Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Student Companion
William L. O’Neill
WORLD WAR II
A Student Companion
William L. O’Neill
O’Neill, William L.
World War II : a student companion / William L. O’Neill.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–19–510800–0
1. World War, 1939–45––Juvenile literature. I. Title.
II. Title: World War Two. III. Title: World War 2.
d743.7.049 1999
940.53––dc21 98-54918
987654321
On the cover: (top left) Dwight D. Eisenhower; (top right) Adolf Hitler;
(bottom) USS Bunker Hill bombarded by kamikazes off Kyushu,
Japan, May 11, 1945
Frontispiece: Private Paul Oglesby of the 30th Infantry stands at the altar of
a bombed-out church during the Italian campaign, September 23, 1943.
CONTENTS
PREFACE
HOW TO USE THIS BOOK
WORLD WAR II:
A STUDENT COMPANION
APPENDIX 1:
IMPORTANT DATES DURING
WORLD WAR II
APPENDIX 2:
MUSEUMS AND HISTORIC SITES
FURTHER READING AND WEBSITES
INDEX
Image Not Available
Servicemen put out a fire aboard the USS West Virginia during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
7
PREFACE
T
he Second World War was the most from taking advantage of the opportunity
deadly and costly military struggle that the defeat of Japan gave them. But
ever fought. It is estimated that over the long term Communism has proved
some 60 million people died as a result of to be less of a threat to freedom than Nazi
it, most of them civilians. But this figure is Germany and Imperial Japan. It has shown
only a guess. Some countries did not want itself to be capable of reform, as in China,
to admit the full extent of their losses. The and even of being overturned, as in Russia
Soviet Union, for example, always used to and Eastern Europe.
claim that about 20 million soldiers and World War II remains, therefore, a
civilians died because of the war. But when struggle that was not less noble for being
he was still president of the USSR Mikhail imperfect. It was fought at times with
Gorbachev admitted that as many as 29 methods that are hard to defend today. It
million Soviet citizens may have perished. failed to solve all the problems of humanity.
Even this number could still be too low. But what it did do was save a large part
Despite the war’s frightful cost, the of the world from tyranny, and make possi-
Soviet Union and the Western democracies ble the salvation of other parts of the
had no choice except to resist the forces of world in the future. Every Allied nation
Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. To start can take pride in what it sacrificed for
with, of course, they fought to save them- this great outcome. No subject is more
selves. But there was more at stake than worth studying today for what it teaches
simple survival. Japan intended to enslave us about the meaning of freedom and
the peoples of East and Southeast Asia, democracy.
whom the Japanese regarded as racially The articles in this book have been
inferior. The Nazis also viewed most of the designed to explain the war as accurately
people of Europe as racially inferior to the as possible. Many of the topics covered
Aryan, or Nordic, “race,” of which they remain controversial to this day, so no
believed Germans to be members. The attempt has been made to present this
Nazi plan was to rule Europe, at the very material as the last word on any subject.
least, and to exterminate not only Jews, Readers will have to decide for themselves
but Gypsies and millions of Slavs. The whether this policy or that program was
wars against Germany and Japan were, in wise, or moral, or effective. Although the
this sense, wars against particularly mur- facts are correct to the best of my knowl-
derous forms of racism. They were also edge, the opinions expressed are my own.
wars fought to save democracy and free- They are products of long study and reflec-
dom. It was for good reason that General tion and are as well-reasoned as I could
Dwight D. Eisenhower called his autobiog- make them, but scholars with impressive
raphy Crusade in Europe. qualifications have often come to different
War is never the best way to handle conclusions. That is the nature of history as
political problems. And wars, even when a field, and part of its glory.
they end in victory, cannot cure every ill. Each entry is meant both to provide
After World War II Americans were unhap- essential information and to lead readers
py that Eastern Europe, and later China on to further study by pointing to other
and other nations, came under Communist entries, suggested readings, and significant
rule. That could not be helped. Without the films and videos. A general bibliography at
Soviet Union Nazi Germany could not have the end lists some of the most important
been defeated, and the Soviets could not be books on World War II, but the subject is
denied the spoils of victory. Neither could so vast that a complete listing would
the Communists in China be prevented require a separate volume.
8
HOW TO USE
THIS BOOK
T
he articles in this Companion are as follows: Fleets, armies and air forces are
arranged alphabetically, so you can spelled out; for example, Fifth Fleet, Third
look up words, concepts, or names Army, Eighth Air Force. Units below them
as you come across them in other readings. were assigned roman numerals; for exam-
You can then use the SEE ALSO listings at ple, IV Corps or XX Bomber Command.
the end of an article to find entries about More basic units were given Arabic num-
related subjects. Sometimes you may find bers; for example, Task Force 58, 4th
that the Companion deals with information Armored Division. Army companies were
under a different article name than what assigned letters, such as Company C, also
you looked up. The book will then refer known as Charlie Company. Battalions and
you to the proper article. For example, if regiments were numbered, as in 2nd Battal-
you look up Paratroops, you will find the ion, 354th Regiment.
notation “SEE Airborne Warfare.” If you American historians often apply Amer-
cannot find an article on a particular sub- ican terms to foreign units, except when
ject, look in the index to guide you to the they had distinctive names, such as Luft-
relevant articles. waffe for the German Air Force. If confu-
All people are listed alphabetically by sion sets in remember that the important
last name; for example the entry for Harry thing is to get the number right, whether
Truman is listed under T as Truman, Harry Arabic, roman, or spelled out.
S. In the case of military figures the rank or Notable individuals: If you want to
position given is the highest they held dur- know about a particular military or civilian
ing the war. For example the entry for figure in the war look up his or her last
Omar N. Bradley names him as Comman- name. There are also topical articles on
der of the 12th U.S. Army Group, although particular groups, such as African Ameri-
he held many other positions and would cans and Japanese Americans.
rise after the war to become chief of the Ordnance: Individual weapons or
Joint Chiefs of Staff. weapons systems sometimes have their own
You can also use this Companion topi- entries, for example the V-1 flying bomb
cally, by reading all the articles about a par- and the German U-boat (submarine). If you
ticular aspect of World War II. Below are do not find the weapon you are looking for
several groupings of topics around com- under its own entry try looking under
mon themes. general headings such as Small arms,
Battles and events: The names of bat- Artillery, and Bombers.
tles and events are those most commonly Origins of the war: The origins of
used, for example Bulge, battle of the; D- the war with Germany and the war with
Day; Dresden, bombing of; Malmedy Japan are explained in the articles on each
massacre. country. But their surrenders are treated in
Countries: Information on the war at separate articles, for example “Japan,
home for Britain, Canada, France, Ger- surrender of”.
many, Italy, Japan, Poland, and the Soviet Theaters of war: Theater is an old term
Union can be found in the articles named for a region of military operations. Howev-
for those countries. American life during er, in World War II the United States used
the war is listed separately under “Home theater only in the war against Germany, as
front.” Other articles on domestic matters in the European Theater of Operations
include “Financing the war,” “Labor,” (ETO). In the Pacific War theaters were
“Mobilization,” and “Motion Pictures.” called areas. Except for the Southwest
Military organizations: The United Pacific Area, which was an Army theater
States spells out or abbreviates major units commanded by General Douglas
9
• H O W T O U S E T H I S B O O K •
MacArthur, the rest of the Pacific was Museums and historic sites: A partial
under the command of Admiral Chester list of museums and historic sites is includ-
Nimitz and known collectively as the Pacif- ed. Some of these, such as the Arlington
ic Ocean Area (POA). It was subdivided Cemetery in Washington, D.C., are not
into the South, Central and North Pacific limited to World War II, but all bear impor-
Areas, each being a separate theater. The tantly on the war experience. As a rule
article Pacific War covers all the fighting museums and sites do not provide a great
against Japan from Pearl Harbor in 1941 deal of information, but they often give
through the first half of 1942. Thereafter impressions or provide a sense of time and
combat operations are described in separate place that cannot be found elsewhere.
articles named for each area. Websites: There are a growing number
Further Reading: If you want to know of internet sites devoted to aspects of World
more about a specific topic, you can use the War II. The Further Reading section in the
FURTHER READING entries at the end of back of this book provides links to internet
each article as well as the Further Reading addresses and resources. Web pages for the
guide at the end of the book, which lists museums and historic sites listed in Appen-
more general sources. dix 2 have been included when available.
10
WORLD WAR II
A Student Companion
In 1942 African Americans were
African Americans still underrepresented in the military,
which was not only politically unwise
but a waste of manpower. Roosevelt
ordered the Navy, much against its will,
Negroes, the term used to describe to enlist blacks for general service. The
African Americans for most of the 19th Army General Staff suggested that
and 20th centuries, were the largest racially integrated units be formed. This
racial minority in the United States and proved to be too radical a step, even
suffered from segregation and discrimi- though it was more expensive to build
nation during the war just as they had segregated training camps. However, in
before it. Yet manpower shortages and all the service branches except the Army
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s need Air Corps, officer candidate schools
for black votes combined to temper were integrated to save money.
white intolerance. More important, At the end of 1944 there were more
gains made by blacks during the war set black officers than could be placed,
the stage for the civil rights revolution because of the Army’s rule that only
that would follow it. whites were to command black units.
Blacks in the Services Because the Another rule was that no black could be
leadership of the armed forces was prej- ranked higher than the lowest-ranked
udiced against blacks, the mobilization white in any unit, which meant that few
plan of 1940 called for only about half blacks could rise above first lieutenant.
as many blacks as whites to be drafted This was justified on the grounds that
in proportion to their respective pop- black troops were said to prefer white
ulations. Blacks were to be confined officers, which was untrue, particularly
largely to service rather than combat because so many white officers were
units and be excluded entirely from the southerners with racist attitudes offen-
Army Air Corps and Marines, and from sive to African-American troops.
the Navy except as waiters. However, White officers seldom wished to be
military discrimination became a politi- assigned to black units. If white officers
cal issue in the 1940 election, and to were hard on the troops, charges of dis-
hold the black vote Roosevelt forced crimination typically resulted, but if they
the Army to say that it would become stood up for their men they were often
10 percent black, giving roughly the scorned by their peers and accused of
same ratio of blacks to whites as in the being “nigger lovers.”
general population. To police African-American barracks,
This did not go far enough for white and prevent violence directed against black
liberals and black activists, and in response soldiers by whites, white officers often had
to further pressure the Army announced to take on extra patrol duties because
that it would form a number of black commanders would not entrust black offi-
combat units, promote a black colonel to cers with doing this. In the South, white
the rank of brigadier general, and appoint officers of black units were discriminated
black advisors to Secretary of War Henry against socially. Almost everyone believed
Stimson and the Selective Service chief, that they were assigned to command black
Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey. These troops as a punishment.
actions kept black voters in the Democrat- In addition, black soldiers were
ic party, even though blacks continued to often victims of violence, especially in the
serve in segregated units. South; scores were killed or wounded
11
• A F R I C A N A M E R I C A N S •
sioned 700 black officers to the Navy’s survey made by the U.S. Employment
58. But, on the whole, blacks were Office found that more than half of the
neglected by the military in World responding defense contractors had no
War II, which, given the manpower intention of hiring blacks.
shortage, was a blunder as well as an This situation outraged A. Philip
injustice. Randolph, president of the Brotherhood
Despite everything, the black war of Sleeping Car Porters, the only Negro
experience had long-term benefits in union of any importance, who issued a
addition to the fact that African-Ameri- call for a black march on Washington to
can veterans took advantage of the GI protest job discrimination. Randolph
Bill of Rights. The war gave black veter- was the leading spokesman for black
ans a larger view of the world and of workers because the two most impor-
their own abilities. Many who were tant labor organizations had no black
drafted from southern states never officers. The American Federation of
returned to the region that had discrimi- Labor, an older establishment consisting
nated against them most fiercely. By of unions that organized workers by
1950 more than half of all black veter- craft—plumbers, mechanics, and car-
ans were living in a different part of the penters, for example—actively discrimi-
country from where they had been born, nated against blacks. The Congress of
compared to about a third of blacks in Industrial Organizations, which enrolled
the same age group who had not served its members industrywide, did have
in the military. black members, but, because it was only
Studies show that military service ben- a few years old, no prominent black
efited veterans after the war. In 1949 each officers. Because the all-black Brother-
additional year of age added $75 to the hood of Sleeping Car Porters was large
annual income of whites nationwide, but and established, both it and Randolph
only $20 to that of blacks in the South. If commanded great respect among
they had moved to the North, their African Americans.
income increase was the same as that of Despite the requests of Mayor
whites. For whites each year of military Fiorello LaGuardia of New York and
service was worth as much to their later others not to hurt the defense effort or
earning power as an additional year of embarrass President Roosevelt, Ran-
education. But for blacks each year of ser- dolph went forward with his plans for
vice was worth up to three years of educa- the march. It was expected that 50,000
tion. One of the few good things about the African Americans would turn out on
war was that the military, which did not July 1, 1941. Four days before the
want blacks and discriminated against scheduled march, FDR invited a group
them severely, benefited African Americans of leaders, including Randolph and Wal-
just the same. ter White, president of the National
On the home front For black Association for the Advancement of
civilian workers, World War II opened Colored People (NAACP), to meet with
up a host of new opportunities. This too him.
was unintentional, for, like the armed The result was Executive Order
services, industry had not intended to 8802, which established what became
recruit blacks. In 1940 there were the Fair Employment Practices Commis-
5,389,000 employed blacks, of whom sion (FEPC), an agency that worked on
3,582,000 were male, almost none of behalf of African Americans, Jews,
whom had high-paying defense jobs. A aliens, naturalized citizens, Asians, His-
13
• A F R I C A N A M E R I C A N S •
panics, and Native Americans. It would in Mobile, Alabama, white workers riot-
enjoy considerable success, aided greatly ed, seriously injuring 20 blacks. Two
by labor shortages that forced employers blacks were killed and 50 injured during
to lower old barriers. By 1944 blacks a race riot in Beaumont, Texas.
held 7.5 percent of all jobs in war indus- On June 15 and 17, 1943, there
tries. This was less than their share of were minor race riots in the Detroit area,
the population but a great improvement where black workers had flocked for
over 1940. automotive industry jobs, worsening an
The industries that resisted hiring already acute housing shortage. Sunday,
blacks, or hired them only at the lowest June 20, was unusually hot, and crowds
levels, were usually those dominated by of people jammed Belle Isle in the
racist labor unions. The machinists and Detroit River seeking relief. Many fights
boilermakers represented 30 to 40 per- broke out and by 11:00 p.m. the fights
cent of airframe workers and more than had turned into mob violence. Down-
20 percent of shipyard employees, but town, a black mob, inflamed by rumors,
the machinists were lily white and the seems to have rioted first, after which
boilermakers segregated blacks in power- whites retaliated, hunting down and
less locals. Of the 31 national unions killing blacks, with police support and
that openly discriminated against blacks, approval.
19 were in the railroad industry. Almost Federal troops were finally called in
all of them refused to change their prac- to restore order, by which time some 35
tices despite FEPC orders and court rul- people, a majority of them black, were
ings. White workers frequently went on dead, more than 700 wounded, and
Adam Clayton
strike to protest the hiring or promotion 1,300 under arrest. Seventeen blacks were
Powell, Jr.,
of blacks. When white workers at the shot by the police, all of them supposedly
addresses the
Philadelphia Transit Company went on looters. Whites looted and burned, too, Negro Free-
strike to protest the upgrading of eight but none were shot by policemen. dom Rally at
black porters to drivers, the company In light of the appalling amount of Madison
had to be taken over by the Army in racial violence during the war, some of it Square Gar-
order to keep the trains and buses run- caused by blacks to be sure, but most of den in New
ning. it a result of white racism, there was no York City,
Job discrimination was bad, but reason to be optimistic about an June 26, 1944.
racial violence was even worse. Attacks
on blacks were frequent in the South,
where lynchings continued throughout
the war. They also became common
elsewhere. A series of racial clashes
occurred in 1943. Fights between white
and black gangs in Newark, New Jersey,
caused the death of one black. A black
soldier was killed during a race riot in Image Not Available
Centreville, Mississippi. In El Paso,
Texas, a riot among soldiers caused two
deaths. At Camp Stewart, Georgia, gun-
fire was exchanged between black sol-
diers and military policemen that re-
sulted in five casualties, one fatal. After
12 blacks were promoted at a shipyard
14
• A F R I K A K O R P S •
Waves of para-
troopers are
dropped from
planes during
operations in
Holland.
ners, taking serious casualties even before Gavin, James M. On to Berlin: Battles of
reaching their drop sites. The most suc- an Airborne Commander. New York:
Viking, 1978.
cessful Allied drops were made on the Huston, James Alvin. Out of the Blue:
night of June 5–6, 1944, as the spearhead U.S. Army Airborne Operations in
of Operation Overlord, the code name World War II. West Lafayette, Ind.: Pur-
due University Press, 1972.
for the invasion of Normandy. One Ridgway, Matthew B. Soldier: The Mem-
British and two U.S. divisions (the 82nd oirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. New York:
and 101st Airborne) succeeded in taking Harper, 1956.
most of their objectives, more or less jus-
tifying themselves—although there is no
question but that Overlord would have
succeeded without them. Air Corps, U.S.
The greatest loss experienced by SEE United States Army Air Forces
paratroopers took place during Opera- (USAAF)
tion Market Garden when, beginning on
September 17, 1944, one British and
two U.S. airborne divisions, plus a Pol-
ish brigade, landed behind enemy lines Aircraft
in Holland. The plan was to secure
bridges, especially over the Rhine, but it
proved to be too ambitious, and heavy
Allied casualties produced few returns.
More than anything else, what distin-
Thereafter, except for an uneventful
guished World War II from previous
two-division drop behind the Rhine in
conflicts was the massive use of aircraft.
March 1945, most Allied paratroopers
Germany’s blitzkriegs (lightning wars)
fought as regular infantrymen. Even the
were made possible by powerful air
famed U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, which
attacks on enemy units, and on the
was brilliantly led by Major General
communication and supply lines behind
Matthew B. Ridgway, a paratroop com-
them. The defeat of Britain and France
mander, consisted largely of regular
in 1940 resulted in large part from their
infantry and armored units. Though they
having lost control of the air.
did a superb job, the use of trained para-
No nation made greater use of air-
chutists as ordinary infantrymen was in
craft than the United States. The Japan-
effect an admission that large-scale air-
ese Navy was defeated almost entirely
borne operations were not cost effective.
by U.S. naval warplanes. General Doug-
Apparently they still are not, for although
las MacArthur was able to bypass
the U.S. Army continues to maintain air-
strongly defended Japanese-held islands
borne divisions, it has not staged a mass
in the Southwest Pacific because they
combat drop since World War II.
were completely cut off by the Army Air
Forces and could not launch attacks or
SEE ALSO be reinforced or supplied.
D-Day The Axis forces in North Africa
were defeated after Allied air power iso-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G lated them from their sources of supply
Ambrose, Stephen E. Band of Brothers: E in Europe. The Allies gained control of
Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Air-
borne: From Normandy to Hitler’s
the air over Western Europe even before
Eagle’s Nest. New York: Simon & the invasion of Normandy and main-
Schuster, 1992. tained it afterward. Because the Ger-
17
• A I R C R A F T C A R R I E R S •
Aircraft carriers
mans could only travel on land at night When the United States went to war, the
and in bad weather, their operations U.S. Navy possessed seven fleet carriers
were severely limited. When pressure (CVs). Two, Lexington and Saratoga,
from Allied ground forces threw them had been built on the hulls of battle
into retreat, and therefore into the open, cruisers, and with a displacement of
slaughter resulted. almost 34,000 tons were the largest ships
Air transportation was vital as well. in the fleet. None of the other five was
China was supplied entirely by air for larger than 18,000 tons. Under construc-
most of World War II. U.S. forces were tion were the first of the Essex-class air-
able to fight all over the world because craft carriers, which displaced 24,500
of the mighty U.S. Air Transport Com- tons and would begin joining the fleet in
mand (ATC), whose fleet of two- and 1942. Because their flight decks were not
four-engine planes served as freighters, armored, protection having been sacri-
troop carriers, ambulances, and tankers ficed for speed and carrying capacity, all
as needed. With a peak strength of were capable of speeds in excess of 30
3,700 aircraft, the ATC was an asset knots. The older carriers held about 70
unmatched by any other power and warplanes, whereas Essex-class carriers
envied by all. had room for more than 100.
Fighter-bombers and medium Before the war most admirals had
bombers served both the Allied and Axis believed that battleships would continue
powers well. But the American and to be the decisive weapons of naval war-
British investment in heavy four-engine fare. Carriers were seen as auxiliaries
bombers was a poor one. Heavy that would scout ahead of the battle line,
bombers were, according to air marshals achieve air superiority, attack enemy
and generals, supposed to win the war ships, and perform other useful services.
against Japan but never produced the But Pearl Harbor and Midway estab-
expected results or justified the resources lished the carrier’s primacy. Thereafter,
devoted to them. They were more useful battleships served as auxiliaries.
in the Pacific, where Japanese air defens- Because the carriers of the Pacific
es were light, but the strategic bombing Fleet were heavily outnumbered by
of Japan was essentially a failure. It was those of Japan, an emergency class of
18
• A I R C R A F T C A R R I E R S •
they stood up to the Japanese suicide including the Soviet Union, the term
attacks, while eight thin-skinned U.S. Grand Alliance was frequently used. The
carriers had to be withdrawn from com- Allies were also called the United
bat when their flight decks were pene- Nations well before the United Nations
trated by kamikazes. organization was formed in 1945.
SEE ALSO SEE ALSO
Battleships; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle Britain; China; France; Soviet Union;
of; Midway, Battle of; Okinawa, Battle of; United States
Pearl Harbor, attack on; Philippine Sea,
Battle of the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Hough, Richard. The Longest Battle: The
America First
War at Sea, 1939–45. New York: Mor- Committee
row, 1986.
Miller, David. Carriers: The Men and the
Machines. New York: Salamander, 1991.
Poolman, Kenneth. Allied Escort Carriers
of World War Two in Action. New York:
Blandford, 1988. The America First Committee led the
Reynolds, Clark G. The Carrier War. fight to keep the United States from
Alexandria, Va: Time-Life Books, 1982.
Y’Blood, William T. The Little Giants:
entering World War II. Because antiwar
U.S. Escort Carriers Against Japan. sentiment was particularly strong on col-
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, lege campuses, it was hardly surprising
1987. that the America First Committee (AFC)
grew out of a student group organized at
Yale University by Kingman Brewster (a
Air Force, U.S. future president of Yale) and R. Douglas
Stuart, a law student. Business and politi-
Bicycle riders
SEE United States Army Air Forces cal leaders responded enthusiastically to
in Vale, Ore-
this student initiative, and on September
gon, proudly
4, 1940, the AFC was launched in Chi- display their
cago with Robert Wood, chairman of patriotism and
Allies Sears Roebuck and Company, as national America First
chairman and Stuart as national director. allegiance in a
At its peak the AFC had some July 4th
800,000 members, the largest enrollment parade, 1941.
Following the World War I model, all
states at war with, or occupied by, the
Axis powers became known during
World War II as the Allies. The principal
member states were China, France,
Britain (also known as the United King-
dom) and its empire and common- Image Not Available
wealth, the Soviet Union, and the United
States. Because the Western Allies and
the Soviet Union conducted entirely sep-
arate war efforts, in common speech the
term Allies sometimes referred only to
the West. When making a point of
20
• A M E R I C A N F E D E R A T I O N O F L A B O R •
had been assigned, no further efforts were Robbins, Keith. Appeasement. Malden,
made to exploit Allied sea power. For the Mass.: Blackwell, 1997.
Taylor, Telford. Munich: The Price of
rest of the war Allied forces inched their Peace. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
way up the Italian peninsula by means of 1979.
costly frontal assaults.
SEE ALSO
Italian campaigns
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Arcadia conference
D’Este, Carlo. Fatal Decision: Anzio and
the Battle for Rome. New York: Harper-
Collins, 1991.
Sheehan, Fred. Anzio, Epic of Bravery. Arcadia was the code name for the first
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1964. summit meeting held by the Americans
Verney, Peter. Anzio 1944: An Unexpected and the British after Pearl Harbor.
Fury. London: Batsford, 1978. Churchill and his chiefs met with Roo-
sevelt and his advisors in Washington
from December 22, 1941, to January
14, 1942. Among the decisions they
Appeasement made was to confirm their prewar com-
mitment to give the defeat of Germany
top priority. For the first time, they seri-
ously discussed an invasion of North
Appeasement is a term used to negatively Africa. The course of the war was
characterize the Anglo-French policy of reviewed and the U.S. agreed to much
attempting to prevent a European war by higher production quotas than those
agreeing to Hitler’s demand for addi- established when it was still neutral. A
tional territory—particularly Austria and unified command in the Far East called
the western tip of Czechoslovakia. In ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Aus-
1938 appeasement climaxed at the tralian) was formed. Roosevelt created
Munich conference. There an agreement the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a counterpart
was negotiated, primarily by Hitler and to the British body already in existence,
British Prime Minister Neville Chamber- and the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
lain, although France and Italy partici- which consisted of the British and
pated as well. The Munich agreement American chiefs to oversee the war as a
gave the western end of Czechoslovakia whole, was created.
to Germany, in return for Hitler’s prom-
SEE ALSO
ise to end his demands. His failure to live
Chiefs of Staff, Combined; Chiefs of Staff,
up to its terms meant the end of appease- Joint
ment and, soon, to the outbreak of war.
SEE ALSO
Chamberlain, Neville; Germany; Munich
agreement Ardennes campaign
SEE Bulge, Battle of the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
De Bedts, Ralph F. Ambassador Joseph
Kennedy 1938–1940: An Anatomy of
Appeasement. New York: P. Lang, 1985.
22
• A R M O R •
Artillery
ing power and accuracy, it also proved guns against the great Allied bomber
to be the best antitank gun of the war as fleets to the bitter end.
well as one of the best tank guns.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Although Germany and the Soviet
Baldwin, Ralph Belknap. The Deadly
Union produced large numbers of self- Fuze: The Secret Weapon of World War
propelled (SP) assault guns—artillery II. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press,
pieces mounted on tank bodies—the 1980.
Batchelor, John, and Ian V. Hogg.
United States and Britain did not, believ- Artillery. New York: Scribners, 1972.
ing that ordinary towed guns provided Blackburn, George G. The Guns of Nor-
the infantry with sufficient fire support. mandy: A Soldier’s Eye View, France
1944. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
Perhaps this was so, but the employ- 1995.
ment of tank destroyers as assault guns, Hogg, Ian V. British & American Artillery
a use for which they had not been of World War II. New York: Hippo-
designed and one that put crews at high crene, 1978.
Perret, Geoffrey. There’s a War to Be Won:
risk, suggests that a fully armored, large- The United States Army in World War
caliber American SP gun would have II. New York: Random House, 1991.
been valuable in Europe.
Antiaircraft (AA) guns were of two
types: light weapons for use against low-
flying planes and heavier guns designed
Atlantic, Battle of the
to reach high altitudes. The American
90-mm gun was a good example of the
latter, especially when firing rounds
equipped with “proximity” fuses. These Of all the battles fought in World War
were, in effect, tiny radar units that II, the Battle of the Atlantic was the
exploded AA rounds in the neighbor- most important. If it had been lost, there
hood of the target. First used in 1943 would have been no aid to Britain, no
against Japanese aircraft in the Pacific, Allied invasion of France, no Lend-Lease
proximity fuses were eventually directed convoys to Russia, and therefore no vic-
against ground as well as aerial targets tory. Shipping was critical to every
in both Europe and the Pacific. Its ability Allied operation and the greatest num-
to enable gunners to destroy their tar- ber of ships lost went down in the
gets without making a direct hit made North Atlantic. Yet, despite the life-and-
the proximity fuse a great asset. death struggle that Britain was waging
A German innovation was the “flak against Hitler’s U-boats, the U.S. mili-
tower,” a reinforced concrete structure tary had made no preparations of its
bristling with AA guns that was almost own to conduct antisubmarine warfare
impossible to destroy from the air. After (ASW) before Pearl Harbor. As a result,
the war, they proved so hard to level the Western Hemisphere became a
that in Berlin one was finally covered happy hunting ground for U-boat cap-
with earth to make an artificial hill. tains, beginning on December 31, 1941,
By 1944 U.S. air superiority above when they first reached U.S. waters.
the battlefield was so great that the During the next several months, 61
number of AA units could be sharply ships were sunk off the East Coast; in
reduced, freeing up a substantial number February and March, 42 ships went
of men for service in the infantry, where down in the Caribbean and 8 in the
they were desperately needed. Germany, Gulf of Mexico. U-boats struck at will,
on the other hand, fired its massed AA attacking on the surface even in broad
26
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •
U-boats stalked
ships along
coastal waters
and convoy
routes in the
Atlantic.
Groups of U-
boats were
called “wolf
packs.” Image Not Available
daylight. For ASW operations along the established a limited convoy system. By
East Coast of the United States, the the middle of May a coastal blackout
Navy had available perhaps 20 vessels, (needed because ships silhouetted by
not one of which was fast enough to lights on shore were easy targets) was in
catch a U-boat running on the surface. It force—despite numerous complaints
also had about 100 aircraft, none suited that it would damage the tourist season.
to ASW or capable of long patrols. Yet after six and a half months, the
The Army Air Forces (AAF) threw United States had sunk only 8 U-boats
in 100 two-engine aircraft, 9 B-17 while losing more than 360 merchant
bombers, and a handful of other planes ships. As late as June 15, two U.S. mer-
whose crews had no ASW training and chant vessels were torpedoed off Virginia
which were not equipped to track, much Beach in full view of bathers. Finally, by
less destroy, enemy submarines. Luckily, late summer enough ASW small boats
Germany was not building many U- and aircraft had been assembled to force
boats, but even the handful it deployed the U-boats to relocate to the western
were tremendously effective. If Hitler Caribbean. By the end of September, 173
had seen their value in time, the war merchantmen had been sunk there. On
might have gone far worse for the October 15, 1942, the 1st Bomber Com-
Allies. mand became the Army Air Forces’s
Gradually, under pressure from oil Antisubmarine Command (AAFAC). The
company executives alarmed by tanker Air Forces had discovered that the Very
losses, some obvious and overdue steps Long Range Liberator (VLR Liberator)
were taken. In March 1942 the Civil Air was its best weapon against the U-boat,
Patrol began making offshore flights and and also that searching out U-boats was
gradually the AAF’s 1st Bomber Com- more effective than simply escorting con-
mand acquired the means to fight U- voys—though that had to be done as
boats. By early April the Navy had well. Its views were opposed by the Navy,
27
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •
which wanted the VLR Liberators itself war, leaving Britain with no more than a
and still preferred to escort convoys. few months’ supply of food.
This interservice bickering and com- Roosevelt had already agreed, on
petition took place against a back- November 30, 1942, to assign Britain
ground of rising ship losses. Although 2.5 million tons of shipping. But much
waters in the Western Hemisphere grew of it was yet to be built. In the meantime
safer, the mid-Atlantic became increas- sinkings continued to rise while the
ingly dangerous. After January 1943 no needs of the Mediterranean were prov-
merchant ship was destroyed within a ing to be greater than expected. Military
600-mile radius of any Allied air base, operations in North Africa were sup-
yet the overall loss rate soared. This was posed to require only 66 ships a month
the work of Admiral Karl Doenitz, head for a four-month period, but they actu-
of the U-boat force and, since January ally used more than 400—much of the
30, commander in chief of the German excess provided by Britain. In January,
Navy. His promotion was a result of Churchill took the extreme step of
Hitler’s decision to forget the surface switching to Atlantic routes 52 of 92
fleet and concentrate on submarines. monthly sailings scheduled for India.
Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler did Despite such drastic measures Britain After 85 days
so too late, but Doenitz still managed to remained short of merchant vessels at a on a raft, three
wreak havoc by concentrating his vessels time when Americans were making ever survivors of a
torpedoed mer-
in a patch of the North Atlantic that greater demands on them. The gap be-
chant ship are
was beyond the reach of land-based air- tween what American planners wanted
rescued off the
craft. As many as 80 U-boats at a time and Britain could provide came to about coast of Brazil
worked the area, with devastating 6 million tons, more than a quarter of by a Navy
results. In the first three weeks of March the entire volume of cargo destined for patrol boat on
1943 alone, the Allies lost 750,000 tons U.S. forces overseas that year. January 24,
of shipping, a rate that if continued for Troop and cargo movements from 1943.
long would have destroyed their mer-
chant fleets, or at least those of Britain.
In 1942 the amount of U.S. shipped
goods to the British doubled, while
Britain transported many U.S. troops
and significantly increased the number
of warships that protected Atlantic con-
voys. Nonetheless, in 1942 Britain lost
almost 6 million tons of shipping, a
third more than in 1941, while U.S.
losses came to fewer than 2.5 million Image Not Available
tons. In the same year American ship-
yards turned out vessels able to carry
almost 4 million tons of shipping, giving
the United States a net gain of 1.5 mil-
lion tons, while Britain suffered a net
loss in excess of 2 million tons. This
combination of shipping losses and a
great increase in military cargo crippled
Britain’s merchant fleet. In January 1943
imports fell to the lowest level of the
28
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •
the United States to Britain almost Army could not fully use even the re-
ceased, thanks to the Allied invasion of duced tonnage made available to it, hav-
Africa and the great upsurge in U-boat ing asked for too much in the first place.
activity. On March 12, 1943, Britain Roosevelt won his gamble not only
revealed its shipping requirements to the because more shipping was built than
U.S. service heads. The figures seemed to anticipated but because ASW weapons
indicate that if 27 million tons of goods became better and more numerous.
were shipped to Britain, the least it Also, the navy became more coopera-
could get by with, there would be tive. But success was, in addition, a
almost no merchant vessels left to sup- result of decisions about how weapons
port U.S. forces. The U.S. Joint Chiefs should be deployed that Roosevelt made
demanded that Britain provide more personally. This involved managing
ships anyway, but Britain had none to details of the war that Hitler, Stalin, and
spare. Although no one questioned the Churchill did all the time but was
necessity of having the United States unusual for Roosevelt, who gave the ser-
meet its own shipping needs, if Britain’s vice chiefs a high degree of freedom. In
basic requirements were not met, the this respect, one reason for Germany’s
British national war effort—and there- success was that the U-boats were
fore the Allied one—would collapse. directed by a single commander while
The Joint Chiefs refused to admit this, the various Allied services often worked
however, insisting that the shipping at cross-purposes, each going its own
agreements made at the Casablanca con- way using different methods and failing
ference in January 1943, when shipping to cooperate or share information.
losses were not so great, be carried out Of all the Allied military shortcom-
anyway. ings, the intelligence failure was the
Only Roosevelt could break the most serious, for by 1943, ULTRA,
deadlock, which he was able to do Britain’s code-breaking operation, was
because the U.S. War Shipping Adminis- turning out a steady flow of decrypted
tration (WSA) believed that the Joint enemy radio messages. ULTRA was a
Chiefs were asking for too much. The great help in locating U-boats, not only
WSA’s figures indicated that, thanks to so that they could be attacked but also
increased shipbuilding, a modest cut- because convoys could be rerouted away
back in military shipping during the from U-boat “wolf packs,” easily the
third quarter of 1943 would make it most effective way of defending them.
possible to meet the essential needs of However, for lack of coordination, the
Britain at little expense to the U.S. war priceless data did not always reach those
effort. FDR accepted this analysis and who needed them. Further, the U.S.
took one of his bigger gambles. Navy retained operational control over
Overruling the Joint Chiefs, Roo- army air units and exercised it con-
sevelt stood by his promise to assign stantly, rather than laying down policy
Britain 2.5 million tons of shipping. In and allowing air officers to carry it out,
May he directed the WSA to provide the procedure followed with much suc-
Britain with 150 to 200 merchant ships cess by the Royal Navy and Royal Air
over a 10-month period. From a low Force Coastal Command.
point of 4.5 million tons in the first quar- Admiral Ernest J. King, the hard-
ter of 1943, British imports rose to 7.5 nosed U.S. naval chief, finally admitted
million tons in the second, exceeding that the Battle of the Atlantic was being
requirements. And, as it turned out, the lost, and on March 1, 1943, at his invi-
29
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •
Servicemen on
the deck of the
U.S. Coast
Guard cutter
Spencer watch
the explosion
of a depth
charge aimed
at destroying a
Image Not Available German U-
boat trying to
break into the
center of a
large convoy
off the Ameri-
can coastline.
Image Not Available fornia Institute of most of them would be required to live
Technology and the on a remote mesa in New Mexico where
University of California the scientific work was to be consoli-
This implosion- at Berkeley. Although he dated at the Los Alamos Laboratory.
type plutonium was a brilliant scientist, Oppenheimer Oppenheimer also turned out to be a
bomb, called had never run a large laboratory and— natural leader, able to keep his collection
“Fat Man,” unlike the leading scientists of the Man- of geniuses and prima donnas hard at
was dropped hattan Project—had never won the work under spartan conditions.
on Nagasaki on
Nobel Prize. To make the fuel for an atomic
August 9, 1945.
Major General Groves insisted on bomb, an entire industry had to be built
making this appointment, overriding from scratch, at a cost of some $2 bil-
objections from scientists and Army lion—a gigantic sum at the time, espe-
counterintelligence, who opposed nam- cially because Congress could not be
ing someone whose former fiancée, wife, told what it was appropriating the
brother, and sister-in-law had all been money for. The manufacturing work
members of the Communist party, and was concentrated in two places—Oak
perhaps still were. In doing so, Groves Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Wash-
made his greatest contribution to the ington—each of which had the abun-
bomb project, for Oppenheimer, who dant supply of electrical power required
had what a colleague described as “intel- to make an atomic bomb. But otherwise
lectual sex appeal,” was able to enlist the manufacturing centers were com-
hundreds—and eventually thousands— pletely different, for the Manhattan
of scientists and engineers to work on a Project’s goal was to make not one type
program he could not reveal to them in of atomic bomb but two radically differ-
advance for security reasons. Further, ent weapons.
Soldiers exam-
ine the devas-
tating effects of
the atomic
bomb dropped
on Hiroshima.
Oak Ridge had the easier job of history had taken place, the scientists left
refining uranium 235 until it achieved their bunkers to see the soon-to-become-
the level of purity that would cause a familiar giant, boiling, mushroom-shaped
chain reaction when two pieces of it col- cloud rising toward the heavens. Careful
lided. This was accomplished by fitting calculations revealed that the plutonium
them into a barrel and firing one piece weapon had a force of 18.6 kilotons,
at another. The theory behind this four times what had been expected.
weapon was so convincing that scientists It was a plutonium bomb, known as
did not even field test the device. The Fat Man, that exploded over Nagasaki,
first uranium-based explosion took Japan, on August 9, 1945, with a force
place over Hiroshima, Japan, on August estimated at 22 kilotons. Because of high
6, 1945, the product of a bomb known winds, Fat Man had to be dropped sev-
as Little Boy. The plane that carried the eral miles from the intended site, and it
bomb was Enola Gay, named after the was therefore less destructive than Little
pilot’s mother. It was estimated that the Boy, killing somewhere between 40,000
force of Little Boy equaled an explosion and 140,000 people.
of 12,500 tons of TNT. In the future, The extensive damage done to the
nuclear weapons would be designated human body by the radiation effect,
according to the number of such kiloton which caused people to die long after a
(one thousand tons) units of force they nuclear explosion, and which partially
would release. Little Boy is believed to accounts for the wide variation in casu-
have killed between 70,000 and alty estimates, was not anticipated by
200,000 people. The highest figure scientists. It would be years before the
includes those who died years, and in Los Alamos scientists and others
some cases many years, after the blast involved with the U.S. nuclear weapons
and is probably exaggerated. program would come to grips with what
Late in 1942, at the University of many regarded as the ugliest feature of
Chicago, a team led by Enrico Fermi, a nuclear warfare. Although few ques-
Nobel laureate from Italy, built the first tioned the decision to wage nuclear war
atomic reactor. At Hanford, Washington, at the time, a controversy developed
five reactors modeled on this prototype later that continues to this day.
created an artificial element called pluto- SEE ALSO
nium by bombarding uranium 238 with Japan, surrender of
neutrons. After many difficulties, suffi-
cient plutonium was produced to set off F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
a chain reaction. This was achieved by Cooper, Dan. Enrico Fermi and the Revo-
lutions of Modern Physics. New York:
surrounding pure plutonium with high Oxford University Press, 1999.
explosives that, when detonated, com- Goodchild, Peter. J. Robert Oppenheimer:
pressed the material, causing a chain Shatter of Worlds. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1980.
reaction faster and more efficiently than Hersey, John. Hiroshima. 1946. Reprint,
could be done in a gun barrel. In effect, New York: Knopf, 1985.
the plutonium was imploded to produce Maruki, Toshi. Hiroshima No Pika. New
a gigantic eruption. However, because of York: Lothrop, Lee, and Shepard, 1982.
Fiction.
its complexity, the implosion device had Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the
to be tested. This was done at the Alam- Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon &
ogordo Bombing Range in New Mexico Schuster, 1986.
Wyden, Peter. Day One: Before Hiroshima
on July 16, 1945. and After. New York: Simon & Schuster,
After the first atomic explosion in 1984.
34
• A X I S •
American pris-
oners carry
fallen comrades
on their march
in Bataan.
This captured
Japanese pho-
tograph testi-
fies to the cru- Image Not Available
elty with which
POWs were
treated.
35
• B A T T L E S H I P S •
at this stage of the war were dead set the air war that second thoughts could
against area bombing (indiscriminate not be permitted.
attacks on entire cities). And even if they
SEE ALSO
had wanted to cooperate with Harris,
Royal Air Force; Strategic bombing;
the U.S. Eighth Air Force was reeling United States Army Air Forces
from terrible losses in August and Octo-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ber that had, in effect, forced it to give
up bombing German cities until it could Cooper, Alan W. Bombers over Berlin: The
RAF Offensive, November 1943–March
be supplied with long-range fighter 1944. Wellingborough: P. Stephens, 1989.
escorts. What’s more, even if it had had Hastings, Max. Bomber Command. New
more bombers and fighters, daylight York: Dial, 1979.
Hawkins, Ian L., ed. Courage*Honor*
attacks on one of the most heavily Victory, B-17s Over Berlin: Personal Sto-
defended cities in Europe would have ries from the 95th Bomb Group. Wash-
been very costly, a fact that was proven ington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995.
Middlebrook, Martin. The Berlin Raids:
the following March when the Eighth R.A.F. Bomber Command Winter,
Air Force did attack Berlin—with a 1943–44. New York: Viking, 1988.
powerful fighter escort—but still suf-
fered heavy losses. Further, the small
bomb-load capacity of U.S. heavy
bombers, which had been designed for Berlin, fall of
precise attacks on industrial sites rather
than entire cities, meant that they would
contribute relatively little to the destruc-
tion of a great urban area like Berlin. Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin both
It is a mystery why Harris, or any- regarded Berlin as a highly valuable prize
one else, believed that leveling the capi- that would give whichever nation cap-
Two Russian
tal of Germany would cause the Nazi tured it great prestige and a degree of
officers salute a
government to surrender, since the great political benefit as well. For this reason
photographer of
bulk of Germany’s industrial might Churchill put heavy pressure on General the American
would remain untouched. It says much Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander in Signal Corps in
about the general pointlessness of the chief of Allied forces, to take Berlin before Berlin after its
Allied bombing offensives that Harris the Soviets could. It is not clear whether capture.
was allowed to act on this ill-conceived
campaign anyway. What Harris called
the Battle of Berlin started on August
23, 1943, and ended in the spring of
1944, when Bomber Command was
forced to concentrate on D-Day targets.
The Battle of Berlin ended in failure
for the Allies; the German capital con-
tinued to function, even though the
Eighth Air Force staged daylight attacks
Image Not Available
on Berlin during the last days of the war.
Harris lost 492 bombers during this
campaign, the United States fewer
because of its later start. Nothing much
was learned from this defeat, because
the Allies were by now so committed to
38
• B L A C K S •
which the Germans used well. Gradual- were driven from most of France and
ly, the Americans learned how to fight in much of Belgium. The River Seine was
the hedgerows, but the going was slow easily crossed and Paris liberated.
and the costs heavy. In order to achieve On September 4 the British took the
a breakthrough Bradley drew up plans great Belgian port of Antwerp intact.
for Operation Cobra. This attack in the This should have solved what were
south of Normandy would begin with a becoming very serious Allied supply
huge saturation bombing attack on the problems, as everything was still coming
German lines. After delays and a false in over the beaches of Normandy and
start, it took place on July 26. The Ger- being trucked for longer and longer dis-
mans held out for a few days longer tances as the armies advanced. However,
against repeated ground attacks, but by British delay enabled German troops to
the 28th their lines were crumbling. fortify their side of the Scheldt Estuary, a
Bradley then unleashed Patton’s 60-mile-long waterway that linked
Third Army, and the breakthrough Antwerp to the North Sea. It took
turned into a breakout, with two of Pat- Canadian troops months to clear the
ton’s corps racing east, then north. Most Scheldt, seriously handicapping Allied
of the Germans in France were now in operations. Further, the retreating Ger-
danger of being caught between British mans had dug in and rebuilt the West
and U.S. forces in the Falaise “pocket.” Wall, so the war of movement was over,
Two of Montgomery’s divisions, which and it was back to wearing the enemy
were to close the pocket, moved out down again.
slowly. Patton wanted to close the By December 1944 the Germans
Falaise pocket himself, but Bradley had cut Bradley’s headquarters in Lux-
would not hear of it. As a result most of embourg off from his First and Ninth
the Germans got away, although some armies, which came temporarily under
50,000 were still in the pocket when it British command. In January he
finally shut. regained the First Army, but the Ninth
This was Bradley’s most criticized Army stayed with Montgomery to beef
decision. If Patton had been allowed to up his 21st Army Group, which was
proceed, most of the Germans in France much smaller than Bradley’s and not
might have been taken. Nothing would getting any reinforcements. The Ameri-
have stood between the Allies and a cans were having manpower problems
sweep into Germany, for its West Wall too, but a few more divisions were still
(a line of frontier fortifications) was in on their way to the front. And infantry
need of repair and weakly held. replacements were found by taking men
Bradley restrained Patton because he from antiaircraft units and from non-
thought that the Third Army was overex- combat jobs behind the lines. Bradley
tended and its lead elements would be would not have all the men he wanted,
crushed by the retreating Germans. That but he would have enough.
may have been so, but had Patton failed In February the Allied combined
to close the gap, at worst a division or chiefs of staff agreed to Eisenhower’s
two might have been lost. If he had suc- plan for final victory. Montgomery’s 21st
ceeded, the war in the West would have Army Group was supposed to be the
been practically over. In hindsight, it main assault force, driving across the
appears to have been a risk worth taking. Rhine and the north German plain
All the same, the breakout was, on toward Berlin. The U.S. 6th Army
its own terms, a triumph. The Germans Group—which consisted of the U.S. Sev-
43
• B R I T A I N •
Omar Bradley
south. By April 7 nearly all his forces were
discusses strat-
in motion. The Ninth Army reached its
egy with Gen-
eral Dwight
stop line, the Elbe River, on April 11, hav-
Eisenhower. ing traveled 226 miles in 19 days. The
First Army linked up with the Soviets,
who were advancing from the east, on
April 25. Patton’s Third Army reached the
former Czechoslovakia at the beginning
of May, stopping to wait for the Soviets,
Image Not Available who would occupy the reborn state after
the war. In the north, Montgomery
moved forward with his usual caution.
