts before
it became effective to the prejudice of the accused; or to
make a certain crime graver or prescribe a heavier
penalty for it (The Matter Of The Petition For The
Declaration Of The Petitioner's Rights And Duties Under

Sec. 8 Of R.A. No. 6132, G.R. No. L-32485, 22 October
1970).
 The law does not have any retroactive effect
EXCEPT if it favors the offender unless he is a
habitual delinquent or the law otherwise provides.
 This is consistent with the general principle that
criminal laws, being a limitation on the rights of the
people, should be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Bill of Attainder is prohibited.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial (Montenegro v.
Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882, G.R. No. L-4211). It is
essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative
body (J. Feliciano)
Different effects of repeal of penal law.
1. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the
new law, the new law shall be applied, except
when the offender is a habitual delinquent or
when the new law is made not applicable to
pending action or existing causes of action.
2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the
law in force at the time of the commission of
the offense shall be applied.
3. If the new law totally repeals the existing law
so that the act which was penalized under the
old law is no longer punishable, the crime is
obliterated.
 When the repeal is absolute the offense ceases to
be criminal.
 When the new law and the old law penalize the
same offense, the offender can be tried under the
old law.
 When the repealing law fails to penalize the offense
under the old law, the accused cannot be convicted
under the new law.
 A person erroneously accused and convicted under
a repealed statute may be punished under the
repealing statute.
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons
37 SCRA (1971)
Facts: Petitioners who were serving their
sentence of life imprisonment for the complex crime of
rebellion with murder and other crimes seek the
retroactive application of the Hernandez doctrine which
was promulgated after their conviction. The Hernandez
ruling negated the existence of the crime charged
stating that rebellion cannot be complexed with other
crimes. Thus, the accused in the Hernandez case was
sentenced only to 10 years of imprisonment.
Held: Both the RPC and the Civil Code allow for
the retroactive application of judicial decisions. While
reference in Art. 22 of the Civil Code is made to
legislative acts, it would be merely an exaltation of the
literal to deny its application to a case like the present.
The Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the constitution, as well as legislation,
form part of our legal system.
7
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
In Re: Kay Villegas Kami
35 SCRA 429 (1970)
Facts: Petition for declaratory relief challenging the
validity of Sec. 8 of RA 6132 on the ground that it
violates due process, right of association, freedom of
expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
Held: An ex post facto law is one which:
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act.
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation
of a right for something which when done was
lawful; and
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.
The constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal
laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true
that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A.
No. 6132 including Sec. 8 thereof, the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed after the approval of
the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto.
People v. Bracamonte
257 SCRA 380 (1996)
Facts: On September 23, 1987, Bracamonte and two
others were seen dashing away from the house of the
victims. The mother found her son and their maid dead
inside the house and P1,100 was stolen from them. The
accused were charged with robbery with double
homicide on October 6, 1987. The accused were
convicted of the crime charged in 1990. R.A. 7659
reimposed the death penalty as capital offense in
December 31, 1993.
Held: Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the
death penalty for certain heinous crimes, including
robbery with homicide, the capital punishment could not
be imposed in the case at bench. The crime here was
committed way back in September 23, 1987, while R.A.
No. 7659 took effect only on December 31, 1993. To
impose upon appellant the death penalty would violate
the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new law
imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be applied.
4. Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine Lege
Art. 3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable
by law are felonies (delitos).
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony
shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law
prior to its commission.

 There is no crime when where is no law punishing
it.
 The phrase ―punished by law‖ should be understood
to mean ―punished by the Revised Penal Code‖, and
not by special law.
Bernardo v. People
123 SCRA 365 (1983)
Facts: The accused were charged and
convicted for violating PD No. 772 for possessing and
squatting on a parcel of land owned by Cruz.
Held: Conviction is null and void. PD No. 772
does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble
shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in
urban communities. It is a basic principle of criminal law
that no person should be brought within the terms of a
penal statute who is not clearly within them nor should
any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly
made so by the statute.
People v. Pimentel
288 SCRA 542 (1998)
Facts: Respondent Tujan was charged with
subversion under R.A. No. 1700. When he was arrested
7 years after he was charged, an unlicensed revolver
and ammunition was found in his possession. As such,
he was also charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms
under P.D. No. 1866.
Held: Tujan was not placed in double jeopardy
because the issue had not yet arisen for he had not yet
been actually convicted.
R.A. No. 7636 totally repealed R.A. No. 1700
making subversion no longer a crime. Based on Art. 22
of the RPC, this law should be given retroactive effect
since the law is favorable to the accused, and since he is
not a habitual delinquent. The Court convicted Tujan
with simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
but since Tujan‘s length of detention is greater than the
penalty prescribed, the court ordered his immediate
release.
David v. GMA
489 SCRA 160, 259
Facts: Sometime in February 2006, President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) issued PP 1017, to be
implemented by G.O. No. 5. These laws aim to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government. Pursuant to such laws, GMA
cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation
of their permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily
Tribune was raided by the CIDG, resulting in the
confiscation of its anti-GMA articles and write-ups.
Another anti-GMA news agency was likewise raided on
the same day.
Held: PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it grants
President GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. It is
settled that legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature as stated under Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution. Neither Martial Law, state
of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify the
President‘s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. Thus, PP1017 is void and cannot be enacted.
8
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
Villareal v. People
G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
Facts: Several members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity
were charged of Homicide for the death of their
neophyte Lenny Villa during the initiation rites.
Held: The accused are guilty of slight physical
injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five
accused fraternity members would have all been
convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment). Since there was no law
prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are
constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time
of his death.
5. STRICT CONSTRUCTION of penal laws against
the State
1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 14(2)
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved….
Note: The Doctrine of Pro Reo
 Whenever a penal law is to be construed or
applied and the law admits of two
interpretations – one lenient to the offender
and one strict to the offender- the
interpretation which is lenient or
favorable to the offender will be adopted
(Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales vda. De
Carungcong, v. People, G.R. No. 181409, 11
February 2010).
Constitutional Limitations on the Power of the
Congress to enact Penal Laws:
a. Equal Protection
No person or class of persons shall be deprived
to the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and in
like circumstances. For classification to be reasonable, it
must:
(a) Rest on substantial distinctions;
(b) Germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) Not limited to existing conditions only;
(d) Apply equally to all members of the same class
(Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 183891, 19 October
2011).
b. Due Process
In criminal proceedings, due process requires
that the accused be informed why he is being proceeded
against and what charge he has to meet, with his
conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not
tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut
it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a
valid law. It is assumed, therefore, that the court that
renders the decision is one of competent jurisdiction
(Ang Tibay v. CA, 69 Phil. 635).
c. Non-imposition of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment or Excessive Fines
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress - reasoning by analogy is applied only when
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already similarities are limited and it is admitted that
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua significant differences also exist.
(Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 19).

 The imposition of the penalty of death is Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners

prohibited. Accordingly, R.A. No. 8177 (Act 28 SCRA 344 (1969)
Designating Death by Lethal Injection) is Facts: Pascual was charged in an
repealed. R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) administrative case for immorality and was announced
and all other laws, executive orders and by counsel of complainants to be their first witness.
decrees, insofar as they impose the death Held: The Board of Medical examiners cannot,
penalty, are repealed or amended accordingly consistently with the self-incriminating clause, compel
(Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
―An Act Prohibiting The Imposition of Death without his consent. A proceeding for malpractice
Penalty in The Philippines‖). possesses a criminal or penal aspect in the sense that
the respondent would suffer the revocation of his license
d. Bill of Attainder as a medical practitioner which is even a greater form of
deprivation than forfeiture of property.
A statute becomes a bill of attainder when it applies While crime should not go unpunished and that
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective
members of a group inflicting punishment on them should not be accomplished according to means
amounting to a deprivation of any right, civil or political, offensive to high sense of respect accorded to human
without judicial trial. Stated otherwise, the singling out personality. More and more in line with the democratic
of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and creed, the deference accorded to an individual even
a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due
bill of attainder (Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. weight.
882).
D. GENERAL PROVISIONS
e. Ex Post Facto Law
Art. 1 Time when Act takes effect. This Code shall
An Ex Post Facto Law is one which: take effect on the first day of January, Nineteen
 makes criminal an act done before the passage Hundred and Thirty.
of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act;
 The RPC consists of two books: Book One consists
 aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
of 1) basic principles affecting criminal liability and
was, when committed;
2) the provisions on penalties including criminal and
 changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
civil liability; Book Two defines felonies with the
punishment than the law annexed to the crime
corresponding penalties.
when committed;
 alters the legal rules of evidence, and
 Two theories in criminal law
authorizes conviction upon less or different
 CLASSICAL
testimony than the law required at the time of
 POSITIVIST
the commission of the offense;
 assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
 The RPC is based mainly on principles of old or
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation
classical school.
of a right for something which when done was
lawful; and
Characteristics of the classical theory
 deprives a person accused of a crime of some
a. The basis of criminal liability is human free will
lawful protection to which he has become
and the purpose of the penalty is retribution.
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
b. That man is essentially a moral creature with
amnesty disadvantage (In Re Kay Villegas
an absolutely free will to choose between good
Kami, Inc., G.R. No. L-32485, 22 October
and evil thereby placing more stress upon the
1970).
effect or result of the felonious act than upon
the man, the criminal himself.
Rules of Construction of Penal Laws
1. Criminal statutes are liberally construed in favor
c. It has endeavored to establish a mechanical
of the offender. This means that no person shall
and direct proportion between crime and
be brought within their terms of the law who is
penalty.
not clearly within them, nor should any act be
pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so
d. There is a scant regard to the human element.
by statute.
2. The original text in which a penal law is approved
Characteristics of the positivist theory
will govern in case of a conflict with an official
a. That man is subdued occasionally by a strange
translation. Hence, the RPC, which was approved
and morbid phenomenon which constrains him
in Spanish text, is controlling over its English
to do wrong, in spite of or contrary to his
translation.
volition.
3. Interpretation by analogy has no place in criminal
matters.

9

b. That crime is essentially a social and natural
phenomenon, and as such, it cannot be treated
and checked by the application of abstract
principles of law and jurisprudence nor by the
imposition of a punishment which is fixed and
determined a priori; but rather through the
enforcement of individual measures in each
particular case after a thorough, personal and
individual investigation conducted by a
competent body of psychiatrists and social
scientists.
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as
provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced
not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but
also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a
Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or
currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and
securities issued by the Government of the Philippine
Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees,
should commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or
5. Should commit any of the Crimes Against
National Security and the Law of Nations, defined in Title
One of Book Two of this Code.
II. FELONIES
Art. 3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable
by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of
deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by the
Revised Penal Code.
Felony v. Offense
Felony Offense
The term felony is limited A crime punished under a
only to violations of the special law is called a
Revised Penal Code. statutory offense
Misdemeanor v. Crime
Misdemeanor Crime
A misdemeanor is minor Whether the wrongdoing
infraction of the law, such is punished under the
as a violation of an Revised Penal Code or
ordinance under a special law, the
generic word ―crime‖ can
be used.
10
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
Elements of Felonies
1. There must be an act or omission;
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by
the RPC; and
3. That the act is performed by means of dolo or the
omission incurred by means of culpa.
Definition of terms
 ACT – must be overt or external (mere
criminal thought or intent is not punishable)
Actus Reus/Physical Act
 To be considered as a felony, there must
be an act or omission;
 An act refers to any kind of body
movement that produces change in
the outside world.
 A mere imagination, no matter how
wrong, does not amount to a felony.
 OMISSION – failure to perform a duty
required by law, ie. failure to render
assistance, failure to issue receipt, non-
disclosure of knowledge of conspiracy against
the government.
A. HOW COMMITTED
Classification of felonies according to the means by
which they are committed (IN GENERAL ONLY)
1. Dolo.
2. Culpa.
1. DOLO
Requisites of dolo or malice
1. freedom – that the act or omission was
voluntary and without external
compulsion.
2. intelligence – knowledge needed to
determine the morality and consequences
of an act. The imbecile, insane and minors
have no criminal liability.
3. intent – intent to commit the act with
malice, being purely a mental process, is
presumed and the presumption arises
from the proof of the commission of the
unlawful act (Reyes, pp. 38-39).
 The offender, in performing the act or incurring
the omission, has the intention to cause an
injury to another.
 The word ―deceit‖ in par. 2 of Art. 3 is not the
proper translation of the word ―dolo‖. Dolus is
actually equivalent to malice, which is the
intent to do an injury to another (Reyes, p.
35).
 Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom
and the use of intelligence (Reyes, supra.).
 The existence of intent is shown by the overt
acts of a person (Reyes, supra.).
 Criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of an unlawful act BUT the
presumption of criminal intent does not arise
from the proof of the commission of an act
which is not unlawful.

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
―the act itself does not make a man guilty
unless his intention were so‖
A crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of be
innocent.
It must be borne in mind that the act from
which the presumption of existence of criminal
intent springs must be a criminal act.
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus
―an act done by me against my will is not my
act‖ (U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 499)
Presumption of Criminal Intent
Criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act BUT the presumption of criminal intent does
not arise from the proof of the commission of an act,
which is not unlawful (Reyes, supra.).
INTENT V. MOTIVE
INTENT is the purpose to use a particular
means to effect such result.
 There is no felony by dolo if there is no intent.
MOTIVE is the moving power which impels
one to action for a define result.
 Motive is not an essential element of a crime,
and, hence need not be proved for purposes of
conviction. (People v. Aposaga, G.R. No. L-
32477, 30 October 1981).
 Motive is essential only when there is doubt as
to the identity of the assailant. It is immaterial
when the accused has been positively
identified. (People v. Gadiana, G.R. No. 92509,
13 March 1991).
 Proof of motive alone is not sufficient to
support a conviction but lack of motive may be
an aid in showing the innocence of the
accused. (People v. Corput, 107 Phil 44, 49)
People v. Temblor
161 SCRA 623 (1988)
Facts: Cagampang and his wife were
conversing in the store adjacent to their house when
Temblor arrived and asked to buy cigarettes. Temblor
then shot Cagampang and demanded the wife to bring
out her husband‘s firearm. Months after, the wife was
summoned to the police station and there she identified
the accused. The accused‘s defense was alibi and lack of
motive.
Held: The knowledge of the accused that
Cagampang possessed a firearm was enough motive to
kill him as killings were perpetrated by members of the
NPA for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and
ammunition. Their group is prevalent not only in Agusan
del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as
the NPA‘s ―agaw armas‖ campaign. Moreover, proof of
motive is not essential when the culprit has been
positively identified.
11
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
People v. Hassan
157 SCRA 261 (1988)
Facts: The accused, an illiterate, 15-year-old
pushcart cargador, was convicted of the crime of murder
for the death of Ramon. The lone eyewitness claimed he
saw the accused stab Ramon only once at the back. He
identified the accused alone at the funeral parlor without
being placed in a police line-up.
Held: The testimony of witness was weak. It
conflicted with the findings of the medico-legal officer
who identified 2 stab wounds which were inflicted while
assailant was in front of the victim. The manner by
which the witness was made to identify the accused was
pointedly suggestive and activated visual imagination
when there was none. The method of identification
became just a confrontation and was made in violation
of the constitutional right of the accused.
The court noted the total absence of motive
ascribed to the accused for stabbing Ramon who is a
complete stranger to him. While as a general rule,
motive is not essential for purposes of complying with
the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem
from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive
on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards
his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt
as to the identity of the culprit as when the identification
is extremely tenuous as in this case.
People v. Delos Santos
403 SCRA 153 (2003)
Facts: Delos Santos stabbed Flores with a
kitchen knife hitting him on the different parts of his
body, inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly
caused his death. Delos Santos then argues that since
the prosecution witnesses testified that there was no
altercation between him and Flores, it follows that no
motive to kill can be attributed to him.
Held: The court held that the argument of
Delos Santos is inconsequential. Proof of motive is not
indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the
accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his
participation is adequately established. In People vs.
Galano, the court ruled that in the crime of murder,
motive is not an element of the offense. It becomes
material only when the evidence is circumstantial or
inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the
accused had committed it. In this case, the court finds
that no such doubt exist as witnesses De Leon and
Tablate positively identified Delos Santos.
Valenzuela v. People
525 SCRA 306 (2007)
Facts: A grocery boy was caught trying to
abscond a box of Tide Ultrabar laundry soap from the
Super Sale Club. The guards apprehended him at the
store parking lot while trying to board a taxi. He claimed
the theft was merely frustrated for he was not able to
dispose of the goods.
Held: The determination of whether a crime is frustrated
or consummated necessitates an initial concession that
all of the acts of execution have been performed by the
offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the
felony itself was actually produced by the acts of
execution. The determination of whether the felony was
produced after all the acts of execution had been
performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of
the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally
furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised
Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel the

particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying
criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea supplies an important characteristic of a
crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime, and accordingly,
there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in
crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as
a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent, and essential for criminal liability. It follows that
the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be
able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and
indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held
that a criminal law that contains no mens
rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected
rights. The criminal statute must also provide for the
overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist
in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be
shown; there must also be an actus reus.
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find
expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is
produced. In this case, the crime of theft is
consummated when the act unlawful taking was
performed regardless whether the perpetrator had the
capacity or opportunity to dispose the stolen goods.
There is no frustrated theft.
Recuerdo v. People
493 SCRA 517 (2006)
Facts: Recuerdo issued several checks to Floro. She did
not pay the amounts due from the closed accounts. In
her defense, the accused claims good faith in issuing the
checks.
Held: Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (with
malice). For one to be criminally liable for estafa under
paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, malice and specific intent to defraud are required.
General criminal intent is an element of all
crimes but malice is properly applied only to deliberate
acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must
unite with an unlawful act for there to be a felony. A
deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a presumption
of malice by intent. On the other hand, specific intent is
a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some
particular thing.
The general criminal intent is presumed from
the criminal act and in the absence of any general intent
is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be
proved by the accused.Generally, a specific intent is not
presumed. Its existence, as a matter of fact, must be
proved by the State just as any other essential
element. This may be shown, however, by the nature of
the act, the circumstances under which it was
committed, the means employed and the motive of the
accused
There can be no estafa if the accused acted in
good faith because good faith negates malice and deceit.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no
technical meaning or statutory definition, and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud
or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual‘s
personal good faith is a concept of his own mind,
therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought
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to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith
lies in an honest belief in the validity of one‘s right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention
to overreach another.
In this case, the accused had the intention to
evade the payment by claiming that the checks were not
issued as payment for the jewelries issued to her.
Therefore, there was intent to defraud the victim.
People v. Delim
396 SCRA 386 (2003)
Facts: One evening, as Modesto and his family was
preparing to have dinner, the Delim brothers forcefully
entered the house and hogtied Modesto and took him
outside the house. Two other Delims remained in the
house preventing Modesto‘s wife and child from asking
for help. It was only the next day that the attackers left.
The dead body of Modesto was found three days after
the incident. He sustained several stab wounds and his
cause of death was due to a gunshot to the head.
Held: The prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus
delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act
and second, defendant‘s agency in the commission of
the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two
things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder
cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the
death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death
was produced by the criminal act of some other than the
deceased and was not the result of accident, natural
cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the
criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible
for the act which produced the death. To prove the
felony of homicide or murder, there must be
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that
the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other
words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the
killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus
delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove by
circumstantial evidence that the accused killed the
victim. The accused were convicted of homicide since
the circumstances which would have qualified the crime
into murder were not alleged in the information.
People v. Glenn De Los Santos
355 SCRA 415 (2001)
Facts: Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends
went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf truck. On their way,
they decided to pass by a restaurant where Glenn had 3
bottles of beer. From Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City,
Glenn‘s truck hit, bumped, seriously wounded and
claimed the lives of several members of the PNP who
were undergoing an endurance run on a highway
wearing black shirts and shorts and green combat
shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on the spot, 12 were
seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10
sustained minor injuries. At the time of the occurrence,
the place of the incident was very dark as there was no
moon. Neither were there lamposts that illuminated the
highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex

crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder
and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor
vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.
Held: We are convinced that the incident, tragic though
it was in light of the number of persons killed and
seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional
felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of
evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the
police trainees that would drive him into deliberately
hitting them with intent to kill.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a
conviction especially where the assailant is positively
identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in
determining which of two conflicting theories of the
incident is more likely to be true
Neither is there any showing of a political angle of
a leftist-sponsored massacre of police elements
disguised in a vehicular accident. Even if there be such
evidence, i.e., that the motive of the killing was in
furtherance of a rebellion movement, GLENN cannot be
convicted because if such were the case, the proper
charge would be rebellion, and not murder.
GLENNs offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or
to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the
moment he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had
he done so, many trainees would have been spared. He
committed the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries.
MISTAKE OF FACT
It is a misapprehension of fact on the part of
the person who caused injury to another. He is not,
however, criminally liable, because he did not act with
criminal intent. (Reyes, p. 42).
Requisites:
1. That the act done would have been lawful
had the facts been as the accused
believed them to be.
2. That the intention of the accused in
performing the act should be lawful
3. That the mistake must be without fault or
carelessness on the part of the accused.
(Reyes, p. 43).
U.S. v. Ah Chong
15 Phil 488 (1910)
A houseboy who stabs his roommate in the
dark, honestly mistaking the latter to be a robber
responsible for a series of break-ins in the area, and
after crying out sufficient warnings and believing himself
to be under attack, cannot be held criminally liable for
homicide. Stabbing the victim whom the accused
believed to be an intruder showed a mistake of fact on
his part which led him to take the facts as they appear
to him and was pressed to take immediate action.
People v. Oanis
74 Phil 257 (1988)
Police officers who shot a sleeping man in the
back mistaking him for a notorious escaped convict
wanted dead or alive, could still be held liable for the
killing since they did not take reasonable precautionary
measures. Police officers are still liable because they are
not justified in killing a man whose identity they did not
ascertain. The third requisite of mistake of fact is
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lacking. In this case, self-defense is not tenable as a
defense as there was no unlawful aggression but they
may avail of the defense of fulfillment of duty as a
mitigating circumstance.
 Criminal intent is replaced by negligence and
imprudence in felonies committed by means of
culpa.
MISTAKE OF LAW
People v. Bitdu
G.R. No. L-38230, November 21, 1933
Facts: Bitdu was married in accordance with
Mohammedan rites while her first marriage was still
subsisting. She was charged and convicted of bigamy. In
her defense, she claims that she already obtained a
divorce decree in accordance with the Muslim law,
therefore, she contracted her second marriage in good
faith.
Held: It seems to us unnecessary to determine whether
or not the divorce in question was granted in accordance
with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to which
there seems to exist considerable uncertainty, because
in our view of the case a valid divorce can be granted
only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act
No. 2710. It is not claimed that the appellant was
divorced from her first husband in accordance with said
Act.
With respect to the contention that the appellant acted
in good faith in contracting second marriage, believing
that she had been validly divorced from her first
husband, it is sufficient to say that every one is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does
not know that is act constitutes a violation of the law
does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
As to the suggestion of the Solicitor-General that
divorces among the Moros according to their religious
practices should be recognized as valid as a matter of
public policy, because in the contrary case, "there would
be no end of criminal prosecutions, for polygamy still
abounds among them, and the remarriages of people
divorced under the Koran are the order of the day," that
is a matter for the consideration of the Legislature and
the Governor-General.
In Re: Petition to sign in the roll of Attorneys
Michael M. Medado
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
Facts: Medado graduated from UP College of Law in
1979. He passed the bar exams and took the Attorney‘s
Oath in 1980. He practiced law for 30 years before he
learned that he only signed the attendance sheet and he
has not actually signed the Roll of Attorneys. He now
appeals to sign the roll of attorneys.
Held: While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because
everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences. Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
In this case, Medado was allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys a year after the resolution of the case. He was
fined for unauthorized practice of law and was barred
from practicing the profession for one year.

2. CULPA
RPC, Art. 365 par. 7
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily,
but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be the cause is not immediate nor the
danger clearly manifest.
Requisites of culpa:
1. freedom
2. intelligence
3. imprudence, negligence or lack of
foresight and lack of skill
 In culpable felonies, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the incident
of another act performed without malice. (Reyes, p.
49).
 an act performed without malice but at the same
time punishable though in a lesser degree and with
an equal result
 imprudence - lack of precaution to avoid
injury, usually involves lack of skill
 negligence - failure to foresee impending
danger, usually involves lack of foresight
People v. Buan
22 SCRA 1383 (1968)
Facts: The accused was driving a passenger
bus. Allegedly because of his recklessness, the bus
collided with a jeep injuring the passengers of the latter.
A case was filed against the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence for which he was
tried and acquitted. Prior to his acquittal, a case for
serious physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence was filed. Accused claimed
that he was placed in twice in jeopardy.
Held: The second case must be dismissed.
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again
for the same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense
under Art. 365 of the RPC lies in the execution of an
imprudent act which would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes the negligent act and not the result.
The gravity of the consequences is only taken into
account to determine the penalty. It does not qualify the
substance of the offense.
People v. Pugay
167 SCRA 439
Facts: Miranda and the accused Pugay are
friends. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta
was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime
after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started
making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun
of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its
contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told
Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on
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fire making a human torch out of him. They were
arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the
incident gave their written statements.
Held: Having taken the can from under the
engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring
its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused
knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell
of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his
notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed
to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may
be committed by his companions who at the time were
making fun of the deceased. Thus, he is guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence.
Villareal v. People
G.R. No. 151258, 1 February 2012
Facts: The Court was asked to revisit our
Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing.
Held: The Court is constrained to rule against
the trial court‘s finding of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent to inflict physical injuries x x x. The absence of
malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,
that the accused fraternity members are ultimately
devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(N.B. This ruling shall be interpreted without prejudice
to the applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent
cases.)
B. CRIMES DEFINED AND PENALIZED BY
SPECIAL LAWS
There are 3 classes of crimes. The RPC defines and
penalizes the first two classes: 1) intentional and 2)
culpable felonies.
The third class of crimes is those defined and penalized
by special laws, which include crimes punished by
municipal or city ordinances.
 The provisions of this Code are not applicable
to offenses punished by special laws especially
those relating to the requisite of criminal
intent; the stages of commission; and the
application of penalties.
 However, when the special law is silent, the
Code can be given suppletory effect.
 Dolo is not required in crimes punished by
special laws because these crimes are mala
prohibita.
 In those crimes punished by special laws, the
act alone, irrespective of motive, constitutes
the offense.
 Good faith and absence of criminal intent are
not valid defenses in crimes punished by
special laws.

1. MALA IN SE and MALA PROHIBITA
Mala in se - an act, by its very nature, is
inherently and morally wrong; it is committed with
criminal intent.
Malum prohibitum – an act is wrong only
because there is a law punishing it. It is enough that the
prohibited act was voluntarily committed and need not
be committed with malice or criminal intent to be
punishable.
 Note, however, that not all violations of special
laws are mala prohibita. While intentional
felonies are always mala in se, it does not
follow that prohibited acts done in violation of
special laws are always mala prohibita. Even if
the crime is punished under a special law, if
the act punished is one which is inherently
wrong, the same is malum in se, and
therefore, good faith and the lack of criminal
intent is a valid defense; unless it is the
product of criminal negligence or culpa
(Arsenia Garcia v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No.157161, 14 March 2006).
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
369 SCRA 394 (2001)
Facts: Estrada is challenging the plunder law.
One of the issues he raised is whether plunder is a
malum prohibitum or malum in se.
Held: Plunder is a malum in se which requires
proof of criminal of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that
the crime of plunder was committed ―willfully, unlawfully
and criminally.‖ It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
part of the petitioner.
US v. Go Chico
14 Phil. 128 (1909)
Facts: Go Chico displayed in the window of his store
medallions with the head of Aguinaldo, the flag and the
banner of the insurrection. He was charged of violation
of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 which punishes any person
who displays, exposes to public view any material or
symbol of the Revolution. In his defense, Go Chico
claims that he did not intend to violate the law and that
he did not display such objects were not actually used in
the insurrection.
Held: It is not necessary that the appellant should have
acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made
such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person
who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is
necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent
influence would be substantially worthless. It would be
impossible of execution. In many cases the act
complained of is itself that which produces the
pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In
those cases the pernicious effect is produced with
precisely the same force and result whether the
intention of the person performing the act is good or
bad.
The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within
a recent period, by the enemies of the Government
tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and
insurrection against governmental authority just as
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effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made
with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without
the intervention of any other factor, is the evil.
People v. Dela Rosa
G.R. No. 84857, January 16, 1988
Facts:Dela Rosa and others were recruited by the New
People‘s Army. Before they could execute their attack,
they killed the rebel commander and surrendered to the
authorities. After they talked to the barangay chairman
and the mayor, the police charged them with illegal
possession of firearms.
Held: While mere possession is malum prohibitum, there
must be animus possidendi on the part of the accused.
In this case, Dela Rosa intended to surrender to the
authorities. Temporary, incidental, casual or harmless
possession is not punishable.
2. RELATION OF RPC TO SPECIAL LAWS
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
Padilla v. Dizon
158 SCRA 127 (1988)
Facts: Padilla filed an administrative complaint
against RTC Judge Dizon for rendering a manifestly
erroneous decision acquitting Lo Chi Fai of the offense
charged for smuggling foreign currency out of the
country in violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
The Circular prohibits transmission of foreign currency
out of the Philippines without authorization from the
Central Bank. Penal sanction for such violation is
provided in PD No. 1883. Judge Dizon then acquitted
accused because of lack of intent to violate and benefit
from the act alone.
Held: Judge showed gross ignorance of the
law. He ought to know that proof of malice or mens rea
is not essential in offense punished by special laws
which are mala prohibita. The judge did not take into
consideration the admission of the accused that he was
a ―carrier‖ of foreign currency for other people but chose
to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that
he and his alleged business associate were using the
money for a particular investment.
Padilla v. CA
269 SCRA 402 (1997)
Facts: Padilla, driving his Pajero at high speed
despite the bad weather, hit a balot vendor. A chase
took place and eventually, Padilla‘s vehicle was stopped.
He was arrested and several firearms were found inside
his vehicle. He admitted possession claiming he used
them for shooting but was not able to produce any
permit to carry.
Held: P.D. No. 1886 provides only 2 requisites
to establish crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm: (1) existence of subject firearm and (2) the fact
that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding permit to possess.
Either the testimony of a representative of or a
certification from the PNP Firearms and explosives office
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession.

PD 1866 is constitutional. To justify
nullification, there must be a clear breach of the
constitution. The contention that the penalty of simple
illegal possession is cruel and excessive in contravention
of the constitution does not merit serious consideration.
The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the
same cruel and excessive.
The court cited the People v. Simon doctrine as
to the penalties to be imposed although PD 1866 is a
special law, the penalties therein were taken from the
RPC, hence, the rules in the said code for graduating by
degrees or determining the proper period should be
applied.
People v. Saley
291 SCRA 715 (1998)
Facts: Saley was convicted of 16 cases of
illegal recruitment, one of which was on the large scale.
She was also convicted of 11 counts of estafa. She
claims that she was not engaged in recruitment but is
merely acting as an agent. She also claimed that she
was merely aiding the processing of the complainant‘s
visas.
Held: Saley is guilty of illegal recruitment and
estafa. She has no valid license or authority to engage in
placement of workers. There is no double jeopardy in
this case. Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal
recruitment is malum prohibita while estafa under the
RPC is malum in se.
People v. Simon
234 SCRA 555 (1994)
Facts: The accused was arrested after a buy-
bust operation conducted by the police wherein the
accused sold 2 tea-bags of marijuana to a poseur buyer
for P40.
Held: To sustain a conviction for selling
prohibited drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, the sale must be clearly established. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction.
The court held that in the instant case the
imposable penalty under R.A. No. 6425 as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 is prison correccional to be taken from the
medium period thereof pursuant to Art. 64 of the RPC,
there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance.
Dissent: It is thus clear that an offense is
punished by the RPC if both its definition and the
penalty therefore are found in the special law. That the
latter imports or borrows from the RPC its nomenclature
of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a
penalty found in the RPC can by no means make an
offense thereunder an offense ―punished or punishable‖
by the RPC.
Ladonga v People
451 SCRA 673 (2005)
Facts: Spouses Ladonga were convicted by the
RTC for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (3 counts). The husband
applied for probation while the wife appealed arguing
that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for
conspiring with her husband as the principle of
conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a
special law.
Held: B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly prescribe
the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC.
Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg.
22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
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suppletorily. The court cited the case of Yu vs. People,
where the provision on subsidiary imprisonment under
Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 was applied
suppletorily.
The suppletory application of the principle of
conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of
the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. v.
Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
The Court in this case however ruled in favor of
Ladonga(wife) as the prosecution failed to prove that
she performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy.
People v. Bustinera
431 SCRA 284 (2004)
Facts: Bustinera was convicted by the trial
Court for qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code for the unlawful taking of the taxi cab driven
by him which is owned and operated by Cipriano and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Held: The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is
now covered by the anti-carnapping law (R.A. No. 6539)
and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
The trial court having convicted Bustinera of qualified
theft instead of carnapping, erred in the imposition of
the penalty. While the information alleges that the crime
was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same
cannot be appreciated as the suppletory effect of the
Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is
a legal impossibility of application, either by express
provision or by necessary implication.
Moreover, when the penalties under the special
law are different from and are without reference or
relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there
can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the
application of penalties under the said Code or by other
relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable
only to said rules for felonies under the Code.
The court cited the case of People v. Panida
which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty
imposed was the indeterminate sentence of 14 years
and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months,
as maximum, this Court did not apply the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-
carnapping law provides for its own penalties which are
distinct and without reference to the said Code.
Bustinera was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 14 years and 8 months as minimum, to 17
years and 4 months, as maximum for the crime of
carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as amended.
Teves v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 180636, April 28, 2009
Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for Representative of
the 3rd legislative district of Negros. During his tenure as
a Mayor, he was convicted of violating the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and the Local Government
Code for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit. A case for disqualification was filed against him
alleging that the violation he committed was a crime of
moral turpitude.

Held: "It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in
itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law
or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act
itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act
itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include
such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the
local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our
culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish
occupation. While it is a form of gambling, the morality
thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable
issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
it was held that: The morality of gambling is not a
justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it
is generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter,
even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit
some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient.
Brion, J., concurring
The most common definition of moral turpitude is similar
to one found in the early editions of Black‘s Law
Dictionary:
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in
private and social duties which man owes to his fellow
man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and
man. xxx Act or behavior that gravely violates moral
sentiment or accepted moral standards of community
and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in
some criminal offenses as distinguished from others. xxx
The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of
the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished
from statutory mala prohibita.
The Approaches Applied to TEVES
The Objective Approach
The crime for which petitioner Teves was convicted
(possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit) is, at its core, related to gambling – an act that
by contemporary community standards is not per se
immoral. Other than the ruling heretofore cited on this
point, judicial notice can be taken of state-sponsored
gambling activities in the country that, although not
without controversy, is generally regarded to be within
acceptable moral limits. The ponencia correctly noted
that prior to the enactment of the Local Government
Code of 1991, mere possession by a public officer of
pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not expressly
prohibited. This bit of history alone is an indicator that,
objectively, no essential depravity is involved even from
the standards of a holder of a public office. This
reasoning led the ponencia to conclude that "its illegality
does not mean that violation thereof . . . makes such
possession of interest inherently immoral."
From the Perspective of the Elements of the Crime
Under this approach, we determine whether a crime
involves moral turpitude based solely on our analysis of
the elements of the crime alone.
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The essential elements of the offense of possession of
prohibited interest (Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law)
for which the petitioner was convicted are:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest
by the Constitution or any law.
From the perspective of moral turpitude, the third
element is the critical element. This element shows that
the holding of interest that the law covers is not a
conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right
and duty, justice, honesty and good morals; it is illegal
solely because of the prohibition that exists in law or in
the Constitution. Thus, no depravity immediately leaps
up or suggests itself based on the elements of the crime
committed.
The Subjective Approach
This approach is largely the ponencia‘s approach, as it
expressly stated that "a determination of all surrounding
circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered." In doing this, the ponencia firstly
considered that the petitioner did not use his official
capacity in connection with the interest in the cockpit,
not that he hid this interest by transferring it to his wife,
as the transfer took effect before the effectivity of the
law prohibiting the possession of interest. The ponencia
significantly noted, too, that the violation was not
intentionally committed in a manner contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals, but due simply to Teves‘ lack
of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition. This, in my
view, is the clinching argument that no moral turpitude
can be involved as no depravity can be gleaned where
intent is clearly absent.
C. PUNISHABLE CONDUCT
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.
1. WRONGFUL ACT DIFFERENT FROM THAT
INTENDED
 One who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may naturally
and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not.
 Rationale: el que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado
―He who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused‖
 When a person has not committed a felony,
he is not criminally liable for the result which is not
intended.

People v. Mananquil
132 SCRA 196 (1984)
Facts: One evening, Valentina went to NAWASA where
her husband works as a security guard. She accuses her
husband of keeping a mistress and burning her clothes.
She got into an argument with her husband before she
poured gasoline on him and set him on fire. Her
husband died as a result. She was charged with
Parricide. In her defense, she claims that the real cause
of death was her husband‘s pneumonia and that the
burns were only secondary causes of death.
Held:
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. — Criminal
liability shall be incurred.
1. By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he
intended.
The essential requisites of which are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender
One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of
homicide if the injury contributes immediately or
immediately to the death of such other. The fact that
other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the
actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if
the deceased might litem recovered if he had taken
proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical
operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment
aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or
that death was men." caused by a surgical operation
rendered necessary by the condition of the wound.
The principle on which this rule is founded is one of
universal application. It lies at the foundation of criminal
jurisprudence. It is that every person is held to
contemplate and be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts. A different doctrine would
tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
human life a salutary and essential safeguard.
People v. Toling
62 SCRA 17 (1975)
Facts: The Toling brothers suddenly started stabbing
their co-passengers in a train going to Bicol. Several
passengers died of stab wounds from the brothers. Four
persons were found dead near the railroad tracks.
Apparently they jumped off the train to avoid being
killed.
Held: Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended". The
presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131,
Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind
an immediate sense of danger which causes such person
to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the
person who creates such a state of mind is responsible
for the injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T.
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Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911,
500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against
whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes
himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm
and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by
the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is
responsible for homicide in case death results by
drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People
vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping
from the train of the four victims already named
precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the
appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The felony committed must be the proximate
cause of the resulting injury.
PROXIMATE CAUSE – the cause, which, in
the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
 When death is presumed to be the natural
consequence of physical injuries inflicted:
1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries
were inflicted was in normal health.
2. That the death may be expected from the
physical injuries inflicted.
3. That death ensued within a reasonable time.
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the
resulting injury when:
a. There is an active force that intervened
between the felony committed and the resulting injury,
and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely
foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
b. The resulting injury is due to the intentional
act of the victim.
 The causes which may produce a result different from
that which the offender intended are:
a. ERROR IN PERSONAE – mistake in the
identity of the victim; injuring one person
mistaken for another (this is a complex crime
under Art. 49)
b. ABERRATIO ICTUS – mistake in the blow,
that is, when the offender intending to do an
injury to one person actually inflicts it on
another; and
c. PRAETER INTENTIONEM – the act exceeds
the intent, that is, the injurious result is
greater than that intended.
Proximate Cause
Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina
102 Phil. 181 (1957)
Facts: A bus travelling from Cavite to Pasay overturned
to the side of the highway because its front tire burst.
Three of the passengers were stuck behind the driver
seat. During this time, oil spilled out of the bus. The
people living near the area responded to the calls for
help. They carried torches because it was dark as it was
already past midnight. Unfortunately, the bus was set
ablaze because the torches ignited the gasoline which
leaked and spread around the bus. The bus company
claims that the proximate cause of the death of the

victims was the torch which triggered the fire and not
their negligence.
Held: A definition of proximate cause is found in Volume
38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by
plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.' And more comprehensively,
'the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as
a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result
therefrom.
In this case, the proximate cause of the death is the
carrier‘s negligence in transporting their passengers. The
tires of the bus were not replaced and during the
incident, the driver and the conductor did not do
anything to prevent the people with the torches from
approaching the overturned bus.
People v. Iligan
G.R. No. 75369, November 26, 1990
Facts: Before the incident, Quinones and two others got
into an altercation with Ilagan. They were able to run
away from Ilagan. Later on, while the three were
walking to Quinones‘ house, Ilagan suddenly emerged
and hacked Quinones in the head with a bolo. The blow
caused Quinones to fall on the highway where he was
ran over by a vehicle causing his death.
Held: Under these circumstances, we hold that while
Iligan‘s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.‘s head might not have
been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the
latter‘s death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom." In other words, the sequence of
events from Iligan‘s assault on him to the time
Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering
the very short span of time between them, one
unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events,
Iligan cannot escape liability.
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Efficient Intervening Cause
Urbano v. IAC
157 SCRA 1 (1998)
Facts: One morning, Urbano found his palay flooded.
Javier admitted to opening the irrigation canal which
angered Urbano. This led to a heated argument which
ended with Urbano hitting Javier on the palm with a
bolo. The wound was treated but Javier died a month
later due to tetanus.
Held: The proximate cause of the death of Marcelo
Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario
Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier
got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with
his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements
like tetanus germs.
The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Error in Personae (mistake in identity)
People v. Oanis
G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943
Facts: Police Officer Oanis and other officers were
instructed to arrest Balagtas, an escaped convict. On the
day of the operation, the police officers were given tips
on where to find the convict. When they arrived at a
house where Balagtas was believed to be at, Oanis and
Galanta saw a man sleeping with his back towards the
door. They shot simultaneously or successively at him
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. As it was found
later, the man killed was an innocent citizen named
Tecson. In their defense, the accused claims that there
was a mistake in identity.
Held: The crime committed by appellants is not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. A
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence, and
where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered
as reckless imprudence to support a plea of mitigated
liability. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the
crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia.
People v. Gona
54 Phil. 605 (1930)
Facts: A celebration with liberal supply of alcohol was
taking place at a house. The Gona and Dunca got into a
quarrel. Later on, Dunca left the house with several
people. Gona took a bolo and followed the group with
the intent to kill Dunca. He hacked someone in the neck
which caused the person‘s death. It turns out that the
person hacked was Mapudul. Gona‘s defense was that
there was error in personae as he really intended to kill
Dunca and not Mapundul.
Held:Mistake in killing one man instead of another
cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance when it
is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully.

Aberratio Ictus (Miscarriage in the blow)
People v. Sabalones
294 SCRA 751 (1988)
Facts: Two vehicles proceeded to the house of
Stephen Lim when Sabalones et. al. fired towards the
vehicles killing 2 of the passengers and seriously injuring
3 others. The lower court convicted the accused.
Appellants accuse the trial court of engaging in
conjecture in ruling that there was aberratio ictus in this
case.
Held: The allegation does not advance the
cause of the appellants. It must be stressed that the
trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to
explain why the appellants staged the ambush, not to
prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. In
any event, the lower court was not engaging in
conjecture because the conclusion that the appellants
killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial
statement of appellant Beronga and the testimony of
one witness. Nonetheless, the fact that they were
mistaken does not diminish their culpability. Mistake in
the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as
when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.
People v. Esteban
103 SCRA 520 (1981)
Facts: Earlier in the day, Maravilla and Lulu went to the
house of Camaya to collect the balance from a
compromise agreement in the killing of Lulu‘s husband.
Camaya said that Esteban would pay the balance. Later
that evening, Maravilla went to the house of Maria
Pascua where there was a drinking session. At around
11 in the evening, gunshots were fired at Maravilla and
his companions. The owner of the house Maria was
found dead while Maravilla was fatally wounded but
survived due to timely medical intervention.
Held: The fact that Esteban intended to kill Maravilla and
in the course of the assault incidentally killed Maria
Pascua makes him liable for murder just the same
because a person committing a felony is criminally liable
although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended (Art. 4, Revised, Penal Code). This
rule covers aberratio ictus or mistake as to victim.
Esteban is guilty of murder of Maria Pascual and
frustrated murder of Maravilla.
People v. Adriano y Samson
G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015
Facts: One morning, a Toyota Corolla drove alongside a
Honda CRV and the passenger of the Corolla shot the
CRV causing it to swerve and fall into a canal. 4 men
alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver. A
bystander was also killed by a stray bullet. The accused
were convicted of two counts of murder.
Held: Although the bystander‘s death was by no means
deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora, where the
Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in
aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of
two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two
victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in
Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the
Flora doctrine.
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Praeter Intentionem
People v. Cagoco
58 Phil. 524 (1933)
Facts: Father and son Yu were standing on the sidewalk
in Manila. While they were talking, Cagoco was moving
back and forth behind Yu Lon before hitting him at the
back of the head with his fist. Yu died later that night.
Cagoco claims that he should be convicted only for slight
physical injuries instead of murder.
Held: Since the accused struck the deceased from
behind and without warning, he acted with treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make."
Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provide that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be criminally
liable for a felony different from that which he proposed
to commit, it is indispensable that the two following
requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was
committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the offender.
We have seen that under the circumstances of this case
the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because
his death was the direct consequence of defendant's
felonious act of striking him on the head. If the
defendant had not committed the assault in a
treacherous manner. he would nevertheless have been
guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to kill the
deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime
with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
2. OMISSION
Art. 116. Misprision of treason. — Every person
owing allegiance to (the United States) the Government
of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and
having knowledge of any conspiracy against them,
conceals or does not disclose and make known the
same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of
the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which
he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an
accessory to the crime of treason.
Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or
employees. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or
employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the
means in their power, or shall continue to discharge the
duties of their offices under the control of the rebels or
shall accept appointment to office under them.
Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and
tolerance. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon
any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in

dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously
refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment
of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission
of offenses.
Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion.
— Any public officer who shall consent to the escape of a
prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and temporary special disqualification
in its maximum period to perpetual special
disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced
by final judgment to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum
period and temporary special disqualification, in case the
fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only
held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of
law or municipal ordinance.
Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. —
The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person
who, having been elected by popular election to a public
office, shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in or
to discharge the duties of said office.
Art. 275. Abandonment of person in danger and
abandonment of one’s own victim. — The penalty of
arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
1. Any one who shall fail to render assistance to any
person whom he shall find in an uninhabited place
wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render
such assistance without detriment to himself, unless
such omission shall constitute a more serious offense.
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance
to another whom he has accidentally wounded or
injured.
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child
under seven years of age, shall fail to deliver said child
to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to take
him to a safe place.
 It is the failure to perform a duty required by
law.
 It is important that there is a law requiring the
performance of an act. If there is no positive
duty, there is no liability
Examples: failure to render assistance, failure to
issue receipt or non-disclosure of knowledge of
conspiracy against the government.
3. PROPOSAL AND CONSPIRACY
Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony.
— Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are
punishable only in the cases in which the law specially
provides a penalty therefore.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has
decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to
some other person or persons.
Art. 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit
treason; Penalty. — The conspiracy or proposal to
commit the crime of treason shall be punished
respectively, by prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
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P10,000 pesos, and prision correccional and a fine not
exceeding P5,000 pesos.
Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup
d’etat, rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy
and proposal to commit coup d’etat shall be punished by
prision mayor in minimum period and a fine which shall
not exceed eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00).
Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. — Persons
conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium period
and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos
Art. 186. Monopolies and combinations in restraint
of trade. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall enter into any contract
or agreement or shall take part in any conspiracy or
combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, in
restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial
means free competition in the market;
Art. 306. Who are brigands; Penalty. — When more
than three armed persons form a band of robbers for the
purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or
kidnapping persons for the purpose of extortion or to
obtain ransom or for any other purpose to be attained
by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed
highway robbers or brigands.
Persons found guilty of this offense shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period if the act or
acts committed by them are not punishable by higher
penalties, in which case, they shall suffer such high
penalties.
If any of the arms carried by any of said
persons be an unlicensed firearm, it shall be presumed
that said persons are highway robbers or brigands, and
in case of convictions the penalty shall be imposed in
the maximum period.
Art. 340. Corruption of minors. — Any person who
shall promote or facilitate the prostitution or corruption
of persons underage to satisfy the lust of another, shall
be punished by prision mayor, and if the culprit is a
pubic officer or employee, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, he shall
also suffer the penalty of temporary absolute
disqualification.
 Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are two
different acts or felonies: (1) conspiracy to commit a
felony, and (2) proposal to commit a felony.
GENERAL RULE: Conspiracy and proposal to commit a
felony are not punishable
EXCEPTION: They are punishable only in the cases in
which the law specially provides a penalty therefore.
RATIONALE: Conspiracy and proposal to commit a
crime are only preparatory acts and the law regards
them as innocent or at least permissible except in rare
and exceptional cases.

CONSPIRACY
- exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.
 The RPC specially provides a penalty for mere
conspiracy in treason, coup d‘etat, rebellion or sedition.
Treason, coup d‘etat, rebellion or sedition must not
actually be committed or else conspiracy shall no longer
be punishable because it is not a separate offense from
the felony itself.
 Criminal liability attaches to persons who participated
in furtherance of a common design to commit a crime.
Regardless of the nature of his participation in the
commission of said crime, said person will be held
equally liable.
INDICATIONS OF CONSPIRACY
- for a collective responsibility among the
accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time
of the aggression, all of them acted in concert, each
doing his part to fulfill their common design to commit
the felony. (Reyes, p. 124).
 REQUISITES OF CONSPIRACY
a. That two or more persons came to an
agreement:
- Agreement presupposes meeting of the
minds of two or more persons.
b. That the agreement concerned the
commission of a felony; and
- The agreement must refer to the commission
of a crime. It must be an agreement to act, to
effect, to bring about what has already been
conceived and determined.
c. That the execution of the felony be
decided upon.
- The conspirators have made up their minds
to commit the crime. There must be a
determination to commit the crime of
treason, rebellion or sedition.
PROPOSAL
Requisites:
a. That a person has decided to commit a
felony; and
b. That he proposes its execution to some
other person or persons.
 There is no criminal proposal when:
a. The person who proposes is not determined to
commit the felony.
b. There is no decided, concrete and formal
proposal.
c. It is not the execution of a felony that is
proposed. (Reyes, p. 128):
 It is not necessary that the person to whom the
proposal is made agrees to commit treason or rebellion.
Conspiracy and proposal is punishable in the
following cases:
 Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason;
 Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup
d'etat, rebellion or insurrection;
 Conspiracy to commit sedition;
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 Conspiracy or combination in restraint of
trade;
 Conspiracy to commit arson;
 Conspiracy to commit terrorism; and
 Conspiracy to commit importation, sale,
trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution, transportation, manufacture,
cultivation of dangerous drugs and
maintenance of a den, dive or resort where
any dangerous drug is used in any form.
U.S. v. Bautista
6 Phil 581 (1906)
Facts: Appellants Bautista, Puzon and De
Guzman were convicted in the Court of First Instance
of Manila of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put
down, and destroy by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands and the
Government of the Philippine Islands, as defined and
penalized in section 4 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission.
Held: Only Bautista and Puzon are guilty of
conspiracy. In this case, evidence on record shows that
Bautista was fully aware of the purposes of the
meetings he participated in, and even gave an
assurance to the chief of the military forces that he is
making the necessary preparations. On the other hand,
Puzon voluntarily accepted his appointment and in
doing so, assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance. These are considered evidence of the
criminal connection of the accused.
De Guzman, on the other hand, is not guilty
of conspiracy. While he might have been helping the
conspirators by accepting bonds in bundles, he was not
aware of the contents nor did he assume any obligation
with respect to these bonds.
People v. Fabro
325 SCRA 285 (2000)
Facts: Petitioner Fabro together with her
common-law husband Pilay and Irene Martin was
charged with the crime of "violation of Section 21 (b)
Art. IV, in relation to Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act
No. 6425 as amended, for selling to PO2 Apduhan, who
acted as poseur buyer, one kilo of dried marijuana
leaves. Fabro contends that her guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt as based on the testimony of
the NBI, the real possessor of the confiscated properties
was her co-accused Martin.
Held: Fabro‘s contention that Martin was the
real curlprit being the source of the contraband does not
in any way absolve her of the crime of selling marijuana.
While it is true that it was Martin who took the money, it
was Fabro who negotiated with the poseur buyers,
fetched her co-accused; and carried and handed over
the marijuana to Apduhan. The acts of Martin and Fabro
clearly show a unity of purpose in the consummation of
the sale of marijuana.
It is clear that Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425
punishes the mere conspiracy to commit the offense of
selling, delivering, distributing and transporting of
dangerous drugs. Conspiracy herein refers to the mere
agreement to commit the said acts and not the actual
execution thereof. While the rule is that a mere
conspiracy to commit a crime without doing any overt
act is not punishable, the exception is when such is
specifically penalized by law, as in the case of Section 21
of Republic Act 6425. Conspiracy as crime should be
distinguished from conspiracy as a manner of incurring
criminal liability the latter being applicable to the case.

People v. Bello
428 SCRA 388 (2004)
Facts: Accused Bello et. al. mapped out a plan
to rob a moneychanger. Calling the moneychanger from
a motel room, Bello misrepresented that she came from
Japan and would like to convert her 40 pieces of yen to
pesos. She requested that the currency conversion be
made in her room as she did not want to carry around a
huge sum of money. During the occasion of the robbery,
Andasan, the messenger who brought the money to
Bello was killed. The trial court ruled that Bello conspired
with the other accused and was found guilty as principal
for the crime of robbery with homicide.
Bello, argued that her alleged conspiracy with
the other accused was not sufficiently established by
circumstantial evidence as there was no showing that
she had the same purpose and united with the other
accused in the execution of the crime. She alleged that
her mere presence in the crime scene is not per se a
sufficient indicium of conspiracy. She insists that she
acted against her will due to the irresistible force
employed by her co-accused.
Held: The Court held that Bello conspired with
her co-accused to commit the crime. Records clearly
reveal that Bello was part of the plan to rob the
moneychanger. The chain of events and the conduct of
Bello lead to no other conclusion than that she conspired
with her co-accused to commit the crime.
Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide
to pursue it. Conspiracy is predominantly a state of mind
as it involves the meeting of the minds and intent of the
malefactors. Consequently, direct proof is not essential
to establish it. The existence of the assent of minds of
the co-conspirators may be inferred from proof of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that
they are parts of the complete plan to commit the crime.
Li v. People
427 SCRA 217 (2001)
Facts: Because of an altercation between
Arugay and Li, the latter armed himself with a baseball
bat and used the same to hit Arugay on the arm. Arugay
armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Li on the head
causing the bat to fall from his hand and leaving him
unconscious or semi-unconsious. At this point in time,
Sangalang, who was also present stabbed Arugay
several times which resulted to the latter‘s death. The
lower court held that there was conspiracy in the
present case
Held: The existence of conspiracy should be
ruled out. Sangalang was the main actor in stabbing
Arugay to death. As Li was incapacitated or probably
unconscious at the time Sangalang stabbed Arugay, it
cannot be assumed that Sangalang did what he has
done with the knowledge or assent of Li, much more in
coordination with each other. Based on the
circumstances, the Court is hard put to conclude that
Sangalang and Li had acted in concert to commit the
offense. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could very well
be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by
Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was struck on
the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous reaction,
a finding of conspiracy cannot arise.
Proving conspiracy is a dicey matter, especially
difficult in cases such as the present wherein the
criminal acts arose spontaneously, as opposed to
instances wherein the participants would have the
opportunity to orchestrate a more deliberate plan.
Spontaneity alone does not preclude the establishment
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of conspiracy, which after all, can be consummated in a
moment‘s notice — through a single word of assent to a
proposal or an unambiguous handshake. Yet it is more
difficult to presume conspiracy in extemporaneous
outbursts of violence; hence, the demand that it be
established by positive evidence. A conviction premised
on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not
on mere inferences and presumption.
People v. Bagano
375 SCRA 470 (2002)
Facts: Jeremias and his wife Merlinda were
sleeping in their home when they were awakened by
someone repeatedly calling Jeremias' name. Jeremias
went to the window to see who it was and thereafter left
their room to go outside. Merlinda remained in their
room, but peering through the window, she saw Cañete
suddenly embrace Jeremias as the latter was opening
the gate. Thereupon, Bagano with ice pick in hand
stabbed Jeremias on the chest. Jeremias struggled to
free himself from Cañete's clasp and ran, but Bagano
gave chase. Jeremias died upon arrival at the hospital.
Held: Conspiracy is attendant in the commission of the
crime. For conspiracy to exist, it is sufficient that at the
time of the commission of the offense the accused had
the same purpose and were united in its execution.
Proof of an actual planning of the perpetuation of the
crime is not a condition precedent. From the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, and as
can be inferred from their acts, it is evident that Bagano
and Cañete were one in their intention to kill Jeremias.
Hence, in accordance with the principle that in
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the fact that it
was Bagano who delivered the fatal blow on Jeremias
and Cañete's participation was limited to a mere
embrace is immaterial. Conspiracy bestows upon them
equal liability; hence, they shall suffer the same fate for
their acts.
People v. Bangcado
346 SCRA 189 (2000)
Facts: SPO1 Bangcado together with SPO1
Banisa frisked and searched Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan
and Lino to see if they were concealing any weapons.
After making sure that the victims were unarmed,
Bangcado directed the victims to form a line against a
Ford Fierra. Because Bangcado and Banisa were holding
handguns, Cogasi and his friends did as they were told
and were caught unaware when they were shot by
Bangcado. Adawan and Lino died of gunshot wounds in
the head, while Cogasi and Clemente sustained head
wounds. The lower court convicted both Bangcado and
Banisa for 2 counts of murder and 2 counts of frustrated
murder.
Held: There being no finding of Conspiracy
with Bangcado, the Court acquitted Banisa of all the
charges against him. In the absence of any previous
plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal
responsibility arising from different acts directed against
one and the same person is individual and not collective,
and that each of the participants is liable only for his
own acts. Consequently, Banisa must be absolved from
criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims. It is
clear that neither the victims nor Banisa could have
anticipated Bangcado's act of shooting the victims since
the attack was sudden and without any reason or
purpose. Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not
yet been revealed prior to the killings.

People v. Ramos
427 SCRA 299 (2004)
Facts: The trial court found appellant Eulalia
San Roque guilty for conspiring and confederating with
her co-accused for the murder of her live-in-partner
Lomida. Lomida was stabbed, shot and burned resulting
to his death. Appellant argues that the fact of such
conspiracy has not been satisfactorily proven during the
trial of the case. She vigorously contends that she did
not participate in the killing of the victim.
Held: In determining the existence of
conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. The
presence of conspiracy among the accused can be
proven by their conduct before, during or after the
commission of the crime showing that they acted in
unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or
design. There must be a showing that appellant
cooperated in the commission of the offense, either
morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement
or materially through external acts indicating a manifest
intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in
an efficacious way. In such case, the act of one becomes
the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be
deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.
The series of events in this case convincingly
show that appellant and her co-accused acted in unison
and cooperated with each other in killing Lomida.
Appellant was the one who opened the door and allowed
the other accused to enter the house. She joined them
in bringing the victim to the residence of Ramos, her
brother-in-law. While her co-accused dragged the
helpless victim, tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him
twice by a bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times,
appellant merely watched intensely. She even ―turned
her back‖ as the lifeless body of the victim was being
burned. And after attaining their purpose, she fled with
the other accused.
The above circumstances clearly show the
common purpose and concerted efforts on the part of
appellant and her co-accused.
People v. Amar
G.R. No. 194235 (2016)
Each of the accused-appellants had intentional,
direct, and substantial participation in the victim‘s
kidnapping for ransom. The victim's abduction, his
being taken to and held up in a house in Ilocos Norte
under guard, the ransom demand and negotiation, and
finally, the ransom payout, which all happened in a span
of six (6) days, clearly took planning and coordination
among accused-appellants. Accused-appellant Efren
Gascon (―Gascon‖), in particular, was among the four
(4) men who abducted the victim in Meycauayan,
Bulacan on October 8, 2002, and kept guard over the
victim for six (6) days in Dingras, Ilocos Norte. In view
thereof, accused-appellant Gascon could not be a mere
accomplice as his presence at the scene/s of the crime
was definitely more than just to give moral support; his
presence and company were indispensable and essential
to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom. Thus,
all the accused-appellants, as co-conspirators, were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.
People v. Olazo
G.R. No. 220761 (2016)
Facts: An Information for the crime of Robbery
with Homicide was filed with the RTC against Eddie
Olazo, Miguel and Charito, together with Rogelio,
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Joseph, Dionesia, Rommel and Eddie. The RTC convicted
Charito, together with Rogelio, Eddie Olazo and Miguel.
Aggrieved Charito appealed before the CA, along with
Eddie Olazo and Miguel. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC insofar as the conviction of Charito. Charito
then filed an Appeal with the Supreme Court claiming
that the prosecution was unable to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt since his participation in the
planning stages of the crime was insufficient to sustain
his conviction and the finding of conspiracy between him
and his co-accused.
Held: There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the
criminal design of another, indicated by the performance
of an overt act which produces the crime. In proving
conspiracy, direct evidence is not indispensable as its
existence may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime. In this, Joseph positively identified Charito and
declared that he saw him during the initial planning of
the commission of the crime and noted Charito‘s express
agreement. He also testified that he saw Charito in the
evening of August 8, 2004, when he brought the
accused near the house of spouses Vallecera and again
upon return to the drop-off area almost an hour later.
Hence, Charito‘s appeal was dismissed.
People v. Peralta
G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968
Facts: A commotion happened inside the New Bilibid
Prison. While members of the Sigue-Sigue gang were
preparing to attend a mass at 7:00 a.m., members of
the OXO gang attacked with improvised weapons killing
a number of Sigue Sigue members and sympathizers.
Peralta was among those identified as an attacker for
the OXO.
Held: A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is
not a crime except when the law specifically provides a
penalty therefore as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act
from the view-point of morality, but as long as the
conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of
their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is
not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains
undisturbed.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
Li v. People
427 SCRA 217 (2004)
Facts: At 1:00 a.m., Arugay was watching television
with his sisters and Tan when he heard noises outside
their house. He saw Li and Sangalang taking a bath
naked. Arugay yelled: Pare bastos kayo, bat kayo
nakahubad? A verbal confrontation ensued. Li, who was
now wearing briefs, hit Arugay with a baseball bat.
Arugay then hit Li with a bolo knocking Li unconscious.
Sangalang stabbed and killed Arugay It must be pointed
out that Kingstone Li and Eduardo Sangalang were then

in the same house at the same time. Eduardo Sangalang
is the boyfriend of the half-sister of Kingtone Li.
Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy between
housemates Sangalang and Li in killing Arugay.
Held: No. Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after
petitioner had become unconscious. Before that point,
even as Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was not
proven that Li had asked for, or received, any assistance
from Sangalang. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could
very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment
reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was
struck on the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous
reaction, a finding of conspiracy cannot arise.
It appears that the fight involved two distinct
phases. The first phase commenced when Li, without
sufficient provocation, assaulted Arugay with the
baseball bat. Lis participation in this phase, albeit as a
solitary actor, was indubitably established. Sangalangs
participation, much less his physical presence during this
phase, was not established at all. In the second phase,
Sangalang was the main actor. Li was incapacitated by
then. Clearly, the existence of conspiracy should be
ruled out.
People v. Listerio
335 SCRA 40 (2000)
Facts: One afternoon, the Araque brothers tried to
collect a sum of money from one of their debtors in
Alabang, After failing to collect anything, the brothers
were attacked by Listerio and company with bladed
weapons and lead pipes. This caused the death of
Jeonito while Marlon survived due to timely medical
intervention. Listerio and his co-attackers were charged
with murder and frustrated murder.
Held: Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found for
criminals do not write down their lawless plans and
plots. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a
joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest
Conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct
or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly
as the crime itself. In the absence of direct proof
thereof, as in the present case, it may be deduced from
the mode, method, and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. Hence, it is necessary that a conspirator should
have performed some overt acts as a direct or
indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his
co-conspirators by being present at the commission of
the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
other co-conspirators.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship; it denotes
an intentional participation in the transaction with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. Conspiracy to exist does not require an
agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists
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if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. In this case, the presence of accused-
appellant and his colleagues, all of them armed with
deadly weapons at the locus criminis, indubitably shows
their criminal design to kill the victims.
People v. Comadre
431 SCRA 366 (2004)
Facts: Antonio Comadre lobbed a grenade that landed
on the roof of Agbanlog. The explosion killed Robert
Agbanlog and injured others who were having a drinking
session at the terrace of the house. When the grenade
was thrown, Antonio was seen with George and Danilo.
They were all charged as conspirators to complex crime
of murder with multiple attempted murder.
Held: A conspiracy must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly
and convincingly as the commission of the crime
itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the
crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy
transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano did not have any participation in the commission
of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere
presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close
relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish
conspiracy considering that they performed no positive
act in furtherance of the crime.
STAGES OF COMMISSION OF A CRIME
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted
felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the
elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when
the offender performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than this own spontaneous
desistance.
DEVELOPMENT OF A CRIME
a. internal acts – such as mere ideas in the
mind of a person, are not punishable even if,
had they been carried out, they would
constitute a crime
b. external acts – cover a) preparatory and b)
acts of execution
c. preparatory – acts tending toward the crime;
ordinarily not punishable unless specifically
provided for; these acts do not yet constitute
even the first stage of the acts of execution;
intent not yet disclosed
d. acts of execution – acts directly connected to
the intended crime; varies with the crime and
is punishable under the code; usually overt
acts with a logical relation to a particular
concrete offense

FORMAL CRIME OR CRIMES OF EFFECT
Felonies whereby a single act of the accused
consummates the commission thereof. There are no
stages to its commission.
MATERIAL CRIMES
Crimes that may be committed in stages, i.e.,
attempted, frustrated, and consummated.
STAGES OF COMMISSION
1. Attempted – there is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not
produce it by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.
2. Frustrated – it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
3. Consummated – a felony is consummated
when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present.
ATTEMPTED FELONY
ELEMENTS:
1. The offender commences the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony;
3. The offender‘s act is not stopped by his own
spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was
due to cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
 The commission of the felony is deemed commenced
directly by overt acts when 1) there be external acts; 2)
such external acts have direct connection with the crime
intended to be committed.
OVERT ACT – some physical activity or deed, indicating
the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a
mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its
complete termination following its natural curse, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
 Drawing or trying to draw a pistol or raising a bolo as
if to strike the offended party with it is not an overt act
of homicide.
INDETERMINATE OFFENSE – It is one where the
purpose of the offender in performing an act is not
certain. Its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous.
 The intention of the accused must be viewed from the
nature of the acts executed by him, and not from his
admission.
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SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE PHASES OF A
FELONY
1. SUBJECTIVE PHASE
- That portion of the execution of the
crime starting from the point where the offender
still has control over his acts.
- If the offender reaches the point
where he has no more control over is acts, the
subjective phase is passed.
- If it is already passed but the felony is
not produced, it is frustrated.
2. OBJECTIVE PHASE
- the result of the acts of execution,
that is, the accomplishment of the crime.
- If the subjective and objective phases
are present, there is consummated felony.
US v. Eduave
36 Phil. 209 (1917)
Facts: Eduave struck a girl from behind with a bolo
severing muscles and tissues. He threw the victim‘s
body into the bushes. He surrendered himself to the
authorities and declared that he killed the victim.
However, the victim was not actually killed.
Held: The crime is frustrated murder.
Article 3 of the Penal Code defines a frustrated felony as
follows:
A felony is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence, but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
An attempted felony is defined thus:
There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all
the acts of execution which constitute the
felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own voluntarily desistance.
The essential element which distinguishes attempted
from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no
intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency
between the beginning of the commission of the crime
and the moment when all of the acts have been
performed which should result in the consummated
crime; while in the former there is such intervention and
the offender does not arrive at the point of
performing all of the acts which should produce the
crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause
apart from his voluntary desistance.
In case of an attempt the offender never passes the
subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and
compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes
before the subjective phase is passed. On the other
hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase
is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is
complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was
passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the
intervention of causes independent of the will of the
offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the
crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it
was due to something beyond his control.

