KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T.

ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch

134, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for
five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed
they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose
Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was
replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of respondent judge from
the consideration of the case.[1] The motion alleged in pertinent part:

1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver the three (3) successive postponements
for the presentation for cross-examination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;

2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not
yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting
did not likewise appear while other counsels were present;

3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty.
Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796,
and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;

4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be
the last case to recover the partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle;

5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the
Presiding Judge, he should immediately move for his inhibition.

The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.

Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him
on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court.[2]

In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his
Counsel, Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed the motion in a
representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him that a young man possibly employed by the Court had
advised him to have the case reraffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a hearing, because
their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who the judge may be and when he would appear. Wickers sense of disquiet increased when at
the next two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the latters witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels
were present.[3]

Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and
sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of December 17, 1993. In the same
order respondent judge directed petitioners to appear before him on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.

In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his
discretion in citing them for contempt. They argue that when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a
judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt.

In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by
virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was personally recruited
from the South by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding
sessions on October 18, 1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man
who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from
implementing the execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to avail themselves of all possible remedies; that after holding
petitioners in contempt, he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos claim that he
was just lawyering and acting as the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client is untenable because his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important
than those which he owes to his client; and that by tendering their profuse apologies in their motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order,
petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil
Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be reraffled to another sala of the RTC of
Makati, while in their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong
be allowed to continue hearing the case on the ground that he had a full grasp of the case.

In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of the case, it was upon the suggestion of
respondent judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case.

What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has
been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within
the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.[6]

It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may be punished only [a]fter charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent
may be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only
judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.[7]

Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners are right about the nature of the
case against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they
were held guilty of contempt. What is important to determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners
liable for direct contempt.

We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail.[8] The contempt power ought
not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.[9]

Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangels finding that petitioners are
guilty of contempt. A reading of the allegations in petitioners motion for inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:

2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet
reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did
not likewise appear while other counsels were present;

3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty.
Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796,
and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;

leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose
wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated easing out the former judge to make room for such transfer.

These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of
justice in this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is
that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely in the interest
of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution.[10] This is a matter of record which could have easily been
verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he deliberated for two months whether or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly
asked him to do.

In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his client of whom he was merely a
mouthpiece. He was just lawyering and he cannot be gagged, even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were
false since it was his client who verified the same.

To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified young man, whom he thought to be employed
in the court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on
the same days the new judge failed to come. It would, therefore, appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been personally
recruited by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been eased out were Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus understating
his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.

Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client
came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his
responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep.[11] Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as
his client.

Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others[12] and not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by the record or have materiality to the case.[13]

After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners profuse apologies and indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without
any jail sentence, petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel
be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City. If
nothing else, this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence first evident in
petitioners motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith.

Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel:[14]

Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from
participating in the consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they based their
motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn
insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.

Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than
vindictive principle we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of petitioner
Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have
come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact
Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could not point a court employee who was
the source of the same. At least he had the grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel
was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners description of him in the instant petition as a
judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact that the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he
is a 1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.

In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15] which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the judge corrupt, the Court, while finding counsel guilty
of direct contempt, removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court for the reason that

Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in
imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of
grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be
increased to P500.00.

The same justification also holds true in this case.

WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the
fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Baculi vs. Battung

Before us is the resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating
Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B.
Baculi, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of the Bar with
postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao City.

Background

Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment[2] with the Commission on Discipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter
violated Canons 11[3] and 12[4] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent
was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his
voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, Then cite me! [5]Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt
and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against
you! I am not afraid of you! [6] Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of
court for the second time.

After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The
respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you! He kept on shouting, I am not
afraid of you! and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.[7]

Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of the
Clerk of Court.[8]

Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640, an ejectment case.

Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he modified on December 14, 2007. After the
modified decision became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash the
previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted
that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The respondent filed his Answer,[9] essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who disrespected him.[10] We quote from his Answer:
 23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against him once inside the court room when he was
lambasting me[.]

24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without
oral argument because he wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the public that
I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT making
it an impression to the litigants and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and
IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.