Seeing that all the German fronts
were collapsing and Berlin was under
attack by the Soviets, Hitler killed him-
self on April 30. On May 7 the Ger-
mans formally surrendered to Eisen-
hower in Reims, France.
enth Army and the French First Army— These were Bradley’s salad days,
and Bradley’s 12th Army Group would which would in time bring him a fifth
play supporting roles by making local star, making him equal in rank to Eisen-
attacks in their areas. hower and other senior commanders.
All this changed on March 7, when As head of the largest army group in the
units of the First Army seized an intact West, he certainly deserved this honor.
bridge at Remagen on the Rhine. Eisen- Although some historians have been
hower allowed Bradley to expand his critical of Bradley for being overly con-
bridgehead on the east bank of the servative, his style meshed well with
Rhine, and on March 22 Patton’s Third Eisenhower’s broad front strategy.
Army crossed the Rhine also, giving Bradley remained in the Army after
Bradley two solid bases from which to World War II, becoming chief of staff in
expand. Montgomery crossed on the 1948 and chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
24th as planned, but Bradley’s forces in 1949. He held this position throughout
were moving so much faster that Eisen- the Korean War (1950–53), and in its
hower changed his plans. final months served again under Eisen-
When the First and Ninth armies hower, who had been elected President.
met on April 1, the German Army He retired from military service after a
Group B in the Ruhr was surrounded. truce agreement with China and North
On April 4 the Ninth Army rejoined the Korea was signed in the summer of 1953.
12th Army Group and Bradley was
given the job of ending German resis-
tance in the west. Montgomery’s 21st
Army Group, now much smaller, would Britain
guard his northern flank, with 6th Army
Group doing the same to his south. The
race for glory would be won by the
Americans rather than the British. In 1940 Britain had a population of 48
Bradley formed his three armies million. It was one of the world’s great
along a 140-mile front running north to powers, a leading industrial state, and
44
• B R I T A I N •
possessed a vast empire that spanned the sessed or controlled almost the entire
globe and occupied about one-fourth of continent of Europe. Little wonder
it. Although the army was relatively some in Britain believed that with all
small, the Royal Navy was the largest in hope of defeating Hitler apparently
the world, as was the British merchant lost, the time had come to make peace.
fleet. In Europe the Royal Air Force took Hitler, prepared to deal, proposed that
second place only to the German Luft- in return for peace he would allow
waffe. Together with those of France, Britain to retain its independence and
which was also a wealthy industrial state its empire. Britain would still rule the
with a huge land army and a modern waves, while he would continue to
fleet, these assets gave the Allies superior- rule Europe.
ity over the Wehrmacht (Germany’s com- Britain alone Thanks to inspired
bined military forces) on paper. leadership by Winston Churchill,
But, although it was superior to the Britain’s new prime minister, and their
German armed forces in sheer numbers, native stubbornness, the British stood
the Allies did not have the advantage in firm and saved their island from inva-
quality, as was demonstrated when Ger- sion by winning the Battle of Britain.
many attacked to the west in May 1940. The Royal Air Force (RAF) prevented
By the end of June it had conquered German troops from landing, but if it
France and driven Britain out of Europe. had failed, the invaders would not have
The British Army survived and returned been met by the British Army alone. A
home, thanks to the “miracle of “Home Army” of poorly armed overage
Dunkirk” in which civilian vessels men, mostly veterans of World War I,
joined the military to save many British was mobilized as well. As there was no
troops beached on the French coast. But invasion, they served the rest of the war
the Army arrived in England minus its in capacities where combat-ready sol-
vehicles and heavy weapons. diers were not required. Even so, the
Britain now found itself alone fac- willingness of aging and unprepared
ing a triumphant Third Reich that pos- men to fight was a measure of Britain’s
These English
policemen
escort a mother
and her chil-
dren from an
area where an
unexploded
German bomb
waits to be
defused. Image Not Available
45
• B R I T A I N •
This photo-
graph of a Lon-
don railway
station captures
the British
mobilization
effort. As
troops arrive
for training and
Image Not Available
defense, chil-
dren hurry to a
reception room
where they
await evacua-
tion from the
capital.
spirit in the dangerous summer of 1940. fight, for it would only be a matter of
At this stage of the war, everything time before an all-powerful Germany
was at stake, not just for Britain but for threatened U.S. interests and even its
democracy—even for the United States, national security. As no one could say
although many Americans refused to how long this would take, the British
admit this. Had Britain fallen, there soldiered on and did their best. It would
would have been no D-Day—in 1944, prove to be more than enough.
or ever—for the United States could not Mobilization for war Britain was
have liberated Europe alone. Without the most fully and efficiently mobilized of
Britain, the United States would have all the great warring powers. It mobilized
been the only surviving democratic so well because it had to, of course, but
great power in a world dominated by except for the United States, all the other
police states. great powers would eventually find them-
Could the United States have sur- selves in similarly desperate positions.
vived in such a world? Would it have None would match Britain’s achievement.
been able to remain democratic? These Britain’s success was based partly on the
are questions that have never had to be relative speed but also on the thorough-
answered, because the RAF and the ness with which it mobilized its
British people won out in what Churchill resources—especially its womanpower.
would rightly call their “finest hour.” Every nation drafted men and,
It remained true in 1940, however, except for the United States again, most
that while Hitler had lost the battle, he controlled the male labor force as well.
still seemed to have won the war. Britain But only the British actually conscripted
therefore adopted the only possible women. Single females between 19 and
course of action, a strategy announced 30 years old were drafted and given a
in plain words by Churchill. It would, choice between serving in uniform or
he declared, hang on by the skin of its working in a war industry. In practice
teeth and keep fighting Germany as best Britain mobilized every woman younger
it could until the United States entered than 40, except those with large family
the war. Churchill knew that sooner or responsibilities or ones who had to care
later the United States would have to for war workers assigned to their homes.
46
• B R I T A I N •
Women labored in the fields and did was allowed about one pound of meat a
every sort of industrial job, however dan- week, four ounces of bacon and ham,
gerous or dirty, except coal mining, a eight of sugar, and eight of cheese. Dur-
male area that few, if any, women cared ing an eight-week span, a consumer
to enter. could have a packet of dried eggs, equal
The result was that although 22 in theory (though not in taste) to a dozen
percent of the country’s workforce, male real ones. This rationing was far more
and female, served in the armed forces, strict than that practiced in the United
an even larger group, 33 percent, States, but it was widely accepted as fair.
labored in war industries. This enabled Food rationing did not really take
production to reach amazing heights. hold in the United States until March
Aircraft production rose from 3,000 1943, and there was actually a meat sur-
machines built in 1938 to 15,000 by plus that year because beef and pork
January 1940. During the next two production rose while rationing cut into
years, 30,000 aircraft were built, and by sales. Victory gardens, not possible in
March 1944, another 60,000 had gone crowded England, produced huge quan-
into service. This was an incredible pro- tities of fresh vegetables. At various times
duction feat that equaled, and may even coffee, sugar, whiskey, cigarettes, and
have exceeded, Germany’s effort. other goods were in short supply. But
Between 1939 and early 1944, when gasoline rationing ended on August 15,
Britain was building 105,000 planes, 1945, and most other forms ended soon
Germany turned out about 118,000 air- after. For Britons rationing continued
craft; however, only a handful of Ger- well into peacetime.
many’s planes were four-engined, as Surprisingly, the nation as a whole
opposed to thousands of Britain’s. ate better under rationing than it had
Because it was an island nation, before the war. In the 1930s high unem-
Britain built a huge number of ships. This ployment and low wages during the
was an area in which Germany could not worldwide Depression had combined to
compete, because the British destroyed leave many working-class families short
most of its small surface fleet and swept of food. But under rationing, and with
German merchant ships from the seas as real wages rising because of the labor
well. Britain, on the other hand, was build- shortage, workers could buy more
ing major warships at the rate of more expensive foods and often ate in factory
than 100 a year by 1942, and merchant lunchrooms where food was wholesome
shipping was well in excess of 1 million and plentiful. Cheap new restaurants
tons annually. Because Britain had the also sprang up in which food was “off
smallest population of any great power the ration.” Because of better nutrition,
and had to import every raw material it civilian death rates in Britain actually
needed except coal, this was a stunning declined during the war.
achievement. British taxation, though heavy, was
In World War II, Britain introduced fair also. Britain financed 55 percent of its
rationing at once, remembering its expe- war effort through income rather than
rience in World War I when it waited too borrowing, which was the highest rate in
long to start conserving. Gasoline was the world. (Even the United States paid
rationed in September 1939; meat, but- only 45 percent of its war costs through
ter, and sugar early in 1940; clothing in tax revenue.) The basic income tax rate,
1941. By 1942, when the U-boats had which had been 50 percent, rose to 95 per-
made the shortages most acute, an adult cent for the wealthy. This program
47
• B R I T A I N •
The Allied
Relief Fund’s
mobile can-
teens provided
food and drink
to London’s air
raid victims.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Fraser, David. And We Shall Shock Them:
Image Not Available The British Army in World War II. Lon-
don: Hodder & Stoughton, 1983.
War Department, U.S. The British Army in
World War II: A Handbook. Novato,
Calif.: Presidio, 1990.
British Navy
SEE Royal Navy
General Bernard Like all armies, the British Army did
Montgomery not always make the best use of its
leads British resources. It disdained tanks before the
troops in the war and never developed the doctrine and
Bulge, Battle of the
campaign to tactics that would have enabled its armor
liberate North
and infantry to work closely together. A
Africa.
British infantry division had more vehicles
than those of any other army, although The U.S. Army would meet its supreme
most of them had only two powered test in the Ardennes Forest of Belgium in
wheels. This put them ahead of the Ger- December and January 1944–45. The
mans, whose regular infantry divisions Battle of the Bulge—named for the large
depended on horses and oxen for trans- indentation made in the U.S. Army’s
port, but behind the U.S. Army, nearly all line—was the greatest clash on the west-
of whose vehicles had four-wheel drive ern front, and the biggest engagement
and could go off-road. the United States has ever fought, rang-
Britain relieved its front-line troops ing over an area that was roughly 60
more often than the United States did. miles wide and 30 miles deep. Some
Some historians feel that Britain in fact 600,000 U.S. soldiers were involved,
took its soldiers out of the line too and they took proportionate casualties:
often for maximum efficiency, but it 20,000 killed, 20,000 captured, and
seems more likely that Britain erred, if 40,000 wounded. Two U.S. infantry
at all, on the right side, whereas U.S. divisions were all but wiped out, and
troops were relieved only seldom and 800 tanks were destroyed.
then briefly. Terrible though these losses may
Another criticism is that the British seem, Germany’s were worse, totaling
were not aggressive enough. When the perhaps 100,000, or a third of their
forces were commanded by Bernard attacking force. At the Bulge, Hitler
Law Montgomery, this was certainly used up his manpower reserves, hasten-
true. But Britain, the weakest of the ing Germany’s defeat.
52
• B U L G E, B A T T L E O F T H E •
Those offensives were part of his broad- immediately ordered the 2nd Division to
front strategy, which was already being break off its attack and join its 23rd
executed with too few troops to provide a Infantry Regiment at Elsenborn. Hodges
margin of safety. On December 16 the ordered up the famed 1st Infantry Divi-
entire U.S. reserve consisted of the 82nd sion, “the Big Red One,” from Aachen,
and 101st Airborne divisions, both of where it too was recuperating. The 2nd
which were being refitted after suffering disengaged itself from the enemy in an
heavy losses. Although they would play extremely difficult operation that it exe-
important roles in the Bulge, a reserve cuted smoothly, evidence of how good
consisting of two undermanned divi- the Army had become since coming
sions—which even at full strength had ashore in France.
only 10,000 men apiece, no armor, and Meanwhile, the 99th’s battered
few guns—was close to being no reserve parts disengaged and passed through the
at all. 23rd Infantry to regroup and dig in on
After a short artillery barrage, the Elsenborn Ridge, where the 2nd and 9th
Germans attacked on December 16 along divisions would join them. By December
an 85-mile front, taking Allied Supreme 18 Elsenborn was proving its worth.
Headquarters by surprise. But what U.S. artillery laid down murderous bar-
should have been easy became terribly dif- rages from the ridge. Protected by fog
ficult, thanks to the undaunted if greatly and darkness, U.S. tanks and guns were
outnumbered Americans. Most remark- lying in wait along narrow roads, strik-
able was the defense put up by the 99th ing panzers from the side and rear,
Infantry Division, a new outfit that had where even the Tigers were vulnerable.
seen little action. Like other divisions in On the 18th, brute force having failed,
the Ardennes, it occupied a stretch of line Dietrich attempted to bypass Elsenborn,
that ought to have been held by a corps, but his attacking force was prevented
the next larger unit, which equaled two or from reaching the strategic Malmedy
even more divisions. Although caught off Road by elements of the Big Red One,
guard, the men of the 99th fought back which had arrived just in time.
furiously, to the point of calling friendly Together these four divisions, the
artillery fire down on their own positions. 2nd and 99th in the center and the 9th
The 99th was the northernmost divi- and 1st on their flanks, created an
sion to be attacked. Behind it lay Elsen- unbreakable line by December 20. As a
born Ridge, high ground covering two result of their determined stand the Ger-
critical road junctions without which the man counteroffensive was spoiled after
Sixth SS Panzer Army could not advance. only five days of battle. Dietrich realized
Though Dietrich did not know it, quite this and wanted to settle for limited
by chance the veteran U.S. 2nd Infantry gains, but Hitler insisted on continuing
Division was attacking just above him. the attack even though Elsenborn Ridge
As the 99th’s situation worsened, Major barred the Sixth Panzer Army from
General Leonard T. Gerow of the V Antwerp. This was sheer stubbornness
Corps, which was responsible for the on his part, as the operation now lacked
northern Ardennes, put the 2nd Divi- any strategic purpose.
sion’s reserve regiment in front of Elsen- Most accounts of the fighting turn on
born Ridge. the 101st Airborne and its defense of Bas-
On December 17, Lieutenant Gen- togne, which was indeed remarkable. But
eral Courtney H. Hodges of the First the key position in the Battle of the Bulge
Army gave Gerow a free hand. Gerow was Elsenborn Ridge. The holding of it by
54
• B U L G E, B A T T L E O F T H E •
the 2nd and 99th Infantry divisions, the lat- had taken him longer than he could
ter often fighting in small units out of afford. Before the 28th and the 106th
touch with higher command against went under they fought hard. The time
attackers who outnumbered them five or they won enabled Eisenhower to rush
more to one, was the outstanding achieve- support to the pivotal crossroad villages
ment of the battle. In the critical early days, of St. Vith and Bastogne. At St. Vith the
these two divisions repelled an entire Ger- 7th Armored Division held up an entire
man corps, the elite First SS Panzers. German corps for three days, ruining
At the southern end of the front the Manteuffel’s schedule and giving the
Germans were also in trouble. Although U.S. generals time to gain control of the
Germany’s Seventh Army greatly out- battle. During this critical period Eisen-
numbered the veteran U.S. Fourth hower was drawing men and supplies
Infantry Division, which had taken from other sectors of the front and
6,000 casualties in the Huertgen Forest pouring them into the Ardennes. He
and was still recovering, the 4th put up moved 250,000 men and 50,000 vehi-
a tremendous defense, slowing down the cles in the first week, a performance that
German advance and gaining time for no other army in history has ever
reinforcements to move up. As a result equaled.
another unbreakable line was estab- Although surrounded, Bastogne
lished, which forced the Germans to remained in U.S. hands, thanks to the
narrow their attack to the central 101st Airborne, Combat Command B of
Ardennes, in which there was little room the 10th Armored Division, and the
to maneuver. crack 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
The Fifth Panzer Army was now With the aid of breaks in the weather
playing the part originally assigned to the that permitted air support and resupply,
Sixth. Things were going much better for this mixed force held out until General
Germany in the central Ardennes, because Patton’s relief column could reach it on
of outstanding leadership by Lieutenant December 27. That same day, survivors
General Hasso von Manteuffel. His plan of the 2nd Panzer Division gave them-
of attack did not rely on brute force but selves up, having almost reached the
was marked by stealth and speed, with Meuse before being blocked by the U.S.
deep-penetration units racing through the 2nd Armored Division. That proved to
U.S. lines without benefit of artillery sup- be as far as the Germans would get.
port. These and other enterprising meth- As great as the U.S. victory was, the
ods smashed the veteran U.S. 28th Battle of the Bulge might have been
Infantry Division and wiped out the greater still. Eisenhower had reacted
106th, which had just arrived in the quickly to the German attack, sending
Ardennes and was an outfit that had been the 7th and 10th Armored divisions to
built from scratch by cannabilizing other Middleton’s sector on December 16
units. Further, it was deployed in a posi- despite General Omar Bradley’s reserva-
tion from which it could not retreat. As a tions. Hitler had told his generals that it
result it was cut to pieces. In addition to would take at least two days for Eisen-
heavy casualties, at least 7,000 men hower to realize the trouble he was in,
became prisoners of war (POWs)—the then two or three more to receive per-
largest number of U.S. POWs ever taken mission from Roosevelt and Churchill to
by Germany in a single action. call off his offensives and reinforce the
However, while Manteuffel had Ardennes. By then he intended that the
effectively destroyed two divisions, it Germans would be across the Meuse
55
• B U L G E, B A T T L E O F T H E •
the Germans withdrew slowly in good tance of the Burma Road was that with-
order, inflicting maximum damage. The out it supplies for China had to be
Battle of the Bulge was declared at an flown in over the dreaded “Hump,” a
end on January 28, though the old lines series of high mountain ranges that lay
were not restored until February 7. between India and Kunming, China.
Because the United States regarded keep-
SEE ALSO
ing China in the war essential to victory,
Eisenhower, Dwight D.; France, Battle of;
Montgomery, Bernard Law; Patton, the loss of Burma forced it to open an
George S., Jr. air route to China that was extraordi-
narily expensive and dangerous to main-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G tain, yet could deliver only a fraction of
Ambrose, Stephen A. Citizen Soldiers. the goods China needed. In January
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. 1945, for example, a total of only
———. Eisenhower, 1890–1952. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. 15,000 tons was ferried to China, at a
Bradley, Omar N., and Clay Blair. A Gen- cost to the U.S. Air Transport Com-
eral’s Life: An Autobiography by General mand of 36 lives. (This was about equal
of the Army Omar N. Bradley. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. to the monthly tonnage moved over the
MacDonald, Charles B. A Time for Trum- Burma Road in 1941, but more than
pets: The Untold Story of the Battle of half of it was for American use.) In that
the Bulge. New York: Morrow, 1985.
same month an alternative route to
China, the Ledo Road, was completed,
after which the United States, its strate-
gic goal having been met, largely with-
Burma drew from Burma.
Although the Allies discussed a vari-
ety of more imaginative ways in which
Burma might be retaken, in whole or in
A British colony when the Pacific war part, the actual process involved gruel-
broke out on December 7, 1941, Burma ing land campaigns supported by air
was invaded by Japanese forces one power. The first offensive began in
week later. The Japanese aims were to October 1942. It achieved modest gains
protect their position in Malaya, to cut but ended in a stalemate. A long-range
the Burma Road, which was the princi- penetration by 3,000 British, Gurkha,
pal supply route to Nationalist China, and Burmese troops (called Chindits)
and to use Burma as a staging area for under the colorful Brigadier Orne
possible operations against India. After Wingate fought behind enemy lines, sup-
fierce fighting, Britain was driven from plied entirely by air, from February into
Burma in May, its troops making the April of 1943. The raid was highly pub-
longest fighting retreat in the history of licized and did prove that troops could
the British Army. The fight for Burma fight in this way, but the losses were so
would be Britain’s longest campaign of great (almost a third of Wingate’s force)
the war, ending only when the Japanese and the results so disappointing that it is
Empire laid down its arms. hard to see why another such raid was
Apart from a desire to avenge its authorized.
defeat, Britain’s objective in fighting so Nonetheless, in February 1944 the
hard and at such length in the terrifying British began flying in another long-
mountains and jungles of Burma was range penetration force of 9,000 men.
never entirely clear. The strategic impor- After Wingate was killed in a plane
57
• B Y R N E S , J A M E S F . •
crash in March, in April his force fell Chan, Won-loy. Burma, the Untold Story.
into a conventional role, supporting a Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986.
Grounds, Tom. Some Letters from Burma:
Chinese offensive under U.S. General The Story of the 25th Dragoons at War.
Joseph Stilwell. By August, when it was Tunbridge Wells: Parapress, 1994.
airlifted back to India, the group had
sustained 3,600 casualties. A U.S. force,
called Merrill’s Marauders after its com-
mander, Major-General Frank Merrill, Byrnes, James F.
was based on the Chindit model and
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE,
suffered comparably in support of Stil-
1945– 47 Image Not Available
well’s operations.
In the end the fight for Burma took • Born: May 2, 1879, Charleston, S.C.
place by conventional means. North • Political party: Democratic
Burma, including the vital town of • Education: Parochial school
• Government service: House of
Myitkyina, was taken by an Allied Representatives (Democrat–S.C.),
mixed but mostly Chinese force under 1910–24; U.S. Senate (Democrat–
Stilwell in 1944. Western, southern, and S.C.), 1930–41; U.S. Supreme Court
justice, 1941–42; director, Office of
central Burma fell to Britain’s largely Economic Stabilization, 1942–43;
Indian Fourteenth Army, commanded by director, Office of War Mobilization,
General Sir William Slim, regarded by 1943–45; secretary of state, 1945–47;
governor of South Carolina, 1951–55
many as Britain’s best field commander, • Died: January 24, 1972, Columbia,
in 1944 and 1945. Portions of eastern S.C.
Burma remained in Japanese hands until
August 28, 1945, when the Burmese gar-
rison surrendered. British and Common-
wealth casualties in Burma came to Jamess F. Byrnes was a conservative
71,200, Japanese to 106,000. The fight- Democrat, an early supporter of
ing in Burma was as fierce as anywhere Franklin D. Roosevelt for President and
else in the war, the environment equally a friend of the New Deal during his
difficult. As Burma was of little strategic years in the Senate. An able administra-
value, most of this effort was misplaced. tor, he, perhaps more than anyone else,
A limited campaign in the north to seize was responsible for imposing order on
and hold the territory through which the the chaotic mobilization process and
Ledo Road was to cross was probably was sometimes referred to by journalists
all that was needed. Yet even that limited as the “assistant president,” a term Roo-
aim might have been too much, because sevelt hated.
the road was completed so late in the As senators, Byrnes and Harry S.
war that it did little to benefit China. Truman had been allies and friends, so
much so that in 1944 Byrnes asked Tru-
SEE ALSO man to nominate him for Vice President
Chiang Kai-shek; China; China-Burma- at the 1944 Democratic National Con-
India theater vention. Truman agreed to do so, but
when Roosevelt made clear his prefer-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G ence for Truman, Byrnes withdrew, sav-
Allen, Louis. Burma: The Longest War, ing Truman considerable embarrassment.
1941–1945. New York: St. Martin’s, 1984. Truman, who placed great weight
Bidwell, Shelford. The Chindit War: Stilwell,
Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma, on friendship, asked Byrnes to serve as
1944. New York: Macmillan, 1980. secretary of state within hours of taking
58
• C A N A D A •
his oath of office. According to the law at Ward, Patricia Dawson. The Threat of
that time, Byrnes, as secretary of state, Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of
Foreign Ministers, 1945–1946. Kent,
would have succeeded to the presidency Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1979.
had anything happened to Truman. On
the face of it, friendship apart, there did
not seem to be any particularly good rea-
son for putting Byrnes, a man without Canada
experience in foreign affairs, in charge of
the State Department. One theory is that
Truman wanted Byrnes, who had been a
court reporter in his youth, because he By the time of World War II, Canada
had the only verbatim stenographic had long been a colony of Britain and
record made by any American at Yalta. It then a self-governing dominion of the
was an incomplete record, because Roo- British Commonwealth. In 1931
sevelt, with his usual shrewdness, had Britain’s Parliament enacted the Statute
allowed Byrnes to sit in on only those dis- of Westminster, which gave Canada and
cussions that would play well in the Unit- the other dominions control of their for-
ed States. As, in effect, Roosevelt’s sales- eign policies as well as domestic affairs.
man for Yalta, Byrnes did a good enough This meant that Canada was not obliged
job to make Truman think he would be to follow Britain’s lead in declaring war
highly useful at the State Department. upon Germany, but it did so anyway.
President Truman gave Byrnes a free On September 9, 1939, Canada’s gov-
hand at first, so he bore considerable ernment, reflecting the views of its Eng-
responsibility for the Potsdam confer- lish-speaking population, asked King
ence and the subsequent negotiations George VI to issue a declaration of war
with Japan that ended World War II. on its behalf. On September 10, a week
But the strong-willed Byrnes and Presi- after Britain, Canada was at war.
dent Truman soon fell out after the war, Although geographically one of the
and Byrnes secretly resigned in April largest countries in the world, Canada
1946, although the volume of work still then had a population of only 11.5 mil-
to be done required him to stay on until lion, most of it concentrated within 60
January 1947. Byrnes was out of his miles of the U.S. border. A third of the
depth as secretary of state and one of population was of French descent and
Truman’s weakest appointments. lived primarily in the province of Que-
bec. Because Francophones, as French-
SEE ALSO speaking Canadians are called, had
Japan, surrender of; Truman, Harry S.; resented being drafted in World War I,
Yalta conference Prime Minister Mackenzie King
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G promised that draftees would not be
Clements, Kendrick A., ed. James F. Byrnes sent abroad without their consent.
and the Origins of the Cold War. Those who refused service overseas—
Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, not all of them French Canadians—were
1982.
Messer, Robert L. The End of an Alliance:
deeply resented by the volunteers serving
Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Ori- in fighting units, who called them “zom-
gins of the Cold War. Chapel Hill: Univer- bies.” Riots at home against conscrip-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1982. tion by these so-called zombies were
Robertson, David. Sly and Able: A Political
Biography of James F. Byrnes. New York: deeply resented at the front. Despite
Norton, 1994. resistance to the war at home and a
59
• C A N A D A •
Canadian sol-
diers, driving
hard toward
the Rhine and
the defeat of
Germany, take
a break from
their duties for
mail call. Image Not Available
merchant ships along the vital North the European theater. For Canada, more
Atlantic lifeline, where it sank 33 U- than any other nation, the theory that
boats, was probably the RCN’s most making war by air would be cheaper in
important job, but it was also active in lives than fighting on the ground proved
the English Channel and, to a much to be an illusion.
smaller extent, in the Pacific. Twenty- In many ways the Canadian war
four Canadian warships were lost dur- effort resembled the U.S. experience.
ing the war. Inflation was brought under control,
Perhaps the greatest contribution and the combination of full employment
made to the air war by Canada was the and relatively high wages meant a rising
British Empire Air Training Scheme. At standard of living during the war with
Britain’s request Canada agreed in continued prosperity after it. Unlike the
December 1939 to establish a large air- United States, however, where domestic
crew training program. The plan was policy was conservative during the war,
for Canada to provide the facilities and Canada’s moved leftward. In September
training for British and other dominion 1943 its Liberal party government
air crews as well as for its own, who announced that it would create a wel-
would be in a minority. Originally fare state. Partly this was intended,
Canada promised to turn out 20,000 through heavy government spending, to
pilots and 30,000 other specialists and prevent a recession after the war. In part
to provide more than half of the $607 this change was forced on the Liberal
million it was believed the plan would party by the two opposition factions,
cost. This was a great deal to ask of a both of which had been advocating
small population and its tiny air force, social welfare measures with consider-
but Canada succeeded beyond all expec- able success. Although the idea of the
tations. In the end, Canada graduated welfare state would continue to be
168,600 flying personnel, of whom despised in the United States, Canada
more than 75,000 were pilots. More- proceeded to pay monthly family
over, it paid almost three-quarters of the allowances to mothers for every child
total cost of $2.2 billion, a remarkable and spend very large sums for housing
feat. Commonwealth fliers were trained while the war was still on.
in Australia, New Zealand, South Before the war, although diplomatic
Africa, and Rhodesia, too, but the and economic relations with the United
majority were produced by Canada. States were close, Canada had tried to
In addition, Canada was an impor- keep its mighty southern neighbor at
tant participant in the Royal Air Force arm’s length. But the war changed that. A
(RAF) Bomber Command’s war on Ger- Joint Canadian–U.S. Defense Board was
man cities. Its first bomber squadron established in 1940, more than a year
was made up Canadians who had before U.S. entry into the war. After Pearl
served in the RAF. But ultimately the Harbor was attacked in December 1941,
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) sent the U.S. and Canadian economies became
94,000 men and 48 squadrons of air- tightly integrated, and their military activi-
craft overseas. One-eighth of all the ties, especially in the U-boat war, were
bombs dropped by Bomber Command closely linked. Canada provided more
fell from Canadian planes. Counting support for the atomic bomb project than
accidents, 17,000 members of the RCAF any other country except Britain.
were killed during the war, which Inevitably, as the United States and
equaled the Canadian army’s losses in Canada grew closer together, Canada
61
• C A R R I E R S •
and Britain drew further apart. After the to the Battle of the Atlantic, which the
war, Canada and the United States would Allies were losing at the time. Britain
become each other’s closest friends and and the United States agreed that the
biggest trading partners. The United U.S. Army Air Force would bomb tar-
States could not have asked for, or gets on the European continent by day
dreamed of, a better neighbor and ally. while the RAF’s Bomber Command
would continue its nighttime area-
SEE ALSO
bombing (indiscriminate air attacks on
Atlantic, Battle of; France, Battle of; Ital-
ian campaigns; Lend-Lease; Strategic German cities). Under Operation Point-
bombing; Royal Air Force blank, as this program was called, the
United States would conduct its own air
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
war instead of joining forces with
Barris, Theodore. Days of Victory: Cana-
dians Remember, 1939–1945. Toronto: Bomber Command, as Churchill and the
Macmillan Canada, 1995. British had hoped.
Douglas, William A. B. Out of the Shad- Roosevelt announced at the confer-
ows: Canada in the Second World War.
New York: Oxford University Press, ence that the Allies would accept noth-
1977. ing less than the unconditional surren-
Granatstein, J. L., and Peter Neary, eds. der of the Axis powers. This would
The Good Fight: Canadians and World
War II. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995.
prove to be a controversial decision
Kirkconnell, Watson. Canada, Europe, and that, critics argued, lengthened the war.
Hitler. London: Oxford University Press, The French generals Charles de Gaulle
1940. and Henri Giraud were forced, despite
Minns, John A., ed. The Cinderella Army:
Canada’s First Army in Europe, 1944. being political antagonists, to join
Barrie, Ont.: RAM Press, 1993. forces in what became the French
Morton, Desmond. Canada and War: A National Committee for Liberation.
Military and Political History. Toronto:
Butterworths, 1981. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, consist-
ing of the U.S. and British chiefs, agreed
on Operation Husky, the invasion of
Sicily in July, and established August 1,
Carriers 1943, as the target date for invading
France. Husky, to no one’s surprise,
SEE Aircraft carriers forced that date to be pushed back, first
to May 1944, and ultimately to June.
Apart from giving the Battle of the
Atlantic high priority—a very important
Casablanca step—the decisions reached at Casablan-
conference ca have been criticized by many histori-
ans for delaying the invasion of Nor-
mandy and thereby lengthening the war.
Operation Pointblank, also known as
the Combined Bomber Offensive, was,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and at the very least, premature. Both the
Prime Minister Winston Churchill met U.S. and British bomber offensives
at Casablanca, Morocco, from January would be defeated, heavy losses causing
14 to January 24, 1943. This confer- them to be suspended until 1944. The
ence, code-named Symbol, resulted in effort, largely inspired by Roosevelt, to
several important decisions. It was make Giraud equal to de Gaulle also
decided there to give the highest priority ended in failure. By the end of the year
62
• C A S U A L T I E S •
surrender by their soldiers as treason. North Pacific Area, the South Pacific
Estimates range from some tens of Area, and the Southwest Pacific Area.
thousands to, as is more likely, several The Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was
million, so the official figure is clearly an Army theater; the others belonged to
unreliable. At a guess, 10 million Soviet the Navy and were commanded collec-
military personnel were killed and tively by Admiral Chester Nimitz under
another 18 million wounded, of whom the designation Pacific Ocean Area.
1 million died. The civilian dead may Although some ships went to the
have amounted to another 1 million SWPA and the Navy was heavily
killed by enemy action. Untold millions engaged in the South Pacific from 1942
more died of malnutrition-related dis- to 1944, the Central Pacific became its
eases, exposure, and other causes result- main theater. This was because Chief of
ing from the war. Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King
When one adds to these gruesome chose to make it so. King believed—
figures the losses of Australia (17,501 wrongly, some have argued—that the
dead), Canada (42,000 dead), Italy (over best way to defeat Japan was first to
300,000 dead), the United Kingdom take the scattered atolls and islands of
(270,000 military personnel and 60,000 the Central Pacific, then land on the
civilians dead), and the United States coast of China. From bases there, Japan
(405,000 dead), the millions slain in the could be bombed into surrendering or
Holocaust—perhaps 12 million persons, possibly be invaded. General Douglas
half of them Jewish—and the enormous MacArthur, the supreme commander of
civilian casualties sustained by Poland SWPA, thought that his theater should
and other occupied countries, the total have gotten the resources that went to
becomes astronomical. A common figure the Central Pacific. Many historians have
used to account for all deaths in the war since agreed with him, but King was a
is 60 million, a figure so huge that it is power on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
hard to grasp; it would be like losing the as a rule, he got his way in the Pacific.
entire current population of France. Yet Tarawa Thus, instead of aiding
even this vast number is probably too MacArthur, the largest fleet in the world
low, given the uncertainties of measure- attacked Tarawa and Makin atolls in
ment. All one can know for sure is that it the Gilbert Islands. On November 21,
was the bloodiest war in history—espe- 1943, after a brief bombardment, U.S.
cially for civilians whose deaths outnum- Marines assaulted Tarawa’s Betio Island
bered those of the military. in a bloody three-day engagement. The
Japanese had dug in, and the Marines
SEE ALSO
suffered 3,000 casualties, including
Medicine
1,000 dead, while Japan lost 4,500
men—all on an island of less than three
square miles.
Army casualties on Makin were
Central Pacific Area low, but on the fourth and last day a
Japanese submarine sank the escort car-
rier Liscomb Bay at a cost of more than
600 lives. Naval officers were not slow
In 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff divided to point out that had the Marines been
the Pacific into four theaters of war, sent to Makin they could have taken it
named the Central Pacific Area, the by storm and the Liscomb Bay would
64
• C E N T R A L P A C I F I C A R E A •
States’s increasing might in the Pacific summer the United States would sustain
could be applied to a single purpose. nearly 23,000 casualties in the process
Defenders of the Central Pacific of destroying at most three Japanese
campaigns argue that the two drives divisions.
were mutually supportive, yet this was Saipan and beyond Unhappily for
seldom the case. They required two many Marines, Nimitz did not run the
entirely separate lines of communica- Navy. When King, who did, saw the
tion with much duplication of effort, joint report drawn up at the Pearl Har-
and they competed with each other for bor conference in January he exploded,
scarce resources, notably landing ships leaving Nimitz no choice but to obey
and service personnel. SWPA never had orders. It was on to the Marianas and
enough service troops, engineers in par- their principal islands, Guam, Tinian,
ticular, and the Marianas made things and especially Saipan—which was
worse, because the great bomber bases invaded on June 15, 1944. The Marines
established there required large num- fought another bloody battle and suf-
bers of engineers to build and main- fered heavy losses.
tain them. One merit of this campaign, howev-
The plan suggested at Pearl Harbor er, was that it drew out the Japanese fleet.
would have put the Navy’s main effort The Imperial Japanese Navy had been
on MacArthur’s flank, required only one planning an attack on MacArthur’s forces
line of communications to serve both but sailed for the Marianas instead. This
campaigns, and enabled landing ships resulted in the Great Marinas Turkey
and carriers to shuttle between the two Shoot or, as it is more properly called, the
theaters as needed. These campaigns Battle of the Philippine Sea. When it was
would have been mutually supportive in over, Japanese naval aviation was finished
fact as well as theory. as an effective force.
There would also have been no On July 26, 1944, as the Marines
more battles like that at Tarawa, for in fought to clear Guam, Franklin Delano
the Southwest Pacific the enemy strong- Roosevelt sailed into Pearl Harbor. He
holds could usually be bypassed and was running for office again and wished
contained with land-based air attacks— to impress the electorate by showing his
as had happened at Rabaul, where flag as commander in chief. But he also
100,000 Japanese troops were dug in had real work to do, because the time for
behind fearsome defenses. To take a final decision on Pacific strategy was
Rabaul by storm would have cost more fast approaching.
U.S. lives than were expended on Iwo Events had overtaken the old plan
Jima. Instead, it was simply neutralized approved in 1943. At that time the goal
for the balance of the war. If Iwo Jima was to reach the South China coast and
and the Marianas had been treated simi- establish bomber bases there from
larly, thousands of lives would have which to reduce Japan or, perhaps, pre-
been saved. pare to invade it. But since then the
Between April and October of Japanese had seized more of China, and
1944, MacArthur’s forces advanced the Army Air Forces were preparing to
1,000 miles in Indonesia, from Hollan- launch its B-29 Superfortress bombers
dia (now Jayapura) to Morotai, destroy- from the Marianas. What to do next
ing nine Japanese divisions at a cost of was becoming the subject of heated
10,000 U.S. casualties, including 1,648 debate, with King wanting to invade
dead. Yet in the Marianas alone that Formosa, MacArthur the Philippines.
66
• C E N T R A L P A C I F I C A R E A •
These tank
lighters came
under fire
during the
invasion of
Saipan in 1944.
General MacArthur was still insist- mosa as the fastest way to Japan.
ing that the whole Philippine archipel- MacArthur eloquently made the case for
ago had to be liberated, for political as Luzon’s being slower but surer.
well as military reasons. He argued that MacArthur may in fact have arrived at a
the United States would lose face abroad tacit agreement with Roosevelt by which
if it allowed the loyal Filipinos to lan- the President would support
guish needlessly. The voters at home MacArthur’s plan while the general
would be unhappy also, because the issued glowing communiques from his
nation felt guilty about having failed the theater in time for the November elec-
Philippines in 1942. And not only tions. Whether that was so or not, FDR
MacArthur, whose motives were trans- did endorse the plan, Admiral Leahy—
parently selfish and self-aggrandizing, Roosevelt’s personal chief of staff—
argued that bases in the Philippines favored it, too, and within six weeks of
should be established before conducting their conference Nimitz, who required
further operations. little persuasion, had fallen into line.
Chester Nimitz thought so too, as In the end even King had to agree, if
did most of his senior commanders. The only because his own planners had
naval officers’ main difference with found that Formosa could not be taken
MacArthur was that they did not agree without a huge number of army service
with him on the need to liberate the troops. Because they were not available
entire archipelago. Having the northern- in the numbers required, Formosa was
most island of Luzon was essential, definitely out. But in the Philippines,
however, for aircraft based there could where sympathetic local troops could be
cover the South China Sea and cut off recruited for much of the heavy labor,
Japan from Southeast Asia. In addition, additional army service workers would
Manila Bay was far superior as a fleet not be required.
anchorage to the Marianas. Iwo Jima and Okinawa In the
In Hawaii, Nimitz loyally presented Philippine Islands the two Pacific wars
King’s argument for the invasion of For- came together briefly, for the Navy
67
• C H A M B E R L A I N , N E V I L L E •
chairman of the State Council and gen- would. Japan won all the battles and
eralissimo. He established his capital at ended up controlling much of the coast
Nanking, an inland city near Shanghai. and some 170 million Chinese. But it
Chiang’s rise to power had been could not catch the retreating Chinese
rapid, but the power he actually exer- forces or dislodge Chiang from his new
cised was less than it seemed. He did not capital of Chungking, deep in the interior.
replace the leaders he defeated with men Though cut off from most of the
loyal to himself, so the warlords were world, except for modest amounts of
constantly rising against him and having aid that reached him over the Burma
to be defeated or negotiated with. Road or from Soviet Russia, Chiang and
Chiang’s actual rule did not extend his forces survived. The Japanese now
beyond the provinces of China con- found themselves locked in a war of
trolled by his army. The number of attrition that they could not afford and
provinces varied considerably but may could not end—except by leaving China.
have averaged around 10. The rest of This was out of the question for Japan’s
China’s 28 provinces were ruled by war- militarists, who had planned the inva-
lords. Although in theory subordinate to sion and now would have to live with
Chiang and the national government, in their mistake—one that would ulti-
practice they did as they pleased in their mately be fatal to them.
holdings. Beset by the warlords, pressing In 1941 Japan decided to cut off
him from the provinces he did not con- China from outside aid and strangle
trol; the communists, who began to Chiang’s government. Because this
grow again; and challenges to his rule would probably mean war with the
from within the KMT, Chiang was United States, Japan seized the initiative
always at war. by destroying much of the Pacific Fleet
Matters grew worse for him in at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December
1931 when the Japanese seized the terri- and seizing virtually all of Southeast
tory of Manchuria’s warlord, who was Asia and the western Pacific.
aligned with Chiang. Further incidents In the years that followed, U.S. aid to
followed, ending with the outright inva- Nationalist China increased. Supplies
sion of China by the Imperial Japanese were flown to China from India, and U.S.
Army in 1937. During these years warplanes operated out of bases on
Chiang continued to extend his rule and Nationalist soil. Allied forces gradually
succeeded in driving the communists out retook most of Burma, and by 1945 a
of southern China. Late in 1936 Chiang new road, the Ledo, ran from India to
was kidnapped and, while being held China. Throughout this period Chiang
captive, agreed to form a joint anti- contributed as few troops as possible to
Japanese front with the communists. the war against Japan, keeping his best
The agreement was never formalized, units along his northwest frontier with
however, and nothing really changed. Communist China. This infuriated many
Chiang does not seem to have been Americans who had to deal with Chiang,
weakened by the experience, as he had since their only interest was in defeating
actually conceded little. Japan. He wanted to see Japan defeated
When Japan invaded, Chiang put as well, but he was counting on the Allies
into effect a strategy of retreat he had doing it while he prepared for his post-
developed earlier, trading space for time war showdown with the communists.
until the Japanese were overextended. Successful in the short run, Chiang
Events unfolded as he had thought they would fail in the end because his regime
70
• C H I A N G K A I - S H E K, M A D A M •
was brutal, incompetent, and corrupt, China. Her father, Charles Jones Soong,
and because as a leader he fell far short was a Methodist missionary and mer-
of Mao Zedong, leader of Communist chant who supported Sun Yat-sen, the
China and a master of intrigue and pro- father of the Republic of China. Soong
paganda. In the postwar struggle for had three daughters and three sons, the
power, Chiang would be outmaneu- third of whom, T. V. Soong, held a vari-
vered, his popular support would fall ety of offices under Chiang, including
away, and army desertions to the com- foreign minister and premier.
munist side would take place on an One daughter, Ch’ing-ling, became the
enormous scale. In 1949 Chiang and the second wife of Sun Yat-sen. Soong Ai-ling,
Kuomintang party were driven from another daughter married H. H. K’ung, a
China. Chiang spent the rest of his life future president of Nationalist China.
as the ruler of the island of Formosa In 1927 Soong Mei-ling married
(later renamed Taiwan), cherishing futile Chiang Kai-shek. Charming, beautiful,
hopes of one day returning in triumph intelligent, and courageous, she was
to the mainland. also hot-tempered and arrogant. How-
ever, these less attractive qualities did
SEE ALSO
not prevent her from being a great asset
Chiang Kai-shek, Madam; China; China-
Burma-India theater to her husband, particularly during
World War II.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
After Eleanor Roosevelt, she was
Berkov, Robert. Strong Man of China: The the most famous wife of a head of state
Story of Chiang Kai-shek. Freeport, N.Y.:
Books for Libraries Press, 1970. and was greatly admired in the United
Chiang, Kai-shek. China’s Destiny. 1947. States, where she had been educated.
Reprint, New York: Da Capo, 1976. She used her celebrity and fluent En-
Crozier, Brian. The Man Who Lost China:
Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Scribners, glish to promote China, notably during
1976. a highly successful tour of the United
Dolan, Sean. Chiang Kai-shek. New York: States from November 1942 to May
Chelsea House, 1988.
1943. There she spoke effectively at ral-
lies, got her picture on the cover of Life
magazine (a great distinction at the
Chiang Kai-shek, time), and secured additional aid for
China. The willingness of the press to
Madam (Soong take her at face value helped Nationalist
Image Not Available Mei-ling) China conceal its defects for a long
WIFE OF CHINA’S PRESIDENT time.
Madame Chi- F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ang Kai-shek Eunson, Roby. The Soong Sisters. New
and her hus- York: Franklin Watts, 1975.
band laugh dur- Seagrave, Sterling. The Soong Dynasty.
ing a photo New York: Harper & Row, 1985.
session while Madam Chiang was the third wife of Thomas, Harry J. The First Lady of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Born in China: the Historic Wartime Visit of
visiting the Mme. Chiang Kai-shek to the United
United States in 1900 as Soong Mei-ling, she belonged States in 1943. New York: International
1940. to one of the best-known families in Business Machines Corp., 1943.
71
• C H I E F S O F S T A F F , C O M B I N E D ( U . K . – U . S . ) •
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
SEE ALSO
Chiang Kai-shek; China-Burma-India
theater; Japan
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Japan’s withdrawal from China an king, where Chiang had established his
essential condition for lifting sanctions wartime capital, had radically different
in 1941, the United States could proba- agendas. Whereas Roosevelt meant to
bly have struck a temporary deal with strengthen Chiang’s government as a
Japan. To knowingly risk war on its weapon against Japan, Chiang was pri-
behalf is the most one nation can do for marily interested in destroying the Chi-
another, yet Americans, including the nese Communist Party (CCP). After
President, knew almost nothing about Pearl Harbor, Chiang’s policy was to let
the country they were trying to save. the United States beat the Japanese
Despite this lack of knowledge there while he prepared for war with the com-
was a large body of support in the munists. Under intense pressure, Chiang
United States for China, especially after would cooperate militarily with the
it was invaded by Japan. Following United States, but on the smallest scale
Pearl Harbor, China became the United possible.