People v. Lamahang
61 Phil 703 (1935)
Facts: The accused was caught in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a
store where the owner was sleeping. The accused had
only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening
another from the wall, when the policeman showed up,
who instantly arrested him. The trial court convicted him
of attempted robbery.
Held: The conviction is erroneous. It is the
opinion of the SC that the attempt to commit an offense
which the Penal code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is
the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt
acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization
and consummation. What we have here is an attempt to
commit an indeterminate offense.
There is no doubt that it was the intention of
the accused to enter the store by means of violence,
passing through the opening which he had started to
make on the wall, but it is not sufficient, for the purpose
of imposing penal sanction to make an assumption that
the act was in preparation for the commission of
robbery. There is no logical and natural relation between
the act of entering and robbery. Thus, he should be
guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling.
People v. Dio
130 SCRA 151 (1984)
Facts: The appellant and his companion tried
to divest Crispulo of his Seiko wrist watch but Crispulo
resisted their attempt and fought the robbers. The
victim was stabbed and later died. The Seiko watch was
still strapped to his wrist. The lower court convicted the
appellant of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
Held: The decision of the lower court was
erroneous. The accused were unsuccessful in their
criminal venture since the watch was still securely
strapped to the victim‘s wrist. The crime of robbery was
therefore not consummated. The killing may be
considered as merely incidental to the plan to carry out
the robbery. The accused must be convicted of
attempted robbery with homicide.
People v. Trinidad
169 SCRA 51 (1989)
Facts: Deceased Soriano and Laroa together
with Tan were inside a Ford Fierra when Trinidad asked
for a ride. The accused shot the two deceased. Tan got
off the Fierra and rode a jeepney which just passed by.
When he saw the accused riding at the back of the jeep,
he tried to run but when the jeep started driving away,
he clung to its side. The accused fired two shots at Tan,
one hitting him on his thigh. The lower court convicted
him of frustrated murder.
Held: The accused can only be convicted of
Attempted Murder because the accused was unable to
perform all acts of execution which would have produced
the murder. The victim‘s wound in the right thigh was
not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound
is inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder.
People v. Campuhan
329 SCRA 270 (2000)
Facts: The mother of the 4-year-old victim
caught the houseboy Campuhan in the act of almost
raping her daughter. The hymen of the victim was still
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intact but since in previous Orita ruling, entry into labia
is considered rape even without rupture of hymen and
full penetration is not necessary, question arises
whether what transpired was attempted or
consummated rape.
Held: Attempted rape only. Mere touching of
external genitalia by penis is already rape. However,
touching should be understood as inherently part of
entry of penis into labia and not mere touching of the
pudendum. There must be clear and convincing proof
that the penis indeed touched the labia and slid into the
female organ and NOT MERELY STROKED THE
EXTERNAL SURFACE. Some degree of penetration
beneath the surface must be achieved and the labia
majora must be entered. Prosecution did not prove that
the Campuhan‘s penis was able to penetrate victim‘s
vagina because the kneeling position of the accused
obstructed the mother‘s view of the alleged sexual
contact. The testimony of the victim herself claimed that
penis grazed but did not penetrate her organ.
There was only a shelling of the castle but no
bombardment of the drawbridge yet.
People v. Listerio
335 SCRA 40 (2000)
Facts: Brothers Jeonito and Marlon were
passing by Tramo, Muntinlupa when a group composed
of Agapito Listerio, Samson, George, and Marlon, all
surnamed Dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya blocked
their path and attacked them with lead pipes and bladed
weapons. Listerio, Marlon and George, who were armed
with bladed weapons, stabbed Jeonito from behind.
Jeonito‘s brother, Marlon, was hit on the head by
Samson and Bancaya with lead pipes and momentarily
lost consciousness. When he regained his senses, he
saw that Jeonito was already dead. Their assailants then
fled after the incident. Marlon who sustained injuries in
the arm and back, was thereafter brought to a hospital
for treatment. The lower court found Listerio guilty for
the ―attempt‖ to kill Marlon.
Held: The SC held that the crime is a
frustrated felony not an attempted offense considering
that after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head
as a result of which he lost consciousness and fell, Marlo
n's attackers apparently thought he was already dead
and fled.
A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless
the offender, after beginning the commission of the
crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by
some outside cause from performing all of the acts
which should produce the crime. In other words, to be
an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be
thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes
and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he
has performed all of the acts which should produce the
crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to
perform. If he has performed all the acts which should
result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily
desists from proceeding further, it cannot be an
attempt.
Valenzuela v. People (2007)
Facts: A grocery boy was caught trying to
abscond a box of Tide Ultrabar laundry soap from the
Super Sale Club. The guards apprehended him at the
store parking lot while trying to board a taxi. He claimed
the theft was merely frustrated for he was not able to
dispose of the goods.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
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Held: The Revised Penal Code provisions on
theft have not been designed in such fashion as to
accommodate the Adiao, Dino and Empelis rulings.
Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly
or impliedly allows that the ―free disposition of the items
stolen‖ is in any way determinative of whether the crime
of theft has been produced. We thus conclude that
under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of
frustrated theft.
showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause
the victims death without timely medical intervention.
When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound
would be fatal without medical intervention, the
character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under
this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence
should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the
crime committed should be attempted,
not frustrated, homicide.

People v. Pareja
G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012 FRUSTRATED FELONY
Facts: According to the testimony of the victim, Pareja
removed her clothes and tried to insert his penis but ELEMENTS:
wasn‘t able to penetrate as he stopped when the 1. The offender performs all the acts of
victim‘s cries got louder. The lower courts convicted execution;
Pareja of rape. 2. All the acts performed would produce the
felony as a consequence;
Held: Pareja committed Attempted Rape. According to 3. But the felony is not produced;
the victim‘s testimony, the accused was able to touch 4. By reason of causes independent of the
the mons pubis, the rounded eminence which becomes will of the perpetrator.
hairy around the vagina. However, Pareja was not able
to penetrate the labia majora or the outer lips of the  In frustrated felony, the offender must perform all the
vagina. In rape cases, the penetration of the labias acts of execution. Nothing more is left to be done by the
consummates the rape. offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime.
People v. Borinaga
55 Phil. 433 (1930) FRUSTRATED FELONY VS. ATTEMPTED FELONY
Facts: A misunderstanding regarding the payment for 1. In both, the offender has not accomplished his
the construction of Mr. Mooney‘s fish corral angered criminal purpose.
Borinaga, an associate to the said project. That evening, 2. While in frustrated felony, the offender has
while Mooney was sitting in a neighbor‘s store with his performed all the acts of execution which would
back facing the window, Borinaga tried to stab Mooney produce the felony as a consequence, in
with a knife. However, the knife hit the back of the chair attempted felony, the offender merely
and Mooney was unharmed. commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
Held: The crime was frustrated murder. The essential execution.
condition of a frustrated crime, that the author performs
all the acts of execution, attended the attack. Nothing ATTEMPTED OR IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
remained to be done to accomplish the work of the FRUSTRATED
assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of
The evil intent of the offender is not accomplished
the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the
The evil intent of the The evil intent of the
will of the perpetrator.
offender is possible of offender cannot be
accomplishment accomplished
Serrano v. People
The evil intent cannot be The evil intent of the
G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010
accomplished because of offender cannot be
Facts: Anthony Galang was stabbed in the stomach with
the intervention of certain accomplished because it is
a bladed weapon during a rumble between two groups in
cause or accident in which inherently impossible of
UP Diliman. Galang was ganged up by members of the
the offender had no accomplishment or
opposing group when he was stabbed while being held.
participation. because the means
The petitioner, Gener and Orieta thereafter continued to
employed by the offender
beat and stone the victim until he fell into a nearby
is inadequate or
creek. The petitioner and his group left him there. The
ineffectual.
RTC held that it was frustrated homicide while the CA
held that the wounds were not fatal, therefore, the
crime was attempted homicide. People v. Eriña
50 Phil 998 (1927)
Held: The following factors to determine the presence of Facts: The victim of the crime was a child of 3
an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; years and 11 months. There are doubts whether the
(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds accused succeeded in penetrating the vagina before
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the being disturbed in the timely intervention of the mother
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the and sister. The physician found a slight inflammation of
killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under the exterior parts of the organ, indicating an effort had
which the crime was committed and the motives of the been made to enter the vagina but it is doubtful whether
accused. We also consider motive and the the entry had been effected.
words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted Held: Though complete penetration is not
injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors necessary, penetration of the labia is sufficient.
However, since there is no sufficient evidence of such
The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound penetration, the act is merely frustrated.
inflicted which must be supported by independent proof Dissent: It is consummated rape.

28

People v. Orita
184 SCRA 105 (1990)
Facts: The victim was a 19-year old college
student. She arrived at her boarding house early
morning coming from a late-night party. The accused
suddenly held her and poked a knife to her neck. They
entered a room and the victim was ordered to lie down.
The accused made the victim hold his penis and insert it
in her vagina. Because of their position, the accused
cannot fully penetrate her. Only a small part of his penis
inserted her vagina. The victim was able to escape and
report to the police what happened. The lower court
convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
Held: Perfect penetration is not essential for
the consummation of rape. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the
moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim,
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated rape.
Taking into account the nature, elements and
manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how
the frustrated stage in rape can ever be consummated.
People v. Caballero
400 SCRA 424 (2003)
Facts: As Eugene walked by the gate of the
Mondragon Compound, Armando Caballero suddenly
grabbed Eugene towards the compound. Eugene
resisted. Spontaneously, Armando‘s brothers Ricardo,
Marciano, Jr., and Robito joined Armando and assaulted
Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the
clothesline and hit Eugene with it. Eugene‘s sister,
Myrna, saw the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene
and shouted for help. Arnold saw the commotion and
rushed to the scene to pacify the protagonists. However,
Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed the latter on the
left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito, Marciano, Jr. and
Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of them stabbed
Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid
under the house of a neighbor. Leonilo, who likewise
rushed to the scene was stabbed by Robito. Eugene and
Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they
sustained. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to and
operated on Arnold, testified that the stab wound
sustained by Arnold on the left side of his body was
mortal and could have caused his death were it not for
the timely and effective medical intervention:
Held: A crime is frustrated when the offender
has performed all the acts of execution which should
result in the consummation of the crime. The offender
has passed the subjective phase in the commission of
the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while passing through the
subjective phase. He did all that is necessary to
consummate the crime. However, the crime is not
consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. In homicide
cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts
of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal
and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance.
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CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
CONSUMMATED FELONY
Requisites:
1. All the acts of execution are present
2. The result is achieved.
 Every crime has its own elements which must all be
present to constitute a culpable violation of a precept of
law.
How to determine whether the felony is
attempted, frustrated or consummated?
1. the nature of the offense
ex. In arson, it is not necessary that the property is
totally destroyed by fire. The crime of arson is
therefore consummated even if only a portion of the
wall or any other part of the house is burned.
2. the elements constituting the felony
ex. In theft, the mere removal of the personal
property belonging to another with intent to gain is
sufficient to consummate the offense. In estafa, the
offended party must actually be prejudiced or
damaged. (Adiao case v. Domiguez case)
3. the manner of committing the crime
a. formal crimes – those which are consummated
by a single act (ex. Slander, adultery)
 There can be no ATTEMPT in a formal crime.
b. crimes consummated by mere attempt (ex.
Attempt to flee to an enemy country, treason)
 There is not ATTEMPTED crime because the
overt act in itself consummates the crime.
c. felonies by omission
 There can be no attempted stage because the
offender does not execute acts. He omits to
perform an act which the law requires him to do.
d. crimes committed by mere agreement
- The offer made by one of the parties to the other
constitutes attempted felony, if the offer is
rejected.
- In view of this rule, it would seem that there is
no frustrated bribery but in People v. Diego Quin,
SC ruled that if the public officer returned the
money given by the defendant, there is
frustrated bribery.
e. material crimes
- There are three stages of consummation:
attempted, frustrated and consummated.
U.S. v. Adiao (1955)
Facts: Adiao is a customs inspector. He
abstracted a leather belt from the luggage of a Japanese
and secreted the belt under his desk in the Customs
House where it was found by other customs employees.
Adiao was convicted of frustrated theft.
Held: Since the defendant performed all the
acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of
the felony, he is guilty of consummated crime of theft.
The fact that he was under observation during the entire
transaction and was unable to get the merchandise out
of the Customs House is not decisive; all the elements of
the completed crime of theft are present.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

People v. Hernandez (1925) D. CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES

Facts: The accused, a 70-year-old man was
convicted by the trial court of frustrated rape for having Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light
intercourse with his granddaughter who was at that time felonies. — Grave felonies are those to which the law
only 9 years of age. The lower court claimed that there attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in
can be no consummated rape without a complete any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Art.
penetration of the hymen. 25 of this Code.
Held: Finding the hymen intact is not always Less grave felonies are those which the law
proof that no rape has been committed. The law may punishes with penalties which in their maximum period
now indeed be considered as settled that while the are correctional, in accordance with the above-
rupturing of the hymen is not indispensable to a mentioned Art.
conviction, there must be proof of some degree of
entrance of the male organ within the labia of
 Art. 9 classifies felonies according to their gravity.
pudendum. In the present case, the physician found the
a. GRAVE FELONIES – those in which the law
labia and the opening of the vagina inflamed together
attaches a capital punishment or afflictive
with an abundance of semen. Child even testified that
penalty.
defendant succeeded partial penetration. The accused is
guilty of consummated rape.
 Capital punishment is death penalty
Valenzuela v. People
 The afflictive penalties in accordance with Art.
525 SCRA 306 (2007)
25 of this code are:
Facts: A grocery boy was caught trying to
reclusion perpetua
abscond a box of Tide Ultrabar laundry soap from the
reclusion temporal
Super Sale Club. The guards apprehended him at the
perpetual or temporary absolute
store parking lot while trying to board a taxi. He claimed
disqualification
the theft was merely frustrated for he was not able to
perpetual or temporary special
dispose of the goods.
disqualification
prision mayor
Held: The determination of whether a crime is frustrated
or consummated necessitates an initial concession that
b. LESS GRAVE FELONIES – those in which
all of the acts of execution have been performed by the
their maximum period are correctional
offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the
felony itself was actually produced by the acts of
 When the penalty prescribed for the offense is
execution. The determination of whether the felony was
composed of two or more distinct penalties, the
produced after all the acts of execution had been
higher or highest of the penalties must be a
performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of
correctional penalty.
the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally
furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised
 The following are correctional penalties
Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel the
prision correccional
particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying
arresto mayor
criminal intent.
suspension
destierro
The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea supplies an important characteristic of a
c. LIGHT FELONIES – those infractions of law in
crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
which the penalty is arresto menor or a fine not
unlawful act for there to be a crime, and accordingly,
exceeding P200 or both.
there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in
 A felony punishable by a fine not exceeding
crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as
P200 and censure is a light felony, because public
a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
censure, like arresto menor, is a light felony.
intent, and essential for criminal liability. It follows that
the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be
able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. — Light
indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held felonies are punishable only when they have been
that a criminal law that contains no mens consummated, with the exception of those committed
rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected against person or property.
rights. The criminal statute must also provide for the Light felonies are those infractions of law for the
overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist commission of which a penalty of arresto menor or a
in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is provided.
shown; there must also be an actus reus.
 This should be seen in the light of articles prescribing
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find penalties for crimes in their different stages of
expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is commission. This means that light felonies which are
produced. In this case, the crime of theft is only attempted or frustrated are not punishable by law.
consummated when the act unlawful taking was
performed regardless whether the perpetrator had the  However, in the commission of crimes against persons
capacity or opportunity to dispose the stolen goods. and property, every stage of execution is punishable but
There is no frustrated theft. only the principals and accomplices are liable in light
felonies, the accessories are not.

30
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

 Rationale: Light felonies produce such slight or  Efficient Intervening Cause - there is an efficient
insignificant moral and material injuries that public supervening event if the event breaks the sequence
conscience is assuaged even if the acts punished only leading from the cause of the ultimate result. [Allied
when consummated. Banking Corp. v. Wan, et al, G.R. No. 13319]

 The causes which may produce a result different from

III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. HOW INCURRED
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.
 This article has no reference to the manner criminal
liability is incurred. The manner incurring criminal
liability under the RPC is stated under Art. 3, that is,
performing or failing to do an act, when either is
punished b law, by means of deceit or fault.
 Art. 4 merely states that criminal liability is incurred
by those mentioned by the said article.
that which the offender intended are:
a. ERROR IN PERSONAE - mistake in the
identity of the victim; injuring one person
mistaken for another (this is a complex
crime under Art. 49)
b. ABERRATIO ICTUS - mistake in the
blow, that is, when the offender intending
to do an injury to one person actually
inflicts it on another; and
c. PRAETER INTENTIONEM – the act
exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious
result is greater than that intended.
* RPC, Art. 13 Mitigating circumstance –
That the offender had no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed.
2. By any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or an account of the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means.
3. Impossible Crimes
Requisites:

1. By any person committing a felony although the 1. That the act performed would be an offense
wrongful act done be different from that which he against persons or property.
intended Felonies Against Persons are:
a. Murder
Requisites: b. Homicide
a. That an intentional felony has been c. Infanticide
committed; and d. Abortion
b. That the wrong done to the aggrieved e. Duel
party be the direct and natural and logical f. Physical Injuries
consequence of the felony. g. Rape
Felonies Against Property:
 Any person who creates in another‘s mind an a. Robbery
immediate sense of danger, which causes the latter to b. Brigandage
do something resulting in the latter‘s injuries, is liable c. Theft
for the resulting injuries. d. Usurpation
e. Culpable Insolvency
 Wrong done must be the direct, natural and logical f. Swindling and other deceits
consequence of the felony committed. g. Chattel Mortgage
- where it clearly appears that the injury would h. Arson and other crimes involving
not have cased death, in the ordinary course of events, destruction
but would have healed in so many days and where it is i. Malicious Mischief
shown beyond all doubt that the death was due to the
malicious or careless acts of the injured person or a
third person, the accused is not liable for homicide. 2. That the act was done with evil intent.
The offender must have intent to do injury to
 The offended party is not obliged to submit to a another.
surgical operation to relieve the accused from the
natural and ordinary results of his crime. 3. That its accomplishment is inherently
 The felony committed must be the proximate cause of impossible, or that the means employed is
the resulting injury. either inadequate or ineffectual.
In impossible crime, the act performed by the
 Proximate Cause - that cause, which, in natural and offender cannot produce an offense against persons
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient or property because:
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. [Bataclan v. a. the commission of the offense is
Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186] inherently impossible of accomplishment

31

- The act intended by the offender is by its
nature one of impossible accomplishment.
- There must either 1) LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY –
when completed intended acts do not amount to a
crime, or 2) PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY – when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor
prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
- examples: 1) when one tries to kill another
by putting in his substance which he believes to be
arsenic when in fact it is common salt; 2) when one
tries to murder a corpse.
b. the means employed is either inadequate
or ineffectual
- example: when one tries to poison another but
the quantity of arsenic added in his substance was
not sufficient to kill a person
- but where the means employed is adequate
and the result expected is not produced, it is not an
impossible crime, but a frustrated felony.
4. That the act performed should not
constitute a violation of another provision of
the RPC
- example: A pointed a gun at B to rob the latter
of a watch but B was not wearing a watch. It is
not an impossible crime because A‘s pointing his
gun at B already constituted at least the crime of
grave threats.
Why is an impossible crime punishable?
It is punishable in order to suppress criminal
tendencies. Objectively, the offender has not committed
a felony, but subjectively, he is a criminal.
Urbano v. IAC
157 SCRA 1 (1998)
Facts: Urbano went to his rice field and found
his palay flooded with water. Urbano found out that it
was Javier who was responsible for the opening of the
irrigation canal. He got angry and tried to hack Javier
but the latter tried to parry the attack and in the
process, a two-inch incised wound was inflicted on the
right palm of Javier‘s hand. The wound was treated and
incapacitation was diagnosed to be from 7-9 days. 22
days after, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very
serious condition caused by tetanus toxin. Javier died
the next day. Urbano was convicted of homicide.
Held: Urbano is acquitted because the infection
was distinct and foreign to the crime. The proximate
cause of Javier‘s death was due to his own negligence as
he went back to work even if his wound had not yet
healed properly. The evidence on record also shows that
the wound inflicted by Urbano did not exhibit any signs
of being infected with tetanus; at most, it was only
infected with a mild form of tetanus and not the severe
form that killed him
Intod v. CA
215 SCRA 52 (1992)
Facts: Intod et al. went to Palangpangan‘s
house, all armed with firearms. They went to the
bedroom and began firing their weapons. However,
Palangpangan was in another city and her home was
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was
in the room when the accused fired their weapons. RTC
convicted the accused of attempted murder.
32
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
Held: The accused is guilty of an impossible
crime. The factual situation in the case presents a
physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime
impossible of performance.
Quinto v. Andres
453 SCRA 511 (2005)
Facts: Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school
pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was about
11 yrs old saw Andres and Pacheco who invited them to
go fishing inside a drainage culvert. Wilson assented but
Garcia seeing that it was dark inside opted to remain
seated in a grassy area about 2 meters from the
entrance of the drainage system. Pacheco, Andres and
Quinto, entered the drainage system which was covered
by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter
wide, with water about a foot deep. After a while,
respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out
of the drainage system and left without saying a word.
Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged
again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead.
Andres laid the boy's lifeless body down in the grassy
area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled
from the scene. For his part, Andres went to the house
of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and
informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed
to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed
her.
Held: The court ruled that respondents cannot
be held criminally nor civilly liable for the death of
Wilson. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof
of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill
the deceased before or after the latter was invited to
join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that
respondent Andres used to go to their house and play
with her son before the latter's death. When the
petitioner's son died inside the drainage culvert, it was
respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He
then informed the petitioner of her son's death. Even
after informing the petitioner of the death of her son,
respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to
the grassy area where the deceased was.
People v. Valledor,
383 SCRA 653 (2002)
Accused should be held liable only for
attempted murder and not frustrated murder. The
wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his right forearm
was not fatal. The settled rule is that where the wound
inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the
accused did not perform all the acts of execution that
would have brought about death.
B. CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
IMPUTABILITY RESPONSIBILITY
Quality by which an act Obligation of suffering the
may be ascribed to a consequences of the
person as its author or crime.
owner.
Implies that a deed may Implies that the person
be imputed to a person. must take the
consequence of such deed.

1. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
• Those where the act of a person is said to be
in accordance with law, so that such person is deemed
not to have transgressed the law and is free from both
criminal and civil liability.
• The law recognizes the non-existence of a
crime by expressly stating in the opening sentence of
Art. 11 that the person therein mentioned ―DO NOT
INCUR CRIMINAL LIABILITY.‖
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do
not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or
rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person
or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his
relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided
that the first and second requisites prescribed in the
next preceding circumstance are present, and the
further requisite, in case the provocation was given by
the person attacked, that the one making defense had
no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person
or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of
this Article are present and that the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or
injury, does an act which causes damage, provided that
the following requisites are present:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists.
Second. That the injury feared be greater
than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and
less harmful means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in fulfillment of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
• Article 11 recognizes the acts of such persons as
justified. Such persons are not criminals, as there is no
crime committed.
Par. 1 – SELF-DEFENSE
• Self-defense includes not only the defense
of the person or body of the one assaulted but also that
33
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
of his rights, that is, those rights the enjoyment of which
is protected by law.
• Includes Right to Honor and Defense of
Property Rights.
Requisites:
a. There must be unlawful aggression
• This is an indispensable requisite.
• If there is no unlawful aggression, there is
nothing to prevent or repel.
• Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at
least threatened assault of an immediate and
imminent kind.
• There must be an ACTUAL PHYSICAL assault upon
a person, or at least a THREAT to inflict real injury.
• When there is no peril to one‘s life, limb or right,
there is no unlawful aggression.
PERIL TO ONE’S LIFE
1. ACTUAL – that the danger must be present, that
is, actually in existence.
2. IMMINENT- that the danger is on the point of
happening. It is not required that the attack already
begins, for it may be too late.
• A slap on the face constitutes unlawful aggression
since the face represents a person and his dignity.
Slapping it is a serious personal attack.
• Retaliation is different from an act of self-defense.
In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the
injured party already ceased to exist when the
accused attacked him. In self-defense, the
aggression was still existing when the aggressor was
injured or disabled by the person making a defense.
• In self-defense, the person must have no time nor
occasion for deliberation and cool thinking.
• The unlawful aggression must come from the
person who was attacked by the accused.
• There is no unlawful aggression when there is
agreement to fight because where the fight has been
agreed upon, each of the protagonists is at once
assailant and assaulted. But when the aggression is
ahead of the stipulated time and place, it is unlawful.
• The rule now is STAND GROUND WHEN IN THE
RIGHT. So, where the accused is where he has the
right to be, the law does not require him to retreat
when his assailant is rapidly advancing upon him with
a deadly weapon.
• The belief of the person may be considered in
determining the existence of unlawful aggression.
Ex. If the aggressor used a toy pistol but the
accused believed it was a real gun, he may claim self-
defense.
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it
• The second requisite presupposes the existence of
unlawful aggression.

• The law protects not only the person who repels
an aggression (meaning actual), but even the person
who tries to prevent an aggression that is expected
(meaning imminent).
• The reasonableness of the necessity depends
upon the circumstances particularly the time and
location where the aggression took place.
• The means employed by the person making a
defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression.
• The reasonableness of the means used will depend
upon the NATURE and QUALITY of the weapon used
by the aggressor, his PHYSICAL CONDITION, SIZE
and other circumstances, and those of the person
defending himself, and also the place and occasion of
the assault.
*** THE FIRST TWO REQUISITES ARE COMMON TO
THREE KINDS OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSE: 1) SELF-
DEFENSE, 2) DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE AND 3)
DEFENSE OF A STRANGER.
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself
• The third requisite of self-defense is present:
1. When no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor by the person defending himself; or
2. When, even if a provocation was giver, it
was not sufficient; or
3. When, even if the provocation was
sufficient, it was not given by the person defending
himself; or
4. When, even if a provocation was given by
the person defending himself, it was not proximate and
immediate to the act of aggression.
BATTERED WOMAN DEFENSE-R.A. 9262 (27 March
2004) Sections 3 & 26 in relation to People v.
Genosa, 419 SCRA 537 (2004)
 Battered Woman Syndrome as a
Defense
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from battered woman syndrome do not
incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised
Penal Code.
Par. 2 – DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
RELATIVES THAT CAN BE DEFENDED
1. Spouse
2. Ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity in the same degrees.
5. Relatives by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree.
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REVIEW NOTES
• Relatives by affinity, because of marriage, are parents-
in-law, son or daughter-in-law, and brothers or sisters-
in-law.
• Death of the spouse terminates the relationship by
affinity; unless the marriage has resulted in issue who is
still living, in which case the relationship of affinity
continues.
• Consanguinity refers to blood relatives. Brothers and
sisters are within the second civil degree; uncle and
niece or aunt and nephew are within the third civil
degree; and first cousins are within the fourth civil
degree.
REQUISITES OF DEFENSE OF RELATIVES:
1. Unlawful aggression;
• Unlawful aggression may not exist as a
matter of fact, it can be made to depend upon the
honest belief of the one making a defense. Ex. The
sons of A honestly believed that their father was the
victim of an unlawful aggression when in fact it was
their father who attacked B. If they killed B under
such circumstance, they are justified.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it;
• The gauge of reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the aggression as against one‘s
self or in defense of a relative is to be found in the
situation as IT APPEARS TO THE PERSON
REPELLING THE AGGRESSION (the defender).
3. In case the provocation was given by the
person attacked, the one making a defense
had no part therein.
• There is still legitimate defense of relative even if
the relative being defended has given provocation,
provided that the one defending such relative has
no part in the provocation.
• Reason for the rule: Although the provocation
prejudices the person who gave it, its effects do not
reach the defender who took no part therein,
because the latter was prompted by some noble or
generous sentiment in protecting and saving a
relative.
Par. 3 – DEFENSE OF STRANGER
Requisites:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
3. The person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
Who are deemed strangers?
Any person not included in the enumeration of
relatives mentioned in paragraph 2 of this article, is
considered stranger for the purpose of paragraph 3.
BASIS: What one may do in his defense, another may
do for him. The ordinary man would not stand idly by
and see his companion killed without attempting to save
his life.

People v. Narvaez
121 SCRA 389 (1983)
Facts: Narvaez was taking his rest inside his
house when he heard that the wall of his house was
being chiseled. He saw that Fleischer and Rubia,
together with their laborers, were fencing the land of the
father of the deceased Fleischer. If the fencing would go
on, Narvaez would be prevented from getting into his
house and the bodega of his rice mill so he asked the
group to stop but they refused. The accused got mad so
he got his shotgun and shot Fleischer. Rubia ran towards
the jeep and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, the
accused fired at Rubia as well. Narvaez claimed he acted
in defense of his person and rights.
Held: The court took into consideration the fact
that the 2 deceased were accompanied with three
laborers and that the were using tools which could be
lethal weapons such as nail and hammer, bolo, etc. and
that the jeep the deceased used contained a gun leaning
near the steering wheel. There was aggression on the
part of the victims not on the person of the accused but
on his property rights when Fleischer angrily ordered the
continuance of the fencing.
The third element of self-defense is also
present because there was no sufficient provocation on
the part of Narvaez since he was sleeping when the
deceased where fencing.
However, the second element was lacking.
Shooting the victims from the window of his house is
disproportionate to the physical aggression by the
victims. Thus, there is incomplete self-defense and the
accused is entitled to a penalty lower by one or two
degrees.
Dissent: Defense of property is not of such
importance as the right to life and defense of property
can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form
of attack on the person of one entrusted with said
property. In this case before us, there is no evidence
that an attack was attempted. The utterance, ―no,
gaddemit, proceed, go ahead,‖ is not unlawful
aggression which entitles him neither to a plea of self-
defense nor to a mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense.
People v. Boholst-Caballero
61 SCRA 180 (1974)
Facts: Boholst (wife) and Caballero (husband)
are married to each other. But since their marriage was
an unhappy one, they separated. One evening, the wife
went caroling with her friends and she was seen by her
husband standing in a corner of the yard of Barabad. He
accused her of prostituting and threatened to kill her as
he held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose
bled. He, then, choked her and at the same time
continuously saying that he will kill her. The wife then
pulled out the knife of her husband tucked inside the
belt line and stabbed him. When she was released, she
ran home. The wife is claiming self-defense.
Held: The wife who being strangled and choked
by a furious aggressor had no other recourse but to get
hold of any weapon within her reach to save herself. The
claim that it was not proper for the wife to be standing
in the middle of the night outside a yard giving the
impression that she is prostituting herself, is not
sufficient provocation. All that the accused did was to
provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the
mind of her husband which is not a sufficient
provocation under the law of self-defense.
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People v. Alconga
78 Phil 366 (1947)
Facts: The deceased Barion was the banker in
the game of black jack. Raposo played the game while
the accused posted himself behind Barion acting as a
spotter of the cards of the latter and communicating it
to his partner Raposo. When Barion learned about what
Raposo and Alconga were doing, an exchange of words
ensued. One morning, when Alconga was in the
guardhouse, Barion arrived and swung his pingahan at
the former but the accused was able to avoid the blow.
In a crawling position, Alconga avoided the following
blows and was able to draw his revolver and shoot
Barion. He was able to crawl out of the guardhouse and
a hand-to-hand fight ensued. Having sustained several
wounds, Barion ran away but was followed by the
accused and another fight took place. Alconga then
slashed Barion‘s head with a bolo which caused the
latter‘s death. The accused pleaded self-defense.
Held: An accused was no longer acting in self-
defense when he pursued and killed a fleeing adversary,
though originally the unlawful aggressor, there being no
more aggression to defend against, the same having
ceased from the moment the deceased took to his heels.
People v. Sumicad
56 Phil 643 (1932)
Facts: Sumicad was hauling logs when Cubol
suddenly struck him with his fist. Sumicad tried to
escape but Cubol continued to strike him with his fists.
Sumicad receded until he found himself cornered by a
pile of logs which prevented him from further retreat. As
Cubol advanced towards him, Sumicad drew out his bolo
and struck him. Cubol tried to wrest the bolo from
Sumicad and to prevent this, the latter struck him again
twice which broke Cubol‘s cranium resulting to his
death.
Held: As a general rule, a man is not justified
in killing an assailant who is not armed with any
dangerous weapon. This rule applies only when the
contending parties are in the open and the person
assaulted can escape. However, where one has no
means of escaping, the one who is assaulted can use a
weapon in any way reasonably necessary to his
protection against the aggressor.
The deceased here is a bully of known violent
character and although unarmed, he attempted to take
from the accused a bolo which is the only means of
defense possessed by the latter. It would have been an
act of suicide on the part of the accused to allow the
bolo to pass into the hands of his antagonist.
People v. Luague
62 Phil 504 (1935)
Facts: The deceased tried to rape the accused
while her husband was away. The deceased threatened
the accused with a knife to compel her to have sex with
him. As the deceased was preparing to lie down with
her, he placed the knife on the floor and so the accused
took advantage of the situation by getting the knife and
stabbing the deceased with it.
Held: An attempt to rape is a sufficient
aggression for a legitimate claim of self-defense. We
have the right to HONOR. Woman‘s honor is a right as
precious as her very existence because chastity once
defiled cannot be restored.

People v. Dela Cruz
61 Phil 344 (1935)
Facts: Accused was found guilty of homicide
for stabbing and killing Rivera. Prosecution claimed that
Dela Cruz and Rivera had a relationship and that the
accused was madly in love with the deceased and was
extremely jealous of another woman with whom Rivera
also had a relationship. Dela Cruz claimed, on the other
hand, that on her way home one evening, Rivera
followed her, embraced and kissed her and touched her
private parts. She didn‘t know that it was Rivera and
that she was unable to resist the strength of Rivera so
she got a knife from her pocket and stabbed him in
defense of her honor.
Held: She is justified in using the pocketknife
in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her
honor. It was a dark night and she could not have
identified Rivera. There being no other means of self-
defense.
People v. Jaurigue
76 Phil. 174 (1946
Facts: Amado (deceased) has been courting
the accused Avelina in vain. On the day of the crime,
Avelina and Amado were in Church. Amado sat beside
Avelina and placed his hand on her thigh. Thereafter,
Avelina took out her knife and stabbed Amado in the
neck, causing the death of Amado.
Held: Although the defense of one‘s honor
exempts one from criminal liability, it must be proved
that there is actual danger of being raped. In this case,
1) the church was well-lit, 2) there were several people
in the church, including the father of the accused and
other town officials. In light of these circumstances,
accused could not have possibly been raped. The means
employed in defense of her honor was evidently
excessive.
U.S. v. Bumaglang
14 Phil 644 (1909)
Facts: Bumanglang was missing 40 bundles of
palay. Later, accompanied by his co-defendants, he
awaited the culprit and caught Ribis so they confronted
him assaulted him with sticks and other cutting and
stabbing weapons. As a result, Ribis died. Defendants
declared that during the fight they only beat the
deceased with sticks and Ribis unsheathed his bolo.
Bumanglang et al were convicted of homicide.
Held: The bolo of the deceased was sheathed
when the body was discovered. There was no unlawful
aggression on the part of Ribis. Thus, there can be no
claim of self-defense.
Separate Opinion: A man who ambushed one
he suspects to be a thief can claim defense of property.
Not only was there unlawful aggression against
Bumanglag, there was also a wrongful invasion of his
habitat and attempt to commit a felony against his
property. With the imminence of danger to his life, he
realized that he had to ask assistance from his friends,
considering Ribis‘ criminal record, character and unusual
strength.
Toledo v. People
439 SCRA 94 (2004)
Facts: Toledo saw his nephew, Ricky, and the
latter's friends about 5 m away from his house, having a
drinking spree. He ordered them not to make loud
noises, and they obliged. He then went to his house and
went to sleep. After some time, Ricky and his friends
also went to sleep. They had not laid down for long
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when he heard stones being hurled at the roof of the
house. Ricky saw Toledo stoning their house and asked
him why he was doing the same. Toledo did not answer
but met Ricky at the doorstep of his house and without
warning stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo
which resulted to his death. In the lower court, Toledo
defended himself by alleging that his bolo accidentally
hit the stomach of the victim and that he was able to
prove all the essential elements of self-defense.
Held: The Court ruled that it is an aberration
for Toledo to invoke the two defenses at the same time
because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical.
There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in
the realm of criminal law.
The court further ruled that Toledo was not
justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent
threat to his life necessitating his assault. Records reveal
that there is no unlawful aggression, a condition sine
qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense,
on the part of Ricky. Ricky arrived at Toledo‘s house
unarmed. With no weapon to attack Toledo or defend
himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from him.
People vs. Enfectana
381 SCRA 359 (2002)
Facts: While Adelaida and her husband Leo
were on their way home, they were sideswiped by a
tricycle driven by appellant Erwin with Efren both
surnamed Enfectana as passenger. As a result, her
husband fell in a crouching position. When he was about
to get up, Eusebio also surnamed Enfectana came from
behind to stab him. Then Erwin and Efren took turns in
stabbing Leo. He died as a result. In court, Eusebio
Enfectana admitted that he killed Leo. He, however,
alleged that he acted in self-defense
Held: It is an established principle that once
this justifying circumstance is raised, the burden of
proving the elements of the claim shifts to him who
invokes it. The elements of self-defense are: (1) that the
victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting to
actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the
person claiming self-defense; (2) that there be
reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent
or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation
executed by the person claiming self-defense be not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victim's
aggression. The condition of unlawful aggression is a
sine qua non; otherwise stated, there can be no self-
defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has
committed unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.
Given the fact that the relationship between
the parties had been marred by ill will and animosities,
and pursuant to the rule on the burden of evidence
imposed by law on the party invoking self-defense, the
admission of Eusebio that he killed Leo made it
incumbent upon appellant to convincingly prove that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
which necessitated the use of deadly force by Eusebio.
Unfortunately, Eusebio miserably failed to prove the
existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. Eusebio is guilty of murder.
Cano v. People
413 SCRA 92 (2003)
Facts: Conrado and his deceased brother were
rivals in the Rush ID Photo business and had booths
along the sidewalk of Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.

Condrado borrowed the permit of the deceased and had
it photocopied without the latter‘s permission. The
deceased confonted Conrado and tried to stab him with
a fan knife. The latter locked himself in the dark room of
his booth to protect himself but was followed by the
deceased and they ended up attacking each other.
During the scuffle, the scissors which Orlando was able
to grab fell from his hands. He then grabbed the knife
of the deceased who in turn picked the scissors. They
again attacked each other which resulted to the death of
the other.
Held: Conrado‘s act of killilng his brother was
attended by a justifying circumstance of self-defense. It
was the deceased who purposely sought and initially
attacked Orlando with a knife. The act of a person
armed with a bladed weapon pursuing another
constitutes unlawful aggression because it signifies the
pursuers intent to commit an assault with his weapon.
There was also lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of Condrado. His act of photocopying the permit of his
brother without the latter‘s permission can hardly be
considered as provocation to merit so deadly an assault
with a bladed weapon.
Balunueco v. CA
401 SCRA 76
Facts: Amelia was coddling her youngest child
in front of her house when she saw accused Reynaldo,
his father Juanito, brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all
surnamed Balunueco, and one Flores chasing her
brother-in-law Servando. With the 5 individuals in hot
pursuit, Servando scampered into the safety of Amelia's
house. Meanwhile, Senando, who was then cooking
supper, went out of the house unaware of the
commotion going on outside. Upon seeing Senando,
Reynaldo turned his attention on him and gave chase.
Senando instinctively fled towards the fields but he was
met by Armando who hit him with a stone, causing
Senando to feel dizzy. Reynaldo, Ricardo, and Armando
cornered their quarry near a canal and ganged up on
him. Armando placed a can on top of Senando's head
and Ricardo repeatedly struck Senando with an ax on
the head, shoulder, and hand. At one point, Ricardo lost
his hold on the ax, but somebody tossed him a bolo and
then he continued hacking the victim who fell on his
knees. To shield him from further violence, Amelia put
her arms around her husband but it was not enough to
detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy. Amelia was
also hit on the leg. The RTC and CA convicted Ricardo of
Homicide. He now imputes errors to the CA in not taking
into consideration the fact that if indeed he participated,
he had acted in defense of his relatives.
Held: Of the three (3) requisites of defense of
relatives, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua
non, for without it any defense is not possible or
justified. In order to consider that an unlawful
aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that
an attack or material aggression, an offensive act
positively determining the intent of the aggressor to
cause an injury shall have been made; a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to
justify the commission of an act which is punishable per
se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the
ground that it was committed in self-defense or defense
of a relative.
In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly
failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence of a
positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the
deceased Senando. It was he and his kin who had
initiated the unlawful aggression and not Senando.
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Further, the natural impulse of any person who has
killed someone in defense of his person or relative is to
bring himself to the authorities and try to dispel any
suspicion of guilt that the authorities might have against
him. Ricardo failed to do the same. With the exception
of his self-serving allegations, there is nothing on record
that would justify his killing of Senando.
People v. Dijan
383 SCRA 15 (2002)
Facts: Silvestre and Hilario were at a store to
buy some cigarettes when they saw the group of Dijan,
Paglinawan and Lizardo, passing by the store.
Paglinawan suddenly confronted Hilario for purportedly
giving him a "bad stare." Silvestre apologized and
explained that it was the natural way Hilario gazed at
people. Dijan, Paglinawan and Lizardo then left the place
while Silvestre and Hilario proceeded home. While
Silvestre and Hilario were walking, the 3 accused,
ganged up on, and took turns in stabbing, Hilario. At
that point, Hilario, who was walking slightly ahead of
Silvestre, cried out and told the latter to flee. Silvestre
ran away until he was able to cling to a passing
passenger jeepney. Hilario was found to have sustained
several stab wounds, punctured and incised wounds,
and abrasion in various parts of the body which caused
his death. Appealing his conviction in court, Dijan
invoked the justifying circumstance of ―defense of a
stranger.‖
Held: In order to successfully put up this
defense an accused must show the existence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful
aggression must be a continuing circumstance or must
have been existing at the time the defense is made.
Once unlawful aggression is found to have ceased, the
one making the defense of a stranger would likewise
cease to have any justification for killing, or even just
wounding, the former aggressor. From the defense
account, it would appear that Hilario was already
disarmed and the unlawful aggression by Hilario (if
indeed he was the aggressor) to have by then been
abated, when Dijan still delivered the fatal thrusts on
the victim.
The number of wounds sustained by the victim
would itself likewise negate Dijan‘s claim of defense of a
stranger. The autopsy conducted on the corpse would
show that the deceased sustained 14 injuries consisting
of 9 stab wounds, 3 punctured wounds, an incised
wound and an abrasion. Certainly, the nature and
number of wounds inflicted by an accused on the victim
should be significant indicia in determining the
plausibility of the defense plea.
People v. Nestor Roxas
G.R. No. 218396, 10 February 2016
Facts: In the evening of October 25, 1995, Severino
Manalo (victim) and Vicente were talking to each other
in front of the house of Alfredo Asi (Alfredo). Then,
Vicente saw the accused-appellant approach Severino
from behind and suddenly stab the latter thrice with a
white sharp bladed weapon. The three successive stab
blows landed on Severino's back, his stomach and on his
side. Vicente testified that Severino was caught off
guard when he was stabbed by the accused-appellant as
the victim was facing the former while they were talking.
Immediately after Severino was stabbed, the accused-
appellant fled from the place of the incident. For fear
that he might also be attacked, Vicente scampered away
to a safer distance until he reached his place where he
called for help. Vicente, together with some people,

returned to the crime scene where they found Severino
sprawled on the ground already dead.
Accused raised self-defense as an excuse.
Held: After taking into account the location and the
number of stab wounds sustained by the victim, the
accused-appellant's claim of self-defense further
crumbles. To reiterate, the first stab blow hit Severino's
back jibing with Vicente's assertion that the former was
stabbed from behind. Then, when the victim was totally
caught by surprise with the initial attack, the second and
third stab blows were delivered. Additionally, the
number of wounds suffered by Severino invalidates the
accused-appellant's allegation that he was only
defending himself for the number of wounds inflicted are
rather demonstrative of deliberate and criminal intent to
end the life of the victim. Likewise weakening accused
appellant's contention that he acted in self-defense was
his behavior immediately after the incident. In the case
at bar, the accused-appellant himself admitted that upon
seeing the victim lying on the ground, he boarded a jeep
to go to his sister's place in San Pascual, Batangas
before moving to Bicol where he hid from the authorities
for several years. The accused-appellant's flight negates
his plea of self-defense and indicates his guilt.
Espinosa v. People
G.R. No. 181701, March 15, 2010
Facts: Merto has a grudge against Espinosa. One
evening, Merto went to the house of Espinosa shouting
violent threats and challenging Espinosa to a fight. When
Espinosa went outside, Merto threw stones at him.
Espinosa retaliated by hitting Merto in the left leg with a
bolo until someone restrained him. As a result, Merto
sustained two fractures. In his defense, Espinosa claims
that he only acted in self defense.
Held: It is settled that reasonable necessity of the
means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and
defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence,
in the consideration of which will enter the principal
factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which
the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more
than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and
the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the
harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such
injury.
After petitioner was successful in taking down private
complainant Merto—the former continued to hack the
latter, who was, by then, already neutralized by the
blow. The petitioner continuously hacked the private
complainant with the bolo scabbard, even as the latter
lay almost motionless upon the muddy ground. Clearly,
this "continuous hacking" by the petitioner constitutes
force beyond what is reasonably required to repel the
private complainant‘s attack—and is therefore
unjustified.
Nacnac v. People
G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012
Facts: One evening, SPO1 Espejo tried to take the police
station‘s tricycle saying that he needs to settle a
disagreement with someone in Laoag City. SPO2
Nacnac, the officer of the day, refused because Espejo
was drunk and they were on duty until the next
morning. Their argument led Espejo cursing Nacnac and
he tried to draw his pistol. Nacnac saw this and fired a
warning shot and ordered Espejo to stop. However,
Espejo still drew his gun. SPO2 Nacnac shot SPO1
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Espejo in the head. The officer claims self defense as
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Held: Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of
self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense
will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying
circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if
the other elements are present. It would presuppose an
actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
danger on the life and limb of a personnot a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude but most
importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor. x x x There is aggression in
contemplation of the law only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
just speculative.
In this case, a police officer is trained to shoot quickly
and accurately. There is reasonable basis to presume
that the appellant indeed felt his life was actually
threatened. It would have been fatal for the appellant to
have waited for SPO1 Espejo to point his gun before the
appellant fires back. Also, the lone gunshot was a
reasonable means to repeal the attack. There was also
lack of provocation as the accused gave a lawful order
and fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and
drunk victim.
Par. 4 – AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL
 Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury,
does an act which causes damage to another.
DAMAGE TO ANOTHER – the term covers
injury to persons and damage to property. Damage done
deliberately to avoid a greater evil.
Requisites:
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists;
- The evil must actually exist and not
merely expected or anticipated or may happen
in the future.
2. That the injury feared is greater than that
done to avoid it;
Note: The instinct of self-preservation
will always make one feel that his own safety is
of greater importance than that of another.
- The greater evil should not be brought
about by the negligence or imprudence of the
actor.
- The evil which brought about the greater
evil must not result from a violation of law by
the actor.
3. That there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.
General rule: No liability in justifying
circumstances because there is no crime.
Exception: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under
this paragraph. It is borne by the persons benefited by
the act. They shall be liable in proportion to the benefit
which they may have received.

People v. Ricohermoso
56 SCRA 431 (1974)
Facts: The land Ricohermoso cultivated
belonged to Geminiano. When the latter went to the
house of the former, as if by pre-arrangement,
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo and approached
Geminiano from the left while Severo (Rico‘s father-in-
law) got an axe and approached from the right. Rico
stabbed Geminiano first and while in a helpless position,
the latter was hacked on the back by Severo.
At that same place and time while the killing of
Geminiano was taking place, Juan (son of Severo)
suddenly embraced Marianito (son of Geminiano), who
had a gun slung on his shoulder, from behind. They
grappled and rolled downhill towards the camote patch.
Marianito passed out and when he regained
consciousness, his rifle was gone. He walked uphill and
saw his father. Geminiano died later. Juan invoked the
justifying circumstance of greater necessity in explaining
his act of preventing Marianito from shooting Rico and
Severo.
Held: The act of Juan was designed to insure
the killing of Geminiano without any risk to his
assailants. Juan was not avoiding any evil but his
malicious intention was to forestall any interference in
the felonious assault. He acted in conspiracy with Rico
and Severo.
Ty v. People
439 SCRA 220 (2004)
Facts: Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un was
confined at the Manila Doctors' Hospital from October
1990 until June 1992. Being the patient's daughter, Ty
signed the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility for
Payment" in the Contract of Admission. Ty's sister, Judy
Chua, was also confined at the same hospital. The total
hospital bills of the two patients amounted to
P1,075,592.95. Ty executed a promissory note wherein
she assumed payment of the obligation in installments.
To assure payment of the obligation, she drew 7
postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the
hospital which were all dishonored by the drawee bank
and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency
of funds. For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the
checks because of ―an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury.‖ She averred that she was forced to issue the
checks to obtain release for her mother who was being
inhumanely and harshly treated by the hospital. She
alleged that her mother has contemplated suicide if she
would not be discharged from the hospital. Ty was found
guilty by the lower courts of 7 counts of violation of
BP22.
Held: The court sustained the findings of the
lower courts. The evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided
is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, the defense of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury‖ is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage
of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By
her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or
other forms of security instead of postdated checks to
secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity
to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have
been brought about by the negligence or imprudence,
more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case,
the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about
by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills.
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People v. Retubado
417 SCRA 393 (2003)
Facts: Before the killing, someone played a joke on
Jesse Retubado‘s bbrother who was mentally ill by
placing a firecracker in his cigarette box. Emmanuel Jr.
was the suspect but the barangay investigation held that
Emmanuel Jr. was not the culprit. Days later, Jesse
followed Emmanuel Senior who was a pedicab driver.
When Emmanuel Senior got home, he asked Jesse why
he was being followed. Jesse said that he wanted to talk
to Emmanuel Jr. Emmanuel Sr. said that Jr. was already
asleep. Jesse pulled out a gun and shot Emmanuel Sr. in
the head. In his defense, Jesse claims he acted under a
state of necessity as Senior allegedly tried to wrestle the
gun from him.
Held: It is indispensable that the state of necessity must
not be brought about by the intentional provocation of
the party invoking the same. The defense of a state of
necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. It is an
affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused
with clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the
lower courts held that it was Jesse Retubado who was
the attacker. He is not entitled to the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity.
Par. 5 – FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR LAWFUL
EXERCISE OF RIGHT OR OFFICE.
REQUISITES:
1. That the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or office
Art. 429. Civil Code. The owner or lawful
possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
 If in protecting his possession of the
property he injured (not seriously) the one trying to get
it from him, he is justified.
 The actual invasion of property may consist
of a mere disturbance of possession or of a real
dispossession.
2. That the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office.
 Shooting an offender who refused to surrender is
justified but shooting a thief who refused to be arrested
is not justified.
People v. Delima
46 Phil 738 (1922)
Facts: Napilon escaped from the jail where he
was serving sentence. Some days afterwards the
policeman, Delima, who was looking for him found him
in the house of Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of
bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima demanded the
surrender of the weapon but Napilon refused. Delima
fired his revolver to impose his authority but the bullet

did not hit him. The criminal ran away and Delima went
after him and fired again his revolver this time hitting
and killing him.
Held: The killing was done in the performance
of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender and had no right, after evading service of his
sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a
weapon in his hand, which compelled the policeman to
resort to such extreme means, which, although it proved
to be fatal, was justified by the circumstance.
People v. Oanis
74 Phil 257 (1943)
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is
justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary
to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is
never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating
him with wanton violence or in resorting to dangerous
means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.
Pomoy v. People
439 SCRA 439 (2004)
Fats: Police sergeant Pomoy, went near the
door of the jail where Balboa was detained for robbery
and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for
tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that
time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in
a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. The
gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the
handle of the gun protruding from the holster. Balboa
tried to remove Pomoy‘s gun and the two grappled for
possession of the gun. Thereafter, 2 gunshots were
heard. When the source of the shots was verified,
petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol,
facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood. Pomoy
invoked the defense of accident for his defense.
Held: Pomoy is acquitted. At the time of the
incident, petitioner was a member — specifically, one of
the investigators — of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, he was in the lawful performance of his
duties as investigating officer that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from
the latter's cell for a routine interrogation.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the
victim's death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an
enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its
holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of
the two successive shots — all of which led to the death
of the victim — were sufficiently demonstrated to have
been consequences of circumstances beyond the control
of petitioner. At the very least, these factual
circumstances create serious doubt on Pomoy‘s
culpability.
People v. Ulep
340 SCRA 688 (2000)
Accused-appellant and the other police officers
involved originally set out to perform a legal duty: to
render police assistance, and restore peace and order at
Mundog Subdivision where the victim was then running
amuck. There were two (2) stages of the incident at
Mundog Subdivision. During the first stage, the victim
threatened the safety of the police officers by
menacingly advancing towards them, notwithstanding
accused-appellant's previous warning shot and verbal
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admonition to the victim to lay down his weapon or he
would be shot. As a police officer, it is to be expected
that accused-appellant would stand his ground. Up to
that point, his decision to respond with a barrage of
gunfire to halt the victim's further advance was justified
under the circumstances. After all, a police officer is not
required to afford the victim the opportunity to fight
back. Neither is he expected – when hard pressed and in
the heat of such an encounter at close quarters – to
pause for a long moment and reflect coolly at his peril,
or to wait after each blow to determine the effects
thereof.
However, he cannot be exonerated from
overdoing his duty during the second stage of the
incident — when he fatally shot the victim in the head,
even after the latter slumped to the ground due to
multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the
police officers. Sound discretion and restraint dictated
that accused-appellant, a veteran policeman, should
have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw the
latter fall to the ground. The victim at that point no
longer posed a threat and was already incapable of
mounting an aggression against the police officers.
Shooting him in the head was obviously unnecessary.
The law does not clothe police officers with
authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill- it must
be stressed that their judgment and discretion as police
officers in the performance of their duties must be
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but
within reasonable limits.
Cabanlig v. Sandiganbayan
464 SCRA 324 (2005)
Facts: A robbery occurred a few days earlier. The police
officers were able to recover most of the items except
for a flower vase and a small radio. The officers went to
the area with Valino, one of the suspects on a pickup.
Valino was seated between officers Cabanlig and
Mercado. When he saw an opportunity, Valino grabbed
officer Mercado‘s M-16 and jumped out of the jeep.
Valino was shot to the head by Cabanlig. In his defense,
the officer claims that he was acting in fulfillment of
duty.
Held: Policeman in the performance of duty is justified
in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure
and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm. In case injury or death
results from the policeman‘s exercise of such force, the
policeman could be justified in inflicting the injury or
causing the death of the offender if the policeman had
used necessary force. Since a policeman‘s duty requires
him to overcome the offender, the force exerted by the
policeman may therefore differ from that which
ordinarily may be offered in self-defense. However, a
policeman is never justified in using unnecessary force
or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
affected otherwise.Unlike in self-defense where unlawful
aggression is an element, in performance of duty,
unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite.
In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the
presence of the policemen when Valino grabbed the M16
Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to
escape. The policemen would have been justified in
shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely
necessary to prevent his escape. But Valino was not only

an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16
Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the duty not
only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose
firearm. By grabbing Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a
formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the
policemen in grave danger.
Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012
Facts: A jeepney containing several people who
attended a fiesta was fired at by 6 men who were PNP
officers and barangay officials. One of the passengers
was killed and others were severely wounded. The
accused officers claim that the vehicle refused to stop at
a checkpoint and they only were acting in the fulfillment
of duties.
Held: Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the
law. Only absolute necessity justifies the use of force,
and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such
necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in
that respect. Although the employment of powerful
firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary
force, petitioners in this case do not seem to have been
confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the
moving jeepney occupied by the victims.
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which
caused injuries to Villanueva and which brought the
eventual death of Licup has been committed by
petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining
peace and order; that the acts performed by them
preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the
execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves,
demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the
subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective
action deliberately and consciously intended to inflict
harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those
acts negates their defense of lawful performance of
official duty.
Lacanilao v. CA
162 SCRA 563 (1988)
Issue: When the decision finds in favor of the accused
the circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of a right, would Article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code apply, thereby resulting in the lowering of
the penalty by one or two degrees?
Held: Yes. Article 69 is applicable, for the requirement
"that the majority of such conditions be present" is
immaterial since there are only two conditions in order
that the circumstance in No. 5 of Article 11 may be
taken into account. Basic is the rule that penal laws in
favor of the accused should be given liberal construction
without, of course, going beyond the obvious intention
of the legislature. Article 69 is, obviously, in favor of the
accused as it provides for a penalty lower than that
prescribed by law when the crime committed is not
wholly justifiable, the intention of the legislature being
to mitigate the penalty by reason of the diminution of
either freedom of action, intelligence, or intent, or of the
lesser perversity of the offender.
Hildawa v. Enrile
G.R. No. L-67766, August 14, 1985
Facts: Petitioner alleges that in response to the rising
criminality in Metro Manila, the police deployed secret
marshals given the authority to kill thieves, robbers,
pickpockets and other criminal elements.
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Held: There is nothing wrong in the creation and
deployment of special operation teams to counter the
resurgence of criminality, as there is nothing wrong in
the formation by the police of special teams/squads to
prevent the proliferation of vices, prostitution, drug
addiction, pornography and the like. That is the basic
job of the police. It is the alleged use of violence in the
implementation of the objectives of the special squads
that the court is concerned about.
What is bad is if kill these "criminals" because then they
are not only law enforcers but also the prosecutors. the
judges and the executioners. Due process of law
requires that the accused must be heard in court of
competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under the
orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry
and investigation, upon notice to him. with an
opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within
the authority of a constitutional law.
Thus, when a person is killed by another the burden of
proving self-defense is on the assailant. It becomes his
duty to establish this justifying circumstance by
evidence clear and convincing. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence. It matters not that the
People's evidence is weak. He must show that (1) he is
not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on his part; and, (3) he employed
reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression.
Par. 6 – OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED FOR
SOME LAWFUL PURPOSE
Requisites:
1. That an order has been issued by a superior.
2. That such order must be for some lawful
purpose.
3. That the means used by the subordinate to
carry out said order is lawful.
 When the order is not for a lawful purpose,
the subordinate who obeyed it is criminally liable.
 The subordinate is not liable for carrying out
an illegal order of his superior, if he is not aware of the
illegality of the order and he is not negligent.
People v. Beronilla
96 Phil 566(1955)
Facts: Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz,
Abra at the outbreak of war and continued to serve as
Mayor during Japanese occupation. Beronilla was
appointed later as Military Mayor. Later, while the
operations for the liberation of Abra was in progress,
Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal in
his custody and asked the residents to file charges of
espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority
against him. After trial, Borjal‘s execution took place.
Later, Beronilla, together with a priest, executioner,
grave digger, etc. were indicted for murder. The
prosecution claimed that Col. Volkmann transmitted a
radiogram message stating that the jury system
organized by the municipality is illegal and cannot order
execution of Borjal.
Held: There is no proof that Beronilla was able
to receive the radiogram message. The records are
ample to sustain the claim of the accused that the
arrest, prosecution and trial were done pursuant to
express orders of the 15th Infantry HQ. Where the
accused acted upon orders of superior officers that the

military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in
good faith, without being aware of their illegality,
without any fault or negligence on their part, the act is
not accompanied by criminal intent. A crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act
be innocent.
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan
268 SCRA 332 (1997)
Facts: Pres. Marcos instructed Tabuena over
the phone to pay directly to the Office of the President in
cash what MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction
Corporation (PNCC) which later was reiterated in writing.
The Marcos‘ memo indicated the amount of P55m for
partial payment of the obligation to PNCC as mentioned
in Ongpin‘s memo. In obedience to Marcos‘ instruction,
the accused withdrew the amount by means of 3
separate issuances of manager‘s check and encashment
in 3 separate dates as well. The money withdrawn were
placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags and delivered
to the private secretary of Marcos also in 3 separate
days. According to the accused, the disbursement was
not in the normal procedure since it is paid in cold cash,
there were no vouchers supporting it and no receipt
from PNCC.
Tabuena and Peralta were convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of malversation as defined in Art. 217,
RPC for misappropriating funds of Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) worth P55M.
Held: The accused are acquitted. The accused
is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to
an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Sandiganbayan claimed that are Marcos‘ memo was
unlawful because it orders disbursement of P55M when
the Ongpin memo reveals that the liability is only 34.5M.
Granting this to be true, it will not affect Tabuena‘s good
faith as to make him criminally liable. Thus, even if the
order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate
is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable,
for then there would only be a mistake of fact
committed in good faith.
2. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
 Exempting circumstances (non-imputability)
are those grounds for exemption from punishment
because there is wanting in the agent of the crime any
of the condition which make the act voluntary or
negligent. While the act is criminal, the actor is not
liable. There is, however, civil liability.
 The exemption from punishment is based on
the COMPLETE ABSENCE of intelligence, freedom of
action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the
part of the accused.
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability. — the following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of
the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
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3. A person over nine years of age and under
fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which
case, such minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally
irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the
provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall
commit him to the care and custody of his family who
shall be charged with his surveillance and education
otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful
act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of
irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act
required by law, when prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause.
• One who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances commits a crime, although by the
complete absence of any of the conditions which
constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no
criminal liability arise.
Par. 1 – AN IMBECILE OR INSANE PERSON,
UNLESS THE LATTER HAS ACTED DURING A LUCID
INTERVAL
IMBECILE
- one who, while advanced in age, has a
mental development comparable to that of children
between 2 and 7 years of age.
– one who is deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime.
- exempt in all cases from criminal liability
INSANE
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act but capable of having lucid intervals.
During a lucid interval, the insane acts with intelligence
and thus, not exempt from criminal liability.
- Cognition Test – complete deprivation of
intelligence.
- Volition Test – complete deprivation of will.
PROCEDURE WHEN AN IMBECILE OR INSANE
COMMITTED A FELONY
- The court shall order his confinement in one
of the hospitals or asylums established for persons
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the court. The
court must obtain the opinion of the Director of Health
before permitting his release.
• When the person is sane at the time of the commission
of the crime but he becomes insane at the time of the
trial, he is liable criminally. The trial, however, shall be
suspended until mental capacity of the accused be
restored to afford him a fair trial.
• Evidence of insanity must refer to the time preceding
the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent
to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be
acquitted.