25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]

xxxx

28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi could have just made an order that the
Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did was that he forced me to argue so that he will
have the room to humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).

Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.

The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his Commissioners Report, [11] Commissioner
De la Rama stated that during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely reiterated what they alleged in their submitted
pleadings. Both parties agreed that the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would be submitted for the Commissioners
review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and the transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.

Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:[12]

At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the respondent was calm. He politely
argued his case but the voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference, it was also
observed that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in the TSN, where there was already
an argument, the complainant stated the following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you do
not want to appear before my court, then you better attend to your cases and do not appear before my
court if you do not want to be corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words we are very sorry [ were] actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge
was saying the quoted portion of the TSN)

That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions when the undersigned noticed that
Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding judge.

Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?

*
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to present our evidence
ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules on summary
procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)

It was observed that the judge uttered the following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant.

Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other.

Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him. But after hearing
the tape, the undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the complainant.

Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases to be called. They must have
observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as one in saying that it was
really Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter cautioned him not to shout.

The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:

Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00.

Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross ignorance of the law.

Court: Yes, proceed.

(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)

Court: Next case.

Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.

(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
 Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished)

Court: The next time

Atty. Battung: We would like to clear

Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to see me, see me after the court.
Next case.

Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)

Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a
lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The respondents argument that Judge Baculi
provoked him to shout should not be given due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he
created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to file an action before the Office of the
Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act according to the norms of judicial conduct.

With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the
evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial processes to frustrate the ends of justice.

Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that the respondent be reprimanded.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung
disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court
personnel. The respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the
respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him
for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions
were not only against the person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly
disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.

Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule,
demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.[13] that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky
foundations.

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latters role, stature and position in our justice system. When the
respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the
respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to decide cases.
Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining
lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty
of six (6) months suspension.

We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.

In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor,[14] we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating
Rule 11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for violating the Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances
against a judge in newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs violations are no less serious as they were committed in the courtroom
in the course of judicial proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before the litigating public. His actions were plainly
disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Decision. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondents personal record as an attorney;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
Cervantez vs. Sabio
Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional
retirement on November 23, 2005. Some of the cases lodged in his sala were ejectment cases filed by Extra-Ordinary Development Corporation (EDC)
against the clients of Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio (respondent). It appears that respondent had filed motions for inhibition of complainant on the basis of
the fact that EDC gave him a house and lot putting into serious doubt his impartiality, independence and integrity. The motions were denied.

After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated April 6, 2006,[1] sought the investigation of complainant for
bribery.

In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 6, 2006 of Edwin P. Cardeo,[2] a utility worker in the
MTC of Cabuyao, stating that, inter alia, orders and decisions of complainant were not generated from the typewriter of the court but from a computer
which the court did not have, it having acquired one only on May 2, 2005; that there had been many times that a certain Alex of EDC would go to the
court bearing certain papers for the signature of complainant; that he came to learn that a consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or
decision released by complainant in favor of EDC; and that he also came to know that attempts at postponing the hearings of the complaints filed by
EDC were thwarted by complainant as he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.

By Resolution of August 30, 2006,[3] this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
relative to respondents complaint against complainant, approved the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit, the complaint
being unsubstantiated and motivated by plain unfounded suspicion, and for having been filed after the effectivity of his optional retirement (underscoring
supplied).

Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint[4] of complainant against respondent, for disbarment.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

From the Report and Recommendation[5] of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Randall C. Tabayoyong, it is gathered that despite
the January 12, 2007 Order for respondent to file an answer to the complaint, he failed to do so, prompting the Commissioner to declare him in default.

It is further gathered that after the conduct by the Investigating Commissioner of a mandatory conference on May 25, 2007, the parties were ordered to
file their respective position papers. In compliance with the Order, complainant submitted his verified position paper.[6] Respondent did not.

Defined as issues before the IBP were:

(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the complainant before the Office of the Court Administrator
in Admin Matter OCA IPI No. 06-1842-MTJ was malicious, false and untruthful.

(2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondents complaint against herein complainant false and untruthful, it noting that
respondents complaint was dismissed by this Court due to insufficiency of evidence which, to the IBP, merely shows a failure on the part of respondent
to prove his allegations against complainant.