States’s favorite ally. Most Americans Despite a stream of negative reports
seem to have been at least honorary from U.S. diplomatic and military per-
members of what would later be called sonnel on the incompetence and unpop-
the China lobby. ularity of Chiang’s regime, Roosevelt
Even though China had been the refused to admit that his China policy
United States’s reason for entering the was fatally flawed. Nor would he accept
Pacific war, Washington could do little the view of his ambassador in Chung-
to help it during the dark days after the king, Clarence Gauss, that the country
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, could never be more than a “minor
1941, beyond maintaining a volunteer asset” to the United States and had the
U.S. fighter group, the Flying Tigers, potential to become a “major liability.”
that had been established there earlier Chiang had skillful representation in
that year. Once the Pacific war broke the United States and was the China
out, the Flying Tigers became part of the lobby’s favorite leader. For political rea-
Tenth, then the Fourteenth, Army Air sons, Roosevelt could not turn his back
Force. The United States had few on Chiang, and the military saw China
weapons to spare at first. And China as the logical springboard from which to
could not be easily supplied, because invade Japan. Then, too, Roosevelt
Japan controlled all the convenient ports wanted China to be one of his “Four
and the Burma Road to India. Neverthe- Policemen,” who would maintain peace
less, Roosevelt was determined to build after the war was over. Necessity thus
up Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s gov- became the mother of self-deception.
ernment and expand his territory as a In 1942 U.S. Army Chief of Staff
base from which to invade Japan, and so George C. Marshall sent Lieutenant
that China could serve as a useful ally in General Joseph W. “Vinegar Joe” Stil-
the postwar era. Much bitterness would well, an expert on China, where he had
result from this unfortunate decision. served for many years, to command in
The truth about China was that it China and Burma.
would never be able to offer much help. Stilwell had been military attaché to
But because Americans believed that a the U.S. embassy in Beijing, when Japan
strong China was essential to the war attacked in 1937, and sympathized with
effort, truth could not be allowed to the Chinese. He was an outstanding field
stand in the way of policy. Neither could commander, having distinguished himself
the fact that Washington and Chung- in prewar maneuvers by his flair and
76
• C H I N A – B U R M A – I N D I A T H E A T E R •
imagination. In addition to his theater supplied only by air over the treacherous
command, Chiang named him chief of Himalayas—called by fliers “The
staff of the Nationalist Chinese Army, an Hump”—an extraordinarily dangerous
empty gesture, since Chiang had no route that claimed the lives of many.
intention of allowing an American to This trickle of supplies, when a torrent
command his troops. They would not be was needed, ruled out major operations.
of much use anyway, for the 3-million- In his effort to open Burma, Stilwell
strong National Army of the Republic of found his greatest enemy to be Generalis-
China looked impressive only on paper. simo Chiang Kai-shek, whom he private-
Most of its 300 divisions were ill trained, ly called Peanut, and his next greatest
malnourished, disease ridden, horribly Claire Chennault, who led the Flying
led, and, for the most part, outside Tigers and its successor, the U.S. Four-
Chiang’s jurisdiction. Warlords ran most teenth Air Force. Chennault, who wanted
of these divisions, with Chiang com- to be independent of Stilwell, was mak-
manding no more than 30. What few ing absurd promises to defeat Japan if he
resources he did have available went to were provided with 147 aircraft.
the 400,000 men who stood guard The actual situation, as Stilwell
against the CCP in North China, leaving pointed out, was that if Chennault
little for the fight against Japan. annoyed the Japanese too much they
Stilwell reached China in March would simply take his airfields. He
1942, just as the Japanese invaded argued that the correct strategy was to
Burma, where the British fought badly secure a land route to India first, then
and the Chinese worse. Chiang gave undertake more ambitious land and air
Stilwell nominal command of his troops operations. However, Roosevelt
in Burma, but once there, Vinegar Joe favored Chennault’s idea—because
discovered that he had no real authority Chiang liked it and because it would be
over them. In lightning attacks the easier to supply a small air force than a
Japanese destroyed the Allied front, and large ground army. At the Trident con-
Stilwell personally led a column of 114 ference in May 1943 in Washington,
survivors out of the jungle to India, the Churchill and Roosevelt produced a
only group of escapees to make it with- compromise, dividing the supplies sent
out loss of life. to China between Stilwell and Chen-
Throughout the campaign, Ameri- nault, although Chennault had the
can journalists had published evasive higher priority.
reports. Upon reaching India, Stilwell In March 1944 Japan launched two
put things right at a press conference major offensives that prompted impor-
with the blunt statement: “I claim we tant changes. One drive along the
took a hell of a beating. We got run out Burma–India frontier threatened the
of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I Chinese “X-Force” operating in Burma
think we ought to find out what caused under Stilwell’s command. This drive
it, go back and retake it.” These finally led Washington to warn Chiang
remarks made him famous. that all U.S. aid to him would be cut off
Stilwell would spend the next two unless he put the companion “Y-Force”
and a half years trying to build up a under Stilwell also. Chiang had been
Chinese force of 30 divisions able to accepting aid but keeping most of his
retake North Burma and defend a new troops out of battle, which could no
land route from India in place of the old longer be tolerated.
Burma Road. Until then, China could be Chiang complied, permitting a
77
• C H I N A – B U R M A – I N D I A T H E A T E R •
but the entire China-Burma-India the- the century and was very well known
ater never justified the resources that both at home and abroad.
were, with such difficulty, devoted to it. Early life Although Churchill was
the grandson of a duke, he was techni-
SEE ALSO
cally a commoner, because titles of
Chiang Kai-shek; China
nobility passed only to eldest sons. His
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
father, Lord (a courtesy title) Randolph
Sun, Youli. China and the Origins of the
Churchill, was the third son of the sev-
Pacific War, 1931–1941. New York: St. enth duke of Marlborough and there-
Martin’s, 1993. fore did not inherit the dukedom. Lord
Tuchman, Barbara W. Stilwell and the U.S. Randolph was a Conservative politician
Experience in China, 1911–1945. New
York: Macmillan, 1971. of note, rising to become chancellor of
the exchequer (in charge of the trea-
sury). He married Jennie Jerome, an
American heiress, but her money never
Churchill, Winston came down to Winston, who was ob-
liged to earn his living by his pen for
Spencer most of his adult life.
PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN, After attending prep school at Har-
1940–45 row, which he hated, and the military
• Born: November 30, 1874, Blenheim academy at Sandhurst, which he liked,
Palace, England Churchill joined the cavalry and served
• Political parties: Union, Liberal, in India, Cuba, and the Sudan. He had
Conservative
many adventures during these years,
• Education: Harrow, 1886–92; Royal
Military College at Sandhurst, 1893–94 most of them as a journalist on leave
• Military service: British cavalry 2nd from his regiment in India, where little
lieutenant, 1895–1900; major, 1915; was happening. At the 1898 Battle of
lieutenant colonel of infantry, 1915–16
Omdurman in Sudan during Britain’s
• Previous government service: House of
Commons, 1900–1904; undersecretary war with the Dervishes, Churchill took
of state for the colonies, 1905–1908; part in the last great cavalry charge
president of the Board of Trade,
1908–10; home secretary, 1910–11;
made by the British Army. He also cov-
first lord of the Admiralty, 1911–15; ered the Boer War in South Africa as a
minister of munitions, 1917–18; reporter, was captured by the Boers, and
secretary of state for war and air,
1918–21; secretary for the colonies, then escaped, which made him an
1921–22; chancellor of the exchequer, instant celebrity.
1924–29; first lord of the Admiralty, Churchill resigned his commission in
1939–40
• Died: January 24, 1965, London,
1900 and stood for Parliament as a Con-
England servative. His own fame, augmented by
already extensive writings, and his
famous name, ensured his election. In
1905 he bolted the Conservative party
Winston S. Churchill is best known in and became a Liberal, a step perhaps
the United States as Britain’s wartime even more rare in Britain than in the
prime minister, particularly for his hero- United States. As a Liberal he quickly
ic leadership in 1940 and 1941 when rose to become civilian head of the Royal
Britain stood alone against Germany. Navy, which, because Britain still ruled
But Churchill had been a major figure in the waves, made him a world figure. He
British politics since the early years of championed the doomed Gallipoli,
79
• C H U R C H I L L, W I N S T O N S P E N C E R •
Allied troops from Dunkirk, which was and guarded by the British Fleet, would
completed June 3. carry on the struggle, until, in God’s
The British expeditionary force was good time, the New World, with all its
saved, but all else was lost. The Army power and might, steps forth to the res-
returned to Britain minus most of its cue and the liberation of the Old.”
weapons. France surrendered in June. His listeners were deeply moved,
With Germany having won the Conti- one Labour member writing that the
nent, and the United States on the side- speech “was worth 1,000 guns and the
lines, there were many in Britain who speeches of 1,000 years.”
felt that the time had come to accept For his leadership in that desperate
Hitler’s terms for peace—which were time, Churchill will always be honored.
that Britain could keep the Empire In a rare moment of modesty, Churchill
while Germany retained Europe. If once said that it was the British people
Britain had dropped out of the war who had the lion’s heart; it fell to him
there would have been no way for the only to give the roar. This was to allow
United States to intervene in Europe himself too little credit, for no other
and little chance of defeating Hitler. It British politician could have rallied the
was at this critical juncture, with the British as he did—none had his com-
fate of the world hanging in the bal- mand of the language, his ability to sum-
ance, that Churchill realized his full mon the past in aid of the present, his
promise at last. Insisting on a fight to faith in Britain’s greatness. Who else
the finish, he led the British people with could have convinced the British when
never-to-be-forgotten eloquence and all seemed lost that they were actually
force as they stood alone against enjoying what he would later call “their
Hitler’s war machine. finest hour”?
On June 4 Churchill addressed the Churchill as war leader After the
House of Commons, ending with these Soviet Union and the United States
defiant lines: became allies of Britain, Churchill prob-
“Even though large tracts of Europe ably did the war effort more harm than
and many old and famous States have good. As prime minister and minister of
fallen or may fall into the grip of the defence, he strongly influenced British
Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of strategy, often for the worse. No one
Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. was more responsible than he for the
“We shall go on to the end. We shall Royal Air Force’s bombing attacks on
fight in France, we shall fight on the seas Germany, which killed hundreds of
and oceans, we shall fight with growing thousands of civilians and consumed at
confidence and growing strength in the a minimum 25 percent of Britain’s war
air, we shall defend our island, whatever effort, while contributing little to victory.
the cost may be. Like the U.S. air war over Europe, it
“We shall fight on the beaches, we was not only a crime but a blunder—
shall fight on the landing grounds, we one which, unlike the United States,
shall fight in the fields and in the streets, Britain could ill afford.
we shall fight in the hills; we shall never More serious still was Churchill’s
surrender. absolute determination to prevent, or at
“And even if, which I do not for a least delay, the Allied invasion of France,
moment believe, this island or a large the only way for the Allies to ensure
part of it were subjugated and starving, Germany’s early defeat and, in addition,
then our Empire beyond the seas, armed minimize the Soviet Union’s postwar
81
• C H U R C H I L L, W I N S T O N S P E N C E R •
Churchill
(below fore-
ground lamp-
post) waves
and gives the
famous V-for-
victory sign to
a mob of peo-
ple on May 8,
1945, after
Image Not Available
making his V-E
Day speech in
London.
position in Europe. This was a return to by resisting for as long as he could the
the marginal strategy Churchill had creation of a second front. It was the
advocated in World War I, which had postponement of what became Opera-
ended in defeat at Gallipoli. It proved a tion Overlord, not Stalin’s guile or Roo-
poor strategy in World War II as well, sevelt’s innocence, that let the Red
tying down most of the West’s strength Army occupy so much of Europe.
in North Africa and Italy while the Declining influence After D-Day,
buildup for the attack across the English Churchill’s influence in the Grand
Channel languished. Alliance of Britain, the Soviet Union,
If D-Day, the invasion of France, and the United States diminished. The
had taken place in 1943, as General United States was now providing not
George C. Marshall and other U.S. only the bulk of Allied military strength
strategists wanted, Germany would in the West and 25 percent of Britain’s
most likely have fallen at least a year weaponry but many other forms of aid
earlier than it did, with a great saving as well. In the bargaining with Stalin
of human lives on the battlefield and in that occupied much of Roosevelt’s last
the Holocaust. Also, all of central months, FDR went his own way—drag-
Europe, and maybe part of eastern ging Churchill behind him.
Europe as well, would have ended up The unkindest blow of all fell on
outside the Soviet empire. Conservative Churchill in July 1945, during a confer-
Americans used to argue that if only ence of the Big Three in Potsdam, Ger-
Roosevelt had listened to Churchill many. Britain held its first general elec-
there would have been no sellout to tion in 10 years and, to the surprise of
Stalin at Yalta. The opposite is more Americans, threw the Conservatives
likely true, however: although out. Churchill, preoccupied with war
Churchill’s ancient anti-Bolshevism— and diplomacy, had failed to recognize
which dated all the way back to 1917— that the British people, who had suf-
resurfaced near the end of the war, no fered so much, were now determined to
one had done more to ensure that com- have a welfare state, which only the
munism would rule in the East than he, Labour party could give them.
82
• C I V I L D E F E N S E •
Churchill, though deeply hurt, took Kimball, Warren F. Forged in War: Roo-
his defeat with the greatness of charac- sevelt, Churchill, and the Second World
War. New York: Morrow, 1997.
ter that always redeemed his quick tem- Rose, Norman. Churchill: The Unruly
per, heavy drinking, and other faults. Giant. New York: Free Press, 1994.
He was bathing when he got the news,
and remarked: “They are perfectly enti-
tled to vote as they please. This is
democracy. This is what we have been
fighting for.” Although entitled to
Civil defense
return to Potsdam for the conference’s
end, Churchill went to Buckingham
Palace at the end of election day and The office of Civilian Defense (OCD)
gave his resignation to the king. was established in May 1941 by Presi-
Churchill then issued a statement wish- dent Roosevelt, who named the peppery
ing the new government well. In pri- mayor of New York, Fiorello
vate, his words carried more bitterness. LaGuardia, as its chief. OCD was sup-
When his wife remarked that this might posed to coordinate civilian efforts to
be a blessing in disguise, Churchill prepare for war, but its authority was so
replied that it seemed “quite effectively vague, its mission so unclear, and public
disguised.” enthusiasm for its mandate so slight,
In recent years British authors have that little came of it at first. Then, after
written books highly critical of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December
Churchill. It is true that he had serious 1941, a vast tide of civilian enthusiasm
faults and made many mistakes, but overwhelmed the OCD. Citizens com-
when he rallied the British in 1940, he, mittees sprang up everywhere. Hospitals
and they, saved everything. Their finest reeled before hordes of people eager to
hour is Churchill’s monument and his donate blood for the armed forces. In
claim to greatness. With his books, arti- Chicago 23,000 block captains were
cles, and especially speeches, he proved sworn in at a mass ceremony. OCD’s
once again that words above all deter- inability to channel this surge of support
mine the fate of nations. It was not just aroused numerous complaints—that it
Britain’s good fortune but the world’s did not have a women’s division, for
that when all seemed lost, it was led by example—although any civilian effort
a man who could mobilize the full would have to depend on women to a
power of the English language in the very large extent.
service of liberty. In time the OCD did make use of
female volunteers, especially after the
SEE ALSO President appointed his wife Eleanor to
D-Day; Foreign policy; France, fall of; Ital-
give LaGuardia a hand. But the OCD
ian campaigns; Mediterranean theater; never became a major government
Potsdam conference; Strategic bombing; agency, in large part because the United
Yalta conference States was never attacked, making a civil
defense effort on the European scale
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
unnecessary. For the most part, civilian
Churchill, Winston S. The Second World contributions to the war effort were
War. 6 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, handled by other agencies, by a vast
1948–54.
Gilbert, Martin. Churchill: A Life. New number of independent organizations
York: Henry Holt, 1991. like the Red Cross, or not at all.
83
• C O N C E N T R A T I O N C A M P S •
The Civilian Air Warning System, beating, and starving them, frequently
amateur aircraft spotters, enrolled a half to death.
million members. A partial blackout of At first Nazi Germany had many
the East Coast was imposed in 1942. such camps, but in 1934 the system was
First aid classes drew hundreds of thou- reorganized under the Schutzstattel (SS)
sands of students, as did classes on how and put under the supervision of special
to survive an air raid. By February 1952 Death’s Head formations. By 1937 there
5 million Americans belonged to some were only three important camps:
type of volunteer civil defense organiza- Dachau, Sachsenhausen, and Buchen-
tion. That summer some 11,000 Local wald. The Allied troops who liberated
Defense Councils carried 10 million vol- these camps in 1945 were horrified by
unteers on their rolls, some directly the mass graves, fiendish instruments of
involved in civil defense, others in torture, and brutalized inmates they dis-
numerous war-related activities, such as covered there. But for all their ghastli-
scrap drives and Victory gardens. ness, they were small-scale affairs com-
pared to the death camps of the
Holocaust, which lay to the east of Ger-
many. The victims of concentration
Concentration camps camps numbered only in the tens of
thousands, whereas perhaps 12 million
people—half of them Jews—perished in
the death camps.
The Nazis began establishing concentra-
tion camps for political prisoners soon SEE ALSO
after coming to power in 1933. The Holocaust
first and most notorious of these was F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Dachau, located near Munich. These
Auerbacher, Inge. I Am a Star: Child of the
camps were atrocious places and Holocaust. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
designed to be so. The Nazis meant to tice-Hall, 1986.
terrorize their enemies—and potential Buechner, Howard A. Dachau: The
Hour of the Avenger (An Eyewitness
enemies—by inflicting inhuman punish- Account). Metairie, La.: Thunderbird
ments on them, including torturing, Press, 1986.
Two prisoners
(in foreground)
support a
comrade dur-
ing a roll call
at this German
concentration
camp because
Image Not Available
fainting was
frequently used
as an excuse
for guards to
“liquidate”
useless inmates.
84
• C O N G R E S S, U. S. •
Baldwin, Margaret. The Boys Who Saved because the war had not been going well
the Children. New York: Julian Messner, up to that time. President Roosevelt had
1981.
Feig, Konnilyn G. Hitler’s Death Camps: hoped that Operation Torch, the inva-
The Sanity of Madness. New York: sion of French North Africa, would turn
Holmes & Meier, 1981. the electorate around. But Operation
Geehr, Richard S., ed. Letters from the
Torch came on November 8, just a few
Doomed: Concentration Camp Corre-
spondence 1940–1945. Lanham, Md.: days after the election. To his credit,
University Press of America, 1992. Roosevelt did not flinch when informed
Phillips, Walter Alfred Peter. The Tragedy of the invasion’s delay, which he knew
of Nazi Germany. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1969. would hurt Democrats at the polls. In
Smith, Marcus J. The Harrowing of Hell: the new 78th Congress the Republicans
Dachau. Albuquerque: University of New were just 13 seats short of a majority in
Mexico Press, 1972.
the House and 9 seats behind in the Sen-
ate. Because of by-elections held to fill
vacated seats, the Democrats actually
Congress, U.S. lost their majority in the House,
although it was not reorganized under
Republican leadership because the 1944
elections were so near.
Beginning in 1937, Congress, although Although it continued to support
nominally under Democratic control, Roosevelt in military and foreign affairs,
was really dominated by a coalition of the new Congress killed off as many
Republicans and conservative southern New Deal agencies as it could. Young
Democrats. Because Congress was people were hardest hit, losing the
strongly influenced by isolationism (the National Youth Administration, the
desire of most citizens for the United Civilian Conservation Corps, and other
States to stay out of world affairs in gen- programs targeted at them. These were
eral and World War II in particular) not needed during the war, when most
before the bombing of Pearl Harbor in young people were in the armed services
December 1941, Roosevelt was reluctant or at work on a full- or part-time basis.
to prepare adequately for war, and slow But they would be missed afterward.
to aid the Allies after Hitler invaded Congress would not expand the
Poland in September 1939. draft in 1944 when the military man-
Nevertheless, Congress, by very nar- power crisis hit. It consistently refused to
row margins, did enact a bill creating the draft women for noncombat jobs, even
Selective Service System (which adminis- though public opinion polls showed that
tered a military draft) in 1940, extended most Americans, including young women
it in 1941 (by a single vote in the of draft age, would accept such a mea-
House), and passed the important Lend- sure. It would not pass a national service
Lease Act (which provided war machin- bill that would have required civilians to
ery to Britain and its allies) in 1941. work at assigned jobs, although again the
Once the United States entered the war, polls were favorable. But in 1944 it did
Congress gave Roosevelt an almost com- pass the GI Bill of Rights, a sweeping
pletely free hand when it came to defense program of veterans’ benefits that was
and foreign policy issues. both very popular and a great success. In
In the off-year election of 1942, the 1944 elections Democrats regained
Republicans made big gains, partly be- control of Congress again, too late to
cause voter turnout was light and partly make any difference to the war effort.
85
• C O R A L S E A, B A T T L E O F T H E •
the Coral Sea bound for Port Moresby. the Navy, was famous as a happy ship
Although this area was in General Dou- and was greatly missed by her crew. She
glas MacArthur’s theater, a divided com- was also missed by Admiral Nimitz, for
mand arrangement stipulated that fleet now he was left with only three carriers
carrier operations would remain under to face the Japanese onslaught.
Navy control wherever they took place. The loss of Lexington made the bat-
Accordingly, Nimitz sent Vice Admiral tle of the Coral Sea a tactical win for the
Frank Jack Fletcher to defend the Coral Japanese, who had inflicted more harm
Sea with two fleet carriers, Lexington than they suffered. But it remained a
and Yorktown. Nimitz had no replace- strategic victory for the United States,
ment for these priceless warships, but because after the battle Japan was ob-
the Allies could not afford to lose Aus- liged to call off its invasion of Port
tralia, so the risk had to be taken. At the Moresby for lack of air support. In the
Coral Sea, Nimitz’s courage would be Coral Sea the United States’s sailors and
rewarded, and not for the last time. airmen saved Australia.
On May 1 both U.S. carrier groups The Battle of the Coral Sea was the
were in place. They and the Japanese high-water mark of Japan’s advance in
strike force, which included two fleet the Pacific, as it turned out, and a crucial
carriers and one light carrier, blundered setback. Because of it, two damaged
back and forth for days, always missing Japanese fleet carriers would not return
each other. Battle was finally joined on to service in time for Midway—much
May 7. When it was over, Japanese reducing the odds in that all-important
planes had sunk a U.S. destroyer and an engagement. The Coral Sea was the first
oil tanker and scored numerous but not naval battle fought entirely by aircraft,
fatal hits on Lexington and Yorktown. and both sides made many mistakes. But
The “Lady Lex” suffered most, because the Japanese committed more of them,
she had been built on a battle cruiser and the U.S. Navy was learning fast. The
hull and was less maneuverable than next time, at Midway, it would do better.
Yorktown, a carrier from her keel up. At
SEE ALSO
this point the U.S. Navy was far ahead,
Midway, Battle of; Pacific war
the Japanese having lost a light carrier
and the use (temporarily) of its big carri- F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ers, the Shokaku for two crucial Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. Blue Skies and
months, and the Zuikaku until June 12, Blood: The Battle of the Coral Sea. New
York: Eriksson, 1975.
because of heavy damage to its air Millot, Bernard. The Battle of the Coral
group. Sea. London: Allan, 1974.
But the balance changed when Lex-
ington started erupting. She had taken
two torpedoes and three bomb hits during
the battle, but her crew gained control of Cruisers
the fires, relit her boilers, and she was
steaming home at 25 knots when gasoline
fumes from her ruptured tanks exploded. After battleships and carriers, cruisers
Remarkably, although 36 planes were the largest warships in the U.S.
went down with her, only some 200 Navy. Like most navies, the U.S. Navy
lives were lost out of a complement of had two basic cruiser types, heavy (more
nearly 3,000. The Lexington, with than 10,000 tons’ displacement), and
Saratoga, the biggest combat vessel in light. Heavy cruisers were armed usually
87
• D - D A Y •
the Germans from bringing up rein- the Germans pressed into service, and
forcements from the eastern front. temporary bridges. These attacks se-
A third factor favoring the Allies verely limited Germany’s ability to move
was that they had broken Germany’s troops and supplies around in France.
military codes and could read its radio Deception Equally important, the
traffic. ULTRA, as this information was Allies leaked false plans that kept Hitler,
called, had been most useful in Africa, who made the key decisions, from con-
where radio was the principal medium centrating his troops in Normandy.
of communications. It would be of less There were 6 primary plans plus 36 sec-
value on the Continent, where secure ondary ones, entailing leaked informa-
land lines reduced German radio use. tion, guerrilla raids by resistance forces,
Yet the Allies could usually count on Allied military actions, and a host of
knowing the enemy’s strength—referred other activities that misled Germany and
to in military terms as “the order of kept its troops dispersed.
Image Not Available battle”—giving them an intelligence One of the best deception opera-
advantage. tions was Fortitude North, a low-cost
Preparations Although the Allies’ plan that required only a handful of
efforts to destroy the German-controlled men and women. The Allied command
French rail yards with heavy bombers created a fictitious British Fourth Army
did not have the hoped-for results, Allied headquartered at Edinburgh Castle in
fighter-bomber attacks were highly suc- Scotland and, by pouring out radio mes-
cessful. By D-Day, Major General Lewis sages, convinced German intelligence
H. Brereton’s Ninth Air Force had 11 that the Allies were about to invade
medium bomber groups, each consisting Norway, which Germany had occupied
of 64 aircraft, and 18 fighter groups since June 1940. As a result, the 27 Ger-
with 75 planes apiece, which he used to man divisions in Norway remained
destroy bridges. At the time, critics there instead of defending France.
argued that bridges were poor targets, The most important deception plan,
Division patch- because they said it would take 1,200 code named Fortitude South, had two
es were worn tons of bombs to destroy a single bridge parts. First it had to persuade Germany
on American across the Seine. But on May 10, 1944, that the main Allied effort would be at
military uni- a flight of P-47 Thunderbolts dropped the Pas de Calais, where the English
forms for quick two 1,000-pound bombs on a rail Channel was narrowest. After D-Day
identification.
bridge, completely destroying it. the job of this force was to suggest that
They were
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expe- the Normandy landings had been
especially use-
ful during large
ditionary Forces (SHAEF) then drew up intended to mislead, the real target still
operations, a plan to destroy bridges all over north- being Calais.
such as the ern France. They would isolate the Nor- In a major counterintelligence tri-
Normandy mandy beaches, all the while keeping umph, the British had “turned” an
invasion. Germany in the dark as to where the entire German spy network, which was
Allied landings would take place. The now working for the Allies and giving
campaign began on May 24. the Reich a flood of misinformation.
By D-Day the U.S. Ninth Air Force But the heart of this massive deception
and the RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force effort was a fake army group supposed-
had destroyed all nine Seine railroad ly consisting of 50 divisions and 1 mil-
crossings and a dozen highway bridges. lion men in the southeast of England
Allied air units then kept them closed, by commanded by Lieutenant General
bombing repaired structures, boats that George S. Patton, Jr. To support the
89
• D - D A Y •
relations with the United States were per- offended by this intransigence were unwill-
manently poisoned by this adventure. ing to see that for me, intent as I was on
De Gaulle as war leader Charles beating back innumerable conflicting pres-
de Gaulle was an outsized figure even in sures, the slightest wavering would have
an age of giants, but unlike other world brought collapse. In short, limited and
leaders he was not chief of a great state. alone though I was, and precisely because
De Gaulle started out as the leader of I was so, I had to climb to the heights and
practically nothing, yet through persis- never then to come down.”
tence and strength of character, he This proved to be no idle boast but
spearheaded the drive to restore French became an exact description of the
honor. His insignia, the two-barred course he followed. No one less arro-
Cross of Lorraine, would everywhere gant, unbending, insensitive, ungrateful,
come to be seen as the symbol of and self-confident than de Gaulle could
France’s rebirth. It took immense per- have forced the Allies to accept him as
sonal powers and unbending determina- the leader first of North Africa, then of
tion to accomplish this. liberated France, and finally the head of
To Roosevelt, and even to Churchill, a great power entitled to share in the
who was more sympathetic, de Gaulle occupation of Germany at the end of
appeared to have major faults. Utterly the war. Inevitably, this brought down
dependent on Britain and the United on him the anger of Churchill but espe-
States, he made a habit of biting the cially Roosevelt.
hands that were feeding him. Churchill But, however mistaken de Gaulle
claimed that de Gaulle once said to him may have been in matters of detail, as
that if he were too cooperative he would over Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, his
be regarded by the French as being a tool devotion to France would make possi-
of the Allies. If that was the danger, he ble its salvation. Few Frenchmen
clearly succeeded in avoiding it, leading appreciated this at first. Most accepted
to Churchill’s well-known remark that German rule as final: some passively,
the heaviest cross he had to bear was the many others by actively cooperating
Cross of Lorraine. with the Nazis. Among the latter “col-
The fundamental disagreement laborators” were those responsible,
between de Gaulle and his allies was that among other crimes, for the deaths of
they were determined to treat him as the many of the 75,000 to 100,000 French
commander of a small allied force, while Jews who were sent to Nazi death
he insisted upon being treated as the camps. It was de Gaulle’s major
leader of France. In his outstanding war achievement that, over time, he and his
memoirs, de Gaulle explained his strategy, movement made it impossible to be
which he adopted immediately upon both a good French citizen and a col-
reaching England in 1940. Although laborator. This situation first angered
grateful to Churchill, de Gaulle had rea- and embarrassed many, but finally it
son to feel that the great powers would became the means to restore the self-
pursue their war aims at the expense of respect of the French.
France if necessary—which he was deter- De Gaulle and Roosevelt The com-
mined to prevent against all odds. bination of his relatively low rank and
From the first, de Gaulle’s idea was his high aims made it easy to underesti-
that since he had nothing, he could not mate de Gaulle at first, as did Roosevelt.
give an inch. As he wrote in his memoirs: In October 1942 he began giving Lend-
“Those who, all through the drama, were Lease aid directly to de Gaulle’s French
93
• D E G A U L L E , C H A R L E S •
General de
Gualle addresses
the Algiers Con-
sultative Assem-
bly on June 17,
1944.
National Committee, but while Allied This deal, which the Allies considered
military cooperation improved some- practical, was to de Gaulle merely a crude
what, the Free French were not only attempt by Roosevelt to take Free France
excluded from the invasion of French out of the picture. If so, the policy failed
North Africa but were not even badly. The French authorities in Tunisia
informed of it. De Gaulle had no doubts defied Darlan’s order to surrender, giving
about what FDR meant. It was the Pres- Hitler time to rush in troops and prevent
ident’s intention, de Gaulle believed, to an Allied victory. And, after Darlan was
gain control of French affairs and the assassinated on December 24, 1942, the
Free French army. Allied attempt to replace him with Giraud
This explanation appeared to de aroused little enthusiasm.
Gaulle to be the reason why the Ameri- Throughout the critical year follow-
cans had first tried to make General ing the North African invasion, de
Henri Giraud the leader of French Gaulle played his cards with great
North Africa but then struck a bargain shrewdness. He did not blame the Allies
with Admiral Jean Darlan, the comman- for failing to include Free France in their
der of Vichy armed forces who had been invasion of French territory but instead
in North Africa on November 8, 1942, called on Frenchmen to assist it. Never
when the Allies invaded it. The so-called challenging Roosevelt directly, he contin-
Darlan deal made this Nazi collaborator ued to extend his influence and build
the high commissioner of French North grass roots support.
Africa (with Giraud under him as head In time it became clear that the
of the military) in return for ordering French in North Africa would not
the Vichy French forces to lay down accept Giraud and his Vichyites as their
their arms. lawful rulers. A clumsy power-sharing
94
• D E S T R O Y E R S •
arrangement with de Gaulle worked no from his position as head of state in 1946
better. Finally, Giraud resigned as co- when he encountered opposition instead
president of the French Committee for of using the army to stay in power. Thus
National Liberation—now the umbrella de Gaulle was well placed in 1958 to
group covering all anti-Vichy French- save French democracy once again when
men—and closed his separate recruiting it was threatened by an armed revolt led
offices. In 10 months de Gaulle had by generals determined to win the losing
swallowed him up. struggle to retain Algeria.
French Committee for National
SEE ALSO
Liberation On November 9, 1943, de
France; Mediterranean theater
Gaulle created a government in exile.
From that day on there was one army, F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
one navy, and one leader of all the Free Aglion, Raoul. Roosevelt and de Gaulle:
French for the first time since 1940. In Allies in Conflict: A Personal Memoir.
New York: Free Press, 1988.
his memoirs de Gaulle is honest about Cogan, Charles G. Charles De Gaulle: A
how he forced himself and his govern- Brief Biography With Documents. New
ment upon the reluctant Allies, saying York: Bedford, 1995.
Cook, Don. Charles De Gaulle: A Biogra-
only that they came to terms with what phy. New York: Putnam, 1983.
they could not prevent. It was in fact De Gaulle, Charles. The Complete War
greatly to France’s advantage to have Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1967.
de Gaulle in command, for he was a Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Rebel,
fierce and successful defender of French 1880–1944. New York: Norton, 1990.
interests. But the Allied cause did not Shennan, Andrew. De Gaulle. New York:
suffer as a result, despite Roosevelt’s Longman, 1993.
reluctance to accept de Gaulle as a legiti-
mate leader.
Roosevelt made a final effort to put
de Gaulle in his place before D-Day, Destroyers
when he insisted that de Gaulle’s follow-
ers not be allowed to govern the liberated
areas of France, but this ploy also came
to nothing. On June 14, 1944, after the Before the development of destroyer
Allied beachhead was established, de escorts during World War II, destroyers
Gaulle arrived in Normandy, toured the were the smallest naval warships. Fast,
liberated area, and as he left General maneuverable, armed with naval guns,
Bernard Montgomery’s headquarters, torpedo tubes, depth charge launchers,
said to the British commander that he and a wide variety of antiaircraft
was leaving an officer behind to “look weapons, destroyers were among the
after the population.” With these words most useful of fighting ships.
Charles de Gaulle established his author- The most common U.S. destroyer of
ity over liberated France, and because it World War II was the Fletcher class, of
could not be removed except by force, which at least 175 were built. Capable of
Roosevelt had to accept it. making 38 knots, with their five 5-inch
Under de Gaulle, France made guns and 10 torpedo tubes they packed a
important contributions to the war effort, sizable punch. At first they were less
especially in Italy and on the western effective than Japanese destroyers,
front. And de Gaulle proved himself to because of seriously defective torpedoes
be genuinely democratic, stepping down and inferior tactics. But when these faults
95
• D E S T R O Y E R E S C O R T S •
Fortresses of the U.S. Eighth Air Force tured). Of these, more than 10 million
wiped out Dresden’s civil defense workers. were sustained on the eastern front.
It is not known how many perished Hitler and most of his generals
in the firestorm, since most of the dead underestimated the difficulties they
were hurriedly buried in mass graves. At would face in Russia. For one thing,
a rough guess, some 50,000 people were they believed—with good reason—that
killed in Dresden. Prime Minister the Red Army would be easy to beat.
Churchill, a supporter of this operation Stalin had murdered most of his senior
at first, backed away from it when crit- officers during the purges of the 1930s.
ics challenged the morality of making Then, too, the Red Army had performed
war on civilians. badly in its Winter War with Finland in
1939–40. As part of the Stalin-Hitler
SEE ALSO
Pact of August 23, 1939, the Soviets
Arnold, Henry H.; Hamburg, bombing of;
Strategic bombing were allowed to invade Finland in that
year. Stalin wanted to strengthen Rus-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G sia’s security at Finnish expense by seiz-
Irving, David. The Destruction of Dres- ing various territories, notably lands
den. New York: Ballantine, 1963. north of Leningrad and west of Mur-
McKee, Alexander. Dresden 1945: The mansk. When the Finns refused to give
Devil’s Tinderbox. New York: Dutton,
1984. in to Soviet demands, the Red Army
Vonnegut, Kurt. Slaughterhouse-Five. attacked on November 30.
1959. Reprint, New York: Dell, 1999. The Soviets won in the end, but
Fiction.
only at a remarkable cost. Although Fin-
land had some 200,000 troops and the
Soviets 1.2 million, the Finns were
Eastern front highly motivated, well trained, and ably
led. Leaderless and demoralized, the
Red Army floundered, then ground to a
halt. A new offensive that began on
The eastern front opened on June 22, February 1, 1940, did better, after the
1941, when the Wehrmacht, Germany’s Soviet forces had been reorganized and
armed forces, swept over the country’s reequipped. They broke the Manner-
border into the Soviet Union. Operation heim line across Finland’s Karelian
Barbarossa, the code name for this Peninsula and destroyed the Finns’ fall-
assault, was designed to seize European back positions as well.
Russia with its coal, oil, and grain fields. The armistice concluded on March
These newly conquered territories were 12, 1940, gave Stalin just what he had
to provide Germany with unlimited raw asked for. Even so, 200,000 Russian
materials and living room (in German, troops had been killed, while Finnish
lebensraum) beyond what anyone previ- losses were only one-eighth as great.
ously had thought possible. Understandably, military experts around
Yet, despite Germany’s early successes the world concluded that the Red Army
there, the eastern front would become the was far more feeble than its huge num-
graveyard of that army and cost Hitler the bers of men and weapons suggested.
war. A single statistic tells it all: In World Besides the issue of military might,
War II, German forces are believed to Germany believed that the Soviet Union
have taken more than 13 million casual- was politically fragile. Stalin’s rule was
ties (dead, wounded, missing, and cap- based on terror, and many of the Soviet
97
• E A S T E R N F R O N T •
A German
motorized col-
umn comes
under attack
by Soviet air-
craft during the
early weeks of
the war on the
eastern front.
mile front. Over the winter he sent only the Black Sea, fell at last, and the Ger-
7,500 new vehicles to replace 75,000 that mans seized additional territory else-
had been lost. Equally serious for an where in southern Russia and the Cau-
army that still relied on draft animals to casus, between the Caspian and Black
transport its infantry, of 180,000 horses seas. But the main German thrust came
and oxen that had been lost, Germany to grief in the city of Stalingrad.
could replace only 20,000. And, because With 500,000 inhabitants when the
German industry was still on a peacetime war broke out, Stalingrad commanded
footing, Nazi aircraft and tank shortages the Volga River basin and produced more
were also acute. than a quarter of all Soviet tanks and
Meanwhile, Soviet production was mechanized vehicles. German General
booming. Factories—often without heat Friedrich Paulus and his Sixth Army
or even roofs, and staffed by women, old reached Stalingrad in November 1942,
men, and children—were churning out but, although he nearly destroyed the city,
weaponry. By the end of 1942, the Soviet he succeeded only in taking part of it. The
assembly lines were producing 2,000 Soviets launched flanking attacks to the
tanks a month and 30,000 planes per Sixth Army’s rear and, on November 23,
year, whereas Germany would build only completely encircled it. Paulus requested
4,000 planes in all of 1942. The aircraft permission to break out, but Hitler, rely-
were good, too; the tanks even better. ing on Reich Marshal Goering’s promise
More than half the Soviet tank produc- to supply the Sixth Army by air, refused
tion consisted of the excellent T-34, which to permit a retreat. The Luftwaffe, or Ger-
Germany would not match until its Pan- man Air Force, took heavy losses and
ther was deployed in 1943. And even could not meet the minimum needs of the
then, the Panthers would be produced in embattled Sixth Army. Paulus surrendered
small numbers compared to T-34s. to the Soviets on January 31, 1943. In a
Despite these shortages, the German few more days, the Battle of Stalingrad
offensive went well at first, resulting in was over. Later in February, the Caucasus
the expected victories. The Crimea, in was cleared of Germans for good.
100
• E A S T E R N F R O N T •
advance along a broad front as the prac- was all in favor of such a dash, but the
tical course, if not the best strategy. territory that would have been gained by
From September 1944 until March it had been promised to the Soviet Union
1945, the Allies advanced slowly. Then, at the Yalta conference in February 1945
late in December 1944, Hitler surprised and would have had to be turned over to
the Allies by launching one last offen- it in any case. Furthermore, Berlin was a
sive, through the Ardennes Forest of political prize but had no strategic value,
Belgium, where the U.S. line was weak. and taking it would have been very
Eisenhower was at his best in this crisis, costly. Eisenhower therefore did the sen-
telling his commanders to see this as an sible thing, notifying Stalin that his forces
opportunity rather than a setback. would stop along the line agreed to at
Eisenhower pulled men out of the Yalta. Soviet troops then went on to
long U.S. front and rushed them in huge take Berlin, suffering, at the very least,
numbers to the bulge created by Ger- 100,000 casualties for the sake of this
many’s advance. This engagement, the empty honor.
Battle of the Bulge, was the greatest
SEE ALSO
ever fought by the U.S. Army and
Bulge, Battle of; D-Day; France, Battle of;
ended in victory, as Eisenhower knew Italian campaigns; Marshall, George C.;
it would. North African campaign; Patton, George
Eisenhower’s broad-front approach S., Jr.; Sicily, Battle of
began paying off in March 1945, when
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
the German lines started to crumble.
Although Montgomery was supposed Ambrose, Stephen. Eisenhower: Soldier and
President. New York: Touchstone, 1991.
to cross the Rhine River first, units of ––––––. Eisenhower: Soldier of the Army,
the U.S. Ninth Army under Bradley’s President-Elect, 1890–1952. New York:
overall command, seized an intact Simon & Schuster, 1983.
Darby, Jean. Dwight D. Eisenhower: A
Rhine bridge at Remagen, and Eisen- Man Called Ike. New York: Lerner, 1989.
hower gave Bradley free rein to exploit Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower at War,
this opportunity. 1943–1945. New York: Random House,
1986.
What followed was another great Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe.
surge forward like the one after the Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948.
breakout from Normandy, with U.S. Lee, R. Alton. Dwight D. Eisenhower: A
armored units running wild and captur- Bibliography of His Times and
Presidency. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly
ing entire German armies. On May 7, Resources, 1991.
following Hitler’s suicide on April 30, Sandberg, Peter Lars. Dwight D. Eisen-
Admiral Karl Doenitz, who now com- hower. New York: Chelsea House, 1987.
manded the Third Reich, surrendered to
Eisenhower at 2:41 a.m. in Reims,
France. Eisenhower, the Allies, and the
cause of freedom had triumphed. Election of 1942
After the war, Eisenhower would be
criticized for failing to take Berlin, which
might have been possible. The Soviets
had been closer to it than U.S. troops in In 1940 the Democratic party retained
March, when German resistance in the control of both houses of Congress. But
West began to collapse, but Bradley’s President Franklin D. Roosevelt was
troops were more mobile and perhaps often frustrated by Congress, because
could have reached Berlin first. Churchill many Democrats in it were conservative
106
• E L E C T I O N O F 1 9 4 4 •
southerners who were closer on many for longer periods than was good for
issues to the Republican party than to combat efficiency.
Roosevelt’s New Deal program.
In the off-year elections of Novem-
ber 1942, the conservatives won so
many seats that during the next two
years the legislative branch was, in all Election of 1944
but name, a Republican Congress.
Because of a light Democratic turnout
(possibly caused by a lack of confidence
in Roosevelt), and because most of the By the fall of 1944, business was boom-
war news to that point had been bad, ing while abroad one victory followed
the Republicans fell only 13 seats short another. Under these circumstances and
of a majority in the House and missed with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
controlling the Senate by just 9. reelection a sure thing, it was hard to
If North Africa had been invaded a generate interest in politics.
week earlier than it was on November In 1944, unlike in 1940, Roosevelt
8, the election results might well have made an early announcement of his
been different, for Operation Torch was intention to run, draining the GOP nom-
popular at home, and its impact would ination of its value. Thomas E. Dewey,
have benefited the Democrats. Instead, formerly a mob-busting district attorney
their margin was so thin that in 1944, and now governor of New York, ac-
just before the general election, the cepted it anyway. Because Dewey repre-
Democrats would lose their majority sented eastern, internationalist Republi-
altogether. cans, the Republicans balanced their
The 1942 election results strength- ticket by nominating as his running mate
ened the conservative wing of each the isolationist governor of Ohio, John
party. Southern Democrats frequently Bricker, a darling of the party’s right
voted with Republicans, which is how it wing. Having no fresh ideas, the GOP
came about that the 78th Congress ran against the New Deal again, exciting
ended many New Deal programs. few but the party faithful.
Although Congress normally supported The Democratic convention proved
the President in military and foreign to be much more lively, because even
affairs, in 1944 it refused to enact a though the Presidential nomination had
national service bill. This measure been settled, the choice of a Vice Presi-
would have given the federal govern- dent remained open. The incumbent,
ment considerable authority over the Henry A. Wallace of Iowa, was popular
civilian labor force, so that workers among liberal Democrats, but south-
could be kept on the job or sent wher- erners hated him, as did the big-city
ever they were most needed. Congress bosses, who still had great power. FDR
also refused to increase the military draft was willing to dump Wallace if neces-
when asked to do so. sary, and because he ignored his Vice
Both congressional decisions hurt Presidents anyway, he did not have a
the war effort. Congress’s failure to strong personal preference.
expand the draft was especially serious, The choice of the party’s leaders
because in 1944 a military manpower was Harry S. Truman of Missouri, who
shortage developed. This forced the had been a little-known U.S. senator
army to keep fighting men on the line until 1941. In that year he became chair
107
• E L E C T I O N O F 1 9 4 4 •
ENIGMA
SEE Intelligence, military
and other black leaders a few days authoritarian (that is, they did not toler-
before the scheduled event. The result ate differences of opinion or political
was that the march was canceled in protest), militaristic, and anti-intellectual.
exchange for FDR’s issuing of Executive While these qualities often made
Order 8802, establishing what became them attractive to criminals and ultrana-
the Fair Employment Practices Commis- tionalists, no fascist party ever came to
sion (FEPC). power by means of a free election. And
The FEPC opened up many defense fascist regimes’ ultranationalism—their
industries not only to blacks but to most central trait—also made it difficult
Jews, aliens, Hispanics, American Indi- for them to cooperate with each other.
ans, and other groups suffering from job There was no coalition on the Axis side
discrimination. Thus, the march on equal to that of the Anglo-American
Washington of 1941 that never took alliance, which set the standard for joint
place was more successful than most of planning and teamwork.
the actual civil rights marches of later
SEE ALSO
years, which usually failed to produce
Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Italy; Mussolini,
such immediate and tangible benefits. Benito.
SEE ALSO
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
African Americans
Griffin, Roger, and W. J. Krazanowski,
eds. Fascism. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1995.
Payne, Stanley G. A History of Fascism,
1914-1945. Madison: University of Wis-
Fascism consin Press, 1995.
Stille, Alexander. Benevolence and Betrayal:
Five Italian Jewish Families Under Fas-
cism. New York: Penguin, 1993.
After Soviet
planes bombed
this Finnish
town, women
returned to sal-
vage what they
could from
their ruined
homes.