• Feeblemindedness is not imbecility because a feeble-
minded person can distinguish right from wrong.
• Cases covered under this article:
a. Dementia praecox
b. Kleptomania – if found by a competent
psychiatrist as irresistible
c. Epilepsy
d. Somnambulism – sleep-walking
e. Malignant malaria – which affects the
nervous system
People v. Mejaro Roa
G.R. No. 225599, 22 March 2017
Facts: Eliseo was approached from behind by
accused who suddenly stabbed him on the left lower
back with a bolo. The accused surrendered voluntarily.
Accused is known to have suffered mental disorder prior
to his commission of the crime charged. The RTC found
the accused guilty of the offense of Murder. The CA
affirmed the finding of conviction by the trial court.
Held: Insanity as an exempting circumstance is
not easily available to the accused as a successful
defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the
human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an
exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it
with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or
proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.
Accused further argues that the presumption of sanity
must not be applied in his case, because of the rule that
a person who has been committed to a hospital or to an
asylum for the insane is presumed to continue to be
insane. In this case, however, it is noteworthy that while
accused was confined in a mental institution in 2001, he
was properly discharged therefrom in 2002. This proper
discharge from his confinement clearly indicates an
improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his
doctors would not have allowed his discharge from
confinement. Absent any contrary evidence, then, the
presumption of sanity resumes and must prevail.
People v. Tubogoca
285 SCRA 312(1998)
Facts: Jacqueline, together with her sisters,
lived with their father after their mother died. One night,
she was roused by her father who asked her to scratch
his back but later she was forced to have intercourse
with him. Her sister Jinky also experienced the same
with his father 2 years after. When their grandmother
found out about the incident, they filed charges against
the accused. The accused claim that he cannot
remember anything because he often drinks liquor at
home.
Held: The law presumes every man to be sane.
The accused failed to overthrow the presumption of
sanity. Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the
mental condition of the accused when the crime was
performed. His charade of amnesia is a desperate
gambit for exculpation.
People v. Madarang
332 SCRA 99(2000)
Facts: Fernando and his wife quarreled. In the
heat of the fight, the accused stabbed his wife causing
her death. The accused declared that he had no
recollection of the stabbing incident. Further, he alleges
that he did not know where he was that day. Court
ordered the accused‘s confinement in a mental
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institution where it was found that he was inflicted with
schizophrenia. He was submitted to treatment for 2
years, after which, he faced the charges against him.
Held: The accused failed to prove that he was
completely deprived of intelligence in committing the
act. He did not show any signs of insanity prior to and
immediately after the act. He was only diagnosed of
schizophrenia months after the incident. Also, schizos
have lucid intervals.
People v. Bonoan
64 Phil 87 (1937)
A person suffering from dementia praecox
pleaded insanity as a defense for committing murder. In
dementia praecox, the crime is usually preceded by
much complaining and planning. In these people,
homicide attacks are common because of delusions that
they are being interfered with sexually or that their
property is being taken. During period of excitement,
such person has no control whatever of his acts. An
irresistible homicide impulse was considered embraced
in the term of ―insanity‖.
People v. Taneo
58 Phil 87(1933)
Facts: A fiesta was being celebrated in the
barrio and visitors were being entertained at the house
of Taneo and his wife. That afternoon, Taneo went to
sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the
room with a bolo in his hand. He wounded his wife who
was pregnant at that time in the abdomen when she
tried to stop him. He attacked two of his visitors and his
father, after which, he wounded himself. 5 days later,
his wife died because of the wound. He was charged of
parricide.
Held: The accused acted while in a dream and
his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in
the sense of entailing criminal liability.
People v. Formigones
87 Phil 658(1950)
Held: One day, the accused stabbed his wife
from the back who was sitting at the top of the stairs in
their house. Accused admitted the killing and that he
was jealous and had suspicions that his wife and his
brother were having a relationship. Counsel for accused
interposed the defense of insanity stating that in prison,
the accused behaved like an insane person, would go
stark naked in the presence of his fellow inmates,
remain indifferent to his surroundings and sang chorus
with inmates or by himself.
Held: At most, the accused is found to be
feeble-minded but this does not exempt him from
liability but may serve as a mitigating circumstance. The
accused admitted to his motive for the killing which is
jealousy so he must know what he was doing at that
time. His actions immediately after he struck his wife
and his behavior in prison may only be due to remorse
at having killed his wife due to his feeblemindedness.
People v. Valledor (supra)
Facts: Roger was in his house working on a
lettering job inside his bedroom together with his first
cousin, Elsa and his friends, Simplicio and Antonio. All
of a sudden, Valledor entered the room uttered Roger's
nickname ("Jer") and immediately attacked him with a
knife. Valledor then stabbed Elsa on the chest and said,
"Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa).
Thereafter, Valledor fled, leaving Simplicio and Antonio
unharmed. Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to

the hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a
commotion and saw that Ricardo, a neighbor of the
victim, who was likewise stabbed by Valledor was
wounded. Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on
the other hand was treated for the 5-centimeter wound
sustained by him on his right forearm. Valledor invoked
the defense of insanity.
Held: Valledor failed to discharge the burden of
overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the
commission of the crime.
Judging from his acts, Valledor was clearly
aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact
purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other
people were also inside the room, but Valledor went for
the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the
victims was accentuated by calling out their names and
uttering the words, "I had my revenge" after stabbing
them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the
scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of
the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof.
As consistently held by this Court, "A man may
act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is legally so. Then, too, the medical
findings showing that Valledor was suffering from a
mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has
no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental
condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense.
Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was
legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should
be held liable for his felonious acts.
Par. 2. – A PERSON UNDER NINE YEARS OF AGE
• FIFTEEN YEARS OR LESS – presumed to be incapable
of committing a crime, and this presumption is an
absolute one which cannot be overcome by any
evidence. (R.A. No. 9334)
• Senility, although said to be the second childhood, is
only mitigating.
4 PERIODS OF THE LIFE OF A HUMAN BEING
a. 15 years and below –
AGE OF ABSOLUTE IRRESPONSIBILITY
b. between 15 and 18 years - killed or raped or offenses under Republic Act No. 9165
AGE OF CONDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
c. 18 or over to 70 years -
AGE OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY
d. over 70 years of age – AGE OF MITIGATED
RESPONSIBILITY.
Par. 3. – A PERSON OVER 9 YEARS OF AGE AND
UNDER 15 UNLESS HE HAS ACTED WITH
DISCERNMENT, IN WHICH CASE, SUCH MINOR
SHALL BE PROCEEDED AGAINST IN COORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 80 OF THIS
CODE.
• A minor over 15 and under 18 years of age must have
acted without discernment to be exempted from criminal
liability.
DISCERNMENT – means the mental capacity of a minor
between 15 and 18 years of age to fully appreciate the
consequences of his lawful act.
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DISCERNMENT INTENT
Moral significance that a Desired act of the person
person ascribes to the said
act
• Discernment may be shown by 1) the manner the
crime was committed or 2) the conduct of the offender
after its commission.
R.A. 9344, Sec. 6 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006)
A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to appropriate proceedings.
The exemption from criminal liability does not
include exemption from civil liability.
Note: A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. A child is deemed to be
fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth
anniversary of his/her birthdate (R.A. No. 10630,
amending Section 6 o R.A. No. 9344).
Serious Crimes committed by Children who are
Exempt from Criminal Responsibility (R.A. No.
10630, amending Section 20 of R.A. No. 9344)
A child who is above twelve (12) years of age
up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits
parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious
illegal detention where the victim is killed or raped,
robbery, with homicide or rape, destructive arson,
rape, or carnapping where the driver or occupant is
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
punishable by more than twelve (12) years of
imprisonment, shall be deemed a neglected child under
P.D. No. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), as
amended, and shall be mandatorily placed in a special
facility within the youth care faculty or ‗Bahay Pag-asa‘
called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support
Center (IJISC) (Sec. 20-A of R.A. No. 9344, as
amended).
Repetition of Offenses (R.A. No. 10630, amending
Section 20 of R.A. No. 9344)
A child who is above twelve (12) years of age
up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits an
offense for the second time or oftener shall be deemed
a neglected child under P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
shall undergo an intensive intervention program
supervised by the local social welfare and development
officer, provided that:
1. the child was previously subjected to
a community-based intervention program;
2. if the best interest of the child
requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility

or ‗Bahay Pag-asa‘, the child‘s parents or guardians
shall execute a written authorization for the voluntary
commitment of the child; and
3. if the child has no parents or
guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written
authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper
petition for involuntary commitment shall be
immediately filed by the DSWD or the LSWDO pursuant
to P.D. No. 603, as amended (Sec. 20-B of R.A. No.
9344, as amended).
Note: In the following cases the minor offenders are
under 15 years of age when they committed the crime.
They are thus exempt from criminal liabilities.
People v. Doquena
68 Phil 580 (1939)
A 13-year old student stabs the school bully,
and is convicted for having shown discernment through
his responsible demeanor and school performance.
Doquena‘s discernment is gleaned from his academic
records, leadership qualities and demeanor while
testifying in court.
The discernment that constitutes an exception
to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, is his mental capacity
to understand the difference between right and wrong,
and such capacity may be known by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by
the records in each case, the very appearance, the very
attitude of said minor not only before and during the
commission of the act but also after and even during
trial.
Jose v. People
448 SCRA 116 (2005)
Facts: Jose, 13 years old was in a car with his
cousin Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur
buyer SPO1 Guevarra if he could afford to buy shabu.
Guevarra replied in the affirmative afterwhich Zarraga
called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the
shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. Jose
handed over the plastic containing the shabu to Zarraga
who handed the same to Guevarra. The trial court
rendered judgment convicting both Jose and Zarraga.
Held: Jose is acquitted. The prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with
discernment relative to the sale of shabu. Aside from
bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to
Zarraga, Jose merely sat in the car and had no other
participation in the transaction between his cousin and
the poseur buyer. There is no evidence that Jose knew
what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before
and at the time he handed the same to Zarraga.
Llave v. People
488 SCRA 376 (2006)
Facts: A 12 year old honor student was
charged with raping his seven year old neighbor. When
caught, the accused ran away and hid for a few days at
his grandparent‘s house. He claimed that he acted
without discernment.
Held: Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of
age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability,
unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason
behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence
of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is
an essential element of a felony either by dolo or by
culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine
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the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the
accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical
appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and
during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing
and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the
gruesome nature of the crime and the minor‘s cunning
and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with
methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind
the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure
that passersby would not be able to discover his
dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto
Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled
from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of
his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmother‘s
house to avoid being arrested by policemen and
remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took
him into custody.
• When the minor is adjudged criminally irresponsible –
duty of court is to commit him to custody of his family or
some institution.
• The allegation of ―with intent to kill‖ in the information
is sufficient allegation of discernment.
Guevarra v. Almodovar
169 SCRA 476 (1989)
Facts: John Philip Guevarra and Teodoro Almine, both
11 years of age, were target shooting a bottle cap
(tansan) using a pellet gun. Teodoro was hit on his left
collar bone which caused his death. The minor was
charged of Homicide through reckless imprudence.
Held: The discernment that constitutes an exception to
the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong. The terms
"intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts.
While both are products of the mental processes within a
person, the former refers to the desired of one's act
while the latter relates to the moral significance that
person ascribes to the said act.
The basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the
RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the
part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as
the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
The second element
of dolus is intelligence; without this
power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish
a licit from an illicit act, no crime can
exist, and because ... the
infant (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability.
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of
age and below are not capable of performing a criminal
act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of
appeal but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt.

However, they are presumed to be without criminal
capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it
could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating
the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they)
acted with discernment.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa,
three (3) elements are indispensable, namely,
intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence.
Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However,
intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is
necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen
years of age be possessed with intelligence in
committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-
offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern
the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent
act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below
fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under
Article 365 of the RPC. The case was remanded for trial
on the merits.
People v. Henry Arpon
G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011
Facts:Henry Arpon was accused of 8 counts of rape
committed against his niece. The first incident happened
when Henry was only 13 years old and the victim was 8
years old. The others were committed when Henry was
already 17 years old. He even threatened the victim that
he will kill the victim‘s mother if she tells anybody about
the rape.
Held: Henry is exempted from criminal liability for the
1st incident when he was still 13 years old. For the
subsequent acts committed when he was already 17
years old, he already acted with discernment.
R.A. 9344 sec. 6 provides:
A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings…
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Presidential Decree No. 603
THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE
Article 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful
offender is one who is over nine years but under twenty-one
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.
A child nine years of age or under at the time of
the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability and shall
be committed to the care of his or her father or mother, or
nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of the court
and subject to its supervision. The same shall be done for a
child over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense, unless he acted with
discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Article 192.
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The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal
Code shall be deemed modified by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Article 190. Physical and Mental
Examination. - It shall be the duty of the law-enforcement
agency concerned to take the youthful offender, immediately
after his apprehension, to the proper medical or health
officer for a thorough physical and mental examination.
Whenever treatment for any physical or mental defect is
indicated, steps shall be immediately undertaken to provide
the same.
The examination and treatment papers shall form
part of the record of the case of the youthful offender.
Article 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held
for Examination or Trial. - A youthful offender held for
physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal,
if unable to furnish bail, shall from the time of his arrest be
committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare
or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the
province or city which shall be responsible for his
appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in
the absence of any such center or agency within a
reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the
provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for
youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court
may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the
Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies
authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on
recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable
person who shall be responsible for his appearance
whenever required.
Article 192. Suspension of Sentence and
Commitment of Youthful Offender. - If after hearing the
evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find
that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged
against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court
shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such
minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social
Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the
government, or duly licensed agencies or any other
responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one
years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem
proper, after considering the reports and recommendations
of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or
responsible individual under whose care he has been
committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation
and supervision by a representative of the Department of
Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other
officer as the Court may designate subject to such conditions
as it may prescribe.
Article 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender
whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of
the court in the same manner as appeals in criminal cases.
Article 194. Care and Maintenance of
Youthful Offender. - The expenses for the care and
maintenance of the youthful offender whose sentence has
been suspended shall be borne by his parents or those
persons liable to support him: Provided, That in case his
parents or those persons liable to support him can not pay
all or part of said expenses, the municipality in which the
offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses
or part thereof; the province to which the municipality
belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third
shall be borne by the National Government. Chartered cities
shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a
chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of the internal

revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid portion shall be
withheld and applied to the settlement of said indebtedness.
All city and provincial governments must exert
efforts for the immediate establishment of local detention
homes for youthful offenders.
Article 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The
Department of Social Welfare or its representative or duly
licensed agency or individual under whose care the youthful
offender has been committed shall submit to the court every
four months or oftener as may be required in special cases,
a written report on the conduct of said youthful offender as
well as the intellectual, physical, moral, social and emotional
progress made by him.
Article 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is
shown to the satisfaction of the court that the youthful
offender whose sentence has been suspended, has behaved
properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member
of the community, even before reaching the age of majority,
upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare,
it shall dismiss the case and order his final discharge.
Article 197. Return of the Youth Offender to
Court. - Whenever the youthful offender has been found
incorrigible or has wilfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his rehabilitation programs, or should his
continued stay in the training institution be inadvisable, he
shall be returned to the committing court for the
pronouncement of judgment.
When the youthful offender has reached the age
of twenty-one while in commitment, the court shall
determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with
the next preceding article or to pronounce the judgment of
conviction.
In any case covered by this article, the youthful
offender shall be credited in the service of his sentence with
the full time spent in actual commitment and detention
effected under the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 198. Effect of Release of Child Based
on Good Conduct. - The final release of a child pursuant to
the provisions of this Chapter shall not obliterate his civil
liability for damages. Such release shall be without prejudice
to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil
damages.
Article 199. Living Quarters for Youthful
Offenders Sentence. - When a judgment of conviction is
pronounced in accordance with the provisions of Article 197,
and at the time of said pronouncement the youthful offender
is still under twenty-one, he shall be committed to the
proper penal institution to serve the remaining period of his
sentence: Provided, That penal institutions shall provide
youthful offenders with separate quarters and, as far as
practicable, group them according to appropriate age levels
or other criteria as will insure their speedy rehabilitation:
Provided, further, That the Bureau of Prisons shall maintain
agricultural and forestry camps where youthful offenders
may serve their sentence in lieu of confinement in regular
penitentiaries.
Article 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where
a youthful offender has been charged before any city or
provincial fiscal or before any municipal judge and the
charges have been ordered dropped, all the records of the
case shall be destroyed immediately thereafter.
Where a youthful offender has been charged and
the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him
to an institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to
this Chapter, all the records of his case shall be destroyed
immediately after such acquittal, dismissal or release, unless
civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal action, in
which case such records shall be destroyed after satisfaction
of such civil liability. The youthful offender concerned shall
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not be held under any provision of law, to be guilty of
perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of
his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related
thereto in response to any inquiry made of him for any
purpose.
"Records" within the meaning of this article shall
include those which may be in the files of the National
Bureau of Investigation and with any police department, or
any other government agency which may have been
involved in the case.
Article 201. Civil Liability of Youthful
Offenders. - The civil liability for acts committed by a
youthful offender shall devolve upon the offender's father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother, or
in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil
liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or
family friend of the youthful offender.
Article 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The
Department of Social Welfare shall establish regional
rehabilitation centers for youthful offenders. The local
government and other non-governmental entities shall
collaborate and contribute their support for the
establishment and maintenance of these facilities.
Article 203. Detention Homes. - The
Department of Local Government and Community
Development shall establish detention homes in cities and
provinces distinct and separate from jails pending the
disposition of cases of juvenile offenders.
Article 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian
or Any Person in the Commission of Delinquent Acts
by Their Children or Wards. - A person whether the
parent or guardian of the child or not, who knowingly or
wilfully,
1. Aids, causes, abets or connives with the
commission by a child of a delinquency, or
2. Does any act producing, promoting, or
contributing to a child's being or becoming a juvenile
delinquent, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five
hundred pesos or to imprisonment for a period not
exceeding two years, or both such fine and imprisonment, at
the discretion of the court.
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 02-1-19-SC. February 28, 2002.]
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON COMMITMENT OF
CHILDREN
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting
for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed
Rule on Commitment Of Children, the Court Resolved to
APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on April 15, 2002 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not
later than March 15, 2002.
February 28, 2002.
RULE ON COMMITMENT OF CHILDREN
SECTION 1. Objective. — The objective
of this Rule is to ensure that every effort is exerted to
promote the child's welfare and enhance his
opportunities for a useful and happy life. Toward this
end, this Rule seeks to protect the child from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to his development.
SECTION 2. Interpretation. — The
best interests of the child shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning him, whether

undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities and
legislative bodies consistent with the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. —
(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen years of
age.
(b) "Department" refers to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.
(c) "Dependent child" is one who is without a
parent, guardian or custodian, or one whose parents,
guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be
relieved of his care and custody, and is dependent upon
the public for support.
(d) "Abandoned child" is one who has no proper
parental care or guardianship, or whose parents or
guardian has deserted him for a period of at least six (6)
continuous months.
(e) "Neglected child" is one whose basic needs
have been deliberately unattended to or inadequately
attended to, physically or emotionally, by his parents or
guardian.
(f) "Physical neglect" occurs when the child is
malnourished, ill-clad and without proper shelter.
(g) "Emotional neglect" occurs when a child is
raped, seduced, maltreated, exploited, overworked or
made to work under conditions not conducive to good
health; made to beg in the streets or public places, or
when placed in moral danger, or exposed to drugs,
alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other vices.
(h) "Disabled child" includes mentally retarded,
physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed and
mentally ill children, children with cerebral palsy and
those with similar afflictions.
(i) "Mentally retarded child" is one who is (1)
socially incompetent, that is, socially inadequate,
occupationally incompetent and unable to manage his
own affairs; (2) mentally subnormal; (3) intellectually
retarded from birth or early age; (4) retarded at
maturity; (5) mentally deficient as a result of
constitutional origin through heredity or diseases or (6)
essentially incurable.
(j) "Physically handicapped child" is one who is
crippled, deaf-mute, blind, or otherwise suffers from a
defect which restricts his means of action or
communication with others.
(k) "Emotionally disturbed child" is one who,
although not afflicted with insanity or mental defect, is
unable to maintain normal social relations with others
and the community in general due to emotional
problems or complexes,
(l) "Mentally ill child" is one with any behavioral
disorder, whether functional or organic, which is of such
a degree of severity as to require professional help or
hospitalization.
(m) "Commitment" or "surrender of a child" is the
legal act of entrusting a child to the care of the
Department or any duly licensed child-placement or
child-caring agency or individual by the court, parent or
guardian or any interested party.
(n) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose
parents have been permanently and judicially deprived
of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial,
continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or
incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities in
accordance with Section 4 herein.
(o) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose
parents knowingly and willingly relinquished parental
authority to the Department or any duly licensed child-
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placement or child-caring agency or individual in
accordance with Section 3 herein.
(p) "Child-placing or child-placement agency"
refers to a private non-profit or charitable institution or
government agency duly licensed, and accredited by the
Department to provide comprehensive child welfare
services, including but not limited to, receiving
applications for adoption or foster care, evaluating the
prospective adoptive or foster parents and preparing the
home study report.
(q) "Child-caring agency" refers to a private non-
profit or charitable institution or government agency
duly licensed and accredited by the Department that
provides twenty-four hour residential care services for
abandoned, orphaned, neglected, involuntarily or
voluntarily committed children.
(r) "Guardian ad litem" is a person appointed by
the court where the case is pending for a child sought to
be committed to protect his best interests.
(s) "Case Study Report" is a written report of the
result of an investigation conducted by a social worker
as to the socio-cultural, economic and legal status or
condition of the child sought to be committed. It shall
include among others his developmental age,
educational attainment, family and social relationships,
the quality of his peer group, his family's strengths and
weaknesses and parental control over him. The report is
submitted to the Family Court to aid it in its evaluation
of whether the child ought to be committed to the care
of the Department or any duly licensed child-placement
or child-caring agency or individual.
SECTION 4. Petition for Involuntary
Commitment of a Child. —
(a) Who may file. — The Secretary of the
Department or his authorized representative or any duly
licensed child-placement or child-caring agency having
knowledge of a child who appears to be dependent,
abandoned or neglected, may file a verified petition for
involuntary commitment of said child to the care of any
duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual.
(b) Venue. — The petition shall be filed with the
Family Court of the province or city in which the parent
or guardian resides or where the child is found.
(c) Contents of Verified Petition. — The petition
must state:
(1) The names of the parents or guardian
and their place of residence. If the child's parents
are unknown, petitioner must allege that diligent
efforts have been exerted to locate them. If said
parents are deceased, petitioner shall attach a
certified true copy of their death certificate;
(2) The facts showing that the child is
dependent, abandoned, or neglected;
(3) The facts showing who has custody of
the child at the time of the filing of the petition; and
(4) The name, address and written
consent of the Department or duly licensed child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual to
whose care the commitment of the child is sought
to be entrusted.
(d) Summons; Court to Set Time for Hearing. — If
the court is satisfied that the petition is sufficient in form
and substance, it shall direct the clerk of court to
immediately issue summons which shall be served
together with a copy of the petition and a notice of
hearing, upon the parents or guardian of the child and
the office of the public prosecutor not less than five (5)
days before the date of the hearing. The office of the

public prosecutor shall be directed to immediately
transmit the summons to the prosecutor assigned to the
Family Court concerned.
If it appears from the petition that both parents of
the child are dead or that neither parent can be found in
the province or city where the court is located and the
child has no guardian residing therein, summons may
not be issued and the court shall thereupon appoint a
guardian ad litem pursuant to Sub-section (f) below and
proceed with the hearing of the case with due notice to
the provincial or city prosecutor,
(e) Social Worker. — After the court sets the
petition for hearing in accordance with Sub-section (d)
above, it shall direct the social worker to submit, before
the hearing, a case study report of the child to aid it in
evaluating whether said child should be committed to
the care of the Department or any duly licensed child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual. The
report shall bear the signature of the social worker on
every page.
(f) Guardian Ad Litem of Child. — If neither of the
parents nor the guardian of the child can be located or
does not appear in court despite due notice, or if the
court finds them incompetent to protect the best
interests of the child, it shall be the duty of the court to
appoint a suitable person as guardian ad litem to
represent the child. In making the appointment, the
court shall consider the background of the guardian ad
litem and his familiarity with the judicial process, social
service programs and child development. A member of
the Philippine Bar may be appointed guardian ad litem.
(g) Child's Right to Counsel. — The court, upon
request of the child capable of forming his own views or
upon request of his guardian ad litem, shall appoint a
lawyer to represent him in the proceedings.
(h) Duty of Public Prosecutor. — The provincial or
city prosecutor shall appear for the State and ascertain if
there has been due notice to all parties concerned and
that there is justification for the declaration of
dependency, abandonment or neglect.
(i) Hearing. — The court shall direct the person or
agency which has custody of the child to bring the latter
to the court on the date of the hearing of the petition
and shall ascertain the facts and determine whether the
child is dependent, abandoned, or neglected, and if so,
the cause and circumstances of such condition.
(j) Judgment. — If, after the hearing, the court
shall find the child to be dependent, abandoned, or
neglected, it shall render judgment committing him to
the care and custody of the Department or any duly
licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual until he reaches the age of eighteen (18). The
judgment shall likewise make proper provisions for the
custody of the property or money belonging to the
committed child.
If the child is committed to the Department, it shall
notify the court within thirty (30) days from the order of
commitment, the name and address of the duly licensed
and accredited child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual where the child shall be placed.
However, if the court finds that the abandonment or
neglect of the child may be remedied, the child may be
allowed to stay in his own home under the care and
control of his parents or guardian, subject to supervision
and direction of the Department.
(k) Visitation or Inspection. — Any duly licensed
child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to
whom a child has been committed by the court shall be
subject to visitation or inspection by a representative of
the court or of the Department, as the case may be or of
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REVIEW NOTES
both, to determine whether the welfare and interests of
the child are being served.
(l) Report of Person or Institution. — Any duly
licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual to whom a child has been committed by
judicial order may at any time be required by the court
to submit a report, containing all necessary information
for determining whether the welfare of the child is being
served.
(m) Temporary Custody of Child. — The duly
licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual to whom a child has been committed may file
a verified motion with the court which granted the
petition for involuntary commitment of a child to place
him in the care of any suitable person, upon the latter's
request, for a period not exceeding one month at a time.
The court may order the social worker to submit a case
study report to aid it in evaluating whether such
temporary custody shall be for the best interests of the
child. The period of temporary custody of the child may
be extended by the court for a period not exceeding one
month at a time upon motion of the duly licensed child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual to which
the child has been committed.
The court, motu proprio, or upon request of the
child assisted by his guardian ad litem, or at the
instance of the agency or person to whom the child was
committed, after due notice and hearing, shall
discontinue the temporary custody of the child if it
appears that he is not being given proper care.
After one month from the date temporary custody
of the child was given to another suitable person, the
agency or individual shall submit to the court a verified
report on whether the temporary custody of the child
has promoted his best interests.
(n) Change of Custody. — If the child is committed
to the Department, it shall have the authority to change
the custody of a child it had placed with any duly
licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual if it appears that such change is for the best
interests of the child. The Department shall notify the
court of any change in custody of the child.
When conflicting interests arise among child-
placement or child-caring agencies, the court which
granted the involuntary commitment of the child, upon
motion of the Department or any of the agencies
concerned, shall order the change of commitment of the
child.
(o) Removal of Custody. — A motion to remove
custody of a child may be filed by an authorized
representative of the Department with knowledge of the
facts against a child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual to whose custody a child has been committed
by the court on the ground of neglect of such child as
defined in Section 3 (e) of this Rule. The court shall set
the motion for hearing with notice to the public
prosecutor and the court-designated social worker. If
the court finds after hearing that the allegations of the
motion have been established and that it is for the best
interests and welfare of the child, the court shall issue
an order removing him from the custody of the person
or agency, as the case may be, and committing him to
the custody of another duly licensed child-placement or
child-caring agency or individual.
In the same proceeding, the court may suspend or
revoke the license of the agency or individual found
guilty of such neglect depending upon the gravity or
frequency of the offense.
(p) Restoration of Parental Authority After
Involuntary Commitment. —

(i) Who may file; Ground. — The parents
or guardian of a child committed to the care of a
person, agency or institution by judicial order
may file a verified motion for the restoration of
his rights over the child with the court which
granted the involuntary commitment on the
ground that he is now able to take proper care
and custody of said child, provided, however,
that the child has not yet been adopted.
HDATSI
(ii) Notice of Hearing. — The court shall
fix the time and date for the hearing of the
motion, which shall not be earlier than thirty (30)
days nor later than sixty (60) days from the date
of the filing of said motion and cause notice of
the hearing to be sent to the person, agency or
institution to which the child has been
committed, the public prosecutor and the court-
designated social worker, at least five (5) days
before the date of hearing.
(iii) Hearing. — At the hearing, any
person may be allowed to intervene at the
discretion of the court to contest the right to the
relief demanded. Witnesses may be called and
examined by the parties or by the court motu
proprio.
(iv) Resolution. — If it is found that the
cause for the commitment of the child no longer
exists and that the movant is already able to take
proper care and custody of the child, the court,
after taking into consideration the best interests
and the welfare of the child, shall issue a
resolution terminating the parental authority of
the person, agency or institution to whom the
child was committed by judicial order and
restoring parental authority to the movant.
q) Jurisdiction for Prosecution of Punishable Acts.
— The Family Court which granted the involuntary
commitment shall have jurisdiction over the prosecution
of a child who left without prior permission from the
person or institution to which he has been judicially
committed or the person under whose custody he has
been judicially committed in accordance with Subsection
(m) of Section 4 of this Rule. It shall likewise have
jurisdiction over the person who induced the child to
leave such person or institution, except in case of actual
or imminent grave physical or moral danger to the child.
The Family Court which granted the involuntary
commitment shall also have jurisdiction over the
prosecution of parents or guardians of the child who
may be held liable under Articles 59 and 60 of P.D. No.
603 and Sections 9, 10 and 31 of R.A. No. 7610.
SECTION 5. Voluntary Commitment
of a Child to an Institution or Individual. — The
parent or guardian of a dependent, abandoned or
neglected child may voluntarily commit him to the
Department or any duly licensed child-placement or
child-caring agency or individual subject to the rules of
the Department. However, no child shall be committed
unless he is surrendered in writing by his parents or
guardian stating such voluntary commitment and
specifically naming the office, agency, or individual to
whose custody the child is to be committed. Such
written instrument should be notarized and signed in the
presence of an authorized representative of the
Department after counseling and other services have
been made available to encourage the child's parents to
keep the child.
(a) Petition for removal of Custody. —
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REVIEW NOTES
(i) Who may file; Ground. — The parents
or guardian who voluntarily committed the child, or
in their absence or failure, any person with
knowledge of the facts, may file a verified petition
to remove custody of the child against the child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual to
whose custody the child has been voluntarily
committed on the ground of neglect of such child as
defined in Section 3 (e) of this Rule. A child may
also be removed from the custody of the child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual on
the ground that the voluntary commitment of the
child was unjustified.
(ii) Venue. — The petition shall be filed
with the Family Court of the province or city where
the child-placement or child-caring agency to which
the child has been voluntarily committed is located
or where the child may be found.
(iii) Contents of Verified Petition — The
petition must state:
(1) The name and address of the child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual
to whose custody the child has been voluntarily
committed; SEIDAC
(2) The facts showing that the child has
been neglected by the agency or in cases
where the voluntary commitment was
unjustified, that the parents of the child are
actually capable of taking care and custody of
the child;
(3) The name, address and written
consent of the duly licensed child-placement or
child-caring agency or individual to whose care
the child may be transferred.
(4) The facts showing that petitioner has
exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him.
(iv) Notice of Hearing. — If the petition is
sufficient in form and substance, the court shall set
the same for hearing with notice to the
Department, the public prosecutor, the court-
designated social worker, the agency or individual
to whom the child has been committed and in
appropriate cases, the parents of the child.
(v) Judgment. — If after hearing the
court finds that the allegations of the petition have
been established and that it is for the best interests
and welfare of the child, it shall issue an order
removing the child from the custody of the person
or agency concerned, and committing him to the
custody of another duly licensed child-placement or
child-caring agency or individual.
The court, in the same proceeding may, after
hearing the comment or recommendation of the
Department, suspend or revoke the license of the
agency or individual found guilty of such neglect
depending upon the gravity or frequency of the offense.
(b) Restoration of Parental Authority After
Voluntary Commitment. — The restoration of rights of
the parent or guardian over the child who has been
voluntarily committed shall be governed by the rules of
the Department, provided, however, that the petition for
restoration is filed within six (6) months from the date of
voluntary commitment. In case the Department refuses
to grant legal custody and parental authority to the
parent or guardian over the child who has been
voluntarily committed to an agency or individual, the
parent or guardian may file a petition in court for
restoration of parental authority in accordance with
Section 4 (p) of this Rule.

(c) Jurisdiction for Prosecution of Punishable Acts.
— The Family Court of the place where the child may be
found or where the duly licensed child-placement or
child-caring agency or individual is located shall have
jurisdiction over the prosecution of a child who left
without prior permission from the person or institution
to which he has been voluntarily committed. It shall
likewise have jurisdiction over the person who induced
the child to leave such person or institution, except in
case of grave actual or imminent physical or moral
danger, to the child. The same Family Court shall also
have jurisdiction over the prosecution of parents or
guardians of the child who may be held liable under
Articles 59 and 60 of P.D. No. 603 and Sections 9, 10
and 31 of R.A. No. 7610.
SECTION 6. Petition for Commitment
of a Disabled Child. —
(a) Who may file. — Where a child appears to be
mentally retarded, physically handicapped, emotionally
disturbed, mentally ill, with cerebral palsy or with similar
afflictions and needs institutional care but his parents or
guardians are opposed thereto, the Department, or any
duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual may file a verified petition for commitment of
the said child to any reputable institution providing care,
training and rehabilitation for disabled children.
The parents or guardian of the child may file a similar
petition in case no immediate placement can be
arranged for the disabled child when his welfare and
interests are at stake. AEHTIC
(b) Venue. — The petition for commitment of a
disabled child shall be filed with the Family Court of the
place where the parent or guardian resides or where the
child is found.
(c) Contents of Verified Petition. — The petition for
commitment must state the following:
(1) The facts showing that the child
appears to be mentally retarded, physically
handicapped, emotionally disturbed, mentally ill,
with cerebral palsy or with similar afflictions and
needs institutional care; IADCES
(2) The name of the parents and their
residence, if known, or if the child has no living
parent, the name and residence of the guardian, if
any; and
(3) The fact that the parents or guardian
or any duly licensed disabled child-placement or
child-caring agency, as the case may be, has
opposed the commitment of such child;
(4) The name and written conformity of
the institution where the child is to be committed.
(5) An estimate of the costs and other
expenses of maintaining the child in the institution.
The verified petition shall be sufficient if based
upon the personal knowledge of the petitioner.
(d) Order of Hearing; Notice. — If the petition filed
is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix the
date of the hearing thereof, and a copy of such order
shall be served on the child alleged to be mentally
retarded, physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed,
mentally ill, with cerebral palsy or with similar afflictions
and on the person having charge of him or any of his
relatives residing in the province or city as the court
may deem proper.
The order shall also direct the sheriff or any other
officer of the court to produce, if necessary, the alleged
disabled child on the date of the hearing.
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REVIEW NOTES
(e) Hearing and Judgment. — If the court finds
that the allegations of the petition have been established
and that institutional care of the child is for his best
interests or the public welfare and that his parents, or
guardian or relatives are unable for any reason
whatsoever to take proper care of him, the court shall
order his commitment to the proper institution for
disabled children. The court shall likewise make proper
provisions for the custody of the property or money
belonging to the committed child.
The expense of maintaining a disabled child in the
institution to which he has been committed shall be
borne primarily by the parents or guardian and
secondarily, by such disabled child, if he has property of
his own.
In all cases where the expenses for the
maintenance of the disabled child cannot be paid in
accordance with the immediately preceding paragraph,
the Department shall bear the expenses or such part
thereof as may remain unpaid.
The court shall furnish the institution to which the
child has been committed with a copy of its judgment,
together with all the reports and other data pertinent to
the case.
(f) Discharge of Judicially Committed Disabled
Child. — Upon motion of the parent, guardian or
institution to which the child has been judicially
committed under this rule, the court, after hearing, shall
order the discharge of such child if it is established and
certified by the Department that:
(1) He is no longer a danger to himself
and the community;
(2) He has been sufficiently rehabilitated,
from his physical handicap or if of working age, is
already fit to engage in gainful occupation; or
(3) He has been sufficiently relieved of
his psychological, mental and emotional problems
and is ready to assume normal social relations.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. — This rule
shall take effect on April 15, 2002 after its publication in
a newspaper of general circulation not later than March
15, 2002.
[A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. February 28, 2002.]
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT
WITH THE LAW
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting
for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed
Rule on Juveniles In Conflict With The Law, the Court
Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on April 15, 2002
following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 15, 2002.
February 28, 2002.
SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rule.
— This Rule shall apply to all criminal cases involving
juveniles in conflict with the law.
A juvenile in conflict with the law is a person who at the
time of the commission of the offense is below eighteen
(18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of
age.

This Rule shall not apply to an accused who at
the time of initial contact as defined in Section 4(p) of
this Rule, or at any time thereafter, shall have reached
the age of eighteen (18), in which case the regular rules
on criminal procedure shall apply without prejudice to
the rights granted under Sections 36, 37, 38 and 39 of
this Rule. (n)
SECTION 2. Objective. — The objective
of this Rule is to ensure that the justice system treats
every juvenile in conflict with the law in a manner that
recognizes and upholds his human dignity and worth,
and instills in him respect for the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others. The Rule considers his
developmental age and the desirability of his
reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role
in society in accordance with the principle of restorative
justice.
To attain this objective, the Rule seeks:
a) To provide a procedure in the adjudication of
juveniles in conflict with the law that takes into account
their distinct circumstances and assures the parties of a
fair hearing with their constitutional and statutory rights
recognized and respected;
b) To divert from the justice system juveniles who
can be cared for or placed under community-based
alternative programs of treatment, training and
rehabilitation in conformity with the principle of
restorative justice;
c) To deal with the juvenile in a family
environment whenever possible, separate him from his
parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the
interest of public safety;
d) To remove from juveniles in conflict with the
law the stigma of criminality and the consequences of
criminal behavior; and
e) To provide for the care, protection and
wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of
juveniles in conflict with the law.
SECTION 3. Interpretation. — This
Rule shall be interpreted liberally to promote the best
interests of the child in conformity with Philippine laws
and the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the
Child.
SECTION 4. Definitions. — As used in
this Rule,
(a) To be in conflict with the law means being
charged with the commission of an act defined and
punished as a crime or offense under the law, including
violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, and
ordinances of local government units.
(b) Serious offense refers to any offense not
covered by Section 1, par. B, Criminal Cases, of the Rule
on Summary Procedure, to wit: (1) violations of traffic
laws, rules and regulations; (2) violations of the rental
law; (3) violations of municipal or city ordinances; (4) all
other offenses punished with imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of
other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of
the civil liability arising therefrom; provided, however,
that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, the imposable fine is not in excess
of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
(c) Youth detention center refers to a government-
owned or operated agency providing habilitating and
rehabilitative facilities where a juvenile in conflict with
52
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REVIEW NOTES
the law may be physically restricted pending court
disposition of the charge against him.
(d) Intake report is a preliminary written report
containing the personal and other circumstances of the
juvenile in conflict with the law and prepared by the
social worker assigned by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) or local government
unit to assist him as soon as he enters the justice
system.
(e) Case study report is a written report of the
result of an investigation conducted by the social worker
designated by the Family Court on the social, cultural,
economic and legal status or condition of the juvenile in
conflict with the law. It includes, among others, his
developmental age; educational attainment; family and
social relationships; the quality of his peer group; the
strengths and weaknesses of his family; parental control
over him; his attitude toward the offense; the harm or
damage done to others resulting from the offense; his
record of prior offenses, if any; and the attitude of his
parents towards his responsibility for the offense.
(f) Diversion refers to an alternative child-
appropriate process of determining the responsibility
and treatment of a juvenile in conflict with the law on
the basis of his social, cultural, economic, psychological
or educational background without resorting to formal
court adjudication.
(g) Diversion programs refer to programs that the
juvenile in conflict with the law is required to undergo in
lieu of formal court proceedings,
(h) Disposition conference is a meeting held by the
court with the social worker who prepared the case
study report together with the juvenile in conflict with
the law and his parents or guardian ad litem, for the
purpose of determining the disposition measures
appropriate to the personal and peculiar circumstances
of the juvenile.
(i) Recognizance is an undertaking in lieu of a
bond assumed by a parent or custodian who shall be
responsible for the appearance in court by the juvenile
in conflict with the law when required.
(j) Probation is a disposition alternative under
which a juvenile in conflict with the law is released and
permitted to remain in his home after conviction and
sentence. The juvenile is subject to conditions imposed
in the sentence and to supervision by the court and a
probation officer who has the duty to return the juvenile
to the court in case of violation of a condition of his
probation.
(k) Suspended sentence is the holding in abeyance
of the service of the sentence imposed by the court
upon a finding of guilt of the juvenile in conflict with the
law who will undergo rehabilitation.
(l) Community continuum is a community-based
group therapy process that provides continuous
guidance and support to the juvenile in conflict with the
law upon his release from rehabilitation and his
reintegration into society.
(m) Age of criminal responsibility is the age when a
juvenile who is nine (9) years or over but under fifteen
(15) years commits an offense with discernment.
(n) Discernment means the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong and
its consequences.
(o) Restorative Justice is a principle which requires
a process of resolving conflicts with the maximum
involvement of the victim, the offender, and the
community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the victim,
reconciliation of the offender, the offended and the
community and reassurance to the offender that he can

be reintegrated into society. It. also enhances public
safety by activating the offender, the victim and the
community in prevention strategies.
(p) Initial contact is the apprehension or taking
into custody of a juvenile in conflict with the law by law
enforcement officers or private citizens. It includes the
time when the juvenile receives a subpoena under
Section 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6 (a) or
Sec. 9 (b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require
preliminary investigation or where there is no necessity
to place the juvenile under immediate custody.
(q) Corporal punishment is any kind of physical
punishment inflicted on the body as distinguished from
pecuniary punishment or fine.
SECTION 5. Exemption from Criminal
Liability. — A minor under nine (9) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability.
A minor nine (9) years and above but under fifteen
(15) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be committed to the care of his father or
mother, or nearest relative or family friend; in the sound
discretion of the court and subject to its supervision.
However, if the prosecution proves that he has acted
with discernment; he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Sections 24 to 28, or 36 to 40 of this
Rule, as the case may be, and subjected to a
delinquency prevention program as determined by the
court.
Exemption from criminal liability does not include
exemption from civil liability which shall be enforced in
accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code and Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
In case the act or omission of the juvenile involves
a quasi-delict, Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall apply.
SECTION 6. Procedure in Taking a
Juvenile into Custody. — Any person taking into
custody a juvenile in conflict with the law shall:
(a) Identify himself and present proper
identification to the juvenile;
(b) Inform the juvenile of the reason for such
custody and advise him of his constitutional rights in a
language or dialect understood by him;
(c) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and
from sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual
advances on the juvenile;
(d) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon,
handcuffs or other instruments of force or restraint,
unless absolutely necessary and only after all other
methods of control have been exhausted and have
failed;
(e) Refrain from subjecting the juvenile to greater
restraint than is necessary for his apprehension;
(f) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;
(g) Notify the parents of the juvenile or his nearest
relative or guardian, if any, and the local social welfare
officer as soon as the apprehension is made;
(h) Take the juvenile immediately to an available
government medical or health officer for a physical and
mental examination. The examination results shall be
kept confidential unless otherwise ordered by the Family
Court. Whenever treatment for any physical or mental
defect is necessary, steps shall be immediately taken by
the said officer to provide the juvenile with the
necessary and proper treatment; and
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(i) Hold the juvenile in secure quarters separate
from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders.
SECTION 7. Taking Custody of a
Juvenile Without a Warrant. — A peace officer or a
private person taking into custody a juvenile in conflict
with the law without a warrant shall likewise follow the
provisions of Sections 5, 8 and 9 of Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall forthwith
deliver him to the nearest police station. The juvenile
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7
of Rule 112.
SECTION 8. Conduct of Initial
Investigation by the Police. — The police officer
conducting the initial investigation of a juvenile in
conflict with the law shall do so in the presence of either
of the parents of the juvenile; in the absence of both
parents, the guardian or the nearest relative, or a social
welfare officer, and the counsel of his own choice. In
their presence, the juvenile shall be informed of his
constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
The right of the juvenile to privacy shall be
protected at all times. All measures necessary to
promote this right shall be taken, including the exclusion
of the media.
SECTION 9. Fingerprinting and
Photographing of the Juvenile. — While under
investigation, no juvenile in conflict with the law shall be
fingerprinted or photographed in a humiliating and
degrading manner. The following guidelines shall be
observed when fingerprinting or photographing the
juvenile:
(a) His fingerprint and photograph files shall be
kept separate from those of adults and shall be kept
confidential. They may be inspected by law enforcement
officers only when necessary for the discharge of their
duties and upon prior authority of the Family Court;
TADCSE
(b) His fingerprints and photographs shall be
removed from the files and destroyed: (1) if the case
against him is not filed, or is dismissed; or (2) when the
juvenile reaches twenty one (21) years of age and there
is no record that he committed an offense after reaching
eighteen (18) years of age.
SECTION 10. Intake Report by the
Social Welfare Officer. — Upon the taking into custody
of a juvenile in conflict with the law, the social welfare
officer assigned to him by the DSWD shall immediately
under take a preliminary background investigation of the
juvenile and submit, prior to arraignment of the
juvenile, a report on his findings to the Family Court in
which the case may be filed.
SECTION 11. Filing of Criminal Action.
— A criminal action may be instituted against a juvenile
in conflict with the law by filing a complaint with the
prosecutor or the municipal trial court in cases where a
preliminary investigation is required. In Manila and other
chartered cities, if their charters so provide, the
complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor.
It may also be filed directly with the Family Court if no
preliminary investigation is required under Section 1 of
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor assigned to the Family
Court.

SECTION 12. Prosecution of Civil
Action. — When a criminal action is instituted against a
juvenile in conflict with the law, the action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
governed by Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
SECTION 13. Preliminary
Investigation. — As far as consistent with this Rule,
the preliminary investigation of a juvenile in conflict with
the law shall be governed by Section 3 of Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If clarificatory
questions become necessary, the Rule on Examination of
a Child Witness shall apply.
If a preliminary investigation is required before the
filing of a complaint or information, the same shall be
conducted by the judge of the Municipal Trial Court or
the public prosecutor in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause
to hold the juvenile for trial, he shall prepare the
corresponding resolution and information for approval by
the provincial or city prosecutor, as the case may be.
The juvenile, his parents/nearest relative/guardian and
his counsel shall be furnished forthwith a copy of the
approved resolution.
SECTION 14. Venue. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, any criminal or civil action
involving a juvenile in conflict with the law shall be
instituted and tried in the Family Court of or nearest the
place where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential elements occurred.
SECTION 15. Recognizance. — Before
final conviction, all juveniles charged with offenses
falling under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
shall be released on recognizance to the custody of their
parents or other suitable person who shall be
responsible for the juveniles' appearance in court
whenever required.
SECTION 16. When Bail a Matter of
Right. — All juveniles in conflict with the law shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In the event the juvenile cannot post bail for lack of
financial resources, the Family Court shall commit the
juvenile pursuant to Section 18 of this Rule.
However, where the juvenile does not pose a threat
to public safety, the Family Court may, motu proprio or
upon motion and recommendation of the DSWD, release
the juvenile on recognizance to the custody of his
parents or other responsible person.
SECTION 17. When Bail Not A Matter
of Right. — No juvenile charged with an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong.
SECTION 18. Care of Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law. — The juvenile charged with
having committed a delinquent act, held for trial or while
the case is pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail or is
denied bail, shall, from the time of his being taken into
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custody, be committed by the Family Court to the care
of the DSWD, a youth detention center, or a local
rehabilitation center recognized by the government in
the province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction
of the said court. The center or agency concerned shall
be responsible for the juvenile's appearance in court
whenever required. In the absence of any such center or
agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of
the trial, the juvenile shall be detained in the provincial,
city or municipal jail which shall provide adequate
quarters for the juvenile separate from adult detainees
and detainees of the opposite sex.
SECTION 19. Case Study Report. —
After the institution of the criminal action, the social
worker of the Family Court shall immediately undertake
a case study of the juvenile and his family, his
environment and such other matters relevant to the
proper disposition of the case. His report shall be
submitted within the period fixed by the Family Court,
preferably before arraignment, to aid it in the proper
disposition of the case.
SECTION 20. Diversion Proceedings
Before Arraignment. — Where the maximum penalty
imposed by law for the offense with which the juvenile in
conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of not
more than six (6) months, regardless of fine or fine
alone regardless of amount, and the corresponding
complaint or information is filed with the Family Court,
the case shall not be set for arraignment; instead, it
shall forthwith be referred to the Diversion Committee
which shall determine whether the juvenile can be
diverted and referred to alternative measures or
services offered by non-court institutions. Pending
determination by the Committee, the court shall deliver
the juvenile on recognizance to the custody of his
parents or legal guardian who shall be responsible for
the presence of the juvenile during the diversion
proceedings.
SECTION 21. Diversion Committee. —
In each Family Court, there shall be a Diversion
Committee to be composed of its branch clerk of court
as chairperson, and the prosecutor, a lawyer of the
Public Attorney's Office and the social worker assigned
to the said Family Court as members.
The chairperson of the Committee shall call for a
conference with notice to the juvenile, his parents/legal
guardian and his counsel, and the private complainant
and his counsel, and recommend to the Family Court
whether the juvenile should be diverted to a diversion
program or undergo formal court proceedings. In
making its recommendation, the Committee shall
consider the following factors:
a) The record of the juvenile on his conflict with
the law;
b) Whether the imposable maximum penalty of
the offense is more than six (6) months, regardless of
fine; or only a fine, regardless of amount;
c) Whether the juvenile is an obvious threat to
himself and/or the community;
d) Whether the juvenile is unrepentant;
e) Whether the juvenile or his parents are
indifferent or hostile; and
Whether the juvenile's relationships with his peers
increase the possibility of delinquent behavior.
If the Committee recommends diversion, it shall
submit the diversion program for the juvenile for the
consideration and approval of the court.

The Committee cannot recommend diversion should
the juvenile or the private complainant object thereto. If
no diversion program is recommended, the court shall
include the case in its calendar for formal proceedings.
Consent to diversion by the juvenile or payment by
him of civil indemnity shall not in any way be construed
as admission of guilt and used as evidence against him
in the event that his case is included in the court
calendar for formal proceedings.
SECTION 22. Diversion Programs. —
The diversion program designed by the Committee shall
be distinct to each juvenile in conflict with the law
limited for a specific period. It may include any or a
combination of the following:
a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
b) Return of property;
c) Payment of the damage caused;
d) Written or oral apology;
e) Guidance and supervision orders;
f) Counseling for the juvenile and his family;
g) Training, seminars and lectures on (i) anger
management skills; (ii) problem-solving and/or conflict
resolution skills; (iii) values formation; and (iv) other
skills that will aid the juvenile to properly deal with
situations that can lead to a repetition of the offense;
h) Participation in available community-based
programs;
i) Institutional care and custody; or j) Work-
detail program in the community.
SECTION 23. Hearing of Diversion
Program. — The Family Court shall set the
recommendation and diversion program for hearing
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
SECTION 24. Undertaking. — In all
cases where a juvenile in conflict with the law is given
the benefit of a diversion program, an undertaking
describing the program shall be signed by him, his
parents or legal guardian and the complainant, and
approved by the Family Court. The program, which shall
be enforced under the supervision and control of the
Family Court, shall contain the following terms and
conditions:
a) The juvenile shall present himself to the social
worker of the Family Court that approved the diversion
program at least once a month for evaluation of its
effectiveness. Whenever the juvenile is permitted to
reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another Family
Court, control and supervision over him shall be
transferred to the Family Court of that place, and in
such case, a copy of the undertaking, the intake and
case study reports and other pertinent records shall be
furnished the said court. Thereafter, the Family Court to
which jurisdiction over the juvenile is transferred shall
have the power with respect to the latter that was
previously possessed by the Family Court that approved
the diversion and such other conditions as the
Committee may deem just and proper under the
circumstances.
b) The juvenile shall faithfully comply with the
terms and conditions in the undertaking. His non-
compliance shall be referred by the Committee to the
Family Court where the case has been transferred for a
show-cause hearing with notice to the juvenile and
private complainant. The court shall determine whether
the juvenile should continue with the diversion program
or his case returned to the original court for formal
proceedings.
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The Family Court shall exert its best efforts to
secure satisfaction of the civil liability of the juvenile and
his parents or guardian. However, inability to pay the
said liability shall not by itself be a ground to discontinue
the diversion program of the juvenile.
SECTION 25. Closure Order. — The
juvenile subject of diversion proceedings shall be visited
periodically by the Family Court social worker who shall
submit to the Committee his reports thereon. At any
time before or at the end of the diversion period, a
report recommending closure or extension of diversion,
as the case may be, shall be filed by the Committee with
the Family Court. The report and recommendation shall
be heard by the Family Court within fifteen (15) days
from its receipt thereof, with notice to the members of
the Committee, the juvenile and his parents or legal
guardian and counsel and the complainant to determine
whether the undertaking has been fully and satisfactorily
complied with. If the juvenile has complied with his
undertaking, the Family Court shall issue the
corresponding closure order terminating the diversion
program. It may, however, extend the period of
diversion to give the juvenile a further chance to be
rehabilitated. In the event the court finds that the
diversion program will no longer serve its. purpose, it
shall include the case of the juvenile in its calendar for
formal proceedings.
SECTION 26. Duty of the Family Court
to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. — In all
criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall
ensure the protection of the following rights of the
juvenile in conflict with the law:
a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt;
b) To be informed promptly and directly of the
nature and cause of the charge against him, and if
appropriate, through his parents or legal guardian;
c) To be present at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment. The juvenile may, however, waive his
presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set
forth in his bail, unless his presence at the trial is
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification. The absence of the juvenile without
justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall
be considered a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. When the juvenile under custody escapes, he
shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present
in all subsequent hearings until custody over him is
regained;
d) To have legal and other appropriate assistance
in the preparation and presentation of his defense;
e) To testify as a witness in his own behalf and
subject to cross-examination only on matters covered by
direct examination, provided that the Rule on the
Examination of a Child Witness shall be observed
whenever convenient and practicable.
The juvenile shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself and his silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him;
f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him;
g) To have compulsory process issued to secure
the attendance of witnesses and production of other
evidence in his behalf;
h) To have speedy and impartial trial, with legal
or other appropriate assistance and preferably in the
presence of his parents or legal guardian, unless such

presence is considered not to be in the best interests of
the juvenile taking into account his age or other peculiar
circumstances;
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the
manner prescribed by law;
j) To be accorded all the rights under the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness; and
k) To have his privacy fully respected in all stages
of the proceedings.
SECTION 27. Arraignment and Plea. —
The provisions of Rules 116 and 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply to the
arraignment of the juvenile in conflict with the law. The
arraignment shall be scheduled within seven (7) days
from the date of the filing of the complaint or
information with the Family Court, unless a shorter
period is provided for by law.
Arraignment shall be held in chambers and conducted by
the judge by furnishing the juvenile a copy of the
complaint or information, reading the same in a
language or dialect known to and understood by him,
explaining the nature and consequences of a plea of
guilty or not guilty and asking him what his plea is.
SECTION 28. Pre-trial. — The provisions
of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
shall govern the pre-trial of the juvenile in conflict with
the law. Agreements or admissions made during the pre
trial conference shall be in writing and signed by the
juvenile, his parents or guardian and his counsel;
otherwise, they cannot be used against him.
Whenever possible and practicable, the Family
Court shall explore all possibilities of settlement of the
case, except its criminal aspect. Plea bargaining shall be
resorted to only as a last measure when it will serve the
best interests of the juvenile and the demands of
restorative justice.
SECTION 29. Trial. — All hearings shall
be conducted in a manner conducive to the best
interests of the juvenile and in an environment that will
allow him to participate fully and freely in accordance
with the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness.
SECTION 30. Guiding Principles in
Judging the Juvenile. — Subject to the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and other special
laws, the judgment against a juvenile in conflict with the
law shall be guided by the following principles:
1. It shall be in proportion to the gravity of the
offense, and shall consider the circumstances and the
best interests of the juvenile, the rights of the victim,
the needs of society in line with the demands of
restorative justice.
2. Restrictions on the personal liberty of the
juvenile shall be limited to the minimum. Where
discretion is given by law to the judge to determine
whether the penalty to be imposed is fine or
imprisonment, the imposition of the latter should be
preferred as the more appropriate penalty.
3. No corporal punishment shall be imposed.
SECTION 31. Promulgation of
Sentence. — If after trial the Family Court should find
the juvenile in conflict with the law guilty, it shall impose
the proper penalty, including any civil liability which the
juvenile may have incurred, and promulgate the
sentence in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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SECTION 32. Automatic Suspension of
Sentence and Disposition Orders. — The sentence
shall be suspended without need of application by the
juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the
case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days
from the promulgation of sentence which shall be
attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the
juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall
proceed to issue any or a combination of the following
disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation
and welfare of the juvenile:
1. Care, guidance, and supervision orders;
2. Community service orders;
3. Drug and alcohol treatment;
4. Participation in group counseling and similar
activities;
5. Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center
of the DSWD or other centers for juveniles in conflict
with the law authorized by the Secretary of the DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD)
of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the
juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition
measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court
a status and progress report on the matter. The Family
Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such
report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his
parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence
may be deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply
to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once
enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of
promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) years of age or over.
SECTION 33. Discharge of Juvenile
Subject of Disposition Measure. — Upon the
recommendation of the SSCD and a duly authorized
officer of the DSWD, the head of an appropriate center
or the duly accredited child-caring agency which has
custody over the juvenile, the Family Court shall, after
due notice to all parties and hearing, dismiss the case
against the juvenile who has been issued disposition
measures, even before he has reached eighteen (18)
years of age, and order a final discharge if it finds that
the juvenile has behaved properly and has shown the
capability to be a useful member of the community.
If the Family Court, however, finds that the juvenile
has not behaved properly, has been incorrigible, has not
shown the capability of becoming a useful member of
society, has willfully failed to comply with the conditions
of his disposition or rehabilitation program, or should his
continued stay in the training institution where he has
been assigned be not in his best interests, he shall be
brought before the court for execution of his judgment.
If the juvenile in conflict with the law has reached
the age of eighteen (18) years while in commitment, the
Family Court shall determine whether to dismiss the
case in accordance with the first paragraph of this
Section or to execute the judgment of conviction. In the
latter case, unless the juvenile has already availed of
probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other
similar laws, he may apply for probation if qualified
under the provisions of the Probation Law.
The final release of the juvenile shall not extinguish
his civil liability. The parents and other persons
exercising parental authority over the juvenile shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the

acts or omissions of the juvenile living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law.
SECTION 34. Probation as an
Alternative to Imprisonment. — After promulgation
of sentence and upon application at any time by the
juvenile in conflict with the law within the period to
appeal, the Family Court may place the juvenile on
probation, if he is qualified under the Probation Law.
SECTION 35. Credit in Service of
Sentence. — The juvenile in conflict with the law who
has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of his sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment, if he agrees
voluntarily in writing to abide by the same or similar
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
except in any of the following cases:
1. When the juvenile is a recidivist or has been
convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;
or
2. When upon being summoned for execution of
sentence, he failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the juvenile does not agree to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he
shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-
fifths of the time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment.
Whenever the juvenile has undergone preventive
imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the
possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged
to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the
proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In
case the maximum penalty to which the juvenile may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.
Any form of physical restraint imposed on the
juvenile in conflict with the law, including community
service and commitment to a rehabilitation center, shall
be considered preventive imprisonment.
SECTION 36. Confidentiality of
Proceedings and Records. — All proceedings and
records involving juveniles in conflict with the law from
initial contact until final disposition of the case by the
Family Court shall be considered privileged and
confidential. The public may be excluded from the
proceedings and, pursuant to the provisions of Section
31 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, the
records shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to
anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the
proceedings for any purpose whatsoever, except to
determine if the juvenile may have his sentence
suspended under Section 25 of this Rule or if he may be
granted probation under the Probation Law, or to
enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action.
The Family Court shall take other measures to
protect this confidentiality of proceedings including non-
disclosure of records to the media, the maintenance of a
separate police blotter for cases involving juveniles in
conflict with the law and the adoption of a system of
coding to conceal material information, which will lead to
the juvenile's identity. Records of juveniles in conflict
with the law shall not be used in subsequent
proceedings or cases involving the same offender as an
adult.
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SECTION 37. Non-liability for perjury or
concealment or misrepresentation. — Any person
who has been in conflict with the law as a juvenile shall
not be held guilty of perjury or of concealment or
misrepresentation by reason of his failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto
in response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose.
SECTION 38. Sealing of Records. —
The Family Court motu proprio, or on application of a
person who has been adjudged a juvenile in conflict with
the law, or if still a minor, on motion of his parents or
legal guardian, shall, upon notice to the prosecution and
after hearing, order the sealing of the records of the
case if it finds that two (2) years have elapsed since the
final discharge of the juvenile after suspension of
sentence or probation, or from the date of the closure
order and he has no pending case of an offense or a
crime involving moral turpitude.
Upon entry of the order, the case shall be treated
as if it never occurred. All index references shall be
deleted and in case of inquiry, the Family Court,
prosecution, law enforcement officers and all other
offices and agencies that dealt with the case shall reply
that no record exists with respect to the juvenile
concerned. Copies of the order shall be sent to these
officials and agencies named in the order. Inspection of
the sealed records thereafter may be permitted only by
order of the Family Court upon petition. of the juvenile
who is the subject of the records or of other proper
parties.
This procedure shall be without prejudice to the rule
on destruction of video or audio tapes under Section 31
of the Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness.
SECTION 39. Prohibition Against
Labeling. — In the conduct of proceedings from initial
contact with the juvenile in conflict with the law to the
final disposition of the case, there shall be no branding
or labeling of the latter as a young criminal, juvenile
delinquent, prostitute, vagrant, or attaching to him in
any manner any derogatory name. Likewise, no
discriminatory remarks and practices shall be allowed,
particularly with respect to the juvenile's social or
economic status, physical disability or ethnic origin.
SECTION 40. Contempt Powers. — A
person who directly or indirectly disobeys any order of
the Family Court or obstructs or interferes with its
proceedings or the enforcement of its orders issued
under this Rule shall be liable for contempt of court.
SECTION 41. Effectivity. — This rule shall take
effect on April 15, 2002 after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March
15, 2002.
Par. 4. – ANY PERSON WHO, WHILE PERFORMING
A LAWFUL ACT WITH DUE CARE, CAUSES AN
INJURY BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR
INTENTION OF CAUSING IT.
ELEMENTS:
1. A person performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere
accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.