Noting, however, this Courts August 30, 2006 Resolution finding respondents complaint unsubstantiated and motivated by plain, unfounded
suspicion, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent knowingly instituted not only a groundless suit against herein complainant, but
also a suit based simply on his bare suspicion and speculation. (underscoring supplied)

On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery charge against complainant, respondent violated the proscription of the Code of
Professional Responsibility against wittingly or willingly promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit including baseless administrative complaints against
judges and other court officers and employees.

The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that

while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the allegations in respondents affidavit-complaint against herein
complainant were false, the evidence nonetheless show[s] that respondent had knowingly and maliciously instituted a groundless
suit, based simply on his unfounded suspicions against complainant;[7] (Underscoring supplied)

and that he violated Canons 10,[8] 11,[9] & 12[10] and Rule 11.04[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility under his oath of office.

He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.

The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution,[12] informs that on November 22, 2007, it adopted the following Resolution
adopting and approving with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents violation of Canons 10, 11 and 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional responsibility for filing a groundless
suit against complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. (Emphasis in the original)
The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.

Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a lawyer is to be disciplined, the evidence against him should be
substantial, competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on the basis of hearsay.[13]

No doubt, it is this Courts duty to investigate the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers. But it is also its duty to shield them from
unfounded suits which are intended to, among other things, harass them.
 WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar questioned act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.

Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE
WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. — Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties,
which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is
nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. — However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT
EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. — Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of
whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In
fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on
said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. — The Ombudsman cannot compel
this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before
Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of
service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman
could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can,
whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and
(2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidences.

In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office
alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in
fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in
1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.

Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts.

The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code
for his felonious act.

However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs
counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates
reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot
compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4

The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been
granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet
been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of
said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action
on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty.
Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5054 May 29, 2002

SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr.,
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.

From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized respondent to sell her two parcels of land
located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots,
but despite complainant’s repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent
and his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was required to present ex-parte her evidence. On 29 September
1993, the court rendered its decision (Annex "C" of the Complaint) ordering respondent herein to pay complainant the sum of P16,000 as principal
obligation, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay
the costs of suit.1âwphi1.nêt

Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket
fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, which the court granted on
30 October 1995. The next day, the alias writ of execution was issued (Annex "B" of Complaint). It appears that only a partial satisfaction of
the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn
against his account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.

Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed (Annexes "D" and "E" of
Complaint). Demands for respondent to make good the checks fell on deaf ears, thus forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Annexes "F," "G," "H" and "I" of the Complaint).

In the "Joint Affidavit" of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City, respondent admitted having drawn and issued
said four postdated checks in favor of complainant. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by complainant, he
subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified
that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.

We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable action on his three motions for extension of time to file
the comment. His failure to do so compelled complainant to file on 10 March 2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on the ground that his
strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment "smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the
bar and a law dean."

In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent to have waived the filing of a comment; and referred this
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety days from notice of the
resolution.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Milagros V. San Juan concluded that respondent had
no intention to "honor" the money judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2)
closing of the account against which said checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then
recommends that respondent be declared "guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant" and be suspended from the practice of law for at least
one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.

In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Atty. San Juan’s Report and
Recommendation.

We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty.
Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondent’s grave misconduct and notorious
dishonesty.

There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant
reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he
compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor.
Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the
Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to
prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already
unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had
done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against
him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his
obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.

All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent’s claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all checks is preposterous. The
account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which
could not be encashed before their maturity dates.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers
(Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably
failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondent’s act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt
to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his
continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity of making a mockery of our
generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file
the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the
comment. To the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful
orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).

Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that
lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for their failure to do so.1âwphi1.nêt

The penalty of suspension "for at least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both vague and inadequate. A suspension may
either be indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides, under the circumstances of this case a suspension for a year is plainly very light and inadequate.
For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
coupled with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty. That graver penalty is
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is
directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuñez the amount of P13,800 within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.

This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts with copies of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.