Image Not Available
easy target. Thus flamethrowers were when the United States was still neutral,
most effective against pillboxes (small, Chennault persuaded Washington to pay
enclosed fortifications) and bunkers that for air units in China that would be
had already been seriously weakened. manned by volunteers from the U.S.
One-man flamethrowers were, therefore, Army and Navy. By November 1941
primarily mopping-up weapons, unlike three AVG squadrons consisting of 100
the armored models, which could be pilots were training in Burma.
used offensively. Even in mopping-up When Japan attacked Burma (then
operations, casualties among those who still a British colony) in December, the
operated flamethrowers remained high. AVG joined with Royal Air Force (RAF)
units to put up a remarkable defense.
Although heavily outnumbered, the
Allied squadrons repeatedly broke up
Flying Tigers Japanese air attacks, particularly those
aimed at Rangoon. These successes
enabled the British first to reinforce the
Burmese capital and then, when its fall
became certain, to withdraw from Ran-
The American Volunteer Group (AVG) goon in good order. The Japanese occu-
in China was known as the Flying Tigers pied it on March 8, 1942, only because
because of the fangs painted on the long Allied air strength was down to 10
noses of their P-40 fighters. fighters, some barely airworthy.
The AVG was formed by Captain After leaving Burma, AVG pilots
Claire Chennault, a retired U.S. Army operated from bases in China until their
flying officer who was an advisor to contracts ran out in July 1942. Chen-
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In 1941, nault had hoped that most of the pilots
A Chinese sol-
dier guards a
line of Ameri-
can P-40 fight-
er planes (Fly-
ing Tigers) at
an unidentified
flying field in
China. The
American pur-
suit planes had
a 12-to-1 vic- Image Not Available
tory ratio over
the Japanese.
114
• F O R R E S T A L, J A M E S V. •
would stay on under his command in vast powers. This struggle continued
what would become the U.S. Tenth Air when Forrestal succeeded Knox after the
Force, but only five did so, most prefer- secretary’s death on April 28, 1944.
ring to rejoin their old outfits. A member of the Urban League,
Except for delaying the fall of Ran- which worked to improve economic
goon and permitting a safe evacuation, opportunities for blacks, Forrestal
the Flying Tigers did not significantly immediately assigned more blacks to
change the course of events. But their large auxiliary vessels, such as supply
courage and skill were legendary and ships and tankers. Previously, African
gave both the United States and China Americans had only served in the Navy’s
something to cheer about in the darkest most menial jobs. Under Forrestal,
days of the war. many skilled occupations were opened
to blacks, and 60 became officers. He
SEE ALSO
also opened the previously all-white
China-Burma-India theater
WAVES (Women Accepted for Volun-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
tary Emergency Service) to blacks.
Bond, Charles R. A Flying Tiger’s Diary.
Forrestal worked hard to improve
College Station: Texas A&M University the Navy’s public relations, despite
Press, 1984. Admiral King’s notorious reluctance to
Chennault, Claire Lee. Way of a Fighter. tell the press anything. A frequent visitor
New York: Putnam, 1949.
Howard, James H. Roar of the Tiger. to the Navy’s far-flung battle areas, he
New York: Orion, 1991. witnessed the Marine Corps’s bloody
Schultz, Duane. The Maverick War. New assault on Iwo Jima in February 1945.
York: St. Martin’s, 1987.
Forrestal was deeply moved by the sacri-
fice and suffering he saw on Iwo, and
his former mere dislike of war turned to
Forrestal, James V. absolute hatred as a result.
Forrestal played a small but impor-
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
tant role in the surrender of Japan. On
• Born: February 15, 1892, Beacon, August 10, 1945, after two atomic
N.Y.
bombs had been dropped on it and the
• Government service: Undersecretary
of the navy, 1940–44; secretary of the Soviets had entered the Pacific war,
navy, 1944–47; secretary of defense, Japan broadcast to the Allies that it
1947–49 would surrender on the condition that
• Died: May 22, 1949, Bethesda, Md.
“the prerogatives of His Majesty as a
Sovereign Ruler” be maintained. Most
of Truman’s advisors believed that this
Beginning as a bond salesman on Wall offer should be accepted because the
Street, Forrestal worked his way up to emperor would, in fact, be subordinate
become president of a large brokerage to General Douglas MacArthur, who
house, Dillon, Read and Co., in 1938. would head the occupation of Japan.
As undersecretary of the navy, he super- Only Secretary of State James Byrnes
vised its procurement and production insisted that nothing less than uncondi-
program. He worked closely with Secre- tional surrender would meet with public
tary Frank Knox and was a dependable approval. Forrestal broke the standoff
ally in Knox’s struggle to keep the arro- by suggesting that Japan’s condition be
gant chief of naval operations, Admiral accepted, but that its surrender still be
Ernest King, from adding to his already called unconditional.
115
• F R A N C E •
France
When war broke out in 1939, France recovered psychologically from its enor-
was one of the world’s great powers mous losses in World War I. The attitude
and a leading industrial state. It still of the French Army reflected this loss of
retained a vast colonial empire, with spirit. It thought only in defensive terms,
particularly large holdings in Africa and although the best defense is the ability to
Southeast Asia. It was also a fully func- deliver an effective counterattack. The
tioning democracy with a greatly French Army had done this in 1914,
admired high culture. flanking a German host on the Marne
In the late 1930s, France had spent River and saving France from defeat.
heavily on defense, with the result that it But there would be no “Miracle of
had large, well-equipped armed forces, the Marne” in World War II. When the
including the world’s fourth-largest fleet German blitzkrieg (lightning war) struck
and a 5-million-man army. Its frontier in May 1940, France and Britain were
with Germany was defended by the defeated by an enemy inferior in numbers
Maginot Line, a chain of modern, linked of men and tanks to the Allied force but
underground forts of unequaled size and superior in just about everything else.
strength. The Maginot Line was at the As the western front collapsed,
time believed to be impossible to break. defeatists in the French cabinet refused
Further, France was allied with Britain, Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s
an even richer and more powerful state request that the seat of government be
with a larger empire and the world’s moved to North Africa. From there,
biggest navy. Unlike the situation in protected by its own fleet as well as the
1914, when it had few troops, Britain Royal Navy, and with an empire to
was raising a large army. draw on for men and material, France
But France had great liabilities, too. could have fought on.
France’s population of 41 million was Instead, France abandoned all resis-
smaller than Britain’s and barely half tance and signed a humiliating armistice
that of Germany. Its empire, like with Germany. Most of France was
Britain’s, was too large to defend—espe- annexed or occupied by the Germans,
cially French Indochina. and Italy received a small occupation
Furthermore, French morale was zone in the French Riviera. On July 10,
poor. Unlike Germany, which under 1940, the French National Assembly
Hitler regained its nerve, France had never voted overwhelmingly to give control of
116
• F R A N C E •
Local elections were held in April and and 160,000 people were deported from
May 1944, a national election in October. France for political or racial reasons.
De Gaulle accepted the results, even The total French deaths, the majority of
though more than 80 percent of the seats them civilians, came to some 600,000.
in France’s new legislature went to left-
SEE ALSO
wing parties, which opposed him.
De Gaulle, Charles; France, Battle of;
At the time of France’s liberation, France, fall of
one French army had been fighting with
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
distinction in Italy for the better part of
two years. After liberation de Gaulle Burrin, Philip. France under the Germans:
Collaboration and Compromise. New
formed a second army in France, basing York: New Press, 1996.
it on the resistance fighters of the Paxton, Robert O. Vichy France: Old
Maquis, an underground army that had Guard and New Order. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972.
fought the Germans in occupied France. Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the
As the First French Army it too fought Third Republic. New York: Simon &
with distinction as part of the U.S. 6th Schuster, 1969.
Tunis, John R. His Enemy, His Friend.
Army Group. New York: Morrow, 1967.
When the war ended, the French
Army had a total of 18 divisions, a
respectable force under the circum-
stances, though small compared to what
France had fielded in 1939–40. Still, the France, Battle of
French contribution to victory was suffi-
cient for de Gaulle to demand, and be
granted, an occupation zone in Germany
alongside those of the United States, After the Allies landed in Normandy on
A woman
Britain, and the Soviet Union. He was D-Day, June 6, 1944, the plan was to cheers the
not invited to the critical Yalta conference clear Normandy by June 23, reach the return of the
in 1945, because France was still more of mouth of the Seine River by July 10, French Army
a dependent state than an equal ally. But and then drive eastward. But, despite and the libera-
in the years after the war France would Allied air supremacy, the Germans man- tion of France
rise again, thanks largely to de Gaulle, aged to bring in reinforcements and put by the Allies.
the Free French, and the resistance.
France lost more people in the war
than either Britain or the United States,
despite their larger populations. All told,
including some resistance fighters and
40,000 men from Alsace and Lorraine
drafted into the German Army, 210,000
French military personnel died. Added
to that figure were 60,000 French civil-
Image Not Available
ians killed by bombers—mostly Allied
aircraft—and another 90,000 civilians
and resistance fighters who were massa-
cred, executed, or otherwise killed by
the Germans. Further, 40,000 French
prisoners of war died, another 40,000
French workers in Germany were killed,
118
• F R A N C E , B A T T L E O F •
up tremendous resistance. British attacks ing that the two Allied armies would
on the key city of Caen were beaten end up firing on each other, Bradley pre-
back by Germany’s powerful Tiger vented Patton from closing what became
tanks. U.S. Army assaults bogged down known as the Falaise gap. Many Ger-
in the hedgerow country of southern mans thus managed to escape, but when
Normandy, known as the Bocage. the gap was closed on August 21, some
All the same, inch by inch, in the 50,000 German troops were captured,
face of heavy casualties, the Allies with another 10,000 killed in the bloody
expanded their beachhead. On July 25 Falaise pocket.
General Omar Bradley kicked off Oper- With the Allies in hot pursuit, the
ation Cobra, a massive attack designed surviving Germans raced for the Seine
to break the German front. After five River, which they crossed in a week.
days it was successful, and the Battle of Although they had to leave much equip-
France began. ment behind and were down to a hun-
On the 27th, Bradley had given dred tanks, 240,000 German troops
Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., escaped. This was enough, together with
command of a corps, with the rest of reinforcements, to rebuild and defend
Patton’s new Third Army to follow on Germany’s West Wall, or Siegfried Line,
August 1. On July 30 the 4th Armored a belt of fortifications on its western
Division seized Avranches, at the base of border. Four Allied armies crossed after
the Cotentin Peninsula, opening up not them, soon to be joined by a fifth. It had
just Brittany but southern Normandy as landed on France’s Mediterranean coast
well. U.S. Army pressure forced the Ger- in mid-August and in early September
mans out of cover during daylight, moved into position on Patton’s right,
exposing them to fighter-bomber attacks. completing the Allied front.
In three days Patton poured seven The Allies made good progress for a
divisions through the narrow Avranches while after crossing the Seine. Patton
bottleneck onto open ground beyond it advanced a hundred miles to the Meuse,
in one of his more amazing feats. Meet- Brussels fell to the British, who then
ing little resistance, he asked for permis- took the great port of Antwerp with its
sion to junk the cautious original plan docking facilities intact. Unfortunately,
and break out of Normandy to the east. British commanders failed to occupy the
Given his head, Patton unleashed his far side of the Scheldt River, a 60-mile-
armor, which raced east, then north, cre- long estuary that linked Antwerp to the
ating one side of a large pocket in which open sea. It would take Canadian troops
parts of three German armies were several months to clear the Germans
trapped. In a week one of his corps was out, during which time Allied supply
at Le Mans, and by August 13 it was problems would end the great advance.
driving for Argentan. As of September 1944, the Allies did
On the 7th, the Germans had not have a single usable port and were
launched a desperate counterattack on still bringing their supplies in over open
Mortain, which failed. Now, finding English Channel beaches hundreds of
themselves in danger of wholesale cap- miles from the front. The more the Allied
ture, they turned around and scrambled armies advanced, the fewer supplies they
frantically to escape the pocket before it could receive. Shortages forced Supreme
could be closed by Patton’s troops Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower to
advancing from the south and Canadi- ration supplies in a way that, as it turned
ans moving down from the north. Fear- out, was chiefly at Patton’s expense. Thus
119
• F R A N C E , B A T T L E O F •
he literally ran out of gas and the Third operation failed because it tried to go “a
Army ground to a halt. (The other Allied bridge too far.” The larger problem was
armies did too, partly because of stiffer that without Antwerp the Allied armies
German resistance, but mostly from lack could not be adequately supplied.
of supplies and because their vehicles Although there would be much hard
were wearing out.) fighting over the winter, the Allies would
All hope of continuing the drive not roll again until the spring of 1945.
now rested upon the success of Opera- General Omar Bradley’s decision to
tion Market-Garden, an ambitious plan halt Patton at Falaise and Eisenhower’s
to drop Allied airborne divisions deep refusal to give Patton the gas he needed
into enemy territory on crucial river to keep moving in September have been
crossings. The farthest of these, the Rhine severely criticized. There was some risk at
bridges at Arnheim, Holland, were some Falaise, to be sure. Patton could have
60 miles behind German lines. The plan closed the gap when he wanted to, but
was that the British Second Army would whether he could have held it shut
then drive through the corridor thus cre- against the desperate Germans will never
ated and cross the Rhine. be known. And it was true that the Allied
But this plan, which was exception- forces might have accidentally fired at
ally daring for Field Marshal Sir Bernard each other as they drew closer together.
Law Montgomery, the normally cau- But if Patton had succeeded, the
tious British commander, exceeded the Germans would have lost most of their
Allies’ ability. British airborne troops, in divisional and corps leaders and staffs,
one of the most remarkable small-unit making it all but impossible for them to
actions of the war, did seize the end of a establish a new line of defense. The war
bridge at Arnheim, but they could not would then have been all but over. Here,
hold it. The British Second Army failed it seems, was a risk worth taking. Eisen-
to break through the German defenses hower’s decision, though it was partly
to relieve the paratroopers at Arnheim. political—he could not allow Patton to
The Allies ground to a halt. In hind- win more glory by taking supplies away
sight, it is clear that Operation Market from the British—is easier to defend.
Garden was overly ambitious. As one The Third Army, attacking on its own,
British officer memorably put it, the had it gotten into Germany, would have
120
• F R A N C E , F A L L O F •
been extremely vulnerable to flank which were neutral before the German
attacks. Because of this perhaps the risk blitzkrieg (lightning war) began but
was too great. would fight when invaded, the Allies
The Battle of France, even if it did may have had as many as 4 million men
not bring total victory in the West, was compared to Germany’s 2 million. They
still one of the greatest wins of the war. also had more guns and tanks than Ger-
The Germans had lost half a million men many, which outnumbered them only in
since D-Day and been driven out of the air.
France. Germany’s final defeat, as all Few outside Germany believed that
could now see, was but a matter of time. you could successfully attack a force up
to twice the size of your own. On the
SEE ALSO
contrary, a common rule of thumb was
D-Day; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Germany,
surrender of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard; that the assault force had to be twice
Patton, George S., Jr. the enemy’s size, because fighting on the
defensive was so much easier than
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
attacking.
Ambrose, Stephen C. Citizen Soldiers.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. If Germany had followed its origi-
Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower at War, nal plan, it probably would have been
1943–1945. New York: Random House, stopped. The German General Staff’s
1986.
Knight, Clayton. We Were There at the first thought had been to attack through
Normandy Invasion. New York: Grosset the Low Countries again, as in World
& Dunlap, 1956. War I. But the Allies expected this and
Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1974.
placed their forces to meet such an
Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieu- assault. Germany would not attack the
tenants: The Campaign of France and mighty Maginot Line along its border
Germany, 1944–1945. Bloomington: with France, they reasoned. And the
Indiana University Press, 1981.
Ardennes Forest could not be crossed by
armored vehicles. Therefore, Germany
had no choice except to go through the
France, fall of Low Countries, where the Allies were
ready to establish a defensive line as
soon as Germany’s guns opened up.
Hitler had wanted to invade the
In 1940 the Allies were confident that West immediately after Poland fell, but
they could hold the western front. Dur- bad weather and other problems forced
ing the winter of 1939–40, known as Germany to wait. During that time, the
the “Phony War” because little action full difficulty of attacking a superior
took place, France had time to fully force became obvious and Hitler was
mobilize and Britain to send it more persuaded to drop his original plan. The
than 10 divisions. “Hitler has missed the Low Countries would still be attacked,
boat,” Prime Minister Neville Chamber- to suck the Allies in, but the main thrust
lain declared. What he meant was, by would be through the lightly defended
the standards of World War I, to which Ardennes. Lieutenant General Hans
the Allies were still clinging, they had Guderian, the army’s armor expert, was
more than enough men and weapons to certain his tanks could get through the
stop a German attack. Ardennes and split the Allied front.
Including Belgium and the Nether- Guderian was right. On May 10,
lands, known as the Low Countries, 1940, the Germans struck hard, batter-
121
• F R A N C E , F A L L O F •
Further support came from French and ated an armored force instead of distrib-
Belgian units left behind that fought a uting its numerous tanks among the
gallant rear-guard action. infantry. Before the war Charles de
And, finally, the British sent every- Gaulle, France’s leading authority on
thing that could sail to the French tanks, had begged Premier Leon Blum to
coast—fast destroyers, private yachts, fer- insist on such a force. But the French
ries, ancient gunboats. The Mosquito Army ignored de Gaulle’s warnings, so
Navy, as they called it, was the most when Germany’s panzers crossed the
peculiar fleet of vessels ever assembled for Meuse River they were unstoppable. Yet
a military operation. Hundreds of them the armored fist that won the battle was
were lost in the process, but the BEF got made up of only seven armored and two
home. motorized infantry divisions. The rest of
The miracle of Dunkirk, which the attacking host consisted of slow-
came to an end on June 4, 1940, was a moving infantry divisions that advanced
marvelous achievement, good for British on foot and depended on horses and
morale as well as for Britain’s chances of oxen to move their heavy weapons and
survival. But it resulted from the worst supplies. De Gaulle’s armored force, had
British defeat since 1066, a beating that it existed, could have stopped them cold.
destroyed the French Army and made Instead, the panzer attack, together with
Hitler master of Europe. Although the superior German planning, training,
BEF got away, the Germans had no leadership, and tactics, won the day.
trouble mopping up France’s weary The Luftwaffe was important too in
troops. The Germans took Paris without the fall of France, for it quickly won the
a fight on June 14. The Maginot Line air battle. The British did not have
was taken from the rear, where it had enough modern planes to achieve air
no weapons. The Italians attacked in the superiority over the battlefield and at the
south but were thrown back by a small same time protect Britain, and the
French force in a victory that changed French Air Force performed feebly.
nothing. On June 22 France signed a Once the Allied front was broken,
truce in the same railway car where the French leaders lost all confidence and
triumphant Allies had accepted Ger- promptly surrendered, rather than
many’s surrender in 1918. ordering the Army to fall back or relo-
There is much disagreement over the cate to North Africa. As a result, after
extent to which defeatism and low the fall of France, Britain remained the
morale were responsible for the fall of only power still at war with Hitler. Its
France. At one time they were consid- turn would be next.
ered vital to Germany’s success. In recent
years, however, explanations have SEE ALSO
focused on a combination of Allied mis- Britain, Battle of; de Gaulle, Charles;
takes and German advantages. For France
instance, almost a third of France’s avail-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
able troops were used to garrison the
Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. Divided and Con-
Maginot Line and therefore missed the quered: The French High Command and
decisive battles. If large numbers of them the Defeat of the West, 1940. Westport,
had been placed in a mobile reserve they Conn.: Greenwood, 1979.
might have made all the difference. Taylor, Telford. March of Conquest: The
German Victories in Western Europe,
Furthermore, success would have 1940. New York: Simon & Schuster,
been even more likely if France had cre- 1958.
123
• G E N O C I D E •
A Nazi soldier
Genocide carries ammu-
nition boxes to
the front lines
to support the
German
The literal meaning of genocide is the
counter-offen-
effort to deliberately and systematically
sive in Decem-
destroy a race or nation of people. The ber 1944.
term seems to have been coined by Ra-
phael Lemkin, a Polish-born legal expert
who served during the war as an advisor Image Not Available
to the U.S. War Department. He formed it
by joining the Greek word genos (race or
tribe) with the Latin suffix -cide (to kill).
Lemkin first used it in his book Axis Rule
in Occupied Europe (1944).
The need for a new term to describe
the slaughter of Europe’s Jews, Gypsies,
and other minority groups was strongly The German Army was the best in
felt at the time, Churchill having called the world when war broke out and may
what was then going on “a crime that have remained so as late as 1943. By
has no name.” then, however, the enormous losses sus-
tained on the eastern front compelled
SEE ALSO
Germany to take whatever soldiers it
Holocaust
could get as replacements. Not only
were under- and over-age Germans
drafted, but to fill out the ranks Ger-
many took men from many nations,
German Air Force including Russian prisoners of war and
SEE Luftwaffe Muslims from Yugoslavia. Even these
often reluctant warriors were not
enough to keep the German Army up to
strength. Whereas in 1939 an infantry
division had 17,734 men, by 1944 the
typical division was down to 12,700—
German Army including 1,700 non-Germans.
The strengths of the German Army,
its great size apart, were numerous. Ger-
man weaponry was always first class, as
were German munitions. German plan-
At the outbreak of war in 1939, the ning was unrivaled, enabling major
German Army consisted of 3.74 million campaigns and offensives to be launched
men, a figure that would rise to more on short notice. A classic example was
than 6.5 million in 1943–44. At that the Norwegian campaign that began on
time (1943–44) the army was organized April 7, 1940. Hitler had not given the
into 11 groups, each consisting of two order for it until February 21, which
or more field armies, of which there meant that his staff officers had only
were 26 in all. about six weeks to put together an oper-
124
• G E R M A N A R M Y •
ation that was brilliantly planned and with under- and overage men and even
carried out. Of all the armies in the the handicapped.
world, only Germany’s could have More serious still was the failure of
pulled this off. Then, too, German disci- German industry to put the Army on
pline was harsh. On the eastern front wheels. Of the 304 divisions that it pos-
some 15,000 troops were executed for sessed in 1945, only 31 were armored
cowardice or other failings, frequently and 13 motorized. Most of the rest
on the spot. relied on horses and oxen to move their
Even so, fear was not what drove supplies, equipment, and heavy
the German Army. Unlike the myth weapons. Even the Red Army was more
that German soldiers were mindless mobile, thanks to the 450,000 vehicles it
robots, individual initiative was prized was provided with by the United States.
and encouraged at every level. German And, despite the fact that Germany
commanders had more freedom of invented armored warfare, from 1941
action than was usual in the West. onward it never had enough tanks.
Once a mission plan was laid down, Because Germany was not equipped to
they could change it as needed. Divi- produce tanks in volume, it tried to
sional commanders led from the front, make up for what it lacked in quantity
sometimes with just a radioman and a with superior design. Its Panthers and
driver. Hundreds of German generals Tigers were among the best tanks of the
were killed after putting themselves war, but for every Panther Germany
thus at risk, but the results spoke for produced, Russia built two and one-half
themselves. of its comparable T-34s. The heavy
All ranks were taught the führer, or Tiger was king of the western battle-
leadership, principle. Every soldier was fields. However, barely more than 1,000
encouraged to think two ranks above saw service, a tenth the number that
his own so that if his immediate supe- Germany needed.
rior fell, he could step into the open As the war went on, a lack of
position. More than anything else, this mobility and armor and the steadily
was what kept the German Army declining quality of German military
together until the very last days of the manpower drained the army’s strength.
war. Obedience combined with the Although the German Army remained a
führer principle made it possible for the very tough foe to the end, by 1944 both
surviving fragments of destroyed divi- the U.S. and Soviet armies were superior
sions to be assembled virtually on the to it in most respects.
battlefield and returned to combat as
effective units. No other army could SEE ALSO
do this. Bulge, Battle of the; Eastern front; France,
Good as it was, the German Army Battle of; Germany, surrender of; SS
(Schutzsstaffeln)
had serious defects. The pool of Ger-
man manpower was not sufficient for
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
the army to field hundreds of divisions
Bartov, Omer. Hitler’s Army. New York:
of equal quality. Unlike in the West, Oxford University Press, 1991.
where all infantry divisions were more Görlitz, Walter. History of the German
or less similar, German infantry ranged General Staff. New York: Praeger, 1953.
Guderian, General Heinz. Panzer Leader.
in quality from assault divisions consist- London: Michael Joseph, 1952.
ing of well-trained, able-bodied men to Manstein, Erich. Lost Victories. Chicago:
support and garrison divisions manned Henry Regnery, 1958.
125
• G E R M A N Y •
The original
caption to this
captured Nazi
photograph
reads, “Austria
becomes Ger-
man. Entry of
German police
into Imst.”
Image Not Available
strengthened and purified nation in an von Hindenburg, who was old and
anticommunist, anti-Slav war that politically incompetent, to issue emer-
would provide Germans with additional gency decrees that concentrated all
living space. power in Hitler’s hands. It was the end
Far from making a secret of his of German democracy. After Hinden-
plans to destroy democracy and subju- burg died in 1934 Hitler took over the
gate Europe, Hitler laid them out in presidency as well, naming himself to
Mein Kampf (My Struggle), a book that the new office of Führer (leader) and
other leaders in Germany and the rest of Reich chancellor. Germany was now
the world failed to take seriously. It was officially the Third Reich (the first was
written in 1924, while Hitler was in the medieval Holy Roman Empire; the
prison for having attempted to seize second, imperial Germany).
control of Munich, the capital of In 1935, having turned Germany
Bavaria, by force. Although his small into a police state, Hitler canceled the
band of revolutionaries was easily military provisions of the Treaty of Ver-
defeated, Hitler’s decision to take power sailles and officially launched his rear-
legally proved to be all too successful. mament program. On March 7, 1936,
Hitler turned his small party into a he marched troops into the Rhineland
national movement by exploiting Ger- section of Germany (on the border with
man anti-Semitism, anticommunism, France), which had been demilitarized
and resentment of the Versailles Treaty. by the Versailles Treaty. Although his
But had it not been for the Great army was very small at this time,
Depression, it is unlikely that he would Britain, but especially France—which
have been able to seize power. had enough troops to sweep the
In the 1928 general election, Rhineland clean of German forces in a
Hitler’s party gained only 800,000 matter of days—did nothing. This was
votes. Then, on September 14, 1930, as the first of Hitler’s bloodless victories
the German economy was falling apart, that would make Germany the domi-
the Nazis won 6.5 million votes—more nant power in Europe. Britain and
than 18 percent of the total that were France believed they had to choose
cast. On July 31, 1932, with the econ- between war (which both desperately
omy in ruins because of the Great wanted to avoid) or tolerating German
Depression, the Nazis doubled their expansion. In the end, they wound up
representation in the Reichstag, Ger- with both.
many’s parliament. They won 37 per- On March 12, 1938, Hitler’s troops
cent of the popular vote and elected marched into the independent state of
230 of about 545 delegates. They were Austria, absorbing its largely German-
now the largest German political party. speaking population into the Third
The Weimar Republic had held its last Reich. Hitler then turned his attention
free election. As the economy continued to Czechoslovakia, where about 3 mil-
to worsen, Adolf Hitler, through a series lion ethnic Germans lived in the Sude-
of complex political maneuvers, suc- tenland, the area bordering Germany.
ceeded in having himself appointed Although Czechoslovakia had a military
chancellor of Germany. alliance with France, Hitler believed,
Hitler in power As Germany’s chief correctly, that the Allies would continue
executive, Hitler rapidly consolidated his to appease him. He was also correct in
power by appointing Nazis to key posi- thinking that the Allies would continue
tions. He also persuaded President Paul to ignore the Soviet Union, which,
127
• G E R M A N Y •
widely known, while the Soviets had for ber 28 Germany and the Soviet Union
years been seeking an alliance with the divided Poland between them. The
West. Hitler’s motives were obvious. Allies declared war on September 3 but
With the Soviet Union out of the way took no real action against the Third
he would not have to fight a two-front Reich, resulting in the so-called “Phony
war, as Germany had been forced to do War” of 1939–40. This period ended in
in 1914–18. The Soviet’s motives were April 1940, when Germany seized Den-
less clear. At the time, communists mark and invaded Norway. Allied
praised the pact as a master stroke efforts to aid Norway were futile, and it
that would give Russia time to rearm. surrendered on June 9, by which time
Nonetheless, when war did come to Germany had driven the British out of
the Soviets in 1941 they were unready Europe and all but defeated France. On
for it. June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the
A more likely explanation for the Soviet Union.
Soviets’ signing of this pact is that Stalin This was the final result of the|
had decided that the Allies would not Stalin-Hitler Pact, which came close to
accept him as a partner, which was true destroying the Soviet Union. As Winston
at the time, since they feared him as Churchill said in the memoirs he wrote
much as Hitler. That being so, a war after the war, these events showed Stalin
between the Allies and Germany would and his henchmen to be “the most com-
probably drag on for years, as it had pletely outwitted bunglers” of the war.
after 1914. This presented Stalin with Millions of Soviet citizens would pay
an opportunity to grab land, with Ger- with their lives for Stalin’s blunders, as
man permission, in return for Soviet would other innocent millions whose
neutrality—without, as he saw it, risk- graves would cover Europe.
ing very much. Stalin believed that, as a Role of the United States The
result of the pact, the Soviet Union United States’s policy during this period
would gain a large chunk of Poland, was much the same as that of Britain
the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and France, although it pursued the
and Estonia, parts of Romania, and— policy independently, because the Unit-
after hard fighting, which Stalin had ed States did not belong to the League
not expected—Finland. In return, the of Nations and was not allied with any-
Soviets were to provide Germany with one. Public opinion polls, which had
huge amounts of oil, grain, and other become important in the United States
raw materials, a promise Stalin scrupu- by the mid 1930s, showed that a large
lously kept. majority was opposed to fighting in
Of all Stalin’s blunders this pact Europe for any reason. Congress
was certainly the greatest. But for it, responded to this sentiment with a series
Hitler would not have dared to invade of Neutrality acts that tied the Presi-
France for fear of a Soviet attack. Or, if dent’s hands. Accordingly, President
he did, he would have had to leave such Roosevelt had little choice except to
large forces on his eastern frontier that hope that appeasement would work.
France would not have fallen. As it was, When the Spanish Civil War broke out
Stalin’s greed very nearly undid the in 1936, he followed the Allied lead in
Soviet Union. embargoing arms both to the democrati-
The outbreak of war Hitler in- cally elected government of Spain and
vaded Poland on September 1, 1939, the Fascist rebels, as he was required to
defeating it in four weeks. On Septem- do by the Neutrality acts. And after the
129
• G E R M A N Y •
incident to begin convoying, while also and a geographic area of 226,288 square
instructing the U.S. Navy to shoot Ger- miles. At the peak of its power in 1941,
man warships “on sight.” the Third Reich, having annexed vast ter-
A Gallup poll in September 1941 ritories on all three of its prewar fron-
showed that, although they still hoped to tiers, had 116 million inhabitants and
stay out of the war, 62 percent of Ameri- covered an area of 344,080 square miles.
cans supported the President’s shoot-on- Even before this great expansion,
sight order. But even after a U-boat sank however, Germany was the largest coun-
the USS Reuben James on October 31, try west of the Soviet Union and the eco-
killing 115 sailors, polls showed that the nomic giant of Europe. Thanks to Hitler’s
public still would not support a declara- rearmament program, there was no
tion of war against Germany. With Hitler unemployment. At the time, many Amer-
obstinately refusing to take the bait, Roo- icans believed that the German state and
sevelt’s strategy had failed. In that dark economy were models of Teutonic preci-
hour the cause of freedom seemed lost, sion and police-state efficiency. But in fact
and it might have been had Japan not the Nazi state was a shambles, remark-
attacked U.S. military installations, able for its overlapping authorities and
including the great naval base at Pearl plagued by bureaucratic chaos. Personali-
Harbor on December 7. Four days later ties were vitally important, with favored
Hitler, too, declared war on the United administrators expanding their little
States. U.S. entry into World War II had empires at the expense of those outside
become a reality at last. the magic circle of power.
German home front In 1939 Ger- Germany’s economic planning
many had a population of 79.5 million shared these same defects and was further
131
• G E R M A N Y •
General George S. Patton’s Third Army, sive that would rival, and perhaps
which had been ordered to conduct an replace, Montgomery’s, which was not
“active defense,” had broken through to start for two weeks.
the West Wall on a 40-mile front. The Eisenhower, also excited by the turn
U.S. Ninth Army and the British 21st of events, gave permission to put four
Army Group jumped off together on divisions over the Rhine. On March 13
February 23 and made the long-awaited Eisenhower instructed Bradley to secure
breakthrough, advancing 53 miles in the bridgehead at Remagen and attack
two weeks, capturing 30,000 German toward Frankfurt, junking Operation
troops, and clearing 34 miles of the Undertow. He also approved Bradley’s
Rhine’s west bank. “right hook” plan, knowing full well, or
Meanwhile, Bradley was working so Bradley believed, that while Plunder
on a plan of attack that would put his was still supposed to be the major oper-
own armies on the Rhine as well. This ation, the U.S. attack would actually
strategy went beyond the supportive role become the main one. Hitler also recog-
he had been assigned and would enable nized the importance of losing the
his armies to cross the Rhine before Ludendorff bridge. The officers held to
Montgomery if Montgomery failed to be responsible for the loss were shot.
pick up speed. On March 7 both armies The U.S. offensive On March 13
reached the Rhine. Patton set off, followed by the Seventh
Supreme Headquarters planned for Army. After hard initial fighting they
Montgomery to cross on March 24 with speeded up, capturing 90,000 Germans
32 divisions. But Bradley intended to between them in the largest seizure of
take advantage of the room Eisenhower prisoners since the Germans lost North
was giving him to merge Third and Sev- Africa. On the 23rd, Patton called
enth armies, plus French First, for a mas- Bradley to say he was over the Rhine,
sive sweep to Frankfurt. This in turn having crossed on the fly without even
would enable the U.S. First Army to firing an artillery barrage. He was excit-
cross the Rhine and the combined Franco- ed over beating Montgomery, who had,
American force of 40 divisions to drive as usual, spent too much time making
on to Kassel. his arrangements. Montgomery crossed
Plunder, the British operation, was easily on the 24th as scheduled. Mean-
supposed to be the main event, with while, U.S. troops were pouring across
Bradley’s, code named Undertow, a sec- the Rhine on boats and pontoon
ondary operation. If all worked as bridges. Their effort to contain the U.S.
Bradley expected, however, the U.S. drive Army and conduct the war-winning
would change that. offensive having failed, the British had
On the evening of March 7, fate no choice but to accept a revised plan
gave Bradley a hand. He received a call that had U.S. forces driving for the
from Lieutenant General Courtnay H. Elbe—where the Allies and the Soviets
Hodges saying that the 9th Armored would meet—while Montgomery pro-
Division of his First Army had just cap- tected their northern flank. Mont-
tured the Ludendorff railway bridge at gomery’s 21st Army Group, having
Remagen, the Germans having failed to moved too slowly, would now have to
blow it. Bradley ordered Hodges to play the supporting role.
cross in strength and hold the bridge at On April 4 Eisenhower returned the
all costs. Bradley was elated—now he Ninth Army to Bradley, who now com-
had an opportunity to launch an offen- manded four U.S. armies with 48 divi-
135
• G E R M A N Y , S U R R E N D E R O F •
An aerial view
of the medieval
German city of
Wurzberg
reveals the dam-
age inflicted by
an Allied bomb-
ing raid on
April 1, 1945.
Strategic bomb-
ing often turned
into terror
bombing, and
many German
Image Not Available
city centers were
completely
destroyed.
sions and 1.3 million men, the largest Eisenhower notified Stalin that he ex-
ground force ever commanded by a U.S. pected to meet the Soviet forces roughly
general. With it he would promptly win along the lines established at Yalta.
the war in the West. Although this decision was heavily criti-
Originally the Americans, like the cized at the time, it now seems that Eisen-
British, had seen Berlin as the great prize hower was right to make it. Saving
toward which their efforts should be American lives was more important than
directed. But at the Yalta conference, the empty honor of taking Berlin.
Britain took the lead in agreeing to The war ended abruptly. The Ninth
occupation boundaries that put Berlin Army reached the Elbe River on April
well within what would become the 11 after traveling 226 miles in 19 days.
Soviet zone, although the city itself was On the 16th, Soviet forces attacked
to be divided among the victors. In late Berlin. Two days later German resis-
March, with German resistance crum- tance in the Ruhr ended, with the Allies
bling, it suddenly became possible for taking 317,000 prisoners. While Mont-
the 12th Army Group to drive straight gomery moved carefully across northern
for Berlin. But all knew that whoever Germany, more American troops
attacked Berlin would take heavy losses. reached the Elbe and Patton drove into
Any responsible U.S. commander Czechoslovakia.
was bound to shrink from the idea of los- The German retreat quickly became
ing many men for territory that would a rout, with the U.S. 18th Airborne
then have to be given up. Thus, at the Corps alone capturing 360,000 enemy
end of March, on his own initiative, soldiers. Hitler committed suicide in his
136
• G I B I L L O F R I G H T S •
Berlin bunker on April 30. The next day to 52 weeks to ease the
Germany’s last units in Italy surren- transition from war to Image Not Available
dered. On May 7 Admiral Karl Doenitz, work. Among other things,
who had taken command of the Third the bill provided low-cost,
Reich, surrendered it to Eisenhower at no-down-payment home loans,
2:41 a.m. in Reims, France. The war in lent money to start businesses or
Europe was over. run farms, and, most important, pro-
vided tuition and some living costs for Veterans wore
SEE ALSO
veterans wanting to enroll in high this discharge
Bulge, Battle of; Eastern front; Eisenhower,
schools, trade schools, and colleges. emblem, which
Dwight D.
Congress had not wanted this bill they irreverent-
to be thought of as social legislation. ly called “the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ruptured
Ambrose, Stephen A. Eisenhower and But owing to the huge number of World
duck,” on civil-
Berlin: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe. War II veterans, the GI Bill had the
New York: Norton, 1967. ian clothing
same effect as a major social reform. By after the war.
Benary, Margo. Dangerous Spring. New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1961. 1950 the 16 million veterans and their
Montgomery, Rutherford G. Rough Riders families made up fully a third of the
Ho! Philadelphia: David McKay, 1946. population. In 1945 there had been a
Ryan, Cornelius. The Last Battle. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1966. colossal housing shortage. Five years
Toland, John. The Last 100 Days. New later it was over, thanks largely to the
York: Random House, 1966. 4.3 million home loans provided by the
GI Bill. Nearly 8 million veterans went
back to school, learned a trade, or
attended college under the bill.
GI Bill of Rights The money spent directly by the
federal government rippled through the
whole economy, providing jobs in con-
struction, manufacturing, retail sales,
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, and other areas to people who were not
popularly known as the GI Bill, was veterans. Further, the bill made possible
passed by Congress in January 1944. the baby boom, for veterans could now
After the Civil War and World War I, afford to start families while they were
Congress had voted cash bonuses for still in school, which millions of them
veterans. These benefits had become did. The soaring birth rate, which rose
political footballs, especially the World year by year until the end of the 1950s,
War I bonuses. When it came time to created the largest generation in history.
consider veterans’ benefits for World These baby boomers had to be housed,
War II, everyone remembered the two fed, and educated, creating additional
“bonus marches” of the Depression millions of jobs.
era, one of which had ended in vio- The members of the war generation
lence, when thousands of veterans had became the best-educated and most
marched on Washington demanding prosperous Americans ever seen up to
early payment of their bonuses. that time because of a much-deserved
After World War II, thanks to the GI tribute to them that benefited the entire
Bill, there would be no bonus armies, no nation. The GI Bill showed government
violence, and no attempts to buy veter- at its best, rewarding veterans for their
ans’ votes. One feature of the bill pro- sacrifices and helping them to reach
vided veterans with $20 a week for up their full potential.
137
• G R E N A D E S •
A mechanic
hoists up the
tail of this Cor-
sair at an
airstrip in
Guadalcanal in
order to align
the plane’s
guns properly.
Image Not Available
was not entirely persuaded by his ideas, In 1943 Guderian was brought out
Guderian was allowed to command only of retirement and made Inspector Gener-
a single corps during the 1939 attack on al of Armored Forces: in effect, Hitler’s
Poland. In the main, however, the Polish advisor on tanks. Following a failed
campaign vindicated Guderian’s theories. coup attempt against Hitler in July 1944,
For the attack in the west, Guderian was Guderian became acting chief of the
again given only his XIX Corps, but it army high command, but with German
was assigned the most important task: to forces everywhere in retreat and under
lead the assault through the Ardennes Hitler’s suspicious eye there was little he
Forest that was to split the Allied line and could do. Guderian made every effort to
win a stunning victory. keep Hitler from squandering what
Guderian and his corps performed remained of the Army’s strength but
brilliantly, breaking through to the En- failed even in this. After opposing the
glish Channel in a matter of days. Had Ardennes campaign, or the Battle of the
the German advance not been brought to Bulge, Guderian was relieved of duty
a halt at Hitler’s orders, it would certainly again in February 1945.
have taken the British Expeditionary Of all the Nazi generals only a few,
Force (BEF) and the French First Army. notably Guderian and Marshal Erwin
Even though the BEF escaped through Rommel, would be well regarded by
the “miracle of Dunkirk” by which civil- Westerners after the war. In Guderian’s
ian and military shipping combined to case, this was in some measure a result
save many British troops, the victory of his autobiography, Panzer Comman-
remained a major achievement that made der (1952), a best-seller in the United
Guderian famous. In the final assault on States. However, both were admired for
French forces, his augmented command, their professionalism, for how they led
Panzer Group Guderian, advanced south from the front and being popular with
to the Swiss border and captured their troops, for not participating in
250,000 French troops in a series of bril- Hitler’s crimes, and for having waged
liant maneuvers. war as honorably as possible.
Guderian opposed the invasion of For example, Guderian refused to
Russia (Operation Barbarossa) in 1941, obey Hitler’s infamous order that Ger-
because Britain had not been defeated man soldiers were not to be punished for
yet and he was also concerned about the killing Russian civilians. At the time,
strength of Soviet armor. All the same, he Guderian invoked professional reasons
was given command of Panzer Group 2, for disciplining offending German sol-
which later became the Second Panzer diers, saying that allowing murder would
Army, the strongest of Germany’s four be prejudicial to discipline. After the war
panzer groups. More brilliant victories he added that murdering civilians was
followed until in December the German contrary to the “dictates of Christian
advance came to a halt because of the conscience.” Both explanations may well
onset of winter. Guderian, with other have been true.
officers, argued strongly for a strategic
SEE ALSO
retreat from the gates of Moscow. Bulge, Battle of the; Eastern front; France,
Denied permission by Hitler, he made fall of
such a withdrawal anyway, only to be
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
relieved of his command in the purge of
Macksey, Kenneth. Guderian: Panzer Gen-
some 30 senior officers that followed. He eral. London: MacDonald and Janes,
never led troops in the field again. 1975.
141
• H A L S E Y , W I L L I A M F . •
These carriers were harmless, having It was the divided command of the
lost most of their aircraft, but the Amer- Pacific war that was really at fault, not
icans did not know that. Halsey’s decision—even though it put
Halsey took the bait, driving north the invasion force at risk. Had he
with all his fast carriers and battleships guarded the beaches instead of going
when the enemy carriers were sighted. after what was thought to be a powerful
This enabled the enemy’s battle line to carrier group, he would have been criti-
attack the troop and supply ships of the cized for that decision too. This had
invasion fleet, which were defended by been the fate of Admiral Spruance after
just three task forces built around small the Battle of the Philippine Sea, when he
escort carriers. The defenders put up was accused of allowing Japanese carri-
such a furious fight, however, that the ers to escape, out of a misplaced con-
Japanese commander believed he was cern for the Saipan invasion force.
under attack by TF 38 and retreated But, while questions may be raised
from Leyte Gulf. about Halsey’s performance at Leyte
Halsey’s decision to go after the Gulf and about his seamanship (he twice
Japanese carriers has attracted many sailed his fleet into typhoons), his place
defenders. He believed that his main in history seems secure. He raised U.S.
duty was not to protect the invasion morale in the darkest days of the war
force but to destroy the Japanese Fleet. with his carrier raids and pugnacity. As
Because Halsey reported to the Navy’s commander of the South Pacific Area,
Admiral Nimitz, while the admiral com- he turned a demoralized command into
manding the invasion reported to the a winning one and led the Third Fleet to
Army’s General MacArthur, confusion numerous victories. Few admirals
reigned. accomplished as much.
143
• H A M B U R G , B O M B I N G O F •
mit butchery and remain more or less of this did not bother Hitler and the SS.
undetected in the wide-open spaces of Perhaps more surprisingly, neither did
Russia, there was too much risk of the harm done to the German war
exposure in the heavily populated areas effort. The SS was slaughtering able-
of central and western Europe. To avoid bodied men and women at a time when
bad publicity, murder by stealth was German industry was desperately short
what Hitler wanted. of labor. Many were taken directly from
The answer was what the Nazis war plants to Auschwitz. Some victims
called the Final Solution (of the Jewish even worked for a time at real factories
“problem”), meaning the total annihila- in the death camps before being mur-
tion of Europe’s Jews. The Jewish vic- dered. But as a labor source, these peo-
tims would be transported to camps ple were largely wasted.
located in a remote area for death and Also wasted were the transportation
disposal. In the summer of 1941, resources required for the Final Solution,
Rudolph Hoss, commandant of the for the death trains had top priority,
Auschwitz concentration camp in even over military shipments. It appears
Poland, received orders to expand and that, with defeat staring him in the face,
transform his facility into a giant death Hitler regarded the Final Solution as his
factory. Five other death camps were monument. He was determined to see it
established in or near the General Gov- carried through at whatever cost to the
ernment of Poland (as the Nazi-occu- war effort.
pied territory was called), but Auschwitz Like so many war statistics, the
was the most destructive. total number of Holocaust victims can
Two technical problems needed to only be approximated. The best estimate
be solved before death could be put on is that between 5 and 6 million Jews
an industrial basis. The first was how to perished in the Holocaust, or about 80
kill people on the largest possible scale; percent of European Jewry. That any
the second how to dispose of the mil- survived at all was partly a result of
lions of bodies. The first problem was many heroic individuals and groups
solved by building large chambers in who rescued Jews from the Holocaust.
which people could be gassed. The sec- Oskar Schindler, a businessman,
ond was handled by erecting huge ovens more or less single-handedly saved 1,300
called crematoria to burn the corpses. Polish Jews who were workers in his fac-
Hoss was proud of his methods, tory and their families. A Swede, Raoul
which were much more advanced than Wallenberg, with the aid of U.S. funding
those employed at Treblinka, a neigh- and a network of assistants, saved at least
boring camp. While Treblinka’s 10 gas 100,000 Hungarian Jews. The villagers of
chambers could hold only 200 people Le Chambon, a French town on the
each, at Auschwitz the chambers held Swiss frontier, saved thousands of Jews
2,000. And, while Treblinka relied on by hiding them until they could be spir-
monoxide gas, at Auschwitz zyklon-B ited over the border. Most of occupied
(prussic acid), did the killing much more Denmark’s Jews—some 6,000 of them—
efficiently. were brought to Sweden and safety by
In March 1942 the first shipment of boat in a single night.