• lack of negligence or intent, i.e., striking another with
a gun in self-defense, even if it fired and seriously
injured the assailant is a lawful act.
ACCIDENT – something that happens outside the sway
of our will and although it comes about through some
act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences.
- If the consequences are plainly foreseeable,
it will be a case of negligence.
U.S. v. Tanedo
15 Phil 196 (1910)
Facts: The accused, while hunting, saw wild
chickens and fired a shot. The slug, after hitting a wild
chicken, recoiled and struck the tenant who was a
relative of the accused. The man who was injured died.
Held: If life is taken by misfortune or accident
while the actor is in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing
harm, there is no criminal liability.
People v. Bindoy
56 Phil 15(1931)
Facts: The accused, while in a drinking session,
offered some tuba to Pacas‘ wife but she refused so the
accused threatened to injure her if she didn‘t accept.
Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take
away from the accused the bolo he carried. In the
course of the struggle, accused succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo
from the latter‘s hand towards the left behind the
accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo
reached Emigdio‘s chest who was then behind the
accused.
Held: The accused, in his effort to free himself
hit Emigdio in the chest. There is no evidence that this
was done deliberately. It is merely accidental.
People v. Concepcion
386 SCRA 74(2002)
Facts: Galang got involved in a quarrel at the
town plaza. He was brought to the barangay hall for
questioning by Brgy Captain Capitli. Shortly after,
Concepcion arrived and fired his rifle twice or thrice past
the ears of Galang, who was then sitting, but without
injuring him. After that, however, Concepcion thrust the
barrel of the gun against the abdomen of Galang. Then
there was an explosion. Galang was shot in the thigh. At
least 3 more shots were fired, hitting him in the chest.
Lorenzo died instantly. In his defense Concepcion
claimed that the shooting was only accidental.
Held: There was no accident. By Concepcion‘s
own testimony, the victim was unarmed. In contrast, he
had an armalite and a handgun. It is highly
inconceivable that an unarmed man could pose bodily
harm to another who is heavily armed. Concepcion‘s gun
discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the
victim's body. As observed by the trial court, recklessly
appellant had put his finger on the trigger of his cocked
and loaded rifle. In that state, with the slightest
movement of his finger, the rifle would fire readily. And
it did not just once but several fires. Concepcion is
guilty of homicide.
People v. Agliday
367 SCRA 273 (2001)
Facts: The wife of the accused was washing
dishes in the kitchen when her son was shot with a
shotgun by her husband. Conchita claimed that she and
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her husband quarreled before the incident and then her
husband left the kitchen got his shotgun and went back
to the kitchen to shoot his son.
Accused claimed that it was only an accident.
He was merely cleaning his gun and the gun accidentally
went off and his son‘s buttock was hit.
Held: The exemption from criminal liability
under the circumstance showing accident is based on
the lack of criminal intent. In the case at bar, accused
got his shotgun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his
son who had intervened in the quarrel between the
former and his wife. There was clear intent to fire and
not mere accident.
Nieva v. People
G.R. No. 188751, (2016)
Petitioner Nieva cannot invoke the exempting
circumstance of accident to free him from criminal
liability. Article 12 (4), Book I of the Revised Penal Code
states that ―any person who, while performing a lawful
act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it‖ shall be exempt
from criminal liability. The basis for exemption under
said provision is the complete absence of negligence and
intent. The accused commits a crime but there is no
criminal liability. An accident is a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens. It is an affirmative
defense which the accused is burdened to prove by clear
and convincing evidence.
To successfully claim the defense of accident,
the accused must show that the following circumstances
are present: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2)
with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by
mere accident; and (4) he had no fault in or intention of
causing the injury.
People v. Bandian
63 Phil 530 (1936)
Facts: One morning, Josefina went to a thicket to
respond to a call of nature. Her neighbor saw Josefina
emerge from the thicket staggering and was struggling
to support herself and her clothes were stained with
blood. Her neighbor helped her get home as she was
very dizzy. Later in the day, another neighbor saw a
newborn baby. It was Josefina‘s. She was charged with
infanticide and abandonment of a minor.
Held:What happened was an accident. Prior to the
incident, she was suffering from fever causing her
hemorrhage which made bearing the child difficult. She
abandoned the child because she was overcome by
strong dizziness and debility. There was no fault or
intent to kill the baby.
Par 5. – ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE
COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE.
ELEMENTS:
1. That the compulsion is by means of
physical force.
2. That the physical force must be
irresistible.
3. That the physical force must come from a
third person

• Complete absence of freedom.
• Before force can be considered to be an irresistible
one, it must produce such an effect upon the individual
that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere
instrument and, as such, incapable of committing a
crime.
• The irresistible force can never consist in an impulse or
passion or obfuscation. It must consist of an extraneous
force coming from a third person.
• A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt
from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom.
People v. Lising
285 SCRA 595 (1998)
Facts: Manalili asked Garcia if he could find
someone who could effect the arrest of Robert Herrera,
the suspect on the killing of his brother. Garcia
introduced Lising and they came up with an agreement.
Lising‘s surveillance group was at the Castanos‘
residence in the hope of spotting Herrera. The group
saw a man and a woman (the victims) leave the
residence and followed them. Alighting from the car, the
two were accosted. The abduction of the 2 hit the front
pages and two guards told the police that their friends
who were employees of Lising informed them that Lising
killed the 2 victims. Later, the bodies of the 2 were
found. Lower court found that since there was an
agreement among Manalili, Garcia and Lising, they were
all co-conspirators of the crime and therefore liable
principally. Garcia claimed that he acted under
compulsion of irresistible force.
Held: To be exempt from criminal liability, a
person invoking irresistible force must show that the
force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument who acted not only without will but against
his will. Garcia‘s participation and presence from the
time the abduction was hatched up to the killing of the
victims is undisputed. Conspiracy has been established.
People v. Elicanal
35 Phil 209 (1916)
Facts: The accused was a member of the crew
of a lorcha and Guiloresa was the chief mate. The latter
mentioned that he was going to kill the captain because
he was very angry with him and asked him to assist
him. The accused took this statement as a joke and he
was smiling only when he made the statement. The
following morning, Guillermo assaulted the captain and
with the help of the crew (except the accused) seized
the captain and tied him with a rope. Guillermo then
struck the captain at the back of the neck with an iron
bar and then, delivering the weapon to the accused
ordered him to come forward and assist. The accused
struck the captain on the head which caused the latter‘s
death.
Held: Before one uses the defense of acting
under uncontrollable fear, it must appear that the threat
which caused the fear was an evil greater than or at
least equal to that which he required to commit and that
it promised an evil of such gravity and imminence that it
might be said that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it. Evidence fails to establish that the
threat directed to the accused by the chiefmate, if any,
was of such character as to deprive him of all volition
59
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REVIEW NOTES
and to make him a mere instrument without will. The
fear was not insuperable.
U.S. v. Caballeros
4 Phil 350 (1905)
Facts: The defendants have been sentenced as
accessories in the crime of assassination of 4 American
school teachers. The defendants took part in the burial
of the corpses of the victims.
Held: The defendant Baculi is exempt from
criminal liability because he only assisted in the burial
because he was compelled to do so by the murderers.
As to defendant Caballeros, there is no proof that he
took part in any way in the execution of the crime. His
confession cannot be accepted as proof on a trial
because it was not done voluntarily.
People v. Fronda
222 SCRA 71 (1993)
Facts: Balaan brothers were taken by 7 armed
NPA members accompanied by accused Fronda and
Padua. The accused are both residents of the same
place. The two were convicted of murder. Fronda
appealed claiming he was merely taken by the armed
men as a ―pointer‖.
Held: Records show that appellant‘s
participation in the commission of the crime consisted
of: 1) leading the members of the armed group to the
house where the victims were found, 2) tying the
victims‘ hands and 3) digging the grave where the
victims were buried. He is not a principal by
indispensable cooperation but only an accomplice. The
defense of uncontrollable fear cannot be accepted
because the fact that the accused was seen being
handed by and receiving a hunting knife from one of the
armed men, as well as, his inexplicable failure to report
the incident to the authorities for more than 3 years
negates the existence of uncontrollable fear, such acts
being indicative of his conscious concurrence with the
acts of the assailants.
Ty v. People (supra)
Facts: Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un was
confined at the Manila Doctors' Hospital from October
1990 until June 1992. Being the patient's daughter, Ty
signed the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility for
Payment" in the Contract of Admission. Ty's sister, Judy
Chua, was also confined at the same hospital. The total
hospital bills of the two patients amounted to
P1,075,592.95. Ty executed a promissory note wherein
she assumed payment of the obligation in installments.
To assure payment of the obligation, she drew 7
postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the
hospital which were all dishonored by the drawee bank
and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency
of funds. For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the
checks because of ―an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury‖ She averred that she was forced to issue the
checks to obtain release for her mother who was being
inhumanely and harshly treated by the hospital. She
alleged that her mother has comtemplated suicide if she
would not be discharged from the hospital. Ty was found
guilty by the lower courts of 7 counts of violation of
BP22.
Held: The court sustained the findings of the
lower courts. The evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided
is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, the defense of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By U.S. v. Vicentillo

her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or
other forms of security instead of postdated checks to
secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity
to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have
been brought about by the negligence or imprudence,
more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case,
the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about
by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills.
Par 6. – ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE
IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN
EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY.
ELEMENTS:
1. That the threat which causes the fear is of
an evil greater than or at least equal to,
that which he is required to commit;
2. That it promises an evil of such gravity
and imminence that the ordinary man
would have succumbed to it.
• Lack of Intent.
• REQUISITES: a. existence of an uncontrollable fear; b.
the fear must be real and imminent; and c. the fear of
an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.
19 Phil 118 (1911)
A policeman cannot be held liable for illegal
detention when after arresting his victims, it took him
three days to reach the nearest judge. The distance
which required a journey for three days was considered
to be an insuperable cause.
People v. Bandian
63 Phil 530 (1936)
A woman cannot be held liable for infanticide
when she left her newborn child in the bushes without
being aware that she had given birth at all. Severe
dizziness and extreme debility made it physically
impossible for Bandian to take home the child plus the
assertion that she didn‘t know that she had given birth.
People v. Ventura
433 SCRA 389 (2004)
Facts: Flores learned of the alleged affair of his wife with
Jaime Borinaga. Flores went to his uncle Ventura to plan
on how to confront Jaime about the issue. Flores and
Ventura arrived outside the house of Jaime at 11:00
p.m. They waited until 2:00 a.m. before entering the
house. Flores woke up Jaime and pointed a gun at him.
Jaime tried to wrestle the gun from Flores. Jaime‘s wife
Aileen woke up and called for help. She was stabbed
twice by Ventura which led to her death. The accused
were convicted of murder and attempted murder.

• Duress as a valid defense should be based on real, Held:The accused deliberately took advantage of
imminent or reasonable fear for one‘s life or limb and nighttime. They waited until 2:00 a.m. when the people
should not be speculative, fanciful or remote fear. in the house were already asleep before entering.
Nocturnity was purposely sought by the accused to
• A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion facilitate the commission of the offense.
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity
to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.
3. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
• Speculative, fanciful and remote fear is not
uncontrollable fear. Mitigating circumstances are those which, if
present in the commission of the crime, do not entirely
• The case of US v. Exaltation is also an example were free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to
there is real, imminent or reasonable fear. reduce the penalty.
They are based on the diminution of either
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE UNCONTROLLABLE freedom of action, intelligence or intent or on the lesser
FEAR perversity of the offender.
The offender uses violence The offender employs
or physical force to compel intimidation or threat in CLASSES OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
another person to commit compelling another to 1. ORDINARY MITIGATING
the crime. commit a crime. - Those mentioned in subsections 1 to 10 of Art.
13.
2. PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
JUSTIFYING EXEMPTING
There is neither a crime There is a crime but no
nor a criminal. criminal. The act is not Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person
justified but the actor is under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is
not criminally liable. a minor under eighteen years and his case is one
coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to
No civil liability except in There is civil liability
the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules
no. 4 except no. 4 and 7.
shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine
Par. 7 – ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO PERFORM AN years of age, who is not exempted from liability by
ACT REQUIRED BY LAW, WHEN PREVENTED BY reason of the court having declared that he acted with
SOME LAWFUL OR INSUPERABLE CAUSE. discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed,
but always lower by two degrees at least than that
ELEMENTS: prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
1. That an act is required by law to be done; 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under
2. That a person fails to perform such act; eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
some lawful or insuperable cause. proper period.

60

Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime
committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to
justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in
the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12,
provided that the majority of such conditions be present.
The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which
may be deemed proper, in view of the number and
nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
• Privileged mitigating circumstances which are
applicable only to particular crimes:
1. Art. 268, par. 3. Voluntary release of the
person illegally detained within 3 days without the
offender attaining his purpose and before the institution
of criminal action. The penalty is one degree lower.
2. Art. 333, par. 3. Abandonment without
justification of the spouse who committed adultery. The
penalty is one degree lower.
ORDINARY MC PRIVILEDGED MC
Susceptible of being offset Cannot be offset by
by any aggravating aggravating circumstance
circumstance
If not offset by The effect of imposing
aggravating circumstance, upon the offender the
produces the effect of penalty lower by one or
applying the penalty two degrees than that
provided by law for the provided by law for the
crime in its min period in crime.
case of divisible penalty
•• NOTE: Mitigating circumstances only reduce the
penalty but do not change the nature of the crime.
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following
are mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter,
when all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt
from criminal liability in the respective cases are not
attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of
age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily
surrendered himself to a person in authority or his
agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt
before the court prior to the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or
otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action, defense,
communications with his fellow beings.
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
9. Such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender
without however depriving him of the consciousness of
his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a
similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.
Par. 1- THOSE MENTIONED IN THE PRECEDING
CHAPTER, WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY
TO JUSTIFY OR TO EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY IN THE RESPECTIVE CASES ARE NOT
ATTENDANT.
The circumstances of justification or exemption
which may give place to mitigation, because not all the
requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from
criminal liability in the respective cases are attendant,
are the ff: (see Article 69)
1. Self-defense
2. Defense of Relatives
3. Defense of Strangers
4. State of necessity
5. Performance of duty
6. Obedience to order of superior
7. Minority over 15 and under 18 years of
age
8. Causing injury by mere accident
9. Uncontrollable fear
INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
1. Incomplete self-defense, defense of
relatives, defense of stranger
 In these 3 classes of defense, UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION must always be present. It is an
indispensable requisite.
 Par. 1 of Art. 13 is applicable only when unlawful
aggression is present but the other 2 requisites are not
present in any of the cases referred to in circumstances
number 1, 2 and 3 or Art. 11.
 Ex. When the one making defense against unlawful
aggression used unreasonable means to prevent or repel
it, he is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
2. Incomplete justifying circumstance of
avoidance of greater evil or injury.
REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 11:
a. That the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists;
b. That the injury feared be greater
than that done to avoid it;
c. That there be no other practical and
less harmful means of preventing it.
 Avoidance of greater evil or injury is a justifying
circumstance if all the three requisites mentioned in par.
4 of Art. 11 are present. But if any of the last two
requisites are lacking, there is only a mitigating
circumstance.
3. Incomplete justifying circumstance of
performance of duty.
or REQUISITES under par. 5 of Art. 11:
61
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
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a. That the accused acted in the a. That the threat which caused the fear was
performance of a duty or in the lawful of an evil greater than, or at least equal to,
exercise of a right or office; and that which he was required to commit;
b. That the injury caused or offense b. That it promised an evil of such gravity
committed be the necessary consequence and imminence that an ordinary person
of the due performance of such duty or would have succumbed to it.
the lawful exercise of such right or office.
● If only one of these requisites is present,
In People v. Oanis, the SC considered one of there is only a mitigating circumstance.
the 2 requisites as constituting the majority. It seems
that there is no ordinary mitigating circumstance under Par. 2 – THAT THE OFFENDER IS [UNDER 18 YEARS
Art. 13 par. 1 when the justifying or exempting OF AGE] OR OVER 70 YEARS. IN THE CASE OF THE
circumstance has 2 requisites only. MINOR, HE SHALL BE PROCEEDED AGAINST IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 80.
People v. Ulep
340 SCRA 688 (2000) Par. 2 contemplates the ff:
Facts: One early morning, Wapili was suffering from a 1. An offender over 70 years old.
high fever and was heard talking to himself in his room.
His brother in law was unable to pacify Wapili so called
Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor
Pastor Borial to pray over his suffering relative.
delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either sex, under
However, Wapili went amuck and went outside the
sixteen years of age at the date of the commission of a
house and became wild and violent. When the police
grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court,
responded, Wapili charged at the officers with a rattan
after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings,
stool. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot but Wapili
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall
continued advancing. The police officer shot Wapili who
suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such
fell to the ground. SPO1 Ulep shot Wapili at the back of
minor to the custody or care of a public or private,
the head which led to the victim‘s death. The trial court
benevolent or charitable institution, established under
convicted SPO1 Ulep with murder.
the law of the care, correction or education of orphaned,
homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the
Held: There was incomplete justifying circumstance as
custody or care of any other responsible person in any
defined in Article 69. While the officer was acting in the
other place subject to visitation and supervision by the
fulfillment of his duty, the injury he caused was in
Director of Public Welfare or any of his agents or
excess of what as necessary to perform his task of
representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the
pacifying the danger. In this case, Wapili was already
superintendent of public schools or his representatives,
down on the ground when he was shot to the head, the
subject to such conditions as are prescribed herein
danger already ceased and the killing was unnecessary.
below until such minor shall have reached his majority
age or for such less period as the court may deem
proper.
INCOMPLETE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
The court, in committing said minor as
provided above, shall take into consideration the religion
1. Incomplete exempting circumstance of
of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to
minority over 15 and under 18 years of age.
avoid his commitment to any private institution not
under the control and supervision of the religious sect or
REQUISITES under par. 3 of Art. 12:
denomination to which they belong.
a. That the offender is over 9 and under 15
The Director of Public Welfare or his duly
years old; and
authorized representatives or agents, the
b. That he does not act with discernment.
superintendent of public schools or his representatives,
or the person to whose custody or care the minor has
2. Incomplete exempting circumstance of
been committed, shall submit to the court every four
accident.
months and as often as required in special cases, a
written report on the good or bad conduct of said minor
REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 12:
and the moral and intellectual progress made by him.
a. A person is performing a lawful act;
The suspension of the proceedings against a
b. With due care;
minor may be extended or shortened by the court on
c. He causes an injury to another by mere
the recommendation of the Director of Public Welfare or
accident; and
his authorized representative or agents, or the
d. Without fault or intention of causing it.
superintendent of public schools or his representatives,
according as to whether the conduct of such minor has
● If the 2nd requisite and 1st part of the 4th
been good or not and whether he has complied with the
requisite are absent, the case will fall under Art. 365
conditions imposed upon him, or not. The provisions of
which punishes reckless imprudence.
the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be
affected by those contained herein.
● If the 1st requisite and 2nd part of the 4th
If the minor has been committed to the
requisite are absent, it will be an intentional felony.
custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in
the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of
3. Incomplete exempting circumstance of
the Director of Public Welfare and subject to such
uncontrollable fear.
conditions as this official in accordance with law may
deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to
REQUISITES under par. 6 of Art. 12:
stay elsewhere under the care of a responsible person.

62

If the minor has behaved properly and has
complied with the conditions imposed upon him during
his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of
this article, he shall be returned to the court in order
that the same may order his final release.
In case the minor fails to behave properly or to
comply with the regulations of the institution to which
he has been committed or with the conditions imposed
upon him when he was committed to the care of a
responsible person, or in case he should be found
incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution
should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court
in order that the same may render the judgment
corresponding to the crime committed by him.
The expenses for the maintenance of a minor
delinquent confined in the institution to which he has
been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his
parents or relatives or those persons liable to support
him, if they are able to do so, in the discretion of the
court; Provided, That in case his parents or relatives or
those persons liable to support him have not been
ordered to pay said expenses or are found indigent and
cannot pay said expenses, the municipality in which the
offense was committed shall pay one-third of said
expenses; the province to which the municipality
belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third
shall be borne by the National Government: Provided,
however, That whenever the Secretary of Finance
certifies that a municipality is not able to pay its share in
the expenses above mentioned, such share which is not
paid by said municipality shall be borne by the National
Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of
said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay
said expenses, the internal revenue allotments which
may be due to said city shall be withheld and applied in
settlement of said indebtedness in accordance with
section five hundred and eighty-eight of the
Administrative Code.
LEGAL EFFECTS OF VARIOUS AGES OF OFFENDER:
1. Minor delinquent under 18 years of age, the
sentence may be suspended. (Art. 192, P.D. No.
603 as amended by P.D. No. 1179)
2. Under 18 years of age, privileged mitigating
circumstance (Art. 68)
3. 18 years or over, full criminal responsibility.
Par. 3 – THAT THE OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION
TO COMMIT SO GRAVE WRONG AS THAT
COMMITTED.
 This circumstance can be taken into account
only when the facts proven show that there is a notable
and evident disproportion between the means employed
to execute the criminal act and its consequences.
 The intention, as an internal act, is judged
not only by the proportion of the means employed by
him to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact
that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of
the body.
 Intention must be judged by considering the
weapon used, the injury inflicted and the attitude of the
mind when the accused attacked the deceased.
 This mitigating circumstance is not
applicable when the offender employed brute force.
63
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
 Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is
not appreciated where the offense committed is
characterized by treachery.
 In crimes against persons who do not die as
a result of the assault, the absence of the intent to kill
reduces the felony to mere physical injuries, but it does
not constitute a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13
par 3.
 It is not applicable to felonies by negligence
because in these kinds of felonies, there is no intent on
the part of the offender which may be considered
diminished.
 Par. 3 is only applicable to offense resulting
in physical injuries or material harm. It is not applicable
to defamation or slander.
People v. Ural
56 SCRA 138 (1974)
Facts: Witness Alberto saw policeman Ural
inside the jail boxing detention prisoner Napola. As
Napola collapsed on the floor, Ural went out to get a
bottle. He poured the contents to the dress of Napola
and set it on fire. Napola got burned and he asked
mercy from Ural. Instead, Ural locked him up and
threatened the witness not to tell anyone or else he will
be burned also. When Napola was already suffering
much from the burns, Ural became frightened and he
and Siton helped put out the fire. Napola died later
because of the burns.
Held: Offender is criminally liable although
consequence of his felonious act was not intended by
him. This is covered by Art. 4 of the RPC. The TC failed
to appreciate the mitigating circumstance that the
offender has no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed. It is manifest from the facts that the
accused had no intent to kill the victim. His only design
was only to maltreat him maybe because of his drunken
condition. When the accused realized the fearful
consequences of his act, he allowed the victim to secure
medical treatment.
People v. Amit
32 SCRA 95(1970)
Facts: Amit pleads guilty to rape with homicide
and sentenced to death. Amit appeals claiming that
there are 3 mitigating circumstances including lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Held: A great disproportion between means
employed to accomplish the criminal act on the one
hand, and its consequences on the other, must first be
shown. Otherwise, the mitigating circumstance could
not be considered.
Based on the narration given by the accused
where he said that he held victim‘s neck down as he
boxed her in the face, and considering moreover that
the victim was 57 years old while the accused was only
32, the court held that the means employed by the
accused was sufficient to have caused the death of the
victim.
Death penalty should be imposed. It is a single
indivisible penalty applied regardless of mitigating
circumstance, especially when records of the present
case evince the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and abuse of superior strength.

People v. Regato
127 SCRA 287 (1984)
Facts: Regato, Ramirez and Salceda robbed
the store of Victor Flores. Victor was maltreated to force
him to reveal where their money was. The robbers
found the money in a place different from where Victor
revealed to them. Ramirez got mad and called Victor a
liar. Victor retorted, ―you robbers!‖. With this remark,
Ramirez shot Victor and the three rushed out of the
house.
Held: The SC did not find merit in the
contention that there was lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed. Intention is a mental
process and is an internal state of mind. The intention
must be judged by the ACTION, CONDUCT and
EXTERNAL ACTS of the accused. What men do is the
best index of their intention. In the case at bar, the
aforesaid mitigating circumstance cannot be
appreciated considering that the acts employed by the
accused were reasonably sufficient to produce the
result that they actually made – the death of the victim.
People v. Callet
382 SCRA 43 (2002)
Facts: Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were
beside each other as they watched a cara y cruz game.
Alfredo sat close to the ground, with his buttocks
resting on his right foot. Lecpoy and Eduardo sat on a
piece of wood and on a stone, respectively. Out of
nowhere, the accused, Callet, appeared behind Alfredo
and stabbed the latter on the left shoulder near the
base of the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife.
Instinctively, Alfredo stood up and managed to walk a
few meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and
Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Alfredo died
shortly thereafter. Calleto voluntary surrendered. He
claims that his liability should be mitigated by the fact
that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Held: The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong
so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the
weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury
inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the
accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the
victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity
to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do
what he actually did, and he must be held responsible
therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating
circumstance.
Par. 4. – THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR
THREAT ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT.
PROVOCATION
- Any unjust or improper conduct or act of the
offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating
anyone.
REQUISITES:
a. That the provocation must be sufficient
b. That it must originate from the offended party
c. That the provocation must be immediate to the
act, i.e., to the commission of the crime by the
person who is provoked.
64
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People v. Pagal
79 SCRA 570 (1977)
Facts: Pagal and Torcelino, employees of Gau
Guan, conspired together to take away from their
employer P1,281.00. When Gau Guan refused to open
the kaha de yero, they stabbed him with an icepick and
clubbed him with an iron pipe which resulted to his
death. The two accused were charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide. On appeal, they claimed that
they are entitled to 2 mitigating circumstances:
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation.
Held: The 2 mitigating circumstances cannot
be considered as 2 distinct and separate circumstances
but should only be treated as one because they both
arose from the same incident – the alleged
maltreatment of Pagal and Torcelino by Gau Guan. The
circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be
mitigating in a crime which is planned and calmly
meditated before its execution. Also, provocation in
order to be mitigating must be sufficient and
immediately preceding the act. In this case, it was
months ago when the incident of alleged maltreatment
took place.
Romera v. People
434 SCRA 467(2004)
Facts: While lying in bed, Romera heard the
victim Roy call him and his wife, asking if they had beer
and a fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy because
he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for
Romera but when the latter's wife told him that he was
already asleep, Roy told her to wake her husband up.
Romera went down the house and asked who was at
the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy
thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo
and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he
would kill Romera. Romera tried to prevent Roy from
entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was
hacking at the wall, Romera‘s wife held the door to
allow Romera to exit in another door to face Roy. He
hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to
him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner
grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the stomach.
Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness.
Romera ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
Held: There was sufficient provocation and the
circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the
commission of the offense. Thrusting his bolo at
Romera, threatening to kill him, and hacking the
bamboo walls of his house are sufficient provocation to
enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his
thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and
children are in danger. Romera stabbed the victim as a
result of those provocations, and while Romera was still
in a fit of rage.
The court however stressed that provocation
and passion or obfuscation are not 2 separate
mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if
these 2 circumstances are based on the same facts,
they should be treated together as one mitigating
circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it
is clear that both circumstances arose from the same
set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be
treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
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Par. 5. – THAT THE ACT WAS COMMITTED IN THE People v. Parana

IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE 64 Phil 331 (1937)
TO THE ONE COMMITTING THE FELONY (DELITO), Facts: The preceding night, Parana and Lamay
HIS SPOUSE, ASCENDANTS, DESCENDANTS, were at the house of the deceased‘s brother playing
LEGITIMATE, NATURAL OR ADOPTED BROTHERS cards when the two had an exchange of words so the
OR SISTERS, OR RELATIVES BY AFFINITY WITHIN deceased asked them to leave. The accused refused so
THE SAME DEGREE. the deceased slapped him and ordered him to leave.
The morning after, Parana was about to surprise the
REQUISITES: deceased and stab him from behind when the chauffeur
a. That there be a grave offense done to the one shouted to warn the deceased. The deceased,
committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, defending himself retreated until he fell into a ditch.
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted The appellant mounted astride of the deceased and
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within continued to stab him with the dagger. The deceased
the same degree. was first brought to the hospital but expired 6 days
b. That the felony is committed in vindication of after.
such grave offense. A lapse of time is allowed Held: The mitigating circumstance that he had
between the vindication and the doing of the acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
grave offense. committed against him a few hours before, when he
was slapped by the deceased in the presence of many
persons, must likewise be taken into consideration.
PROVOCATION VINDICATION Although this offense (slapping) was not so immediate,
the court believes that the influence thereof, by reason
It is made directly only to The grave offense may be
of its gravity and the circumstances under which it was
the person committing the committed also against
inflicted, lasted until the moment the crime was
offense the offender‘s relatives
committed.
mentioned in the law.
The cause that brought The offended party must
People v. Diokno
about the provocation have done a grave offense
63 Phil 601 (1936)
need not be a grave to the offender or his
Facts: The deceased and the daughter of
offense. relatives mentioned in the
accused Epifanio eloped. Epifanio and his son, Roman
law.
went to look for them. When they were able to find the
It is necessary that the The vindication of the
deceased, they stabbed him several times until he died.
provocation or threat grave offense may be
Held: The presence of the 5th mitigating
immediately preceded the proximate, which admits
circumstance must be taken into consideration. There
act. of an interval of time
was no interruption from the time the offense was
between the grace offense
committed to the vindication thereof. The herein
done by the offended
accused belong to a family of old customs to whom the
party and the commission
elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave
of the crime.
offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the
peace of the home. The fact that the accused saw the
deceased run upstairs when he became aware of their
Basis to determine the gravity of offense in presence, as if he refused to deal with them after
vindication having gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus
The question whether or not a certain personal strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion
offense is grave must be decided by the court, having in which blinded them and led them to commit that crime.
mind the social standing of the person, the place and
the time when the insult was made. People v. Torpio
431 SCRA 9 (2004)
 Vindication of a grave offense and passion or Facts: While having a drinking spree in a
obfuscation cannot be counted separately and cottage, Anthony tried to let Dennis Torpio drink gin
independently. and as the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis with
gin and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled
U.S. v. Ampar beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him with a
37 Phil 201 (1917) 29 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran
Facts: A fiesta was in progress and the accused towards their home. Upon reaching home, he got a
Ampar went to the kitchen and asked from Patobo some knife. He went back to the cottage by another route
of the roast pig. Patobo replied, ―There is no more. and upon arrival Anthony was still there. Upon seeing
Come here and I will make roast pig of you.‖ Later, Dennis, Anthony avoided Dennis and ran by passing the
while Patobo was squatting down, Ampar struck him on shore towards the creek but Dennis met him, blocked
the head with an ax, causing his death the following him and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran
day. The TC appreciated the mitigating circumstance of but got entangled with a fishing net beside the creek
immediate vindication of a grave offense. and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him and
Held: The offense which the defendant was continued stabbing him resulting to the latters death.
endeavoring to vindicate would be to the average person Thereafter, Dennis left and slept at a grassy meadow
considered as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old near a Camp. In the morning, he went to Estrera, a
man, it evidently was a serious matter to be made the police officer to whom he voluntarily surrendered.
butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. The TC Held: The mitigating circumstance of having
was correct. acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense is
properly appreciated. Dennis was humiliated, mauled
and almost stabbed by Anthony. Although the unlawful

65
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aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony,

it was nonetheless a grave offense for which Dennis
may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance.
However, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation cannot be considered apart from the
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These
two circumstances arose from one and the same
incident, i.e., the attack on the appellant by Anthony,
so that they should be considered as only one
mitigating circumstance.
Par. 6. – THAT OF HAVING ACTED UPON AN
IMPULSE SO POWERFUL AS NATURALLY TO HAVE
PRODUCED PASSION OR OBFUSCATION.
REQUISITES:
a. The accused acted upon an impulse.
b. The impulse must be so powerful that it
naturally produce passion or obfuscation
in him.
 Passion or obfuscation may constitute as a mitigating
circumstance only when the same arose from LAWFUL
SENTIMENTS. It is not applicable when:
a. The act committed in a spirit of LAWLESSNESS.
b. the act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE.
 The crime committed must be the result of a sudden
impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury.
 The accused who raped a woman is not entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of ―having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion‖ just because he finds himself in a secluded
place with that young ravishing woman, almost naked
and therefore, ―liable to succumb to the uncontrollable
passion of his bestial instinct.‖
People v. Muit
117 SCRA 696 (1982)
Facts: Rosario Muit was the Brgy. Zone
President and Torrero was the zone auditor. They used
to meet frequently because they were having an affair
which eventually reached the husband of Rosario,
Delfin. Delfin shot Torrero 3 times at the front yard of
the Muits. Delfin surrendered himself and turned in the
pistol he had used.
Held: Muit is guilty of murder with mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation. The accused was driven strongly by
jealousy. The feeling of resentment resulting from the
rivalry in amorous relations with a woman is a powerful
stimulant to jealousy and prone to produce anger and
obfuscation.
U.S. v. Hicks
14 Phil 217(1909)
Facts: For about 5 years, Hicks and Sola lived
together as husband and wife when they separated. A
few days later, Sola contracted new relations with
another negro named Wallace. Hicks went to Wallace‘s
house and asked the latter to go out. They talked for
awhile and then Hicks shot Wallace
Held: Even if it is true that the accused acted
with obfuscation because of jealousy, the mitigating
circumstance cannot be considered in his favor because
the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the
loss of self-control are such which originate from
legitimate feelings and not those which arise from
vicious, unworthy and immoral passions. The cause of
the passion of the accused was his vexation
engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to
live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect
right to do.

 The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising US v. De la Cruz

from jealousy cannot be invoked in favor of the accused 22 Phil 429 (1912)
whose relationship with the woman was illegitimate. Facts: The evidence clearly discloses that the
convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who
 Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise from had theretofore been his lover upon discovering her in
causes existing only in the honest belief of the offender. flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance.
Held: The accused was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation
PASSION OR IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
because the impulse was caused by the sudden
OBFUSCATION
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his
Mitigating circumstance Exempting circumstance
discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.
Cannot give rise to an
 Note: when the court used the word ―illicit‖,
irresistible force because
it doesn‘t mean that it is an illegitimate or
the latter requires physical
bigamous relationship. It means that it is
force
cohabitation without a valid marriage.
Passion or obfuscation is in Irresistible force must
the offender himself come from a third person
People v. Germina
Must arise from lawful The irresistible force is 290 SCRA 146(1998)
sentiments unlawful Facts: One night, the accused went to the
Angeles residence to look for Raymund. He went to
PASSION PROVOCATION verify the news that the latter mauled and stabbed the
Produced by an impulse Comes form the injured accused‘s mentally retarded brother, Rafael. Raymund
which may be caused by party was not yet at home and the moment he arrived, the
provocation accused spotted him and shot him.
Need not be immediate. It Must immediately precede Held: There is no treachery. Passion cannot co-
is only required that the the commission of the exist with treachery because in passion, the offender
influence thereof lasts crime loses his control and reason while in treachery the
until the moment the means employed are consciously adopted. One who
crime is committed loses his reason and self-control could not deliberately
The effect is the loss of reason and self-control on the employ a particular method or form of attack in the
part of the offender. execution of the crime. Passion existed in this case

66

because it clearly arose from lawful sentiments or
legitimate feelings. The accused committed the crime
due to the maltreatment inflicted by the victim on his
mentally retarded brother.
People v. Gonzalez
359 SCRA 352 (2001)
Facts: Both of the families of Andres and that
of Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. Gonzales was with his grandson and 3
housemaids, while Andres was driving with his pregnant
wife, Feliber, his 2yr old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin
and his sister-in-law. At an intersection, their two
vehicles almost collided. Gonzales continued driving
while Andres tailed Gonzales‘ vehicle and cut him off
when he found the opportunity to do so, then got out of
his vehicle and knocked on the appellant's car window.
Heated exchange of remarks followed. On his way back
to his vehicle, he met Gonzales son, Dino. Andres had a
shouting match this time with Dino. Gonzales then
alighted from his car and fired a single shot at the last
window on the left side of Andres' vehicle at an angle
away from Andres. The single bullet fired hit Kenneth,
Kevin and Feliber which caused the latter‘s death.
Held: The mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation is not obtaining. Andres' act of shouting
at Gonzales‘ son, who was then a nurse and of legal
age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation.
Dino was shouting back at Andres. It was not a case
wherein Gonzales son appeared helpless and oppressed
that Gonzales lost his reason and shot at the vehicle of
Andres. The same holds true for Gonzales‘ claim of
provocation on the part of Andres. Provocation must be
sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong
committed and that the provocation must be
commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency
of provocation varies according to the circumstances of
the case. The aggressive behavior of Andres towards
Gonzales and his son may be demeaning or humiliating
but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at Gonzales‘
vehicle.
People v. Lab-eo
373 SCRA 461 (2002)
Facts: After being told to go away by the
victim. Lab-eo left and returned to where the victim
was selling clothes and then and there stabbed her at
the back with a knife. Thereafter, he surrendered to the
Chief of Police. Lab-eo argues for the appreciation of the
mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, as
well as of sufficient provocation, in his favor.
Held: For a person to be motivated by passion
and obfuscation, there must first exist an unlawful act
that would naturally produce an impulse sufficient to
overcome reason and self-control. There is passional
obfuscation when the crime is committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust
or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. In asking Lab—eo to
leave, the victim did not do anything unlawful. There is
an absolute lack of proof that the Lab-eo was utterly
humiliated by the victim's utterance. Nor was it shown
that the victim made that remark in an insulting and
repugnant manner. The victim's utterance was not the
stimulus required by jurisprudence to be so
overwhelming as to overcome reason and self-restraint.
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People v. Bates
400 SCRA 95 (2003)
Facts: While Edgar, Simon, and Jose are along
a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter
suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation
surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose who was
then walking ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed
Carlito's right hand and elbow and tried to wrest
possession of the firearm. While the 2 were grappling for
possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito who
immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo
Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and
nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the
banana plantation, each brandishing a bolo. They
immediately attacked Jose hacking him several times.
Jose fell to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his
son kept on hacking him.
Held: Passion and obfuscation may not be
properly appreciated in favor of the appellant. To be
considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or
obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not
from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger
and resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo
was infuriated upon seeing his brother, Carlito, shot by
Jose. However, a distinction must be made between the
first time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time
that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked
Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if
appellant refrained from doing anything else after that,
he could have validly invoked the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when,
upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back
to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the
ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a
clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of
revenge.
Par. 7. – THAT THE OFFENDER HAD VOLUNTARILY
SURRENDERED HIMSELF TO A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY OR HIS AGENTS, OR THAT HE HAD
VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED HIS GUILT BEFORE THE
COURT PRIOR TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.
2 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THIS
PARAGRAPH:
1. Voluntary surrender to a person in authority or
his agents;
2. Voluntary confession of guilt before the court
prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER:
a. That the offender had not been actually arrested.
b. That the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or to the latter‘s agent.
c. That the surrender was voluntary.
 Merely requesting a policeman to accompany the
accused to the police HQ is not equivalent to voluntary
surrender.
 Other examples:
a. The warrant of arrest showed that the
accused was in fact arrested.
b. The accused surrendered only after the
warrant of arrest was served.
c. The accused went into hiding and
surrendered only when they realized that the forces of
the law were closing in on them.

 Surrender must be SPONTANEOUS. He surrendered 1)
because he acknowledges his guilty or 2) because he
wishes to save them the trouble and expenses
necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
 The surrender must be by reason of the commission of
the crime for which he is prosecuted.
People v. Coronel
17 SCRA 509 (1966)
Facts: Coronel was among those convicted for robbery
with multiple homicide. Coronel and several armed men
entered the house of Judge Bautista and killed the
family. The commission of the crime was attended by
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength, use of motor vehicle,
dwelling, nighttime, which was purposely sought and
taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime, and by an armed band. In the course of the trial,
Coronel changed his plea from ―not guilty‖ to ―guilty‖.
He also presented proof that he voluntarily surrendered
to a military camp.
Held: There is no question that the appellant enjoys in
his favor the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, which, however, is not sufficient to offset the
aggravating circumstances found to be attendant in the
commission of the crime. While the accused entered a
plea of guilty, he did it only during the continuation of
the trial so that this circumstance may not, under the
law, be considered to mitigate the liability of the
accused. We feel, though, that such an admission of
guilt indicates his submission to the law and a moral
disposition on his part to reform. Sentence is modified
from death penalty to life imprisonment.
People v. Pinca
318 SCRA 270 (1999)
Facts: Pinca and Abenir, after drinking at a
bakeshop, hitched a ride with a tricycle driver on their
way home. After passing a man who was apparently
drunk because he was swaying while he walked, the
accused asked the driver to drop them off already. Pinca
told Abenir that that was the guy who spilled a drink on
him earlier that day. The accused picked up a long piece
of wood and waited for the man to pass by. When the
latter did, the accused hit him at the back of his head
which led to his death.
When the police came, the accused readily
went with them and proceeded to tell his story that he
was innocent and that it was Abenir who killed the man.
The accused was convicted of the crime of murder.
Held: For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, 3 requisites should be present: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender
surrendered to a person of authority and 3) the
surrender was voluntary. The actions of the accused
belied this claim. He actually DENIED having committed
the crime. He went on to try and ―clear his name.‖ There
is no voluntary surrender.
People v. Amaguin
229 SCRA 166 (1994)
Facts: Celso and Gildo, together with others,
attacked the Oros. During the fray, Gildo was armed
with a knife and an ―Indian target.‖ And just as they
were about to finish off the Oro brothers, Willie, the
eldest of the Amaguins, appeared with a revolver and
delivered the coup de grace.
68
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
Held: SC agrees with the accused-appellants‘
view that voluntary surrender should be appreciated in
their favor. While it may have taken both Willie and
Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact is,
they voluntarily surrendered to the police before arrest
could be effected.
People v. Dulos
237 SCRA 141 (1994)
Facts: The accused hired two professional
entertainers to entertain his guests. One of the
entertainers, Susan, accepted an offer to check in with
the accused guests but later on changed her mind and
rejected the offer. When she went home with her
boyfriend, the accused chased them and asked for the
amount paid to Susan by one of his guests. Susan
denied this. Susan‘s boyfriend was shot by the accused
which resulted to his death.
Held: Voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated where there was no conscious effort on the
part of the accused to voluntarily surrender. Here, there
was no conscious effort on the part of the accused to
voluntary surrender to the military authorities when he
went to Camp Siongco after the fateful incidents. As he
himself admitted, he was not placed under custody by
the military authorities as he was free to roam around
as he pleased.
There is no voluntary surrender also where an
accused merely surrendered the gun he used in the
killing, without surrendering his person to the
authorities.
Andrada v. People
452 SCRA 685 (2005)
Facts: On 24 September 1986, accused
Andrada attacked, assaulted and hacked Arsenio Ugerio
on the head. Evidence of the prosecution showed that
after attacking the victim, he was apprehended by
responding police officers. Accused, however, alleged
that he voluntarily surrendered to the police.
Held: For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made
in such a manner that it shows the interest of the
accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to
save them the trouble and expenses that would be
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Accused‘s
surrender is not voluntary as he was apprehended by
responding police officers in the waiting shed at the
corner of Cambas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. Hence,
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should not have been appreciated in his favor.
REQUISITES OF PLEA OF GUILTY
a. That the offender spontaneously confessed his
guilt;
 Plea of guilty on appeal is not mitigating.
b. That the confession of guilty was made in open
court, that is, before the competent court that is to
try the case; and
 The extrajudicial confession made by the
accused is not voluntary confession. Such
confession was made outside the court. The
confession must be made in open court.
c. That the confession of guilt was made prior to
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.

 The change of plea should be made at the
first opportunity when his arraignment was
first set.
 A conditional plea of guilty is not mitigating
* Plea of guilty is mitigating because it indicates a moral
disposition in the accused, favorable to his reform. It is
an act of repentance and respect for the law.
People v. Crisostomo
160 SCRA 47(1988)
Facts: On Christmas day, while the accused
was passing near the house of Romeo, he met the latter
and invited him to go drinking. Romeo declined and
suddenly, the accused rushed towards Romeo from
behind and shot him with a revolver.
After the arraignment wherein accused entered
a plea of not guilty and again during the trial, the
accused signified his intention to withdraw his plea of
not guilty to a lesser charge of homicide and prayed that
he be allowed to prove the mitigating circumstances.
Held: The appellant offered to enter a plea of
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide only after some
evidence of the prosecution had been presented. He
reiterated his offer after the prosecution rested its case.
This is certainly not mitigating.
People v. Jose et al.
37 SCRA 450 (1971)
Facts: The Maggie De la Riva story. Maggie
was driving her car with her maid inside when they were
stopped by another car. The appellant, Pineda, together
with his 3 companions took Maggie with them leaving
the maid behind. Maggie who was blindfolded was
brought to a hotel. Inside the room, her blindfold was
removed and she was asked to strip for them. Then, the
appellants raped her.
Held: The court rejected Pineda‘s argument
that because the charge against him and his co-
appellants is a capital offense and the amended
complaints cited aggravating circumstances, which, if
proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty
of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of
the trial. The court held that while a plea of guilty is
mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission
of all the material facts alleged in the information,
including the aggravating circumstances, it matters not
that the offense is capital, for the admission covers both
the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying
and/or aggravating the crime. Because of the aforesaid
legal effect of Pineda‘s plea of guilty, it was not
incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence,
much less to require his presence in court.
People v. Montinola
360 SCRA 631 (2001)
To be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty, the accused must have voluntarily
confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. The
following requirements must therefore concur: (1) the
accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the
confession of guilt was made in open court, that is,
before a competent court trying the case; and (3) the
confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. The third requisite is
wanting in the present case.
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People v. Dawaton
389 SCRA 277 (2002)
Facts: On 20 September 1998, one Lavares
and several of his companions, including respondent
Dawaton were drinking. Intoxicated, Lavares decided to
sleep while the respondent Dawaton and his companions
continued drinking. Lavares was thereafter awakened
when respondent Dawaton stabbed him at the base of
his neck. Respondent Dawaton continued stabbing
Lavares until the latter died. Respondent Dawaton
pleaded not guilty when he was first arraigned, but
during the pre-trial, he offered to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide but was rejected by the
prosecution, hence, the case proceeded to trial. The
trial court found respondent Dawaton guilty of murder,
and sentenced him to death.
Held: The plea of guily to the crime of
homicide cannot be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in this case. While the accused offered to
plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, he was
charged with murder for which he had already entered a
plea of not guilty. The Supreme Court had already ruled
that an offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
cannot be considered as an attenuating circumstance
under the provisions of Art. 13 of the Revised Penal
Code because to be voluntary the plea of guilty must be
to the offense charged.
Par. 8. – THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF AND DUMB,
BLIND OR OTHERWISE SUFFERING FROM SOME
PHYSICAL DEFECT WHICH THUS RESTRICTS HIS
MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE, OR
COMMUNICATION WITH HIS FELLOW BEINGS.
 This paragraph does not distinguish between educated
and uneducated deaf-mute or blind persons.
 Physical defect referred to in this paragraph is such as
being armless, cripple, or a stutterer, whereby his
means to act, defend himself or communicate with his
fellow beings are limited.
Par. 9. – SUCH ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER AS
WOULD DIMINISH THE EXERCISE OF THE WILL-
POWER OF THE OFFENDER WITHOUT HOWEVER
DEPRIVING HIM OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS
ACTS.
REQUISITES:
a. That the illness of the offender must
diminish the exercise of his will-power.
b. That such illness should not deprive the
offender of consciousness of his acts.
 When the offender completely lost the exercise of will-
power, it may be an exempting circumstance.
 It is said that this paragraph refers only to diseases of
pathological state that trouble the conscience or will.
 Ex. A mother who, under the influence of a puerperal
fever, killed her child the day following her delivery.
Par. 10. – AND FINALLY, ANY OTHER
CIRCUMSTANCE OF A SIMILAR NATURE AND
ANALOGOUS OF THOSE ABOVEMENTIONED.
 Over 60 years old with failing sight, similar to over 70
years of age mentioned in paragraph 2.
 Voluntary restitution of the property stolen by the
accused or immediately reimbursing the amount
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

malversed is a mitigating circumstance as analogous to GENERIC AC QUALIFYING AC

voluntary surrender.
 Not resisting arrest is not analogous to voluntary
surrender.
 Testifying for the prosecution is analogous to plea of
guilty.
In Emilio Cimafranca v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 94408, 14 February 1991), the Supreme Court
held that the return of the funds malversed is neither a
defense and will not be an exempting circumstance nor
a ground for extinguishing the criminal liability of the
accused but it can be a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender.
 In the instant case, the return of the
property malversed was not mitigating
because it took the accused several years
before he returned the government
property. In fact, when the engine was
returned, it was already scrap and the
revolver was rusty and had to be reblued.
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE NEITHER
EXEMPTING NOR MITIGATING
1. Mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus, for
under Art. 48, there is a complex crime
committed. The penalty is even higher.
2. Mistake in the identity of the victim, for under
Art. 4, par. 1, the accused is criminally liable
even if the wrong done is different from that
which is intended.
3. Entrapment of the accused.
4. The accused is over 18 years of age. If the
offender is over 18 years old, his age is neither
exempting nor mitigating.
5. Performance of righteous action.
4. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
¤ Aggravating circumstances are those which, if
attendant in the commission of the crime, serve to
increase the penalty without, however, exceeding the
maximum of the penalty provided by law for the offense.
¤ They are based on the greater perversity of the
offender manifested in the commission of the felony as
shown by:
a. motivating power itself;
b. the place of commission;
c. the means and ways employed;
d. the time; or
e. the personal circumstances of the
offender, or of the offended party.
FOUR KINDS OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. GENERIC – Those that can generally apply
to all crimes. Nos. 1, 2, 3 (dwelling), 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14,
18, 19, and 20 except ―by means of motor vehicles.‖
2. SPECIFIC – Those that apply only to
particular crimes. Nos. 3 (except dwelling), 15, 16, 17
and 21.
3. QUALIFYING –Those that change the
nature of the crime. Art. 248 enumerates the qualifying
AC which qualify the killing of person to murder.
4. INHERENT – Those that must accompany
the commission of the crime.
The effect of a generic AC, The effect of a qualifying
not offset by any AC is not only to give the
mitigating circumstance, is crime its proper and
to increase the penalty exclusive name but also to
which should be imposed place the author thereof in
upon the accused to the such a situation as to
MAXIMUM PERIOD. deserve no other penalty
than that specially
prescribed by law for said
crime.
A generic aggravating A qualifying AC cannot be
circumstance may be offset by a mitigating
compensated by a circumstance.
mitigating circumstance.
According to the new rules, generic and qualifying
aggravating circumstances must be alleged in order to
be appreciated.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DO NOT
HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE PENALTY
AC 1) which in themselves constitute a crime
specially punishable by law, or b) which are included by
the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty
therefore shall not be taken into account for the purpose
of increasing the penalty (Art. 62, par. 1)
¤ AC which arise: a) from the moral attributes of the
offender or b) from his private relations with the
offended party, or c) from any other personal cause,
shall only serve to aggravate the liability of the
principals, accomplices, and accessories as to whom
such circumstances are attendant.
Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following
are aggravating circumstances:
1. That advantage be taken by the offender of
his public position.
2. That the crime be committed in contempt or
with insult to the public authorities.
3. That the act be committed with insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed
in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not
given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with abuse of
confidence or obvious ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in the palace
of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties,
or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
6. That the crime be committed in the night
time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever
such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the
offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors
shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a
band.
7. That the crime be committed on the
occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake,
epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of
armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial
for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by
final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of this Code.

70

10. That the offender has been previously
punished by an offense to which the law attaches an
equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to
which it attaches a lighter penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in
consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
12. That the crime be committed by means of
inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel
or intentional damage thereto, derailment of a
locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving
great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with evident
premeditation.
14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be
employed.
15. That advantage be taken of superior
strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.
16. That the act be committed with treachery
(alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.
17. That means be employed or circumstances
brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects
of the act.
18. That the crime be committed after an
unlawful entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of
a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.
19. That as a means to the commission of a
crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.
20. That the crime be committed with the aid
of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of
motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other
similar means. (As amended by R.A. No. 5438).
21. That the wrong done in the commission of
the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for its commissions.
People v. Antonio
393 SCRA 169 (2002)
Facts: Kevin Paul, 7 year-old son of the victim
Sergio was lying on the bed beside his father Sergio in
the bedroom when he heard a window being opened and
the sound of feet stepping on the floor. Then someone
kicked open the door to the bedroom. Kevin saw Wilson
Antonio carrying a shotgun. Wilson aimed his gun at
Sergio who was asleep on the bed and fired hitting
Sergio on the chest, shoulder and back. He was also hit
on his left thigh. Immediately after firing his gun, Wilson
hurriedly left the room. When the police arrived, Sergio
was already dead. Wilson surrendered to the police
after eluding arrest for more than 1 yr. The trial court
convicted him of murder qualified by treachery and
aggravated by the circumstance of evident
premeditation, dwelling and unlawful entry. The above
aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the
Information.
Held: Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, every complaint or information must
state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances. This rule may be given retroactive effect
in the light of the well-established rule that statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. The aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and
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unlawful entry, not having been alleged in the
Information, may not now be appreciated to enhance
the liability of Wilson.
People v. Suela
373 SCRA 163 (2002)
Facts: Brothers Edgar and Nerio Suela, and
Edgardo Batocan, sporting ski masks, bonnets and
gloves, brandishing handguns and knife, barged into the
room of Director Rosas who was watching television
together with his adopted son, Norman and his friend
Gabilo. They threatened Rosas, Norman and Gabilo to
give the location of their money and valuables, which
they eventually took. They dragged Gabilo downstairs
with them. Upon Nerio‘s instructions, Batocan stabbed
Gabilo 5 times which caused the latter‘s death . The trial
court sentenced Edgar, Nerio and Batocan to suffer the
penalty of death appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of disguise which was not alleged in the
Information against the three.
Held: Following current Rules on Criminal
Procedure, particularly Section 9 of the new Rule 110,
and current jurisprudence, the aggravating circumstance
of disguise cannot be appreciated against appellants. In
as much as the same was not alleged in the
Information, the aggravating circumstance of disguise
cannot now be appreciated to increase the penalty to
death notwithstanding the fact that the new rule
requiring such allegation was promulgated only after the
crime was committed and after the trial court has
already rendered its Decision. It is a cardinal rule that
rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive
application insofar as they benefit the accused.
People v. Mendoza
327 SCRA 695 (2000)
Facts: Anchito and Marianito passed by
appellant's house and asked for a drink from appellant's
wife, Emily. Anchito began talking with Emily and they
were about 4 arms-length from Marianito when
appellant suddenly appeared. Appellant hacked Anchito
on the nape, which prompted Marianito to flee out of
fear for his life. Anchito died in a kneeling position with
hack wounds at the back of the neck and body.
Appellant voluntary surrendered. The trial court ruled
that voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
Held: The trial court erred in ruling that
voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. Treachery in the present case
is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance.
Its presence served to characterize the killing as
murder; it cannot at the same time be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the
imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot
offset voluntary surrender.
Par. 1. - THAT ADVANTAGE BE TAKEN BY THE
OFFENDER OF HIS PUBLIC POSITION.
¤ The public officer must use the influence, prestige or
ascendancy which his office gives him as the means by
which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter
is presented in the inquiry, ―did the accused abuse his
office in order to commit the crime?‖
¤ When a public officer commits a common crime
independent of his official functions and does acts that
are not connected with the duties of his office, he should
be punished as a private individual without this AC.

¤ The mere fact that he was in fatigue uniform and had
army rifle at the time is insufficient to establish that he
misused his public position in the commission of the
crimes (People v. Pantoja)
¤ Even if defendant did not abuse his office, if it is
proven that he has failed in his duties as such public
officer, this circumstance would warrant the aggravation
of his penalty.
¤ Taking advantage of public position, cannot be taken
into consideration in offenses where it is made by law an
integral element of the crime such as in malversation or
in falsification of documents committed by public
officers.
People v. Capalac
117 SCRA 874 (1982)
Facts: Magaso stabbed Moises in a cockpit. The
aggressor attempting to escape was confronted by 2
brothers of Moises, Jesus (deceased) and appellant
Mario Capalac. Magaso, seeing that he was cornered,
raised his hands as a sign of surrender. The brothers
were not appeased. Mario proceeded to pistol-whip
Magaso and after he had fallen, Jesus stabs him. The
lower court convicted the accused of murder and took
into consideration the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public office because the accused is
a police officer.
Held: On the aggravating circumstance that
the accused used his public position as a policeman, it
was held that the mere fact that he was a member of
the police force was insignificant to the attack. He acted
like a brother, instinctively. He pistol-whipped the
deceased because he had a pistol with him. It came in
handy and so he acted accordingly. That he was a
policeman is of no relevance.
People v. Gapasin
231 SCRA 728 (1994)
Facts: Gapasin was a member of the Phil.
Constabulary. He was issued a mission order to
investigate a report regarding the presence of
unidentified armed men in one barrio. He was informed
that a certain Calpito had an unlicensed firearm. He shot
Calpito with the use of an armalite after seeing the latter
walking along the road. Gapasin was convicted of
murder.
Held: The accused took advantage of his public
position because as a member of the PC, he committed
the crime with an armalite which was issued to him
when he received his order.
People v. Villamor
373 SCRA 254 (2002)
Facts: Brothers Jerry and Jelord Velez were on
their way home on board a motorcycle. Jerry was
driving. As they neared a junction, they heard a
speeding motorcycle fast approaching from behind. The
brothers ignored the other motorcycle, which caught up
with them. As they were about to cross the bridge
leading to their home, gunshots rang out from behind
them. They abruptly turned the motorcycle around
towards the direction of the gunfire. The light of their
motorcycle's headlamp fell on their attackers aboard the
second motorcycle. The assailants fired at them a
second time and fled. Jerry saw PO3 Villamor and
Maghilom on board the motorcycle behind them.
Maghilom was driving the motorcycle while Villamor was
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holding a short gun pointed at them. Jerry sustained
gunshot wounds but survived. Jelord, however, died on
the spot during the first gun burst.
Held: There was no showing that Villamor took
advantage of his being a policeman to shoot Jelord Velez
or that he used his "influence, prestige or ascendancy"
in killing the victim. Villamor could have shot Velez even
without being a policeman. In other words, if the
accused could have perpetrated the crime even without
occupying his position, there is no abuse of public
position. The Court cited the case of People v. Herrera,
where the Court emphatically said that the mere fact
that accused-appellant is a policeman and used his
government issued .38 caliber revolver to kill is not
sufficient to establish that he misused his public position
in the commission of the crime.
Par. 2. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN
CONTEMPT OR WITH INSULT TO THE PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES.
REQUISITES:
a. That the public authority is engaged in the
exercise of his functions.
b. That he who is thus engaged in the exercise of
his functions is not the person against whom
the crime is committed.
c. The offender knows him to be a public
authority.
d. His presence has not prevented the offender
from committing the criminal act.
PUBLIC AUTHORITY / PERSON IN AUTHORITY
A public officer who is directly vested with
jurisdiction, that is, a public officer who has the power to
govern and execute the laws. The councilor, mayor,
governor, barangay captain etc. are persons in
authority. A school teacher, town municipal health
officer, agent of the BIR, chief of police, etc. are now
considered a person in authority.
¤ Par. 2 is not applicable if committed in the presence of
an agent only such as a police officer.
AGENT
A subordinate public officer charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as barrio policemen,
councilmen, and any person who comes to the aid of
persons in authority.
¤ The crime should not be committed against the public
authority or else it becomes direct assault.
¤ Lack of knowledge on the part of the offender that a
public authority is present indicates lack of intention to
insult the public authority.
Par. 3. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED (1) WITH
INSULT OR IN DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE
THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS (a)
RANK, (b) AGE, OR (c) SEX, OR (2) THAT IS BE
COMMITTED IN THE DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED
PARTY, IF THE LATTER HAS NOT GIVEN
PROVOCATION.
¤ Four circumstances are enumerated in this paragraph,
which can be considered single or together. If all the 4

circumstances are present, they have the weight of one
aggravating circumstance only.
¤ This circumstance (rank, age or sex) may be taken
into account only in crimes against person or honor.
¤ There must be evidence that in the commission of the
crime, the accused deliberately intended to offend or
insult the sex or age of the offended party.
(1) WITH INSULT OR IN DISREGARD OF
THE REPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON
ACCOUNT:
(a) OF THE RANK OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
ex. An attempt upon the life of a general of the
Philippine Army is committed in disregard of his rank.
(b) OF THE AGE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
ex. When the aggressor is 45 years old and the
victim was an octogenarian.
¤ It is not proper to consider disregard of old
age in crimes against property. Robbery with homicide is
primarily a crime against property.
(c) OF THE SEX OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
¤ This refers to the female sex, not to the male
sex (Reyes)
¤ Killing a woman is not attended by this AC if
the offender did not manifest any specific insult or
disrespect towards her sex.
¤ THIS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FOLLOWING:
1. When the offender acted with passion and
obfuscation.
2. When there exists a relationship between the
offended party and the offender.
3. When the condition of being a woman is
indispensable in the commission of the crime
i.e. parricide, rape, etc.
¤ Disregard of sex absorbed in treachery.
(2) THAT BE COMMITTED IN THE
DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
DWELLING – BUILDING OR STRUCTURE,
EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR REST AND COMFORT.
¤ a ―combination house and store‖ or a market
stall where the victim slept is not a dwelling.
¤ This is considered an AC primarily because of
the sanctity of privacy, the law accords to human abode.
Also, in certain cases, there is an abuse of confidence
which the offended party reposed in the offender by
opening the door to him.
¤ The evidence must show clearly that the
defendant entered the house of the deceased to attack
him.
¤ The offended party must not give
provocation. If the provocation did not take place in the
house, dwelling may be considered as an AC.
¤ Dwelling is aggravating, even if the offender
did not enter the upper part of the house where the
victim was, but shot from under the house.
¤ Even if the killing took place outside the
dwelling, it is aggravating provided that the commission
of the crime was begun in the dwelling.
¤ Dwelling is aggravating in abduction or illegal
detention.
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¤ It is not aggravating where the deceased was
called down from his house and he was murdered in the
vicinity of his house.
¤ Dwelling includes dependencies, the foot of
the staircase and the enclosure under the house. If the
deceased was only about to step on the first rung of the
ladder when he was assaulted, the AC of dwelling will
not be applicable.
DWELLING NOT APPLICABLE:
1. When both offender and offended party are
occupants of the same house.
2. When the robbery is committed by the use of
force upon things, dwelling is not aggravating because
it is inherent to the crime.
3. In the crime of trespass to dwelling, it is also
inherent or included by law in defining the crime.
4. When the owner of the dwelling gave sufficient
and immediate provocation.
5. When the dwelling where the crime was
committed did not belong to the offended party.
6. When the rape was committed in the ground
floor of the 2-storey structure, the lower floor being
used as a video rental store and not as a private place
of abode or residence.
¤ A victim raped in the boarding house where she was a
bed spacer. Her room constituted a ―dwelling‖.
¤ Dwelling may be temporary dwelling.
¤ Note: The Code speaks of dwelling, not domicile.
¤ Dwelling is not aggravating in adultery when paramour
also lives in the conjugal home.
¤ Dwelling is not included in treachery.
People v. Rodil
109 SCRA 308 (1981)
Facts: Lt. Mesana approached Rodil and
identifies himself as a PC officer. He asked Rodil whether
or not the gun which the latter possessed had a license.
Rodil attempted to draw his gun but was prevented by
Mesana‘s companions. Rodil was asked to sign a
document attesting to the confiscation of the gun but he
refused. Instead, he drew a dagger and managed to
stab Mesana in the chest repeatedly.
Held: The AC of disregard of rank should be
appreciated because it is obvious that Mesana identified
himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a
member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore
inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.
People v. Daniel
86 SCRA 511 (1978)
Facts: 13-year-old Margarita was at the bus
station when the accused, Daniel, started molesting her,
asking her name and trying to get her bag to carry it for
her. She refused and asked the help of the conductor
and driver but they did not help her. She ran to the
jeepney stop and rode the jeep. Daniel followed her to
the boarding house and he raped her.
Held: Although Margarita was merely renting a
bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for
all intents and purposes a ―dwelling‖ as the term is used
in Art. 14(3) of the RPC. Be she a lessee, a boarder, or a
bedspacer, the place is her home the sanctity of which
the law seeks to protect and uphold.

People v. Banez
301 SCRA 248 (1999)
Facts: The accused was living with his parents.
His sisters complained to their father that the accused
made trouble whenever he was drunk. They wanted to
put the accused in another house. That night while they
were discussing the plans for the accused, while their
father went to his room, the accused, who looked drunk,
ran to the kitchen and got 2 knives and then stabbed
the father. The father died.
Held: The aggravating circumstance of dwelling
cannot be considered aggravating where the accused
and the victim were living in the same house where the
crime was committed. The rationale for considering
dwelling an aggravating circumstance is the violation by
the offender of the sanctity of the home of the victim by
trespassing therein to commit the crime. This reason is
entirely absent in this case.
People v. Lapaz
171 SCRA 539 (1989)
Facts: Eulalia Cabunag, a 70-year-old woman
who was living alone, was beaten to death by 3 men.
Appellant Barleso, Lapaz and Cristoto agreed to kill
Eulalia because there was one incident when the victim
called Barleso a thief in front of many people.
Held: The presence of treachery is clear as
Barleso invited two companions to help him execute his
plan to beat the victim to death with pieces of wood in
the middle of the night, insuring death of the victim
without risk to himself arising from the defense with the
offended party might make.
While it may be true that nighttime is absorbed
in the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex and age
cannot be similarly absorbed. Treachery refers to the
manner of the commission of the crime. Disregard of sex
and age pertains to the relationship of the victim, who is
a 70-year old woman, and the appellant who is a young
man, 27 years old, at the time of the commission of the
offense.
People v. Taboga
376 SCRA 500 (2002)
Facts: Taboga entered the house of Tubon, a
widowed septuagenarian, robbed, stabbed and burned
beyond recognition the latter‘s house.
Held: Anent the circumstance of age, there
must be a showing that the malefactor deliberately
intended to offend or insult the age of the victim.
Neither could disregard of respect due to sex be
appreciated if the offender did not manifest any
intention to offend or disregard the sex of the victim. In
other words, killing a woman is not attended by the
aggravating circumstance if the offender did not
manifest any specific insult or disrespect towards the
offended party's sex. In the case at bar, there is
absolutely no showing that Taboga deliberately intended
to offend or insult the victim. However, even if
disrespect or disregard of age or sex were not
appreciated, the four circumstances enumerated in
Article 14, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, can be considered singly or together.
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People v. De Mesa
354 SCRA 397 (2001)
Facts: Motas, Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City, was shot by De Mesa
while playing a card game with some town mates at a
neighborhood store resulting to his death. The trial
court, in convicting De Mesa for murder, appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of commission of the crime in
contempt of or with assault to public authorities.
Held: The trial court also erred in appreciating
the aggravating circumstance that the commission of
the crime was in contempt of or with assault to public
authorities. The requisites of this circumstance are: (1)
the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his
duties and (2) he is not the person against whom the
crime is committed. None of these circumstances are
present in this case. In the first place, the crime was
committed against the barangay chairman himself. At
the time that he was killed, he was not engaged in the
discharge of his duties as he was in fact playing a card
game with his neighbors.
People v. Montinola (Supra)
Facts: Montinola boarded a passenger jeepney
driven by Hibinioda. Among the passengers was
Reteracion. All of a sudden, appellant drew his gun, an
unlicensed firearm, .380 cal pistol and directed
Reteracion to hand over his money or else he would be
killed. Montinola aimed the firearm at the neck of
Reteracion and fired successive shots at the latter. As a
result Reteracion slumped dead. Montinola was charged
with robbery with homicide and illegal possession of
firearm.
Held: Disregard of age, sex or rank is not
aggravating in robbery with homicide, which is primarily
a crime against property, as the homicide is regarded as
merely incidental to the robbery.
People v. Taño
331 SCRA 448 (2000)
Facts: Amy was tending a video rental shop
owned by Marina. Taño kept going in and out of the
shop and on the last time he went inside said shop, he
suddenly jumped over the counter, strangled Amy,
poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled her
towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and
gained carnal knowledge of her against her will and
consent. Before they could reach the upper floor, he
suddenly pulled Amy down and started mauling her until
she lost consciousness; then he freely ransacked the
place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly banging
her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl, he
took her bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then
proceeded upstairs where he took as well the jewelry
box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's
employer. The trial court appreciated dwelling as an
aggravating circumstance because the incident took
place supposedly at the residence of private
complainant's employer, "which doubles as a video
rental shop.
Held: Dwelling cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in this case because the rape
was committed in the ground floor of a two-story
structure, the lower floor being used as a video rental
store and not as a private place of abode or residence.
People v. Rios
333 SCRA 823(2000)
Facts: Rios hurled stones at the house of
Ambrocio and Anacita Benedicto. A few minutes later,

and while the Benedicto spouses were tending their
store, Rios bought cigarettes. Ambrocio confronted Rios
about the stoning incident and an altercation ensued
between them. Having heard the appellant shout at
Ambrocio, Mesa intervened and requested the 2 to part
ways and escorted them to their respective residences.
A few minutes later, appellant went back to the store.
Ambrocio went to the terrace of their house. Appellant
suddenly approached Ambrocio and stabbed his right
stomach. Mesa and his group saw Anacita weeping while
Ambrocio was lying lifeless in the terrace of their house.
Ambrocio died before he was brought to the hospital.
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance
of dwelling.
Held: The trial court correctly appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada in this
case. The word dwelling includes every dependency of
the house that forms an integral part thereof and
therefore it includes the staircase of the house and much
more, its terrace. When a crime is committed in the
dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not
given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance.
People v. Arizobal
348 SCRA 143 (2000)
Facts: Arizobal and two others entered the
house of spouses Clementina and Laurencio Gimenez.
They then ransacked the house and ordered Laurencio
to go with them to his son Jimmy‘s house. Upon
reaching the house of Jimmy, they tied the latter and
one Francisco also surnamed Gimenez. They consumed
the food and cigarettes Jimmy‘s wife Erlinda, was
selling. They proceeded to ransack the household in
search of valuables. Thereafter, Erlinda was ordered to
produce P100,000 in exchange for Jimmy‘s life. Erlinda
offered to give a certificate of large cattle but the
document was thrown back at her. The 3 then dragged
Jimmy outside the house together with Laurencio. One
of the culprits returned and told Erlinda that Jimmy and
Laurencio had been killed for trying to escape. The trial
court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling.
Held: The trial court is correct in appreciating
dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Generally,
dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can
only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as
trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place.
However, in robbery with homicide the authors thereof
can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the
sanctity of the victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the
robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of the
inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their
way in, looted their houses, intimidated and coerced
their inhabitants into submission, disabled Laurencio and
Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of
the house to be killed.
Par. 4. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED WITH (1)
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR (2) OBVIOUS
UNGRATEFULNESS.
(1) ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
REQUISITES:
a. That the offended party had trusted the offender.
b. That the offender abused such trust by
committing a crime against the offended party.
c. That the abuse of confidence facilitated the
commission of the crime.
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¤ The confidence between the offender and the offended
party must be immediate and personal.
¤ It is inherent in malversation, qualified theft, estafa by
conversion or misappropriation and qualified seduction.
(2) OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS
¤ The ungratefulness must be obvious –
manifest and clear.
1. offended party trusted the offender;
2. offender abused said trust by committing a
crime against the offended; and
3. the act committed is with Obvious
Ungratefulness.
People v. Mandolado
123 SCRA 128 (1983)
Facts: Mandolado and Ortillano, with Erinada
and Simon are trainees/draftees of the AFP. They got to
know each other and had a drinking session at the bus
terminal. The accused was drunk. He got his gun and
started firing. Erinada and Simon rode a jeep and tried
to escape from Mandolado and Ortillano but the two
eventually caught up with them. The two accused shot
the victims to death.
Held: There is no aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence. In order that abuse of confidence
be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that ―there
exists a relation of trust and confidence between the
accused and one against whom the crime was
committed and that the accused made use of such a
relationship to commit the crime. It is also essential that
the confidence between the parties must be immediate
and personal such as would give the accused some
advantage to commit the crime. It is obvious that the
accused and the victims only met for the first time so
there is no personal or immediate relationship upon
which confidence might rest between them.
People v. Arrojado
350 SCRA 679 (2001)
Facts: Arrojado is the first cousin of the victim,
Mary Ann and lived with her and her father. Arrojado
helped care for the victim‘s father for which he was paid
a monthly salary of P1,000.00. Arrojado killed Mary Ann
by stabbing her with a knife. Thereafter he claimed that
the latter committed suicide.
Held: The aggravating circumstance of abuse
of confidence is present in this case. For this
aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show
that the confidence between the parties must be
immediate and personal such as would give the accused
some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the
criminal act. The confidence must be a means of
facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit
taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the
former would not abuse said confidence.
Par. 5. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN THE
PALACE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR IN HIS
PRESENCE, OR WHERE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES ARE
ENGAGED IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES,
OR IN A PLACE DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
WORSHIP.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
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PLACE WHER PUBLIC CONTEMPT OR INSULT (2) UNINHABITED PLACE

AUTHORITIES ARE TO PUBLIC - One where there are no houses at all, a place
ENGAGED IN THE AUTHORITIES at a considerable distance from town, or where the
DISCHARGE OF THEIR (par. 2) houses are scattered at a great distance from each
DUTIES (par. 5) other.
The public authorities are in the performance of their - TEST: WON in the place of the commission of
duties. the offense, there was a reasonable possibility of the
The public authorities who The public authorities are victim receiving some help.
are in the performance of performing their duties - The fact that persons occasionally passed in
their duties must be in outside of their offices. the uninhabited place and that on the night of the
their office. murder another hunting party was not a great distance
The public authority may The public authority away, does not matter. It is the nature of the place
be the offended party. should not be the offended which is decisive.
party. - It must appear that the accused SOUGHT
THE SOLITUDE of the place where the crime was
¤ If it is the Malacañang palace or a church, it is committed, in order to better attain his purpose.
aggravating, regardless of whether State or official or - The offenders must choose the place as an
religious functions are being held. aid either (1) to an easy and uninterrupted
accomplishment of their criminal designs or (2) to insure
¤ The President need not be in the palace. His presence concealment of the offense.
alone in any place where the crime is committed is
enough to constitute the AC. It also applies even if he is (3) BAND
not engaged in the discharge of his duties in the place - Whenever more than 3 armed malefactors
where the crime was committed. shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a
¤ However, as regards the place where the public band.
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, - The armed men must act together in the
there must be some performance of public functions. commission of the crime.
- If one of the four armed persons is a principal
¤ Cemeteries are not places dedicated for religious by inducement, they do not form a band.
worship. - All the armed men, at least four in number,
must take direct part in the execution of the act
¤ Offender must have the intention to commit a crime constituting the crime.
when he entered the place. - Considered in crimes against property and
persons and not to crimes against chastity.
- It is inherent in brigandage.
Par. 6. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED (1) IN
THE NIGHT TIME, OR (2) IN AN UNINHABITED
People v. Jose (supra)
PLACE, OR (3) BY A BAND, WHENEVER SUCH
Facts: The Maggie Dela Riva story. Maggie, the
CIRCUMSTANCES MAY FACILITATE THE
victim, was on her way home, driving her car
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
accompanied by her maid, when she was stopped by
WHENEVER MORE THAN THREE ARMED
another car boarded by 4 men. Accused Pineda pulled
MALEFACTORS SHALL HAVE ACTED TOGETHER IN
her out of the car and forced her inside the assailants‘
THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE, IT SHALL BE
car. She was brought to a hotel and there, the 4
DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY A BAND.
accused raped her.
Held: The Supreme Court found that there was
¤ These 3 circumstances may be considered separately committed forcible abduction with rape. With rape as the
when their elements are distinctly perceived and can more serious crime, the penalty to be imposed is the
subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of maximum penalty in accordance with Art. 48 of the RPC.
perversity. With this finding, the penalty of death was imposed.
While the Supreme Court did not find it necessary to
Nighttime, uninhabited place or band is consider the aggravating circumstances, the Court still
aggravating: considered the aggravating circumstances for the
1. When it facilitated the commission of the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be
crime; or imposed in each of the other 3 crimes of simple rape.
2. When especially sought for by the offender to The court claimed that there was an AC of nighttime
insure the commission of the crime or for the because appellants purposely sought such circumstance
purpose of impunity; or to facilitate the commission of these crimes.
3. When the offender took advantage thereof for
the purpose of impunity. People v. Desalisa
229 SCRA 35 (1994)
(1) NIGHTTIME Facts: Moved by hatred and jealousy, the
- The commission of the crime must begin and accused, armed with a sharp pointed instrument,
be accomplished in the nighttime. attacked and inflicted physical injuries on the vagina of
- The offense must be actually committed in his wife who was about 5 months pregnant. Thereafter,
the darkness of the night. When the place is illuminated the accused hanged his wife to a jackfruit tree, causing
by light, nighttime is not aggravating. her death and that of her fetus.