Jews reached Auschwitz, and in the But most of the Jews who survived
months and years that followed death were citizens of the lesser Axis states.
trains steamed into Poland from the Mussolini refused to ship Jews to the
four corners of Europe. The inhumanity death camps. His armies protected large
151
• H O L O C A U S T •
Death books
from Mau-
thausen con-
centration
camp record
the deaths of
prisoners in
painstaking
detail. Death
rates were as
high as 40 per- Image Not Available
cent a year
because of
deliberately
inadequate
food, clothing,
and shelter.
Dawidowicz, Lucy. The War Against the Japan’s 3.8. Beyond that, however, the
Jews, 1933–1945. New York: Holt, Rine- Americans were a proud people who sub-
hart & Winston, 1975.
Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the scribed to a common culture based on
European Jews. New York: Holmes & work, family, respect for institutions, and
Meier, 1985. faith in self and nation. It was these qual-
Lustig, Arnost. Darkness Casts No Shad-
ities, as well as more measurable factors,
ow. Washington, D.C.: Inscape, 1976.
that the Axis powers failed to take into
account when declaring war on the
United States.
Home front However, when Pearl Harbor was
attacked, on December 7, 1941, the
United States was unprepared to fight
either Germany or Japan, let alone both.
There were 133.4 million Americans in The process of developing a war econ-
1941, of whom 13.7 million were classi- omy was proceeding at a leisurely pace.
fied by the Census Bureau as “Negro and Rearmament crawled along too, and
other.” The great majority of black adults although the army had drafted 1 million
were employed as laborers, laundry- men beginning in 1940, they were still
women, domestic servants, and similar being trained. The armed forces could
unskilled, low-wage occupations. Racial not absorb the huge numbers of men
segregation was universal, enforced by who rushed to enlist after Pearl Harbor.
law in the southern states and everywhere Nor was industry ready to absorb the
else by custom. millions of civilian volunteers who also
White women were better off than wished to help the war effort.
blacks, but unlike today their choices As government struggled to mobilize,
were limited and most served as full-time many civilians took matters into their
housewives. In 1940, of 65.6 million own hands, forming a huge variety of
women in the population 13.8 million volunteer organizations to serve in civil-
were employed, and of them, all but 4.2 ian defense, roll bandages, sell war
million were single. bonds, and collect scrap metal, rubber,
Most working women were young fats, and many other increasingly scarce
and expected to leave the workforce items and commodities. Volunteerism
after marriage. The majority of employed became a big part of U.S. life, which
women were unskilled factory operatives, helped somewhat to offset government’s
servants, shop clerks, secretaries, and cler- failure to plan ahead.
ical workers. Others served in the helping Far more than any other warring
professions, like teaching and nursing, nation, the United States would depend
that were poorly paid and lacked oppor- on volunteers, and especially women, to
tunities for advancement. organize the home front. The Red Cross,
While the United States had few with 3.5 million female volunteers, was
armed defenders—only 458,000 service- far and away the most important body
men in 1939—it was better prepared to engaged in volunteer war work. But many
make war than it might have looked on more served in organizations like the
paper. Despite hard times, it was the Women’s Ambulance and Defense Corps
world’s foremost industrial nation. It had of the United States, which also trained
produced in the previous year 28.7 per- volunteers to serve as air raid wardens,
cent of world manufacturing output, security guards, and messengers. There
compared to Germany’s 13.2 percent and were thousands of war-related volunteer
153
• H O M E F R O N T •
These giant
gears in a
machine shop
in Massachu-
setts would
become part of
U.S. warships.
To build even
one battleship
or aircraft car-
rier was a Image Not Available
monumental
task.
groups, which did everything from staging ular jobs if assigned to them by govern-
advertising campaigns for the armed ment. But Congress was afraid to enact
forces to collecting scrap metal. what was essentially a labor draft, no
It was civilians who put together the matter what the polls reported.
great salvage drives that became such a Unquestionably the greatest achieve-
prominent feature of domestic life. And it ment on the home front was the enor-
was civilians who made successes of the mous increase in production that made
seven war-bond sales campaigns that raised the United States, as Roosevelt called it,
many billions of dollars. With no federal the Arsenal of Democracy. A tanker fleet
support at all to begin with, the so-called with a total capacity of 2.5 million tons
Victory gardens sprouted in backyards, in 1941 grew to 11.4 million tons in
courtyards, parks, and public spaces. Indi- 1945, despite heavy losses in the early
viduals and local governments pitched in to war years. To equip the nation’s factories,
grow vegetables for themselves and their the machine tool industry produced $4.7
neighbors. This allowed more of the com- billion worth of tools between 1940 and
mercial crops to be canned for use by the 1945, 20 times what had been made in
military and U.S. allies. the previous decade.
During most of the war, polls When the President asked for 50,000
showed that people were willing to sacri- aircraft in 1940, people thought he was
fice even more than the government crazy—but by 1945, 300,000 aircraft
asked. It was clear that Americans would had been built, 245,000 for the Army
have accepted a military draft of young and Navy, the rest for the Allies. Other
women if Congress had passed such a munitions figures were similarly gigantic.
bill. They also supported President Roo- From May 1940 to war’s end, U.S. indus-
sevelt’s proposal for national service. This try turned out 8,243 warships, 64,000
would have required all able-bodied landing vessels, and 86,000 tanks. A new
adults—with some exceptions, such as type of cargo vessel called the Liberty
mothers of young children—to fill partic- ship, which was relatively cheap and easy
154
• H O M E F R O N T •
to make, was designed during the war. more difficult. Consumers had to return
The U.S. yards built 2,710 of them. used toothpaste tubes in order to buy
In some industries, such as steel, new ones, while tinfoil and cellophane
which had been underused before the simply disappeared, as did bobby pins,
war, output could be raised just by going which were replaced by wooden tooth-
to full production. In 1940 steel mills picks and thread. New clothes lacked
were running at 82 percent of capacity elastic thread and webbing, metal but-
and pouring 67 million tons a year. In tons, zippers, hooks and eyes, silk, nylon,
1945 the mills poured 89 million tons, canvas, duck, and sometimes leather.
half the world’s total—with the same-size Coats could not have pleats, gussets, bel-
workforce. As a rule, the existing plants lows, or yokes. A “victory suit,” which
and mills could greatly expand their pro- would have carried economy to the point
duction simply by going to double or of eliminating lapels, was ruled out, but
triple shifts. to save wool double-breasted suits could
But thousands of facilities had to be not have vests, and no suit could come
greatly enlarged, while others were built with more than one pair of pants. Cloth
from scratch. And about 16 million men could not go over cloth, eliminating
served in the military during the war, cre- trouser cuffs and patch pockets.
ating an industrial manpower shortage. It Women’s skirts were limited in
was solved by hiring older men and boys length and circumference; certain dyes,
and paying more overtime, but chiefly by especially greens and browns, were some-
recruiting married women. Because 90 times unavailable. Girdles, still everyday
percent of the munitions jobs were new wear for women, had to be made of bone
and there were few men to fill them, the or piano wire instead of rubber. Shoes,
strong prejudice against hiring women when you could get them, came in only
for what were seen as male jobs had to six colors, three of them shades of
be put aside. brown. Almost anything from coffee to
The war changed everything except canned goods (half the 1943 production
human needs and desires. Many once- went overseas) could run out without
ordinary tasks became fiendishly difficult notice, and cigarette shortages were hard
to perform under wartime conditions. on this nation of smokers.
Numerous goods previously taken for A striking feature of the war effort,
granted were replaced by inferior substi- and a source of many problems, was the
tutes or simply disappeared altogether. A enormous increase in the movement of
48-hour work week and long commutes people from one place to another. Includ-
became the rule for all workers, regard- ing service personnel, 27.3 million people
less of gender. Because so many goods moved from their original county of resi-
and services—including household appli- dence during the war. In the period
ances and supplies, certain types of food, 1935–40, an unusually active one
domestic help, and medical care—were in because men were moving often in their
short supply, wives and mothers (whether search for work, total civilian mobility
employed or not) had to devote more amounted to 2.8 million persons a year.
time to housework, getting their children But during each of the peak war years it
to doctors, and shopping, which was fur- averaged 4.7 million.
ther complicated by the use of ration With automobile use restricted, most
books and the need to go from store to long-distance travel was by train, putting
store looking for scarce items. enormous stress on the rail system as well
Shopping has probably never been as the passengers—jammed into over-
155
• H O M E F R O N T •
that same year “I’ll Be Home for Christ- the 1940s. New records were constantly
mas” (with its melancholy ending “if being set for tickets sold for shows, trains,
only in my dreams”) was a hit also. horse races—even book purchases were
Songs like this meant much to battle- up. All this was a function of the national
hardened troops as well as to the folks incomes having reached $150 billion at a
back home. In memoir after memoir, vet- time when only $95 billion worth of
erans noted how much popular music goods and services was available for pur-
meant to them. This was particularly true chase. Flush times were the result.
in Europe, where soldiers with access to a The Battle of the Bulge that began in
radio could receive American pop songs December 1944 came as a shock to
from the U.S. Armed Services Network, Americans, who were under the impres-
the British Broadcasting Company, and sion that Germany had all but been
even from German stations. defeated. It provoked a burst of demands
By 1944 everyone at home smelled for more sacrifices and greater efforts on
victory and saw no need to keep working the home front. In response, government
without a letup, especially since war pro- closed the racetracks, ended the reconver-
duction was being cut back. Once gov- sion of war plants to consumer goods
ernment began reducing defense orders, production, and placed a midnight cur-
no appeal for voluntary sacrifice could be few on bars and nightspots.
expected to have much effect. Good har- Supposedly these steps were to con-
vests reduced the incentive to maintain serve fuel and essential services, but
Victory gardens. The wheat yield in 1944 everyone knew that their primary pur-
was the largest in American history, the pose was motivational—and it didn’t
corn crop second only to the record har- work. Those most affected by the curfew
vest of 1942. People responded accord- were servicemen on leave and night-shift
ingly. While in 1943 some 21 million workers, who bitterly protested the point-
families had planted Victory gardens, in lessness of denying them a little fun. The
1945 only 17 million would do so. With curfew proved so unpopular that it could
plenty of money on hand and no appli- not be enforced. Late-night bars reap-
ances or new housing to buy, consump- peared; drinking and sexual relations
tion of whatever remained was bound to became more open and commonplace
increase. Hence the contradiction that as than ever. After three months officials
the war entered its bloodiest phase, at reopened the tracks and lifted the curfew.
home the good times were rolling. Although the Pacific war was
In 1944 farmers made a total of $20 approaching its climax, demobilized ser-
billion, compared to an average of $8 bil- vicemen were coming home in ever-
lion in the late 1930s, although the farm growing numbers. The halting reconver-
population shrank by more than 8 mil- sion to a peacetime economy deprived
lion people. Workers in 1944 earned $44 people of jobs without adding to the
billion, as against $13 billion in 1939. war effort. Moralizers blamed people
Department stores were packed with for being self-indulgent, yet the polls did
buyers of luxury goods despite a shortage not support this.
of salespeople. Restaurants were mobbed, A 1943 Gallup poll showed that 78
movie and stage theaters teemed, night- percent of respondents favored drafting
clubs flourished. 4Fs (able-bodied men who had escaped
Hotels were booked solid weeks in military service because of minor physical
advance, even though the best rooms cost handicaps) into war plants. After the Bat-
as much as $105 a day, a lot of money in tle of the Bulge, 56 percent favored a gen-
157
• H O M E F R O N T •
Tamar, Erika. Good-bye Glamour Girl. maintained by the victorious great pow-
New York: Lippincott, 1984. ers acting together. Others took a more
hopeful view of the United Nations,
which was why Hull received the Nobel
Hull, Cordell Peace Prize in 1945. Hull was a popular
secretary and a political asset to Roo-
SECRETARY OF STATE, 1933–44 sevelt, who regretted his resignation.
• Born: October 2, 1871, Pickett, Tenn. Worn out and frustrated, Hull left office
• Political party: Democratic immediately after the 1944 Presidential
• Previous government service: election.
Tennessee state representative,
1893–97; judge, fifth judicial circuit, F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Tennessee, 1903–7; congressman,
Gellman, Irwin F. Secret Affairs: Franklin
1907–21, 1923–31; senator, 1931–33
Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner
• Died: July 23, 1955, Washington, Welles. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
D.C. versity Press, 1995.
Hull, Cordell. Memoirs. New York:
Macmillan, 1948.
the JN-25 code stumped U.S. code In July 1939, Polish intelligence gave
breakers, but in 1943 they began read- one ENIGMA machine each to Britain
ing it again. With some lapses, they and France. Britain proceeded to con-
would do so for the rest of the war. struct a huge code-breaking operation at
Japanese Army messages were Bletchley Park, giving the information
harder to crack, and it was not until derived from breaking ENIGMA ciphers
1943 that code breakers in the Southwest the code name ULTRA. Gathering
Pacific Area began to make progress ULTRA data was a continuous process,
decrypting them. A major breakthrough as the Germans regularly introduced new
was finally achieved in January 1944 keys and made changes to the machine
when the code books of a retreating itself. Beginning in January 1944, Ameri-
Japanese division were unearthed. The cans participated in the work of Bletchley
army’s code could then be read for some Park, though in a lesser role.
months. By the time it was changed, code ULTRA was a considerable aid to
breakers had already learned where a Britain’s Fighter Command during the
Japanese barge bearing the new code Battle of Britain. It was also very helpful
books had been sunk. When divers in the long war Britain fought with Ger-
brought them up, this produced another man and Italian forces in North Africa.
intelligence triumph. The great British victory at El Alamein, in
In the summer of 1945 additional particular, was made possible by ULTRA.
code books were discovered in the Philip- ULTRA played an important part in
pines and Okinawa. Decryptions the Battle of the Atlantic, enabling the
obtained by their use made it clear that Allies to divert convoys from areas to
Japan’s preparations for defending the which U-boats had been ordered. ULTRA
home islands against an invasion were far also enabled Allied planners to tell
stronger than had been thought. It is pos- whether the elaborate deception plans
sible that the planned invasion might designed to draw German attention away
have been canceled, therefore, even if the from Normandy prior to D-Day were
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima working. But ULTRA proved most useful
and Nagasaki had failed to produce a in North Africa and at sea, where the
Japanese surrender. Germans could not communicate by
Although British intelligence played secure land lines.
an active part in the effort to crack Throughout the war, German radio
Japanese codes, Americans did the largest traffic generated ULTRA information of
share of the work. In the war against considerable value. The Germans never
Germany, however, these positions were realized that ENIGMA had been broken,
reversed. Britain had been at war with thanks in part to incredibly tight Allied
Germany for more than two years before security. Indeed, not until the 1970s was
the United States came in, and thus had a the existence of ULTRA made public.
significant lead in signals intelligence. This information required the rewriting
British intelligence owed much to the of many military histories.
Poles, who had built duplicates of the
SEE ALSO
German “ENIGMA” code machine.
All of Germany’s armed forces used D-Day
ENIGMA to encipher their radio com-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
munications, believing that its millions of
Ambrose, Stephen E. Ike’s Spies: Eisen-
possible combinations made ENIGMA’s hower and the Espionage Establishment.
ciphers unbreakable. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981.
161
• I N T E R N M E N T •
and starved to death by the tens of mil- States itself, would be able to survive
lions, civilians stood little chance of hav- under these conditions. It was a risk
ing their human rights respected in Americans should have been unwilling
internment camps. to take. The fact remains that they did.
Democrats and Republicans alike—
SEE ALSO
but the latter more strongly—agreed
Japanese Americans
throughout the prewar years that the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
United States should not rearm and
Christgau, John. “Enemies”: World War II
should stay out of Europe’s affairs. No
Alien Internment. Ames: Iowa State Uni- one did more to encourage these beliefs
versity Press, 1985. than Charles A. Lindbergh, the greatest
Collins, Donald E. Native American American hero of his generation.
Aliens: Disloyalty and the Renunciation
of Citizenship by Japanese Americans The first man to fly solo across the
during World War II. Westport, Conn.: Atlantic, Lindbergh won the nation’s
Greenwood Press, 1985. heart, not only for the feat itself but for
Smith, Page. Democracy on Trial: The
Japanese American Evacuation and Relo- his supposed modesty. He protected his
cation in World War II. New York: privacy as much as a celebrity could,
Simon & Schuster, 1995. but Lindbergh had a high opinion of
Taylor, Sandra C. Jewel of the Desert:
Japanese American Internment at Topaz.
himself and a low one of humankind.
Berkeley: University of California Press, The kidnapping and murder of his first
1993. child, the media circus surrounding it,
and the trial of the boy’s killer only
deepened his dislike of the masses.
Charles Lindbergh had supported
Isolationists the crusade of his father, Congressman
C. A. Lindbergh, against U.S. interven-
tion in World War I, a stand that
destroyed the elder Lindbergh’s political
Americans who were opposed to enter- career. This experience was much on
ing World War II before Pearl Harbor Lindbergh’s mind during his own simi-
was attacked in December 1941 were lar campaign a generation later. So too
called isolationists. After World War I, a was the idea that another great war, no
majority of Americans, both liberals matter who won it, would destroy
and conservatives, decided that entering Western civilization and leave Soviet
the war had been a mistake. When communism as the only real victor, a
Hitler dragged Europe into war in 1939 common view among conservative
most people failed to understand that, isolationists.
unlike in 1917, the United States had a Through the efforts of a U.S. mili-
great deal at stake in the outcome. tary attaché in Berlin, who hoped Lind-
In World War I a German victory bergh would learn something useful, he
would not have made much difference made several visits to Germany at the
to Americans. But a German victory in invitation of the Nazis. The first was for
World War II would have left the Unit- eleven days in July and August 1936,
ed States as the only democratic power followed by two others, one of several
in a world of police states and empires. weeks in 1937, and a final one October
For the United States to adopt a policy 11–29, 1938. During these visits the
of isolationism meant running the risk Nazis managed to fool Lindbergh into
that democracy, and perhaps the United thinking that the Luftwaffe (German
163
• I S O L A T I O N I S T S •
Next to a por-
trait of Adolf
Hitler, the
American avia-
tor Charles
Lindbergh
(left) meets
with Nazi
leader Her-
mann Göring
(right). Lind-
Image Not Available
bergh was per-
haps the best-
known
advocate of
American isola-
tionism in the
years preceding
the war.
would mean waiting until all of the quently put it. Their argument was that
nation’s potential allies had been beat- aircraft based in Italy could strike Ger-
en, and that defeat would then be likely, many and targets in the Balkans. Also,
did not carry much weight. taking Italy would make clearing the
Nor were the advantages of fighting rest of the Mediterranean simpler, a
abroad, rather than at home, evident to high priority for the British. With Italy
many. Isolationism was not based on a in hand, it would then be easier to
rational analysis of what course best open a second front in the Balkans,
served the United States’s interests. which the British preferred to invading
“American boys must not die in foreign France.
wars” was a frequently repeated chant. U.S. planners were unhappy about
Few asked why it would be better to invading Italy, however, because doing
have them killed at home, along with so would not weaken Germany much.
many civilians. Indeed, some argued that Italy in Ger-
man hands would actually be an Allied
SEE ALSO asset. Germany would then have to
America First Committee; Germany;
occupy it, tying up more than a few
Japan divisions. But if the Allies invaded
Italy, they would take unnecessary
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G casualties. And then they would have
Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse: Its to supply its civilian population with
Twentieth-century Reaction. New York: at least the bare necessities, which
Abelard-Schuman, 1957. would require ships that were needed
Cole, Wayne S. Charles A. Lindbergh and
the Battle Against American Intervention
elsewhere.
in World War II. New York: Harcourt, The Invasion However, by the
Brace, Jovanovich, 1974. time Sicily fell it was too late in the
———. Roosevelt & the Isolationists, year to organize an invasion of France,
1932–45. Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press, 1983. while forces already on the island could
Mosley, Leonard. Lindbergh: A Biography. quickly be moved to the Italian main-
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976. land. Thus, on September 3, General
Bernard Law Montgomery’s Eighth
Army crossed the Strait of Messina.
U.S. forces were scheduled to invade
Salerno and drop from the air on
Italian campaigns Rome. Mussolini had been arrested in
July (he would be rescued later by Ger-
man commandos) and replaced by
Marshal Pietro Badoglio.
After the capture of Sicily in August On September 8, Badoglio surren-
1943, the Allies invaded the Italian dered Italy to the Allies without a
mainland, as much out of momentum struggle. On September 9, General
as for any strategic reason. There had Mark Clark’s U.S. Fifth Army, consist-
been much discussion as to whether ing of four divisions plus special forces,
this was a good idea. The British, espe- went ashore at Salerno (code named
cially Prime Minister Winston Avalanche). There it met with such
Churchill, his cabinet, and his chiefs of fierce German resistance that it was
staff, were keenly in favor of “knock- almost driven off.
ing Italy out of the war,” as they fre- The Germans seized control of
165
• I T A L I A N C A M P A I G N S •
Rome and most of the country, with Allies’ narrow win at Salerno that they
Badoglio fleeing south to the protection could be stopped. Hitler required little
of Britain’s Eighth Army, which was persuasion, so the German Army
encamped in the toe of Italy’s “boot” quickly dug in. Now, instead of an easy
in the extreme south. The Italian fleet takeover, the Allies found themselves
set sail for various Allied ports. Italy’s caught up in a grueling struggle that
soldiers abroad became German pris- would go on almost to the day Ger-
oners, while those at home were dis- many surrendered.
armed and released, or else sent to Ger- The fight for Italy Italy saw some of
many as slave laborers. the hardest fighting of the entire war.
Eisenhower canceled the planned The Germans dug themselves into moun-
assault on Rome and dropped some of tainous positions from which they had to
the paratroopers intended for it on be blasted out by Allied troops fighting
Salerno instead. Heavy fire from naval uphill. In many places the ground was
guns and a maximum air effort secured so rough that supplies had to be deliv-
the beachhead. In two weeks the ered by mules. The winter fights were
Eighth Army arrived from Calabria, especially cruel. When a German posi-
giving the Allies a continuous line tion finally fell, there was always anoth-
across Italy. er right behind it.
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, The Allied buildup was so slow
commander of Germany’s forces in that when winter came to Italy the Ger-
southern Italy, was persuaded by the mans had 20 divisions in place, the
166
• I T A L I A N C A M P A I G N S •
Allies only 14. Over time, more divi- er-bombers and with Allied forces hav-
sions arrived, giving the Allies a slight ing sealed off the Alps, it surrendered
numerical advantage. But, because of on May 2. By then Hitler and Mussoli-
U.S. reservations and British weakness, ni were already dead. Mussolini had
the Allies never were strong enough been shot by Italian partisans on April
to punch through Germany’s lines 28, and Hitler had killed himself on
of defense except with the greatest April 30.
difficulty. The Allies sustained 189,000 casu-
After a series of failed attacks, the alties in Italy, the Germans 435,000. In
Allies sought to break the Gustav Line a strictly numerical sense, therefore, the
by landing above it at Anzio in January Italian campaign might be said to have
1944. Although the idea behind Opera- paid for itself. But many of the German
tion Shingle was sound, the force that casualties were prisoners of war taken
landed was a feeble one and Kesselring at the very end. During most of the
easily contained it. fight for Italy, a smaller German force
Breaking the Gustav and held a larger Allied one at bay. If the
Gothic lines All that remained was to Allies had chosen not to invade Italy,
batter at the German line in hopes it the 20-odd Allied divisions stuck there
would collapse. In the winter and could have hastened the day of Hitler’s
spring of 1944, the U.S. Fifth and defeat by fighting on the western front.
British Eighth armies fought a series of Meanwhile, the Germans would still
punishing battles to seize Monte Cassi- have had to keep many divisions in
no, the key to the Gustav Line. The Italy for fear of an Allied attack. Thus
fighting lasted from January 12 to May the mere threat of an invasion would
18. After the first attack failed, the have weakened Germany at almost no
Allies decided to bomb a 6th-century cost. With all respect for the brave men
monastery that overlooked the town, in who fought it, the Italian campaign was
the mistaken belief that it had been for- an error.
tified by the Germans. Not only a crime
against culture, the attack was also an
outright blunder, because the Germans SEE ALSO
proceeded to fortify the ruins, making Anzio, Battle of; Italy; Italy, surrender of;
Mussolini, Benito; Sicily, Battle of
their position even stronger.
Eventually the Polish II Corps took
Monte Cassino, the Gustav Line was
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
pierced in several places, and the embat-
Blaxland, Gregory. Alexander’s Generals:
tled U.S. VI Corps broke out of Anzio. The Italian campaign, 1944–45. London:
But, as so often in the war, the Allies W. Kimber, 1979.
moved too slowly, the Germans too Bluemenson, Martin. Salerno to Cassino.
Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
fast. Kesselring merely pulled his troops Military History, 1969.
out and retired to the Gothic Line Botjer, George F. Sideshow War: The Ital-
above Rome, so the whole cycle had to ian Campaign, 1943–1945. College Sta-
tion: Texas A & M University Press,
be repeated. After another cruel winter 1996.
of fighting, the Gothic Line was finally Fisher, Ernest F. Cassino to the Alps.
broken. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
This time, with the Third Reich on Military History, 1977.
Jackson, W. G. F. The Battle for
the verge of collapse, the German army Italy. New York: Harper & Row,
group did not escape. Harried by fight- 1967.
167
• I T A L Y •
The great differences between Italy’s pushed ahead during the winter of
means and Mussolini’s aims would be 1940–41. This setback, embarrassing for
fatal to Italian fascism—and to many Mussolini, interfered with Germany’s
Italians. Despite its rich culture and beau- plans for the Balkans and forced Hitler to
ty, Italy was a nation of the second or bail Italy out.
third rank that Mussolini treated as if it To attack Greece, the Germans need-
were a great power. Among many vain- ed permission to cross Yugoslavia. On
glorious gestures, one may stand for all. March 25, 1941, it was granted by the
In 1936 Italy seized Ethiopia, most of Yugoslavian government, which also
whose people still lived in the Stone Age. joined the Axis. But the existing govern-
Mussolini then announced the birth of a ment was then promptly overthrown by
new Roman Empire. patriots who reversed the decision. An
Although he was jealous of Hitler, infuriated Hitler ordered the seizure of
Mussolini was naturally drawn to an Yugoslavia as well as Greece. Ten days
alliance with Germany. It was a fascist later, on April 6, 1941, the German
police state like Italy and, like Italy forces struck. Yugoslavia fell almost at
again, bent on conquest. The Allies once and an armistice was signed on the
would certainly have accepted Italy, 17th. Without pausing for breath, the
and offered some material benefits to it. Germans rolled into Greece, and took it
But the Allies would not have gone in a matter of weeks.
along with Mussolini’s expansion plans, Italy was allowed to occupy most of
while Hitler did. Thus Mussolini Greece and part of Yugoslavia. While
forged a “Pact of Steel” with Germany the Italian Army had failed to distin-
in 1939 and seized Albania. Then, after guish itself in war, it behaved honorably
a prudent interval to make sure that as an occupation force by refusing to
Germany would win the battle, Italy implement Hitler’s anti-Semitic policies.
attacked France on June 10, 1940— More than that, Italian officers pro-
unsuccessfully, as the French easily tected Jews in their zones of occupation.
drove the Italian Army back. But Hitler In France the Italian Army prevented
rewarded Mussolini all the same by Germans and police from the pro-Nazi
giving Italy an occupation zone in Vichy government—sometimes at gun-
southern France. point—from seizing the 240,000 Jews
The Italian Army’s poor showing who were under its protection. In
against France ought to have made Mus- Yugoslavia it saved some 600,000 Jews
solini rethink his position, but did not. In from anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi Croat-
1940–41 Italy and Britain fought a series ian forces.
of naval battles for control of the The seeds of Italy’s next defeats had
Mediterranean, which the British usually already been sown before it advanced
won. In an especially bold stroke a hand- into Greece. In August 1940 an Italian
ful of obsolete British carrier planes crip- army stationed in Ethiopia easily occu-
pled half the Italian fleet at Taranto on pied British Somaliland. The next month
November 11, 1940. Italian units advanced out of Libya about
On land it was worse. In October 60 miles into Egypt, which was indepen-
1940 Mussolini’s army invaded Greece, dent in theory but actually controlled by
which had rejected various unreasonable Britain. In December the British struck
Italian demands. But after gaining some back, driving deeply into Libya. After
ground, the Italians were forced back. eight weeks of fighting, Italian casualties
With British air support, the Greek Army (mostly prisoners of war) came to
169
• I T A L Y •
lightly armored and gunned—was con- Germany as slave laborers. While the
sidered the worst in the world. Italian air- civilian losses can only be estimated, per-
craft were similarly poor, and Italian war- haps 300,000 were killed in bombing
ships were notable for their obsolete raids; others died while fighting as parti-
technology. Bad management and admin- sans or as workers in Germany.
istration—test reports of naval vessels After the German occupation
were faked to make ships seem faster began, Italy was doomed to be fought
than they were, for example—were often over for the rest of the war. In the
responsible for these faulty products. north, Germany established a puppet
Between January 1940 and April government, called the Italian Social
1943, the Italian aircraft industry manu- Republic (ISR), led by Mussolini, whom
factured 10,545 aircraft, with production German commandos had rescued. At
reaching a high of only 241 units a first many surviving fascists enlisted in
month. Meanwhile, British aircraft con- Mussolini’s armed forces. But before
struction during this time exceeded 2,000 long it became clear that the Germans
a month. Of some 4,500 fighters pro- meant to plunder Italy, not treat the ISR
duced, fewer than 300 were equal to the as an ally. The Bank of Italy’s gold went
British Hurricane. In the same period to Germany, along with many other
only one battleship, three light carriers, assets and resources. Life was unspeak-
and five destroyers joined the Italian fleet. ably grim in the ISR and not much bet-
These were pitifully small numbers for a ter in liberated Italy, to whose people
nation that meant to defeat Britain in the the Allies could provide only the bare
Mediterranean, and more pitiful still con- necessities.
sidering their lack of quality. Italian honor was redeemed some-
Italy suffered heavy losses in the war. what by the lack of Italian anti-Semitism.
Eight percent of its industrial plants was As long as the Italian Army survived,
destroyed, along with 2 million rooms of Jews in Italian zones of occupation were
civilian housing out of a total of 36 mil- protected. At home, too, although Mus-
lion. Sixty percent of its locomotives were solini issued anti-Semitic decrees, fascists
destroyed and 90 percent of its trucks. did not kill Jews. It was not until the Ger-
Five thousand bridges were blown up. man occupation of Italy that Jews were
Agricultural production fell by 60 percent. murdered there, or sent to the eastern
The human cost was excessive, too. death camps.
At peak strength the Italian Army had The Italian people paid a fearful
about 2 million men, the Navy 260,000, price for their obedience to Mussolini,
and the Air Force several hundred thou- however. Although most Italians had fol-
sand. While fighting on the Axis side, lowed Mussolini, most had done so with
200,000 Italian servicemen were killed little enthusiasm. The eagerness of Italian
(including 80,000 on the eastern front soldiers to surrender to the Allies was the
and 50,000 in the Balkans), an unknown result of lack of faith rather than cow-
but larger number wounded, and ardice. Still, the Italians had followed
600,000 made Allied prisoners. their leader for many years and suffered
After September 8, 1943, when Italy accordingly.
surrendered, its forces were disarmed by
the Germans. Italian units sustained SEE ALSO
another 19,000 casualties when they
Italian campaigns; Mediterranean theater;
attempted to resist. After being disarmed, Mussolini, Benito; North African cam-
600,000 uniformed Italians were sent to paign; Sicily, Battle of
171
• I T A L Y , S U R R E N D E R O F •
security. Manchuria was the only place inland. Japan offended world opinion
to which Japanese citizens could emi- by behaving in this barbarous way, yet
grate, as virtually all of the world’s failed to pacify China.
major nations denied them permission The U.S. reaction War in China
to enter as immigrants. presented President Roosevelt’s adminis-
Manchuria was also the source of tration with a dilemma. Viewed strictly
essential raw materials for Japan, such in terms of American self-interest, there
as iron ore and coal, as well as of criti- was much to be said for tolerating Japan
cal foodstuffs. And it was Japan’s buffer in the short run. The United States had a
against the Soviet Union, which also had large stake in maintaining good relations
designs on Manchuria. with Japan, where U.S. investments
Further, the Great Depression of the totaled $466 million, twice as much as
1930s ruined Japan’s export trade, and in China. Forty-eight percent of U.S.
the prohibitive Smoot-Hawley Tariff of exports to the Far East went to Japan,
1930 closed Japan’s markets in the Unit- and 21 percent of the United States’s Far
ed States. These events made Manchuria Eastern imports came from it—in dollar
even more important to Japan. terms much less than before the stock
War with China In July 1937 market crash of 1929, but still a sub-
Japan, whose government was now con- stantial figure. U.S. commerce with
trolled by the Imperial Japanese Army, Japan was three times that with China
made an incredible blunder by invading and produced a favorable balance of
China. The Japanese assumption was trade. If the United States were forced to
that China, where power was shared choose between the two countries, eco-
between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek nomics dictated that it side with Japan.
and assorted regional warlords, would The alternative, which was to chal-
be easy to seize and hold. But China’s lenge Japanese imperialism, meant risk-
military weakness turned out to matter ing a war that would damage trade and
less than its size. endanger the Philippines—the United
Japan won every battle in China but States’s Far Eastern commonwealth that
could not win the war. Chiang relocated it could not protect and yet had to
his capital to Chungking, a mountain defend. Such a war would cost much in
stronghold deep inside China that the lives and money and, if won, still leave
Japanese could not reach. They occu- East Asia vulnerable to the Soviets. If
pied all the major cities and much of Japan refused ever to leave China, the
China’s coast, but because China refused United States would someday be forced
to surrender, the Japanese found them- to act, but to do so later instead of
selves bogged down in a ruinous war. sooner was clearly the wisest path.
Apparently thinking that the Chi- At first the government and people of
nese people could be terrorized into giv- the United States were as reluctant to
ing up, the Japanese Army committed fight Japan as to fight Germany. But as
terrible atrocities in China. During what Japan continued to violate China, sup-
became known as the Rape of Nanking, port for sanctions grew. On July 26,
for example, some 250,000 Chinese lost 1939, after Britain made concessions in
their lives during a six-week orgy of vio- China as a result of Japanese pressure,
lence. Many of these acts took place in Roosevelt decided to give the six-month
full view of Western journalists and notice required to cancel a commercial
diplomats, for Nanking had been treaty with Japan that dated from 1911.
Chiang’s capital before he moved it This step met with the approval of 81
175
• J A P A N •
Tokyo women
help clean up
debris in the
war-scarred
capital some
weeks before
the Japanese
surrender on
August 14,
1945.
percent of the Americans polled by the China’s links to the outside world.
Gallup organization. By 1935 public Accordingly, Tokyo demanded that the
opinion polls had become frequent and Allies withdraw their support of China,
reliable enough to influence public poli- ordered France to stop all traffic between
cy. Roosevelt appears to have been Indochina and China, and insisted that
guided by them to a considerable extent Britain shut down China’s supply lines
in his conduct of prewar diplomacy. through Hong Kong and Burma.
The outbreak of war in Europe in Japan also declared the “regions of
1939 further weakened Britain’s position the South Seas” to be part of its Greater
in Asia. Avoiding a Japanese conflict East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The
was more important than ever, yet the Sphere was a device by which Japan
tight focus of the European imperial hoped to rally the oppressed peoples of
powers on Germany created fresh Asia to its side. Represented as a policy
opportunities for Japanese expansion. It of “Asia for the Asians” at a time when
was essential to Britain that China con- much of the continent was still ruled by
tinue fighting and thus tie down the Europe, the slogan had considerable
Japanese Army. But being stuck in appeal. Asians knew much about mis-
China would lead Japan to seek a solu- treatment by Europeans. Of Japan’s far
tion to its problem by widening the war. more dangerous aims, they as yet had
That was hinted at on September 15, little knowledge.
1939, when Japan signed an armistice The United States Acts to Contain
with the Soviet Union, putting an end to Japan Britain, France, and China called
the undeclared war between them. vainly on Washington to assist them
The European war created a tempta- against Japan. But Roosevelt and Secre-
tion for Japan’s military leaders that they tary of State Cordell Hull feared that
could not resist. Having failed to crush strong action, such as economic reprisals
China, they saw in the weakening of the against Japan, might trigger a war that
colonial powers an opportunity to cut the United States was unprepared to
176
• J A P A N •
fight. Some felt that sanctions would be by acquiring the Netherlands East Indies
effective, because Japan was so depen- and their rich oil fields.
dent on the United States, which provid- Japanese planners had been work-
ed it with 80 percent of its oil, 90 per- ing on the conquest of Southeast Asia
cent of its gasoline, 74 percent of its for months, although no target date had
scrap metal, and 60 percent of its been set. They knew that the campaign
machine tools. But Roosevelt was might lead to war with the United
unwilling to gamble on this assumption. States, but Japan hoped that the United
Finally, however, after much bureau- States, which was weak militarily and
cratic jockeying, on July 25, 1940, Roo- had its eyes turned toward Europe,
sevelt signed an order embargoing avia- would not fight. These were, in fact,
tion fuel and lubricants and the type of compelling motives for a U.S. policy of
scrap metal used in making steel. restraint. The United States was unpre-
Japan was not deterred by this lim- pared for war with Germany, Roo-
ited embargo. In August and September, sevelt’s efforts to provoke one notwith-
Tokyo forced Britain to withdraw its standing, still less for a second conflict
troops from Shanghai, the Dutch to con- with Japan. London and Washington
sider making economic concessions in agreed that Germany, as the greater
the East Indies, and the French to recog- menace, must be disposed of first.
nize Japanese claims in Indochina. On But by the summer of 1941 an Anglo-
September 26, 1940, when it appeared American war with Japan was looming,
that the Battle of Britain was won and despite numerous diplomatic contacts and
after Japanese troops had entered discussions. The United States was still
Indochina, Roosevelt embargoed all iron deadlocked with Japan over China. Japan
and steel scrap. The next day Japan insisted on retaining a free hand in China,
signed the Tripartite Pact with Italy and while the United States demanded that it
Germany, which specified that they withdraw altogether.
would help each other if any of them At this time Japan had come to
went to war with a nation at present regard war with the United States as
neutral. unavoidable. This attitude resulted from
On April 13, 1941, Washington the U.S. response to its occupation of
learned that Japan and the Soviet Union southern Indochina, which began on
had signed a nonaggression pact, speci- July 24. The United States knew some-
fying that if one went to war with a thing was about to occur, thanks to
third power, the other would remain Operation MAGIC, a triumph of the
neutral. The implications were obvious. code breaker’s art, which enabled U.S.
If the pact held, Japan would gain free- intelligence to read Japanese radio traf-
dom of action in Southeast Asia. That it fic. The Japanese diplomatic code,
would hold became clear after June 22 named Purple by U.S. code breakers,
when Germany invaded Russia. To was yielding up priceless information.
Washington this attack meant that Because of decrypted Japanese
Japan’s rear was safe because the Soviets diplomatic messages and other forms of
would not want to fight in both Asia intelligence, Washington was aware of
and Europe. The way was now clear for Japanese ship movements, although not
Japan to take Southeast Asia, isolating their destination. Yet, wherever the
China from outside aid. Japan could Japanese were going, it did not appear
also free itself of dependence on U.S. oil that they could be stopped, because the
177
• J A P A N •
This captured
Japanese pho-
tograph of a
pilot rally was
taken on an
aircraft carrier
before the
attack on Pearl
Harbor on
Image Not Available
December 7,
1941.
178
• J A P A N •
Harbor. Some hours later Japan struck three great industrial states
again, crippling Philippine defenses. plus Holland made little
On December 8, 1941, the United sense until 1940, when the
States declared war on Japan, and on Asian balance of power
the 11th Hitler issued a declaration of was tipped by events in
war against the United States. At last the Europe.
long wait was over. The early defeat and
Image Not Available
Roosevelt’s political enemies were occupation of Holland and
soon charging that he had known in France meant that their
advance about the Japanese plan to lightly defended colonial
attack U.S. military bases in Hawaii but empires in Asia could not
allowed the Japanese to go ahead so as to be reinforced. Britain’s plan
enter the war against Hitler. There is no in case of war with Japan
evidence to support this charge. Thanks had been to send its fleet to Malaya. Japan’s war
to MAGIC, Washington knew that Japan From “Fortress Singapore” the Royal with China
was going to attack, but it believed that Navy would then control Southeast began in July
Hawaii was safe because it was so far Asia. But with Britain fighting Ger- 1937, more
from Japan and so strongly defended. many, few ships could be spared for ser- than four years
The real charge against Roosevelt’s vice in Asian waters. This left only the before the
United States
administration is not that it deliberately United States as an obstacle to Japan.
entered the
allowed Pearl Harbor to be attacked, However, the United States’s Far
war. The
but that its Far Eastern policy was a Eastern forces were weak and could do American pub-
shambles. After deciding that Germany nothing in the short run to stop Japan. lic, however,
was the greater threat to vital U.S. inter- Thus, the way was open for Japan to supported the
ests, the administration should have seize the resources of Southeast Asia Chinese cause
bent over backward to reach agreement and, at the same time, cut off China from the very
with Japan. At the very least, it should from outside help. start.
have stalled for time, since the United Accordingly, the Japanese Army and
States was not yet strong enough to Navy agreed to exploit these opportuni-
fight Germany alone, still less Japan as ties. In the summer of 1940, Japan occu-
well. But Washington did nothing, pied the northern part of French
allowing a Japanese deadline that it Indochina. Then in July 1941 it secured
knew meant war to pass without mak- the south as well. This brought relations
ing any effort to avoid or postpone the between Japan and the United States to
conflict. That this was the popular a head. Washington demanded that the
course and supported by opinion sur- Japanese withdraw not only from Indo-
veys did not make it good policy. Events china, but from China too. When the
dictated Roosevelt‘s course, actions that Japanese refused, President Franklin
were too little and too late if boldness Roosevelt organized an oil embargo.
was needed, too belligerent if it was not. Japan would receive no more oil from
The conquest of Southeast Asia the United States, its biggest supplier.
The trouble with the southern strategy, And the Netherlands East Indies, Mexi-
however, was that it meant taking on co, and other oil producers agreed not
the great colonial powers. The United to sell to Japan either.
States held the Philippines, France held Japan possessed only about a year’s
Indochina, Holland held the Nether- supply of oil and had just two ways of
lands East Indies, and Britain held responding to Roosevelt’s demands. It
Burma and Malaya. For Japan to fight could either give in on the United
179
• J A P A N •
States’s terms or seize oil fields on its was falling short. Expecting a brief war,
own. Few were surprised when Japan Japanese leaders had not developed their
chose the latter course. war industries on a large enough scale.
What did surprise Westerners was Too few ships had been built, and indus-
the speed and ferocity of Japan’s attacks, try remained disorganized. In 1943, with
and the ease with which it defeated all the war going badly for Japan, Prime
the colonial powers. In six months it Minister Tojo Hideki created a new min-
acquired a vast new empire in Southeast istry of munitions with sweeping powers
Asia and the western Pacific. The Nether- that was supposed to eliminate corrup-
lands East Indies fell, as did Burma, tion and inefficiency. However, it was
Malaya, and the Philippines, along with sabotaged by military interference and
miscellaneous islands and territories. In uncooperative industrialists.
one of the greatest military campaigns of Desperate measures did bring some
all time, Japan gained the raw materials it gains in production, though. Draining
needed to go on making war. stockpiles of raw materials, for example,
Japan’s military leaders knew that in enabled aircraft production to go up. In
the long run the United States’s vast 1942 the aircraft industry produced only
industrial advantages would make it 5,000 planes, but in 1944 it turned out
impossible to beat. Their hope was that, 28,000. This was a feat that could not
discouraged by early losses, the Ameri- be repeated, however, because the air-
cans would quickly give up. Instead, the craft and other industries had used up
U.S. Navy defeated the Japanese at Mid- their material reserves. There were plen-
way Island in June 1942 and invaded ty of raw materials in Southeast Asia,
Guadalcanal in August. Japan was now but the Japanese could not use them
committed to a war of attrition that it because U.S. submarines were destroy-
could not possibly win. The price of its ing their merchant fleet.
aggression would be utter ruin. The production figures for other
On the home front The Japanese industries show how badly the U.S.
people were already suffering when blockade hurt Japan. In 1941 some 500
Tokyo started the Pacific war. Since the medium-sized tanks were built; in 1945
invasion of China in 1937, fuel restric- only 89 were completed. Japan built six
tions had severely hampered civilian aircraft carriers in 1942, its best year,
travel. Rice, charcoal, clothing, and and four as late as 1944, but in 1945
other essential goods and services were production fell to zero. Destroyer pro-
rationed and in short supply. Govern- duction peaked at 31 in 1944, then fell
ment price controls failed to stop infla- to 6 the next year.
tion from destroying the value of money. Collapse and defeat By 1944 the
The home ministry set up a system fabric of Japanese life was beginning to
that put every village and neighborhood shred. All kindergartens in Tokyo were
under its direct control. In time every closed. Sugar became impossible to buy.
residential area would have meetings at Few passenger trains were allowed to
the same time to receive directives and carry civilians. Food shortages produced
listen to identical radio broadcasts. In packs of wild dogs in the streets of
this way, the entire population was Tokyo, which some people tracked
mobilized and organized, down to and down, killed, and ate. Then came the
including schoolchildren. firebomb raids. Tokyo was the first to
Yet, by 1942, despite its overseas be hit. On March 9 and 10, 1944, it
conquests, Japan’s military production was carpeted with incendiary bombs,
180
• J A P A N , S U R R E N D E R O F •
which killed perhaps 100,000 people. was dwarfed by the many more millions
As its cities burned, 10 million of people in China and Southeast Asia,
Japanese fled to the country, flight being mostly civilians, who were killed by the
Japan’s substitute for civilian defense. Japanese or died of disease and starva-
Workers left their jobs to scavenge for tion as a direct result of Japanese acts of
food, which actually did little harm to aggression.
production, because fuel shortages had SEE ALSO
closed most of the factories. The U.S. Atomic bombs; Chiang Kai-shek; China;
naval blockade, now supported by fight- Hirohito; Hull, Cordell; Japan, surrender
er-bombers from carriers and bases in of; Japanese Army; Japanese Navy; Pearl
Harbor, attack on; Tojo, Hideki
Okinawa and mines dropped by B-29s,
closed off Japan from the mainland. F U RTHER READING
Even travel between the home Borg, Dorothy. The United States and the
islands became difficult, owing to the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–38. Cam-
destruction of ferries. Trains could not bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1964.
run by day, and movement by night was Boyle, J. H. China and Japan at War,
hampered by downed bridges and 1937–1945. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
blocked roads. Japan’s collapsing trans- University Press, 1972.
Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking: The
portation system, as well as its shortages Forgotten Holocaust of World War II.
of food and everything else, would have New York: Basic Books, 1997.
caused massive civilian deaths from star- Crowley, James B. Japan’s Quest for
Autonomy: National Security and For-
vation and disease had the war lasted
eign Policy, 1930–1938. Princeton:
much longer than it did. The atomic Princeton University Press, 1966.
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Heinrichs, Waldo. Threshold of War:
Nagasaki were terrible engines of Franklin D. Roosevelt and U.S. Entry
into World War II. New York: Oxford
destruction. But they did force Emperor University Press, 1988.
Hirohito to put an end to the war on Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War: World
August 15, 1945, saving many Japanese War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945.
New York: Random House, 1978.
as well as American lives. Toland, John. Rising Sun: The Decline and
By then much of Japan lay in ruins, Fall of the Japanese Empire. New York:
and Southeast Asia and the western Random House, 1970.
Pacific were dotted with Japanese
graves. Although Japan never had more
than 6 million men in uniform at any
given time, a total of 10 million served Japan, surrender of
in the armed forces. Of these, more than
2 million were killed, but only 150,000
were wounded, because Japanese ser-
vicemen were supposed to fight to the The main problem facing U.S. leaders
last man, and usually did. when President Franklin D. Roosevelt
About 500,000 civilians were killed died on April 12, 1945, was how to
by U.S. bombers, and more than bring about a Japanese surrender.
600,000 were wounded. In addition, Although the U.S. blockade had sealed
250,000 troops taken prisoner by the its fate and firebombs were making
Soviets in Manchuria at war’s end never Japanese cities uninhabitable, Japan’s
returned to Japan. Total Japanese deaths leaders still would not admit that further
for the war came to about 3 million. resistance was useless. They meant to
Immense though it was, this death toll fight to the last man, woman, and child
181
• J A P A N , S U R R E N D E R O F •
vent further acts of defiance. Isolated when the invasion of Japan was to begin.
kamikaze attacks were made against U.S. It also suggests that the timing of the
ships and positions. Several hundred bombings was important as well, for by
army trainees seized a Tokyo park for dropping the two bombs closely together,
two days, after which the majority sur- the United States forced Hirohito and the
rendered while their leaders committed high command to move so fast that plot-
suicide. Rebellious young warriors dug ters and potential rebels were unable to
into the summit of a hill near the palace, organize quickly enough. Because emo-
where they holed up for four days before tions were running so high, even a week
all 12 killed themselves. or two of delay might have made a cru-
Diehards made many attacks on gov- cial difference.
ernment buildings, radio stations, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be
post offices in the provinces. A conspir- remembered as examples of the horrors
acy among naval air officers to keep on of war. But the memory of what hap-
fighting was discovered and crushed. Vice pened to those cities in 1945 should not
Admiral Matome Ugaki led a flight of be used to indict U.S. leaders as war
Japanese planes on a kamikaze attack criminals—which seems to lie behind
against the U.S. fleet, with all 11 aircraft much of the criticism. Faced with a cruel
mysteriously disappearing at sea. foe who showed no sign of surrender-
On August 16, Emperor Hirohito ing, President Truman and his lieu-
sent three princes away to overseas tenants took the only course that
headquarters, so that no one could pre- remained open to them. In doing so they
tend that the order to surrender was a saved not only Allied lives, but many
fake. Later he dispatched two more Japanese lives as well.
princes to restrain military fanatics in Millions of Japanese would have per-
the home islands. All the same, more ished as the result of an invasion. And
than 1,000 officers and hundreds of millions would probably have died had
civilians took their own lives. Many did bombardment and blockade been
so in a plaza before the ruins of the employed instead, mostly of starvation
imperial palace, which ran with blood and diseases resulting from the complete
for days after the surrender. collapse of Japan’s transportation system.
These events took place after the fire- With no easy choices available to them,
bomb raids had done their work, after the U.S. leaders made the best of a bad
millions had fled to the countryside, after situation. They have been acquitted by
the Soviets had declared war, after two history, if not always by historians.
atomic bombs had fallen on Japan, and
after the emperor had twice ordered the SEE ALSO
government to surrender. Many of these Atomic bombs; Hirohito; Japan; Japanese
acts came after Japan had actually sur- Army; Japanese Navy; Kamikaze
rendered, the emperor had explained this
to the nation, and an imperial order had F U RTHER READING
been sent to all Japanese commands Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy:
Hiroshima and Potsdam. New York:
demanding their obedience. Vintage, 1965.
This level of resistance strongly sug- Brooks, Lester. Behind Japan’s Surrender:
gests that if the atomic bombs had not The Secret Struggle that Ended an
forced the emperor’s hand, there would Empire. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.
Feifer, George. Tennozan: The Battle of
have been no surrender, not in August Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb. New
and perhaps not even by November, York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992.
185
• J A P A N E S E A M E R I C A N S •
Japanese Americans
would be held for an average of 900 science began working behind the scenes
days under harsh conditions in rural to undo this injustice. On December 3,
areas and wastelands. There were 10 1943, Attorney General Nicholas Biddle
major camps: two each in California, requested that President Roosevelt order
Arizona, and Arkansas, and one each in a liberal “release and return” program.
Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado. In February 1944 Secretary Harold
All the camps had much more severe cli- Ickes, whose Interior Department con-
mates, both in winter and summer, than trolled the WRA, made similar requests.
the internees were used to. When FDR continued to ignore them,
The camp at Poston, Arizona, was Ickes assigned Undersecretary Abe
desert country, lacking in shade and Fortas to work on the problem. Fortas
whipped by dust and sand. When the visited the camps and, horrified by their
internees began arriving in July, many conditions, brought back strong argu-
passed out from the intense heat. One ments in favor of early release.
said later: “People kept falling down. General Charles H. Bonesteel, the
We thought it was Devil’s Island.” Seven new military commander for the West
victims of heat stroke died in the first Coast, opposed internment and worked
days. Many internees believed this was ceaselessly against it, which was proba-
intentional, Poston being in their eyes a bly why he was transferred after serving
death camp. The army-style barracks in less than six months at his headquarters
which they lived offered no shelter from in San Francisco. The tide had turned all
the heat, were overrun with insects, and the same. At the first cabinet meeting
were impossible to keep clean. after Roosevelt’s reelection in 1944, Bid-
Camp Minidoka in Idaho was hot in dle asked Roosevelt to release all the
the summer but had temperatures that internees certified by the Justice Depart-
fell to 25 degrees below zero in the win- ment as loyal.
ter. Tule Lake in California, despite its This time, having nothing to lose,
pretty name, was a dry lake bed located FDR agreed. On December 10 the new
at an elevation of 4,000 feet. Winter tem- commanding general issued Public
peratures there fell to 29 below zero. In Proclamation No. 21, which was writ-
all the camps, sanitation was poor by any ten by Bonesteel, lifting the evacuation
standard and there was a complete lack and exclusion orders and allowing most
of privacy. Overcrowding, boredom, and internees to return to the West Coast.
hard work were the rule at all camps. Ironically, while their relatives were
The national policy of imprisoning in prison camps, the elite 442nd Regi-
and persecuting Japanese Americans mental Combat Team, composed en-
was upheld by the Supreme Court tirely of Japanese Americans, was fight-
because its respect for civil liberties less- ing against the Germans in Italy. With
ened in wartime, and because the gov- an average strength of about 3,000 sol-
ernment falsely claimed that there was diers, during its 11 months in combat it
no time to screen Japanese Americans suffered a total of 9,486 casualties and
individually, although such a screening became the most decorated unit in the
had taken place before Pearl Harbor. Army. All told, some 33,000 Nisei, or
The government also suppressed the second-generation Japanese Americans,
evidence it did have, which was consid- served in the armed forces with great
erable, that undermined the case for distinction, fighting and dying for the
internment. sake of a country that had put their
Early on, men and women of con- families in prison.
187
• J A P A N E S E A R M Y •
soldiers were poorly led in the field as well It not only damaged the Japanese war
as at the top, a favorite tactic of the offi- effort but also caused Allied troops to
cers being the suicidal frontal attack. On fight harder than ever, to the death if
the other hand, Japanese soldiers were necessary, rather than risk capture.
highly motivated and refused to give up. In 1943 the tide of battle turned
It has been noted that every army against the Imperial Japanese Army. It
swore to fight to the last man and the lost the Solomon Islands and other terri-
last bullet, but only the Japanese actu- tories. Most Japanese units in New
ally did so. Despite, or maybe because Guinea were destroyed. It was able to
of, their small stature, Japanese troops take the offensive only in China, which
could travel and fight for days with only in did in 1944, gaining local victories
the food and ammunition they carried while it continued to lose the war. Else-
on their backs. where it fought fierce defensive battles
Against their best traits, it must be that always ended in defeat. When it
said that their cruelty denied these fine lost Okinawa in 1945, the IJA had lost
soldiers the respect they would other- the war, even though large numbers of
wise have earned. This trait was deliber- troops were still stationed in China and
ately encouraged by army leaders. They Manchuria.
believed that people in occupied territo- The Imperial Japanese Army raised
ries would be easier to rule if they lived 170 infantry, 13 air, 4 tank (beginning in
in terror. In China the Army had 1943), and 4 antitank divisions for over-
thought that if it raped, tortured, and seas service. These units totaled some
murdered enough civilians the Chinese 2,340,000 men, of whom about 1.5 mil-
government would give up, but these lion were killed. The lucky Japanese sol-
ideas proved both evil and false. Instead, diers were the 3 million assembled in the
terror promoted the growth of resistance home islands in 1945 to repel an Allied
movements in many occupied lands. The invasion that never took place.
Chinese Nationalists, though frequently
SEE ALSO
beaten, refused to surrender.
Central Pacific area; China; Pacific war;
In the case of prisoners of war, there South Pacific area; Southwest Pacific area
appears to have been no particular rea-
F U RTHER READING
son for cruel treatment. Prisoners often
possessed valuable skills and, since the Costello, John. The Pacific War,
1941–1945. New York: Rawson Wade,
Japanese used them as workmen, were a 1981.
labor force with much potential. Yet the Toland, John. Rising Sun: The Decline and
Japanese starved, tortured, and mur- Fall of the Japanese Empire. New York:
Random House, 1970.
dered them from the start. Some have
said that this was because the Japanese
regarded surrender as dishonorable, and
prisoners of war were therefore viewed Japanese Navy
with contempt.
However, this does not explain
much, because many of the prisoners the
Japanese took—the Marines on Wake The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) shared
Island, U.S. and native troops in the many of the army’s defects: poor plan-
Philippines—had fought with great ning, a lack of interest in intelligence
courage. Whatever the reasons for it, the work, promotion by seniority rather than
Japanese Army’s brutality was shameful. by merit, poor control over field officers,
189
• J A P A N E S E N A V Y •
command and two separate war efforts. time the Pacific Fleet would be essenti-
Duplication, waste, and confusion ally idle. Meanwhile, MacArthur’s forces
would be the inevitable results. The two were continuously in action and could
campaigns would be fought so far apart have made good use of the vast military
that they would compete for the same resources stockpiled in the central Pa-
resources instead of supporting each cific by the Navy.
other. Only the Japanese and the U.S. Because the southwest Pacific con-
Navy benefited from the arrangement. tained many Japanese strongpoints,
When it lost the Southwest Pacific MacArthur employed a variety of meth-
Area to MacArthur, the Navy was ods. He could threaten Japanese posi-
forced to make the Central Pacific Area tions that he was not in fact going to
its primary theater of war. King ordered attack, keeping the enemy off balance.
a series of amphibious attacks in 1943 MacArthur might land in the enemy’s
against Japanese-held atolls in the cen- rear or bypass him entirely. Cleverness
tral Pacific. The Mariana Islands to the and surprise saved many lives in the
west would be taken in 1944, followed southwest Pacific.
by landings on the China coast. In the Central Pacific Area, on the
In 1944, when Japan seized the other hand, targets were few and far
coastal areas of China, King argued that apart. They could not be taken by sur-
the island of Formosa should be invaded prise and had to be stormed, often at
instead. The Navy, however, did not have great cost. Some admirals, including
the troops required to take Formosa, and Chester Nimitz himself, thought that
the Army would not provide men for an taking unimportant islands in this fash-
operation that would conflict with its own ion was wrong. They favored operations
plans. Accordingly, MacArthur was that would parallel those of MacArthur
allowed to liberate the Philippines and and enable the two drives to support
both services agreed that Okinawa would each other. King personally put a stop to
be liberated next, followed by Japan itself. talks aimed at achieving this result.
Yet even for the invasion of Japan Responsibility for the central Pacific
there was going to be no supreme com- strategy, therefore, was solely his.
mander. The army and naval forces Where interservice rivalries were not
would continue to fight under their own involved, King fully supported General
leaders. If the two disagreed, bargaining Marshall, the figure most responsible for
and haggling would presumably settle U.S. grand strategy during the war.
their differences. Luckily, Japan surren- Although some ships—the vital landing
dered before this strange command ships tank in particular—were never
structure could be put in place. numerous enough, King always man-
Some historians still argue that the aged to produce some when they were
two-front war of the Southwest and needed in European waters. A good
Central Pacific Areas made sense. But strategist himself, King was against the
the central Pacific drive was extremely ill-fated invasion of Italy in 1943. He
wasteful. Huge armadas had to be doubted rightly, as events showed, that
assembled to invade insignificant islands air power alone could win the war. He
that were often strongly defended. The opposed having an independent air force
resulting casualties were very high in like Britain’s RAF, which he saw as a
relation to the number of men involved. bad use of military resources.
Months often went by between one King believed in secrecy to such an
operation and the next, during which extent that if it had been up to him the
194
• K N O X, W I L L I A M F R A N K L I N •
Department of the Navy would never Knox was raised in Grand Rapids,
have held a press conference. Any infor- Michigan, and served briefly under
mation that the Japanese received, no Theodore Roosevelt as a Rough Rider in
matter how insignificant, was a security the Spanish-American War. In 1902 he
threat. When carriers were lost he kept entered the newspaper business in
the news even from Secretary of the Michigan, first as a reporter, then as a
Navy Frank Knox, who was supposed publisher. In 1912 he became co-owner
to be his boss. He tried to keep the great and publisher of two papers, the Man-
U.S. victory at Midway a secret too, but chester, New Hampshire, Union and
of course that information could not be Leader.
kept from the Japanese. Despite his age (42), Knox joined
King will always be remembered for the Army as a private during World
having led the Navy to victory in World War I. He saw action in France and
War II. But all leaders make mistakes, and rose to the rank of major of artillery. In
like many others he fell victim to the intense 1931 Knox became part owner and
partisanship that so often put the Army and publisher of the unprofitable Chicago
Navy at odds. King was very much an offi- Sun, which he restored to financial sta-
cer of his time and place, so his likes and bility. He was the Republican nominee
dislikes were widely shared. Whether any for Vice President in 1936.
other admiral could have done better is As World War II neared, Knox
something we will never know. argued for a strong defense. When fight-
ing broke out in Europe in 1939, he
SEE ALSO
favored all possible aid to the Allies
Central Pacific Area; Nimitz, Chester W.;
Pacific war; United States Navy short of outright intervention. This
stand required courage on the part of a
F U RTHER READING
Midwestern publisher, because the
Buell, Thomas B. Master of Sea Power: A region was strongly isolationist.
Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J.
King. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. In the summer of 1940, President
King, Ernest Joseph. Fleet Admiral King, A Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Knox
Naval Record by Ernest J. King and Wal- to be secretary of the navy, and he
ter Muir Whitehill. New York: Norton,
1952. joined the cabinet in August. His
appointment was made at the same time
that another leading Republican, Henry
L. Stimson—by coincidence another ex-
Knox, William artillery officer—was nominated as sec-
Image Not Available
Franklin retary of war. These nominations
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, strengthened Roosevelt’s cabinet and
1940–44 gave it a bipartisan flavor in time for the
Presidential election of 1940.
• Born: January 1, 1874, Boston, Mass. As civilian head of the Navy, Knox
• Political party: Republican presided over the greatest expansion in
• Education: Alma College, 1893–96
the service’s history, seeing it rise from a
• Military service: U.S. Cavalry, 1898;
U.S. Army, 1917–18; Secretary of the force of some 200,000 (including
Navy, 1940 –44 Marines) in 1940 to one numbering 3.5
• Died: April 28, 1944, Washington, D.C. million (with 500,000 Marines) at the
time of his death. Knox provided the
Navy with important leadership. After
only a month in office, he negotiated
195
• L A B O R •
among war agencies because the general that workers in organized plants auto-
public was represented on it in addition matically became union members unless
to labor and management groups. For they refused to do so within 15 days of
most of its life, the board was directed being hired. This device reversed the fall
by William H. Davis, a successful lawyer in union membership. Largely as a result
and Democrat. Under his leadership, the of the union shop policy, organized
board worked to establish industrywide labor grew from a total of 8.9 million
wage patterns and labor practices. It workers in 1940 to 14.7 million in
also sought to prevent strikes by pres- 1945. Meanwhile, the civilian labor
suring union heads to calm militant force shrank by 1.8 million workers, to
local chapters. 53.9 million.
In order to avoid inflation at a time The wage freeze remained through-
when increased government spending out the war because the government
was pushing up prices, Roosevelt had to simply could not afford to give indus-
control wages as well as prices. To do trial workers the increases they wanted.
this, on April 27, 1942, he asked for Nor was there any strong reason to do
higher taxes, price controls, and a wage so. Like almost everyone else not in uni-
freeze to be worked out by the War form, those employed in manufacturing
Labor Board. The board finally decided benefited from the war, with their real
that wages should be kept at the level wages rising by 22 percent between
existing on January 1, 1941, plus 15 1940 and 1944.
percent. This indexing resulted in aver- This increase was not, however, as
age hourly industrial wages rising by large as those others enjoyed. Net farm
more than a quarter, from 66 cents at income doubled between 1941 and
the beginning of 1941 to 85 cents as of 1945. The after-tax profits of corpora-
January 1, 1943. Consumer prices tions had increased by 57 percent
increased by 16.4 percent during this between 1941 and 1943. The fact that
period. industrial workers gained less gave
The wage freeze reduced inflation, them a valid complaint. Yet the wage
but at the expense of industrial workers. freeze did not apply when a worker
After, Pearl Harbor most labor leaders moved to a better job or had his job
had pledged not to strike while the war upgraded. Millions received hourly
lasted. They believed that unionized increases in this way. Many also saw
workers would be rewarded for giving their fringe benefits improve, which
up the strike weapon. But by freezing benefited them financially even when
wages, the federal government had elim- pay rates remained stable.
inated the main reason for joining But the main reason why workers
unions, and in 1942 their membership earned more than before the war was
declined—sharply, in some cases. that they spent more time on the job: an
To save organized labor, the War average of 45.2 hours per week in 1944
Labor Board fell back on a practice compared with fewer than 38 before the
called the union shop. In return for a war. As prices had risen as well, it
no-strike pledge and promises of union appeared to some that they were work-
cooperation with government, the WLB ing harder but earning less, which was
insisted that employers include in their untrue. Still, as the wage freeze grew in
labor contracts what was called a unpopularity, strikes became more fre-
“maintenance of membership” clause. quent. There were 2,000 walkouts in
As defined in June 1942, it stipulated 1942, 3,700 in 1943, and nearly 5,000
197
• L A B O R •
in 1944, of which 41 involved more asked for, the resulting inflation would
than 5,000 workers. The proportion of have canceled out most if not all of their
all workers involved in strikes quadru- pay raises. The CIO’s restraint was polit-
pled after 1942, returning, in effect, to ically wise, but it was also patriotic and
peacetime levels. in the workers’ best interest. Moreover,
There were differences in wartime workers were profiting from the war, if
strikes all the same. Most of these less so than others. Their feelings of
strikes were being treated A Government
“quickie” stop- unjustly were propoganda
pages that halted nothing compared poster implied
work for one shift to those experi- the terribe fate
or less. Congress enced by GIs, who in store for
of Industrial Orga- saw walkouts as American fami-
nization leaders stabs in their lies if workers
remained faithful backs. were to strike.
to the no-strike GIs may have
pledge, cracking felt bitterness
Image Not Available
down on locals toward disgruntled
that walked out workers on the
and giving the home front, yet
Roosevelt adminis- strikes more than
tration more than anything else sym-
they received in bolized for service-
return. It was a men the unfairness
hard war for them, of wartime. Despite
trapped as they the deep commit-
were between an ment of Americans
irritated member- to the war effort,
ship and a War as a whole it
Labor Board that became more strict resembled an upside-down pyramid. On
over time. top a majority of civilians were living
Life was simpler for the AFL, which well. Meanwhile, at the bottom a com-
had not tied itself to the Democratic parative handful of fighting men bore all
party and felt no need to punish its locals the suffering. Nothing much could be
for breaking the no-strike pledge. This done about this. Some people called for
live-and-let-live policy made it more “equality of sacrifice,” but in war that is
attractive to resentful workers, and AFL impossible. Fighting men risk their lives;
unions grew, to some degree at the CIO’s civilians, at most, some income.
expense. Were it not for the WLB’s
SEE ALSO
“maintenance of membership” policy, the
Mobilization; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano
shift would have been even greater.
Strikes in wartime greatly angered F U RTHER READING
the public. Still, they were almost always Lichtenstein, Nelson. Labor’s War at
brief and did not hurt the war effort. Home: The CIO in World War II.
The appearance that workers at home New York: Cambridge University Press,
were betraying the boys overseas was 1982.
Vatter, Harold G. The U.S. Economy in
far less serious than the reality. If strik- World War II. New York: Columbia Uni-
ing workers had gotten what they had versity Press, 1985.
198
• L A N D I N G S H I P S A N D C R A F T •
headed the Navy; General George C. under Roosevelt had been important to
Marshall, the army chief of staff; and the smooth working of the U.S. military
General Henry Arnold, chief of the machine. Under Truman, however, espe-
Army Air Forces. Marshall feared that cially at first, Leahy had real power.
Admiral King, because he was outnum- Typically, he used it with care.
bered on the JCS, might be tempted to Leahy was the least known of the
go directly to the President when dis- nation’s top military leaders of World
agreements arose. He solved this possi- War II. His work was bureaucratic and
ble problem with an inspired solution. diplomatic and did not involve making
He asked Roosevelt to recall Leahy to command decisions. He was not associ-
active service as chief of staff to the ated with any faction or party. He had
President with a seat on the JCS, whose no pet theories about how the war
meetings Leahy would chair. should be waged. But in his quiet way
This solved the King problem to the he was a model officer and did his coun-
degree that it could be solved, and gave try a great service.
Roosevelt a close and trusted advisor on
F U RTHER READING
all military matters. Admiral Leahy had
Adams, Henry H. Witness to Power: The
offices in the White House, saw the Presi- Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.
dent every day, and in time was asked by Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
Roosevelt to help with many problems 1985.
Leahy, William D. I Was There. 1950.
that had little, if anything, to do with mil- Reprint, North Stratford, N.H.: Ayer,
itary affairs. Although not as close to 1980.
Roosevelt as Harry Hopkins, FDR’s main
troubleshooter in civilian affairs, Leahy
played a similar role in the military.
When Hopkins was too ill to work, LeMay, Curtis E.
which happened several times during the COMMANDER OF XXI
war, Leahy did Hopkins’s job as well as BOMBER COMMAND
his own. Close-mouthed, industrious, and
• Born: November 15, 1906, Columbus,
orderly, Leahy was the perfect chief of Ohio
staff for a President whose habit it was to • Political party: none
surround himself with chaos. • Education: Ohio State University,
1924–28, B.S.
Leahy made his greatest contribu-
• Military service: U.S. Army second
tion to the war effort when Harry S. lieutenant, 1928–37; captain,
Truman became President in 1945. Roo- 1940–41; colonel, 1942–43; brigadier
sevelt had done nothing to prepare Vice general, 1943–44; major general, 1944
• Died: October 1, 1990, March AFB,
President Truman for the Oval Office in Calif.
case his own health, which was poor,
failed. Thus, when Truman was sworn
in on April 12, 1945, he knew almost
nothing about Roosevelt’s foreign and A tactical genius, Curtis LeMay had
military policies. It therefore fell to trained for years with the Boeing B-17
Leahy, who knew more about both than Flying Fortress before the war. He was
anyone else except Roosevelt himself, to given the 305th Bombardment Group
brief the new President. Further, unlike not long after Pearl Harbor was
Roosevelt, who did as he pleased, Tru- attacked in December 1941. The B-17
man not only listened to Leahy but fre- was the world’s first operational four-
quently took his advice. Leahy’s job engined heavy bomber. Heavily armed
201
• L E M A Y, C U R T I S E. •
and armored, it was designed to force its air war would have to wait for the
way through enemy fighters in daylight arrival of long-range fighters.
and drop its relatively small bombload After his service in Europe, LeMay
exactly on target. was made chief of the XX Bomber
When LeMay took his group to Command based in India and China.
Britain in 1942 he soon discovered that The XX was equipped with the new
the formation in use there did not Boeing B-29 Superfortress, a much larg-
enable B-17s to provide each other with er, stronger, faster aircraft than the B-17.
overlapping fields of machine-gun fire. But its bases were too far from major
Accordingly, he designed the Lead-High- targets, and its China bases were too
Low combat box. This formation, hard to supply. Even the long-range B-
which permitted between 18 and 21 29 could not bomb effectively under
bombers to give each other maximum these conditions. When the Allies took
fire support, was adopted by all the the Mariana Islands in 1944, the Army
heavy bomb groups of the Army Air Air Force based its XXI Bomber Com-
Forces. He pioneered in other ways too, mand on them. The B-29s of LeMay’s
developing methods that won wide- XX Bomber Command were then trans-
spread acceptance. ferred to the XXI, which LeMay took
LeMay often led his group into bat- over on January 19, 1945.
tle and provided it with such effective The XXI Bomber Command had
leadership that he was promoted to been trying unsuccessfully to destroy tar-
command the 3rd Air Division of the gets in Japan with precision bombing
Eighth Air Force in 1943. In that capaci- from high altitudes. The trouble was
ty he led it in one of the most costly air that at high altitudes, the B-29s encoun-
attacks of the war. tered enormous winds. If the winds were
On August 17, 1943, LeMay per- behind them, the aircraft flew up to a
sonally led the 3rd Division to Regens- hundred miles per hour faster than nor-
burg, Germany, where it successfully mal, making accuracy impossible. And if
bombed an aircraft plant in an experi- they flew into the wind, their speed was
mental mission before flying on to reduced by the same hundred miles per
Tunisia. Twenty-four of the 127 planes hour, in this case making them easier
he commanded went down that day, targets.
giving his division an unbearably high LeMay’s assignment was to aban-
loss rate of some 20 percent. don precision bombing and instead burn
No one blamed him for this. LeMay down Japan’s cities. By this stage of the
had attacked the target accurately and war, the United States’s earlier prejudice
on time, unlike the 1st Air Division, against terror bombing of civilians had
which was supposed to attack Schwein- largely faded away. Accordingly, LeMay
furt, Germany, at the same time as brought his usual enthusiasm and tech-
LeMay’s raid on Regensburg. Bad nical skill to this challenging problem.
weather over England had delayed it for Since accuracy no longer mattered,
hours because, unlike the 3rd Division, he decided to have his B-29s attack by
its pilots had not been trained to take night at low altitudes. Because they used
off guided only by instruments. In any less fuel at low altitudes than when fly-
case, operations over Germany were ing high, they could carry less gas and
making it clear that heavy bombers more firebombs. He further increased
could not make their way to the target the bombloads by removing the B-29s’
without fighter support. Victory in the guns and all but one of the gunners. On
202
• L E N D - L E A S E P R O G R A M •
given U.S. unreadiness. ensure Japan’s defeat if, indeed, its fate
But once U.S. industry shifted into was not already sealed.
high gear, immense quantities of goods Since there was no point in holding
and weapons would go out under Lend- back, the Japanese Navy determined to
Lease, to Britain and its allies, and to make a maximum effort. It still had nine
Soviet Russia too after Germany in- battleships, including the world’s largest,
vaded it in the summer of 1941. Ulti- the Yamato and the Musashi, together
mately, 38 nations would receive Lend- with a dozen heavy cruisers. It also had
Lease supplies valued at somewhere four fast carriers, but all told they could
between $42 and $50 billion. Britain, launch only about 100 planes manned by
and its empire and commonwealth, green pilots because the Japanese fleet air
received about half of this, the Soviet arm had been destroyed in the Battle of
Union some $10 billion worth of aid. A the Philippine Sea in June. Therefore, the
few figures will suggest what these dol- Japanese decided to use the carriers as
lars actually bought. decoys. They would lure away the U.S.
At war’s end the Soviet Union pos- Third Fleet, with Admiral William Halsey
sessed 665,000 motor vehicles, 400,000 commanding, while two surface units
of them made in the United States. The would meet in Leyte Gulf to wipe out the
United States also supplied the Soviets Leyte invasion force, which Halsey was
with 2,000 locomotives, 11,000 freight supposed to be guarding.
cars, and 540,000 tons of rail, with At about 1:00 a.m. on October 23,
which the Soviets laid more track than 1944, two U.S. submarines sighted a
during the last decade before the war. strong Japanese fleet. Under the com-
Food shipments alone were equal to the mand of Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, it
entire wartime consumption of the Red consisted of 5 battleships, including the
Army. At the same time, the United States Yamato and the Musashi, plus 10 heavy
was providing Britain with much of its and 2 light cruisers and more than 12
armaments, rising to a peak of 28.7 per- destroyers. Prompt U.S. air and subma-
cent of all British military equipment in rine attacks forced it to turn back.
1944. As Roosevelt had predicted in In the meantime, naval aircraft detect-
1941, the United States became the arse- ed a second force under Vice Admiral Shoji
nal of democracy, as well as its granary. Nishimura, including two battleships, a
cruiser, and four destroyers, making for the
Surigao Strait at the southern end of Leyte.
But Halsey and Admiral Thomas C.
Kinkaid, commanding MacArthur’s Sev-
Leyte Gulf, Battle of enth Fleet, were awaiting news of the
Japanese carriers before committing them-
selves. At about five in the afternoon, Vice
Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s carriers were
The greatest naval battle ever fought, the sighted far to the north of Leyte Gulf.
Battle of Leyte Gulf marked the doom of Halsey now took the bait. He and
the Japanese surface fleet. This turning Kinkaid, not knowing that the carriers
point resulted from the U.S. invasion of had few planes and pilots, took it for
Leyte, an island in the Philippine archipel- granted that this was the Japanese main
ago in October 1944 (as shown in map force. On hearing a false report that the
on p. 142.) The Imperial Japanese Navy enemy carriers were accompanied by bat-
knew that losing the Philippines would tleships, Halsey drove north with all his
205
• L E Y T E G U L F , B A T T L E O F •
kamikaze suicide attacks that were now ter understanding the world that had
Japan’s only hope, had their beginning. resulted.
As for the publishing industry itself,
SEE ALSO
the war spurred economic developments
Kamikaze; Halsey, William F.
that shook up the genteel book trade
F U RTHER READING
and helped democratize American read-
Falk, Stanley W. Decision at Leyte. New
ing. It abetted the paperback revolution,
York: Norton, 1966. begun in 1939 with Pocket Books’ cau-
tious release of ten paperbacks selling
for 25 cents each. Wartime paper
rationing, which squeezed books into
Liberty ships smaller formats, helped make paper-
backs respectable, and a mobile public
SEE Kaiser, Henry J. liked the slim, light volumes. The Armed
Services Editions became the biggest
mass publishing venture in American
history. Sixty million books, ranging
Lindbergh, Charles A. from Charles Dickens and Joseph Con-
SEE Isolationists rad to mysteries and westerns, poured
into the hands of soldiers and sailors––
free. Charges of censorship flared as
zealous officers tried to circumscribe
Literature what GIs might read, but the venture
was a huge success, shaping both how
and what was read after the war.
Luftwaffe
lack of production. Germany produced Hitler, however, insisted that the jet
relatively few aircraft in 1940 and 1941, be reconfigured as a bomber, despite its
because Hitler was expecting a short short range and limited bomb capacity.
war. Erhard Milch, a skillful airline So much time was wasted attempting to
executive in private life, gained control make the 262 perform a function
of air supply and procurement in 1942, unsuited to it that it did not go into
and he increased aircraft production. action as a fighter until 1944. There
Although aircraft production rose were too few pilots by then, and fewer
sharply, it was never enough. When still with adequate training. Tactics
1942 ended, German industry was pro- appropriate for a jet fighter were still to
ducing 50 percent more aircraft than in be worked out. Units of 262s scored a
1941. But while Germany turned out an handful of impressive victories, but these
average of 367 fighters a month in did not affect the course of the war.
1942, Britain, Canada, and the United German designers produced many
States averaged 1,959. Germany aver- impressive propeller-driven aircraft. The
aged 349 bombers a month, the three Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter was supe-
allies 1,378, many of them four-engine rior to the British Hurricane, although it
heavies that Germany did not make. was not quite as good as the Spitfire.
German aircraft production, along with The newer Focke-Wulf 190 was as fast
weapons manufacturing as a whole, as or faster than any Allied fighter
reached its peak in 1944. In April, Ger- except for the U.S. P-51 Mustang. The
many produced more than 2,000 fight- JU 88 medium bomber was highly ver-
ers in a month for the first time. In Sep- satile: it could dive-bomb in addition to
tember, 3,375 fighters were turned out, bombing in level flight and was useful
a German wartime record. for reconnaissance and other purposes.
Impressive though they may be, these The 88 was produced in greater num-
figures are misleading. Germany was still bers than all other German bombers put
far behind the Allies in aircraft produc- together.
tion. A lack of fuel was crippling the In addition to the Me 262, German
Luftwaffe too. As a result, many aircraft designers produced air-to-air and ground-
had to be grounded. Training slowed to-air rockets, a rocket-powered fighter,
drastically, and early in 1945 it came to a and were working on a jet bomber,
stop. among other things. But, as German
The Luftwaffe did have a weapon qualitative superiority was not matched
that might have forced the Allies to sus- by its production capacity, these
pend their daylight bombing attacks on advanced weapons did the Reich little
Germany. This was the Messerschmitt good. Some never became operational.
262, the world’s first jet aircraft. As a Those that did were too few, too late.
fighter it could have entered squadron Had German aircraft production
service in 1943, when it became opera- reached its peak in 1942 instead of
tional. The Me 262 was 100 miles an 1944, and if the resources wasted on the
hour faster than Allied propeller-driven V-2 rocket had been applied to jets and
fighters. The Allies would not have jets of other advanced weapons, things may
their own until late in 1945. Thus it was have turned out differently.
possible that a large-scale deployment of A few incidents suggest what might
the 262 would have forced the United have been. In April 1945, 6 Me 262s
States to suspend, probably for most of armed with R4M air-to-air rockets
the war, daylight raids on Germany. destroyed 15 Allied B-17s. A few days
209
• M A C A R T H U R , D O U G L A S •
his failures, MacArthur became a great MacArthur resolved to expel them, doing
national hero. Roosevelt thus had to give so in a crude and costly way. Again and
him a job equal to his fame, which is again he threw his two poorly-trained
why he became the supreme commander and prepared National Guard divisions
of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). against heavily fortified Japanese strong-
This appointment was part of a deal points in the Buna-Gona region. On Jan-
according to which the Army gained a uary 22, 1943, Buna fell. This was the
theater for MacArthur while the Navy first time the Japanese had experienced a
got everything else in the Pacific, which permanent defeat on land.
was organized by the Navy as the Pacific MacArthur denied that the cam-
Ocean Area under Admiral Chester paign had been unnecessarily bloody for
Nimitz. This meant there would be no his troops. But in fact, due to his poor
unified command in the Pacific, rather leadership, the troops who took Buna-
two different and competing wars against Gona had a death rate three times as
Japan, involving much delay and waste. high as the Marines sustained on
MacArthur’s first campaign as Guadalcanal, one of the bloodier cam-
supreme commander of the SWPA was in paigns of the war. This fact undercut
the Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea. MacArthur’s claims that his victory had
Papua, essential to the defense of Aus- been won at a reasonable cost. But,
tralia, had been invaded by Japanese although MacArthur went on deceiving
forces soon after war broke out. Aus- outsiders, he and his staff knew better.
tralian troops had managed to save Port After the Papuan campaign, MacArthur
Moresby, its most important harbor, and made a promise, which he kept, that
drive the Japanese back over the Owen there would be no more Bunas.
Stanley Range. But the Japanese still held MacArthur was learning fast, and
the peninsula’s northwest coast. the experience would not be wasted.
211
• M A C A R T H U R , D O U G L A S •
Over the next two years his troops Stanleys. Gradually the air commanders
would suffer fewer than 20,000 casual- worked out a strategy of blockading
ties in the course of many operations, enemy strongpoints from the air, cover-
partly because of tactical lessons learned ing and assisting Allied ground troops,
in Papua that would make later cam- while, by advancing their forward bases,
paigns more efficient. Among other bringing more and more Japanese targets
things, MacArthur was learning the within bombing range, or what was
many uses of aircraft, whose value he commonly called the bomb line.
had previously sneered at. And his At first, progress was slow, for
understanding of sea power was MacArthur did not have enough of any-
expanding too. MacArthur’s need for a thing. But as his forces expanded and
sea lift (i.e., troop ships and assault ves- his tactics improved, his troops
sels) was glaringly exposed at Buna, advanced faster and faster. In April
where he had almost no ships and thus 1944, in his most daring move to date,
could not stage landings to outflank or MacArthur moved his troops 580 miles
isolate enemy fortifications. His com- beyond their lines on the northwest
plaints in this regard led the Navy to New Guinea coast to seize the town of
assign him a specialist, Rear Admiral Hollandia, now Jayapura, in Indonesia.
Daniel E. Barbey, whose VII Amphibi- Because this involved bypassing enemy
ous Force would stage 56 operations in strongpoints, the Japanese were taken
the Southwest Pacific Area. MacArthur by surprise. In less than two years
also learned how to exploit the decoded MacArthur advanced almost 2,000
enemy radio messages provided by miles, 1,100 of it in the last two months.
Army and Navy intelligence. They After a shaky start MacArthur
would play a key part in future opera- developed into a commander worthy of
tions by helping to determine which his reputation. The sharpness and timing
enemy strongholds could be bypassed. of his operations, his close coordination
The key to MacArthur’s success was of land, sea, and air forces, and the
his use of tactical air, which was more boldness and success of his strategy of
important in the SWPA than in perhaps bypassing enemy strongholds have justly
any other theater. The southwest Pacific been admired ever since. In the SWPA,
is thick with islands that provided his victories were won by cunning and
numerous sites for airfields. But, unlike stealth as often as not, saving many U.S.
the Germans’ defenses in Europe, Japan- soldiers’ lives.
ese air defenses were weak, enabling Meanwhile, the Navy’s central
even heavy U.S. bombers to make pre- Pacific drive was proving to be very
cise low-level attacks. expensive. Japanese positions in that
MacArthur also had two outstand- part of the Pacific were few and small.
ing air commanders in General George They could not be outflanked, or taken
C. Kenney and Lieutenant General from the rear. Thus, at Saipan and Iwo
Ennis C. Whitehead. Kenney taught Jima, among others, Marines were
MacArthur what planes could do, start- obliged to make frontal assaults against
ing with an airlift of troops to Buna. heavily fortified Japanese positions and
Many on MacArthur’s staff doubted that suffer terrible losses.
men could be flown directly to the battle MacArthur argued for much of the
area. Kenney proved them wrong and war that the Navy’s campaign should
saved most if not all of MacArthur’s men parallel his own. That way the two
from having to cross the dreaded Owen advancing forces could readily support
212
• M A C A R T H U R , D O U G L A S •
each other. The fast carriers and precious little cost. MacArthur’s forces sustained
landing ships tank (LSTs) needed for 62,000 casualties, including 14,000
amphibious landings could be moved deaths. While this was a large figure for
back and forth between MacArthur and the Pacific war, it was small when seen in
Admiral Chester Nimitz as needed, the context of Japanese losses, which
instead of idling in the central Pacific in came to 350,000. In the central Pacific,
the off time between operations. Admiral however, U.S. casualties were relatively
Nimitz apparently thought so too, but higher. On tiny Iwo Jima, for example,
was overruled by his domineering superi- U.S. casualties actually exceeded those of
or, Admiral Ernest King. the Japanese defenders.
In 1944, at a conference in Hawaii MacArthur’s less admirable character
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and traits loom large in many accounts. A
Admiral Nimitz, MacArthur finally chronic liar, he was likewise boastful,
received permission to retake the Philip- arrogant, remote, and vain. Most commu-
pines. Although he had personal motives niques from the SWPA named only one
for wanting to do so, to erase his earlier man, himself. His commanders soon dis-
defeat, there were good reasons for liber- covered that he deeply resented any pub-
ating the islands. The United States needed licity they might receive. They learned to
to show that it cared for the people it had avoid the press, which is why names like
failed to protect in 1942. Furthermore, Walter Kruger, Robert Eichelberger, and
Luzon was a strategic prize. Missions George C. Kenney are unfamiliar today
launched from Luzon air bases would compared to those of General Dwight D.
give American forces control of the sea- Eisenhower’s lieutenants in the European
lanes between Southeast Asia and Japan, theater. Yet, in the end, MacArthur
depriving the Japanese of such essential achieved much. After Buna he learned
raw materials as oil, rubber, and tin. Tak- from his mistakes, took the advice of his
ing Luzon certainly made more sense generally excellent commanders, and
than invading Formosa, which was what launched a series of brilliant campaigns
Admiral King wished to do. In the Philip- that were classics of their kind.
pines, U.S. forces would be met with MacArthur was hated by most of
open arms, while the Formosan response his men for his lack of apparent concern
could not be predicted. for them. Yet his skill kept many alive
The Philippine campaign won addi- who would have perished under a more
tional laurels for MacArthur. Leyte, the conventional leader. The Okinawa cam-
first island to be attacked, was more paign, directed by less imaginative gener-
strongly defended than MacArthur had als, was proof of this. There the United
been led to expect. Luzon was tougher States had complete control of the sea
still. In fact, when the war ended, one of and air, making possible numerous
MacArthur’s field armies was still fighting amphibious and airborne operations.
a strong Japanese force in the mountains Instead, soldiers and Marines made one
of northern Luzon. But MacArthur’s frontal assault after another, battering
forces liberated the other islands with away at the Japanese lines until they
speed and dash. finally collapsed. About 35 percent of
The Philippine campaign as a whole the Americans who fought in the Battle
was a smashing success, even though it of Okinawa became casualties, a ratio
was not quite completed by the end of exceeding even that of MacArthur’s
the war. Again, with local exceptions, Papuan campaign, which was his worst
much had been accomplished at relatively and never was repeated. In the end,
213
• M A C H I N E G U N S •
MacArthur earned his job as supreme gium civilians almost at once. The worst
commander and made the most of it. such event, known as the Malmedy mas-
sacre, took place in Belgium on Decem-
SEE ALSO
ber 17, 1944, and resulted in the deaths
Iwo Jima, Battle of; King, Ernest J.; Leyte
Gulf, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester W.; Oki- of 86 U.S. prisoners.
nawa, Battle of; Pacific war; Southwest
Pacific Area
liantly as before. Roosevelt had made the hard for air power before Pearl Harbor, at
right decision, for Marshall really could a time when Congress was reluctant to
not be spared. In effect, as the master pay for it. But once the great air forces
U.S. planner and strategist he was run- had been built, neither paid much atten-
ning the war—and doing it better than tion to how they were used. At the top,
anyone else could. Next to Roosevelt only Secretary of War Henry Stimson
himself Marshall was the most indispens- worried about killing civilians, and most
able man in the United States. of his cries fell on deaf ears.
By the same token, many soldiers On the big strategic issues Marshall
had died in the Mediterranean in order was usually right. He correctly opposed
for Eisenhower to learn his job. This had the Mediterranean operation on military
been much too expensive an education to grounds. He was convinced that however
waste. He was better qualified than Mar- necessary it was for political reasons to
shall to be the supreme commander. Hav- invade North Africa, taking Sicily made
ing appointed the right men to the right little sense and Italy even less. If Opera-
jobs, FDR kept them there. tion Roundup had gone forward in 1943
Because Marshall participated in it would have been against a relatively
making almost every strategic decision, easy target, for France had significantly
his biography comes close to being a his- weaker defenses in 1943 than it would a
tory of the U.S. war effort. However, year later.
when things went wrong it was rarely Even so, had Marshall not kept
because Marshall had erred. More often everyone focused, there might have
it was because, for whatever reason, he been no Operation Overlord at all, or
had not been involved. This was true perhaps not until 1945. This seems to
even in matters far removed from grand be what Churchill had in mind, as by
strategy and army building. For example, then the Soviets would have all but fin-
one explanation that has been offered for ished the Nazis off. Of course, they
the failure to provide U.S. troops in would also have overrun most of
Europe with a good tank is that Marshall Europe as well, a significant drawback
was not interested in weapons. The impli- to the Mediterranean strategy Churchill
cation is that if Marshall had been as favored.
interested in weaponry as he was in strat- Marshall was right about the atomic
egy and tactics, all the U.S. ground and bomb as well. Had it not been used
air weapons would have been the best. against Japan, the Pacific war would have
But Marshall was overworked as it was had one of two possible conclusions. One
and had to delegate authority in so many scenario was that the planned invasion
areas that he could not afford to look at would have gone ahead, with hideous
any smaller pictures. casualty tolls for the Allies and worse for
A greater pity is that Marshall never the Japanese. The only other alternative
took the issue of strategic bombing very was to let the blockade and the air
seriously. He treated the Army Air Forces attacks do their work. This tactic would
as a separate service in most respects. This have resulted in victory, no doubt, but
approach allowed the “bomber barons” would have taken considerable time.
of the air force a free hand to kill German During that time Americans would have
and Japanese civilians in great numbers, been getting killed every day in various
to little real purpose. Marshall’s indiffer- parts of the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
ence was shared by Roosevelt, which And Japanese civilians would have been
seems equally strange. Both had fought dying too, from conventional bombs and
217
• M E D I C I N E •
starvation and disease as Japan’s trans- years of the Cold War following World
portation system collapsed. War II) he was second only to Eisen-
Marshall was a great talent scout. hower. As a man he was second to none.
Douglas MacArthur had been forced on
SEE ALSO
him by the public. But most of the
Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Japan, surrender
Army’s other commanders were men of; MacArthur, Douglas; Mediterranean
Marshall knew personally and whose theater; Patton, George S.; Roosevelt,
careers he had advanced. Recognizing Franklin Delano; Strategic bombing
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s worth was cer-
F U RTHER READING
tainly his biggest coup.
Eisenhower was a very junior general Eisenhower, Dwight D. Dear General:
Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to
when Marshall picked him to command Marshall. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Operation Torch, and he seemed an University Press, 1971.
unlikely choice. However, Marshall had Marshall, George C. Infantry in Battle. Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1934.
watched Eisenhower closely in Washing- Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall.
ton and given him more and more 4 vols. New York: Viking, 1963–87.
important jobs. When he finally gave
Eisenhower what proved to be the prize
appointment of the war, it was because
the general had performed superbly. Medicine
Likewise, the corps command that
Marshall gave George S. Patton for Torch,
which seems so obvious an appointment
now, was hardly a unanimous choice at
the time. Patton had done brilliant work As in most wars, disease and accidents
in maneuvers and training troops. Yet were more common in World War II
many officers regarded him as too unsta- than battle wounds. Two-thirds of hos-
ble and eccentric to lead men into battle. pital admissions—on both sides—
Patton was, indeed, profane, theatrical, resulted from sickness or injuries not
and given to making peculiar remarks and received in combat. Typhus was the
gestures. Marshall believed that much of scourge of the eastern front, while in
this was only for show, however, and that North Africa dysentery, hepatitis, malar-
in the field Patton would be business-like ia, and skin diseases were rampant,
and effective—as he had been in World especially among the Germans.
War I. Patton—and others too, although Malaria was universal throughout
less spectacularly—would more than Asia and the South Pacific. There was no
repay Marshall’s confidence. cure for it, but antimalaria drugs existed,
Marshall was indeed the “architect as did mosquito nets. The failure to pro-
of victory” in many ways: a hugely gifted vide either of these to U.S. and Filipino
planner and manager, farsighted, incisive, troops defending Bataan in 1942 had
unique. He was a model officer as well, ruinous consequences. Hospital admis-
notable for his enormous integrity, self- sions for malaria ranged from 500 to
lessness, and devotion to duty—the 1,000 a day. Up to 80 percent of the
noblest Roman of them all. In a war led troops on the line are thought to have
by showoffs of every kind, Marshall’s been infected with it. Along with short-
character stood out. As a soldier-states- ages of food and ammunition, disease
man (he would serve as secretary of state was the main reason why the Bataan gar-
and secretary of defense in the darkest rison surrendered when it did.
218
• M E D I C I N E •
After three months of combat on New led to men keeping men in action for
Georgia in the Solomon Islands, a force excessive periods of time. Even before
of 30,000 men had 13,000 hospital doctors thought to address the problem,
admissions for illness and injury. Of officers had noticed that men reached
these, 27 percent were wounded in their peak of efficiency after about 90
action, 15 percent were otherwise days on the line. Then they all started to
injured, 21 percent had malaria, 18 per- deteriorate, regardless of their individual
cent diarrheal diseases, and 19 percent strength or courage. A survey of platoon
neuropsychiatric disorders. The inci- leaders in two veteran infantry divisions
dence of NP cases on New Georgia was carried out by the Army Research
not exceptional by World War II stan- Bureau revealed that when asked which
dards, however, for it was a rule of soldiers they would most hate to lose,
thumb that the longer an action lasted the greatest concentration among en-
the more NPs there would be, regardless listed men was those with four to five
of other conditions. months of experience (including days
In Europe the Army would experi- spent in rear areas).
ence 110,000 NP cases as a whole, but Both groups reached their highest
they were highly concentrated. During level of performance between their third
one 44-day period of intense combat on and seventh months, and after eight
the Gothic Line in Italy, 54 percent of all months they were less effective than
casualties were neuropsychiatric. men with less combat time. Contrary to
The high incidence of NPs caught the earlier view that some individual
both psychiatrists and army leaders by types of men were predisposed to break
surprise, despite the relatively large num- down, it was now found that after
ber of mentally damaged soldiers that enough time in battle—with 200 days
World War I had produced. These had being about the maximum, and some-
been so many and so serious that as late where between 140 and 180 the aver-
as 1942 some 58 percent of all patients in age—everyone broke down. Mental
Veteran’s Administration hospitals were health experts recommended that men
World War I “shell shock” victims. be given more time behind the lines to
World War II psychiatrists believed ease the stress of battle, and doctors
they had developed a screening process wanted soldiers to be rotated home
that would keep most men liable to before they reached the breaking point.
become NP cases out of the Army. Their But in an Army where there were never
confidence in this process was such that enough riflemen to go around, these
of 5.2 million men who appeared at proposals were out of the question.
army recruiting stations 1.6 million were Although the Army did not change
rejected for “mental deficiencies.” All its way of doing business, psychiatrists
the same, psychiatric discharges from did, introducing more aggressive thera-
the Army would be two and a half times pies. North African NP casualties had ini-
as common as in the previous war. tially been sent to hospitals hundreds of
Every army suffered from combat miles to the rear, from which fewer than
fatigue, which was inevitable given the 10 percent returned to duty. Later, a
horrors of modern war. But in addition series of psychiatric care levels were
to war itself, many NP cases resulted established that started with battalion
from how men were employed in it. The surgeons operating close to the front.
basic problem in the U.S. Army by 1944 They provided psychiatric first aid, con-
was that a military manpower shortage sisting mostly of mild sedation, a good
220
• M E D I T E R R A N E A N T H E A T E R •
night’s sleep, and hot food. action until Hitler was defeated. General
More serious cases went to division George C. Marshall, the army’s chief of
clearing stations two to five miles farther staff, wanted that invasion to take place
back, where they were sedated longer and in 1943. In the meantime, troops and
allowed to bathe. For tough cases the next munitions would be assembled in
level of treatment was at “exhaustion cen- Britain until the invasion date. The code
ters,” where patients might receive actual name for this planned attack was Oper-
psychiatric treatment. Then, after a week ation Roundup.
or 10 days, if all else had failed, the most British prime minister Winston
seriously disturbed went into neuropsychi- Churchill, on the other hand, wanted to
atric hospitals, from which they seldom concentrate on the Mediterranean.
returned to combat. Because the Axis powers controlled the
This approach produced impressive Mediterranean’s western approaches,
results, with about 60 percent of NPs British ships could not use the Suez
returning to their outfits within five days. Canal and thus had to go the long way
Some 70 percent of those hospitalized to India around South Africa. Further-
were later given noncombat assignments, more, campaigns in the Mediterranean
where they replaced men fit for battle. By would support Britain’s Eighth Army,
revolutionizing neuropsychiatric care, which had been fighting Rommel in the
U.S. doctors made their biggest contribu- western deserts of Egypt for months.
tion to victory. Churchill always represented the
Improvements in conventional medi- Mediterranean as a place of wonderful
cine also helped soldiers recover, but they opportunities for the Allies, but the
were offset to a large degree by develop- Americans were skeptical.
ments in weaponry and munitions. Thus, Many believed that Churchill’s
despite the fact that by World War II med- enthusiasm derived from the belief that
ical care had progressed enormously since Britain would not sustain huge casual-
the 1860s, battlefield death rates remained ties in the Mediterranean. This relative
similar to those of the Civil War. It was safety made it preferable to western
only in psychiatry and hospital treatment Europe, which the Germans would fight
that doctors made real advances. hard to retain and where big losses
could be expected.
F U RTHER READING
However, waging a series of small
Herman, Jan K. Battle Station Sick Bay:
Navy Medicine in World War II. campaigns in the Mediterranean while
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, Soviet Russia did most of the fighting
1997. against Hitler’s legions in Europe did
not seem like a good idea to General
Marshall. Further, the U.S. Army’s her-
itage was one of directly engaging the
Mediterranean enemy with maximum force and batter-
theater ing it into submission, not gradually
wearing it down. It had done this in the
Civil War and World War I and planned
to do so again in this one.
Even before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. The strategic decision was up to
Army had been planning to defeat Hitler Roosevelt, who came down on
by invading France. A war with Japan, Churchill’s side, ordering that North
should it take place, was to be a holding Africa be invaded in 1942. This cam-
221
• M E D I T E R R A N E A N T H E A T E R •
During the
invasion of
Sicily on July
11, 1943, an
American
cargo ship is
hit by a bomb
from a German
plane and its Image Not Available
cargo of muni-
tions explodes.
trol of the sea and air. The French which in time would become the real
defense collapsed after three days. government of France.
At this point the Germans immedi- While all this intrigue progressed, the
ately occupied the rest of France, ending war continued. Only a few days before
the pretense that the Vichy government Operation Torch began, Britain’s Lieu-
represented an independent country. But tenant General Bernard Montgomery and
they did not secure the French fleet, his Eighth Army administered a severe
which was scuttled in Toulon by French defeat to General Rommel at El Alamein
admirals. The Allies had hoped it would in the western desert of Egypt. El
sail to join them, but destruction was the Alamein became the farthest point of
next best thing and one the Allies could Germany’s advance in North Africa, and
live with. Britain’s victory there ensured the safety
General Eisenhower put Admiral of Egypt and the vital Suez lifeline.
Darlan in charge of French North Africa. Although it was slow off the mark,
He alone, the theory went, could guaran- the Eighth Army eventually began pursu-
tee an orderly transfer of authority and, ing Rommel while, from the opposite
most important of all, induce the Vichy direction, Allied units advanced to within
troops in Tunisia, where there had been 12 miles of Tunis. Then the rainy season
no Allied landings, to cooperate. The and stronger German defenses put the
chances of this happening were fading offensive on hold and gave Hitler time to
fast on November 11 when Eisenhower send in more troops.
made the Darlan appointment, but con- Hitler seems to have reinforced
sidering the stakes, a slim chance was Tunisia because he could not bear to
better than none at all. admit defeat or tolerate losses of territory.
The French in Tunisia, however, By doing so, he prolonged the fighting
decided to let German forces land, thus there for up to five additional months.
dooming the Allies to a long and bitter During that time and partly because of
campaign instead of the walkover they the Tunisian campaign, the Allies aban-
had hoped for and needed. Had the doned their plan to invade France in
French in Tunisia responded to Darlan’s 1943, thus enabling the Nazi regime to
call, enabling the Allies to arrive there survive for an additional year. From this
first, the infamous agreement would have standpoint, Hitler’s refusal to leave Africa
been easier to take. Bad as it was in other proved to be a tactical mistake that, in
respects, the worst thing about the “Dar- one of war’s cruel ironies, nevertheless
lan deal” was that it yielded few benefits. brought him strategic benefits.
Democratic principles had been sacrificed On May 11, 1943, the last Axis
in vain. army in Tunisia surrendered, costing
Luckily for the Allied cause, Darlan Hitler another 250,000 men, in addition
was soon assassinated by a French civil- to many more killed or evacuated
ian. But because FDR hated Charles de because of wounds. The North Africa
Gaulle, the logical choice for leader of the campaign had been messy, and long.
Free French forces, General Henri Giraud During it the U.S. Army experienced
was put in Darlan’s place instead. Giraud what would turn out to be its only
was unacceptable to most of the French defeats by the German Army—losing at
in North Africa, however, so de Gaulle Sidi bon-Zid and at the Kasserine Pass in
brushed him aside and assumed power Tunisia in February.
himself. Then, on November 9, 1943, de Yet Operation Torch had paid for
Gaulle created a government in exile, itself in many ways. By committing so
224
• M I D W A Y , B A T T L E O F •
many resources to it, Hitler made Africa years, whereas if Roundup had succeeded
a significant front that eased the pres- in 1943, it might have been over in one.
sure on Russia. And in addition to end- Italy, which was supposed to have been
ing in victory for the Allies, it was a an easy win, became a horror for the
valuable learning experience for U.S. Allies. Some of the worst fighting of the
commanders. Politically essential in any war occurred there and it became a
case, it might have been strategically strategic liability, as some Americans had
important as well had it not led the predicted it would. The Italian campaign
Allies to invade Sicily and then the Ital- used up divisions that would have been
ian mainland. more useful in France. And, because the
After Tunisia fell, General Marshall Italians under Allied control had to be
wished to move most of the Allied troops supplied with food and fuel to stay alive,
in Africa to Britain. From there they much of the shipping freed up by Opera-
would be positioned to invade France tion Torch went to serve civilian instead
some time in the summer of 1943. Doing of military purposes. The Mediterranean,
so would have been feasible, for France a sea of dreams for Britain, thus became
was weakly defended at the time and the a nightmare for General Marshall and
Allies already controlled the English the U.S. War Department.
Channel and much of the air over France.
But U.S. leaders were uncertain about SEE ALSO
this course, whereas the British were Casablanca conference; Italian campaigns;
Sicily, Battle of
united on the need to take Sicily, which
would strengthen the Allied grip on the F U RTHER READING
entire Mediterranean. FDR therefore Blumenson, Martin. Kasserine Pass.
gave his consent to the invasion, code Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.
named Operation Husky. Carver, Michael. Dilemmas of the Desert
War: A New Look at the Libyan Cam-
It might have been possible to have paign, 1940–42. Bloomington: Indiana
both Husky and Overlord in the same University Press, 1986.
year—if the Allies had moved at top Grigg, John. 1943: The Victory That
speed. During the months before Tunisia Never Was. New York: Hill & Wang,
1980.
fell, General Patton had been training Howard, Michael. Mediterranean Strategy
troops in Morocco. These forces could in the Second World War. New York:
have been used to take Sicily in May or Praeger, 1968.
Lucas, James. War in the Desert: The
early June, when it was undefended. Eighth Army at El Alamein. New York:
Instead, the Allied high command sched- Beaufort, 1983.
uled Husky for July 10, by which time Sainsbury, Keith. The North African Land-
ings, 1942. Newark: University of
Germany had moved three divisions to Delaware Press, 1976
the island.
The Sicilian campaign was poorly
run. It took 43 days to defeat the Ger-
mans, most of whom then escaped to the Midway, Battle of
Italian mainland. As Operation Roundup
was now out of the question, the Allies
invaded Italy next, partly because the
British wanted it but partly through sheer
momentum. Midway, the first great U.S. victory of
This series of bad decisions meant the Pacific war, prevented Japan from
that the war would last for two more renewing its march across the Pacific. It
225
• M I D W A Y , B A T T L E O F •
resulted from a decision by the Imperial Even less effective was the obsolete
Japanese Navy (IJN) to draw out the Douglas Devastator, a torpedo plane that
U.S. carriers. Attacking Midway, the lacked self-sealing fuel tanks and was so
westernmost of the inhabited Hawaiian slow that if unescorted it was easy to
islands, would lure the Pacific Fleet to shoot down. In addition, the U.S. Navy’s
its doom, Japanese naval leaders Mark XIII aerial torpedo had a small
believed. Taking Midway would also warhead, a tendency to rise to the surface
close a gap in Japan’s defensive screen of the water, unreliable firing mecha-
through which a U.S. task force had nisms, and so little speed that at long
slipped to launch 16 army medium range a Japanese ship could outrun it.
bombers against Tokyo. This famous The Japanese Long Lance torpedo was
raid, led by Lieutenant Colonel James literally 10 times better. Japan’s torpedo
H. Doolittle on April 18, 1942, did little bomber, which Americans called the
material damage. But in principle it had Kate, was also far superior to the Devas-
endangered Emperor Hirohito’s life and tator. Only U.S. dive bombers were up-
humiliated the military. As a result, Mid- to-date.
way, which some planners had thus far Admiral Yamamoto, who had
considered unimportant, overnight planned the brilliant attack on Pearl Har-
became an essential target. bor, this time came up with a poor one
On paper the IJN was impossible to for Midway. Some of his vessels, includ-
beat at this stage of the war. For the ing two light carriers, were to support an
attack on Midway, Admiral Isoroku invasion of the Aleutian Islands off
Yamamoto would have at his disposal 11 Alaska to mislead the U.S. Navy, four big
battleships, 5 fleet carriers and 3 light air- carriers of his First Mobile Force were to
craft carriers, 12 cruisers, 43 destroyers, bomb Midway, then a Midway occupa-
and some 700 aircraft. The United States tion force was to take it. Far behind them
would be able to deploy only 3 fleet car- would be the main body with a light car-
riers with 233 combat aircraft, 8 cruisers, rier and the rest of the surface fleet. Thus,
15 destroyers, and a further 121 planes in the decisive carrier duel the odds
based on Midway Island. would be about even, rather than over-
To make matters worse for the whelmingly in Japan’s favor if Yamamoto
Americans, the Japanese carriers were in had assembled all his forces into one
prime condition and were manned by great fleet.
seasoned crews and aviators. On the In addition to Japanese mistakes, the
other hand, although the USS Enterprise U.S. Navy would benefit from its mastery
was in good shape, the Yorktown had of cryptanalysis, or the breaking of codes.
been damaged at the Battle of the Coral By April 1942, following a lapse, the
Sea in May 1942, and the Hornet was code breakers at Station Hypo in Pearl
brand new and its air group lacked expe- Harbor, plus those in Washington and
rience. Worse still, by this time the Navy Australia, were once again reading many
knew that its aircraft were inferior to of the enemy’s radio messages. Thanks to
those of Japan. The Grumman Wildcat the code breakers, Admiral Chester
fighter was no match for Japan’s Zero, a Nimitz had been able to deploy his carri-
splendid fighter plane that came as a ers to best advantage in the Coral Sea.
nasty surprise to U.S. military leaders Now Naval Intelligence scored its
(although it shouldn’t have because it had greatest coup of the war, by decrypting
been used in China for years). Yamamoto’s plan for Midway. Luckily,
226
• M I D W A Y , B A T T L E O F •
it had been sent over the air in full and danger. However, the most important
the crack code breakers of Fleet Radio tactical decisions of this battle were
Unit, Pacific, headed by Commander made by Spruance, who, if he had done
Joseph J. Rochefort, could read it chap- nothing more in his career, would still
ter and verse. As a result, when the U.S. rank with the greatest U.S. admirals.
carriers sailed, they knew exactly where The strategic planning for Midway
to go. This time they—and not Vice must be credited to Nimitz, who took
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who had the risk of placing full trust in his code
commanded at Pearl Harbor and was breakers. He elected not to play it safe,
doing so now at Midway—would do despite the odds, but to defend Midway
the unforeseen. at all costs. He ordered his task forces to
On May 27, 1942, Yorktown take their station northeast of Midway,
arrived at Pearl Harbor from the Coral out of range of enemy scouts, while air-
Sea with internal damage and serious craft from the island would do their
leaks caused by bomb explosions. The searching for them. As he had hoped,
first estimate for repairs was that it the U.S. carriers retained the element of
would take 90 days. Nimitz gave the surprise and were well placed to strike
yard 72 hours. Fourteen hundred skilled the enemy as soon as it was discovered.
workers immediately swarmed over the On June 3, a long-range Catalina
ship. On May 29th, on schedule, the Flying Boat spotted the Japanese Mid-
Yorktown was out of drydock and load- way occupation force approaching and
ing fuel and replacement planes, acquir- it was attacked all day by planes from
ing an air group composed of elements the island, one of which managed to
from three different carriers. The next slightly damage a tanker. On June 4,
day, at 9:00 a.m., with hundreds of Nagumo launched a strike against Mid-
workmen still aboard (they would be way. Soon after, another Catalina spot-
taken off before the battle), it sailed for ted his carriers at last. While the Japan-
Midway. ese launched their strikes, the U.S.
Enterprise and Hornet were already carriers, still undetected, turned south-
at sea, under the command of Rear west to close in on the enemy.
Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who had Nagumo’s aircraft easily wiped out
never before been responsible for even a the obsolete Marine fighters based on
single carrier. Admiral William F. Halsey, Midway, but heavy antiaircraft fire
an experienced and popular carrier destroyed 38 Japanese planes and put
leader, should have led at Midway, but he 30 more out of action. Nagumo was
had come down with a skin disease. In deprived of a third of his combat air-
choosing Spruance to replace Halsey, craft and now had fewer warplanes than
Admiral Nimitz found exactly the right the advancing U.S. carriers. In addition,
commander, because Spruance would he had to attack Midway again, because
prove himself a master of carrier warfare. it had still not been put out of action.
Command of the battle was given to This meant having to rearm his torpedo
Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher on the planes with bombs and change the
Yorktown, who made several important bombs of his dive bombers from armor
decisions, one of them being to have the piercing to high-explosive.
two task forces operate separately and at While this dangerous procedure was
a distance from each other. As a result, taking place, Nagumo was repeatedly
when the Yorktown came under attack attacked by planes from Midway, which
the other two carriers would be out of did no damage to his fleet while suffering
227
• M I D W A Y , B A T T L E O F •
Thach recalled, he saw a glint in the sun killed at a time when it had only 1,000
and then a “beautiful silver waterfall.” It carrier pilots and was producing per-
was the dauntless dive bombers of Enter- haps 100 more a year. The loss was also
prise and Yorktown screaming down aggravated by the IJN’s self-defeating
through the empty sky. habit of keeping its veteran flyers in ac-
By pure accident, the Yorktown’s air tion until they were killed or wounded.
group had arrived at the same time as As the war progressed, its naval aviators
Lieutenant Commander Clarence became greener and greener, whereas
McClusky of the Enterprise and his 32 those of the U.S. Navy, whose veterans
dive bombers, who had finally found the were rotated home to train new pilots,
Mobile Force after a desperate search in became more numerous and skillful.
which they had used up most of their Although Japan would build new carri-
fuel. As the Japanese combat air patrol ers, its naval air arm was never again as
had been drawn down to sea level by good as it had been at Pearl Harbor.
the torpedo plane attacks, all four Midway was the United States’s revenge
enemy carriers were for the moment for Pearl Harbor and the assurance of
unprotected. final victory. From that time on, the
Enterprise pilots delivered lethal empire of Japan was forced to fight a
blows to Akagi and Kaga, while planes war of defense.
from Yorktown left Soryu a flaming
hulk. In three minutes the Pacific war SEE ALSO
had turned against Japan. Only Hiryu Coral Sea, Battle of the; Pacific war
survived, to launch two waves against
F U RTHER READING
Yorktown, with her veteran pilots
breaking through the U.S. defenses to Barker, A. J. Midway. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983.
put three bombs and two torpedoes into Layton, Edwin T. ‘And I Was There’: Pearl
the great carrier. But the Hiryu’s Harbor and Midway—Breaking the
moment of glory was brief. In the Secrets. New York: Morrow, 1985.
Prange, Gordon W. Miracle at Midway.
evening, 24 dive bombers from Enter- New York: Penguin, 1982.
prise and 10 from Yorktown found the
last Japanese carrier and sent her to the
bottom of the sea.
Yorktown failed to return from the
battle of Midway. The ship survived two Mines
air attacks but was almost dead in the
water when a Japanese submarine fired a
round of torpedoes that sank the ship.
Notwithstanding this major loss, Midway The land mine was a new weapon devel-
gave the IJN a blow from which it would oped between the two world wars to
never recover. With heavy odds against attack tanks. Since antitank mines were
them, the Americans had inflicted much large and relatively easy to find, antiper-
more harm than they suffered, losing one sonnel mines, aimed at individual sol-
fleet carrier to the enemy’s four, less than diers, were devised to protect their larger
1,000 men to the enemy’s 3,000, and 150 cousins.
aircraft (including those based on Mid- The first use of mines in World War
way) to Japan’s 322. II was by Italian forces in North Africa.
Japan would desperately miss the As a rule, mines were most common
more than 100 veteran pilots who were where tanks were in use, hence their
229
• M I N E S •
not let Democratic legislators do so Miller, Sally M., and Daniel A. Cornford,
either. Finally, after tireless lobbying by eds. American Labor in the Era of World
War II. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995.
alarmed private citizens, two Republi- Schwartz, Jordan A. The Speculator:
cans—Representative James Wadsworth Bernard M. Baruch in Washington,
of New York and Senator Edward R. 1917–1965. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1981.
Burke of Nebraska—introduced a bill
providing for a military draft.
That Roosevelt was being overcau-
tious is suggested by the fact that a poll
taken just before passage of the Burke-
Montgomery,
Wadsworth bill showed that 71 percent Bernard Law
of Americans favored the bill, including COMMANDER OF THE 21ST
65 percent of males aged 16 to 25—the ARMY GROUP, 1944–45
very men who would be drafted. Thus
• Born: November 17, 1887, London,
encouraged, Roosevelt endorsed the bill, England
as did Republican candidate for presi- • Political party: Conservative
dent Wendell Willkie. This act required • Education: Royal Military College at
considerable courage on Willkie’s part, Sandhurst, 1908; Staff College, 1920
because his chances for victory de- • Military service: British Army—
subaltern, 1908; lieutenant, 1914;
pended to a large extent on winning the brigade-major, 1916; lieutenant
isolationist vote. colonel, 1931; colonel, 1934; major
general, 1938; commander of II
Roosevelt signed the Burke- Corps, 1940; lieutenant general, 1942;
Wadsworth bill into law on September commander of Eighth Army, 1942;
16, 1940. The National Guard and general, 1943; commander of Allied
ground forces, 1944; field marshal,
Organized Reserve were called up at 1944; Commander of the 21st Army
that time as well. In this manner an Group, 1944 –45
army that numbered 270,000 officers • Died: March 24, 1976, Alton,
Hampshire, England
and men in 1940 was five times that size
a year later. There was a close call in the
summer of 1941 when the House
extended the original one-year enlist- Montgomery was the leading British
ment of draftees by only a single vote. field commander in the Mediterranean
Still, Burke-Wadsworth did the job. For and European theaters. Extremely popu-
the next four years, training this new lar with his troops and the British pub-
army, not raising it, would be the fore- lic, Montgomery was despised by most
most problem. U.S. commanders by his headline-grab-
bing boasts at their expense. Even by
SEE ALSO U.S. standards he was unusually cau-
Byrnes, James F.; Financing the war; tious and slow-moving.
Labor; Selective Service System Efficient, hard working, and a metic-
ulous planner, Montgomery first gained
F U RTHER READING
fame as the commander of Britain’s
Flynn, George Q. The Mess in Washing- Eighth Army in North Africa. His May
ton: Manpower Mobilization in World
War II. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 4, 1942, defeat of General Erwin Rom-
1979. mel, who had so often defeated British
Janeway, Eliot. The Struggle for Survival: commanders in the past, made Mont-
A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in
World War II. New Haven: Yale Univer- gomery a world figure. His victory at El
sity Press, 1951. Alamein in the western desert of Egypt
233
• M O N T G O M E R Y, B E R N A R D L A W •
heim, but they could not hold it. And Montgomery launched his offensive, the
they could not be relieved, because Mont- 12th Army Group had crossed the
gomery’s XXX Corps, stalled on one-lane Rhine and was well into an offensive
roads, failed to break through as that captured hundreds of thousands of
planned. Even Montgomery admitted German soldiers and large portions of
that he was to blame for this defeat. German territory. So it was that the 21st
Throughout the fall of 1944, Mont- Army Group ended up playing only a
gomery continued to pester Eisenhower supporting role, yet again.
with demands for a single thrust on Berlin,
SEE ALSO
antagonizing every U.S. commander with
Bulge, Battle of; Eisenhower, Dwight D.;
his complaints, demands, and insults. His France, battle of; Germany, battle of
misbehavior finally came to a head during
the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans F U RTHER READING
attacked in the Ardennes Forest on Hamilton, Nigel. Monty: The Battles of
December 17, cutting off General Omar Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery.
Bradley, the U.S. 12th Army Group com- New York: Random House, 1994.
mander, from his First and Ninth armies.
Eisenhower then gave temporary com-
mand of them to Montgomery, which was
a big mistake. Montgomery did little dur-
Morgenthau, Henry
ing the battle except to spoil Eisenhower’s T., Jr.
plan for capturing the German force. SECRETARY OF THE
Eisenhower’s strategy was for Gen- TREASURY
eral Patton’s Third Army to drive north
up the base of the Bulge while Mont- • Born: May 11, 1891, New York, N.Y.
• Political party: Democratic
gomery drove south. But once again
• Education: attended Cornell
Montgomery jumped off too late and University, 0000–00
with too little strength to meet the Third • Military service: none
Army in time. Instead, the Bulge was sim- • Government service: Chairman of
ply flattened by repeated U.S. attacks. New York State Agricultural Advisory
Commission 1928–30; state
In the course of the fighting Mont- conservation commissioner, 1930–32;
gomery made such extreme demands, head of Federal Farm Board, 1933;
Secretary of the Treasury, 1933 –45
and treated Eisenhower with such con-
• Died: February 6, 1967,
tempt, that he nearly lost his job. In no Poughkeepsie, N.Y.,
way humbled by this close call, he fol-
lowed it up by holding a press conference
to explain how he had won the battle.
This was too much even for Prime Minis- Henry Morgenthau’s lack of education
ter Winston Churchill, who at once made (he was a college dropout) and of any
a point of describing the Battle of the business or banking experience led
Bulge as a great U.S. victory. many to claim that he was unfit to head
Eisenhower, generous to a fault, the Treasury Department. However, he
planned to give Montgomery priority in was comfortable with the job and, more
crossing the Rhine, the last barrier to an important, was an old friend and neigh-
Allied victory. But, as usual, Mont- bor of President Roosevelt who trusted
gomery spent so long preparing his him completely. That Morgenthau lived
attack that Bradley’s 12th Army Group up to Roosevelt’s expectations is shown
crossed the Rhine first. By the time by his long tenure in office.
235
• M O R T A R S •
Motion pictures
popular with the troops, it vividly por- factory produced was wel-
trayed the infantryman’s way of life and come overseas. Many men
death. Most of the best films about who worked in the film
World War II, however, were produced industry were drafted or, like
afterward, and long afterward in the case Jimmy Stewart, a real hero,
of Patton, A Bridge Too Far, and Saving volunteered for combat. But
Private Ryan, which are among the few entertainment was never Image Not Available
that seem likely to last. more important than during
Most of the wartime films that people the war, which justified the
still enjoy are not actually about the war. special treatment it got.
They include The Man Who Came to Thus Hollywood was pro-
Dinner; the Preston Sturgis satires Sulli- vided with ample film stock
van’s Travels and The Miracle of Morgan’s even when it was in short
Creek; National Velvet, in which a very supply. The movie star
young and very beautiful Elizabeth Taylor SEE ALSO Betty Hutton
rides her beloved horse Velvet to victory in visits sailors
Music; Radio
the Grand National steeplechase; Bing and Marines in
F U RTHER READING the Marshall
Crosby’s Going My Way; and Yankee
Aldgate, Anthony. Britain Can Take It: Islands in
Doodle Dandy, marked by James The British Cinema in the Second World December
Cagney’s exuberant portrayal of George War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
1944.
M. Cohan, the songwriter who penned the Press, 1994.
Beidler, Philip D. The Good War’s Great-
song after which the picture was named. est Hits: World War II and American
Show business played a very impor- Remembering. Athens: University of
tant role in the war effort, lifting morale Georgia, 1998.
at home and in the theaters of war. After Carnes, Mark, ed. Past Imperfect: History
According to the Movies. New York: H.
popular music, no form of entertainment Holt, 1995.
meant more to the troops than American Koppes, Clayton R., and Gregory D.
films. War films shown in war zones were Black. Hollywood Goes to War: How
Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped
likely to cause outbursts of rude GI World War II Movies. New York: Free
humor. Otherwise, everything the dream Press, 1987.
These Navajo
code talkers
were part of
the first assault
wave to land
on Saipan in
June 1944.
tions owing to lack of information long after the fighting had stopped. Unlike
became so great that Johnson finally sent most other veterans, though, code talkers
a letter to every family with a code talker often turned to using Navajo ceremonies
in the service describing the code-talking called the “Enemy Way,” a ritual designed
operation and urging them to tell no one to help them deal with their memories
else for reasons of security. It was the and the ghosts of dead comrades.
right thing to do morally, but somehow
F U RTHER READING
code talking ended up as a feature story
Aaseng, Nathan. The Navajo Code Talk-
in Arizona Highways. ers. New York: Walker, 1992.
Despite this limited public awareness,
the Marine Corps refused to release
information on code talking until 1968.
Because code talking remained top secret Navy
for all that time, not a single Navajo was SEE Japanese Navy; Royal Navy;
given an award or medal. Except for United States Navy
readers of Arizona Highways, few Ameri-
cans knew of the Navajos’ special contri-
bution until recently. Nowadays, their
story is well known and the Navajo code
Nazis
talkers have received many honors and
tributes. In December 1981, President
Ronald Reagan awarded the Navajo
code talkers a Presidential Certificate of In 1919 Adolf Hitler, then still a soldier
Recognition, and proclaimed April 14, on active duty with the German Army,
1983, Navajo Code Talker Day. was assigned to observe a meeting held
Because many code talkers fought on in Munich by the German Worker’s
the front lines—and in some cases behind party (DAP). This right-wing nationalist
enemy lines—they were often in great group appealed to him at once, and he
danger. Like other combat veterans, mem- became its 55th member. In such a tiny
ories and nightmares based on their band, Hitler’s qualities assured him of a
wartime experience often disturbed them rapid rise to the top.
244
• N E G R O E S •
defeatism, into victory in the Solomons Jima caused an uproar at home, but had
would be Halsey’s biggest achievement of little effect on Nimitz’s strategy.
the war. Nimitz was successful in changing
Nimitz went on to drive the Japanese King’s mind on one important issue, how-
out of the Aleutian Islands off Alaska and ever. King had originally planned for the
organize the central Pacific drive that was central Pacific drive to end on the coast of
the U.S. Navy’s main effort in World War China, from where a buildup would take
II. However, unlike Admiral King, Nimitz place to invade Japan. By late 1944, how-
was never entirely sold on the idea of a ever, the Japanese had overrun much of
main drive in the central Pacific. The area China’s coastal area, leading King to
was so far from MacArthur’s command argue for Formosa instead. MacArthur
that the two theaters competed with each preferred Luzon in the Philippines, partly
other instead of being mutually support- because he wanted to liberate the Philip-
ive. MacArthur wanted the Navy to oper- pines more than anything else. But he also
ate parallel to him in the Southwest Pacif- argued that having air bases in Luzon
ic, so that the fast carriers and scarce would let the United States command the
landing ships tank (LSTs) could shuttle South China Sea and would finish the job
between the two lines of advance as need- of cutting off Japan from its supply
ed. After the bloody fight at Tarawa in the sources in Southeast Asia. He also pointed
Gilberts (November 20–22, 1943), out to King that there would be native
Nimitz began to think MacArthur was labor in Luzon to make up for the lack of
right. After meeting with members of men in the Army Service Forces. If For-
MacArthur’s staff, Nimitz tentatively mosa were chosen as the launch site, it
agreed to MacArthur’s proposal. had to be assumed that native laborers
Admiral King shot the idea down at would be unfriendly. King finally gave up
once. Nimitz, who was relieved by the the idea of taking Formosa, and the inva-
fact that only small losses resulted from sion and subsequent operations in the
seizing the Marshall Islands early in 1944, Philippines were highly successful.
accepted King’s decision and led the Cen- Like most naval and air commanders,
tral Pacific drive as best he could. Casual- Chester Nimitz was convinced that Japan
ties remained staggeringly high, however. could be defeated through strategic bomb-
The Fifth Fleet’s landing at Saipan in the ing and blockades. But the Joint Chiefs
Marianas turned into another bloody believed that Japan had to be invaded,
engagement—a much bigger one than and Nimitz was making plans for such an
Tarawa. Seizing Betio, the principle island operation when he learned of the atomic
in Tarawa’s atoll, had cost the Marines bomb. Nimitz was appalled by the
3,000 casualties in 72 hours. On Saipan, bomb’s destructiveness, but he conceded
Marine and army units would sustain the need for it. Japan had been losing the
14,000 casualties during nearly a month war for years, yet nothing, including the
of fighting, which ended on July 9, 1944. burning of most of its urban areas, had
After the Saipan campaign, the U.S. made it decide to surrender. Nimitz
command understood and accepted the thought that atomic warfare would make
high rate of casualties that resulted from the difference, which of course it did.
the inability of land forces to maneuver Though he had no voice in the decision to
on the small, scattered islands of the cen- drop the atomic bombs, he supported the
tral Pacific. Thus, Saipan was followed action personally.
early in 1945 by the invasion of Iwo Jima, Saddled with a dubious strategy that
which resulted in even heavier losses. Iwo he did not always agree with, Nimitz was
247
• N O R T H A F R I C A N C A M P A I G N •
one of the outstanding U.S. commanders intelligence was decoding Japanese radio
of the war. As commander of the Pacific messages, Nimitz knew that Midway
Ocean areas, he ran his huge theater with Island was where the IJN intended to
outstanding skill. He appointed outstand- mass its forces. Nimitz therefore sent only
ing officers to lead his mighty fleet and a small fleet to the Aleutians. Japan occu-
gave them his full support. He richly pied Attu on June 5, 1942, and Kiska
deserved the five stars that came with his two days later, with sufficient strength to
final promotion to fleet admiral. He was rule out an early liberation by the United
also a model officer: modest, considerate, States’s weakened forces in the Pacific.
and a gentleman through and through. For the next nine months, U.S.
Army and Navy aircraft bombed these
SEE ALSO
two Japanese-held islands, but to little
Central Pacific Area; Midway Island, bat-
tle of; North Pacific Area; South Pacific effect. On March 26, 1943, an attempt
Area by the IJN to reinforce Attu was turned
back by a U.S. surface fleet. Attu was
F U RTHER READING
then assaulted by 11,000 men of the 7th
Brink, Randall. Nimitz: The Man and His
Wars. New York: Penguin, 1999. Infantry Division on May 11. Although
Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. How They Won the the Japanese garrison numbered only
War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His about 2,400 men, they put up stiff resis-
Admirals. New York: Weybright and Tal-
ley, 1970. tance against hopeless odds. Rather than
Larrabee, Eric. Commander in Chief. New wait to be hunted down, the Japanese
York: Harper & Row, 1987. staged one of the biggest banzai (suicide)
Potter, E. B. Nimitz. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1976.
charges of the war on the morning of
May 29. After a day of hard fighting,
the Japanese made a final, futile assault
the following day, with the survivors
North African committing suicide. Only 28 Japanese
campaign prisoners were taken. U.S. casualties
came to 600 dead and 1,200 wounded.
SEE Mediterranean Theater Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald,
commander of the North Pacific Area,
now turned from Attu to the other
Japanese-occupied island, Kiska, and
North Pacific Area invaded it with 34,000 U.S. and Cana-
dian troops on August 15, 1945. They
met no resistance, however, because the
As part of its effort to destroy the U.S. entire Japanese garrison of more than
Pacific Fleet in the summer of 1942, 5,000 men had been secretly evacuated
Japan seized the islands of Kiska and on the nights of July 28 and 29. This
Attu in the Aleutians off the coast of retreat was a rare event in the Pacific
Alaska. The idea was to force Admiral war. For the Japanese, last-ditch stands
Chester Nimitz to send warships to like the one at Attu were the rule, clever
Alaska, weakening the Pacific Fleet escapes the exception.
before its showdown with the Imperial
F U RTHER READING
Japanese Navy (IJN).
The Aleutians were in the North Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United
States Naval Operations in World War
Pacific Area, one of three theaters in II. Vol. 7. Aleutians, Gilberts, and Mar-
Nimitz’s Pacific Ocean Area. Because U.S. shalls. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951.
248
• N U R S E S •
Nurses
Army flight nurses risked their lives exact. Such a bill was actually passed by
as well, flying on unarmed transport the House and would have passed in the
planes without even a red cross to protect Senate too had Germany not surrendered
them. Usually, nurses flew alone and had before it came to a vote.
to do a doctor’s work when emergencies The sad fact is that there was no
took place. Obviously, they did it well: need after all to draft nurses. It was prej-
during 13 months in the South Pacific, udice as much as anything else that
army nurses moved 37,000 patients and accounted for the nursing shortage. The
lost only one. military was uninterested in male nurses
Navy nurses were less at risk because and rarely gave them commissions. The
they were not allowed on combat vessels. services did not favor African-American
Those in the theaters of war were sta- nurses either, accepting only a handful.
tioned on hospital ships. Emergency care They refused to take women older than
on warships was given by men who had 45, and there was an unofficial tendency
been trained by nurses. Like army nurses, to reject women older than 30.
members of the Naval Nurse Corps Although by the end of 1942 the
(NNC) were also teachers and adminis- Army was allowing nurses to marry, the
trators. Navy never accepted already married
The demands of war soon created a nurses. And it did not allow single
nursing shortage. In 1940 the entire ANC women in the NNC to marry until 1944.
consisted of just 700 women. A year The services also refused to accept
later, the corps was recruiting that same women doctors. Fewer than 100 female
number each month. By 1944 the mili- physicians were commissioned in the
tary needed 66,000 nurses, but civilian Army Medical Corps, and then only after
hospitals needed 300,000 more. The overcoming numerous obstacles.
result was a shortage of 100,000 nurses. Despite all these stipulations, 60,000
Additional trained nurses did in fact women joined the ANC and 14,000 the
exist. Civilian nurses could have been NNC. The fact that shortages occurred
called to action, but most had been paid was the military’s own fault for shutting
so poorly that they left the profession to out men and women who wished to
take defense jobs. The statistics tell the serve simply because of their age, color,
story: after graduation from nursing or sex.
school and three years of unpaid hospital
SEE ALSO
work, a registered nurse earned less than
Medicine
a welder in training.
Military nurses did earn more than F U RTHER READING
civilians, but they still had to qualify as Camp, LaVonne Telshaw. Lingering Fever:
registered nurses (RNs) at their own A World War II Nurse’s Memoir. Jeffer-
expense before they could be commis- son, N.C.: McFarland, 1997.
Fessler, Diane Burke. No Time for Fear:
sioned. In May 1943 Congress passed Voices of American Military Nurses in
Representative Frances Bolton’s bill pro- World War II. East Lansing: Michigan
viding support for nursing education, but State University Press, 1996.
Poulos, Paula Nassen, ed. A Woman’s War
it came too late in the war to make much Too: U.S. Women in the Military in
of a difference. Thus, in January 1945 World War II. Washington, D.C.:
President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked National Archives and Records Adminis-
that the Selective Service Act be amended tration, 1996.
Weatherford, Doris. American Women and
so that nurses could be drafted into the World War II. New York: Facts on File,
armed forces—20,000 of them, to be 1990.
250
• O F F I C E O F P R I C E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N •
as a propaganda agency it aroused envy dissolved the OSS immediately after the
and suspicion. Accordingly, on June 13, war, it was soon replaced by the Central
1942, the COI’s propaganda activities Intelligence Agency. This suggests that
were spun off to become the indepen- the OSS had done a good enough job in
dent Office of War Information. The the war to make national security offi-
rest remained under Donovan’s com- cials feel that they could not get along
mand as chief of the Office of Strategic without it in some form or another.
Services (OSS), which was put under the
SEE ALSO
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Intelligence, military
In its final form, the OSS had four
intelligence branches, which did every- F U RTHER READING
thing from running spies to interviewing Chalou, George C., ed. The Secrets War:
refugees. The largest of these was the The Office of Strategic Services in World
Research and Analysis Branch (R&A). War II. Washington, D.C.: National
Headed by William L. Langer, a distin- Archives and Records Administration,
1992.
guished historian, R&A employed a Corvo, Max. The O.S.S. in Italy, 1942 –
broad range of specialists and academic 1945: A Personal Memoir. New York:
experts. Its reports came to be widely Praeger, 1990.
McIntosh, Elizabeth P. Sisterhood of Spies:
admired for their intelligence and fairness. The Women of the OSS. Annapolis, Md.:
The OSS’s operational branches Naval Institute Press, 1998.
engaged in sabotage, espionage, and all Morgan, William James. The O.S.S. and I.
New York: Norton, 1957.
sorts of covert activities. They supported Smith, Richard Harris. OSS: The Secret
resistance groups in occupied countries, History of America’s First Intelligence
conducted raids of their own, and Agency. Berkeley: University of Califor-
planted false information. They were sup- nia Press, 1972.
ported in this work by highly skilled tech-
nical services, which provided OSS agents
with custom-made radios and cameras,
as well as other kinds of equipment. Okinawa, battle of
Although it operated in all the the-
aters of war during World War II, the
OSS was most effective in North Africa
and Europe, where it had a freer hand. Okinawa was the last, and one of the
General Douglas MacArthur disliked it bloodiest, battles of the Pacific war. A
intensely, however, and kept it from 60-mile-long island in the Ryukyu chain,
operating in the Southwest Pacific Area, Okinawa was worth having—at least in
to the degree that he was able. Admiral part. Located only about 350 miles
Chester Nimitz, too, was far from being southwest of the Japanese home island
an OSS fan. of Kyushu and 1,000 miles from Tokyo,
As always with intelligence, the con- Okinawa was within easy fighter
tribution made to victory by the OSS is bomber range of many targets in Japan.
hard to evaluate. It operated on a very To take it, Admiral Chester Nimitz
large scale, conducted numerous opera- assembled a great armada: more than
tions, and produced countless reports. 180,000 troops and 1,200 vessels,
Because it was not allowed to play a pol- including 40 carriers of all sizes and 18
icy-making role, the OSS could offer, in battleships.
theory at least, unbiased advice. At any To defend the island, Lieutenant
rate, although President Harry Truman General Tomohiko Ushijima had some
252
• O K I N A W A , B A T T L E O F •
Landing Ships
Tank pour
army equip-
ment ashore on
Leyte Island in
the Philippines,
1944.
and the theater, which included a grow- These arrangements were generally
ing number of army and army air units, satisfactory to all involved. The great
and requested that he appoint an admi- problem still was that General Douglas
ral to command the fleet. Doing so MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area
would allow him to concentrate on his (SWPA) and Nimitz’s Pacific Ocean
duties as commander of the Pacific Areas were entirely separate commands.
Ocean Areas. Admiral Ernest J. King, But except for MacArthur’s SWPA,
chief of naval operations, would not there was now an effective command
hear of this initially, but a compromise and staff structure that would last for
was eventually arrived at. the rest of the war.
While Nimitz remained comman- SEE ALSO
der of the Pacific Fleet, the Central Central Pacific Area; Coral Sea, Battle of
Pacific Force, which contained most of the; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester
the fighting ships in the Navy’s Pacific W.; Pearl Harbor, attack on
Fleet, was renamed the Fifth Fleet in F U RTHER READING
March 1943. It would be named the Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. MacArthur’s Navy:
Fifth Fleet when led by Admiral Ray- The Seventh Fleet and the Battle for the
Philippines. New York: Orion, 1989.
mond A. Spruance and the Third Fleet Lundstrom, John B. The First South Pa-
when under Admiral William F. Halsey, cific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy,
with the two taking turns as comman- December 1941–June 1942. Annapolis,
der. Subject to Nimitz’s policies, opera- Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun:
tional control was now in these two The American War with Japan. New
admirals’ hands. In addition, a Pacific York: Free Press, 1985.
Fleet joint staff was established in Sep- Winslow, Walter G. The Fleet the Gods
Forgot: the U.S. Asiatic Fleet in World
tember 1943 with four sections, two War II. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
headed by army officers. Press, 1982.