76

He was found guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion and was sentenced
to life imprisonment by the lower court.
Held: The aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place is present. The ―uninhibitedness‖ of a
place is determined not by the distance of the nearest
house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in
the place of the commission, there was reasonable
possibility of the victim receiving some help. Considering
that the killing was done during nighttime and many
fruit trees obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby,
there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to
receive any assistance. The couple lived on a small nipa
house on a hill. There are 2 other houses in the
neighborhood which are 150 meters away; the house of
Norma‘s parents and house of Carlito. These cannot,
however, be seen from the couple‘s house because of
the many fruit trees and shrubs prevalent in the area.
People v. Silva
387 SCRA 77 (2002)
Facts: Accused armed with a gun, a bolo, a
rope and a flashlight abducted brothers Edmund and
Manuel Ceriales while the two were playing a game of
cards inside their house in the middle of the night. They
tied both their hands and feet with a rope and they
brought the brothers at an isolated place. Manuel was
stabbed and beheaded causing his instantaneous death.
Edmund Ceriales was able to escape while the accused
were about to kill his brother. The trial court appreciated
nighttime as an aggravating circumstance.
Held: By and of itself, nighttime is not an
aggravating circumstance, however, it becomes
aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the
offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it
facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the
offender's immunity from capture. In this case, the trial
court correctly appreciated nighttime as aggravating
considering that nighttime facilitated the abduction of
the Ceriales brothers, the killing of Manuel and the
attempt to kill Edmund. Evidence shows that accused-
appellants took advantage of the darkness to
successfully consummate their plans. The fact that they
brought with them a flashlight clearly shows that they
intended to commit the crime in darkness.
People v. Ancheta
431 SCRA 42 (2004)
Facts: Appellant Ulep and his group, robbed
Alfredo Roca of 35 sacks of Palay after killing his son, his
wife and his mother with their guns. Thereafter, they
boarded their jeep and left.
Held: The offense was proven to have been
executed by a band. A crime is committed by a band
when at least four armed malefactors act together in the
commission thereof. In this case, all six accused were
armed with guns which they used on their victims.
Clearly, all the armed assailants took direct part in the
execution of the robbery with homicide.
People v. Librando
335 SCRA 232 (2000)
Facts: Edwin and his daughter Aileen, and a
relative, Fernando, were traversing a hilly portion of a
trail on their way home when they met Raelito Librando,
Larry and Eddie. Edwin was carrying a torch at that time
as it was already dark. Raelito inquired from Edwin the
whereabouts of Fernando and without any warning hit
Edwin with a piece of wood. Eddie followed suit and
delivered another blow to Edwin. Edwin ran but he was
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REVIEW NOTES
chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns
hitting Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and
died. The trial court considered nighttime and
uninhabited place as just one aggravating circumstance.
Held: The court did not err in considering
nighttime and uninhabited place as just one aggravating
circumstance. The court cited the case of People vs.
Santos where it has been held that if the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place or band
concur in the commission of the crime, all will constitute
one aggravating circumstance only as a general rule
although they can be considered separately if their
elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist
independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity.
Par. 7. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED ON THE
OCCASION OF A CONFLAGRATION, SHIPWRECK,
EARTHQUAKE, EPIDEMIC OR OTHER CALAMITY OR
MISFORTUNE.
¤ The reason for the existence of this AC is found in the
debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst
of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the
afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of
their misfortune to despoil them.
¤ The offender must take advantage of the calamity or
misfortune.
¤ ―OR OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE‖ – refers to
other conditions of distress similar to ―conflagration,
shipwreck, earthquake or epidemic.‖
Par. 8. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED WITH
THE AID OF ARMED MEN OR PERSONS WHO
INSURE OR AFFORD IMPUNITY.
REQUISITES:
1. That the armed men or persons took part in the
commission of the crime, directly or indirectly.
2. That the accused availed himself of their aid or
relied upon them when the crime was committed.
¤ The armed men must take part directly or indirectly in
the offense.
¤ This AC shall not be considered when both the
attacking party and the party attacked were equally
armed.
¤ This AC is not present when the accused as well as
those who cooperated with him in the commission of the
crime, acted under the same plan and for the same
purpose.
WITH AID OF ARMED BY A BAND
MEN (par. 8) (par. 6)
Aid of armed men is More than 3 armed
present even if one of the malefactors that have
offenders merely relied on acted together in the
their aid, for actual aid is commission of an offense.
not necessary.
¤ If there are 4 armed men, ―aid of armed men‖ is
absorbed by ―employment of a band‖
¤ ―Aid of armed men‖ includes ―armed women‖

Art 14, Par. 6 ―By a Art. 295 and 296:
Band‖ Robbery
Generic Aggravating Applies only to ROBBERY
Circumstance. with unnecessary violence
or physical injuries under
263, par.2, 3 and 4 in
relation to Art, 294, par.
3.4 and 5.
This aggravating circumstance shall not be considered
when:
¤ both the attacking party and the party attacked were
equally armed.
¤ the accused as well as those who cooperated with him
in the commission of the crime acted under the same
plan and for the same purpose.
Par. 9. - THAT THE ACCUSED IS A RECIDIVIST.
Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service
of penalty imposed for another offense; Penalty. —
Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any
person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve
such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this
article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned
at the age of seventy years if he shall have already
served out his original sentence, or when he shall
complete it after reaching the said age, unless by reason
of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be
worthy of such clemency.
¤ A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of
the RPC.
REQUISITES:
a. That the offender is on trial for an offense;
b. That he was previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime;
c. That both the first and the second offenses are
embraced in the same title of the Code;
d. That the offender is convicted of the new
offense.
¤ What is controlling is the time of trial, not the time of
the commission of the crime.
¤ There is no recidivism if the subsequent conviction is
for an offense committed before the offense involved in
the prior conviction.
¤ Sec. 7 of Rule 120 , Rules of Court, provides that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final
(1) after the lapse of the [period for perfecting
an appeal, or
(2) when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or
(3) the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal, or
(4) the accused has applied for probation.
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¤ There is recidivism even if the lapse of time between
two felonies is more than 10 years. Recidivism must be
taken into account no mater how many years have
intervened between the 1st and 2nd felonies.
¤ Pardon does not obliterate the fact that the accused
was a recidivist; but amnesty extinguishes the penalty
and its effects.
People v. Molina
336 SCRA 400(2000)
Facts: Brothers Joseph and Angelito, along
with their cousin, Danny were on their way home when
they heard somebody shout ―kuba‖, referring to Joseph,
a hunchback. They asked who said that but no one
admitted. As the 3 were about to go, Molina delivered a
strong stabbing blow at the back of Joseph. Angelito
came to aid his brother but Molina also stabbed him at
the back. Joseph was dead on arrival at the clinic.
Held: To prove recidivism, it is necessary to
allege the same in the information and to attach thereto
certified copies of the sentences rendered against the
accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still give such
AC credence if the accused does not object to the
presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism.
In this case, the accused never voiced out any
objection when confronted with the fact of his previous
conviction for attempted homicide.
People v. Dacillo
427 SCRA 528 (2004)
Facts: Pacot stabbed and strangled Rosemarie
leading to the latter‘s death. Dacillo for his part, hold
down Rosemarie‘s legs to prevent her from struggling.
The two men stopped only when they were sure that the
victim was already dead. Dacillo then encase her corpse
in a cement. The trial court imposed the death penalty
on the ground that Dacillo admitted during re-cross
examination that he had a prior conviction for the death
of his former live-in partner. The fact that Dacillo was a
recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic
aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable
penalty from reclusion perpetua to death
Held: The aggravating circumstance of
recidivism was not alleged in the information and
therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant.
In order to appreciate recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in
the information and to attach certified true copies of the
sentences previously meted out to the accused. 26 This
is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that: The
complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Par. 10. - THAT THE OFFENDER HAS BEEN
PREVIOUSLY PUNISHED BY AN OFFENSE TO
WHICH THE LAW ATTACHES AN EQUAL OR
GREATER PENALTY OR FOR TWO OR MORE CRIMES
TO WHICH IT ATTACHES A LIGHTER PENALTY.
Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of
habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing offenses (habituality). He shall suffer an additional
the penalty in conformity with the following rules: penalty for being a habitual delinquent.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the
following effects: 4. QUASI-RECIDIVISM
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be - Any person who shall commit a felony after
sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last having been convicted by final judgment, before
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the
maximum periods; penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall
be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime People v. Gaorana
of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty 289 SCRA 652 (1998)
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; Facts: Marivel, upon instruction of Rowena
and (common-law wife of the accused) went to the house of
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the Gaorana and saw the couple lying down. Marivel was
culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the asked to come and Rowena stood up to urinate. Gaorana
last crime of which he be found guilty and to the covered her mouth and pointed a hunting knife to her
additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum neck and raped her. The second incident of rape
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. occurred while Marivel was sleeping in the sala with her
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of brother and sister. Marivel did not shout because she
the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in was afraid of the accused who was a prisoner and had
conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. already killed somebody.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall Held: The 2 Information alleged that both
be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period instances of rape were attended by the aggravating
of ten years from the date of his release or last circumstance of quasi-recidivism. The trial court made
conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious no express ruling that the appellant was a quasi-
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is recidivist, and rightly so. During the trial, the
found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. prosecution manifested that appellant had been
convicted by the RTC and was serving sentence for the
REQUISITES: crime of homicide. However, the prosecution failed or
neglected to present in evidence the record of
a. That the accused is on trial for an offense; appellant‘s previous conviction. Quasi-recidivism, like
b. That he previously served sentence for another recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation
offense to which the law attaches an equal or of a certified copy of the sentence convicting an
greater penalty, or for 2 or more crimes to which accused. The fact that appellant was an inmate of
it attaches lighter penalty than that for the new DAPECOL does not prove that final judgment had been
offense; and rendered against him.
c. That he is convicted of the new offense.
People v. Villapando
REITERACION/ RECIDIVISM 178 SCRA 341 (1989)
HABITUALITY Facts: The accused was charged before the
It is necessary that the It is enough that a final RTC with the crimes of murder and of attempted
offender shall have served judgment has been homicide.
out his sentence for the rendered in the first Held: The court does not agree that reiteracion
first offense. offense. or habituality should be appreciated in this case. The
The previous and It is the requirement that appellant was found by the trial court to have committed
subsequent offenses must the offenses be included in offenses prior to and after the incident of Jan. 14, 1979.
not be embraced in the the same title of the Code. In habituality, it is essential that the offender be
same title of the Code. previously punished, that is, he has served the
Reiteracion is not always Recidivism is not always to sentence, for an offense in which the law attaches, or
an aggravating be taken into provides for an equal or greater penalty than that
circumstance. consideration in fixing the attached by law to the second offense, or for two or
penalty to be imposed more offenses, in which the law attaches a lighter
upon the accused. penalty. Here, the records do not disclose that the
appellant has been previously punished by an offense to
which the law attaches an equal or greater or penalty or
FOUR FORMS OR REPETITION:
for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter
1. RECIDIVISM
penalty.
2. REITERACTION OR HABITUALITY
People v. Cajara
341 SCRA 192 (2000)
3.MULTI-RECIDIVISM OR HABITUAL
Facts: Accused Cajara raped 16-year old Marita
DELINQUENCY
in front of his common-law wife who is the half-sister of
- when a person, within a period of 10 years
the victim and his two small children. The trial court
from the date of his release or last conviction of the
convicted him as charged and sentenced him to death.
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
Held: The records show that the crime was
robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, is found guilty of
aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The
any of said crimes a third time or oftener. In habitual
Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted
delinquency, the offender is either a recidivist or one
of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated
who has been previously punished for two or more
homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of

79

firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his
sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23
years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted
conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on
8 November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art.
14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused
has been previously punished for an offense to which
the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that
attached by law to the second offense or for two or more
offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As
already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only
of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is
reclusion perpetua. Where the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to
the crime, such as in the instant case.
Par. 11. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN
CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR
PROMISE.
• When this AC is present, there must be 2 or more
principals, the one who gives or offers the price or
promise and the one who accepts it, both of whom are
principals – to the former, because he directly induces
the latter to commit the crime, and the latter because
he commits it.
• When this AC is present, it affects not only the person
who received the price or reward, but also the person
who gave it.
• The evidence must show that one of the accused used
money or other valuable consideration for the purpose
of inducing another to perform the deed.
Par. 12. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED BY
MEANS OF INUNDATION, FIRE, POISON,
EXPLOSION, STRANDING OF A VESSEL OR
INTERNATIONAL DAMAGE THERETO, DERAILMENT
OF A LOCOMOTIVE, OR BY THE USE OF ANY OTHER
ARTIFICE INVOLVING GREAT WASTE AND RUIN.
• Unless used by the offender as a means to accomplish
a criminal purpose, any of the circumstances in
paragraph 12 cannot be considered to increase the
penalty or to change the nature of the offense.
• When another AC already qualifies the crime, any of
these AC‘s shall be considered as generic aggravating
circumstance only.
• When the crime intended to be committed is arson and
somebody dies as a result thereof, the crime is simply
arson and the act resulting in the death of that person is
not even an independent crime of homicide, it being
absorbed.
• The killing of the victim by means of such
circumstances as inundation, fire, poison or explosion
qualifies the offense to murder.
• It will be noted that each of the circumstances of
―fire‖, ―explosion,‖ and ―derailment of a locomotive‖ may
be a part of the definition of particular crime, such as,
arson, crime involving destruction, and damages and
obstruction to means of communication.
• In these cases, they do not serve to increase the
penalty, because they are already included by the law in
defining the crimes.
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Par. 13. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED WITH
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
• Evident premeditation implies a deliberate planning of
the act before executing it.
• The essence of premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a
calm judgment.
• Evident premeditation may not be appreciated absent
any proof as to how and when the plan was hatched or
what time elapsed before it was carried out.
REQUISITIES:
1. The time when the offender determined to
commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has
clung to his determination; and
o When the crime was carefully
planned by the offenders;
o When the offenders previously
prepared the means which they
considered adequate to carry it
out.
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution, to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act and to
allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will.
 The offender must have an opportunity to
coolly and serenely think and deliberate on
the meaning and the consequences of what
he planned to do, an interval long enough
for his conscience and better judgment to
overcome his evil desire and scheme.
• Conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation.
• Evident premeditation, while inherent in robbery, may
be aggravating in robbery with homicide if the
premeditation included the killing of the victim.
• The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment (People v. Alinao, G.R. No.
191256, 18 September 2013).
People v. Bibat
290 SCRA 27 (1998)
Facts: At around 1:30 pm, Bibat stabbed to
death one Lloyd del Rosario as the latter was on his way
to school waiting for a ride. The suspect fled while the
victim was brought to the hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. A witness testified that the
accused and several others often met in Robles‘ house.
In one of their meetings, the accused and his
companions hid some guns and ―tusok‖ in the house.
Also, other witnesses saw the accused at around 11:30
am with some companions and heard the plan to kill
someone.
Held: There is evident premeditation because
the 3 requisites are present. There was evident
premeditation where 2 hours had elapsed from the time
the accused clung to his determination to kill the victim
up to the actual perpetration of the crime.

People v. Lug-aw
229 SCRA 308 (1994)
Facts: Pal-loy was fencing the boundary limits
of the land he was farming when his daughter, Sonia,
heard a shot. Immediately, she went uphill and just as a
second gun shot resounded, she saw Bannay and Lug-
aw from a distance and that her father was about to
draw his bolo when Lug-aw shot him.
Held: The SC ruled that there was no evident
premeditation because no one witnessed the initial
attack. As Sonia herself testified, she heard the first
shot, went up a hill, climbed a tree and from there, saw
Lug-aw shooting her father with the shot reverberating
as the second gun report. What she did see was her
father trying to repel the assault with a bolo but he
failed because a second shot hit him. The records are
bereft of evidence that the crime was committed with
evident premeditation.
People v. Camilet
142 SCRA 402 (1986)
Facts: After a prayer meeting was held at the
place of the victim, a deaf-mute boy arrived crying and
while making signals, was able to convey that he was
strangled and spanked. Accompanied by some of his
guests, the victim proceeded to go to the place where
the boy said he was accosted. Nearing the place, the
victim was suddenly stabbed by the accused in the
stomach with a long knife.
Held: Evident premeditation was not
established by the prosecution. Although the facts tend
to show that Camilet might have harbored ill-feelings
towards the Camanchos after they took a portion of the
land he was farming and, as he himself stated to the
police, they also took the produce from his cornfield,
there is no proof that Camilet conceived of killing the
victim. Indeed, there is no evidence of 1) the time when
he determined to commit the crime, 2) an act manifestly
indicating that he has clung to his determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its
warnings.
People v. Ilaoa
233 SCRA 231 (1994)
Facts: The 5 accused were charged for the
gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola. The conviction
was based on the following circumstances: a) The
deceased was seen on the night before the killing in a
drinking session with some of the accused; 2) The
drunken voices of accused Ruben and Nestor were later
heard and Nestor was then seen being kicked and
mauled by the 5 accused; 3) some of the accused
borrowed the tricycle of Alex at about 2 a.m.; 4) blood
was found in Ruben‘s shirt.
Held: Evident premeditation cannot be
considered. There is nothing in the records to show that
appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill
Nestor, nor is there proof to show that such killing was
the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his
part. On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that
the series of circumstances which culminated in the
killing constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no
interval of time separating them for calculation and
meditation.
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People v. Mondijar
392 SCRA 356(2002)
Facts: In a previous incident, Aplacador had
stabbed Mondijar, his father in law on the knee. A
month after, Mondiijar stabbed and hacked his son-in-
law with the use of a sharp and pointed bolo which
resulted to his death.
Held: There was no evident premeditation. For
the circumstance of evident premeditation to be
appreciated, the prosecution must present clear and
positive evidence of the planning and preparation
undertaken by the offender prior to the commission of
the crime. Settled is the rule that evident premeditation,
like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing to
murder, must be established beyond reasonable doubt
as conclusively and indubitably as the killing itself. In
the present case, no evidence was presented by the
prosecution as to when and how appellant planned and
prepared for the killing of the victim. There is no
showing of any notorious act evidencing a determination
to commit the crime which could prove appellant's
criminal intent.
People v. Torpio (supra)
Facts: While having a drinking spree in a
cottage, Anthony tried to let Dennis Torpio drink gin
and as the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis with
gin and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled
beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him with a
22 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran
towards their home. Upon reaching home, he got a
knife. He went back to the cottage by another route
and upon arrival Anthony was still there. Upon seeing
Dennis, Anthony avoided Dennis and ran by passing the
shore towards the creek but Dennis met him, blocked
him and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran
but got entangled with a fishing net beside the creek
and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him and
continued stabbing him resulting to the latter‘s death.
Thereafter, Dennis left and slept at a grassy meadow
near a Camp. In the morning, he went to Estrera, a
police officer to whom he voluntarily surrendered.
Held: There is no evident premeditation in this
case. There was no sufficient interregnum from the
time Dennis was stabbed by the victim, when Dennis
fled to their house and his arming himself with a knife,
and when he stabbed the victim. In a case of fairly
recent vintage, it was ruled that there is no evident
premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a
deliberate plan but of rising tempers, or when the
attack was made in the heat of anger.
People v. Bernal
388 SCRA 211 (2002)
Facts: Appellant, Fernando, Felix, Rey all
surnamed Bernal and the victim Pedrito went to a pub
house. Pedrito, Rey and appellant went inside while
Fernando and Felix waited outside. Fernando later went
inside and saw the three in a sleeping position. Fernando
then asked Felix to start the tricycle as they would bring
home the three. He first brought Pedrito out of the pub
and had him seated at the passengers seat inside the
tricycle. Fernado then got appellant who was roused
when they reached the tricycle. While Fernado was
fetching Rey, accused positioned himself at the back of
Pedrito who was still asleep and discharged his firearm
twice hitting the latter on the head.
Held: The Court ruled that there was no
evidence directly showing any pre-conceived plan or
devise employed by accused-appellant to kill the victim.

Accused-appellant did not go to Barangay Dangdangla,
Bangued to kill the victim but to attend to some
important matters. Accused-appellant was just invited
by his relatives, whom he had not seen for a while after
he changed residence, to have a drinking spree. The
probability is that the decision to shoot the victim was
made only right there and then. This should at least cast
reasonable doubt on the existence of a premeditated
plan to kill the victim. Further, the mere existence of ill-
feeling or grudge between the parties is not sufficient to
establish premeditated killing. Hence, it would be
erroneous to declare that the killing of the victim was
premeditated.
People v. Biso
400 SCRA 300 (2003)
Facts: Dario, a black belt in karate, entered an
eatery, seated himself beside Teresita and made sexual
advances to her in the presence of her brother, Eduardo.
Eduardo contacted his cousin, Biso, an ex-convict and a
known toughie in the area, and related to him what
Dario had done to Teresita. Eduardo and Pio, and 2
others decided to confront Dario. They positioned
themselves in the alley near the house of Dario. When
Dario arrived on board a taxicab, the four assaulted
Dario. Eduardo held, with his right hand, the wrist of
Dario and covered the mouth of Dario with his left hand.
The 2 others held Dario's right hand and hair. Pio then
stabbed Dario near the breast with a fan knife. Eduardo
stabbed Dario and fled with his three companions from
the scene.
Held: There was no evident premeditation. The
prosecution failed to prove that the four intended to kill
Dario and if they did intend to kill him, the prosecution
failed to prove how the malefactors intended to
consummate the crime. Except for the fact that the
appellant and his three companions waited in an alley
for Dario to return to his house, the prosecution failed to
prove any overt acts on the part of the appellant and his
cohorts showing that that they had clung to any plan to
kill the victim.
People v. Olazo, supra
Facts: An Information was filed with the RTC
against Eddie Olazo, Miguel and Charito, together with
Rogelio, Joseph, Dionesia, Rommel and Eddie with the
crime of Robbery with Homicide alleging evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength
and conspiracy. However, both the RTC and the CA
failed to consider evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength as ordinary aggravating
circumstance.
Held: The requirements to prove the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation are
the following: (i) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (ii) an act manifestly indicating
that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (iii)
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation,
it must appear not only that the accused decided to
commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution,
but also that such decision was the result of "meditation,
calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt".
While the SC had previously ruled that the
circumstance of evident premeditation is inherent in
Robbery, it may be considered in the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide if there is premeditation
to kill besides stealing. Here, the evidence clearly
established how and when Charito and his co-
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conspirators hatched their plan to rob the spouses
Vallecera and likewise kill Erlinda. The first attempt of
the malefactors to carry out their scheme was foiled and
it was only on their second attempt that they were able
to consummate the conspiracy. Hence, that there were
persistent attempts made by the accused sufficiently
demonstrate how determined they were to adhere to
their agreement despite the sufficient lapse of time.
Moreover, that Charito and his cohorts went to great
lengths to hire Joseph to ferry them back and forth to
the scene of the crime shows the sobriety and
circumspection surrounding their decision. Such
circumstances therefore show that the crime committed
was a product of intent and coordination among the
accused. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation is present in this case.
People v. Salahuddin
G.R. No. 206291 (2016)
Facts: On February 10, 2004, at around 5:30
in the afternoon, Atty. Segundo Sotto Jr., a prominent
law practitioner in Zamboanga City, together with his
niece, Liezel Mae Java left the former's law office and
went home driving an owner type jeep. On the way
towards their house at farmer's Drive, Sta. Maria,
Zamboanga City, they passed by Nunez Street, then
turned left going to Governor Camins Street and through
Barangay Sta. Maria. When the jeep was nearing
farmer's Drive, the jeep slowed down, then, there were
two gun shots. Liezel Mae, the one sitting at the right
side of the jeep felt her shoulder get numb. Thinking
that they were the ones being fired at, she bent forward
and turned left towards her uncle. While bending
downwards, she heard a sound of a motorcycle at her
right side. Then, she heard another three (3) gunshots
from the person in the motorcycle. Thereafter, the
motorcycle left.
While Liezel's head was touching the abdomen
of her uncle, she was crying and calling out his name. A
few minutes later, rescuers arrived. Liezel and Alty.
Segundo, with the use of tricycles, were brought to
Western Mindanao Medical Center (WMMC).
Dr. Lim and Dr. Melvin Talaver attended to the
victim, but they pronounced the victim to be dead on
arrival.
Held: In this case, the trial court correctly
ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty. Segundo was
attended by treachery because appellant shot the said
victim suddenly and without any warning with a deadly
weapon, thus: x x x Atty. Segundo G. Sotto, Jr., who
was driving his jeep with his teenage niece as passenger
sitting on his right side on the front seat, was totally
unaware that he will be treacherously shot just 200
meters away from his residence. He was unarmed and
was not given any opportunity to defend himself or to
escape from the deadly assault. After he was hit when
the gunman fired the first two shots at him and his niece
and after he lost control of his jeep which bumped an
interlink wire fence and stopped, he was again shot
three times by the gunman.
Par. 14. - THAT THE CRAFT, FRAUD OR DISGUISE
BE EMPLOYED.
CRAFT – involves intellectual trickery and cunning on
the part of the accused. It is employed as a scheme in
the execution of the crime.
e.x. Where the defendants pretended to be
constabulary soldiers to gain entry into the place of the
victims.

The act of the accused in pretending to be
bona fide passengers of the taxicab driven by the
deceased, when they were not so in fact, in order not to
arouse his suspicion, and then killing him, constituted
craft.
• Where craft partakes of an element of the offense, the
same may not be appreciated independently for the
purpose of aggravation.
FRAUD – insidious words or machinations used to
induce the victim to act in a manner which would enable
the offender to carry out his design.
e.x. To enter the house, one of the accused
shouted from the outside that they wanted to buy
cigarettes.
• There is a hairline distinction between craft and fraud.
• DISTINCTION: When there is a DIRECT INDUCEMENT
by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present;
otherwise, the act of the accused done in order NOT TO
AROUSE THE SUSPICION of the victim constitutes craft.
DISGUISE – resorting to any device to conceal identity.
ex. Wearing of masks
• The purpose of the offender in using any device must
be to conceal his identity.
People v. Marquez
117 SCRA 165 (1982)
Facts: Francisca was in their house together
with her children and maid when somebody called in
front of their window who identified themselves as PC
soldiers looking for contraband. The men ordered her to
open up otherwise they will shoot up their house. Then
accused Marquez went inside together with other armed
companions. They took some of their belongings and
one of them even raped Francisca, Leticia (daughter of
Francisca) and Rufina (maid).
Held: The following aggravating circumstances
were proved a) nighttime; 2) unlawful entry; 3) dwelling
of the offended parties; 4) disguise, that is by
pretending to be PC officers; and 5) by utter disregard
due to victims‘ age and sex.
People v. Empacis
222 SCRA 59 (1993)
Facts: Empacis et al. held-up the store of Fidel
and his wife. As Fidel was about to give the money, he
decided to fight. He was stabbed several times which
resulted to his death. Empacis was stabbed by the son
of Fidel. When he went to a clinic for treatment, he was
arrested.
Held: Langomes and Empacis pretended to be
bona fide customers of the victim‘s store and on this
pretext gained entry into the latter‘s store and into
another part of his dwelling. Thus, the aggravating
circumstance of craft was taken into consideration.
People v. Labuguen
337 SCRA 488 (2000)
Facts: Under the pretext of selling 3 cows to
the victim, Labuguen convinced the victim to see the
cows and bring P40,000.00.00 with him. The two rode
on the victim‘s motorcycle and Labuguen lured him to
where he could divest the victim of his money with the
least danger of being caught. He then boarded a bus
leaving the motorcycle of the victim on the side of the
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road. The victim‘s dead body was found on the middle of
a rice field, 50 meters from the service drop of an
irrigation canal.
Held: The generic aggravating circumstances
of fraud and craft are present in this case. Craft involves
intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the
offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious
words or machinations, fraud is present. By saying that
he would accompany the victim to see the cows which
the latter intended to buy, appellant was able to lure the
victim to go with him.
Par. 15. - THAT (1) ADVANTAGE BE TAKEN OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH, OR (2) MEANS BE
EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE.
(1) SUPERIOR STRENGTH
• To TAKE ADVANTAGE of superior strength
means to use purposely excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked.
• One who attacks another with passion and
obfuscation dos not take advantage of his superior
strength.
• An attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his SEX and the WEAPON used in the act afforded
him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself.
• No abuse of superior strength in parricide
against the wife because it is inherent in the crime. It is
generally accepted that the husband is physically
stronger than the wife.
• There must be evidence that the accused was
physically stronger and that they abused such
superiority. The mere fact of there being a superiority in
numbers is not sufficient to bring the case within the
aggravating circumstance.
• There is abuse of superior strength when
weapon used is out of proportion to the defense
available to the offended party.
• Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in
treachery.
• Abuse of superior strength is aggravating in
coercion and forcible abduction, when greatly in excess
of that required to commit the offense.
BY A BAND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH
When the offense is The gravamen of abuse of
committed by more than 3 superiority is the taking
armed malefactors advantage by the culprits
regardless of the of their collective strength
comparative strength of to overpower their weaker
the victim. victims.
(2) MEANS EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN DEFENSE
• This circumstance is applicable only to
crimes against persons and sometimes against person
and property, such as robbery with physical injuries or
homicide.
• This AC is absorbed in treachery.
• Ex. One who, while fighting with another,
suddenly casts sand or dirt upon the latter‘s eyes and
then wounds or kills him, evidently employs means
which weaken the defense of his opponent.

People v. Cabato
160 SCRA 98(1988)
Facts: The accused with 2 other men who are
still at large, armed with firearms and stones and using
face masks, entered the dwelling of the victim. They
held the victim tight as well as the wife, who was able to
scratch the face of the masked man, and as a result was
able to identify the accused. Not satisfied with the
money given by the couple, the two unknown robbers
hit the victim with stone at the back of his head and the
accused did the same to the wife which caused her
death. The prosecution argued that since the attack was
by a robust man of 29 years with a huge stone against
an ageing defenseless human, abuse of superior
strength should aggravate the crime.
Held: The prosecution failed to prove that
there was indeed a notorious inequality between the
ages, sizes and strength of the antagonists and that
these notorious advantages were purposely sought for
or used by the accused to achieve his ends.
People v. Ruelan
231 SCRA 650(1994)
Facts: Ruelan (20 yrs old) was hired by the
spouses Ricardo and Rosa (76 yrs old) to help them sell
and deliver rice to their customers. One day, Rosa asked
Ruelan to accompany her in opening their store in the
public market; she also ordered him to bring a sack and
an axe. When they were about to leave the premises,
the house dog got loose and went towards the street.
Rosa got angry and scolded Ruelan. Ruelan pleaded her
to stop but Rosa did not so Ruelan struck her behind her
right ear, causing her to fall face down. He left her in a
grassy portion beside the street and fled. He
surrendered to the police after 2 days.
Held: Although abuse of superior strength was
proven since Ruelan was only 20 years old, whereas his
victim was 76 years old already, this was not pleaded in
the information. Hence, it shall only be considered as a
generic circumstance in the imposition of the correct
penalty.
People v. Padilla
233 SCRA 46 (1994)
Facts: Pat. Omega was on duty when Ontuca
approached him asking for help claiming he was being
maltreated by strangers. They proceeded to the place
where they saw 3 men and a woman. An argument
ensued between Ontuca and the 3 men, one of which
was Sgt. Padilla. Omega left but returned when he saw
that the 3 men were ganging up on Ontuca. The latter
was stripped of his service revolver. Ontuca was pursued
by Padilla. The former, with only a piece of plywood as a
defense, was shot by the latter in the head.
Held: The killing was qualified by the AC of
abuse of superior strength which was alleged in the
information and proved during trial. The abuse of
superior strength is present not only when the offenders
enjoy numerical superiority, or there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, but also when the offender uses a powerful
weapon which is out of proportion to the defense
available to the victim as in this case.
People v. Lobrigas
394 SCRA 170 (2002)
Facts: Frank, Marlito, both surnamed Lobrigas
and Mante mauled and box Taylaran who was already 76
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years old. The victim died caused by severe beating and
mauling on the chest portion on the victim‘s body.
Held: The crime committed was murder
qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. To appreciate abuse of superior
strength, there must be a deliberate intent on the part
of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater
number. They must have notoriously selected and made
use of superior strength in the commission of the crime.
To take advantage of superior strength is to use
excessive force that is out of proportion to the means for
self-defense available to the person attacked; thus, the
prosecution must clearly show the offenders' deliberate
intent to do so.
People v. Barcelon
398 SCRA 556(2002)
Facts: Barcelon went inside the house of
Amador. Thereafter, accused strangled and stabbed the
victim with a knife. Amador died as a result. At the time
the crime was committed, Amador was a 69 year-old
woman and Barcelon was only 29 years old.
Held: Abuse of superior strength was present
in the commission of the crime. The court cited the case
of People v. Ocumen, where an attack by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex
and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from
which the woman was unable to defend herself.
The disparity in age between the assailant and
the victim, aged 29 and 69, respectively, indicates
physical superiority on appellant's part over the
deceased. It did not matter that appellant was "dark"
with a "slim body build" or "medyo mataba." What
mattered was that the malefactor was male and armed
with a lethal weapon that he used to slay the victim.
People v. Sansaet
376 SCRA 426 (2002)
Facts Uldarico was drinking with 15 other men
that include the Sansaet brothers, Rogelio, Leopoldo and
Silverio. Because of a bad joke that cropped up, verbal
exchanges ensued. Thereafter, Rogelio and Uldarico
started hacking each other with bolos. Silverio and
Leopolo positioned themselves behind the victim and
also hacked him. Uldarico retaliated wounding Silverio.
Rogelio then hacked Uldarico a 2nd time. Leopoldo and
Rogelio continued hacking Uldarico when the latter fell.
They then dragged Uldarico towards the river and there
they each twice hacked Uldarico resulting to his death.
Held: Mere superiority in number, even
assuming it to be a fact, would not necessarily indicate
the attendance of abuse of superior strength. The
prosecution should still prove that the assailants
purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the persons attacked.
Finally, to appreciate the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what should
be considered is whether the aggressors took advantage
of their combined strength in order to consummate the
offense. To take advantage of superior strength means
to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means available to the person attacked to defend
himself. In the case at bar, the victim Uldarico de Castro
was the one who picked a fight with the accused-
appellants because he did not like the joke by one of the
accused-appellants. There was no evidence to show that
the accused-appellants purposely sought and took
advantage of their number to subdue the victim.
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People v. Ventura • There is treachery in killing a child because the

433 SCRA 389 (2004)
Facts: Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Home-
made Revolver and Flores armed with a bladed weapon,
entered the house of the Bocatejas by cutting a hole in
the kitchen door. Ventura announced a hold-up and hit
Jaime on the head and asked for the keys. Jaime called
out for help and tried to wrestle the gun away from
Ventura. Flores then stabbed Jaime 3 times. Flores also
stabbed Jaime‘s wife Aileen who had been awakened.
Aileen tried to defend herself with an electric cord to no
avail. Aileen died on the hospital on the same day.
Held: By deliberately employing a deadly
weapon against Aileen, Flores took advantage of the
superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave
him over his unarmed victim. The fact that Aileen
attempted to fend off the attack on her and her husband
by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at
appellant Flores does not automatically negate the
possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of
his superior strength
Par. 16. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED WITH
TREACHERY (ALEVOSIA).
• TREACHERY means that the offended party
was not given opportunity to make a defense.
• There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
weakness of the victim due to his tender age results in
the absence of any danger to the accused.
ADDITIONAL RULES:
1. When the aggression is CONTINUOUS,
treachery must be present in the BEGINNING
of the assault.
2. When the assault WAS NOT CONTINUOUS, in
that there was an interruption, it is sufficient
that treachery was present AT THE MOMENT
THE FATAL BLOW WAS GIVEN.
• In treachery, it makes no difference whether or not
the victim was the same person whom the accused
intended to kill.
• When it is NOT SHOWN that the principal by induction
directed the killer of the deceased to adopt the means or
methods actually used by the latter in accomplishing the
murder, because the former left to the latter the details
as to how it was to be accomplished, treachery cannot
be taken into consideration as to the principal by
induction.
• A treacherous attack is one in which the victim was
not afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist
the attack. The existence of treachery is not solely
determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears
that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the
execution of the crime, and to render the victim
defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated
against the accused (People v. Labiaga, G.R. No.
202867, 15 July 2013).

REQUISITES:
TREACHERY ABUSE OF MEANS
a. That at the time of the attack, the victim was SUPERIOR EMPLOYED TO
not in a position to defend himself; and STRENGTH WEAKEN
b. That the offender consciously adopted the DEFENSE
particular means, method or form of attack The means, The offender The offender,
employed by him. methods or does not employ like in treachery,
• Treachery does not connote the element of surprise forms of attack means, methods employs means
alone. are employed to or forms of but the means
• There is no treachery when the attack is preceded by a make it attack; he only employed only
warning or the accused gave the deceased a chance to impossible or takes advantage materially
prepare. hard for the of his superior weakens the
• The qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be offended party strength. resisting power
simply deduced from presumption as it is necessary that to defend of the offended
the existence of this qualifying or aggravating himself. party.
circumstance should be proven as fully as the crime
itself in order to aggravate the liability or penalty • When there is conspiracy, treachery is considered
incurred by the culprit. against all the offenders.
• Treachery, evident premeditation and use of superior
RULES REGARDING TREACHERY strength are, by their nature, inherent in the offense of
a. Applicable only to crimes against persons. treason.
b. Means, methods or forms need not insure
accomplishment of crime. • Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength, aid of
c. The mode of attack must be consciously adopted. armed men, by a band and means to weaken the
defense.
• Mere suddenness of the attack is not enough to
constitute treachery. Such method or form of attack • Nighttime and craft are absorbed in treachery except if
must be deliberately chosen by the accused. treachery rests upon an independent factual basis.

ATTACKS SHOWN INTENTION TO ELIMINATE • Treachery is inherent in murder by poisoning.

RISK:
a. Victim asleep • Treachery cannot co-exist with passion and
b. Victim half-awake or just awakened obfuscation.
c. Victim grappling or being held.
d. Attacked from behind

85

People v. Calinawan
G.R. No. 226145, 13 February 2017
Facts: Janice‘s seven year old daughter saw
Calinawan stabbing her mother in their kitchen.
Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled the scene. Janice told
his husband that Calinawan stabbed her. After three
days, Janice died due to the severity of the injuries.
Held: The following elements must be
established before the existence of treachery may be
appreciated: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed
by him. The suddenness or unexpectedness alone,
however, of the attack is insufficient to support the
finding of treachery. Other than Marigor's first-hand
account, no other witness actually saw the stabbing
incident. Obviously, her narration of the events that
unfolded was crucial in determining how the killing was
perpetrated because she was the only one who actually
saw its execution. Her testimony, however, was lacking
in details; thus, it is insufficient to conclude that the
killing was attended with treachery. Absent clear and
convincing evidence on how the attack was perpetrated,
the conclusion that there was treachery is nothing more
but an assumption. It is unfortunate that the particular
means, manner or method of attack was never clearly
illustrated in her testimony leaving the evidence for
murder wanting.
People vs. Sibbu
G.R. No. 214757, 29 March 2017
Facts: Bryan saw from a distance a person in
camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across his
chest and a black bonnet over his head. Bryan also saw
two men in crouching position at a distance of three
meters away from the appellant. Fearing the worst,
Bryan shouted a warning to his family. Appellant then
fired upon them killing three persons. The RTC found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
attempted murder. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s decision.
Held: Treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. In the case, the
evidence on record reveals that at the time of the
shooting incident, the victims were at the porch of their
house totally unaware of the impending attack. In
addition, they were all unarmed thus unable to mount a
defense in the event of an attack. The use of disguise
was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in this case. There could be no other
possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant‘s
face but to conceal his identity.
People v. Roberto Castillo
289 SCRA 213 (1998)
Facts: At around 1:00a.m. Tony went out of a
pubhouse in Quezon City. As he was saying goodbye to
the floor manager outside, Robert Castillo suddenly
appeared and stabbed Tony in the chest with a knife.
Tony ran towards EDSA. The next day, Tony was found
dead near the fence of an INC compound.
Held: There is treachery when the means,
methods and forms of execution gave the victim no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. It must be
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person. There is treachery when
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the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. There
was treachery in this case as the accused appeared from
out of nowhere and suddenly stabbed the victim.
People v. Umayam
381 SCRA 323 (2002)
Facts: Umayam and the victim, Mendoza were
living as husband and wife in a shanty erected inside a
compound owned by Velasquez. During the couple‘s stay
in the compound, Velasquez would notice them
frequently quarreling and Mendoza on occasions would
run to Velasquez for help for the beatings inflicted on
her by her husband. Velasquez then noticed a foul odor
emanating from the couple‘s shanty which he at first
thought to be that of a poultry feed or kaning baboy.
With the assistance of the police who broke the shanty‘s
walls, the decomposing body of Mendoza was found
inside. The trial court found Umayam guilty of murder.
Held: The qualifying circumstance of treachery
was not established with concrete evidence. The
circumstantial evidence on record does not clearly show
that there was any conscious and deliberate effort on
the part of the accused to adopt any particular means,
method or form of attack to ensure the commission of
the crime without affording the victim any means to
defend herself. The conclusion that there was treachery
can hardly be gleaned because the victim and Umayam
were inside their shanty and no one witnessed how the
killing took place. Notably, the medical findings of the
victim's cadaver show, contusions on her arms and legs,
indicating that there may have been a quarrel prior to
the stabbing. This reasonably negates treachery.
People v. Piedad
393 SCRA 488 (2002)
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and
sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
While it is true that the victim herein may have been
warned of a possible danger to his person, since the
victim and his companion headed towards their
residence when they saw the group of accused-
appellants coming back for them after an earlier quarrel
just minutes before, in treachery, what is decisive is that
the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it
impossible for the victim to retaliate.
In the case at bar, Mateo did not have any chance of
defending himself from the accused-appellant's
concerted assault, even if he was forewarned of the
attack. Mateo was obviously overpowered and helpless
when accused-appellants' group numbering around
eight, ganged up and mauled him. Luz came to Mateo's
succor by embracing him and pacifying his aggressors,
but accused-appellants were unrelenting. More
importantly, Mateo could not have actually anticipated
the sudden landing of a large concrete stone on his
head. The stone was thus treacherously struck. Neither
could the victim have been aware that Lito came up
beside him to stab his back as persons were beating him
from every direction. Lito's act of stabbing the victim
with a knife, inflicting a 15-cm deep wound shows
deliberate intent of using a particular means of attack.
Considering the location of the injuries sustained by the
victim and the absence of defense wounds, Mateo
clearly had no chance to defend himself.

People v. Dumadag
432 SCRA 65 (2004)
Facts: Prudente with his friends including
Meliston agreed to meet at a swimming pool to celebrate
the feast of St. John. On their way home, there was
heavy downpour so they decided to take a shelter at a
store where 2 men, 1 of whom is Dumadag are having
some drinks. Dumadag offered Prudente a drink of
Tanduay but the latter refused then left. Dumadag
followed Prudente and stabbed the victim on his breast
with a knife which resulted to his death.
Held: As a general rule, a sudden attack by
the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is
treachery if such mode of attack was deliberately
adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim
of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not
apply if the attack was not pre-conceived but merely
triggered by infuriation of the appellant on an act made
by the victim. In the present case, it is apparent that the
attack was not preconceived. It was triggered by the
appellant's anger because of the victim's refusal to have
a drink with the appellant and his companions.
People v. Rebucan
G.R. No. 182551 (2011)
Facts: Carmela stated that at the time of the
incident, she was playing with a toy camera inside the
house and she was situated beside a chicken cage, near
a bench. Felipe, her grandfather was also there near the
bench and he was carrying Ranil, her brother, in his
right arm. Accused-appellant then came inside the
house in a sudden manner. She insisted that Ranil was
carried by Felipe when the accused-appellant entered
the house. She said that no fight or altercation occurred
between Felipe and the accused-appellant. After Felipe
was hacked, he immediately ran outside of the
house. Carmela and Jericho then ran to the back of the
house.
Held: The abruptness of the unexpected
assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of
any opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As
Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the child
unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his
grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial court
likewise correctly appreciated the existence of
treachery. The said circumstance may be properly
considered, even when the victim of the attack was not
the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it
appears from the evidence that neither of the two
persons could in any manner put up defense against the
attack or become aware of it. Furthermore, the killing of
a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner
of assault is not shown. For the weakness of the victim
due to his tender years results in the absence of any
danger to the accused.
People v. Amora
G.R. No. 190322 (2014)
Facts: Anselmo, Aurelio, and the victim Romeo
were walking on their way to Sampol Market in San Jose
Del Monte City. As they were making their way to the
market, they saw appellant in his store located on the
right side of the street. Suddenly, appellant rushed
towards them and stabbed Romeo twice - one on the
chest and another on the abdomen. They were all
caught by surprise due to the suddenness of the attack.
Romeo fell to the ground while appellant quickly ran
away from the scene.
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Held: The appellant‘s sudden attack on Romeo
amply demonstrates that treachery was employed in the
commission of the crime. It is of no consequence that
appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust the
knife to his torso. Records show that appellant initially
came from behind and then attacked Romeo from the
front. In any event, "[e]ven a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid
it," as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA
correctly held that the crime committed was murder
under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
People v. Libre
G.R. No. 192790 (2016)
There is treachery when the killing was
committed through an unexpected and sudden attack
which renders the victim unable and unprepared to put
up a defense.
There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape.
Respondents‘ attack was well-planned and the
series of events that transpired clearly established
conspiracy among them. First, the perpetrators
undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house
of Ruben together, each with his own firearms. Second,
the perpetrators used Lucy Sabando and her child to
trick Ruben and ensure that he will come out of the
house clueless to their presence. Third, after a moment
of struggling, Caman immediately shot Ruben Barte at
the back. Fourth, perpetrators simultaneously strafed
Barte's house for a long period to ensure that those
inside the house are likewise killed. Fifth, despite Juanita
Barte's plea to stop shooting as there were children with
them, the shooting continued thus manifesting clear
intent to kill. Lastly, when they ceased firing, they
rested at the same time and fled together. The
suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived
the victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any
defense of their persons. Clearly, the victims were
unaware that they would be attacked by accused with a
hail of bullets from their firearms. In fact, they were
already in bed when Lucy Sabando called for help which
prompted Ruben Barte to come out of the house. Hence,
the subsequent shooting was deliberate, unexpected,
swift and sudden which foreclosed any escape,
resistance or defense coming from the victims.
People v. Oandasan
G.R. No. 194605 (2016)
Facts: Three informations were filed against
Oandasan, two of which were for murder involving the
fatal shooting of Tamanu and Montegrico, and the third
was for frustrated homicide involving the near-fatal
shooting of Paleg alleging treachery in all the
informations. The trial court properly appreciated the
attendance of treachery and pronounced that Oandasan
guilty of murder for the fatal shooting of Montegrico.
However, the trial court pronounced Oandasan guilty of
homicide for killing Tamanu and frustrated homicide as
to the wounding of Paleg, on the basis that treachery

was not shown to be attendant which was affirmed by
the CA.
Held: Treachery is also attendant in the
shooting of Tamanu and Paleg The evidence in this case
shows that the attack was unexpected and swift.
Montegrico and his friends were just drinking outside the
bunkhouse when the appellant suddenly appeared from
the back of a dump truck, walked towards their table
and, without any warning, fired at Montegrico. This shot
was followed by more shots directed at Montegrico's
friends, Tamanu and Paleg. Indisputably, Montegrico
was caught off guard by the sudden and deliberate
attack coming from the appellant, leaving him with no
opportunity to raise any defense against the attack.
Also, appellant deliberately and consciously adopted his
mode of attack by using a gun and made sure that
Montegrico, who was unarmed, would have no chance to
defend himself. Hence, the accused is guilty of two
counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder.
People v. Buenafe
G.R. No. 212930 (2016)
Facts: Appellant and two (2) unidentified men
alighted from a vehicle and thereafter, while Rommel
was unwarily texting inside a tent, the two men
suddenly restrained his arms behind his back.
Subsequently, appellant approached Rommel and
delivered several blows to his abdomen until he
crumpled to the ground. After which, appellant walked
towards a nearby hut while the two men dragged
Rommel. Inside the hut, appellant shot the victim using
a lead pipe ("sumpak").
Held: In this case, the victim was merely
unwarily texting inside the tent when the two men held
him from behind so that the appellant can deliver blows
to his abdomen. The victim was too unprepared and
helpless to defend himself against these three men.
Furthermore, appellant's acts of dragging him to the
nearby hut and using a lead pipe (sumpak) evidently
shows that he consciously adopted means to ensure the
execution of the crime. Thus, treachery is appreciated.
Rustia v. People
G.R. No. 208351 (2016)
There is no treachery when the killing was
committed during the heat of an argument.
Treachery exists when the following elements
are present: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.
Thus, it is not sufficient that the victim was unable to
defend himself. It must be clearly shown that the
accused consciously adopted such mode of attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself. Since the killing of the victim was committed in
the heat of their argument, it is quite clear that
Benjamin, Jr. had not consciously adopted his mode of
attack in killing the victim. The fact remains that it was
the victim who had brought the gun to the meeting. To
establish the attendance of treachery in such an
environment, the Prosecution's evidence must
competently and convincingly show that the accused
made some preparation to kill the victim; hence, a
killing done at the spur of the moment cannot be
treacherous. Even where the victim was shot from
behind, if the shooting was done in the course of a
heated argument between the victim and the assailant,
treachery should not be appreciated, for in that
situation, the assailant was filled with anger and rage
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and excitement, and had no time to reflect on his
actions; in other words, he could not be shown to have
consciously adopted the mode of attacking the victim
from behind to facilitate the killing without risk to
himself.
People v. Berk
G.R. No. 204896 (2016)
Facts: Berk and his co-accused Serencio were
charged with Murder for the death of Disu. During
arraignment, Berk pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Serencio remains at large. After trial, the RTC
gave credence to the eyewitness accounts of Marbie and
Loreto of Berk‘s liability in the killing of the victim and
found him guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Held: In the prosecution of the crime of
murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the following elements must be established
by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2)
that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing
was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is not
infanticide or parricide.
The prosecution ably established the presence
of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
The shooting of the unsuspecting victim was sudden and
unexpected which effectively deprived her of the chance
to defend herself or to repel the aggression, insuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor
and without any provocation on the part of the victim.
People v. Salahuddin (supra)
The essence of treachery is the sudden attack
by the aggressor without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.
Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist,
namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution
was deliberately and consciously adopted.
People v. Benjamin Ong
62 SCRA 174 (1975)
Facts: Ong owed Chua P50,000 from their mahjong
sessions. Chua even went to Ong‘s office to collect the
money which embarrassed Ong and eventually caused
Ong to resign from work. Tan, a friend of Ong,
suggested that they just kill Chua. After the parties held
a meeting to discuss the payment of the balance, Tan
and other men followed Chua‘s car. The suspects
abducted and tied Chua‘s hands and brought him to a
place in Novaliches where he was stabbed him with an
icepick. Chua‘s body was buried and his car was left in
Bulacan.
Held: There was conspiracy in the commission of the
crime and it was done with treachery. There was
treachery which qualified the killing to murder when the
victim‘s hands were tied and his mouth was gagged
before he was stabbed to death. The suspects
participated in the planning and execution of the crime.
Because there was concert of design and the unity of
purpose and intention was present, all the suspects are
liable as principals for the conspiracy to murder the
victim.

People v. Escote
400 SCRA 603 (2003)
Facts: At around midnight, a bus going to Pangasinan
was boarded by the accused in Balintawak. A few
minutes after, the suspects declared a holdup and fired
shots at the roof of the bus to wake up the passengers.
They began taking the passenger‘s valuables. SPO1
Mario was among the passengers. He was disarmed and
was shot dead by one of the robbers even after he pled
for his life. The suspects were arrested at a checkpoint
when they presented the dead officer‘s identification
card. They were convicted of robbery with homicide.
Issue: Whether or not treachery can be used to qualify
the robbery with homicide committed.
Held: No. Treachery is not an element of robbery with
homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially
punishable by law nor is it included by the law in
defining the crime of robbery with homicide and
prescribing the penalty therefore. Treachery is likewise
not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for
the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In the application of treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the
law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a
crime against persons and not at the constituent crime
of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery
is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not
to the constituent crime of robbery of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose
its classification as a crime against property or as a
special complex and single and indivisible crime simply
because treachery is appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases
the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating
circumstance.
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim
of homicide is killed by treachery.
Par. 17. - THAT MEANS BE EMPLOYED OR
CIRCUMSTANCES BROUGHT ABOUT WHICH ADD
IGNOMINY TO THE NATURAL EFFECTS OF THE ACT.
IGNOMINY – it is a circumstance pertaining to the
moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the
material injury caused by the crime.
• This AC is applicable to crimes against chastity and
persons.
• When the accused raped a woman after winding cogon
grass around his genital organ, he thereby augmented
the wrong done by increasing its pain and adding
ignominy thereto (People v. Torrefiel).
* NOTE: According to Professor Ambion, this is
not ignominy but cruelty.
• The means employed or the circumstances brought
about must tend to make the effects of the crime MORE
HUMILIATING or TO PUT THE OFFENDED PARTY TO
SHAME.
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ex. When the accused raped a married woman
in the presence of her husband.
People v. Siao
327 SCRA 231 (2000)
Facts: Estrella worked as a housemaid of Rene
Siao‘s family. One day, Rene ordered Reylan, their
houseboy, to bring Estrella to a room. While holding a
gun, Rene forced Reylan to have sex with Estrella (oral
sex, missionary position, and in the manner dogs
perform sexual intercourse).
Held: The accused was held guilty of rape with
the use of a deadly weapon, which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. But the trial court
overlooked and did not take into account the
aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced
accused to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in
committing the rape used not only the missionary
position, the AC of ignominy attended the commission
thereof.
People v. Cachola
420 SCRA 520 (2004)
Facts: Jessie was about to leave their house to
watch cartoons in his uncle's house next door when
accused suddenly entered the front door of their house.
They ordered Jessie to drop to the floor, and then hit
him in the back with the butt of a long gun. Without
much ado, the intruders shot to death Jessie's uncle,
Victorino who was then in the living room. Jessie
forthwith crawled and hid under a bed, from where he
saw the feet of a third man who had also entered the
house. The men entered the kitchen and continued
shooting. When the rampage was over and after the
malefactors had already departed, Jessie came out of his
hiding place and proceeded to the kitchen. There he saw
his mother, Carmelita; his brother Felix.; and his cousin
Rubenson — all slaughtered. The death certificate of
Victorino reveals that his penis was excised.
Held: Ignominy cannot be appreciated in this
case. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that
the offense be committed in a manner that tends to
make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the
victim's moral suffering. Where the victim was already
dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered,
ignominy cannot be taken against the accused. In this
case, the information states that Victorino's sexual
organ was severed after he was shot and there is no
allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider
ignominy as an aggravating circumstance.
People v. Bumidang
346 SCRA 807(2000)
Facts: Baliwang Bumidang raped Gloria in front
of her 80 year old father, Melecio. Melecio helplessly saw
the accused rape her daughter but did not move
because he was too afraid and weak. Before raping the
victim, Baliwang examined the genitals of Gloria with a
flashlight.
Held: The aggravating circumstance of
ignominy shall be taken into account if means are
employed or circumstances brought about which add
ignominy to the natural effects of the offense; or if the
crime was committed in a manner that tends to make its
effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her
moral suffering. It was established that Baliwang used
the flashlight and examined the genital of Gloria before
he ravished her. He committed his bestial deed in the

presence of Gloria's old father. These facts clearly show
that Baliwang deliberately wanted to further humiliate
Gloria, thereby aggravating and compounding her moral
sufferings. Ignominy was appreciated in a case where a
woman was raped in the presence of her betrothed, or
of her husband, or was made to exhibit to the rapists
her complete nakedness before they raped her.
Par. 18. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED AFTER
AN UNLAWFUL ENTRY.
THERE IS AN UNLAWFUL ENTRY WHEN AN
ENTRANCE IS EFFECTED BY A WAY NOT INTENDED
FOR THE PURPOSE.
• There is unlawful entry when an entrance is effected
by a way not intended for the purpose.
• Unlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance and
not for escape.
• There is no unlawful entry when the door is broken
and thereafter the accused made an entry thru the
broken door. The breaking of the door is covered by
paragraph 19.
RATIONALE FOR PAR. 18: One who acts, not respecting
the walls erected by men to guard their property and
provide for their personal safety, shows a greater
perversity, a greater audacity; hence, the law punishes
him with more severity.
• This AC is inherent in robbery with force upon things.
• Dwelling and unlawful entry is taken separately in
murders committed in a dwelling.
• Unlawful entry is not aggravating in trespass to
dwelling.
People v. Baello
224 SCRA 218 (1993)
Facts: Brgy. Captain Borja awoke one night to
find out that their front door was open and that their TV
set was missing. He and his wife saw their dead
daughter lying in bed. The TV set was recovered by the
police at the house of Tadifo, Baello‘s brother-in-law.
Tadifo claimed that Baello and Jerry had an agreement
to rob the house of Borja. It was Jerry who killed Borja‘s
daughter because it was he who was left inside the
house.
Held: The aggravating circumstances of
unlawful entry was properly appreciated against the
accused as he and his companion, Jerry, had entered
the Borja residence through the second floor window, a
way not intended for ingress.
Par. 19. - THAT AS A MEANS TO THE COMMISSION
OF A CRIME, A WALL, ROOF, FLOOR, DOOR, OR
WINDOW BE BROKEN.
• To be considered as an AC, breaking the door must be
utilized as a means to the commission of the crime.
• It is only aggravating in cases where the offender
resorted to any of said means TO ENTER the house. If
the wall, etc. is broken in order to get out of the place, it
is not aggravating.
Par. 19 Par. 18
It involves the breaking Presupposes that there is
(rompimiento) of the no such breaking as by
enumerated parts of the entry is through the
house. window
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Par. 20. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED (1)
WITH THE AID OF PERSONS UNDER FIFTEEN
YEARS OF AGE (SEE R.A 9344) OR (2) BY MEANS
OF MOTOR VEHICLES, MOTORIZED WATERCRAFT,
AIRSHIPS, OR OTHER SIMILAR MEANS. (AS
AMENDED BY RA 5438).
(1) WITH THE AID OF PERSONS UNDER 15 YEARS
OF AGE
(2) BY MEANS OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
• It is aggravating where the accused used the
motor vehicle in going to the place of the crime, in
carrying away the effects thereof, and if facilitating their
escape.
• If the motor vehicle was used only in
facilitating the escape, it should not be an aggravating
circumstance.
• Estafa, which is committed by means of
deceit or abuse of confidence, cannot be committed by
means of motor vehicle.
• Theft, which is committed by merely taking
personal property which need not be carried away,
cannot be committed by means of motor vehicles.
―or other similar means” – the expression
should be understood as referring to MOTORIZED
vehicles or other efficient means of transportation
similar to automobile or airplane.
Par. 21. - THAT THE WRONG DONE IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME BE DELIBERATELY
AUGMENTED BY CAUSING OTHER WRONG NOT
NECESSARY FOR ITS COMMISSION.
CRUELTY
• There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and
delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually,
causing him unnecessary physical pain in the
consummation of the criminal act.
• For cruelty to exist, it must be shown that the accused
enjoyed and delighted in making his victim suffer.
REQUISITES:
1. That the injury caused be deliberately
increased by causing other wrong;
2. That the other wrong be unnecessary for
the execution of the purpose of the
offender.
• Cruelty refers to physical suffering of victim purposely
intended by offender.
• Plurality of wounds alone does not show cruelty.
• There is no cruelty when other wrong was done after
the victim was dead.
IGNOMINY CRUELTY
Involves moral suffering. Refers to physical
suffering.
People v. Lacao
60 SCRA 89 (1974)
Facts: Gallardo, coming from a gathering,
decided to go home. As he was descending the stairs
Baltazar followed him and stabbed him with a knife at
the right side of his body. Baltazar tried to pull out the
knife. Gallrado ran. When the latter reached the bamboo
grove, he was assaulted by David and his son, Salvador,
Jose and Federico. Gallardo sustained 14 wounds by

different bladed instruments. His assailants dragged him
to the field. He died later. It was found that each of the
9 wounds could have caused his death if there were no
timely medical assistance.
Held: The numerousness of wound is not the
criterion for appreciating cruelty. The test is whether the
accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the
wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its
commission or inhumanly increased the victim‘s
suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.
People v. Ilaoa (supra)
The fact that Nestor‘s decapitated body bearing
43 stab wounds, 24 of which were fatal, was found
dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of
cruelty where there is no showing that appellant Ilaoa,
for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused Nestor to suffer
slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary
physical and moral pain. Number of wounds alone is not
the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an
aggravating circumstance. Neither can it be inferred
from the mere fact that the victim‘s dead body was
dismembered.
People v. Catian
374 SCRA 514 (2002)
Facts: Catian repeatedly strike Willy with a
"chako" on the head, causing Willy to fall on his knees.
Calunod seconded by striking the victim with a piece of
wood on the face. When Willy finally collapsed,
Sumalpong picked him up, carried him over his
shoulder, and carried Willy to a place where they burned
Willy. The latter‘s skeletal remains were discovered by a
child who was pasturing his cow near a peanut
plantation.
Held: The circumstance of cruelty may not be
considered as there is no showing that the victim was
burned while he was still alive. For cruelty to exist, there
must be proof showing that the accused delighted in
making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing
him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the
consummation of the criminal act. No proof was
presented that would show that accused-appellants
deliberately and wantonly augmented the suffering of
their victim.
People v. Guerrero
389 SCRA 389 (2002)
Appellant first severed the victim's head
before his penis was cut-off. This being the sequence of
events, cruelty has to be ruled out for it connotes an act
of deliberately and sadistically augmenting the wrong by
causing another wrong not necessary for its commission,
or inhumanely increasing the victim's suffering. As
testified to by Dr. Sanglay, and reflected in her medical
certificate, Ernesto in fact died as a result of his head
being severed. No cruelty is to be appreciated where the
act constituting the alleged cruelty in the killing was
perpetrated when the victim was already dead.
SPECIAL AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
Republic Act No. 8353
An act expanding the definition of the crime of
rape, reclassifying the same as a crime against persons,
amending for the purpose act no. 3815, as amended,
otherwise known as the revised penal code, and for other
purposes
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SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be
known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997".
SECTION 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons.
- The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime
Against Persons under Title Eight of Act 3815, as amended,
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly,
there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code
a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to
read as follows:
"Chapter Three Rape"
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is
Committed-
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
other person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.
2) When the victim is under the custody of the
police or military authorities or any law enforcement of penal
institution.
3) When the rape is committed in full view of the
spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within
the third civil degree of consanguinity.
4) When the victim is a religious engaged in
legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally
known to be such by the offender before or at the time of
the commission of the crime.
(5) When the victim is a child below seven (7)
years old.
(6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted
with Human Immune-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually
transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted
to the victim.
(7) When committed by any member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or paramilitary units thereof or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or

penal institution, when the offender took advantage of his
position to facilitate the commission of the crime.
(8) When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, the victim suffered permanent physical mutilation or
disability.
(9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime.
(10) When the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by prision mayor.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua.
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the
rape is committed by any of the ten aggravating/qualifying
circumstances mentioned in this article.
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The subsequent
valid marriage between the offender and the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. Provided,
That the crime shall be extinguish or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical
overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in
any degree from the offended party, or where the offended
party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving
valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the
prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A."
SECTION 3. Separability Clause.- If any part,
section, or provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not affected thereby
shall remain valid.
SECTION 4. Repealing Clause.- Article 335 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, and all laws, acts presidential
decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and
regulations, inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of
this Act are deemed amended, modified or repealed
accordingly.
SECTION 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Under Republic Act No. 10591, otherwise
known as the ―Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act‖:
If the use of a loose firearm is inherent in the
commission of a crime punishable under the RPC or
other special laws – the use of loose firearm is an
aggravating circumstance. Hence, the penalty for the
use of a loose firearm is not imposed (Sec. 29).
However, if the crime is committed by the
person without using the loose firearm, the violation of
this law shall be considered as a distinct and separate
offense (Sec. 29).
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Under R.A. No. 9165, as amended,
otherwise known as the ―Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002:‖
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to
the contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous
drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in
the commission of a crime by an offender, and the
application of the penalty provided for in the Revised
Penal Code shall be applicable (Sec. 25).
Under R.A. No. 7659 otherwise known as
the ―Organized/Syndicated Crime Group‖:
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
offense was committed by any person who belongs to
any organized / syndicated crime group.
Owner, driver or passenger of carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death is
imposed.
People v. Balgos
323 SCRA 372 (2000)
Facts: Balgos was accused of raping a 6-year
old child named Criselle. While the victim was playing,
the accused asked his nieces to go outside and buy
cheese curls. When they left, the accused opened his
zipper and made Criselle hold his penis. The 2 girls came
back and he asked them to go out and buy more cheese
curls. When they left, he locked the door and had carnal
knowledge with Criselle. The accused cannot penetrate
the victim‘s organ. The lower court convicted the
accused of qualified rape.
Held: The trial court was correct. Under Art.
335 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659 and further
amended by RA 8353, the penalty of death shall be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child
below 7 years of age. There is no dispute that the victim
was 6 years of age when the accused had carnal
knowledge with her.
People v. Ladjaalam
340 SCRA 617(2000)
Facts: Accused who is maintaining a drug den
fired an unlicensed M-14 rifle at the policemen who were
about to enter his house to serve a search warrant.
Held: If an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if
the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held
liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in
favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of
RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for
the language of the new law demonstrates the
legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of 2 separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide. Since the crime committed was
direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal
possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance. (Decided under the old law)

5. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
• Alternative circumstances are those which must be
taken into consideration as AGGRAVATING or
MITIGATING according to the nature and effects of the
crime and the other conditions attending its commission.
Art. 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances
are those which must be taken into consideration as
aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and
effects of the crime and the other conditions attending
its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication
and the degree of instruction and education of the
offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be
taken into consideration when the offended party is the
spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or
adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the
same degrees of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into
consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the
offender has committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to
the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication
is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
The alternative circumstances are:
a. RELATIONSHIP
b. INTOXICATION
c. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND
EDUCATION OF THE OFFENDER
a. RELATIONSHIP
This is taken into consideration when the
offended party is the:
a. spouse
b. ascendant
c. descendant
d. legitimate, natural or adopted brother or
sister
e. relative by affinity in the same degree of
the offender
• As a rule, relationship is MITIGATING in crimes against
property by analogy to the provisions of Art. 332.
- Under Art. 332 of the RPC, no criminal, but
only civil, liability shall result from commission of the
crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses, ascendants,
and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same
line; brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law, if living together.
- Relationship becomes actually an exempting
circumstance since there is no occasion to consider a
mitigating or an aggravating circumstance because there
is no criminal liability.
 It is aggravating in CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS in
cases where the offended party is a relative of a higher
degree than the offender, or when the offender and the
offended party are relatives of the same level, as killing
a brother, a brother-in-law, a half-brother or adopted
brother.
 When the CRIME AGAINST PERSONS is any of the
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES (Art. 263), even if the
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offended party is a descendant of the offender,
relationship is an AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
- But the serious physical injuries must not be
inflicted by a parent upon his child by excessive
chastisement.
 When the crime is less serious physical injuries or
slight physical injuries, ordinary rule applies;
relationship is MITIGATING if the offended party is a
relative of lower degree and AGGRAVATING if the
offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the
offender.
 When the crime against persons is homicide or
murder, relationship is aggravating even if the victim of
the crime is a relative of lower degree.
• Relationship is mitigating in trespass to dwelling.
• Relationship is neither mitigating nor aggravating,
when relationship is an element of the offense.
• In crimes against chastity, relationship is always
aggravating.
- Because of the nature and effect of the crime
committed, it is considered AGGRAVATING although the
offended party is a relative of lower degree.
People v. Atop
286 SCCRA 157 (1998)
Facts: 11-year-old Regina lives with her
grandmother. Atop is the common-law husband of her
grandmother. Atop was found guilty of 4 counts of rape
which was committed in 1993 (2x), 1994 and 1995. The
lower court took into account the aggravating
circumstance of relationship.
Held: The law cannot be stretched to include
persons attached by common-law relations. In this case,
there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links
Atop to his victim.
People v. Marcos
349 SCRA 537 (2001)
Facts: Virgilio arrived at the house of the
Marcoses and proceeded to the artesian well (jetmatic)
located just at the back of the house. Virgilio bent down
to put on the ground the tools he was carrying. Cesar
then came out of the kitchen door with a bolo in hand
and suddenly hacked Virgilio from behind. Virgilio was
hit on the nape of the neck which caused him to fall to
the ground. Then Cesar hacked him again and this time
Virgilio was hit on the right side of the head. Virgilio is
the elder brother of Cesar.
Held: In order that the alternative
circumstance of relationship may be taken into
consideration in the imposition of the proper penalty,
the offended party must either be the (a) spouse, (b)
ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or
adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in
the same degree, of the offender. In the case at bar,
Cesar and Virgilio Marcos are brothers. Accused likewise
declared that Virgilio is his brother. That the victim is
the elder brother of Cesar is likewise alleged in the
Information. The rule is that relationship is aggravating
in crimes against persons as when the offender and the
offended party are relatives of the same level such as
killing a brother. Thus, relationship was correctly
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

b. INTOXICATION
MITIGATING
a. if intoxication is not habitual, or
b. if intoxication is not subsequent to the
plan to commit a felony.
AGGRAVATING
a. if intoxication is habitual; or
b. if it is intentional (subsequent to the plan
to commit a felony)
- It is intentional when the offender
drinks liquor fully knowing its effects, to find in
the liquor a stimulant to commit a crime or a
means to suffocate any remorse.
• When the offender has committed a felony in a state
of intoxication.
- This clause means that the offender‘s mental
faculties must be affected by drunkenness.
- The accused‘s state of intoxication must be
proved.
WHEN THE INTOXICATION IS HABITUAL
- A habitual drunkard is one given to
intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The
habit should be actual and confirmed, but it is not
necessary that it be continuous or by daily occurrence.
People v. Renejane
158 SCRA 258 (1988)
Facts: The accused was convicted for the crime
of murder of 1 policeman and his companion. It was
found that Renejane was with these 2 persons and some
other people and they were having a drinking session
when the incident took place. It was also found that the
policeman apprehended Renejane a month before the
incident for illegal possession of marijuana.
Held: Drunkenness is not necessarily an
aggravating circumstance. The fact that the accused
drank liquor prior to the commission of the crime did not
necessarily qualify such action as an aggravating
circumstance. Intoxication is aggravating if it is habitual
or intentional. There is no finding of either by the lower
court. The affair was an ordinary drinking party. Neither
can this be considered as a mitigating circumstance in
the absence of proof that the intake of alcoholic drinks
was of such quantity as to blur the appellant‘s reason
and deprive him of a certain degree of control.
People v. Camano
115 SCRA 688 (1982)
Facts: After the accused had been drinking
liquor, he stabbed twice the victim Pascua with a bolo
while the latter was walking along the barrio street.
After hacking and stabbing to death the victim, the
accused proceeded to the seashore and on finding
Buenaflor hacked the latter with the same bolo.
Held: Intoxication is mitigating if accidental,
and neither habitual nor intentional, that is, no
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is
aggravating if habitual or intentional. To be mitigating, it
must be indubitably proved. A habitual drunkard is one
given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating
drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is
unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It
lessens individual resistance to evil thought and
undermines will-power making its victim a potential evil
doer.
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The intoxication of the appellant not being
habitual and considering that the said appellant was in a
state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the
felony, the alternative circumstance of intoxication
should be considered mitigating.
c. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION OF
THE OFFENDER
Low degree of instruction and education or lack
of it is generally mitigating. High degree of instruction
and education is aggravating, when the offender avails
himself of his learning in committing the crime.
LACK OF INSTRUCTION, AS MITIGATING
- Lack of instruction cannot be taken into
account where the defendant admitted that he studied in
the first grade in a public elementary school. Art. 15
applies only to him who really has not received any
instruction.
• Not illiteracy alone, but also lack of sufficient
intelligence are necessary to invoke the benefit of the
alternative circumstance of lack of instruction, the
determination of which is left to the trial court.
• Lack of sufficient instruction is not mitigating when the
offender is a city resident who knows how to sign his
name.
• Lack of instruction must be proved positively and
directly and cannot be based on mere deduction or
inference.
• The question of lack of instruction cannot be raised for
the first time in appellate court.
• Ordinarily, LOW DEGREE OR LACK OF INSTRUCTION
IS MITIGATING IN ALL CRIMES.
Exceptions:
(1) crimes against property such as estafa, theft,
robbery arson except theft of large cattle and robbery
with homicide.
(2) crimes against chastity
(3) treason: because love of country should be a
natural feeling of every citizen, however unlettered or
uncultured he may be
(4) murder: because to kill is forbidden by
natural law which every rational being is endowed to
know and feel.
HIGH DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION, AS AGGRAVATING
Degree of instruction is aggravating when the
offender availed himself or took advantage of it in
committing the crime.
People v. Lapaz (1989)
Facts:Johnson used to stay in the house of Eulalia, a 70-
year old woman. Because of an accusation that he was a
thief, Johnson and his wife moved out. One evening,
Johnson and three other men went to the house of
eulalia and beat up the elder woman which eventually
caused her death. The accused were convicted of
murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, disregard of rank,
age and sex. In his defense, Lapaz claims that he lacks
instruction
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

Issues: People v. Casio

1. Whether the aggravating circumstance of G.R. No. 211465, Dec. 3, 2014
disregard of rank, age and sex is absorbed in Facts: A police operation was coordinated to rescue
treachery. minors who were being used in human trafficking in
2. Whether lack of instruction is a defense for the Cebu. The undercover agents posed as tour guides
accused. looking for girls to entertain their tourists. Casio asked
them if they wanted ―chicks.‖ They agreed to the offer
Held: and paid for the services two minors at P500 per person.
1. No. Treachery refers to the manner of Casio was arrested for human trafficking.
commission of the crime while disregard of
rank, age and sex refers to the relationship Held: In an entrapment, the mens rea originates from
between the attacker and the victim. the mind of the criminal. On the other hand, in
2. No. The mere lack of instruction or illiteracy of instigation, the law officer conceives the idea of
the appellant cannot be considered as a committing the crime and suggests it to the accused. In
mitigating circumstance. One does not have to this case, Casio was the one who initiated the
be educated or intelligent to be able to know undercover agents to the idea of paying for minor girls.
that it is unlawful to take the life of another The criminal intent came from the accused.
person even if it is to redress a wrong
committed against him People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Ting
56 Phil. 44 (1931)
Facts: Samson was the chief of customs secret
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES AND OTHER service in Cebu and Natividad was the former collector
SPECIAL SITUATIONS of customs. He was instructed to make sure that the
shipment containing opium shall be unloaded in the
Absolutory causes are those where the act country. He went along the plan and then he informed
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and the Philippine Constabulary of all that had taken place
sentiment there is no penalty imposed. and they discussed a plan to capture the opium owners.
Held: The mere fact that the chief of customs
a. ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION secret service pretended to agree to a plan for
smuggling illegally imported opium through the
ENTRAPMENT INSTIGATION customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure
Ways and means are The instigator practically of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to
resorted to for the purpose induces the would-be the prosecution and conviction of the accused.
of trapping and capturing accused into the Samson did not induce nor instigate the
the lawbreaker in the commission of the offense accused to import the opium but merely pretended to
execution of his criminal and himself becomes a co- have an understanding with the collector of customs.
plan principal. There is nothing immoral in this or against the public
good which should prevent the government from
The means originate from The law enforcer conceives
prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a
the mind of the criminal. the commission of the
case where an innocent person is induced to commit a
crime and suggests to the
crime merely to prosecute him, but it is simply a trap
accused who adopts the
set to catch a criminal.
idea and carries it into
execution.
Araneta v. CA
A person has planned or is A public officer or a private
142 SCRA 532 (1986)
about to commit a crime detective induces an
Facts: Atty. Araneta was the hearing officer of
and ways and means are innocent person to commit
the Dept. of Labor in Cabanatuan while Mrs. Yoyongco is
resorted to by a public a crime and would arrest
the widow of a government employee. The latter went to
officer to trap and catch him upon or after the
see Araneta regarding her claim for death compensation
the criminal. commission of the crime
and Araneta asked for P100 for her claim to be
by the latter.
processed. The widow reported this to the PC and the PC
Not a bar to the The accused must be
decided to entrap Araneta. The entrapment was
prosecution and conviction acquitted.
successful and Atty. Araneta was charged for violating
of the lawbreaker.
the anti-graft law.
Held: Entrapment is not a defense in a criminal
case. It is different from instigation. There is instigation
People v. Doria
when the accused was induced to commit the crime. In
G.R. No. 125299, Jan. 22, 1999
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of
Held: Entrapment refers to the ways and means
the criminal. Entrapment does not exempt the criminal
resorted to for trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in
from liability.
the execution of a criminal plan. The perpetrator is
caught in the act or in flagrante delicto. On the other People v. Pacis
hand, there is instigation when the officer induces the 384 SCRA 684 (2002)
would-be accused into the commission of the crime. As a Facts: Atty. Yap, supervising agent of the
result, the officer becomes a co-principal. The arrest is Dangerous Drugs Division-NBI, received information that
illegal and contrary to public policy and the suspect is Pacis was offering to sell ½ kg of "shabu." A buy-bust
deemed innocent. operation was approved. Yap and Senior Agent Congzon,
Jr., were assigned to handle the case. Yap, Congzon
and the informant then went to the house of Pacis. The
informant introduced Yap to Pacis as interested buyer.

95

They negotiated the sale of ½ kg of shabu. It was
agreed that payment and delivery of shabu would be
made on the following day. The next day, the NBI
agents and the informant went to Pacis's house as
agreed. Pacis handed to Yap a paper bag with markings
"yellow cab". When he opened the bag, Yap found a
transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance
inside. While examining it, Pacis asked for the payment.
Yap instructed Congzon to get the money from the car.
Congzon returned and gave the "boodle money" to Atty.
Yap who handed the money to Pacis. Upon Pacis' receipt
of the payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI
agents and arrested him.
Held: The operation that led to the arrest of
appellant was an entrapment, not instigation. In
entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the
other hand, instigators practically induce the would-be
defendant into the commission of the offense and
become co-principals themselves. It has been held in
numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is
sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of
apprehending criminal elements engaged in the sale and
distribution of illegal drugs.
b. EFFECT OF PARDON
RPC, Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended
party. — A pardon of the offended party does not
extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article
344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the
interest of the injured party is extinguished by his
express waiver.
R.A. No. 8353. Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The
subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty. Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguish
or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void
ab initio.
 A pardon by the offended party does not
extinguish criminal action because a crime is an offense
against the State. In criminal cases, the intervention of
the aggrieved parties is limited to being witnesses for
the prosecution.
 Compromise does not extinguish criminal liability.
 The offended party in crimes of adultery and
concubinage cannot institute criminal prosecution, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
- the pardon here may be implied, as
continued inaction of the offended party after learning
the offense.
- both offenders must be pardoned by the
offended party.
c. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
Art. 6(3). - There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly or over
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than this own spontaneous
desistance.
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Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. —
Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed
against person or property.
Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The
following are criminally liable for grave and less grave
felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from
criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are
such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers
and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling
within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted
under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally
married person who having surprised his spouse in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of
destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of
any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same
circumstances, to parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducer, while the daughters are living with their
parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the
prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise
have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall
not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. —
Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of
another against the latter's will shall be punished by
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of violence or
intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not be
applicable to any person who shall enter another's
dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious
harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third
person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall
enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some
service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall
enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while
the same are open.
Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal
liability. — No criminal, but only civil liability, shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or
relatives by affinity in the same line.

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the
property which belonged to the deceased spouse before
the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall
not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime.
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or
acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if
the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above
named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender
with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him.
The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable
to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after
the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
Carungcong v. People
612 SCRA 274, Feb. 11, 2010
Facts: Accused was charged of Estafa thru falsification.
He raises Article 332 as a defense since he was a
relative by affinity.
Held: The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant
to address specific crimes against property, namely, the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief.
Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex,
are not affected by the absolutory cause provided
by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of
the component crimes of a complex crime for the
purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime
is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other
words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document would be
to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate
simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in
that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment
as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public
document, not as a single charge for the single
(complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State
waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for
the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right
to property committed by the offender against certain
family members as a private matter and therefore
subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply
when the violation of the right to property is achieved
through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a
breach of the public interest in the integrity and
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presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the
latter instance, what is involved is no longer
simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.
d. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN CASE OF
EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection
with acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any
act which it may deem proper to repress and which is
not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject
of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result
in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking
into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.
People v. Veneracion
249 SCRA 244 (1995)
Facts: The accused was found guilty of the
crime of Rape with Homicide. The instant petition raised
the issue whether or not the respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion when he failed or refused
to impose the mandatory penalty of death under RA
7659
Held: The law plainly and unequivocably
provides that ―when by reason or on the occasion of
rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death. Courts are not concerned with wisdom, efficacy
or morality of law. The discomfort faced by those forced
by law to impose death penalty is an ancient one, but it
is a matter upon which judges have no choice. The Rules
of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the
judges should impose the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by the law on the accused.
V. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The
following are criminally liable for grave and less grave
felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices.
 The treble division of persons criminally
responsible for an offense rests upon the very nature of
their participation in the commission of the crime.
 The ACCESSORIES are not liable for light felonies
because in the commission of light felonies, the social
wrong as well as the individual prejudice is so small that
penal sanction is deemed not necessary for accessories

RULES RELATIVE TO LIGHT FELONIES:
a. Light felonies are punishable only when they
have been consummated.
b. But when light felonies are committed
against persons or property, the are punishable even if
they are only in the attempted or frustrated stage of the
execution.
c. Only principals and accomplices are liable for
light felonies.
d. Accessories are not liable for light felonies,
even if they are committed against persons or property.
 Only natural persons can be the active
subject of crime because of the highly personal nature of
the criminal responsibility.
 Only a natural person can be the
offender because:
a. The RPC requires that the culprit should
have acted with personal malice or negligence. An
artificial or juridical person cannot act with malice or
negligence.
b. A juridical person, like a corporation, cannot
commit a crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious
intent is required.
c. There is substitution of deprivation of liberty
(subsidiary imprisonment) for pecuniary penalties in
case of in case of insolvency of the accused.
d. Other penalties consisting in imprisonment
and other deprivation of liberty like destierro, can be
executed only against individuals.
 Officers, not the corporation, are criminally
liable.
 Juridical persons are criminally liable under
certain special laws.
 In all crimes there are always 2 parties:
ACTIVE (the criminal) and PASSIVE (the injured party).
A. PRINCIPALS
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered
principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to
commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of
the offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished.
• When a single individual commits a crime, there is
no difficulty in determining his participation in the
commission thereof.
• But when 2 or more persons are involved, it is
necessary to determine the participation of each.
PAR. 1. – PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION
The principal by direct participation
PERSONALLY TAKES PART IN THE EXECUTION OF THE
ACT constituting the crime.
• Two or more persons who took part in the commission
of the crime are principals by direct participation, when
the following requisites are present:
1. That they participated in the criminal resolution
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2. That they carried out their plan and personally
took part in its execution by acts which directly
tended to the same end.
First requisite – Participation in the criminal
resolution
• Two or more persons are said to have
participated in the criminal resolution when they were in
conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime.
• It is well settled that a person may be
convicted for the criminal act of another where, between
them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of the crime charged.
CONSPIRACY
• A conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.
• The conspiracy contemplated in the first
requisite is not a felony, but only a manner of incurring
criminal liability.
• In order to hold an accused guilty as co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established
that he performed an over act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance
to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of
the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing
the conspiracy.
• Mere knowledge without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute
conspiracy.
• Silence does not make one a conspirator
• The existence of conspiracy does not require
necessarily an agreement for an appreciable length of
time prior to the execution of its purpose, since from the
legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution.
• Conspiracy arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
felony and forthwith decide to pursue it.
• Formal agreement or previous acquaintance
among several persons not necessary in conspiracy.
• Must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence.
• When there is no conspiracy, each of the
offenders is liable only for the act performed by him.
∞ It is not enough that a person participated
in the assault made by another in order to consider him
a co-principal in the crime committed. He must also
participate in the criminal resolution of the other.
∞ When there is conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all. There is collective criminal responsibility.
∞ Conspiracy may cover persons previously
undetermined.
∞ A person in conspiracy with others, who had
desisted before the crime was committed by the other,
is not criminally liable.
∞ When there is conspiracy, it is not necessary
to ascertain the specific act of each conspirator.
∞ There could be no conspiracy to commit an
offense through negligence.
∞ In cases of criminal negligence or crimes
punishable by special law, allowing or failing to prevent
an act to be performed by another, makes one a co-
principal.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
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Second requisite – that the culprits “carried out present: 1. they participated in the criminal resolution
their plan and personally took part in its and 2. they carried out their plan and personally took
execution, by acts which directly tended to the part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the
same end.” same end. Both requisites were met in this case. Further
Dacillo‘s admission that he participated in the
∞ The principals by direct participation must commission of the crime by holding Rosemarie‘s legs
be at the scene of the crime, personally taking part in its made him a principal by direct participation.
execution.
∞ The acts of each offender must directly tend
to the same end. PAR. 2. – PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION
∞ One serving as guard pursuant to the
conspiracy is a principal by direct participation. “Those who directly force or induce others to
∞ When the second requisite is lacking, there commit it.‖
is only conspiracy. ∞ The principal by induction becomes liable
only when the principal by direct participation committed
People v. Nunag the act induced.
173 SCRA 274 (1989)
Facts: The victim claimed that while she was 2 WAYS OF BECOMING PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION
standing outside the house of her neighbor peeping
through an open window to watch a TV program, Nunag 1) BY DIRECTLY FORCING ANOTHER TO
came towards her appearing to be drunk. Nunag, COMMIT A CRIME
threatening to kill her, led her to a nearby ricefield.
Later, they were joined by the other 4 accused. Nunag a. By using IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
then undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. b. By causing UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
Mandap followed and she lost consciousness after. She
regained consciousness only when Manalili was abusing 2) BY DIRECTLY INDUCING ANOTHER TO
her. COMMIT A CRIME.
Held: Accused Nunag, Mandap and Manalili are a. By giving price, or offering reward or
found guilty of 3 distinct and separate crimes of rape. promise.
They being principals by direct participation while the b. By using words of command.
other 2 accused as principals by indispensable
cooperation since there is no sufficient evidence that the REQUISITES:
latter also had sexual intercourse with the victim. The 1. That the inducement be made directly with the
victim lost consciousness and only assumed that the two intention of procuring the commission of the crime;
also raped her. and
a. A thoughtless expression without intention to
People v. Dela Cerna produce the result is not an inducement to
21 SCRA 569 (1967) commit a crime.
Facts: Rafael filed an ejectment suit against b. The inducement may be by acts of command,
dela Cerna‘s father wherein the court ruled in his favor. advice, or through influence, or agreement
Later he was shot by the accused while the former and for consideration.
his family were bringing sacks of corn. He was taken
away by his family to tend his wounds but Dela Cerna 2. That such inducement be the determining cause
and company followed them and Rafael was shot again of the commission of the crime by the material
resulting to his death. Maquiling, one companion of Dela executor.
Cerna, shot Casiano, a relative of Rafael. - The words of advice of the influence must
Held: Dela Cerna cannot be held liable for the have actually moved the hands of the principal by
death of Casiano because the conspiracy was to kill direct participation.
Rafael only. The rule has always been: co-conspirators
are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy; PRINCIPAL BY PROPOSAL TO COMMIT
for other acts done outside the contemplation of the co- INDUCEMENT THE FELONY
conspirators, or acts which are not the necessary and There is an inducement to commit a crime.
logical consequence of the intended crime, only the The principal by The mere proposal to
actual perpetrators are criminally liable. Although inducement becomes liable commit a felony is
Maquiling got the gun from Dela Cerna, the latter only only when the crime is punishable in treason and
gave it to the former as per their agreement to shoot committed by the principal rebellion. The person to
Rafael. by direct participation. whom the proposal is
As to the other companions, facts prove their made should not commit
active participation in the killing. They are all principals. the crime; otherwise, the
proponent becomes a
People v. Dacillo (supra) principal by inducement.
Facts: Pacot stabbed and strangled Rosemarie
The inducement involves The proposal to be
leading to the latter‘s death. Dacillo for his part, hold
any crime punishable must involve
down Rosemarie‘s legs to prevent her from struggling.
only treason or rebellion.
The two men stopped only when they were sure that the
victim was already dead. Dacillo then encase her corpse
in cement.
Held:. Two or more persons taking part in the
commission of a crime are considered principals by
direct participation if the following requisites are

99

EFFECTS OF ACQUITTAL OF PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION UPON THE LIABILITY OF
PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT
1) Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal of co-
defendant.
2) One cannot be held guilty of having instigated
the commission of a crime without first being
shown that the crime has been actually
committed by another.
People v. Dela Cruz
97 SCRA 385 (1980)
Facts: Dela Cruz met with Salip and a
couple of other men when he proposed to them the
killing of Antonio Yu and the kidnapping of the latter‘s
brother for a ransom. A group of men sailed for Basilan
where they met with Salip. They proceeded to the
accused‘s house where the accused informed the group
of the whereabouts of the Chinese brothers and other
details of the plan. The group was able to kidnap and
detain the brother for a short while before he attempted
to escape and was shot by one of the men.
Held: The contention of the accused that
since he did not take part in the commission of the
crime, conspiracy does not exist, is untenable. The
requisites necessary in order that a person may be
convicted as principal by inducement are present.
Without Dela Cruz, the crime would not have been
conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he was the
principal by induction.
US v. Indianan
24 Phil. 203 (1913)
Facts: Indianan was the HEADMAN of the
district of Parang. He ordered his subordinates to seize
Sariol (victim) and bring the latter to Indianan. The
victim was detained by Indianan until nightfall, then
Indianan ordered his subordinates to take Sariol to an
isolated place and kill him. Indianan bolstered his
command by claiming that he had an order from the
governor that Sariol be executed. Indianan‘s
subordinates took Sariol to a cemetery and killed him.
Held: Indianan had a very powerful
influence over his subordinates based on TRADITION
AND CUSTOM as well as his representation that he had
an order from the governor. Hence, his power over them
was such that any order issued by him had the force and
efficacy of physical coercion. The domination of Indianan
was such as to make him responsible for whatever they
did in obedience to such orders. He is a principal by
inducement.
People v. Kiichi Omine
61 Phil. 609 (1935)
Facts: A confrontation happened between Angel, the
owner of a farm and Omine, the farm manager and
several workers. The argument ended up with the
owner‘s son being wounded in the hand and Angel being
held while Anton, a worker, was holding a bolo. Omine
shouted ―pagale y matale!‖ (grab and kill him!). Anton
struck Angel in the chest with the bolo.
Held: The words used must have great dominance and
great influence over the person who acted. The
inducement must be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime and the
inducement is the determining cause of the crime. In
this case, the worker already had the motive to strike.
He already wounded the owner‘s son before striking
Angel in the chest. Only Anton is liable for lesiones
graves.
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PAR. 3. – PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION
―Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense
by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.‖
REQUISITES:
1. Participation in the criminal resolution, that is,
there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention immediately
before the commission of the crime charged;
and
2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense
by performing another act, without which it
would not have been accomplished.
under any of the three concepts defined in Article 17.
ponsibility when
the offenders are criminally liable in the same manner
and to the same extent. The penalty to be imposed must
be the same for all.
criminal responsibility. Principal by induction, except
that who directly forced another to commit a crime, and
principal by direct participation have collective criminal
responsibility. Principal by indispensable cooperation has
collective criminal responsibility with the principal by
direct participation.
People v. Montealegre
161 SCRA 700 (1988)
Facts: Abadilla was eating at a restaurant
when he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming
from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he
went outside and saw a police and reported the matter.
The police approached the table and held Montealgre
and Capalad. Capalad suddenly pulled out his knife and
started stabbing the police at the back. The police
released the 2 in order to draw his gun but Montealegre
restrained the police so that Capalad may continue
stabbing. The 3 grappled and the police was able to
draw his gun and fired at the 2 assailants. A chase
ensued. Capalad was shot which resulted to his death.
The police also died because of the wounds inflicted by
Capalad.
Held: The accused was correctly considered a
co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the
killing of the police officer. The 2 acted in concert. Even
if the accused did not himself commit the act of stabbing,
he is nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having
prevented the police from resisting the attack against
him. The accused was a principal by indispensable
cooperation.
People v. Fronda
222 SCRA 71 (1993)
Facts: The Balaan brothers were abducted and killed by
members of the New People‘s Army. Fronda and Padua
accompanied the rebels to the victims‘ house. They were
the ones who tied the hands of the victims and supplied
the spade and crowbar for digging the graves. The trial
court convicted Fronda and Padua as principals by
indispensable cooperation.
Held: The accused are only accomplices for the crime
can be committed even without their participation. An
accomplice is one who cooperates by previous or
simultaneous acts and his participation is of a minor
character. He must be aware of the criminal intent and
participates by supplying material and moral aid for its
execution.

B. ACCOMPLICES
Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons
who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.
 In quasi-collective criminal responsibility,
some of the offenders in the crime are principals and the
others are accomplices.
 The participation of an accomplice
presupposes the commission of the crime by the
principal by direct participation.
 When there is no conspiracy between or
among the defendants but they were animated by one
and the same purpose to accomplish the criminal
objective, those who cooperated by previous or
simultaneous act but cannot be held liable as principals
are accomplices.
 An accomplice does not have a previous
agreement or understanding or is not in conspiracy with
the principal by direct participation.
CONSPIRATOR ACCOMPLICE
They know and agree with the criminal design.
Conspirators know the Accomplices come to know
criminal intention because about it after the
they themselves have principals have reached
decided upon such course the decision and only then
of action. do they agree to cooperate
in its execution.
Conspirators decide that a Accomplices merely assent
crime should be to the plan and cooperate
committed. in it accomplishment
Conspirators are the Accomplices are merely
authors of a crime instruments who perform
acts not essential to the
perpetration of the
offense.
REQUISITES:
1. That there be community of design; that is,
knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in
his purpose;
2. That he cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with
the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way;
and
3. That there be a relation between the acts done
by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
 The community of design need not be to
commit the crime actually committed. It is sufficient if
there was a common purpose to commit a particular
crime and that the crime actually committed was a
natural or probable consequence of the intended crime.
 The cooperation of an accomplice is not due
to a conspiracy.
 When the acts of the accused are not
indispensable in the killing, they are merely accomplices.
 The accomplice merely supplies the principal
with material or moral aid without conspiracy with the
latter.
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 The wounds inflicted by an accomplice in
crimes against persons should mot have caused the
death of the victim.
RULES:
1. The one who had the original criminal
design is the person who committed the
resulting crime.
2. The accomplice, after concurring in the
criminal purpose of the principal, cooperates
by previous or simultaneous acts.
When the cooperation is by simultaneous act,
the accomplice takes part while the crime is
being committed by the principal by direct
participation or immediately thereafter.
3. The accomplice in crimes against persons
does not inflict the more or most serious
wounds.
 The moral aid may be through advice,
encouragement or agreement.
 There must be a relation between the criminal act
of the principal and the act of the one charged as
accomplice.
PRINCIPAL by ACCOMPLICE
COOPERATION
Cooperation is Cooperation is not
indispensable in the indispensable in the
commission of the act. commission of the act.
People v. Cachola
420 SCRA 520 (2004)
Facts: One day, two armed men entered a house and
shot the four residents to death. According to witnesses,
while the shooting was happening, they saw several
armed men wearing bonnets standing behind a jeep
outside the house. The perpetrators escaped using the
vehicle. The jeep had a marking El Shaddai in front,
aside from the marking fruits and vegetables dealer on
.
the sides Later that evening, the police intercepted the
same jeep and arrested the 8 men riding it. Cahola and
Amay were were identified as the ones who entered the
house while the others were convicted as accomplices to
the murder.
Held: To be an accomplice, there must be a community
of design with the principal. He must know the plan of
the principal and he performs previous or simultaneous
acts. In this case, the lookouts are accomplices.
However, the 6 other men were acquitted due to lack of
sufficient evidence. The armed men outside were all
wearing bonnets and there was reasonable doubt
whether they were the same men present during the
murder.
People v. Gambao
G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013
Facts: Lucia Chan was abducted and brought to a resort
in Laguna. The abductors demanded 20 million pesos as
ransom. The police eventually rescued Chan and
arrested the perpetrators. Among those arrested was
Perpenian, who was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. She chatted with the
abductors and claimed that she thought that there was
only a swimming party.

Held: An accomplice cooperates in the execution by
supplying material and moral aid in relation to the acts
done by the principal. In this case, her presence gave
moral support to the abductors as she kept quiet and
didn‘t tell the police even when there was obviously a
crime being committed. She is an accomplice to the
kidnapping.
People v. Mandolado (supra)
Held: An accomplice cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts, provided he has no direct participation in its
execution or does not force or induce others to commit it,
or his cooperation is not indispensable to its
accomplishment.
In the case at bar, Ortillano, by his acts
showed knowledge of the criminal design of Mandolado.
He was present when the latter tried to attack the driver
of the Ford Fiera with a knife and fired at the vehicle
hitting a female passenger. When Mandolado cocked his
gun and ordered Tenorio to stop the jeep, their 2 other
companion, Simon and Erinada, immediately jumped off
the jeep and ran away but Ortillano stayed. In a display
of unity with Mandolado, Ortillano fired his armalite
while they were riding in the jeep of the victim. And
Ortillano‘s act of firing his gun towards the ground
manifested his concurrence with the criminal intent. In
other words, his simultaneous acts supplied moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. His
presence served to encourage Mandolado, the principal,
or to increase the odds against the victims.
People v. Doctolero
193 SCRA 632 (1991)
Facts: The 3 accused, Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) threw stones at
Sagun‘s house and called to all the men in the house to
come out. Epifiana and Lolita and Jonathan (1 ½ year
old child of Lolita) were struck and stabbed by the
accused inside the house of Sagun. Epifiana and Lolita
died while Jonathan was slightly injured. The same
accused while already on the road, hacked and stabbed
Marcelo which caused his death.
Held: There is no question that while the
3 accused were still stoning at the house, they heard the
2 women protesting and Ludovico went inside and
brutally killed the 2 women inside the room of the said
house. It is impossible to claim that Virgilio and Conrado
did not know what their brother was doing. They knew
and they just stood by and did nothing to stop their
brother. Their presence gave Ludovico encouragement in
the commission of the crime. Thus, the 2 are
accomplices. One can be an accomplice even if he did
not know of the actual crime intended by the principal
provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.
People v. Roche
330 SCRA 91 (2000)
Facts: Roderick and Rodel Ferol were having
drinks with a friend named Bobot inside the Ferol
compound. Without any warning, Roche and Gregorio
barged into the compound. Gregorio tried to hit Rodel
with an empty beer bottle but failed because his
common-law wife, Helen, pulled him away on time.
Roderick however was stabbed on the back with an ice
pick by Roche. Roderick ran towards the house of his
friend Bobot but outside the compound, Caballes caught
up with him. Roderick fell to the ground and was
repeatedly stabbed with a knife by Caballes. One Rossel
tried to stop Caballes but he was chased by the latter. A
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brother of the victim, Jon-Jon, threw bottles at Caballes,
forcing the latter to run away, and leave his victim
behind. Roderick was then taken to his house by Rogelio
and Jon-Jon. But at the time, Roderick was already
dead.
Held: Roche can not be held liable as an
accomplice for the crime charged. There is no evidence
to show that he performed any previous or simultaneous
act to assist Caballes in killing Roderick. It has not been
proven that he was aware of Caballes‘ plan to attack
and kill Roderick. Absent any evidence to create the
moral certainty required to convict Roche, the court
cannot uphold the trial court‘s finding of guilt.
People v. Pilola
405 SCRA 134 (2003)
Facts: Joselito, Julian, Edmar and Odilon were
having a drinking spree. In the course of their drinking,
an altercation between Edmar and Julian ensued. Edmar
and Odilon then left the store. Joselito and Julian were
also about to leave when Edmar and Odilon returned,
blocking their way. Edmar punched Julian in the face.
The two then traded fist blows. For his part, Odilon
positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and
watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito
tried to placate the protagonists but his intervention
apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his
knife with his right hand and stepped down from his
perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito's neck, and
stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant Pilola, who
were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon
stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They
pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed
Joselito. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the
appellant fled. Before running away from the scene,
Ronnie picked up a piece of hollow block and with it
bashed Joselito's head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece
of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Joselito
died on the spot.
Held: To hold a person liable as an accomplice,
two elements must concur: (a) the community of
criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime. Accomplices come to know
about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct
participation after the principal has reached the decision
to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice
agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be committed; they
merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct
participation and cooperate in its accomplishment.
However, where one cooperates in the commission of
the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves
are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct
participation, and not merely an accomplice
All things considered, it was ruled that Ronnie
and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the
victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the
latter's death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice
but is a principal by direct participation.
Even assuming that the appellant did not
conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the
appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal
by direct participation. The stab wounds inflicted by him
cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death
of the victim or contributed materially thereto.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
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People v. Garcia
373 SCRA 134 (2002)
Facts: Valler and Garcia kidnapped Atty.
Tioleco for the purpose of extorting ransom. Lariba and
Rogel were caught by police officers inside the house
where a handcuffed and blinfolded Atty. Tioleco was
detained. Both were unarmed although guns inside the
house are found in their possession.
Held: Lariba and Rogel, were merely guarding
the house for the purpose of either helping the other
accused-appellants in facilitating the successful
denouement to the crime or repelling any attempt to
rescue the victim, as shown by the availability of arms
and ammunition to them. They thus cooperated in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts by means of which they aided or facilitated the
execution of the crime but without any indispensable act
for its accomplishment. Under Art. 18 of The Revised
Penal Code, they are mere accomplices.
C. ACCESSORIES
“without having participated therein either as
principals or accomplices”
“take part subsequent to its commission”
 The accessory takes part AFTER the crime has
been committed.
SPECIFIC ACTS OF THE ACCESSORIES
1. BY PROFITING THEMSELVES OR
ASSISTING THE OFFENDER TO PROFIT BY
THE EFFECTS OF THE CRIME
- The accessory must receive the property
from the principal. He should not take it without the
consent of the principal, or else, he is not an
accessory but a principal in the crime of theft.
- When is profiting by the effect of the
crime punished as the act of principal, and not the
act of accessory?
When a person knowingly acquired or
received property taken by the brigands.

Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, 2. BY CONCEALING OR DESTROYING THE
having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and BODY OF THE CRIME TO PREVENT ITS
without having participated therein, either as principals DISCOVERY.
or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission
in any of the following manners: BODY OF THE CRIME –―corpus delicti‖ which means
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the that a specific offense was in fact committed by
offender to profit by the effects of the crime. someone
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to 3. BY HARBORING, CONCEALING OR
prevent its discovery. ASSISTING IN THE ESCAPE OF THE
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the PRINCIPAL OF THE CRIME
escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or 2 CLASSES:
whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the a. Public officers who harbor conceal or assist in the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of escape of the principal of any crime (not light
some other crime. felony) with abuse of his public functions
REQUISITES:
(1) The accessory is a public officer;
An accessory does not participate in the
(2) He harbors, conceals, or assists in
criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the
the escape of the principal;
felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the
(3) The public officer acts with abuse
crime, he subsequently takes part in 3 ways:
of his public functions.
a) by profiting from the effects of the crime;
(4) The crime committed by the
b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments
principal is any crime, provided it is not a
of the crime in order to prevent its discovery;
light felony.
and
c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of
b. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in
the principal of the crime, provided he acts
the escape of the author of the crime – guilty of
with abuse of his public functions or the
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt against
principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder,
the life of the President, or who is known to be
or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
habitually guilty of some other crime.
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
REQUISITES:
some other crime.
(1) The accessory is a private person.
(2) He harbors, conceals or assists in
“knowledge of the commission of the crime”
the escape of the author of the crime.
 Mere possession of stolen property does not
(3) The crime committed by the
make the accused an accessory where the thief was
principal is either: (a) treason, (b)
already convicted.
parricide, (c) murder, (d) attempt against
 Entertaining suspicion that a crime has been
the life of the president, or (e) that the
committed is not enough.
principal is known to be habitually guilty
 Knowledge of the commission of the crime may
of some other crime.
be established by circumstantial evidence

“commission of the crime”

 the crime committed by the principal must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

103

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612
ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies
reveal that there is rampant robbery and thievery of
government and private properties;
WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have
become profitable on the part of the lawless elements
because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known
as fence, of stolen properties;
WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be
prosecuted only as an accessory after the fact and punished
lightly;
WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy
penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes
of robbery and theft.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part
of the law of the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as
the Anti-Fencing Law.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following
terms shall mean as follows:
(a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with
intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article,
item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should
be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft.
(b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association
corporation or partnership or other organization who/which
commits the act of fencing.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing
shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of
the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not
exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion
temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto
provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the value of the property
robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding
12,000 pesos.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property
involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000
pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the
value of the property involved is over 50 pesos but not
exceeding 200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period if such value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding
50 pesos.
(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical
Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation or
association, the president or the manager or any officer
thereof who knows or should have known the commission of
the offense shall be liable.
Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere
possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of
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value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second
Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all stores,
establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any
good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from
an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering
the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the
Integrated National Police in the town or city where such
store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of
Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police
shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of this section. Any person who fails to secure the
clearance or permit required by this section or who violates
any of the provisions of the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall upon conviction be punished
as a fence.
Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take
effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March,
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.
ACCESSORY DISTINGUISHED FROM PRINCIPAL
AND FROM ACCOMPLICE
1. The accessory does not take direct part or
cooperate in, or induce, the commission of the crime.
2. The accessory does not cooperate in the
commission of the offense by acts either prior thereto or
simultaneous therewith.
3. That the participation of the accessory in all
cases always takes place after the commission of the
crime.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal
liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories
shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the
single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
 The exemption is based on the ties of blood
and the preservation of the cleanliness of one‘s name,
which compels one to conceal crimes committed by
relatives.
 An ACESSORY is exempt from criminal
liability, when the principal is his:
1. spouse,
2. ascendant,
3. descendant,
4. legitimate, natural or adopted brother,
sister or relative by affinity within the
same degree.
- even if only two of the principals guilty of
murder are the brothers of the accessory and the others
are not related to him, such accessory is exempt from
criminal liability.
- a nephew or niece is not included
 An accessory is NOT EXEMPT from criminal
liability even if the principal is related to him, if such
accessory (1) PROFITED by the effects of the crime, or
(2) assisted the offender to profit by the effects of
the crime
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
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People v. Talingdan Held: Ruby is the sister of Ruth. As such, their

84 SCRA 19 (1978) relationship exempts Ruby from criminal liability under
Facts: Bernardo and Teresa lived together Art. 20 of the Revised Penal Code —ARTICLE 20.
but for quite some time their relationship has gotten Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability.—The
bitter. Bernardo knew that Teresa had an illicit penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed
relationship with Talingdan. Their child testified that on upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,
the day the killing occurred, there were 4 men inside ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and
their house and Bernardo knew about it but continued adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity
plowing his field. Later, when Bernardo came inside the within the same degrees, with the single exception of
kitchen, Talingdan and Tobias fired at Bernardo and the accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1
4 climbed the stairs of the batalan. Seeing that the of the preceding article. The reason for exemption is
victim was alive, they fired at him again. Teresa came obvious; it is based on ties of blood and the preservation
out after from her room and pulled her child to question of the cleanliness of one's name, which compels one to
her. Teresa threatened to kill her if she would reveal the conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as those
incident. mentioned in the above-quoted article. Ruby Mariano is
Held: One who conceals or assists in the acquitted.
escape of the principal in the crime can be held guilty as
accessory. There is morally convincing proof that Teresa
is an accessory to the offense. She was inside the room
when her husband was shot. As she came out after the V. PENALTIES
shooting, she inquired from the child if she was able to
recognize the assailants and when the latter identified
Penalty is the suffering that is inflicted by the State for
the 4 accused as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin
the transgression of a law.
her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone but
she went to the extent of warning her not to tell anyone
Different Juridical Conditions of Penalty:
or else she would kill her. Later when the police came,
10. Must be PRODUCTIVE OF SUFFERING, without
she claimed she had no suspects in mind. She, thus,
however affecting the integrity of the human
became active in her cooperation with the 4 accused.
personality.
11. Must be COMMENSURATE with the offense –
People v. Tolentino (2002)
different crimes must be punished with
Facts: Wilfredo Tolentino hit Herman Sagario
different penalties.
with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo.
12. Must be PERSONAL – no one should be
Wilfedo then instructed appellant Jonathan Fabros and
punished for the crime of another.
Merwin Ledesma to help him bring Hernan out of the
13. Must be LEGAL – it is the consequence of a
house. Wilfredo held him by the neck while both
judgment according to law.
appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then
14. Must be CERTAIN – no one may escape its
carried Hernan towards a creek. Appellant assisted
effects.
Wilfredo out of fear and when he noticed that Sagario
15. Must be EQUAL for all.
regained consciousness, he ran away towards a banana
16. Must be CORRECTIONAL.
plantation. Wilfredo then stab Sagario on the different
parts of his body causing his death. Thereafter, Wilfredo
 The purpose of the State in punishing crimes is TO
pushed and waded Sagario on the water.
SECURE JUSTICE. Penal justice must therefore be
Held: Appellant Jonathan Fabros cannot be
exercised by the State in the service and satisfaction of
convicted as an accessory. Under paragraph 2 of Article
a duty and rests primarily on the moral rightfulness of
19 of the Revised Penal Code, the concealment or the
the punishment inflicted.
destruction of the body of the crime or of the effects or
the instruments thereof must have been done in order
Theories justifying penalty:
to prevent the discovery of the crime. That, precisely, is
b. PREVENTION – to suppress danger to the State
wanting in the present case. Appellant was afraid that
c. SELF-DEFENSE – to protect the society from
his co-accused would hurt him if he refused so he
the threat and wrong inflicted by the criminal.
agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards
d. REFORMATION – to correct and reform the
the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise
offender.
indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he
e. EXEMPLARITY – to serve as an example to
adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing
deter others from committing crimes.
incident was one born of fear for his own life. It is not
f. JUSTICE – for retributive justice, a vindication
incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if
of absolute right and moral law violated by the
unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if to do so
criminal.
would put the former's life in peril.
Purpose of penalty under the RPC:
People v. Mariano
a. RETRIBUTION OR EXPIATION – the penalty is
347 SCRA 109 (2000)
commensurate with the gravity of the offense.
Facts: Ruth and their maid Michelle often
b. CORRECTION OR REFORMATION – as shown
engaged in a physical fight. The fight usually ends with
by the rules which regulate the execution of
Ruth pouring boiling water on Michelle. During their
the penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty.
fights which number to at least 6 times a month, Ruth
c. SOCIAL DEFENSE – shown by its inflexible
would bang Michelle‘s head and pull on her hair. Michelle
severity to recidivist and habitual delinquents.
subsequently died as a result. Ruth placed the body of
Michelle in a box which she then loaded inside the
luggage compartment of her sister Ruby‘s car. Ruth and
Ruby were both convicted of murder by the trial court.

105

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
NO ex post facto laws
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony
shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law
prior to its commission.
 This article prohibits the Government from
punishing any person for any felony with any penalty
which has not been prescribed by the law.
 It has no application to any of the provisions
of the RPC for the reason that for every felony defined in
the Code, a penalty has been prescribed.
 REASON: An act or omission cannot be
punished by the State if at the time it was committed
there was no law prohibiting it, because a law cannot be
rationally obeyed unless it is first shown, and a man
cannot be expected to obey an order that has not been
given.
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained
solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of
attainder shall be enacted.
In Re: Kay Villegas Kami
35 SCRA 429 (1970)
Facts: Petition for declaratory relief challenging
the validity of Sec. 8 of RA 6132 on the ground that it
violates due process, right of association, freedom of
expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
Held: An ex post facto law is one which:
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act.
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation
of a right for something which when done was
lawful; and
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.
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The constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal
laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true
that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A.
No. 6132 including Sec. 8 thereof, the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed after the approval of
the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto.
People v. Ferrer
48 SCRA 382(1972)
WON the Anti-subversion Act is a bill of
attainder? The trial court ruled that the Act is a bill of
attainder because it ―tars and feathers‖ the communist
party as a ―continuing menace to the freedom and
security of the country.‖
Held: A bill of attainder is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without a trial. The Act simply
declares the Communist Party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the government. Its
focus is not on the individuals but on the conduct. It is
not enough that the statute specify persons or groups in
order that it may be called a bill of attainder. It is
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach
past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature
of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt.
People v. Bracamonte
257 SCRA 380 (1996)
Facts: Violeta and her common law husband,
Clark Din, arrived home and saw 3 men rushing out of
the house. Inside the house, they found their maid
hands tied with her mouth gagged and bathed in her
own blood. Thereafter, they saw their son in the kitchen
his head and body immersed in a pail of water, dead.
Held: To impose upon the accused the death
penalty under R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on
December 31, 1993 for a crime committed back on
September 23, 1987 would violate the basic rule in
criminal law that, if the new law imposes a heavier
penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission
of the offense shall be applied.
People v. Valdez
304 SCRA 611 (1999)
Facts: Accused was convicted by the RTC and
sentenced him to death for the complex crime of
Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, and
likewise separately sentenced him to suffer the prison
term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms (P.D. No. 1866)
Held: There can be no separate conviction of
the crime of illegal possession under P.D. No. 1866 in
view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294
wherein illegal possession being merely taken as an
aggravating circumstance to other crimes committed.
Insofar as RA 8294 will spare the accused from a
separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession, it
may be given retroactive effect.
PROSPECTIVITY; EXCEPTION
RPC, Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No
felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed
by law prior to its commission.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal
Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be
convict is serving the same. pleaded in the indictment in order to warrant the
imposition of the penalty (Garcia doctrine reiterated in
CIVIL CODE, Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public Medina).
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live Held: By operation of law, the appellant is
or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of the
principles of public international law and to treaty Garcia or Medina doctrine. Sentence modified.
stipulations.
People v. Patalin
311 SCRA 187 (1999)
GENERAL RULE: TO GIVE CRIMINAL LAWS
Facts: The accused were convicted of
PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
Robbery with Physical Injuries and Robbery with Multiple
Exception: to give them retroactive effect when
Rape and were sentenced to imprisonment and death
favorable to the accused.
penalty respectively for the two convictions.
Reason for the exception: The sovereign, in
Held: There is no question that the
enacting a subsequent penal law more favorable to the
abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused.
accused, has recognized that the greater severity of the
The subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will
former law is unjust. The sovereign would be
not affect them. The framers of the Constitution
inconsistent if it would still enforce its right under
themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress
conditions of the former law, which has already been
reimposing the death penalty (RA 7659) can only have
regarded by conscientious public opinion as juridical
prospective application. A subsequent statute cannot be
burdensome.
so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued
under the old law.
 The favorable retroactive effect of a new law may find
the defendant in one of these 3 situations:
DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF REPEAL OF PENAL LAW.
a. The crime has been committed and prosecution
a. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new
begins;
law, the new law shall be applied, except when the
b. Sentence has been passed but service has not
offender is a habitual delinquent or when the new
begun;
law is made not applicable to pending action or
c. The sentence is being carried out.
existing causes of action.
 When the culprit is HABITUAL DELINQUENT, he is not
b. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in
entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the new
force at the time of the commission of the offense
favorable statute.
shall be applied.
 A person shall be deemed to be a HABITUAL
c. If the new law totally repeals the existing law so
DELINQUENT if within a period of 10 years from the date
that the act which was penalized under the old law
of his release of last conviction of the crimes of serious
is no longer punishable, the crime is obliterated.
or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or
falsification, he is found guilt of an said crimes a third
 When the repeal is absolute the offense ceases
time or oftener.
to be criminal.
 The principle against retroactivity does not apply to
civil liability.
 When the new law and the old law penalize the
- but a new law increasing the civil liability
same offense, the offender can be tried under
cannot be given retroactive effect.
the old law.
 The provisions of this article are applicable even to
special laws which provide more favorable conditions to
 When the repealing law fails to penalize the
the accused.
offense under the old law, the accused cannot
 Criminal liability under the former law is obliterated
be convicted under the new law.
when the repeal is absolute.
 Criminal liability under the repealed law subsists:
 A person erroneously accused and convicted
a. When the provisions of the former law are
under a repealed statute may be punished
REENACTED; or
under the repealing statute.
b. When the repeal is by IMPLICATION;
c. When there is a SAVING CLAUSE
 A new law which omits anything contained in
the old law dealing on the same subject,
 What penalty may be imposed for the commission of a
operates as are penal of anything not so
felony?
included in the amendatory act.
- Only the penalty prescribed by law prior tot the
commission of the felony may be imposed.
People v. Pimentel (supra)
- Felonies are punishable under the laws in force
Held: Where the repeal of a penal law is total
at the time of their commission.
and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior
- But the penalty prescribed by law enacted after
law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the
the commission of the felony may be imposed, if
previous offense is obliterated.
it is favorable to the offender.
With the enactment of RA 7636, the charge of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition qualified by
People v. Gallo
subversion should be amended to simple illegal
315 SCRA 461 (1999)
possession of firearm and ammunition, since subversion
Facts: The accused seeks a modification of his
is no longer a crime.
death sentence to reclusion perpetua in line with the
new Court rulings which annunciate that the 7 attendant
circumstances introduced in Sec. 11 of RA 7659 partake

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B. PENALTIES WHICH MAY BE IMPOSED (reclusion, prision, arresto)

3. Restriction of freedom (destierro)
Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed. — The 4. Deprivation of rights
penalties which may be imposed according to this Code, (disqualification and suspension)
and their different classes, are those included in the 5. Pecuniary (fine)
following:
According to their gravity
Scale 1. Capital
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES 2. Afflictive
3. Correctional
4. Light
Capital punishment:
Death. NOTE: Public censure is a penalty, thus, it is not proper
in acquittal. However, the Court in acquitting the
Afflictive penalties: accused may criticize his acts or conduct.
Reclusion perpetua,
Reclusion temporal, • Penalties that are either principal or accessory.
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, Perpetual or temporary absolute
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification, disqualification, perpetual or temporary special
Prision mayor. disqualification, and suspension may be principal or
accessory penalties, because they formed in the 2
Correctional penalties: general classes.
Prision correccional,
Arresto mayor, DURATION OF EACH OF DIFFERENT PENALTIES
Suspension,
Destierro. 1. Reclusion perpetua – 20 years and 1 day
to 40 years
2. Reclusion temporal – 12 years and 1 day
Light penalties: to 20 years
Arresto menor, 3. Prision mayor and temporary
Public censure. disqualification - 6 years and 1 day to 12 years except
when disqualification is accessory penalty; in which case
Penalties common to the three preceding its duration is that of the principal penalty
classes: 4. Prision correccional, suspension and
Fine, and destierro - 6 months and 1 day to 6 years except
Bond to keep the peace. when suspension is an accessory penalty, in which case
its duration is that of the principal penalty.
ACCESSORY PENALTIES 5. Arresto Mayor - 1 month and 1 day to 6
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, months
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification, 6. Arresto Menor – 1 day to 30 days.
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be
voted for, the profession or calling.
Civil interdiction, C. SPECIFIC PRINCIPAL AND
Indemnification, ACCESSORY PENALTIES
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of
the offense,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Payment of costs.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES – those expressly imposed by AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN
the court in the judgment of conviction. HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE
ACCESSORY PENALTIES – those that are deemed THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER
included in the imposition of the principal penalties. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Other classifications of penalties: Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared

According to their divisibility: the policy of the State to foster and ensure not only
1. Divisible obedience to its authority, but also to adopt such measures
- those that have fixed duration and are divisible as would effectively promote the maintenance of peace and
into three periods. order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the
2. Indivisible promotion of the general welfare which are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy in
- those which have no fixed duration.
a just and humane society;
a. Death
b. Reclusion perpetua Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as
c. Perpetual absolute or special amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
disqualification
d. Public censure "Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war
against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving
According to subject-matter them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere,
1. Corporal (death) shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and shall
2. Deprivation of freedom pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."

108

No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the
testimony of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or
on confession of the accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who
commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and
shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."
Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of
Book Two of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or
in the Philippine waters
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas
or in Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or
in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not
being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment or passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of
mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters."
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed upon those who commit
any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under
any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or
firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims
without means of saving themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder,
homicide, physical injuries or rape."
Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211
of the same Code a new article to read as follows:
"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is
entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift
or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death."
Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under
Article 246 of the same Code is hereby restored, so that it
shall read as follows:
"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate,
or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death."
Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty
of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to
death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon
a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles,
or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in
the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
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volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse."
Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for
parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than
three days of age.
If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by
the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be
committed for the same purpose by the maternal
grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal."
Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. -
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted
more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even
if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present
in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence
of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or on
occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision I of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason
or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the
next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the violence or
intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery
shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for
the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its
execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person

not responsible for its commission any of the physical
injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases."
Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to
one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted
to the public in general or where people usually gather or
congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and
conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such
as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings,
public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons
in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and
regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited
or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or
airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for
public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of
public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose
of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of
law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or
defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated
qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is
perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by
a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is
merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission or another
violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military
powder or fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives
or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory
of inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of
the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed."
Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. -
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age
or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the
use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
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When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent
of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the
police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the
husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within
the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below
seven (7) years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted
with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or
any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation."
Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder;
Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and
other incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State."
Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act 1972, are hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall import or bring into the Philippines any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this
Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed.

"Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for
Prohibited Drug Users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or
group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort
where any prohibited drug is used in any form or where such
prohibited drugs in quantities specified in Section 20,
Paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed
in every case where a prohibited drug is administered,
delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same
in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the
death of a person using the same in such den, dive or
resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 20 of this Act to the contrary.
"Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall engage in the manufacture of any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
"Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of
Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall plant, cultivate or culture any medium Indian hemp,
opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or any other plant
which is or may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug or
from which any dangerous drug may be manufactured or
derived.
The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which
any of said plants is cultivated or cultured shall be
confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner
thereof can prove that he did not know such cultivation or
culture despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.
If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the
maximum of the penalties herein provided shall be imposed
upon the offender."
Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall import or bring any regulated drug in the Philippines.
"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall engage in the manufacture of any regulated drug.
"Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
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be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this
Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed."
Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15
of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known
as the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new section to read as
follows:
"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for
regulated drug users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or
group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort
where any regulated drugs is used in any form, or where
such regulated drugs in quantities specified in Section 20,
paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed in every case where a regulated drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to
use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of the
death of a person using the same in such den, dive or
resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 20 of this Act to the contrary."
Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof."
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -
The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III
of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved
is in any of the following quantities :
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the
quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements,
as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs
Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for
the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision

correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful
importation, sale, administration, delivery, transportation
or manufacture of dangerous drugs, the cultivation of
plants which are sources of dangerous drugs and the
possession of any opium pipe and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs shall carry with it the confiscation and
forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of all the proceeds
of the crime including but not limited to money and other
obtained thereby and the instruments or tools with which
it was committed, unless they are the property of a third
person not liable for the offense, but those which are not
of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without
delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of such drugs
as well as the proceeds or instruments of the crime so
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government shall
be turned over to the Board for proper disposal without
delay.
Any apprehending or arresting officer who
misappropriates or misapplies or fails to account for
seized or confiscated dangerous drugs or plant-sources of
dangerous drugs or proceeds or instruments of the crime
as are herein defined shall after conviction be punished by
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos."
Section 18. There shall be incorporated after
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, a new section to
read as follows:
"Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any
person charged under any provision of this Act where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not
be allowed to avail of the provision on plea bargaining."
Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
is hereby amended to read as follows :
"Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and
Employees and Officers and Members of Police Agencies
and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence. - The
maximum penalties provided for Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6,
7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if those
found guilty of any of the said offenses are government
officials, employees or officers, including members of
police agencies and the armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee or
officer who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous
drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article
II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this
Act in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another
as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same
penalty as therein provided."
Section 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person
who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined
in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value
of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for
not less than fourteen years and eight months and not
more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation
of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not
more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
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or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years and one
day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal
shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. -
The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and
temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one
day to twelve years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in
which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. -
The duration of the penalties of prision correccional,
suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and
one day to six years, except when the suspension is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its
duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of
arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six
months.
Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of
arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the
peace shall be required to cover such period of time as
the court may determine."
Section 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not
be imposed; Automatic review of the Death Penalty
Cases. - The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in
which it must be imposed under existing laws, except
when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more
than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or
automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the
required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition
of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua.
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by
the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the
Court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier
than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment
or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded
within ten (10) days from the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter."
Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. -
Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual
delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of
diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with
the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves
constitute a crime especially punishable by law or which
are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing
the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for
the purpose of increasing the penalty.

1(a). When in the commission of the crime,
advantage was taken by the offender of his public
position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
offense was committed by any group who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a
group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating
or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any
aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a
degree that it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from
his private relations with the offended party, or from any
other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or
mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and
accessories as to whom such circumstances are
attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material
execution of the act, or in the means employed to
accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the
liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them
at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation
therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following
effects :
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit
shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the
total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the
offender, in conformity herewith shall in no case exceed
30 years.
For purposes of this article, a person shall be
deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if within a period of
ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of
the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of
any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows :
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be
executed. - The death sentence shall be executed with
preference to any other and shall consist in putting the
person under sentence to death by electrocution. The
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of
the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence
during electrocution as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall
be anaesthetized at the moment of the execution.
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As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of
Prisons, the method of carrying out the sentence shall be
changed to gas poisoning.
The death sentence shall be carried out not later
than one (1) year after the judgment has become final.
Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death
sentence. - The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon
a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year
after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of
age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40.
In all cases where the death sentence has become
final, the records of the case shall be forwarded
immediately by the Supreme Court to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power."
Section 26. < modified or repealed hereby are
Act this of provisions the with inconsistent thereof parts
regulations and rules orders, executive issuances, decrees
presidential laws,>
Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any
part of the provision of this Act shall be held to be
unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions
hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be
in full force and effect.
Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation. The publication shall not be later
than seven (7) days after the approval hereof.
Approved: December 13, 1993
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177
AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION
AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE
81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY
SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
SECTION 1. Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7659 is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to
be executed. — The death sentence shall be executed with
preference to any other penalty and shall consist in putting
the person under the sentence to death by lethal injection.
The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far
as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under
the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the
proceedings prior to the execution.
"The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take
steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is
sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict.
"Pursuant to this, all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the
performance of such task.
"The authorized physician of the Bureau of
Corrections, after thorough examination, shall officially make

a pronouncement of the convict's death and shall certify
thereto in the records of the Bureau of Corrections.
The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier
than one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after
the judgment has become final and executory without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times."
Sec. 2. Persons already sentenced by judgment,
which has become final and executory, who are waiting to
undergo the death penalty by electrocution or gas poisoning
shall be under the coverage of the provisions of this Act
upon its effectivity. Their sentences shall be automatically
modified for this purpose.
Sec. 3. Implementing Rules. — The Secretary of
Justice in coordination with the Secretary of Health and the
Bureau of Corrections shall, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, promulgate the rules to implement its
provisions.
Sec. 4. Repealing Clause. — All laws,
presidential decrees and issuances, executive orders, rules
and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 5. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette
or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation, whichever comes earlier. Publication shall not be
later than ten (10) days after the approval thereof.
Approved: March 20, 1996
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177
Pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8177
entitled "AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL
INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659", the undersigned, in coordination with the
Secretary of Health and the Director of Corrections,
hereby issues the following Rules to govern the
implementation of said Act:
SECTION 1. Objectives. — These Rules
seek to ensure the orderly and humane execution of the
death penalty by lethal injection.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — As
used in these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires —
a. "Death Convict" or "Convict" shall refer to a prisoner
whose death penalty imposed by a Regional Trial Court is
affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc;
b. "Lethal Injection" refers to sodium thiopenthotal,
pancuronium bromide, potassium chloride and such other
lethal substances as may be specified by the Director of
Corrections that will be administered intravenously into the
body of a convict until said convict is pronounced dead;
c. "Bureau" refers to the Bureau of Corrections;
d. "Director" refers to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections;
e. "Secretary" refers to the Secretary of the
Department of Justice;
SECTION 3. Principles. — The following
principles shall be observed in the implementation of these
Rules:
a. There shall be no discrimination in the treatment of a
death convict on account of race, color, religion, language,
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politics, nationality, social origin, property, birth or other
status.
b. In the execution of a death penalty, the death
convict shall be spared from unnecessary anxiety or distress.
c. The religious beliefs of the death convict shall be
respected.
SECTION 4. Prison Services. — Subject to
the availability of resources, a death convict shall enjoy the
following services and privileges to encourage and enhance
his self-respect and dignity:
a. Medical and Dental;
b. Religious, Guidance and Counseling;
c. Exercise;
d. Visitation; and
e. Mail.
SECTION 5. Confinement. — Whenever
practicable, the death convict shall be confined in an
individual cell in a building that is exclusively assigned for
the use of death convicts. The convict shall be provided with
a bunk, a steel/wooden bed or mat, a pillow or blanket and
mosquito net.
SECTION 6. Religious Services. — Subject
to security conditions, a death convict may be visited by the
priest or minister of his faith and given such available
religious materials which he may require.
SECTION 7. Exercise. — A death convict
shall be allowed to enjoy regular exercise periods under the
supervision of a guard.
SECTION 8. Meal Services. — Meals shall,
whenever practicable, be served individually to a death
convict inside his cell. Mess utensils shall be made of plastic.
After each meal, said utensils shall be collected and
accounted.
SECTION 9. Visitation. — A death convict
shall be allowed to be visited by his immediate family and
reputable friends at regular intervals and during designated
hours subject to security procedures.
SECTION 10. List of Visitors. — A list of persons
who may visit a death convict shall be compiled and
maintained by the prison authorities. The list may include
the members of the convict's immediate family such as his
parents, step parents, foster parents, brothers and sisters,
wife or husband and children. The list may, upon the request
of the convict, include his grandparents, aunts, uncles, in-
laws and cousins. Other visitors may, after investigation, be
included in the list if it will assist in raising the morale of the
convict.
SECTION 11. Interviews of Convicts. —
Television, radio and other interviews by media of a death
convict shall not be allowed.
SECTION 12. Handling of Inmate Mail. — The
sending and receiving of mail by a death convict shall be
controlled to prevent illicit communication. Mail shall be
censored in accordance with existing prison rules.
SECTION 13. Outside Movement. — A death
convict may be allowed to leave his place of confinement
only for diagnosis of a life-threatening situation or treatment
of a serious ailment, if the diagnosis cannot be done or the
treatment provided in the prison hospital.
SECTION 14. Court Appearance. — A death
convict shall not be brought outside the penal institution
where he is confined for appearance or attendance in any
court except when the Supreme Court authorizes, upon
proper application, said outside movement. A judge who
requires the appearance or attendance of a death convict in
any judicial proceeding shall conduct such proceeding within
the premises of the penal institution where the convict is
confined.
SECTION 15. How Lethal Injection is to be
Administered. — The execution of the death sentence by
lethal injection shall be done under the authority of the
Director who shall endeavor to mitigate the sufferings of the
convict prior to and during the execution.

SECTION 16. Notification and Execution of the
Sentence and Assistance to the Convict. — The court shall
designate a working day for the execution of the death
penalty but not the hour thereof. Such designation shall only
be communicated to the convict after sunrise of the day of
the execution, and the execution shall not take place until
after the expiration of at least eight (8) hours following the
notification, but before sunset. During the interval between
the notification and execution, the convict shall, as far as
possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in
order to be attended in his last moments by a priest or
minister of the religion he professes and to consult his
lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with
members of his family or of persons in charge of the
management of his business, of the administration of his
property, or of the care of his descendants.
SECTION 17. Suspension of the Execution of the
Death Sentence. — Execution by lethal injection shall not be
inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon
any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter
case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided
in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
SECTION 18. Place of Execution. — The
execution by lethal injection shall take place in the prison
establishment and space thereat as may be designated by
the Director. Said place shall be closed to public view.
SECTION 19. Execution Procedure. — Details of
the procedure prior to, during and after administering the
lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared
by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among
others, the sequence of events before and after the
execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the
administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of
death; and the removal of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution
shall be limited to authorized prison personnel.
SECTION 20. Quantity and Safekeeping of Drugs
Purchased. — The exact quantities of the drugs needed for
an execution of a death penalty shall be purchased by the
Director pursuant to existing rules and regulations not
earlier than ten (10) days before the scheduled date of
execution. The drugs shall be kept securely at the office of
the superintendent of the prison where the death sentence is
to be executed. All unused drugs shall be inventoried and
disposed of properly under the direct supervision of the
Director.
SECTION 21. Administering Lethal Drugs. — The
injection of the lethal drugs to a death convict shall be made
by a person designated by the Director.
SECTION 22. Identity of Person Administering
Lethal Injection. — The identity of the person who is
designated to administer the lethal injection shall be kept
secret.
SECTION 23. Persons Who May Witness
Execution. — The execution of a death convict shall be
witnessed only by the priest or minister assisting the
offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not
exceeding six, if the convict so desires, by the physician and
the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by
such persons as the Director may authorize.
A person below eighteen (18) years of age shall
not be allowed to witness an execution.
SECTION 24. Expulsion of Witness. — Any
person who makes unnecessary noise or displays rude or
improper behavior during an execution shall be expelled
from the lethal injection chamber.
SECTION 25. Non-Recording of Execution.
— The Director shall not allow the visual, sound or other
recording of the actual execution by media or by any private
person or group.
SECTION 26. Disposition of Corpse of
Convict. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of a
death convict shall, upon the completion of the legal
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proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to
an institution of learning or scientific research first applying
for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided
that such institution shall take charge of the decent burial of
the remains. Otherwise, the Director shall order the burial of
the body of the convict at government expense, granting
permission to be present thereat to the members of the
family of the convict and the friends of the latter. In no case
shall the burial of a death convict be held with pomp.
SECTION 27. Effectivity. — These Rules
shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
APPROVED.
Adopted: April 28, 1997
1987 CONSTITUTION. Section 19.
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
RPC, Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties.
— The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason
of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of
perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date
sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
RPC, Art. 47. In what cases the death
penalty shall not be imposed. — The death penalty
shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be
imposed under existing laws, except in the following
cases:
1. When the guilty person be more than seventy
years of age.
2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by
the Supreme court, all the members thereof are not
unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the
imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of
said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of the
inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme
Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be
signed by all justices of said court, unless some member
or members thereof shall have been disqualified from
taking part in the consideration of the case, in which
even the unanimous vote and signature of only the
remaining justices shall be required.
 Majority vote of the SC is required for the
imposition of the death penalty.
 The 1987 Constitution suspended the
imposition of the death penalty but RA 7659 restored it.
 Death penalty is not imposed in the following
cases:
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

a. When the guilty person is below 18 years of persons in charge of the management of his business, of
age at the time of the commission of the the administration of his property, or of the care of his
crime. descendants.
b. When the guilty person is more than 70 years
of age.  A convict sentenced to death may make a will.
c. When upon appeal or automatic review of the
case by the SC, the vote of 8 members is not Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of
obtained for the imposition of the death the death sentence. — The death sentence shall not
penalty. be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next
following the date of the sentence or while she is
 The death penalty is not excessive, unjust or cruel pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy years of
within the meaning of that word in the Constitution. age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
lingering death. accessory penalties provided in Article 40.
 RA 296 providing that eight justices must concur
in the imposition of death penalty is retroactive.
 Death sentence shall be suspended when the accused
 Review by the SC of the death sentence is
is a:
absolutely necessary.
a. Woman, while pregnant;
 In what crimes is death penalty imposed:
b. Woman, within one year after delivery;
1. Treason
c. Person over 70 years of age;
2. Piracy
d. Convict who becomes insane after final
3. Qualified Piracy
sentence of death has been pronounced.
4. Qualified bribery
5. Parricide
 Art. 47 provides for cases in which death penalty is
6. Murder
not to be imposed. On the other hand, Art. 83 provides
7. Infanticide
for suspension only of the execution of death sentence.
8. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention
 RTC can suspend execution of death sentence.
9. Robbery with homicide
 The records of the case shall be forwarded to the
10. Destructive arson
Office of the President, when the death sentence has
11. Rape with homicide
become final, for possible exercise of the pardoning
12. Plunder
power.
13. Certain violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act
14. Carnapping
Art. 84. Place of execution and persons
who may witness the same. — The execution shall
RPC, Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is
take place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed
to be executed. — The death sentence shall be
to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the
executed with reference to any other and shall consist in
priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by
putting the person under sentence to death by
his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the
electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed
physician and the necessary personnel of the penal
under the authority of the Director of Prisons,
establishment, and by such persons as the Director of
endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings
Prisons may authorize.
of the person under sentence during electrocution as
well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be  The execution shall take place in the penitentiary or
anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution. Bilibid in a space closed to the public view.

PERSONS WHO MAY WITNESS EXECUTION:

 Death sentence shall be executed with preference to
a. priests assisting the offender;
any other penalty.
b. offender‘s lawyers;
 Death sentence is executed by lethal injection.
c. offender‘s relatives, not exceeding six, if so
 The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier
requested;
than 1 year nor later than 18 months after the judgment
d. physician, and
becomes final and executory, without prejudice to the
e. necessary personnel of penal establishment
exercise by the President of his executive clemency
 a person below 18 years of age may not be allowed
powers.
to witness an execution.

Art. 82. Notification and execution of the

RPC, Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of
sentence and assistance to the culprit. — The court
the person executed and its burial. — Unless claimed
shall designate a working day for the execution but not
by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the
the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be
completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the
communicated to the offender before sunrise of said
execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or
day, and the execution shall not take place until after
scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of
the expiration of at least eight hours following the
study and investigation, provided that such institute
notification, but before sunset. During the interval
shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains.
between the notification and the execution, the culprit
Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial
shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such assistance
of the body of the culprit at government expense,
as he may request in order to be attended in his last
granting permission to be present thereat to the
moments by priests or ministers of the religion he
members of the family of the culprit and the friends of
professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to
the latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a
make a will and confer with members of his family or
person sentenced to death be held with pomp.

116

 The burial of the body of a person sentenced to death
should not be held with pomp.
- The purpose of the law is to prevent anyone
from making a hero out of a criminal.
People v. Bon
506 SCRA 168, October 30, 2006
Facts: Bon was convicted of multiple counts of rape
against his minor nieces. The accused was sentenced to
suffer death penalty. The two counts were downgraded
to attempted rape by the Court of Appeals. The sentence
was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the
imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines.
Issue: Now that the application of death penalty is not
allowed, how will the court compute for the proper
penalty for the consummated and attempted rapes
Held: "Death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in
the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of
appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted
rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than
death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua.
Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer
be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals,
but instead, prision mayor.
By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death
sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of
his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his
offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two
(2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of
rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep.
Act No. 9346.
For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we
downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by
the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of
prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period.
Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum.
People v. Henry Arpon
G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011
Facts:Henry Arpon was accused of 8 counts of rape
committed against his niece. The first incident happened
when Henry was only 13 years old and the victim was 8
years old. The others were committed when Henry was
already 17 years old. He even threatened the victim that
he will kill the victim‘s mother if she tells anybody about
the rape.
Held: Henry is exempted from criminal liability for the
1st incident when he was still 13 years old. For the
subsequent acts committed when he was already 17
years old, he already acted with discernment.
R.A. 9344 sec. 6 provides:
A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program.
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A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings…
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
People v. Echegaray
257 SCRA 561 (1996)
Facts: Echegaray was sentenced to death
penalty for raping his 10-year–old daughter. On appeal,
the accused claimed that the penalty imposed by the
court is erroneous under R.A. No. 7659 because he is
neither a father, stepfather nor a grandfather of Rodessa
although he was a confirmed lover of the Rodessa‘s
mother.
Held: Where the accused is a confirmed lover
of the victim‘s mother, he falls squarely within Sec. 11
of RA 7659 under the term ―common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.‖ Also, the fact that the victim
referred to the accused as ―Papa‖ is reason enough to
conclude that the accused is either the father or
stepfather of the victim.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
301 SCRA 96 (1999)
Facts: Upon conviction of Echegaray in People
v. Echegaray, the SC temporarily restrained the
execution of its own decision. The respondents claim
that SC has no more jurisdiction over the case because
judgment has become final and it cannot restrain the
execution of its decision.
Held: The rule on finality of judgment cannot
divest the SC of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce
the same judgment. Notwithstanding the order of
execution and the executory nature thereof on the date
set, the date can be postponed. The power to control the
execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction – supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel the courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. The SC did not restrain the
effectivity of the law enacted by the Congress. It merely
restrained the execution of its judgment to give
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of
supervening events in Congress.
People v. Esparas
260 SCRA 539 (1996)
Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of
RA 6425 as amended by RA 7259 for importing into the
country 20kg of shabu. As the accused remains at large
up to the present time, the issue that confronts the
Court is whether or not it will proceed to automatically
review her death sentence.
Held: The reimposition of the death penalty
revived the procedure by which the Supreme Court
reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of
Court – it remains automatic and continues to be
mandatory and does not depend on the whims of the
death convict and leaves the SC without any option. Any
court decision authorizing the State to take life must be
as error-free as possible. It is not only within the power
of the SC but also it is its duty to review all death
penalty cases.

Sec. 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which
authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant
jumps bail has no application to cases where the death
penalty has been imposed.
People v. Munoz
170 SCRA 107(1989)
Facts: Of the 11 persons who were charged
with murder, only 4 were identified and convicted. They
were held guilty for killing 3 persons.
Held: The advocates of the Masangkay ruling
argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty
and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the
remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the
medium. However, a reading of the Constitution will
readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of death penalty. It
merely states that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if
already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The Constitution does not change the periods
of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the RPC, except
only in so far as it prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range
of the medium and minimum penalties remains
unchanged. The problem is an event is addressed not to
this Court but to the Congress.
Abolition of the Death Penalty
Republic Act No. 9346
People v. Bon (2006)
Held: Yet in truth, there is no material
difference between ―imposition‖ and ―application,‖ for
both terms embody the operation in law of the death
penalty. Since Article 71 denominates ―death‖ as an
element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no
question that the operation of Article 71 involves the
actual application of the death penalty as a means of
determining the extent which a person‘s liberty is to be
deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars
the application of the death penalty, as well as expressly
repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the
application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily
extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71.
The court cannot find basis to conclude that
Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative
effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the
other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin
us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not
swaddled in the same restraints appreciated by Muñoz
on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress
empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the
imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to
do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same
realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed
itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of
the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines
has never been more secure than at any time in our
political history as a nation.
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AFFLICTIVE PENALTIES
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — Any person
sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be
pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty years,
unless such person by reason of his conduct or some
other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief
Executive as unworthy of pardon.
Reclusion temporal. — The penalty of
reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one
day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary
disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of
prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be
from six years and one day to twelve years, except
when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be
that of the principal penalty.
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal; Their accessory penalties. — The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be,
and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory
penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry
with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and
that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
RECLUSION PERPETUA
Duration: 20 years and 1 day to 40 years
Accessory Penalties:
a. Civil interdiction for life or during the period of
the sentence as the case may be.
b. Perpetual Absolute Disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
People v. Gatward
267 SCRA 785 (1997)
Facts: The accused was convicted of violating
the Dangerous Drugs Act for unlawfully importing into
the Philippines heroin. The trial court sentenced the
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 35
years of reclusion perpetua there being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance shown to have attended in
the commission of the crime.
Held: As amended by RA 7659, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is now accorded a defined duration
ranging from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. The Court
held that in spite of the amendment putting the duration
of RP, it should remain as an indivisible penalty since
there was never an intent on the part of Congress to
reclassify it into a divisible penalty. The maximum
duration of reclusion perpetua is not and has never been
30 years which is merely the number of ears which the
convict must serve in order to be eligible for pardon or
for the application of the 3-fold rule.

People v. Ramirez
356 SCRA 595 (2001)
Facts: Bañez invited Jojo to a drinking spree in
a nearby store. They sat side by side a bench outside
the store while exchanging pleasantries and drink.
Ramirez suddenly came in front of them. Ramirez
ordered beer then he calmly approached and stabbed
Jojo which caused the latter‘s death. The trial court
sentenced appellant "to suffer imprisonment of 40 years
reclusion perpetua."
Held: The SC disagrees with the trial court in
sentencing appellant "to suffer imprisonment of forty
(40) years reclusion perpetua." There was no
justification or need for the trial court to specify the
length of imprisonment, because reclusion perpetua is
an indivisible penalty. The significance of this
fundamental principle was laid down by the Court in
People v. Diquit. "Since reclusion perpetua is an
indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or
maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code) Reclusion
Perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person
sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing
the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless by reason of his
conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be
considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon
(Art. 27, Revised Penal Code)."
People v. Ballabare
262 SCRA 350 (1996)
Held: The trial court erred in imposing
the penalty of life imprisonment for violation of PD 1866.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form is punished by the penalty of death.
Since the offense was committed on Sep. 16, 1990, at a
time when the imposition of the death penalty was
prohibited, the penalty next lower in degree which is
reclusion perpetua should be imposed. This is not
equivalent to life imprisonment. While life imprisonment
may appear to be the English translation of reclusion
perpetua, in reality, it goes deeper than that.
Reclusion Perpetua as indivisible penalty
LIFE IMPRISONMENT RECLUSION PERPETUA
Imposed for serious Prescribed under the RPC
offenses penalized by
special laws
Does not carry with it Carries with it accessory
accessory penalties penalties
Does not appear to have Entails imprisonment for
any definite extent or at least 30 years after
duration which the convict becomes
eligible for pardon
although the maximum
period shall in no case
exceed 40 years
RECLUSION TEMPORAL
Duration: 12 years and 1 day to 20 years
Accessory Penalties:
a. Civil interdiction for life or during the period of
the sentence as the case may be.
b. Perpetual Absolute Disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
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PRISION MAYOR
Duration: 6 years and 1 day to 12 years
Accessory Penalties:
a. Temporary Absolute Disqualification
b. Perpetual Special Disqualification from the
right to suffrage which the offender shall suffer
although pardoned as to the principal penalty
unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
CORRECCIONAL PENALTIES
Art. 27 (4). Prision correccional, suspension, and
destierro. — The duration of the penalties of prision
correccional, suspension and destierro shall be from six
months and one day to six years, except when
suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which
case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty
of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day
to six months.
Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no
property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the
paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be
subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of
one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following
rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision
correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under
confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence,
and in no case shall it continue for more than one year,
and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against
the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only
a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six
months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a
grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen
days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal imposed is higher than
prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be
executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such
penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the
period of time established in the preceding rules, shall
continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of
which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the
convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency
shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial
circumstances should improve. (As amended by R.A. No.
5465, April 21, 1969).
Art. 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory
penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in the article although pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. —
The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of
suspension of the right too hold office and the right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence.
PRISION CORRECCIONAL
Duration: 6 months and 1 day to 6 years
Accessory Penalties:
a. Suspension from public office
b. Suspension from the right to follow a
profession or calling
c. Perpetual Special Disqualification fro the right
of suffrage, if the duration of the imprisonment
shall exceed 18 months
ARRESTO MAYOR
Duration: 1 month and 1 day to 6 months
Accessory Penalties:
a. Suspension of right to hold office
b. Suspension of the right of suffrage during the
term of the sentence.
LIGHT PENALTIES
Art. 27 (6). Arresto menor. — The duration
of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to
thirty days.
Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict
has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned
in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall
be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of
one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following
rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision
correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under
confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence,
and in no case shall it continue for more than one year,
and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against
the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only
a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six
months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a
grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen
days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal imposed is higher than
prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be
executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such
penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the
period of time established in the preceding rules, shall
continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of
which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the
convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency
shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial
circumstances should improve. (As amended by R.A. No.
5465, April 21, 1969).
Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The
penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension
of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage
during the term of the sentence.
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ARRESTO MENOR
Duration: 1 day to 30 days
Accessory Penalties:
a. Suspension of right to hold office
b. Suspension of the right of suffrage during the
term of the sentence.
PUBLIC CENSURE
 Censure, being a penalty is not proper in acquittal.
PENALTIES COMMON TO AFFLICTIVE,
CORRECCIONAL AND LIGHT PENALTIES
FINE
Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or
light penalty. — A fine, whether imposed as a single of
as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an
afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a
correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos
but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it
less than 200 pesos.
 This article merely classifies fine and has nothing to do
with the definition of light felony.
Fine is:
1. Afflictive – over P6,000
2. Correctional – P200 to P6,000
3. Light Penalty – less than P200
Art. 66. Imposition of fines. — In imposing
fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law; in fixing the amount in each case
attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the
wealth or means of the culprit.
 The court can fix any amount of the fine within the
limits established by law.
 The court must consider:
a. The mitigating and aggravating circumstances; and
b. More particularly, the wealth or means of the
culprit.
 When the law does not fix the minimum of the fine,
the determination of the amount of the fine to be
imposed upon the culprit is left to the sound discretion
of the court, provided it shall not exceed the maximum
authorized by law.
 Fines are not divided into 3 equal portions.
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE
Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace.
— It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give
bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient
sureties who shall undertake that such person will not
commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in
case such offense be committed they will pay the
amount determined by the court in the judgment, or
otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the
clerk of the court to guarantee said undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its
discretion, the period of duration of the bond.

Should the person sentenced fail to give the
bond as required he shall be detained for a period which
shall in no case exceed six months, is he shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall
not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony.
 The offender must present 2 sufficient
sureties who shall undertake that the offender will not
commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in
case such offense be committed they will pay the
amount determined by the court; or
 The offender must deposit such amount with
the clerk of court to guarantee said undertaking; or
 The offender may be detained, if he cannot
give the bond, for a period not to exceed 6 months if
prosecuted for grave or less grave felony, or for a period
not to exceed 30 days, if for a light felony.
 Bond to keep the peace is different from bail bon which
is posted for the provisional release of a person arrested
for or accused of a crime.
D. ACCESSORY PENALTIES
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties
of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for
public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and
employments which the offender may have held even if
conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular office or to be elected to such
office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public
employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such
disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or
other pension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary special disqualification. — The penalties
of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for
public office, profession or calling shall produce the
following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment,
profession or calling affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar
offices or employments either perpetually or during the
term of the sentence according to the extent of such
disqualification.
Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the exercise
of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or
during the term of the sentence, according to the nature
of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such
office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to
hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification.
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Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from
any public office, profession or calling, or the right
of suffrage. — The suspension from public office,
profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such
office or exercising such profession or calling or right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence.
The person suspended from holding public office shall
not hold another having similar functions during the
period of his suspension.
Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall
deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either
as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal; Their accessory penalties. — The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be,
and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. —
The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of
temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage which
the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory
penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in the article although pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The
penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension
of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during
the term of the sentence.
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds
or instruments of the crime. — Every penalty
imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with
it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government,
unless they be property of a third person not liable for
the offense, but those articles which are not subject of
lawful commerce shall be destroyed.

PERPETUAL OR TEMPORARY ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION
Effects:
a. Deprivation of any public office or employment
f offender
b. Deprivation of the right to vote in any election
or to be voted upon
c. Loss of rights to retirement pay or pension
 All these effects last during the lifetime of the convict
and even after the service of the sentence except as
regards paragraphs 2 and 3 of the above in connection
with temporary absolute disqualification.
PERPETUAL OR TEMPORARY SPECIAL
DISQUALIFICATION
Effects:
For public office, profession or calling:
a. Deprivation of the office, employment, profession
or calling affected;
b. Disqualification for holding similar offices or
employments during the period of disqualification;
For the exercise of right to suffrage:
c. Deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected in
an office;
d. Cannot hold any public office during the period of
disqualification
 The penalty for disqualification if imposed as an
accessory penalty is imposed for PROTECTION and NOT
for the withholding of a privilege.
 Temporary disqualification or suspension if imposed as
an accessory penalty, the duration is the same as that of
the principal penalty.
SUSPENSION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE, THE RIGHT
TO VOTE AND BE VOTED FOR, THE RIGHT TO
PRACTICE A PROFESSION OR CALLING
Effects:
a. Disqualification from holding such office or the
exercise of such profession or right of suffrage
during the term of the sentence;
b. Cannot hold another office having similar
functions during the period of suspension.
CIVIL INTERDICTION
Effects:
Deprivation of the following rights:
1) Parental authority
2) Guardianship over the ward
3) Marital authority
4) Right to manage property and to dispose of the
same by acts inter vivos
 Civil interdiction is an accessory penalty to the
following principal penalties:
a) Death if commuted to life imprisonment;
b) Reclusion perpetua
c) Reclusion temporal
INDEMNIFICATION OR CONFISCATION OF
INSTRUMENTS ORPROCEES OF THEOFFENSE
 This is included in every penalty for the commission of
the crime.
 The confiscation is in favor of the government.
 Property of a third person not liable for the offense is
not subject to confiscation.
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 If the trial court did not order any confiscation of the
proceeds of the crime, the government cannot appeal
from the confiscation as that would increase the penalty
already imposed.
PAYMENT OF COSTS
Includes:
a. Fees, and
b. Indemnities, in the course of judicial proceedings.
 Costs may be fixed amounts already determined by
law or regulations or amounts subject to a schedule.
 If the accused is convicted; costs may be charged
against him. If he is acquitted, costs are de officio,
meaning each party bears his own expense.
E. MEASURES NOT CONSIDERED PENALTY
RPC, Art. 24. Measures of prevention or
safety which are nor considered penalties. — The
following shall not be considered as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of
accused persons, as well as their detention by reason of
insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their
confinement in a hospital.
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the
institutions mentioned in Article 80 and for the purposes
specified therein.
3. Suspension from the employment of public
office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings.
4. Fines and other corrective measures which,
in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary
powers, superior officials may impose upon their
subordinates.
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations
which the civil laws may establish in penal form.
 They are not penalties because they are not imposed
as a result of judicial proceedings. Those mentioned in
par. 3 and 4 are merely preventive measures before
conviction of offenders.
 The commitment of a minor mentioned in par. 2 is not
a penalty because it is not imposed by the court in a
judgment of conviction. The imposition of the sentence
in such case is suspended.
 The succeeding provisions are some examples of
deprivation of rights established in penal form:
Family Code, Art. 228. Parental authority
terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Family Code, Art. 229. Unless subsequently
revived by a final judgment, parental authority also
terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment
of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court
divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or
incapacity of the person exercising parental authority.
(327a)

F. APPLICATION AND COMPUTATION
OF PENALTIES
Art. 28. Computation of penalties. — If the
offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of
the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day
on which the judgment of conviction shall have become
final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the
duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of
liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender
is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the
enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other
penalties shall be computed only from the day on which
the defendant commences to serve his sentence.
Rules for the computation of penalties:
1. WHEN THE OFFENDER IS IN PRISON – the duration
of temporary penalties is from the day on which the
judgment of conviction becomes final.
2. WHEN THE OFFENDER IS NOT IN PRISON – the
duration of penalty consisting in deprivation of
liberty, is from the day that the offender is placed
at the disposal of judicial authorities for the
enforcement of the penalty.
3. THE DURATION OF OTHER PENALTIES – the
duration is from the day on which the offender
commences to serve his sentence
Examples of temporary penalties:
1. Temporary absolute disqualification
2. Temporary special disqualification
3. Suspension
 If offender is under detention, as when he is
undergoing preventive imprisonment, Rule No. 1
applies.
 If not under detention, because the offender has been
released on bail, Rule No. 3 applies.
Examples of penalties consisting in deprivation of
liberty:
1. Imprisonment
2. Destierro
 When the offender is not in prison, Rule No. 2 applies.
 If the offender is undergoing preventive
imprisonment, Rule No. 3 applies but the offender is
entitled to a deduction of full time or 4/5 of the time of
his detention.
Art. 29. Period of preventive
imprisonment deducted from term of
imprisonment. — Offenders who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service
of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty,
with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner
agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists or have been
convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;
and
2. When upon being summoned for the
execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
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convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of
his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment. (As amended
by R.A. No. 6127, June 17, 1970).
Whenever an accused has undergone
preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more
than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense
charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is
not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof
or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under
review. In case the maximum penalty to which the
accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment. (As amended by E.O. No. 214, July 10,
1988).
 The accused undergoes preventive imprisonment
when the offense charged is nonbailable, or even if
bailable, he cannot furnish the required bail.
 The convict is to be released immediately if the
penalty imposed after trial is less than the full time or
four-fifths of the time of the preventive imprisonment.
 The accused shall be released immediately whenever
he has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period
equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment for the offense charged.
Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon
principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law
for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon
the principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a
felony is general terms, it shall be understood as
applicable to the consummated felony.
GENERAL RULE:
The penalty prescribed by law in general terms shall be
imposed:
a. Upon the principals
b. For consummated felony
EXCEPTION:
The exception is when the penalty to be
imposed upon the principal in frustrated or attempted
felony is fixed by law.
 Whenever it is believed that the penalty lower by one
or two degrees corresponding to said acts of execution is
not in proportion to the wrong done, the law fixes a
distinct penalty for the principal in frustrated or
attempted felony.
 The graduation of penalties by degrees refers to
STAGES OF EXECUTION (consummated, frustrated or
attempted) and to the DEGREE OF THE CRIMINAL
PARTICIPATION OF THE OFFENDER (whether as
principal, accomplice or accessory)
 The division of a divisible penalty into three periods,
as maximum, medium and minimum, refers to the
proper period of the penalty which should be imposed
when aggravating or mitigating circumstances attend
the commission of the crime.
People v. Formigones
87 Phil 658 (1950)
Facts: The accused without a previous quarrel
or provocation took his bolo and stabbed his wife in the
back resulting to the latter‘s death. The accused was
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Held: The penalty applicable for parricide
under Art. 246 of the RPC is composed only of 2
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death.
Although the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, Art. 63 of the RPC should
be applied. The said article provides that when the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES AND ACCESSORIES IN
CONSUMMATED, FRUSTRATED AND ATTEMPTED
FELONIES.
Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon
principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law
for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon
the principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is
general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the
consummated felony.
Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon
principals of a frustrated crime. — The penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal
in a frustrated felony.
Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of
attempted crimes. — A penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.
Art. 52. Penalty to be imposed upon
accomplices in consummated crime. — The penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in
the commission of a consummated felony.
Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon
accessories to the commission of a consummated
felony. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a
consummated felony.
Art. 54. Penalty to imposed upon
accomplices in a frustrated crime. — The penalty
next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the
frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices
in the commission of a frustrated felony.
Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon
accessories of a frustrated crime. — The penalty
lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories
to the commission of a frustrated felony.
Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon
accomplices in an attempted crime. — The penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an
attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the
accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.
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Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon
accessories of an attempted crime. — The penalty
lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories
to the attempt to commit a felony.
DIAGRAM OF THE APPLICATION OF ARTS. 50-57:
CONSUMMATED FRUSTRATED ATTEMPTED
PRINCIPALS 0 1 2
ACCOMPLICES 1 2 3
ACCESSORIES 2 3 4
―0‖ represents the penalty prescribed by law in defining
a crime, which is to be imposed n the PRINCIPAL in a
CONSUMMATED OFFENSE, in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 46. The other figures represent the
degrees to which the penalty must be lowered, to meet
the different situation anticipated by law.
EXCEPTIONS: Arts. 50 to 57 shall not apply to cases
where the law expressly prescribes the penalty for
frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon
accomplices or accessories.
BASES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT
OF PENALTY:
1. The stage reached by the crime in its
development (either attempted, frustrated or
consummated)
2. The participation therein of the person liable.
3. The aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended the commission of the crime.
 A DEGREE is one entire penalty, one whole
penalty or one unit of the penalties enumerated in the
graduated scales provided for in Art. 71. Each of the
penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal,
prision mayor, etc., enumerated in the graduated scales
of Art. 71 is a degree.
 When there is a mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the penalty is lowered or increased by
PERIOD only, except when the penalty is divisible and
there are two or more mitigating and without
aggravating circumstances, in which case the penalty is
lowered by degree.
 A PERIOD is one of the three equal portions
called the minimum, medium and maximum of a
divisible penalty.
Art. 60. Exception to the rules established
in Articles 50 to 57. — The provisions contained in
Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be
applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes
the penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted
felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or
accessories.

 Arts. 50 to 57 shall not apply to cases where the law
expressly prescribes the penalty for frustrated or
attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or
accessories.
GENERAL RULE: An accomplice is punished by a
penalty one degree lower than the penalty imposed
upon the principal.
EXCEPTIONS:
a. The ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers
and any person who by abuse of authority or
confidential relationship, shall cooperate as
accomplices in the crimes of rape, acts of
lasciviousness, seduction, corruption of minors,
white slate trade or abduction. (Art. 346)
b. One who furnished the place for the perpetration
of the crime of slight illegal detention. (Art. 268)
GENERAL RULE: An accessory is punished by a penalty
two degrees lower than the penalty imposed upon the
principal.
EXCEPTION: When accessory is punished as principal –
knowingly concealing certain evil practices is ordinarily
an act of the accessory, but in Art. 142, such act is
punished as the act of the principal.
When accessories are punished with a penalty
one degree lower:
a. Knowingly using counterfeited seal or forged
signature or stamp of the President (Art. 162).
b. Illegal possession and use of a false treasury
or bank note (Art. 168).
c. Using falsified document (Art. 173 par.3 )
d. Using falsified dispatch (Art. 173 par. 2)
Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. —
For the purpose of graduating the penalties which,
according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57,
inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons
guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted
felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following
rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony
is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in
degrees shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale
prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is
composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more
divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale.
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is
composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the
maximum period of another divisible penalty, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the
medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible
penalty and the maximum periods of the proper divisible
penalty and the maximum period of that immediately
following in said respective graduated scale.
4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is
composed of several periods, corresponding to different
divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall
be composed of the period immediately following the
minimum prescribed and of the two next following,
which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if
possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately
following in the above mentioned respective graduated
scale.
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5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a
crime in some manner not especially provided for in the
four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy,
shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty
as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to
commit the same, and upon accomplices and
accessories.
 This article provides for the rules to be observed in
lowering the penalty by one or two degrees.
a. For the principal in frustrated felony – one degree
lower;
b. For the principal in attempted felony – two
degrees lower;
c. For the accomplice in consummated felony – one
degree lower; and
d. For the accessory in consummated felony – two
degrees lower.
 The rules provided for in Art. 61 should also apply
in determining the MINIMUM of the indeterminate
penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
MINIMUM of the indeterminate penalty is within the
range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
the RPC for the offense.
 Those rules also apply in lowering the penalty by
one or two degrees by reason of the presence of
privileged mitigating circumstance (Arts. 68 and 69), or
when the penalty is divisible and there are two or more
mitigating circumstances (generic) and no aggravating
circumstance (Art. 64).
 The lower penalty shall be taken from the
graduated scale in Art. 71.
The INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES are:
a. death
b. reclusion perpetua
c. public censure
The DIVISIBLE PENALTIES are:
a. reclusion temporal
b. prision mayor
c. prision correccional
d. arresto mayor
e. destierro
f. arresto menor
* the divisible penalties are divided into three periods:
MINIMUM, MEDIUM AND THE MAXIMUM
RULES:
FIRST RULE:
When the penalty is single and indivisible.
Ex. reclusion perpetua
 The penalty immediately following it is
reclusion temporal. Thus, reclusion temporal is the
penalty next lower in degree.
SECOND RULE:
When the penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties
Ex. reclusion perpetua to death
 The penalty immediately following
the lesser of the penalties, which is reclusion
perpetua, is reclusion temporal.
When the penalty is composed of one or more divisible
penalties to be imposed to their full extent
Ex. prision correccional to prision mayor
 The penalty immediately following
the lesser of the penalties of prision
correccional to prision mayor is arresto mayor.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
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THIRD RULE: 2. If the penalty prescribed b the Code consists in 2

When the penalty is composed of two indivisible periods, the penalty next lower in degree is the
penalties and the maximum period of a divisible penalty penalty consisting in 2 periods down in the scale.
Ex. reclusion temporal in its MAXIMUM period 3. If the penalty prescribed by the Code consists in
to death only 1 period, the penalty next lower in degree is
Death the next period down in the scale.
Reclusion Penalty for the principal in
Perpetua consummated murder
Maximum
Reclusion Medium Penalty for accomplice; or EFFECTS OF MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING
Temporal Minimum for principal in frustrated CIRCUMSTANCES
Maximum murder
Prision Medium Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating
Mayor Minimum or aggravating circumstances and of habitual
delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating
When the penalty is composed of one indivisible penalty circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken
and the maximum period of a divisible penalty into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing
Ex. Reclusion temporal in its MAXIMUM period the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
to Reclusion perpetua 1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves
 The same rule shall be observed in lowering constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which
the penalty by one or two degrees. are included by the law in defining a crime and
prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into
FOURTH RULE: account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
When the penalty is composed of several periods 2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any
- This rule contemplates a penalty composed of aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such
at least 3 periods. The several periods must correspond a degree that it must of necessity accompany the
to different divisible penalties. commission thereof.
Ex. Prision Mayor in its MEDIUM period to 3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
Reclusion temporal in its MINIMUM period. arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from
his private relations with the offended party, or from any
Reclusion Maximum other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or
temporal Medium mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and
accessories as to whom such circumstances are
Minimum Penalty for the principal in
attendant.
Prision Maximum the consummated felony
4. The circumstances which consist in the material
Mayor Medium
execution of the act, or in the means employed to
Minimum Penalty for the accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the
Prision Maximum accomplice; or principal in liability of those persons only who had knowledge of
Correccional Medium frustrated felony them at the time of the execution of the act or their
Minimum cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following
FIFTH RULE: effects:
When the penalty has two periods (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be
Ex. Prision correccional in its MINIMUM and sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last
MEDIUM periods crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
Prision Maximum maximum periods;
correccional Medium The penalty prescribed for (b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be
Minimum the felony sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
Maximum which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
Arresto Mayor Medium The penalty next lower prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
Minimum (c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit
shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last
When the penalty has one period crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
- If the penalty is any one of the three periods penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
of a divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
shall be that period next following the given penalty. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the
Ex. Prision Mayor in its MAXIMUM period total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the
 The penalty immediately inferior is prision offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed
mayor in its MEDIUM period. 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be
SIMPLIFIED RULES: deemed to be habitual delinquent, if within a period of
The rules prescribed in pars. 4 and 5 of Art. 61 ten years from the date of his release or last conviction
may be simplified as follows: of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
1. If the penalty prescribed by the Code consists in 3 robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of
periods, corresponding to different divisible any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
penalties, the penalty next lower in degree is the
penalty consisting in the 3 periods down in the
scale.

126

What are the effects of the attendance of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances?
a. Aggravating circumstances which are not
considered for the purpose of increasing the
penalty:
1. Those which in themselves constitute a
crime especially punishable by law.
2. Those included by law in defining the
crime.
3. Those inherent in the crime but of
necessity they accompany the commission
thereof.
b. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the
offender to whom such are attendant. Those
arising from:
1. Moral attributes of the offender
2. His private relations with the offended
party
3. Any other personal cause
c. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
affect the offenders only who had knowledge of
them at the time of the execution of the act or
their cooperation therein. Those which consist:
1. In the material execution of the act
- will not affect all the offenders but only
those to whom such act are attendant
2. Means to accomplish the crime
- will affect only those offenders who have
knowledge of the same at the time of the
act of execution or their cooperation
therein
What are the legal effects of habitual delinquency?
1) Third conviction
- the culprit is sentenced to the penalty for the
crime committed and to the additional penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum period.
2) Fourth conviction
- the penalty is that provided by law for the
last crime and the additional penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
3) Fifth or additional conviction
- the penalty is that provided by law for the
last crime and the additional penalty of prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
Note:
 In no case shall the total of the 2 penalties
imposed upon the offender exceed 30 years.
 The law does not apply to crimes described in
Art. 155
 The imposition of the additional penalty on
habitual delinquents is CONSTITUTIONAL
because such law is neither an EX POST FACTO
LAW nor an additional punishment for future
crimes. It is simply a punishment on future
crimes on account of the criminal propensities of
the accused.
 The imposition of such additional penalties is
mandatory and is not discretionary.
 Habitual delinquency applies at any stage of the
execution because subjectively, the offender
reveals the same degree of depravity or
perversity as the one who commits a
consummated crime.
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 It applies to all participants because it reveals
persistence in them of the inclination to
wrongdoing and of the perversity of character
that led them to commit the previous crime.
Cases where attending aggravating or mitigating
circumstances are not considered in the imposition
of penalties
- Penalty that is single and indivisible
- Felonies through negligence
- When the penalty is a fine
- When the penalty is prescribed by a special law.
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is
present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another
in consideration of their number and importance, for the
purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the
preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.
Imposable penalty:
It is the penalty that will be imposed after applying the
RPC and the ISL.
Prescribed penalty:
It is the penalty prescribed by the RPC after considering
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Rules for the application of indivisible penalties:
1. Penalty is single and indivisible
- The penalty shall be applied regardless of the
presence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Ex. reclusion perpetua or death
2. Penalty is composed of 2 indivisible
penalties:
a. One aggravating circumstance present
- HIGHER penalty
b. No mitigating circumstances present
- LESSER penalty
c. Some mitigating circumstances present and
no aggravating
- LESSER penalty
d. Mitigating and aggravating circumstances
offset each other
- Basis of penalty: number and
importance.

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties
which contain three periods. — In cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of
three different penalties, each one of which forms a
period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76
and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the
penalty the following rules, according to whether there
are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty
prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present
in the commission of the act, they shall impose the
penalty in its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in
the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty
in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably
offset those of one class against the other according to
their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are
present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the
aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose
a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its
maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall
determine the extent of the penalty according to the
number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the
evil produced by the crime.
Rules for the application of DIVISIBLE PENALTIES
a. No aggravating and No mitigating
- MEDIUM PERIOD
b. One mitigating
- MINIMUM PERIOD
c. One aggravating (any number cannot exceed the
penalty provided by law in its maximum period)
- MAXIMUM PERIOD
d. Mitigating and aggravating circumstances
present
- to offset each other according to relative
weight
e. 2 or more mitigating and no aggravating
- one degree lower (has the effect of a
privileged mitigating circumstance)
NOTE: Art. 64 does not apply to:
- indivisible penalties
- penalties prescribed by special laws
- fines
- crimes committed by negligence
Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all
the requisites of exemption of the fourth
circumstance of Article 12 are present.— When all
the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of
Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal liability
are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have
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been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
Penalty to be imposed if the requisites of accident
(Art. 12 par 4) are not all present:
a. GRAVE FELONY
- arresto mayor maximum period to
prision correccional minimum period
b. LESS GRAVE FELONY
- arresto mayor minimum period and
medium period
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime
committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to
justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in
the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12,
provided that the majority of such conditions be present.
The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which
may be deemed proper, in view of the number and
nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed
is not wholly excusable
- One or two degrees lower if the majority of the
conditions for justification or exemption in the cases
provided in Arts. 11 and 12 are present.
People v. Campuhan (supra)
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2)
degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for
the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor
below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is
reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its
periods.
Lacanilao v. CA
162 SCRA 563 (1988)
Facts: The CFI found the accused, a policeman,
guilty of homicide. On appeal before the CA, the CA
found that the accused acted in the performance of a
duty but that the shooting of the victim was not the
necessary consequence of the due performance thereof,
therefore crediting to him the mitigating circumstance
consisting of the incomplete justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty. The CA lowered the penalty merely
by one period applying Art. 64 (2) appreciating
incomplete fulfillment of duty as a mere generic
mitigating circumstance lowering the penalty to
minimum period.
Held: CA erred because incomplete fulfillment
of duty is a privileged mitigating circumstance which not
only cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but
also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than
that prescribed b law. The governing provision is Art. 69
of the RPC.

People v. Patricio
46 Phil 875 (1923)
Facts: Bonifacio and his wife Antonia had an unhappy
relationship. Antonia allegedly had been maintaining
illicit relations with Jose, a nephew. Antonia conspired
with her mother Antonina to kill Bonifacio and even tried
to hire Marcelo, a laborer to participate their plan for
P20. One evening, while Bonifacio was sleeping, Antonia
strangled Bonifacio to death while Antonina and Jose
held the feet and the head of the victim. Bonifacio‘s
body was buried in an improvised grave.
Held: Antonia committed parricide with attended with
the aggravating circumstances of premeditation,
treachery, nocturnity and abuse of superior strength.
Antonina and Jose are guilty of murder attended with
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
US v. Ancheta
15 Phil. 470 (1910)
Facts: Rufino induced 4 Igorots to kill his uncle Tiburcio
to take his carabo, clothing and other property. Rufino
was a principal by induction of the crime of robbery with
homicide and was sentenced to suffer cadena perpetua.
Held: Whether or not the accused intended to gain or
did gain financially or otherwise by the robbery is wholly
immaterial. The mere fact of inducing the commission of
the crime makes him a principal. (Supreme court of
Spain, judgment of October 20, 1881.) The crime was
consummated and completed when the persons induced
committed the crime with the intent to gain for
themselves. The instant the crime became complete as
to them, that instant the accused became a principal. No
further participation in the crime was necessary.
The aggravating or extenuating circumstances that
consist in the moral condition of the delinquent, in his
private relations with the injured party, or in any other
personal cause, shall serve to aggravate or diminish the
liability of only the principals, accomplices, or
accessories who may be affected thereby.
"The circumstances attending the commission of a crime
either relate to the persons participating in the same, or
to its material execution, or to the means employed. The
former do not affect all the participants in the crime, but
only those to whom they particularly apply; the latter
have a direct bearing upon the criminal liability of all the
defendants who had knowledge thereof at the time of
the commission of the crime, or of their cooperation
therein.
In this case, Rufino is guilty of robbery with homicide as
there was evident premeditation and nocturnity, the
accused is sentenced to death.
People v. Takbobo
G.R. No. 102984, June 30, 1993
Facts:Ruben Takbobob claims that he caught his wife in
sexual congress with their neighbor. Ruben hacked and
killed his wife but claims the mitigating circumstances of
passion or obfuscation, voluntary surrender and plea of
guilt. The trial court only appreciated voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty and convicted him of
parricide.
Issue: What is the proper penalty for parricide when
there are two mitigating circumstances.
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Held: Parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Reclusion perpetua and death are two indivisible
penalties. Article 63 applies in this case.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:
3. When the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating
circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
As there was a mitigating circumstance, the lower
penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty to be
imposed.
G. SPECIAL RULES
COMPLEX CRIMES
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. —
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period.
 Art. 48 requires the commission of at least 2
crimes. But the two or more GRAVE or LESS GRAVE
felonies must be the result of a SINGLE ACT, or an
offense must be a NECESSARY MEANS FOR
COMMITTING the other.
 In complex crimes, although two or more
crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one
crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience
of the offender. The offender has only one criminal
intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the evil intent of the
offender is only one.
TWO KINDS OF COMPLEX CRIMES
1. COMPOUND CRIME - When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies
2. COMPLEX CRIME PROPER - When an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other.
COMPOUND CRIME
REQUISITES:
1. That only a SINGLE ACT is performed by
the offender
2. That the single acts produces (a) 2 or
more grave felonies, or (b) one or more
grave and one or more less grave felonies,
or (c) two or more less grave felonies
 Light felonies produced by the same act should be
treated and punished as separate offenses or may be
absorbed by the grave felony.
Ex. When the crime is committed by force or
violence, slight physical injuries are absorbed.
 Example of compound crime:
- Where the victim was killed while discharging
his duty as barangay captain to protect life and property
and enforce law and order in his barrio, the crime is a
complex crime of homicide with assault upon a person in
authority.

 When in obedience to an order several accused
simultaneously shot many persons, without evidence
how many each killed, there is only a single offense,
there being a single criminal impulse.
COMPLEX CRIME PROPER
REQUISITES:
1. That at least two offenses are committed
2. That one or some of the offenses must be
necessary to commit the other
3. That both or all the offenses must be
punished under the same statute.
 The phrase ―necessary means‖ does not mean
―indispensable means‖
 In complex crime, when the offender executes various
acts, he must have a single purpose.
 Subsequent acts of intercourse, after forcible
abduction with rape, are separate acts of rape.
 Not complex crime when trespass to dwelling is a
direct means to commit a grave offense.
 No complex crime, when one offense is committed to
conceal the other.
 When the offender had in his possession the funds
which he misappropriated, the falsification of a public or
official document involving said offense is a separate
offense.
 No complex crime where one of the offense is
penalized by a special law.
 There is no complex crime of rebellion with murder,
arson, robbery, or other common crimes.
 When two crimes produced by a single act are
respectively within the exclusive jurisdiction of two
courts of different jurisdiction, the court of higher
jurisdiction shall try the complex crime.
 The penalty for complex crime is the penalty for the
most serious crime, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
 When two felonies constituting a complex crime are
punishable by imprisonment and fine, respectively, only
the penalty of imprisonment should be imposed.
 Art. 48 applies only to cases where the Code does not
provide a definite specific penalty for a complex crime.
 One information should be filed when a complex crime
is committed.
 When a complex crime is charged and one offense is
not proven, the accused can be convicted of the other.
 Art. 48 does not apply when the law provides one
single penalty for special complex crimes.
PLURALITY OF CRIMES
- consists in the successive execution by the
same individual of different criminal acts upon any of
which no conviction has yet been declared.
KINDS OF PLURALITY OF CRIMES
1. FORMAL OR IDEAL PLURALITY
- There is but one criminal liability in this kind
of plurality.
- divided into 3 groups:
a. When the offender commits an of the
complex crimes defined in Art. 48 of the Code.
b. When the law specifically fixes a single
penalty for 2 or more offenses committed.
c. When the offender commits continued
crimes.
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2. REAL OR MATERIAL PLURALITY
- There are different crimes in law as well as in
the conscience of the offender. In such cases, the
offender shall be punished for each and ever offense
that he committed.
- Ex. A stabbed B. Then, A also stabbed C.
There are two crimes committed.
PLURALITY OF CRIMES RECIDIVISM
There is no conviction of There must be conviction
any of the crimes by final judgment of the
committed. first or prior offense.
CONTINUED CRIME
1. A single crime consisting of a series of acts but all
arising from one criminal resolution.
2. A continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on
foot by a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long a time it may
occupy.
Ex. a collector of a commercial firm
misappropriates for his personal use several
amounts collected by him from different persons.
One crime only because the different appropriations
are but the different moments during which once
criminal resolution arises and a single defraudation
develops.
 A continued crime is not a complex crime.
 A continued crime is different from a TRANSITORY
CRIME which is also called a MOVING CRIME.
REAL OR MATERIAL CONTINUED CRIME
PLURALITY
There is a series of acts performed by the offender.
Each act performed b the The different acts
offender constitutes a constitute only one crime
separate crime because because all of the acts
each act is generated by a performed arise from one
criminal impulse. criminal resolution.
People v. Escober (supra)
Special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. The established rule is that whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on
the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part are
principals in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, although they did no actually take part in the
homicide unless endeavored to prevent homicide. While
it has been established that Punzalan‘s participation in
the crime was to act as a look-out, and as such he did
not participate in the killing of the two helpless victims,
he cannot evade responsibility.
People v. Hernandez
99 Phil. 515 (1956)
Facts: Hernandez and others were charged
with the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons
and robberies. He was found guilty and sentenced to
suffer life imprisonment.
Held: Murder, arson and robbery are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion, as a means
―necessary‖ for the perpetration of the offense. Such
common offenses are absorbed or inherent in the crime
of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in Art. 135
constitute one single crime, it follows that said acts offer
no occasion for the application of Art. 48 which requires
therefore the commission of at least 2 crimes.

Principle of pro reo. Art. 48 is intended to favor
the culprit: when two or more crimes are the result of a
single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than
when he commits said crimes through separate and
distinct acts.
People v. Geronimo
100 Phil. 99 (1956)
As in treason, where both intent and overt act
are necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the
coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes
expressed in Art. 134 of the RPC, and the overt acts of
violence described in the first paragraph of Art. 135.
That both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of one crime and that without either of
them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist, is
shown by the absence of any penalty attached to Art.
134. It follows, therefore, that any or all of the acts
described in Art. 135, when committed as a means to or
in furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art.
134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in
themselves.
Not every act of violence is to be deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it
happens to be committed simultaneously. If the killing,
robbing, etc were done for private purposes, the crime
would be separately punishable and would not be
absorbed by the rebellion.
Enrile v. Salazar
186 SCRA 217(1990)
The appellants proposed 3 options to the
court:
(b) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view
in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes, and that under Art. 48 rebellion
may be properly complexed with common
offenses,
(c) hold Hernandez applicable only to offense
committed in furtherance, or as a necessary
means for the commission, of rebellion, but not
to acts committed in the course of a rebellion
which also constitute ―common‖ crimes of grave
or less grave character,
(d) maintain Hernandez as applying to make
rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in
its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.
Held: The Hernandez doctrine remains binding
and operates to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
another offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion.
People v. Toling
62 SCRA 17 (1975)
The eight killings and the attempted killing
should be treated as separate crimes of murder and
attempted murder qualified by treachery. The
unexpected surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins
upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that
the twins would act like juramentados and who were
unable to defend themselves was a mode of execution
that insured the consummation of the twins‘ diabolical
objective to butcher their co-passengers. The conduct of
the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were
perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they
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cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime
under art. 48 of the RPC which refers to cases where ―a
single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other.‖
Monteverde v. People
387 SCRA 196 (2002)
Facts: Monteverde was purportedly charged
with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
a commercial document for allegedly falsifying the
document she had submitted to show that the money
donated by PAGCOR was used and spent for lighting
materials for her barangay.
Held: Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of
at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both
(or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense
must be a necessary means for committing the other (or
others). Negatively put, there is no complex crime when
(1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a
single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a
necessary means for committing the other (or others).
Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed
to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a
complex crime. Specifically, her alleged actions showing
falsification of a public and/or a commercial document
were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the
two crimes the result of a single act.
People v. Gonzalez (Supra)
Facts: Both of the families of Andres and that
of Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. Gonzales was driving with his grandson
and 3 housemaids, while Andres was driving with his
pregnant wife, Feliber, his 2yr old son, Kenneth, his
nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law. At an intersection,
their two vehicles almost collided. Gonzales continued
driving while Andres tailed Gonzales‘ vehicle and cut him
off when he found the opportunity to do so, then got out
of his vehicle and knocked on the appellant's car
window. Heated exchange of remarks followed. On his
way back to his vehicle, he met Gonzales son, Dino.
Andres had a shouting match this time with Dino.
Gonzales then alighted from his car and fired a single
shot at the last window on the left side of Andres'
vehicle at an angle away from Andres. The single bullet
fired hit Kenneth, Kevin and Feliber which caused the
latter‘s death.
Held: The rules on the imposition of penalties
for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal
Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a
single act constitutes two or more grave and less grave
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of
committing another; in such a case, the penalty for the
most serious offense shall be imposed in its maximum
period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Art. 25 defines grave felonies as those to which the law
attaches the capital punishment or afflictive penalties
from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less grave
felonies are those to which the law attaches a penalty
which in its maximum period falls under correctional
penalties; and light felonies are those punishable by
arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred pesos.
Considering that the offenses committed by the act of
the appellant of firing a single shot are one count of
homicide, a grave felony, and two counts of slight
physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the
imposition of penalties for complex crimes, which

requires two or more grave and/or less grave felonies,
will not apply.
People v. Comadre
431 SCRA 366 (2004)
Facts: Robert Agbanlog, Wabe, Bullanday,
Camat and Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the
terrace of the house of Robert‘s father, Jaime Agbanlog,
Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening
to the conversation of the companions of his son. As the
drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed
appellants George and Antonio Comadre and Lozano
walking. The 3 stopped in front of the house. While his
companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed a hand
grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants
immediately fled. The hand grenade exploded ripping a
hole in the roof of the house. Robert died while his
father, Jaime, Wabe, Camat, and Bullanday sustained
shrapnel injuries..
Held: Antonio is guilty of the complex crime of
murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. The underlying philosophy of
complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows
the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by
imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes
committed. The rationale being, that the accused who
commits two crimes with single criminal impulse
demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes
are committed by different acts and several criminal
resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a
hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of
several separate and distinct offenses, yet these
component criminal offenses should be considered only
as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is
imposed because the offender was impelled by a ―single
criminal impulse‖ which shows his lesser degree of
perversity.
People v. Delos Santos
355 SCRA 415 (2001)
Facts: Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends
went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf truck. On their way,
they decided to pass by a restaurant where Glenn had 3
bottles of beer. From Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City,
Glenn‘s truck hit, bumped, seriously wounded and
claimed the lives of several members of the PNP who
were undergoing an endurance run on a highway
wearing black shirts and shorts and green combat
shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on the spot, 12 were
seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10
sustained minor injuries. At the time of the occurrence,
the place of the incident was very dark as there was no
moon. Neither were there lamposts that illuminated the
highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex
crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder
and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor
vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.
Held: Considering that the incident was not a
product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a
single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty
of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries.
The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to
the ten other victims through reckless imprudence,
would, had they been intentional, have constituted light
felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by
Article 48, they should be treated and punished as
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separate offenses. Separate informations should have,
therefore, been filed
People v. Velasquez
345 SCRA 728 (2000)
Facts: Velasquez, poked a toy gun and forced
Karen to go with her at his grandmother‘s house. Out of
fear and not knowing that the gun that Velasquez was
holding is a mere toy, Karen went with Velasquez.
Velasquez then raped Karen twice. The trial court
convicted Velasquez of two counts of rape.
Held: Considering that Velasquez forcibly
abducted Karen and then raped her twice, he should be
convicted of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape and simple rape. The penalty for complex crimes is
the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more
serious of the two crimes and is punishable with
reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and since reclusion perpetua is a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be imposed as it is. The
subsequent rape committed by Velasquez can no longer
be considered as a separate complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape but only as a separate act of rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
People v. Gaffud Jr.
566 SCRA 76 (2008)
Facts: One evening, residents from a barangat heard 2
gunshots. Not long after, they saw that the house of the
Salvador family was burning. Gaffud was seen running
away from the burning house. The burned bodies of
Manuel and Analyn Salvador were found inside the
house.
Held: The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in
the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro
reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by
imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes
committed. The rationale being, that the accused who
commits two crimes with single criminal impulse
demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes
are committed by different acts and several criminal
resolutions.
We hold that the single act of accused-appellant burning
the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective
of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador,
resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of
double murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is
committed by means of fire. Since the maximum penalty
imposed for murder was death, when the case was
pending in the CA, the CA correctly imposed the penalty
of death for the complex crime of double murder instead
of the two death penalties imposed by the RTC for two
counts of murder. In view, however, of the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346 (otherwise known as An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines), we reduce the penalty of death
to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
 Art. 48 does not apply when the law provides one
single penalty for special complex crimes:
1. Robbery with Homicide (Art. 294 (1))
2. Robbery with Rape (Art. 294 (2))
3. Kidnapping with serious physical injuries (Art.
267 (3))
4. Rape with Homicide (Art. 335)

People v. Fabon
328 SCRA 302 (2000)
Facts: The accused were convicted by the trial
court of ―robbery with homicide and rape‖
Held: When the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide is accompanied by another
offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such
additional offense is treated as an aggravating
circumstance which would result in the imposition of the
maximum penalty of death. The proper designation is
robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape
and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it is
the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code which applies, the rape to be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
People v. Empante (1999)
Facts: The accused was found guilty of three
counts of rape against his daughter who was then below
18 years old and sentenced him to death and to
indemnify his daughter in the amount of P50k with
moral damages amounting to another P50k for each
count of rape. On appeal, he claims that the trial court
should have appreciated two mitigating circumstances in
his favor namely voluntary confession of guilt and
intoxication and sentenced him to a lesser penalty.
Held: Qualified rape is punishable by the single
indivisible penalty of death, which must be applied
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance which may have attended the commission
of the deed.
People v. Elizalde
G.R. No. 210434 (2016)
In People v. Mercado, the Court explained that
when the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, the same shall be punished as a special
complex crime, to wit:
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found
guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for
ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and
sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the
ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special
complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder
under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our
criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex
crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It
effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the
courts between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim
was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where
the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated
as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a
special complex crime under the last paragraph of
Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
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People v. Escober
157 SCRA 541 (1988)
Facts: Abuyen used to be a security guard of Bee Sung
Electrical Supply of the Chua family. He was relieved
from his job because he was sleeping while on duty and
he was frequently absent. One day, Abuyen and some
companions went to the store and pointed a gun at the
security guard Escober. Abuyen went upstairs and
stabbed Chua‘s two children who were watching
television. The perpetrators also took a sum of money
from the drawer. While this was happening, Punzalan
remained outside as a lookout. As Abuyen went down,
he shot Escober before fleeing the place with Punzalan.
Escober was charged as a conspirator to the robbery
with homicide committed.
Held: The lookout acted in conspiracy with the
principal. Therefore, all those who took part as principals
in a complex crime of robbery with homicide are also
guilty even though they didn‘t actually take part in the
homicide.
Escober was acquitted as his participation
wasn‘t established beyond reasonable doubt. He was in
fact shot by Abuyen. It was unnatural to let oneself get
shot if he conspired with the attackers.
People v. Larranaga
G.R. Nos. 138874-75, 2006-01-31 (2004)
Facts: One evening, sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline were abducted by the group of Larranaga.
The victims were brought to a safehouse, then to a cliff
area where the sisters were raped by the men. Marijoy
was pushed into the ravine which caused her death
while her sister was never seen again. One of the
abductors confessed and the accused were all charged
with kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267.
Held:R.A. 7659 amended Article 267 and made
it a special complex crime. When the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Delito Continuado (Continuing Crime)
People v. De Leon
49 Phil 437 (1926)
Facts:One early morning, Vicente de Leon entered the
yard of Magat and took two game roosters. One is
owned by Magat and the other is owned by Nicolas. The
MTC held that there are two crimes of theft while the
CFI held that there was only one crime of theft.
Issue: Whether or not the act was a continuing crime.
Held:The act of taking two roosters, in response to the
unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion
cannot be modified by the accidental circumstance that
the article unlawfully taken belonged to two distinct
persons. There is no series of acts for the
accomplishment of different purposes but only one
which was consummated.
People v. Jaranilla
55 SCRA 563 (1974)
Facts:Jaranilla‘s group hailed Gorriceta‘s Ford pickup and
forced the vehicle to go to the vicinity of the house of
Baylon. Jaranilla and the two other men went to the
coup outside the house and took 6 game cocks. They
fled the scene immediately. Later on, they were chased
by the police. Jaranilla shot officer Jabatan in the head
when he approached the pickup.

Held: The accused committed theft as the taking was
done without force upon things. The robbery in an
uninhabited place in Article 302 requires that the
malefactor must enter a building or a structure. In this
case, the chicken coup was not a building as it was
located outside the house of the owner. The crime of
theft was consummated upon the taking of the cocks.
The act of Jaranilla of shooting the police officer is a
separate case as it was not shown that it was
premeditated. He can be held liable for theft as well as
homicide with direct assault.
Gamboa v. CA
68 SCRA 308 (1975)
Facts:Hayco, a former employee of an optical supply
company was charged with 75 counts of estafa. It is
alleged that the employee did not remit the profits from
the sales and instead used to money for personal use.
Hayco moved to consolidate the cases as he claims that
it came from a single criminal resolution.
Held: Plurality of crimes refers to various acts of the
same or different kind. There is ideal plurality when a
single act results to various infractions of law. This may
be either when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a
necessary means to commit the other. Real plurality is
the performance of different acts with distinct purposes
and resulting in different crimes that are juridically
independent. It is not governed by Article 48.
Continuous crime is a single crime consisting of a series
of acts arising from a single criminal intent not
susceptible of division.
In this case, the acts were performed on different times
and dates spanning for two months. Each day of
conversion is a single criminal act. Once all the elements
of estafa are complete, the crime is consummated.
CRIME DIFFERENT FROM THAT INTENDED
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals
when the crime committed is different from that
intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is
different from that which the offender intended to
commit, the following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony
committed be higher than that corresponding to the
offense which the accused intended to commit, the
penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony
committed be lower than that corresponding to the one
which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for
the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding
paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed
by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or
frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a
higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which
case the penalty provided for the attempted or the
frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
 Art. 49 has reference to Art. 4(1). It applies only when
there is ERROR IN PERSONAE.
 In Art. 49 pars. 1 and 2, the LOWER PENALTY in its
MAXIMUM PERIOD is always imposed.
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 In Par. 3, the penalty for the attempted or frustrated
crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. This rule
is not necessary and may well be covered by Art. 48, in
view of the fact that the same act also constitutes an
attempt or a frustration of another crime.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
Art. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of
failure to commit the crime because the means
employed or the aims sought are impossible. —
When the person intending to commit an offense has
already performed the acts for the execution of the
same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by
reason of the fact that the act intended was by its
nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the
means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the
court, having in mind the social danger and the degree
of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon
him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to
500 pesos.
 Art. 59 is limited to cases where the act performed
would be grave or less grave felonies.
 Basis of penalty:
1. social danger
2. degree of criminality shown by the
offender
ADDITIONAL PENALTY FOR CERTAIN
ACCESSORIES
Art. 58. Additional penalty to be imposed
upon certain accessories. — Those accessories falling
within the terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this
Code who should act with abuse of their public
functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of absolute
perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall
be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute
temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less
grave felony.
 Absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal
offender is guilty of a grave felony.
 Absolute temporary disqualification if the principal
offender is guilt of less grave felony.
WHERE THE OFFENDER IS BELOW 18 YEARS
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a
person under eighteen years of age. — When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is
one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next
to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules
shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine
years of age, who is not exempted from liability by
reason of the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed,
but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under
eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period.

P.D. No. 603. ART. 192. Suspension of
Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender.
If after hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings, the court should find that the youthful
offender has committed the acts charged against him
the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment of
conviction, the court shall suspend all further
proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody
or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any
training institution operated by the government, or duly
licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until
he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a
shorter period as the court may deem proper, after
considering the reports and recommendations of the
Department of Social Welfare or the agency or
responsible individual under whose care he has been
committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to
visitation and supervision by a representative of the
Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed
agency or such other officer as the court may designate
subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
 Art. 68 applies to such minor if his application for
suspension of sentence is disapproved or if while in the
reformatory institution he becomes incorrigible in which
case he shall be returned to the court for the imposition
of the proper penalty.
 9 to 15 years only with discernment: at least 2
degrees lower.
 15 to 18 years old: penalty next lower
 Art. 68 provides for two of the PRIVILEGED
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
 If the act is attended by two or more mitigating and
no aggravating circumstance, the penalty being
divisible, a minor over 15 but under 18 years old may
still get a penalty two degrees lower.
People v. Gambao
G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013
Facts: Lucia Chan was abducted and brought
to a resort in Laguna. The abductors demanded 20
million pesos as ransom. The police eventually rescued
Chan and arrested the perpetrators. Among those
arrested was Perpenian, who was 17 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime. She chatted with
the abductors and claimed that she thought that there
was only a swimming party.
Held: An accomplice cooperates in the
execution by supplying material and moral aid in relation
to the acts done by the principal. In this case, her
presence gave moral support to the abductors as she
kept quiet and didn‘t tell the police even when there was
obviously a crime being committed. She is an
accomplice to the kidnapping.
R.A. 9344 provides that sentence is suspended
for the child in conflict with the law until he is 21 years
old. Also, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority should lower the penalty by one degree.
Applying these provisions in this case, the penalty for
principals of kidnapping is reclusion perpetua.
Accomplices should suffer reclusion temporal. But,
because of the defendant‘s minority, the penalty should
be one degree lower, which is prision mayor.
The court ordered her immediate release
because as of the time of this decision, Perpenian was
already 31 years old and has already served the
sentence due her.
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THE THREE-FOLD RULE
Art. 70. Successive service of sentence. —
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he
shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules
shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of
their respective severity shall be followed so that they
may be executed successively or as nearly as may be
possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the
penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have
been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of
the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of
the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the
following scale:
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10 Temporal absolute disqualification.
11. Suspension from public office, the right to
vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or
calling, and
12. Public censure
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next
preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of
time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be
liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those
imposed equals the same maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed
forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the
duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be
computed at thirty years. (As amended).
Outline of the provisions of this Article:
1. When the culprit has to serve 2 or more
penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if
the nature of the penalties will so permit.
2. Otherwise, the order of their respective
severity shall be followed.
3. The respective severity of the penalties is as
follows:
a. Death
b. Reclusion perpetua
c. Reclusion temporal
d. Prision mayor
e. Prision correccional
f. Arresto mayor
g. Arresto menor
h. Destierro
i. Perpetual absolute disqualification
j. Temporary absolute disqualification
k. Suspension from public office, the right to
vote, and be voted for, the right to follow
profession or calling, and
l. Public censure

The penalties which can be simultaneously served
are:
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification
2. Perpetual special disqualification
3. Temporary absolute disqualification
4. Temporary special disqualification
5. Suspension
6. Destierro
7. Public Censure
8. Fine and Bond to keep the peace
9. Civil interdiction
10. Confiscation and payment of costs
 The above penalties, except destierro, can be
served simultaneously with imprisonment.
 Penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty
cannot be served simultaneously by reason of
the nature of such penalties.
Three-fold Rule
The maximum duration of the convict‘s
sentence shall not be more than three times the length
of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him.
 The phrase ―the most severe of the penalties‖ includes
equal penalties.
 The three-fold rule applies only when the convict has
to serve at least four sentences.
 All the penalties, even if by different courts at
different times, cannot exceed three-fold the most
severe.
- The Rules of Court specifically provide that
any information must not charge more than one offense.
Necessarily, the various offense punished with different
penalties must be charged under different informations
which may be filed in the same court or in different
courts, at the same time or at different times.
 Subsidiary imprisonment forms part of the penalty.
 Indemnity is a penalty.
 Court must impose all the penalties for all the crimes
of which the accused is found guilty, but in the service
of the same, they shall not exceed three times the most
severe and shall not exceed 40 years.
Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan
151 SCRA 339 (1987)
Facts: The petitioner was convicted of violating
Section 3(E) of RA No. 3019 aka the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. One of the issues raised by the
petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan which totals 56 years and 8 days of
imprisonment. He impugns this as contrary to the three-
fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate
penalties should not exceed 40 years.
Held: Petitioner is mistaken in his application
of the 3-fold rule as set forth in Art. 70 of the RPC. This
article is to be taken into account not in the imposition
of the penalty but in connection with the service of the
sentence imposed. Art. 70 speaks of ―service‖ of
sentence, ―duration‖ of penalty and penalty ―to be
inflicted‖. Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned
about the ―imposition of penalty‖. It merely provides
that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than
three times the most severe of these penalties the
maximum which is 40 years.
WHERE THE PENALTY IS NOT
COMPOSED OF 3 PERIODS
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Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty
is not composed of three periods. — In cases in
which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of
three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained
in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal
portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and
forming one period of each of the three portions.
MEANING OF THE RULE
1. Compute and determine first the 3 periods of
the entire penalty.
2. The time included in the penalty prescribed
should be divided into 3 equal portions, after subtracting
the minimum (eliminate the 1 day) from the maximum
of the penalty.
3. The minimum of the minimum period should
be the minimum of the given penalty (including the 1
day)
4. The quotient should be added to the minimum
prescribed (eliminate the 1 day) and the total will
represent the maximum of the minimum period. Take
the maximum of the minimum period, add 1 day and
make it the minimum of the medium period; then add
the quotient to the minimum (eliminate the 1 day) of
the medium period and the total will represent the
maximum of the medium period. Take the maximum of
the medium period, add 1 day and make it the minimum
of the maximum period; then add the quotient to the
minimum (eliminate the 1 day) of the maximum period
and the total will represent the maximum of the
maximum period.
H. THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
ACT NO. 4103
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR ALL PERSONS
CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS
THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if
the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act
No. 4225.)
SECTION 2. This Act shall not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of misprision
of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those
convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents;
to those who have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence; to those who having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment
does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced
by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except
as provided in Section 5 hereof. (As amended by Act No.
4225.)

SECTION 3. There is hereby created a Board of
Pardons and Parole to be composed of the Secretary of
Justice who shall be its Chairman, and four members to be
appointed by the President, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments who shall hold office for a
term of six years: Provided, That one member of the board
shall be a trained sociologist, one a clergyman or educator,
one psychiatrist unless a trained psychiatrist be employed by
the board, and the other members shall be persons qualified
for such work by training and experience. At least one
member of the board shall be a woman. Of the members of
the present board, two shall be designated by the President
to continue until December thirty, nineteen hundred and
sixty-six and the other two shall continue until December
thirty, nineteen hundred and sixty-nine. In case of any
vacancy in the membership of the Board, a successor may
be appointed to serve only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the respective members. (As amended by Republic
Act No. 4203, June 19, 1965.)
SECTION 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole is
authorized to adopt such rules and regulations as may be
necessary for carrying out its functions and duties. The
Board is empowered to call upon any bureau, office, branch,
subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Government for
such assistance as it may need in connection with the
performance of its functions. A majority of all the members
shall constitute a quorum and a majority vote shall be
necessary to arrive at a decision. Any dissent from the
majority opinion shall be reduced to writing and filed with
the records of the proceedings. Each member of the Board,
including the Chairman and the Executive Officer, shall be
entitled to receive as compensation fifty pesos for each
meeting actually attended by him, notwithstanding the
provisions of Section two hundred and fifty-nine of the
Revised Administrative Code, and in addition thereto,
reimbursement of actual and necessary travelling expenses
incurred in the performance of duties: Provided, however,
That the Board meetings will not be more than three times a
week. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4203, June 19,
1965.)
SECTION 5. It shall be the duty of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence to look into the physical, mental
and moral record of the prisoners who shall be eligible to
parole and to determine the proper time of release of such
prisoners. Whenever any prisoner shall have served the
minimum penalty imposed on him, and it shall appear to the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence, from the reports of the
prisoner's work and conduct which may be received in
accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed, and
from the study and investigation made by the Board itself,
that such prisoner is fitted by his training for release, that
there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live
and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that
such release will not be incompatible with the welfare of
society, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence may, in its
discretion, and in accordance with the rules and regulations
adopted hereunder, authorize the release of such prisoner
on parole, upon such terms and conditions as are herein
prescribed and as may be prescribed by the Board. The said
Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall also examine the
records and status of prisoners who shall have been
convicted of any offense other than those named in Section
2 hereof, and have been sentenced for more than one year
by final judgment prior to the date on which this Act shall
take effect, and shall make recommendation in all such
cases to the Governor-General with regard to the parole of
such prisoners as they shall deem qualified for parole as
herein provided, after they shall have served a period of
imprisonment not less than the minimum period for which
they might have been sentenced under this Act for the same
offense.
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SECTION 6. Every prisoner released from
confinement on parole by virtue of this Act shall, at such
times and in such manner as may be required by the
conditions of his parole, as may be designated by the said
Board for such purpose, report personally to such
government officials or other parole officers hereafter
appointed by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence for a
period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining portion of
the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final
release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence as herein provided. The officials so designated
shall keep such records and make such reports and perform
such other duties hereunder as may be required by said
Board. The limits of residence of such paroled prisoner
during his parole may be fixed and from time to time
changed by the said Board in its discretion. If during the
period of surveillance such paroled prisoner shall show
himself to be a law-abiding citizen and shall not violate any
of the laws of the Philippine Islands, the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence may issue a final certificate of
release in his favor, which shall entitle him to final release
and discharge.
SECTION 7. The Board shall file with the court which
passed judgment on the case, and with the Chief of
Constabulary, a certified copy of each order of conditional or
final release and discharge issued in accordance with the
provisions of the next preceding two sections.
SECTION 8. Whenever any prisoner released on
parole by virtue of this Act shall, during the period of
surveillance, violate any of the conditions of his parole, the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue an order for his
re-arrest which may be served in any part of the Philippine
Islands by any police officer. In such case the prisoner so re-
arrested shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the
maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to
prison, unless the Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall, in
its discretion, grant a new parole to the said prisoner. (As
amended by Act No. 4225.)
SECTION 9. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
impair or interfere with the powers of the Governor-General
as set forth in Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative
Code or the Act of Congress approved August 29, 1916
entitled "An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the
United States as to the future political status of the people of
the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous
government for those Islands."
SECTION 10. Whenever any prisoner shall be released
on parole hereunder he shall be entitled to receive the
benefits provided in Section 1751 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Approved and effective on December 5, 1993.
 The indeterminate sentence is composed of:
1. a MAXIMUM taken from the penalty
imposable under the penal code
2. a MINIMUM taken from the penalty next
lower to that fixed in the code.
 The law does not apply to certain offenders:
1. Persons convicted of offense punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment.
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason.
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage.
4. Those convicted of piracy.
5. Those who are habitual delinquents.

6. Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence.
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional
pardon granted to them by the Chief
Executive.
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment
does not exceed one year.
9. Those who, upon the approval of the law, had
been sentenced by final judgment.
10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or
suspension.
 Purpose of the law: to uplift and redeem valuable
human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and economic usefulness
- It is necessary to consider the criminal first
as an individual, and second as a member of the society.
- The law is intended to favor the defendant,
particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment,
depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental
and moral record as a prisoner, to be determined by the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence.
 The settled practice is to give the accused the benefit
of the law even in crimes punishable with death or life
imprisonment provided the resulting penalty, after
considering the attending circumstances, is reclusion
temporal or less.
 ISL does not apply to destierro. ISL is expressly
granted to those who are sentenced to imprisonment
exceeding 1 year.
PROCEDURE FOR DETERMING THE MAXIMUM AND
MINIMUM SENTENCE
 Is consists of a maximum and a minimum instead of a
single fixed penalty.
 Prisoner must serve the minimum before he is eligible
for parole.
 The period between the minimum and maximum is
indeterminate in the sense that the prisoner may be
exempted from serving said indeterminate period in
whole or in part.
 The maximum is determined in any case punishable
under the RPC in accordance with the rules and
provisions of said code exactly as if the ISL had never
been enacted.
 Apply first the effect of privileged mitigating
circumstances then consider the effects of aggravating
and ordinary mitigating circumstances.
 The minimum depends upon the court‘s discretion
with the limitation that it must be within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense committed.
NOTE: A minor who escaped from confinement in the
reformatory is entitled to the benefits of the ISL because
his confinement is not considered imprisonment.
Art. 64. Rules for the application of
penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in
which the penalties prescribed by law contain three
periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which
forms a period in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the
application of the penalty the following rules, according
to whether there are or are not mitigating or
aggravating circumstances:
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1. When there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty
prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is
present in the commission of the act, they shall impose
the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is
present in the commission of the act, they shall impose
the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably
offset those of one class against the other according to
their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are
present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of
the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not
impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in
its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court
shall determine the extent of the penalty according to
the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser
extent of the evil produced by the crime.
De la Cruz v. CA
265 SCRA 299 (1996)
In as much as the amount of P715k is P693k
more than the abovementioned benchmark of P22k,
then adding one year for each additional P10k, the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by
69 years, as computed by the trial court. But the law
categorically declares that the maximum penalty then
shall not exceed 20 years of reclusion temporal. Under
the ISL, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty
should be within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed b the Code for the offense
committed, which is prision correccional.
People v. Campuhan (supra)
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2)
degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for
the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor
below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is
reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its
periods.
People v. Saley (supra)
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed" for the offense. The penalty

next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by
the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of
the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is
left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can
be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might
be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant
case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the
initial determination of the indeterminate penalty;
instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to
modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This
interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal
laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since
the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge
against accused-appellant is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next
lower would then be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
People v. Temporada
G.R. No. 173473, Dec. 17, 2008
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general
prescription for the felonies defined therein which
consists of a range of period of time. This is what is
referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance,
under Article 249 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for
homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges from 12
years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further,
the Code provides for attending or modifying
circumstances which when present in the commission of
a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be
imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is
referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of
homicide which is committed with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC
shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period.
From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single
fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the
"penalty actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the
prison term he has to serve.
With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison
term which consists of a minimum and maximum term
called the indeterminate sentence. Thus, the maximum
term is that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed under
the pre-ISL regime became the maximum term under
the ISL regime. Upon the other hand, the minimum term
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty.
Dela Cruz v. CA
265 SCRA 299 (1996)
Facts:Erlinda Dela Cruz presented herself as the General
Manager of a Brokerage company and offered to deliver
5 container vans of engines in exchange for P715,000.
She failed to do so and she was convicted of estafa.
Taking into consideration the amount involved, adding 1
year for every P10,000 in excess of P22,000: the trial
court imposed the penalty of 4 years, 2 months prision
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correccional to 8 years prision mayor as minimum and
69 years as maximum.
Held: According to Article 315, the total penalty imposed
for estafa shall not exceed 20 years. The proper penalty,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is 20 years
reclusion temporal maximum and prision correccional as
minimum.
I. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS ON PENALTIES
Subsidiary Penalty (R.A. 10592)
Preventive Imprisonment (R.A. 10592)
Good Conduct Time Allowance and other
Allowances (R.A. 10592)
Obstruction of Justice (P.D. 1829)
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10592
AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97,
98 AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL
CODE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 29 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
"ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment
deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or
accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment
shall be credited in the service of their sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time
during which they have undergone preventive
imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects
thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, except in the following cases:
"1. When they are recidivists, or have been
convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;
and
"2. When upon being summoned for the
execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
"If the detention prisoner does not agree to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the
assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during
which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
"Credit for preventive imprisonment for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from
thirty (30) years.
"Whenever an accused has undergone
preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the
possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged
to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the
proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review.
Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of
immediate release under this paragraph shall be the

actual period of detention with good conduct time
allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is
absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial,
the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual
delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous
crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In
case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be
sentenced is lestierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment."
SECTION 2. Article 94 of the same Act is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal
liability. – Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
"1. By conditional pardon;
"2. By commutation of the sentence; and
"3. For good conduct allowances which the
culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive
imprisonment or serving his sentence."
SECTION 3. Article 97 of the same Act is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The
good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this
Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal
institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any
other local jail shall entitle him to the following
deductions from the period of his sentence:
"1. During the first two years of imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each
month of good behavior during detention;
"2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive,
of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of
twenty-three days for each month of good behavior
during detention;
"3. During the following years until the tenth
year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
"4. During the eleventh and successive years
of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
thirty days for each month of good behavior during
detention; and
"5. At any time during the period of
imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of
fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof,
for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service
time rendered.
"An appeal by the accused shall not deprive
him of entitlement to the above allowances for good
conduct."
SECTION 4. Article 98 of the same Act is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. –
A deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence
shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his
preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence
under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this
Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours
following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the
passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to
140
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of
his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose
to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding
the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated
in Article 158 of this Code.
"This Article shall apply to any prisoner
whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving
sentence."
SECTION 5. Article 99 of the same Act is hereby further
amended to read as follows:"
"ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. –
Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a
provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant
allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once
granted shall not be revoked."
SECTION 6. Penal Clause. – Faithful compliance with
the provisions of this Act is hereby mandated. As such,
the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment, a fine of One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and perpetual
disqualification to hold office shall be imposed against
any public officer or employee who violates the
provisions of this Act.
SECTION 7. Implementing Rules and
Regulations. – The Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall within
sixty (60) days from the approval of this Act,
promulgate rules and regulations on the classification
system for good conduct and time allowances, as may
be necessary, to implement the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 8. Separability Clause. – If any part hereof
is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the
provisions not otherwise affected shall remain valid and
subsisting.
SECTION 9. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential
decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby
repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
SECTION 10. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) new papers of general
circulation.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF
APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS
SECTION 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or
delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by
committing any of the following acts:

(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any
criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of
any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means
of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force
or threats;
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or
concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with
intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility,
availability, or admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases,
or to be used in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the
escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense
under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest
prosecution and conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the
purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or
the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true
name and other personal circumstances for the same
purpose or purposes;
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases
by obstructing the service of process or court orders or
disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
(f) making, presenting or using any record,
document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity
and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal
cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept
any benefit in consideration of abstaining from,
discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal
offender;
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another
with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor
or property or that of any immediate member or
members of his family in order to prevent such person
from appearing in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition,
whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person
from appearing in the investigation of or in official
proceedings in, criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to
mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from
apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or
property of the victim; or fabricating information from
the data gathered in confidence by investigating
authorities for purposes of background information and
not for publication and publishing or disseminating the
same to mislead the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is
penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the
higher penalty shall be imposed.
SECTION 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed
by a public official or employee, he shall in addition to
the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.
SECTION 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
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REVIEW NOTES
J. EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF
PENALTIES
Execution of Penalties
Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be
executed. — No penalty shall be executed except by
virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than
that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances
or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.
In addition to the provisions of the law, the special
regulations prescribed for the government of the
institutions in which the penalties are to be suffered
shall be observed with regard to the character of the
work to be performed, the time of its performance, and
other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the
convicts among themselves and other persons, the relief
which they may receive, and their diet.
The regulations shall make provision for the separation
of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into
different departments and also for the correction and
reform of the convicts.
 The judgment must be final before it can be executed,
because the accused may still appeal within 15 days
from its promulgation. But if the defendant has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, the
judgment becomes final and executory.
 See Rules and regulations to implement RA No. 8177
under Capital Punishment.
Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion
temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and
arresto mayor. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua,
reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional
and arresto mayor, shall be executed and served in the
places and penal establishments provided by the
Administrative Code in force or which may be provided
by law in the future.
Art. 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced
to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or
places designated in the sentence, nor within the radius
therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and
not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.
 Convict shall not be permitted to enter the place
designated in the sentence nor within the radius
specified, which shall not more than 250 and not less
than 25 km from the place designated.
 If the convict enters the prohibited area, he commits
evasion of sentence.
 Destierro is imposed:
a. When the death or serious physical injuries is
caused or are inflicted under exceptional
circumstances (art. 247)
b. When a person fails to give bond for good
behavior (art. 284)
c. As a penalty for the concubine in the crime of
concubinage (Art. 334)
d. When after lowering the penalty by degrees,
destierro is the proper penalty.

Art. 88. Arresto menor. — The penalty of
arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in
the house of the defendant himself under the
surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so
provides in its decision, taking into consideration the
health of the offender and other reasons which may
seem satisfactory to it.
Service of the penalty of arresto menor:
a. In the municipal jail
b. In the house of the offender, but under
the surveillance of an officer of the law,
whenever the court so provides in the
decision due to the health of the offender.
In the Matter of the petition for Habeas Corpus
of Pete Lagran
363 SCRA 275 (2001)
Facts: The accused was convicted of 3 counts
of violating BP22 and was sentenced to imprisonment of
1 year for each count. He was detained on Feb. 24,
1999. On Mar. 19, 2001, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus claiming he completed the service of his
sentence. Citing Art. 70, RPC, he claimed that he shall
serve the penalties simultaneously. Thus, there is no
more legal basis for his detention.
Held: Art. 70 allows simultaneous service of
two or more penalties only if the nature of the penalties
so permit. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every
count of the offense committed. The nature of the
sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the terms
simultaneously. The rule of successive service of
sentence must be applied.
Effects of the Probation Law
THE PROBATION LAW
Taken from the DOJ website
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decrees 968, as amended,
defines probation as a disposition under which an accused,
after conviction and sentence, is released subject to
conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a
probation officer. It is a privilege granted by the court; it
cannot be availed of as a matter of right by a person
convicted of a crime. To be able to enjoy the benefits of
probation, it must first be shown that an applicant has none
of the disqualifications imposed by law.
Disqualified Offenders
Probation under PD No. 968, as amended, is intended for
offenders who are 18 years of age and above, and who are
not otherwise disqualified by law. Offenders who are
disqualified are those: (1) sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of more than six years; (2) convicted
of subversion or any offense against the security of the
State, or the Public Order; (3) who have previously been
convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day
and/or a fine of not more than Two Hundred Pesos; (4) who
have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree;
Post-Sentence Investigation
The Post-Sentence Investigation (PSI) and the submission of
the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) are pre-
requisites to the court disposition on the application for
probation.
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Period of Probation
The period of probation is in essence a time-bound
condition. It is a condition in point of time which may be
shortened and lengthened within the statutory limits and the
achievements by the probationer of the reasonable degrees
of social stability and responsibility from the measured
observation of the supervising officer and the exercise
discretion by the court in decisive order.
Probation Conditions
The grant of probation is accompanied by conditions
imposed by the court:
 The mandatory conditions require that the
probationer shall (a) present himself to the
probation officer designated to undertake his
supervision at each place as may be specified in
the order within 72 hours from receipt of said
order, and (b) report to the probation officer at
least once a month at such time and place as
specified by said officer.
 Special or discretionary conditions are those
additional conditions imposed on the probationer
which are geared towards his correction and
rehabilitation outside of prison and right in the
community to which he belongs.
A violation of any of the conditions may lead either to a
more restrictive modification of the same or the revocation
of the grant of probation. Consequent to the revocation, the
probationer will have to serve the sentence originally
imposed.
Modification of Conditions of Probation
During the period of probation, the court may, upon
application of either the probationers or the probation
officer, revise or modify the conditions or period of
probation. The court shall notify either the probationer or
the probation officer of the filing of such an application so as
to give both parties an opportunity to be heard thereon.
Transfer of Residence
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place
under the jurisdiction of another court, control over him
shall be transferred to the executive judge of the "Court of
First Instance" of that place, and in such case, a copy of the
Probation Order, the investigation report and other pertinent
records shall be furnished to said executive judge.
Thereafter, the executive judge to whom jurisdiction over
the probationer is transferred shall have the power with
respect to him that was previously possessed by the court
which granted the probation.
Revocation of Probation
At any time during probation, the court may issue a warrant
for the arrest of a probationer for any serious violation of the
conditions of probation. The probationer, once arrested and
detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for
a hearing of the violation charged. The defendant may be
admitted to bail pending such hearing. In such case, the
provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with
crime shall be applicable to probationers arrested under this
provision. An order revoking the grant of probation or
modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be
appealable.
Termination of Probation
After the period of probation and upon consideration of the
report and recommendation of the probation officer, the
court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon
finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.

Programs and Services
Post-Sentence Investigation. After conviction and
sentence, a convicted offender or his counsel files a petition
for probation with the trail court, who in turn orders the
Probation Officer to conduct a post-sentence investigation to
determine whether a convicted offender may be placed on
probation or not. The role of the probation officer in this
phase is to conduct the post-sentence investigation and to
submit his report to the court within the period not later
than 60 days from receipt of the order of the Court to
conduct the said investigation.
Pre-Parole Investigation. The PAROLE AND PROBATION
ADMINISTRATION - (PPA) conducts pre-parole investigation
of all sentenced prisoners confined in prisons and jails within
their jurisdiction. The purpose is to determine whether
offenders confined in prisons/jails are qualified for parole or
any form of executive clemency and to discuss with them
their plans after release. Probation officers submit their pre-
parole assessment reports to the Board of Pardons and
Parole.
Supervision of Offenders. The Agency supervises two
types of offenders under conditional release: (1)
probationers, or persons placed under probation by the
courts; (2) parolees and pardonees, or prisoners released on
parole or conditional pardon and referred by the Board of
Pardons and Parole (BPP) to PAROLE AND PROBATION
ADMINISTRATION - (PPA) (PPA). The objectives of
supervision are to carry out the conditions set forth in the
probation/parole order, to ascertain whether the
probationer/parolee/pardonee is complying with the said
conditions, and to bring about the rehabilitation of the client
and his re-integration into the community.
Rehabilitation Programs. The treatment process
employed by the field officers focused on particular needs of
probationers, parolees and pardonees. Assistance is
provided to the clientele in the form of job placement, skills
training, spiritual/moral upliftment, counseling, etc.
Community Linkages
Probation/Parole, as a community-based treatment program,
depends on available resources in the community for the
rehabilitation of offenders. Thus, the Agency, recognizing the
important role of the community as a rehabilitation agent,
involves the community in probation work through the use
of volunteer workers and welfare agencies.
Presidential Decree No. 968 permits the utilization of the
services of Volunteer Probation Aides to assist the Probation
and Parole Officers in the supervision of probationers,
parolees and pardonees particularly in the areas where the
caseload is heavy and the office is understaff or where the
residence of the clientele is very far from the Parole and
Probation Office. As defined, a Volunteer Probation Aide is a
volunteer who is a citizen of good moral character and good
standing in the community, who has been carefully selected
and trained to do volunteer probation work. He is appointed
by the Administrator after successful completion of the
Introductory Training Course for probation volunteers. His
term of office is one year but can be renewed thereafter or
terminated earlier depending upon his performance and
willingness to serve.
Further, the PAROLE AND PROBATION ADMINISTRATION -
(PPA), through its Community Services Division, Regional
and Field Offices nationwide, has been tapping
government/non-government organizations/individuals for
various rehabilitation programs and activities for
probationers, parolees and pardonees.
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Llamado v. CA
174 SCRA 566 (1989)
In its present form, Section 4 of the Probation
Law establishes a much narrower period during which an
application for probation ma be filed with the trial court:
―after the trial court shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant and – within the period for perfecting an
appeal‖. The provision expressly prohibits the grant of
an application for probation if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Petitioner‘s right to apply for probation was
lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of
the trial court. The trial court lost jurisdiction already
over the case.
Bala v. Martinez
181 SCRA 459 (1990)
P.D. No. 1990 which amends Sec. 4 of P.D. No.
968 is not applicable to the case at bar. It went into
effect on Jan. 15, 1985 and cannot be given retroactive
effect because it would be prejudicial to the accused.
Bala was placed on probation on Aug. 11, 1982.
Expiration of probation period alone does not
automatically terminate probation; a final order of
discharge from the court is required. Probation is
revocable before the final discharge by the court.
Probationer failed to reunite with responsible society. He
violated the conditions of his probation. Thus, the
revocation of his probation is compelling.
Salgado v. CA
189 SCRA 304 (1990)
There is no question that the decision
convicting Salgado of the crime of serious physical
injuries had become final and executory because the
filing by respondent of an application for probation is
deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.
The grant of probation does not extinguish the
civil liability of the offender. The order of probation with
one of the conditions providing for the manner of
payment of the civil liability during the period of
probation, did not increase or decrease the civil liability
adjudged.
The conditions listed under Sec. 10 of the
Probation law are not exclusive. Courts are allowed to
impose practically any term it chooses, the only
limitation being that it does not jeopardize the
constitutional rights of the accused.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado
260 SCRA 625 (1996)
Facts: The respondent is a deputy sheriff who
was charged of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act and is
now claiming he is in probation. The OCA filed an
administrative case against him and he was suspended
from office.
Held: While indeed the purpose of the
Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it
must not be forgotten that unlike pardon probation does
not obliterate the crime of which the person under
probation has been convicted. The image of the judiciary
is tarnished by conduct involving moral turpitude. The
reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot
justify his retention in the government service.
Dimacuta v. People
G.R. No. 206513, Oct. 20, 2015
Facts: Dimakuta was charged of violating R.A. 7610 for
embracing and touching the breasts and private parts of
a child who was 16 years of age. Dimakuta appealed his
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

conviction claiming that there was consent on the part of the penalty and all its effects;
the complainant. He was convicted by the Court of 4. By absolute pardon;
Appeals for Acts of Lasciviousness. He now applies for 5. By prescription of the crime;
probation. 6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as
Held: Probation can be granted provided that no provided in Article 344 of this Code.
application shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from judgment of How is criminal liability extinguished?
conviction. There are exceptions to this general rule 1. TOTAL
such as when the appeal is merely for the correction of 2. PARTIAL
the penalty and when upon the review of the crime, the
accused should be liable for a lesser offense. In this  Extinction of criminal liability does not automatically
case, he challenged the prosecution‘s evidence and extinguish the civil liability.
asserted his innocence. As he already perfected an
appeal, he is no longer eligible for probation. Causes of extinction of criminal liability:
1. BY DEATH OF THE CONVICT
- the death of the convict whether before or
Suspension in case of Insanity or Minority after final judgment extinguished criminal liability.
- civil liability is extinguished only when death
Art. 79. Suspension of the execution and occurs before final judgment.
service of the penalties in case of insanity. — When - death of the accused pending appeal of his
a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as
sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said the civil liability based solely on the offense committed;
sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the except, the claim for civil liability survives if the same
personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
of circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being observed than delict such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts and
in the corresponding cases. quasi-delicts.
If at any time the convict shall recover his - death of the offended party does not
reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the extinguish the criminal liability of the offender.
penalty shall have prescribed in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. 2. BY SERVICE OF SENTENCE
The respective provisions of this section shall - crime is a debt incurred by the offender as a
also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while consequence of his wrongful act and the penalty is but
the convict is serving his sentence. the amount of his debt. When payment is made, the
debt is extinguished. Service of sentence does not
 Only execution of personal penalty is suspended: civil extinguish civil liability.
liability may be executed even in case of insanity of
convict. 3. BY AMNESTY
 An accused may become insane: - amnesty is an act of the sovereign power
a. at the time of commission of the crime granting oblivion or a general pardon for a past offense,
– exempt from criminal liability and is rarely, if ever, exercised in favor of a single
b. at the time of the trial individual, and is usually exerted in behalf of certain
- court shall suspend hearings and order classes of persons, who are subject to trial but have not
his confinement in a hospital until he yet been convicted.
recovers his reason
c. at the time of final judgment or while 4. BY ABSOLUTE PARDON
serving sentence - It is an act of grace proceeding from the
– execution suspended with regard to the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which
personal penalty only exempts the individual on whom is bestowed from the
punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has
 see Exempting Circumstance of Minority for P.D. No. committed.
603 and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with Law.
Pardon Amnesty
Includes any crime Generally political offenses
VI. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL Given after conviction Given before conviction or
LIABILITY institution of the action
Looks forward and forgives Looks backwards and
the punishment abolished the offense itself
A. TOTAL EXTINCTION Must be proved as a Being a result of a
defense proclamation, the court
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally may take judicial notice of
extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally the same
extinguished: Do not extinguish civil liability
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability 5. BY PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the - the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to
offender occurs before final judgment. prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain
2. By service of the sentence; time.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes

144

6. BY PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTY
- the loss or forfeiture of the right of the
government to execute the final sentence after the
lapse of a certain time.
Requisites: a) that there be final judgment
b) that the period of time prescribed
by law for its enforcement has
elapsed.
7. BY THE MARRIAGE OF THE OFFENDED
WOMAN
- applicable in the crimes of rape, seduction,
abduction or acts of lasciviousness. Marriage must be
made in good faith.
Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion
temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties
shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty
shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in
five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall
prescribe in one year.
The crime of oral defamation and slander by
deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound
one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the
application of the rules contained in the first, second and
third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA
4661, approved June 19, 1966).
 In computing the period of prescription, the first day
is to be excluded and the last day included.
 Where the last day of the prescriptive period for filing
an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the
information can no longer be filed on the next day as the
crime has already prescribed.
PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES PUNISHED
BY:
1. death, reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal
- 20 years
2. other afflictive penalties
- 15 years
3. correctional penalties
- 10 years except arresto mayor which
prescribes in 5 years
4. libel or similar offense
- 1 year (as amended by RA 4661)
5. oral defamation and slander by deed
- 6 months
6. light offenses
- 2 months
PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES PUNISHED BY
SPECIAL LAWS:
a. punished by a fine or imprisonment not more
than 1 month or both – 1 year
b. punished by imprisonment of more than 1
month but less than 2 years – 4 years
c. punished by imprisonment for 2 years but less
than 6 years – 8 years
d. punished by imprisonment for 6 years or more
– 12 years
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CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
e. Internal Revenue offenses – 5 years
f. Municipal ordinances – 2 months (Act. No.
3763, as amended)
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of
offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
 Period commences to run from the day the offense is
committed or discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents. It does not run if the
offender is outside the Philippines.
 The fact that the offender is unknown will not
interrupt the period of prescription because what the
Code requires is the discovery of the crime and not of
the offender.
 The period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information.
- The period is not interrupted b the mere act of
reporting the case to the fiscal.
- The preliminary investigation conducted by the
municipal mayor in the absence of the justice of peace
partakes of the nature of a judicial proceeding and it
does not interrupt the running of the period of
prescription.
 The period commences to run again when the
proceeding is terminated:
- without the accused being convicted or
acquitted
- the proceeding is unjustifiably stopped for a
reason not imputable to the offender.
 In continuing crime, the prescription commences to
run after the termination of the continuity of the offense.
 Period of prescription of election offense begins to
run:
1) if discovery of the offense is incidental in a
judicial proceeding
- from the date of the termination of the
proceedings
2) otherwise
- from the date of the commission of the
offense
Art. 92. When and how penalties
prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence
prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty
years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the
exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which
prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.

PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES:
1. death and reclusion perpetua - 20 years
2. other afflictive penalties – 15 years
3. correctional penalties – 10 years except
arresto mayor which prescribes in 5 years
4. light penalties - year
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of
penalties. — The period of prescription of penalties
shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be
captured, should go to some foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty, or should
commit another crime before the expiration of the
period of prescription.
 Period commences to run from the date the culprit
evades the service of sentence.
 The period is interrupted:
a. if the defendant surrenders
b. if he is captured
c. if he should go to a foreign country with which
the Philippines has no extradition treaty
d. if he should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription
 ELEMENTS:
a. penalty is imposed by final sentence
b. the convict evaded the service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence
c. escaped convict has not given himself up, or
has been captured
d. penalty has prescribed because of the lapse of
time
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall
not work the restoration of the right to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence.
Monsanto v. Factoran
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
Monsanto was convicted of the complex crime
of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was
pardoned. She now seeks reinstatement to her former
position as Assistant treasurer, without need of a new
appointment.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted
felon to public office. A pardon although full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the
pardoned conviction.
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee v.
Desierto
363 SCRA 489 (2001)
The applicable law in the computation of the
prescriptive period for RA 3019 is Section 2 of Act No.
3326 which provides that prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
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People v. Cenido
G.R. No. 210801 (2016)
In People v. Amistoso, the Court explained that
the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as his
civil liability ex delicto. Consequently, Remedios's death
on March 7, 2014 renders the Court's July 7, 2014
Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to her, and is
therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case
against Remedios is dismissed.
People v. Egagamao
G.R. No. 218809 (2016)
Accused Egagamao's death pending appeal of
his conviction extinguished the criminal action inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused. Similarly, the civil action instituted therein for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that Egagamao's civil
liability in connection with his acts against the victim
may be based on sources of obligation other than
delicts; in which case, the victim may file a separate civil
action against the estate of Egagamao, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.
People v. Layag
G.R. No. 214875 (2016)
Facts: Layag was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape by Sexual
Intercourse, 2 counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual
Assault, and Acts of Lasciviousness. However, he died
before the promulgation of his judgment. In view of
Layag‘s death, the SC was constrained to re-open the
case to reconsider and set aside its Resolution and enter
a new one dismissing the criminal cases against him.
Held: Under prevailing law and jurisprudence,
Layag‘s death prior to his final conviction renders
dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1)
of the RPC provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused. Thus, upon
Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished in as much as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal action.
Romualdez v. Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006
Facts:Benjamin Romualdez was charged by the
Ombudsman with violation of R.A. 3019 for non-
disclosure of his SALN from 1967-1985 when he was an
Ambassador. A previous case was filed before the
Sandiganbayan but was dismissed. He now claims that
the action to file the complaint has already prescribed.
Held:To determine if an action has prescribed, the
following has to be considered:
1. the period of prescription for the offense
charged
2. time when the period of prescription starts to
run
3. the time prescriptive period was interrupted
1) the period of prescription for the offense charged
 RA 3019 was effective in 1982. It provides a
15 year prescription period in filing the case.
 BP 195 was the law prior to RA 3019. It
provides a prescription period of 10 years.

In this case:
o for acts committed from 1962-1982, there is a
10 year prescriptive period
o for acts committed from 1982-1985, 15 years
is the prescriptive period
2) time when the period of prescription starts to run
Act No. 3326 provides that the prescriptive period
starts to run on either
a. the day of commission of the crime or
b. the discovery and institution of the judicial
proceedings
The prescription is interrupted when proceedings
are instituted and shall run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy
In this case, a previous case was filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General in May 8, 1987 but was dismissed.
3) the time prescriptive period was interrupted
After the dismissal of the 1987 case, there was no
interruption of the prescription.
The present case was filed by the Ombudsman on
March 3, 2004. The action already prescribed and
all the pending cases must be dismissed.
B. PARTIAL EXTINCTION
Art. 94. Partial Extinction of criminal
liability. — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the
culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.
CAUSES OF PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY:
1. CONDITIONAL PARDON
a) when delivered and accepted is considered a
contract between the sovereign power and
the convict that the former will release the
latter upon compliance with the condition
b) usual condition ―he shall not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines
Violations of the conditions:
 offender is rearrested and re-incarcerated
 prosecution under Art. 159 of the RPC
2. COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE
a) reduce degree of penalty
b) decrease the length of imprisonment
c) decrease the amount of fine
Specific cases where commutation
provided for by the Code:
 convict sentenced to death over 70 years
old
 10 justices of the SC fail to reach a
decision for the affirmance of the death
penalty
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES
3. GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCES DURING
CONFINEMENT
- deduction for the term of sentence for
good behavior
4. PAROLE
- consists in the suspension of the
sentence of a convict without granting
pardon, prescribing the terms upon which
the sentence shall be suspended.
- May be granted to a prisoner after
serving the minimum penalty under the
indeterminate sentence law
- Consists in the suspension of the
sentence of a convict after serving the
minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty, without granting a pardon
prescribing the terms upon which the
sentence shall be punished.
Conditional Pardon Parole
May be given an time May be given after the
before final judgment is prisoner has served the
granted by the Chief minimum penalty is
Executive under the granted by the Board of
Administrative Code Parole and Pardons under
the ISL
For violation, convict may For violation, convict can
be rearrested or be rearrested and re-
prosecuted under Art. 159 incarcerated to serve the
unexpired portion of his
original penalty
Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person
granted conditional pardon. — Any person who has
been granted conditional pardon shall incur the
obligation of complying strictly with the conditions
imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any
of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation
of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be
applied to him.
Art. 96. Effect of commutation of
sentence. — The commutation of the original sentence
for another of a different length and nature shall have
the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of
the former.
Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. —
The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution
shall entitle him to the following deductions from the
period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five
days for each month of good behavior;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive,
of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
eight days for each month of good behavior;
3. During the following years until the tenth
is year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of ten days for each month of good
behavior; and
4. During the eleventh and successive years of
his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
fifteen days for each month of good behavior.
147

GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCES OF A PRISONER IN
A PENAL INSTITUTION:
1. First 2 years
a. 5 days per month of good behavior
2. 3rd – 5th year
b. 8 days
3. following years to 10th year
c. 10 days
4. 11th year and successive years
d. 15 days
 These allowances are granted by the Director of
Prisons and once given cannot be revoked.
Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty.
— A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence
shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the
service of his sentence under the circumstances
mentioned in Article 58 of this Code, gives himself up to
the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of
a proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity or catastrophe to in said article.
SPECIAL TIME ALLOWANCE FOR LOYALTY
- it is a deduction of 1/5 of the period of his sentence if
he, having evaded the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Art. 158, gives himself up
to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance
of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity.
 This article does not apply to prisoners who did not
escape.
 The deduction of 1/5 is based on the original
sentence.
 Under Art. 158, a convict who evaded service of his
sentence by leaving the penal institution on the occasion
of disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake,
explosion or similar catastrophe or during a mutiny in
which he did not participate, is liable to an increased
penalty (1/5 of the time still remaining to be served –
not to exceed 6 months) if he fails to give himself up
within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation
by the President announcing the passing away of the
calamity.
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. —
Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances
once granted shall not be revoked.
Compromise, Affidavit of Desistance,
Payment of Civil Liability
Compromise
Trinidad v. Ombudsman
539 SCRA 415 (2007)
Facts: Two informations were filed against Wilfredo
Trinidad of the DOTC for alleged irregularities in the
bidding process for the NAIA Terminal 3 project.
Trinidad seeks the dismissal of the criminal charges
citing the compromise agreement between the
complainant party and the other bidder evidenced by a
joint motion with a mutual quitclaim and waiver
recognized by the Trial Court in dismissing the civil case.
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Held: Criminal liability cannot be the subject of a
compromise. Crimes are committed against the People
of the Philippines and the offended party may not waive
of extinguish criminal liability that the law imposes for
its commission. Even a complaint for misconduct or
malfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot
be withdrawn by the complainant. There is a need to
maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the
government and its agencies and instrumentalities. The
dismissal of the civil case doesn‘t preclude criminal
prosecution.
Affidavit of Desistance
People v. Orje
657 SCRA 427 (2011)
Facts: A criminal complaint was filed by Orje‘s daughter
for rape. In his defense, Orje presented an Affidavit of
Desistance in his daughter‘s ―Sinumpaang Salaysay.‖
Despite this, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction for rape.
Held:The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 classifies rape as a
crime against persons. It may now be prosecuted de
oficio. A complaint from the offended party is no longer
necessary for prosecution. An affidavit of desistance is
only an additional ground to support the defense for the
charge of rape. There must be other circumstances
which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance,
create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by
witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge.
Payment of Civil Liability
Spouses Cabico v. Dimaculangan-Querijero
522 SCRA 300 (2007)
Facts:Spouses Cabico are the parents of AAA, a minor
who was raped by three suspects. After a trial, the Clerk
of Court talked to the parents and wanted to make them
sign an Affidavit of Desistance. As they refused, Judge
Dimaculangan issued an order stating that AAA received
P50,000 from each of the accused as full payment for
their civil liability.
Held: An Affidavit of Desistance and payment of civil
liability could not justify the dismissal of a criminal case.
Even if the affidavit was valid, the court already had
jurisdiction over the offense and trial must proceed. The
judge was given a stern warning for gross ignorance of
the law.
The Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes
the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as
provided in Article 344 of this Code.

Article 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. -
Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the
culprit may earn while he is serving his
sentence.
VII. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
FELONY
 As a general rule, an offense causes two classes of
injuries:
1. SOCIAL INJURY – produced by the
disturbance and alarm which are the outcome
of the offense
- this is sought to be repaired through the
imposition of the corresponding penalty.
2. PERSONAL INJURY – caused to the victim of
the crime who may have suffered damage,
either to his person, to his property, to his
honor, or to her chastity.
- this is sought to be repaired through
indemnity which is civil in nature.
A. GENERAL RULE
RPC, Art. 100. Civil liability of a person
guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
 BASIS: A crime has dual character: a) as an offense
against the state because of the disturbance of the
social order; and b) as an offense against the private
person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime
of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others
wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the
offender either because there are no damages to be
compensated or there is no private person injured by
the crime.
 In crimes against persons, like the crime of physical
injuries, the injured party is entitled to be paid for
whatever he spent for the treatment of his wounds,
doctor‘s fees etc. as well as for loss or impairment of
earning capacity.
 Moral damages may be recovered as well.
 Exemplary damages as part of the civil liability ma be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances.
 But if there is no damage caused by the commission
of the crime, the offender is not civilly liable.
 Civil liability arises from the commission of the felony.
It is determined in the criminal action except:
a. the offended party waives his right to file a
civil action
b. the offended party reserves his right to
institute it separately, or
c. the offended party institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
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REVIEW NOTES
 A reservation of the right to file a separate civil action
only gives the party aggrieved the right to choose under
which body of laws he must bring the civil action, either
under the:
1. RPC – where the recovery may be defeated
by proof that the acts on which the action is based do
not exist, or
2. Civil Code – where the same proof is
required to preclude recovery, or proof of diligence in
the selection and employment of the employee
 Effect of ACQUITTAL:
As a rule, if the offender is acquitted, the civil
liability is extinguished, except:
a) if the acquittal is on the ground that the guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
b) the acquittal was due to an exempting
circumstance like insanity and
c) when the court finds and states in its judgment
that there is only civil responsibility.
 SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION
The rule is that when the criminal action is
instituted, a separate civil action cannot be instituted or
if already instituted, it is to be suspended. Said rule
applies only when the plaintiff in the civil action is the
offended party in the criminal action and both cases
arise from the same offense.
Exceptions:
Independent civil actions may be filed for:
a. violations of fundamental rights (Art. 32)
b. defamation, fraud and physical injuries (Art.
33)
c. failure or refusal of a member of the police
force to render aid or protection to any person
in case of danger to life or property (Art. 34)
PERTINENT PROVISIONS
Civil Code, Art. 20. Every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from
criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,
subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the
pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on
Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book,
regulating damages. (1092a)
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)

RULE 111
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying
the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than
actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules,
no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and
civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which
shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment
Where the civil action has been filed separately
and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-
97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. — After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil
action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until
final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered
in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action
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in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented
by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated
criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the
running of the period of prescription of the civil action
which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished
if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. (2a)
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded
independently. — In the cases provided for in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. (3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. —
The death of the accused after arraignment and during
the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the
civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this
Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability
arising from other sources of obligation may be
continued against the estate or legal representative of
the accused after proper substitution or against said
estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused
may be substituted for the deceased without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the
offended party shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the
case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil
action the offended party may file against the estate of
the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar.
— A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving
the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal
action against the defendant for the same act or
omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question
in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in
court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in

the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. —
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. (5a)
Quinto v. Andres (2005)
Facts: Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school
pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was about
11 years old saw Andres and Pacheco who invited them
to go fishing inside a drainage culvert. Wilson assented
but Garcia seeing that it was dark inside opted to remain
seated in a grassy area about 2meters from the
entrance of the drainage system. Pacheco, Andres and
Quinto, entered the drainage system which was covered
by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter
wide, with water about a foot deep. After a while,
respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out
of the drainage system and left without saying a word.
Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged
again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead.
Andres laid the boy's lifeless body down in the grassy
area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled
from the scene. For his part, Andres went to the house
of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and
informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed
to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed
her. The respondents aver that since the prosecution
failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they
committed the crime of homicide and caused the death
of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the
latter‘s death.
Held: The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In the
present case, the court ruled that respondents cannot be
held criminally nor civilly liable for the death of Wilson.
In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any
ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the
deceased before or after the latter was invited to join
them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that
respondent Andres used to go to their house and play
with her son before the latter's death. When the
petitioner's son died inside the drainage culvert, it was
respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He
then informed the petitioner of her son's death. Even
after informing the petitioner of the death of her son,
respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to
the grassy area where the deceased was.
Chua v. CA
443 SCRA 142 (2004)
Facts: Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty
Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the City
Prosecutor of Manila charging Spouses Francis and Elsa
Chua, of 4 counts of falsification of public documents
pursuant to Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the
RPC. Accused allegedly prepared, certified, and falsified
the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of the
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BOD of the Siena Realty Corporation by causing it to
appear in said Minutes that Hao was present and has
participated in said proceedings. During the trial in the
MeTC, Atty. Sua-Kho and Atty. Rivera appeared as
private prosecutors. Chua moved to exclude
complainant's counsels as private prosecutors in the
case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove
any civil liability in the case. Petitioner cites the case of
Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature
of the offense or where the law defining and punishing
the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity,
the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution
of the offense.
Held: Petitioner's contention lacks merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is
the fundamental postulate that every man criminally
liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a
crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the State
whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual
member of the society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property has been actually or directly injured
or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An
act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by
law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it
is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really
the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair
or make whole the damage caused to another by reason
of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced
to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of the crime. The civil action
involves the civil liability arising from the offense
charged which includes restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
31 Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action."
Hao did not waive the civil action, nor did she
reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute
the civil action for damages arising from the offense
charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can
intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Basilio v. CA
328 SCRA 341 (2000)
Facts: Pronebo was found guilty by the trial
court of Reckless Imprudence resulting to the death of
one Advincula. Pronebo then filed an application for
probation. Subsequently, the trial court issued an Order
granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary
liability of his employer Basilio. Basilio now asserts that
he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial
court to prove the absence of an employer-employee
relationship between him and accused. Nor that,
alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging
duties as an employee at the time of the incident.
Held: The statutory basis for an employer's
subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the RPC. This
liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding

where the award is made. However, before execution
against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the
existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that
the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3)
that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he
commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4)
that said employee is insolvent.
Basilio knew of the criminal case that was filed
against his driver because it was his truck that was
involved in the incident. Further, it was the insurance
company, with which his truck was insured, that
provided the counsel for Pronebo, pursuant to the
stipulations in their contract. Basilio did not intervene in
the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through
counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show
employer-employee relationship. With the convict's
application for probation, the trial court's judgment
became final and executory. All told, it is our view that
the lower court did not err when it found that Basilio was
not denied due process. He had all his chances to
intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he
was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses
not to intervene at the appropriate time.
Philippine Rabbit v. People
427 SCRA 526 (2004)
Facts: Accused Roman, an employee of
Philippine Rabbit was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property. The court further ruled that Philippine Rabbit,
in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable
for his civil liabilities. Accused then jumped bail and
remained at-large. Philippine Rabbit filed a notice of
appeal. It argues that, as an employer, it is considered a
party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by
the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be
accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical
conclusion — including the appeal.
Held: The argument has no merit.
Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the
criminal case, which was filed solely against Roman, its
employee.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability
of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees. Although in substance and in
effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be
viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they
may assist their employees to the extent of supplying
the latter's lawyers, as in the present case, the former
cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can
only defend the accused.
When the accused-employee absconds or
jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of
the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own
behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its
subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of
the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer are carried in one single decision that has
become final and executory.
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B. SPECIAL CASES
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in
certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12
and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of
Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an
imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine
years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years
of age, who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane,
imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship
or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of
Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has
been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion,
the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.
When the respective shares cannot be
equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the
majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all
events, whenever the damages have been caused with
the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed
by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and
6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if
there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their
property exempt from execution.
CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS EXEMPT FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Exemption from criminal liability does not
include exemption from civil liability.
Exceptions:
1. There is no civil liability in paragraph 4 of Art. 12
which provides for injury caused by mere
accident.
2. There is no civil liability in par. 7 of Art. 12 which
provides for failure to perform an act required by
law when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause.
 The exemption from criminal liability does not include
exemption from civil liability in the cases provided for in
pars. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Art. 12. Pars. 4 and 7 are not
mentioned. Therefore, there is also exemption from civil
liability in the cases provided for in pars. 4 and 7 of Art.
12.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ACTS COMMITTED BY AN
INSANE OR IMBECILE OR MINOR UNDER 9 OR
OVER 9 AND LESS THAN 15 WHO ACTED WITH
DEISCERNMENT

 A minor over 15 years of age who acts with
discernment is not exempt from criminal liability that is
why the RPC is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his
parents. The particular law that governs is Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code which provides, ―the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.‖
 The final release of a child based on good conduct
does not obliterate his civil liability for damages.
2. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ACTS COMMITTED BY
PERSONS ACTING UNDER IRRESISTIBLE FORCE OR
UNCONTROLLABE FEAR
The persons using violence or causing the fear are
primarily liable. if there be no such persons, those doing
the act shall be liable secondarily.
3. CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS ACTING UNDER
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
There is no civil liability in justifying circumstances
except in par. 4 of Art. 11 wherein the person who was
benefited by the act which causes damage to another is
the one civilly liable.
4. CIVIL LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS AND SIMILAR
PERSONS
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of
innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments. — In default of the persons criminally
liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons
or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by
them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the
restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or
the person representing him, of the deposit of such
goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the
care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.
SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS,
TAVERNKEEPERS OR PROPRIETORS OF
ESTABLISHMENTS – ELEMENTS OF PAR. 1:
1. That the INNKEEPER, TAVERNKEEPER OR
PROPRIETOR of establishment or his employee
committed a violation of municipal ordinance
or some general or special police regulation.
2. That a crime is committed in such inn, tavern
or establishment.
3. That the person criminally liable is insolvent.
 When all the above elements are present, the
innkeeper, tavernkeeper or any other person or
corporation is civilly liable for the crime committed in his
establishment.
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ELEMENTS OF PAR 2.
1. The guests notified in advance the innkeeper
or the person representing him of the deposit
of their goods within the inn or house.
2. The guest followed the directions of the
innkeeper or his representative with respect to
the care of the vigilance over such goods.
3. Such goods of the guests lodging therein were
taken by robbery with force upon things or
theft committed within the inn or house.
 When all the above elements are present, the
innkeeper is subsidiarily liable.
 No liability shall attach in case of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons, unless
committed by the innkeeper‘s employees.
 It is not necessary that the effects of the guest be
actually delivered to the innkeeper, it is enough that
they were within the inn.
5. SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF OTHER PERSONS
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other
persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants,
pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
ELEMENTS:
1. The employer, teacher, person or corporation
is engaged in any kind of industry.
2. Any of their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices or employees commits a felony
while in the discharge of his duties.
3. The said employee is insolvent and has not
satisfied his civil liability.
 Private persons without business or industry are not
subsidiarily liable.
 The felony must be committed by the servant or
employee of the defendant in the civil case.
 Employer has the right to take part in the defense of
his employee.
 No defense of diligence of a good father of a family.
Carpio v. Doroja
180 SCRA 1 (1989)
Ruling upon the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability of an employer in the same criminal proceeding
without the need of a separate action, the court held
that it should be shown that:
1) the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of
industry
2) the employee committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties and
3) he is insolvent
The subsidiary liability of the employer,
however, arises only after conviction of the employee in
the criminal action. All these requisites present, the
employer, becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon
the employee‘s conviction and upon proof of the latter‘s
insolvency.
Vda. De Paman v. Seneris
G.R. No. L-37632, July 30, 1982
Facts:Delos Santos was a cargo truck driver for a
Lumber Company. He was charged of Reckless

Imprudence resulting to Homicide when he caused
Paman to fall from the truck. The Court of First Instance
convicted the driver and ordered to pay indemnity to
Paman‘s wife and children. As Delos Santos had no
properties, the wife filed for subsidiary liability for the
employer who was not informed of the proceeding.
Held: To be hold an employer subsidiarily liable, an
employer has to be engaged in any kind of industry, the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties and that the employee is insolvent. When a
criminal action is instituted, civil action for recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action except when the offended party waives rights or
files a separate proceeding.
C. WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
Art. 104. What is included in civil liability.
— The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102,
and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential
damages.
 The first remedy granted by law is RESTITUTION of
the thing taken away by the offender; if restitution
cannot be made by the offender or by his heirs, the law
allows the offended party REPARATION. In either case,
indemnity for consequential damages may be required.
 When property taken away is not recovered, the court
must order the accused to restore it to its owner or, as
an alternative, to pay its just value.
Art. 105. Restitution; How made. — The
restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever
possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or
diminution of value as determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though
it be found in the possession of a third person who has
acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his
action against the proper person, who may be liable to
him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in
which the thing has been acquired by the third person in
the manner and under the requirements which, by law,
bar an action for its recovery.
 RESTITUTION of the thing itself must be made
whenever possible.
 The convict cannot, by way of restitution, give to the
offended part a similar thing of the same amount, kin or
species and quality.
 Where the crime committed is not against property,
no restitution nor reparation of the thing damaged can
be done, although the offended party is entitled to
indemnification under Art. 107.
 If the accused is acquitted, he cannot be ordered to
return the property or amount received EXCEPT if:
- it is proved that the property belonged to the
offended party was in his possession when
stolen from him
- and the identity of the offender is not proved,
in which case the acquitted person in whose
possession the property was found may be
ordered by the court to return it to the owner.
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 HOW RESTITUTION IS MADE?
The thing itself is to be restored, whenever
possible, with allowance for deterioration, or diminution
of value, even if found in the possession of the 3rd
person who acquired it legally, although the latter can
file an action against the person who may be liable to
him except if the thing has been acquired by the 3rd
person in the manner provided by law which bars an
action for its recovery.
Art. 106. Reparation; How made. — The
court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into
consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible,
and its special sentimental value to the injured party,
and reparation shall be made accordingly.
HOW IS REPARATION MADE?
- The court determines the amount of damages
by considering: a) the price of the thing and b) its
special sentimental value to the offended party.
 If there is no evidence as to the value of the thing
unrecovered, there can be no reparation.
 The damages are limited to those caused by the
crime.
 The accused is liable for the damages caused as a
result of the destruction of the property after the crime
was committed either because it was lost or destroyed
by the accused himself or that of any other person or as
a result of any other cause or causes.
 The accused is not relieved of his obligation to satisfy
his civil liability if the insurance company has already
paid the offended party as the payment of the insurance
company was not made on behalf of the accused but
because the contract with the insured-offended party.
However, the insurance company is subrogated to the
right of the offended party to collect damages.
Art. 107. Indemnification; What is
included. — Indemnification for consequential damages
shall include not only those caused the injured party,
but also those suffered by his family or by a third person
by reason of the crime.
 Indemnification for consequential damages includes:
a. those caused the injured party
b. those suffered by the family, or
c. those suffered by 3rd person by reason of the
crime
 Damages cover not only ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
damages but also MORAL AND EXEMPLARY or
CORRECTIVE damages, especially when attended by 1
or more aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the crime and considering that proof of pecuniary loss is
not necessary in order that moral or exemplary damages
may be adjudicated as the assessment of such damages
is left to the discretion of the court.
 Contributory negligence of the offended party reduces
the liability of the accused.
 Where DEATH results:
1. INDEMNITY: P50,000
2. Lost of Earning Capacity
3. Support to a non-heir
4. Moral damages for mental anguish…
5. Exemplary damages if attended by 1 or more
aggravating circumstances

People v. Wahiman
G.R. No. 200942, June 2015
The computation for loss of earning capacity was
extensively discussed in the 1970 case of Villa Rey
Transit v. Court of Appeals. In Villa Rey Transit, this
court considered two factors in determining loss of
earning capacity, which are: "(1) the number of years
on the basis of which the damages shall be computed;
and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said
respondents should be fixed." The number of years is
often pegged at life expectancy (instead of work
expectancy), while the rate of losses is derived from
annual income. The general formula applied is:
 Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy ×
[Gross Annual Income – Necessary Expenses]
o To approximate the first factor of life expectancy,
this court has applied the formula in the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
actuarial of Combined Experience Table of
Mortality.
Hence:
Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (80 – age of the deceased at
time of death)
This is a step-by-step guide to compute an award for
loss of earning capacity.
1. Subtract the age of the deceased from 80.
2. Multiply the answer in (1) by 2, and divide it
by 3 (these operations are interchangeable)
3. Multiply 50% to the annual gross income of the
deceased
4. Multiply the answer in (2) by the answer in (3).
This is the loss of earning capacity to be
awarded
When the evidence on record only shows monthly gross
income, annual gross income is derived from multiplying
the monthly gross income by 12. When the daily wage is
the only information provided during trial, such amount
may be multiplied by 260, or the number of usual
workdays in a year, to arrive at annual gross income.
For this case, the victim was 54 years old at his time of
death. The prosecution was able to prove that his
monthly income was ₱95,000.00. With the amount
multiplied by 12, the victim‘s annual gross income is
₱1,140,000.00.
To compute for life expectancy, or steps 1 and 2, we
would get:
Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (80 – 54)
Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (26)
Life Expectancy = 17 1/3 years
Applying the victim's life expectancy and annual gross
income to the general formula, or step 3:
Loss of Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x 1/2 annual
gross income
Loss of Earning Capacity = 17 1/3 x 1/2
(₱1,140,000.00)
Loss of Earning Capacity = 17 1/3 x ₱570,000.00
Loss of Earning Capacity = ₱9,880,000.00.
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D. PERSONS CIVILLY LIABLE
Art. 108. Obligation to make restoration,
reparation for damages, or indemnification for
consequential damages and actions to demand the
same; Upon whom it devolves. — The obligation to
make restoration or reparation for damages and
indemnification for consequential damages devolves
upon the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation,
and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the
person injured.
 Upon whom does the obligation to make restoration,
reparation or indemnification for damages devolve?
- upon the HEIRS of the person liable
 The heirs of the person liable has no obligation if
restoration is not possible and the deceased left no
property.
 Civil liability is possible only when the offender dies
after final judgment.
 The action to demand restoration, reparation and
indemnification descends to the heirs of the person
injured.
Art. 109. Share of each person civilly
liable. — If there are two or more persons civilly liable
for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for
which each must respond.
Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liability of
principals, accomplices and accessories of a
felony; Preference in payment. — Notwithstanding
the provisions of the next preceding article, the
principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within
their respective class, shall be liable severally (in
solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and
subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.
The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first
against the property of the principals; next, against that
of the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the
accessories.
Whenever the liability in solidum or the
subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by
whom payment has been made shall have a right of
action against the others for the amount of their
respective shares.
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES AND
ACCESSORIES
- Each within their respective class is liable in
solidum among themselves for their quotas and
subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable.
 Subsidiary liability is enforced:
first, against the property of the principals;
second, against that of the accomplices;
third, against that of the accessories
 The person who made the payment when liability is in
solidum or subsidiary liability has been enforced, will
have a right of action against the others for the amount
of their respective shares.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVIEW NOTES

Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in

certain cases. — Any person who has participated
gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to
make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent
of such participation.

 This refers to a person who has participated

gratuitously in the commission of a felony and he is
bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to
the extent of such participation.
 The third person must be innocent of the commission
of the crime; otherwise, he would be liable as an
accessory and this article will apply.

E. EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY

Art. 112. Extinction of civil liability. — Civil

liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of
this Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as
obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Law.

 Extinguished in the same manner as other obligations

in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.

CIVIL CODE, Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance:
(2) By the loss of the thing due:
(3) By the condonation or remission of the
debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of
creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
Other causes of extinguishment of obligations,
such as annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory
condition, and prescription, are governed elsewhere in
this Code. (1156a)

 Loss of the thing due does not extinguish civil liability

because if the offender cannot make restitution, he is
obliged to make reparation.
 Indemnity for damages as a judgment in a criminal
case is purely civil in nature and is independent of the
penalty imposed.

Art. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil

liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil
liability as provided in the next preceding article the
offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil
liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has
not been required to serve the same by reason of
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other
reason.

 Unless extinguished, civil liability subsists even if the

offender has served sentence consisting of deprivation
of liberty or other rights or has served the same, due to
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other
reason.
 Under the law as amended, even if the subsidiary
imprisonment is served for non-payment of fine, this
pecuniary liability of the defendant is not extinguished.

156