256
• P A C I F I C O C E A N A R E A •
advantage. The United States lost many Despite these silver linings, the
aircraft, ships, and men, but because its clouds of war hung heavily over the
aircraft carriers were at sea at the time United States in the aftermath of Pearl
of the attack, the Pacific Fleet retained Harbor. While its enemies were fully
its offensive punch. This advantage armed, the United States was almost
doomed Japan’s hope for a quick end to unprotected. The Army still did not
the war, and made the attack on Hawaii have a single combat-ready division. The
a poor long-term decision. U.S. Army Air Forces had lost most of
To make matters worse for the its front line planes. The Pacific Fleet
Japanese, Vice Admiral Chuichi Na- was heavily outnumbered in every type
gumo denied his air commander permis- of ship. To avoid antagonizing Japan,
sion to launch a second strike against the United States had failed to develop a
Hawaii, thus sparing the shipyards, dry- naval base on Guam, which meant that
docks, machine shops, and especially the for want of a supply train the fleet was
fuel storage tanks, on which the whole tied to Hawaii. The IJN, in contrast,
military effort depended. Had these been had built a string of island bases and
wiped out, the Pacific Fleet would have could go wherever it pleased.
withdrawn to its mainland bases and Japanese planners had devised a
there would have been no triumph at complex and far-reaching network of
Midway Island to redeem Pearl Harbor. operations designed to win the Pacific
Even the battle damage at Pearl Harbor war in short order. The raid on Hawaii
was less serious than it looked: except was accompanied by landings in southern
for the Arizona and the Oklahoma, the Siam and northern Malaya. These were
battleships would be repaired, modern- followed by other attacks that quickly
ized, and put to useful service. reduced most of Southeast Asia. Air
258
• P A C I F I C W A R •
strikes against the Philippines were sup- trained Philippine Scouts, about 30,000
posed to coincide with those against Pearl regulars in all. The Japanese not only
Harbor. They did not, however, because outnumbered MacArthur’s combat-ready
pilots of Japan’s Eleventh Imperial Air force but had total air and naval mastery.
Fleet based on Formosa were grounded On that basis, their plan realistically
by a heavy fog. Having lost the element allowed 50 days for seizing the islands.
of surprise, Japanese airmen were pre- MacArthur waited too long before
pared for heavy casualties. Yet when they deciding to concentrate his troops in
arrived over Clark Field, the main U.S. Bataan, a 30-mile-long peninsula that,
bomber base in the Philippines, they met together with the island of Corregidor,
little resistance. A hundred aircraft were controlled Manila Bay. Bataan was cov-
destroyed at Clark and its neighboring ered with mountains and jungles, making
fighter base—including 18 Flying it highly suitable for a stand. But it had
Fortresses, half the strategic bomber force not been fortified or provisioned either
that was supposed to make the Philip- beforehand or during the several weeks
pines defensible. At a single blow the between the first air strikes and Japan’s
Japanese had reduced U.S. air power in invasion. This oversight occurred because
the Philippines by more than 50 percent. MacArthur planned to attack the Japan-
In the weeks that followed, Japan ese at their landing points and in his arro-
attacked other U.S. possessions in the gance regarded preparations to hold
Pacific. Guam in the Mariana Islands, a Bataan as defeatist. When he finally did
refueling stop for Pan American flying give the order to retreat on December 23,
boats, was the first to fall. Its tiny garri- it was too late to stock Bataan with even
son was overrun on December 10, 1941, the barest essentials.
by 5,400 Japanese soldiers. At Wake Japanese forces occupied Manila on
Island, 2,300 miles west of Hawaii, a January 2, 1942, and the evacuation to
small force of Marines actually sank two Bataan, superbly directed by Major Gen-
destroyers of an invasion fleet on Decem- eral Jonathan Wainwright, was largely
ber 7, forcing the Japanese to retreat. To complete by the 6th. The garrison on
avenge their loss of face, they returned in Bataan consisted of about 15,000 U.S.
greater strength on December 23 and 65,000 Filipino troops, who were
(December 22 Hawaiian time) and short of ammunition, medical supplies,
overran the U.S. garrison. and especially food. Bataan, with its
To make December 22 an even dark- swamps and jungles, was a hotbed of
er day, 43,000 Japanese troops came malaria, and so thousands of soldiers
ashore at Lingayen Gulf at dawn with were soon racked by chills and fever.
orders to take Luzon and then the other Even so, against all odds, the garri-
Philippine Islands. To defend them, Gen- son fought a tremendous delaying battle.
eral MacArthur commanded a force three When its first line of defense was out-
times as large, but his army consisted flanked, it fell back to a second line
mainly of some 100,000 Philippine halfway down the peninsula, stopping
reservists, who were ill trained, poorly Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma’s
armed, and usually fell apart under fire. Fourteenth Army in its tracks. When the
One U.S. general described them simply 50 days he had allowed for the campaign
as a “mob.” were up, Homma had taken 7,000 casu-
MacArthur’s effective forces con- alties, lost an additional 10,000 to
sisted of miscellaneous army units, the 12,000 men to malaria and other dis-
4th Marine Regiment, and 12,000 well- eases, and could not launch another
259
• P A C I F I C W A R •
showmanship, his immaculate uniforms liance. Patton was crushed when Eisen-
and ivory-handled pistols, or his profane hower passed him over, but he under-
speeches to the troops. Among the stood the reason why and was grateful
Allied commanders in Europe, Patton for being allowed to keep the Third
was the only one who understood Army. Bradley could be counted on not
strategic maneuver, a system used to to embarrass Eisenhower nor antagonize
outflank an army and totally destroy it. the British, whereas Patton was likely to
Most of the other Allied commanders do both.
were concerned primarily with limiting In this sense Patton’s career demon-
their risks, which also meant restricting strates the wisdom of holding one’s
their gains. tongue, but this is not why he is remem-
Patton, who was quick to see possi- bered. Patton remains one of the most
bilities and was a master of exploiting admired commanders of World War II
breakthroughs, was the reverse of a because he had a genius for war.
cautious general like Montgomery. He
SEE ALSO
was unorthodox and daring—but sel-
Bulge, Battle of the; France, Battle of; Ger-
dom rash, having calculated the odds. many, surrender of; Mediterranean theater;
No Allied commander understood Sicily, Battle of
armored warfare as well as Patton did,
F U RTHER READING
and none had his ability to “read” a
Blumenson, Martin. Patton, the Man
battle. Amid the fog of war, he had a Behind the Legend, 1885 –1945. New
unique gift for judging accurately what York: Morrow, 1985.
was going on and what the enemy was ———, ed. The Patton Papers. 2 vols.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972, 1985.
likely to do next.
D’Este, Carlo. Patton: A Genius for War.
Had it not been for the slapping New York: HarperCollins, 1995.
incidents, Patton might have become Patton, George S. War As I Knew It.
commander of the 12th Army Group Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947.
Province, Charles M. Patton’s Third Army:
instead of Omar Bradley, who was A Daily Combat Diary. New York: Hip-
junior to him and lacked Patton’s bril- pocrene, 1992.
264
• P E A R L H A R B O R , A T T A C K O N •
Pearl Harbor
was taken com-
pletely by sur-
prise when the
Japanese
arrived in the
early morning
of December 7.
A total of 247 Image Not Available
planes were
either destroyed
or damaged
during the two-
hour attack.
landed, despite the usual fierce resis- and one badly damaged. The Americans
tance. Within hours Admiral Raymond lost only 29 aircraft in what they came
Spruance had learned that the Imperial to call “the Great Marianas Turkey
Japanese Navy (IJN) was going to make Shoot.”
an all-out effort to destroy the Fifth At the time, there was considerable
Fleet, which was there to protect the grumbling that Admiral Spruance had
invasion force. The IJN had assembled a held Task Force 58 back when it could
great armada, including nine new carri- have sunk most or all of the Japanese
ers, in hopes of gaining a decisive victory. carriers. But Spruance believed that
Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa knew guarding the landing force took priority
his force to be weaker than the Fifth over chasing enemy ships. What was not
Fleet, but he counted on two advantages. understood at the time was that by
Because his planes lacked armor and self- destroying most of Ozawa’s planes,
sealing gas tanks that would prevent loss TF58 had put Japanese naval aviation
of fuel and explosions, his planes had out of business anyway. The IJN could
more range than the U.S. fighters, replace its lost aircraft, but not its pilots.
enabling them to attack from 300 miles When the IJN fought its last great battle,
out compared to 200 for the Americans’ at Leyte Gulf in October 1944, they
aircraft. In addition, Ozawa thought he would use their carriers simply as bait,
would have the assistance of some 200 since they could no longer launch effec-
aircraft based on Guam and Tinian in the tive air strikes.
Marianas. What he did not know,
SEE ALSO
because the Japanese commander of
Central Pacific Area; Leyte Gulf, Battle of;
those two islands misled him, was that Spruance, Raymond A.
U.S. carrier planes had wiped out the air-
fields he was depending on for support.
At Midway, Japan’s pilots had been
the best. But this was no longer true— Poland
most of Japan’s veterans had been killed
in action. Along with superior firepower,
the superior skills of its crews gave the
U.S. Navy an ever-growing advantage. Few countries suffered more during
Since Midway, radar had been refined so World War II than Poland. When it was
that it could give 45 minutes’ notice of invaded by Germany on September 1,
an attack, and Carrier Task Force 58 1939, Poland had a population of 36
could launch 300 fighters in less than million. At a minimum, 6 million Poles
half an hour. Since a Hellcat could climb had been killed by the end of the war.
20,000 feet in seven minutes, even the In the 1930s, Poland was governed
last ones off the decks would reach com- by a quasi-dictatorship led by the military.
bat altitude before the first Japanese This leadership aroused much anger in the
fighters arrived. West by taking a chunk of Czechoslova-
Japan’s search planes discovered the kia in 1939 when it was dismembered by
Fifth Fleet late on June 18, 1944, and Hitler. Although it profited briefly from
Ozawa ordered a full attack. The U.S. German aggression, Poland became the
Navy’s response was overwhelming. next to fall. While Britain and France had
Fewer than 100 of 373 Japanese planes promised to come to Poland’s side, and
that flew into battle made it back to did declare war on Germany when it
their carriers, three of which were sunk crossed the Polish border on September 1,
268
• P O L A N D •
1939, they provided little tangible aid. came in late 1942 and early 1943 when
Poland was too far from Britain for the Germany began mass expulsions from the
Royal Air Force to provide support. The Lublin and Zamosc region. Germany’s
French Army was afraid to move beyond plan to resettle the area with German
its Maginot Line, allowing the Germans immigrants was defeated by the Polish
to concentrate their forces in the east, Home Army, which attacked the German
where they deployed 60 divisions. settlers and made resettlement impossible.
There was little Poland could do to The resistance sought to counteract
stem the German advance. It had no German propaganda with its own news-
defensible frontier. Its regular army of papers and leaflets. It gathered intelli-
280,000 was no match for the German gence, which was passed on to Britain.
Wehrmacht (military). It did have a large As German pressure on Polish Jews wors-
reserve, but mobilization problems pre- ened, the resistance established a Com-
vented it from being fully effective. mittee for Aid to Jews. The broad reach
Poland’s small navy and air force were of the resistance made it a shadow state,
quickly destroyed. To make matters with its own courts, schools, universities,
worse, the Soviet Union invaded Poland and cultural life. In the face of terrifying
on September 17, putting the Polish Army dangers, Polish patriots kept the flame of
between two jaws of a nutcracker. War- freedom burning.
saw fell on September 27, and all orga- The best-remembered events in the
nized resistance was over by October 5. history of occupied Poland were the two
Defeat did not end Poland’s role in Warsaw uprisings. The first of these took
the war, however. Some 90,000 Polish place in the Warsaw ghetto, where Jewish
soldiers escaped through neighboring leaders had been stockpiling arms to make
states. Many made their way to the west, a last-ditch stand against what became
to fight again under Allied leadership. In known as the Holocaust. The Allies were
addition, many Poles taken prisoner by still far away. Some 300,000 out of the
the Soviets would be released after Ger- ghetto’s 360,000 inhabitants had been sent
many invaded Russia in 1941. These for- to the Treblinka death camp. This left the
mer prisoners of war also fought again, remainder with only two choices: to die
notably in the Italian campaigns. A passively in gas chambers or with guns in
handful of small vessels became the basis their hands in the ghetto.
of a Polish naval force that eventually On April 19, 1943, about 3,000
numbered 4,000 men, and they fought Germans with armored vehicles and
alongside the Royal Navy. Some of the artillery stormed the ghetto, which was
best squadrons in Britain’s Fighter Com- defended by 1,000 Jews, who fought
mand were Polish as well. A Polish gov- back with small arms and other hand
ernment in exile was headquartered in weapons. Though heavily outnumbered
London throughout the war. and outgunned, they managed to hold
In addition, Poland developed the out until May 16, when they were over-
biggest resistance movement of any con- run. Elements of the Home Army, and
quered state. The main Polish under- the Communist People’s Guard, at-
ground army was organized to help liber- tempted to break into the ghetto and
ate Poland when Allied forces arrived on open an escape line, but could not get
the scene. As a rule it avoided making through. Thus, nearly all the survivors
attacks on German positions for fear that were sent to the Treblinka and Maj-
reprisals would be made against the civil- danek death camps. Although the ghetto
ian population. An exception to this rule rising failed, the heroic defenders
269
• P O L A N D •
Polish soldiers
march out of
Warsaw to a
prison camp
after surrender-
ing the partly
demolished
capital in
1939. Image Not Available
Slavic population too. By 1941 the food Gross, Jan Tomasz. Polish Society Under
ration for Warsaw’s Poles was 669 calo- German Occupation. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1979.
ries a day, which ensured that malnutri- Lukas, Richard C. The Forgotten Holo-
tion and disease would take many lives. caust: The Poles Under German Occupa-
Soviet-occupied Poland fared little tion, 1939–1944. Lexington: University
of Kentucky Press, 1986.
better. It was absorbed into the Soviet Sagajllo, Witold. Man in the Middle: A
Union from September 1939 to June Story of the Polish Resistance, 1940–45.
1941 and was ruled by terror, every London: Leo Cooper, 1984.
effort being made to abolish Polish cul-
ture and murder Polish leaders and
resisters. All private property was seized,
and all important government offices Potsdam conference
filled with Soviet citizens. Polish publica-
tions were suppressed. Ukrainian and
Byelorussian became the official lan-
guages, with Russian also compulsory in Code named Terminal, this was the last
schools and universities. One and a half wartime conference of the Grand
million Poles were deported to beyond Alliance, which consisted of Britain, the
the Ural Mountains. Perhaps 30 percent Soviet Union, and the United States. It
of them died in the Soviet Union before met in Potsdam, Germany, from July 17
being released in the fall of 1941. to August 2, 1945. The United States
After Germany invaded Russia in was represented at the conference for
June 1941, the former Soviet zone of the first time by President Harry S Tru-
Poland was divided between the Gov- man, who had succeeded to office in
ernment General and the Baltic states of April following Franklin Roosevelt’s
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. If Ger- death. The conference began with Prime
many had won the war, Hitler’s plan Minister Winston Churchill heading the
was to turn the Government General British delegation, but his party was
area into German soil and eliminate the defeated in the British general election
Polish people. Even though he ultimate- and Clement Attlee came to Potsdam on
ly lost the war, he still eliminated mil- July 28 as the new Prime Minister.
lions of Poles. The accepted estimate is The terms on which Japan was to
that 6 million Polish people died, fewer surrender were discussed at Potsdam, as
than half being Jewish victims of the were the peace terms for Europe. A great
Holocaust. deal of time was spent on the thorny
Some non-Jewish Poles were mur- question of Poland’s future, as well as on
dered by the Soviets, but most fell prey drawing the boundaries between many of
to Nazism. For its suffering Poland the states of Eastern Europe. Because no
deserved a better fate in the postwar agreement could be reached on these
period than it actually received. issues, they were never resolved.
The Japanese surrender terms were
SEE ALSO the easiest to agree on, and issuing them
Germany; Eastern front became the conference’s main achieve-
ment. Japan’s unconditional surrender
F U RTHER READING
remained the basic demand, but the
Engel, David. Facing a Holocaust: The details had to be spelled out. Japan’s
Polish Government-In-Exile and the
Jews, 1943 –1945. Chapel Hill: Universi- armed forces were to surrender without
ty of North Carolina Press, 1993. conditions and be disarmed. Japan was
271
• P R I S O N E R S O F W A R •
Prisoners of war
Resistance
movements
their fellow countrymen concealed them Mastny, Vojtech. The Czechs Under Nazi
throughout the occupation. Rule: the Failure of National Resistance,
1939 –1942. New York: Columbia Uni-
The French underground was excep- versity Press, 1995.
tionally large and well organized. It Michel, Henri. The Shadow War: Euro-
reached its peak of effectiveness after D- pean Resistance, 1939 –1945. New York:
Harper & Row, 1972.
Day (June 6, 1944), when rail workers
and the Maquis combined to sabotage
the railways and prevent the German
Army from sending reinforcements to
Normandy. Their efforts were so effec- Riots
tive that it required two weeks to move a SEE African Americans; Zoot-suit
single German armored division from riots
southern France to the Normandy battle-
fields. As the Allies neared Paris, the
Maquis went into the streets and battled
with the occupiers. Rommel, Erwin
The Polish Home Army was less for- GERMAN FIELD MARSHAL;
tunate. In 1944, as the Red Army “THE DESERT FOX”
approached Warsaw, the underground
• Born: November 15, 1891;
attempted to seize the city. But German Heidenheim, Germany
forces crushed the uprising as the Red • Political party: National Socialist
Army ground to a halt. The Soviets did (Nazi)
• Education: Royal Officer Cadet
not resume their offensive until Warsaw
School, Danzig, 1911
had been flattened and the resistance • Military service: German Army—
wiped out. second lieutenant, 1912; first
Except in Yugoslavia, where parti- lieutenant, 1916; captain, 1918; major,
1933; lieutenant colonel, 1935;
sans led by Joseph Tito ultimately beat colonel, 1937; brigadier general, 1939;
the Germans, no resistance movement commander of 7th Panzer Division,
was strong enough to liberate its own 1940; commander of Afrika Korps,
1941; major general, 1941; lieutenant
country. But resistance movements in general, 1941; commander of
many cases provided the Allies with sig- German-Italian Panzerarmee, 1942;
general, 1942; field marshal, 1942;
nificant help. Their mere existence sus- commander of Army Group Afrika;
tained national pride both during and commander of Army Group B, 1943
after the war. • Died: October 14, 1944, Germany
SEE ALSO
France; Poland
Although he is not particularly esteemed
F U RTHER READING
by German historians today, Rommel was
Camus, Albert. Between Hell and Reason:
Essays from the Resistance Newspaper extremely popular in Germany during the
Combat, 1944 –1947. Hanover, N.H.: war. He was also admired by the Western
University Press of New England, 1991. Allies, who called him the Desert Fox.
Chevrillon, Claire. Code name Christiane
As an infantry commander in World
Clouet: A Woman in the French Resis-
tance. College Station: Texas A & M War I, Rommel won Germany’s highest
University Press, 1995. decoration, the Pour le Mérite. One of
Foot, M. R. D. Resistance: An Analysis the few professional soldiers to be kept
of European Resistance to Nazism,
1940–1945. New York: McGraw-Hill, on in Germany’s tiny postwar army,
1977. Rommel came to Hitler’s attention as a
278
• R O M M E L , E R W I N •
Eleanor Roo-
sevelt (center)
and Mary
McLeod
Bethune (sec-
ond from left)
greet guests at
the opening of
Midway Hall,
one of two res-
idence halls
built by the
Public Build- Image Not Available
ings Adminis-
tration in
1943 for black
women in
government
service.
Eleanor had pictured. In 1918 she Already well informed on social issues
learned that Franklin was having an because of her close association with
affair with her own secretary and friend, social workers and reformers, she
Lucy Mercer. The marriage survived, but became a skillful politician too. Always
only because divorce would have ruined more liberal than Franklin, she served
Franklin’s political career. Eleanor never as his conscience—especially on issues
forgave him for this betrayal, even relating to women, children, and
though she herself was unable to provide African Americans. During World War
Franklin with the same adoration as Lucy II she served briefly in the Office of
Mercer had. Civilian Defense (OCD), the only gov-
If no longer a love match, the Roo- ernment job she held during Franklin’s
sevelts’ marriage was more than one of lifetime. This proved to be a mistake,
convenience. This became clear when for Eleanor’s liberalism had made her
Franklin was struck down by many enemies, who now extended their
poliomyelitis in 1921. He almost died often-vicious attacks to include the
and was left a paraplegic. With his legs OCD.
heavily braced, he could only move hor- After Pearl Harbor was attacked on
izontally for short distances. From this December 7, 1941, Eleanor’s real war
point on, Eleanor performed not only work was as the President’s representa-
the duties of a politician’s wife but tive on both the home and fighting
served as Franklin’s eyes and ears—and fronts. Her tours often took her to hos-
sometimes his voice as well—in all the pitals and military bases at home and
places he would have liked to go. abroad, most notably to the South
Eleanor helped Franklin resist the Pacific in 1943. Admiral William
temptation to retire from active life and Halsey, commander of the South Pacific
threw herself into furthering his career. Area, like most who did not know
281
• R O O S E V E L T , A N N A E L E A N O R •
Eleanor, dreaded her arrival. He was walked down the long line saying good-
too busy to shower attention on visiting bye and good luck to every truck.
VIPs, and her reputation as a reformer In the course of this one trip, she
and general “do-gooder” did not rec- visited 17 islands plus Australia and
ommend Eleanor to conservative mili- New Zealand, and was seen by an esti-
tary leaders. mated 400,000 servicemen. Among the
By the time she left the area under islands she went to was Guadalcanal,
his command, however, Halsey had which was bombed the night before she
become one of Eleanor’s warmest arrived and the night after she left.
admirers. He later wrote that in a single Admiral Halsey said that in his entire
day she inspected two navy hospitals, time as South Pacific Area commander,
had lunch at an officers’ rest home, Eleanor did more good than any one
reviewed the 2nd Marine Raiders Bat- person or group of civilians who visited
talion, made a speech at a service club, his theater.
attended a reception, and was guest of In other tours she visited Britain
honor at a formal dinner. Although and numerous places in the Caribbean
Halsey did not know it, that night she and South America. During the 1944
wrote her daily newspaper column— Presidential campaign, when FDR was
pecking it out herself on a portable too tired and busy to go on the stump,
typewriter. Eleanor filled in for him on many occa-
Halsey’s own description of sions. She also pushed him to hit the
Eleanor’s methods cannot be bettered. campaign trail himself, which he did
“When I say that she inspected those late in the season, with great success.
hospitals,” he wrote, “I don’t mean that As before the war, Eleanor contin-
she shook hands with the chief medical ued to represent her husband at numer-
officer, glanced into a sun parlor, and ous functions, to serve as a link
left. I mean that she went into every between the President and numerous
ward, stopped at every bed, and spoke other people, and to write a great deal,
to every patient: What was his name? not only her regular column but maga-
How did he feel? Was there anything he zine articles as well. For some time she
needed? Could she take a message also had a weekly radio broadcast.
home? I marveled at her hardihood, Although liberalism and reform took a
both physical and mental; she walked backseat during the war, she continued
for miles, and she saw patients who to speak for the young, the poor, the
were grievously and gruesomely disadvantaged, and African Americans.
wounded. But I marveled at their
SEE ALSO
expressions as she leaned over them. It
was a sight I will never forget.” Roosevelt, Franklin Delano
Eleanor made good on her promises F U RTHER READING
too, carefully writing down the men’s Freedman, Russell. Eleanor Roosevelt: A
names and messages and religiously deliv- Life of Discovery. New York: Clarion,
ering them when she got back home. 1993.
This was a practice that she continued Goodwin, Doris Kearns. No Ordinary
Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt:
throughout the war. At other times she The Home Front in World War II. New
inspected kitchens, stood in chow lines York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
with the men, and rode with them in Lash, Joseph P. Eleanor and Franklin. New
York: Norton, 1971.
jeeps. Once she came across a convoy of Vercelli, Jane. Eleanor Roosevelt. New
armed troops heading for the front and York: Chelsea House, 1994.
282
• R O O S E V E L T , F R A N K L I N D E L A N O •
President Roo-
sevelt addresses
a joint session
of Congress on
May 16, 1940.
gram, which provided essential aid to Soviets, who were battling Germany in
Britain and the Soviet Union. the east, and open the way to seizing
In that summer Roosevelt met with Germany’s industrial bases, without
Prime Minister Winston Churchill of which Hitler could not wage war.
Britain and issued the Atlantic Charter Although this was the best strategy,
with him. This document was a state- it could not be activated until May 1943
ment of democratic principles that would at the earliest. By that time the pressure
govern the Allied war effort, although the to concentrate on the war with Japan
United States was still at peace and as yet might have become irresistible. Perhaps
had no formal allies. He also expanded North Africa was not the right place,
naval operations to the point where the but November 1942 was the right time
U.S. Navy was actually engaged in com- to launch a campaign that would put
bat with German U-boats. At the same U.S. troops into battle against the Ger-
time, he took a hard line against Japan, mans before Americans lost interest in
cutting off its oil supplies until the Japa- them. Just as Marshall had feared, fight-
nese agreed to withdrawal from China (a ing in the Mediterranean forced the
proposition that was out of the question postponement of D-Day to 1944, but it
for Japan’s military rulers). may very well have saved the European
Roosevelt seems to have hoped that priority, on which everything depended.
Germany would declare war as a result of Marshall did get his cross-channel inva-
the fighting in the North Atlantic. Instead, sion of France in 1944, later than he
it was Japan that broke the stalemate by wanted but not too late for the Allies to
attacking Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on help defeat Hitler and liberate Western
December 7, 1941, and seizing U.S., Europe. Thus, Roosevelt seems to have
British, and Dutch possessions in the Pa- done the right thing by forcing Marshall
cific and Asia. Hitler declared war shortly to fight in the Mediterranean first.
after, and the United States finally became From mid-1943 on, with victory
an active player in the world conflict. over Hitler becoming ever more certain,
In the early war years, Roosevelt FDR concerned himself mainly with the
kept a close eye on military affairs, and shape of the postwar world. At major
his foreign relations centered on reach- conferences with Soviet leader Joseph
ing agreements about strategy with the Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, he
British. He successfully clung to Europe struggled to design a new world order
as the first priority for U.S. arms, despite that would be fair, democratic, and
an enormous popular demand for peaceful. Although European colonialism
revenge against Japan. Even so, the did not fit into this vision, the main
Pacific war was expanded far beyond obstacle to a just peace was the Soviet
what General George Marshall and Union.
other planners had wanted. In later years Roosevelt would be
The war in the Pacific would likely criticized for “giving away” Eastern
have grown even larger if Roosevelt had Europe and other areas to the Soviet
not ordered that North Africa be in- Union. But to treat the Soviets as a new
vaded in 1942. War strategists believed enemy after having jointly defeated Hitler
this was the wrong place to fight Hitler, not only seemed unfair but could create a
wishing instead to invade France as self-fulfilling prophesy. In an attempt to
soon as possible in order to establish a avert what would someday become
second front in Western Europe. It known as the “Cold War,” Roosevelt
would take much of the pressure off the made every effort to assure the Soviets of
285
• R O O S E V E L T , F R A N K L I N D E L A N O •
over, the Pacific war already won— At the time World War II broke out,
although the Japanese refused to admit it. the RAF was divided into separate branch-
The United States was safe and rich. It es, with Fighter, Bomber, and Coastal
would soon have the atomic bomb. U.S. Commands being the combat arms. For
casualty rates were lower than those of most of the war, the Coastal Command
any other great nation. In the real world, was controlled by the Royal Navy, an
where people make mistakes and things arrangement that made the British antisub-
go wrong, leadership does not get much marine campaign better coordinated than
better than this. that of the United States.
Overseas the RAF was organized ver-
SEE ALSO
tically, with all types of aircraft operating
Atlantic, Battle of the; Atlantic Charter; under a single command. The most impor-
Casablanca conference; Home front; tant of these were the Middle East Com-
Mediterranean theater; Mobilization; Roo-
sevelt, Anna Eleanor; Teheran conference; mand and Air Command Southeast Asia.
Truman, Harry S.; Unconditional surren- Beginning in 1943, RAF units in the Medi-
der; United Nations; Yalta conference terranean served with U.S. aircraft under
the combined Mediterranean Air Com-
F U RTHER READING
mand. In 1943 the RAF formed its Second
Ben-Zvi, Abraham. The Illusion of Deter- Tactical Air Force to support British
rence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the
Origins of the Pacific War. Boulder, ground troops on the European continent
Colo.: Westview, 1987. during and after D-Day, June 6, 1944.
Burns, James MacGregor. Roosevelt: The Dominion air forces—Australian,
Soldier of Freedom, 1940–1945. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Canadian, New Zealand, South
1970. African—served as part of the RAF, as
Cashman, Sean Dennis. America, Roo- did units made of refugees from occupied
sevelt, and World War II. New York:
New York University Press, 1989.
Europe. Some, notably the Czechs, had
Dallek, Robert. Franklin Roosevelt and their own separate national squadrons.
American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945. RAF squadrons were much larger than
New York: Oxford University Press, those of the U.S. Army Air Forces
1979.
Kimball, Warren F. The Juggler: Franklin (USAAF), being comparable in size to a
Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman. Princeton, U.S. air group. They were supported by
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. Princess Mary’s RAF Nursing Service and
Newton, Verne W., ed. FDR and the Holo-
caust. New York: St. Martin’s Press, the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
1996. (WAAF), who were put at greater risk
than U.S. servicewomen. Most notably
during the Battle of Britain, WAAFs
served in heavily bombed installations.
Although ground personnel were often
Royal Air Force draftees, as in the United States, all RAF air-
men were volunteers. Many were trained
overseas in Canada. Unlike the USAAF,
whose pilots, bombardiers, and navigators
Unlike the United States Army Air were always commissioned officers, RAF
Forces, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was airmen were often sergeants. And while the
an independent service with its own cabi- pilot was always the aircrew commander in
net minister (secretary of state for air), U.S. planes, in the RAF command rested
who presided over the policy-making Air with the man who had the highest rank,
Council. whether he was the pilot or not.
287
• R O Y A L N A V Y •
based in Egypt. In 1941 an Eastern Fleet commanders of small escort vessels. The
was created, with its headquarters in Singa- high ranks and prestige, however, went to
pore. Much of it was destroyed in the early those who commanded battleships and
days of the Pacific war, with the survivors carriers. But everything would have been
withdrawing to Mombasa in British East lost if the RNVR-officered corvettes,
Africa. These survivors eventually grew frigates, destroyers, and aircraft had not
into the British Pacific Fleet, the largest defeated the U-boats.
British Fleet of the war, which fought with Because Germany did not have an
distinction in the Okinawa campaign. important surface fleet and the Italian
The officers and men of the Royal Navy avoided battle, the RN did not fight
Navy fell into three categories: the stand- any great naval actions in the Atlantic or
ing regular navy (RN); the Royal Naval Mediterranean. There were some spectac-
Reserve (RNR), consisting of officers and ular incidents, such as the pursuit and
men with previous RN service as well as sinking of the Bismarck in 1941, but the
former officers of the merchant fleet; and RN’s main job in the war was the
the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve unglamorous but absolutely essential task
(RNVR), consisting of officers who had of keeping the sea-lanes open.
volunteered and draftees who had been Although it was small at first, the
promoted to commissioned rank. The Fleet Air Arm came to play a vital role in
RNVR was called the Wavy Navy, both oceans and the Mediterranean.
because RNVR officers had waved rings When war broke out, the RN had 232
on their cuffs to distinguish them from obsolete aircraft and only five carriers.
RN and RNR officers. Even so, the Fleet Air Arm won a
Enlisted draftees had no service remarkable victory against the Italian
insignias at all. Although there were his- Navy. On November 11, 1940, 21
torical reasons behind these distinctions, Swordfish-class biplanes launched from
to Americans they seemed artificial and the carrier Illustrious torpedoed three
snobbish. In the U.S. Navy all enlisted battleships and a cruiser at anchor in
men dressed alike, and although the U.S. Taranto, Italy. In one stroke the naval
Navy differentiated between regular and balance of power in the Mediterranean
reserve officers, both categories wore shifted in Britain’s favor.
identical uniforms and markings. Taranto also marked the end of the
Because British forces made few battleship era, although this was not fully
amphibious assaults compared with those apparent until the much bigger Japanese
of the United States, the Royal Marines victory at Pearl Harbor a year later. By
had only one division. It was formed in war’s end, the Royal Navy had more
1940 but was later broken up into than 50 carriers of various sizes and
smaller, specialized units. On the other 1,336 front line aircraft, half of which
hand, the Women’s Royal Naval Service were built in the United States.
(whose members were called Wrens) was
SEE ALSO
relatively larger than its U.S. counterpart,
known as the WAVES. In addition to Atlantic, battle of the; Central Pacific
Area; Britain
shore duties, a few Wrens served on motor
torpedo boats. Of the 73,642 RN person-
nel who died in the war, 124 were Wrens.
The RNVR’s officers made up three-
fourths of the officer corps, and they bore Russia
the brunt of the antisubmarine war as SEE Soviet Union
289
• S A I P A N , B A T T L E O F •
Apart from the high cost of taking it, 1943, when enough heavy bombers were
Saipan was notable for being the first available for the U.S. Eighth Air Force to
conquered island with a large Japanese attack strategic targets in Germany with
civilian population. Of its 12,000 non- daylight precision bombing. Schweinfurt
combatants, most of them women and was considered an important target at the
children, about two-thirds committed sui- time, because so much of Germany’s ball-
cide, because they thought honor bearing industry was located in the area.
demanded it or because they had been led It was believed that if the five ball-bearing
to believe that their captors would treat plants in the Schweinfurt region could be
them atrociously. It sickened GIs to see destroyed Germany would run out of ball
whole families jump off cliffs or blow bearings and therefore lose the war.
themselves up with grenades. This was a The first attack was made on
chilling foretaste of what the expected August 17, 1943, by two separate air
invasion of Japan would bring. divisions, which struck Schweinfurt and
Whether the Saipan campaign was the city of Regensburg. Of the 315
worth the cost depends on how much heavy bombers that reached their targets
value is attached to the firebomb raids 60 were destroyed by German fighters
against Japan that were staged from the and flak guns. This rate of loss cast
island. Many argue that these raids con- doubt on the theory that heavily armed
tributed materially to the defeat of Japan, and armored B-17s and B-24s, unac-
but some historians believe they had little companied by fighter escorts, could fight
effect, because Japanese industry had their way to targets deep within Ger-
already been brought to its knees by the many and make it home again without
U.S. naval blockade. suffering heavy casualties.
Because so much had been invested
SEE ALSO
in this form of strategic bombing, air
Central Pacific Area; Philippine Sea, Battle
of the force leaders were reluctant to admit
defeat. On October 14, 1943, the Eighth
F U RTHER READING
Air Force launched another attack, with
Crowl, Philip A. Campaign in the Mari-
anas. Washington, D.C.: Center of Mili- Schweinfurt as the only target. Of 291
tary History, United States Army, 1993. heavy bombers that took off for this
Gailey, Harry A. Howlin’ Mad vs the attack 60 were again lost, leaving the
Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan, concept of the self-defending bomber
1945. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986.
force in ruins. The second Schweinfurt
attack was the fourth on German indus-
trial areas that had been staged in a sin-
gle week, during which 148 bombers
Schweinfurt, bombing were lost. After “Black Week,” as it was
of called, the Eighth Air Force in effect
admitted defeat. There were no more
deep penetration raids into Germany for
the rest of the year. They did not resume
There were two separate bombing on a regular basis until February 1944,
attacks on Schweinfurt, Germany, in when long-range fighter escorts at last
1943 that resulted in very heavy U.S. became available.
losses and put an end, temporarily, to the
SEE ALSO
daylight air war against Germany.
The campaign began on June 10, Spaatz, Carl; Strategic bombing
291
• S E A B E E S •
Churchill also tried to argue that the cast their nets more broadly and stop giv-
Allied air war against Germany was a ing exemptions for fatherhood. Selective
kind of second front. Neither of these Service was generally regarded as fair, in
substitutes met Soviet Russia’s basic part because conscription was not as rig-
need, but as Stalin could not direct Allied orously applied in the United States as in
operations himself, he had no choice but most other belligerent nations.
to wait for the real thing. In January 1944 President Franklin
D. Roosevelt asked Congress for a
SEE ALSO
National Service Bill. It would have sub-
Mediterranean theater
jected civilian men and women to
mandatory work assignments, as well as
making the military draft more produc-
tive. Similar legislation had been highly
Selective Service effective in Britain, and polls showed
System considerable support for it in the United
States. But Congress feared that in prac-
tice National Service would be unpopu-
lar and therefore refused to enact it.
Otherwise known as the draft, the Selec-
tive Service System was established by
an act of Congress in September 1940.
Initially, conscription (the act of draft- Sicily, battle of
ing) applied only to men aged 21 to 36
and the term of enlistment was limited
to one year. In 1941, by a margin of
only one vote in the House of Represen- As Tunisia fell to the Allies in May 1943,
tatives, the term of service was ex- an Allied conference was convening in
tended. The next year the age limit of Washington. Known as Trident, the con-
those eligible for the draft was widened ference’s discussions were often stormy,
to include men 18 to 46 years of age. because U.S. Army chief of staff General
Student exemptions, which were part of George Marshall had begun to tire of let-
the original Selective Service Act, were ting Britain direct the war effort. The
also dropped. In all, some 10 million British had been able to force Marshall to
men were drafted, a majority into the accept Torch, the invasion of North
Army. Women were not drafted at all. Africa, but they could not make him like
Enlisted draftees served an average of 33 it. And now that more time was being
months, officers about 6 months longer. lost while the British continued to come
Draftees were called up as the result up with proposals for landing in various
of decisions made by thousands of local places on the margins of Europe, the
draft boards that reflected local as well as Americans were becoming irritated. Gen-
national prejudices. Most boards pre- eral Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial
ferred to draft single men, which meant General Staff, would not admit that the
that in the early war years, young fathers Americans would never share Britain’s
were being exempted while single men view of the Mediterranean, and he
younger than 40 were called to active ser- always seemed taken aback that putting
vice. By 1944 a military manpower short- off the invasion of France led the United
age developed that required boards to States to divert resources to the Pacific.
293
• S I C I L Y , B A T T L E O F •
This aerial
photograph
captures the
view from a
B-17 Flying
Fortress intent
on destroying
shipping and
harbor installa-
tions at Paler-
mo, Sicily. The
explosions
Image Not Available
below, and the
bomb on its
way, indicate a
successful mis-
sion.
The Trident conference began with code named, had been set into motion.
Churchill arguing for an Italian campaign On July 10, 1943, the greatest fleet
to follow the conquest of Sicily, while ever assembled to that date—an armada
Roosevelt worried that it might delay the of 3,200 ships—arrived off the coast of
cross-channel attack into France he Sicily. In three days 150,000 troops hit
planned for the coming year. After days of the beaches, soon followed by 300,000
tough bargaining, during which each side more. Sicily was defended (on paper) by
promoted its own sideshows in the Medi- 350,000 Axis troops; however, most
terranean and the Pacific, a compromise were Italians who wished only to sur-
was hammered out. After taking Sicily, render. The real opposition was a Ger-
the Allies would eliminate Italy from the man Army corps that never exceeded
war by means of unspecified actions. 60,000 men. The Allies ought to have
These actions would come to an end on brushed it aside, but instead the cam-
November 1, 1943, after which troops paign lasted for 38 days and ended with
would be concentrated in England for a the entire German force escaping to Italy
cross-channel assault on May 1, 1944. after suffering fewer battle deaths than
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin responded the Allies.
angrily to these decisions because the Given the lack of enemy strength,
Germans were gearing up for a great the Sicilian campaign was poorly execut-
offensive at Kursk, in the Soviet Union ed. The British War Office went so far
(which did happen in July 1943), and as to called it “a strategic and tactical
needed to be diverted. Although Stalin failure.” It took too long to execute and
committed a series of unfriendly acts— only gained air bases that could have
including recalling his ambassadors from been obtained more easily by taking
Washington and London—Operation Corsica and Sardinia, which would have
Husky, as the invasion of Sicily had been had the additional effect of neutralizing
294
• S I E G F R I E D L I N E •
Solomon Islands
SEE Guadalcanal, Battle of; South
A sailor checks World War II. The British equivalent was Pacific Area
over the small called the Sten gun, while America had
arms in a the Thompson submachine gun. Popular
guard room in with gangsters before the war in its
England in
anticipation of
drum-magazine version, the Thompson, South Pacific Area
now fitted with a 20- or 30-round box
the Battle of
magazine, was in great demand by Allied
France, 1944.
ground troops throughout the war.
Apart from being a bit heavy and In April 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
expensive, the Thompson was a splendid agreed that the Southwest Pacific Area
weapon, sturdy and absolutely reliable. In was to be a separate Army theater of war.
addition, its .45-caliber rounds gave it The rest of the Pacific became the Pacific
plenty of stopping power. Although 2 Ocean Area, directed by navy Admiral
million Thompson guns were made, the Chester Nimitz, whose vast command
troops would have liked millions more. was subdivided into three areas: South,
The Soviet Army used more machine Central, and North. Once the spheres of
guns than any other. They developed a control had been defined, everyone
cheap model made from stamped out, understood that the first thing to be done
rather than machined, parts that suited was to save Australia from the Japanese
their method of close-in fighting extreme- threat.
ly well. Japan was overextended and proba-
The Allies employed both heavy and bly lacked the means to invade Australia,
light machine guns. The heavy gun—belt- but the Allies could not be sure of this,
fed, water-cooled, and mounted on a tri- and Australia’s strategic importance
pod—was similar to World War I mod- meant that it had to be protected. The
els. Light machine guns were generally question was by which armed service.
newer designs. The U.S. Army issued a Most Japanese bases fell within General
296
• S O U T H P A C I F I C A R E A •
Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific meeting little opposition. Then Rear Admi-
Area. However, to seize or neutralize the ral Frank Jack Fletcher sailed away, only
bases would require naval support, and 36 hours after the marines had landed and
Admiral Ernest King, the Navy’s head, before they were half unloaded. Fearing a
would not allow the Army to control his Japanese attack, he wanted to save his fast
fast carriers. carriers. He left only cruisers and destroy-
After a serious struggle, the Joint ers to defend the invasion force.
Chiefs arrived at a compromise. The But even as he fled, Japanese heavy
effort to protect Australia was divided cruisers were moving down the “slot”
into three parts, or “tasks.” Task One formed by the Solomon Islands. At 1:30
was to establish a position in the south- a.m. on August 9, they took the Allied
ern Solomon Islands. Because this would cruisers by surprise, destroying four of
require an amphibious landing that only them: three American and one Aus-
the Navy could mount, its South Pacific tralian. This encounter, dubbed the Battle
Area was moved one degree west so as to of Savo, was the U.S. Navy’s worst defeat
include these islands. Task Two would be at sea and did much to prolong the
an army advance along the northeast Guadalcanal campaign. Since Rear Admi-
coast of New Guinea together with a ral Richmond Kelly Turner, who com-
naval drive up the Solomons. Task Three manded Amphibious Force South Pacific,
was to be an assault on Rabaul, a great now had no air cover, he sailed away at
Japanese air and naval base on New noon, leaving the Marines stranded.
Britain, from which it controlled the By a narrow margin, the expedi-
Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago. tionary force on Guadalcanal was saved,
Tasks Two and Three would be under and the island finally taken after a costly
MacArthur’s command, with the Joint campaign lasting six months. Watch-
Chiefs determining the forces’ composi- tower was a mistake all the same, for if
tion and timing. King believed that by forcing the opera-
Turf having been staked out and tion on Marshall he had a guarantee of
honor preserved, King was eager to seize boundless support he was seriously mis-
Guadalcanal (code named Cactus) in the taken. Watchtower had to compete not
Solomons, where a Japanese airfield was only with MacArthur’s theater but with
under construction. MacArthur favored the North African campaign as well.
doing so as well, for operations in the Guadalcanal might have been lost if
Navy’s South Pacific Area supported his Japan had made a maximum effort.
own, unlike the subsequent central Instead, the Japanese sent reinforcements
Pacific campaigns, which were too far in small numbers and never assembled a
away to help him. large enough force to win the battle. Even
The War Department reluctantly so, the Navy was reduced at one point to
went along, despite well-grounded fears a single carrier in the Pacific as a direct
that the Navy was too weak to mount result of Watchtower.
such an offensive and would soon be call- The U.S. Army was dismayed
ing for assistance. The Joint Chiefs because Admiral King was soon
ordered Operation Watchtower—assaults demanding more and more support
on Tulagi and Guadalcanal—to com- from it. He had forced the operation on
mence in early August 1942. Just as the Marshall by threatening to seize Tulagi,
Army feared, King was barely able to which was at first considered more
patch together an expeditionary force. important than Guadalcanal, with naval
The marines went ashore on August 7, power alone if the Army did not assist
297
• S O U T H P A C I F I C A R E A •
In the early
morning light
on Bougain-
ville, a tank
and infantry-
men scout out
Japanese sol-
diers who may
have infiltrated Image Not Available
American lines
the night
before.
him. However, when the fighting started ered blockading and neutralizing it from
he immediately began calling for land- the air, which would free up resources
based air support. King later said that for other operations.
the Battle of Savo Island was the black- As the climax of Operation Cart-
est day of the war for him. After Savo, wheel, Halsey’s forces invaded
which showed that the Navy had over- Bougainville in the Solomons on Novem-
reached itself, King’s demands became ber 1, 1943. The Japanese first sought to
relentless. To hold Guadalcanal would prevent the landings by attacking the
cost America 24 ships and make the invasion fleet with four cruisers and six
waters between the Guadalcanal, Savo, destroyers. They were driven off by a U.S.
and Florida islands—Ironbottom Sound task force composed of four new light
to Allied sailors—the largest naval cruisers and eight destroyers. The Japa-
graveyard of the war. nese then sent down a large force from its
The South Pacific Area’s first theater main fleet anchorage in Truk. But code
commander was Vice Admiral Robert breakers in Hawaii decrypted the order
Ghormley. He did not function well in a and warned Halsey that seven heavy and
job that entailed trying to do too much one light cruiser plus four destroyers were
with too few resources. In September making for Rabaul, which would put
1942 he was replaced by Vice Admiral them within easy striking distance of his
William Halsey, the Navy’s most aggres- landing site in Bougainville.
sive commander. Halsey restored morale Halsey had no battleships or heavy
and, after being given more men and cruisers with which to protect his inva-
munitions, launched Operation Cart- sion force, because every available large
wheel in June 1943. warship had been assigned to the Cen-
Cartwheel’s job was to implement tral Pacific Area. What he did have on
Task Two by taking a series of steps up temporary loan were the fast carriers
the Solomons and toward the Bismar- Saratoga and Princeton. Carrier planes
cks, isolating Fortress Rabaul. Task had never attacked a Japanese base as
Three, the plan to storm Rabaul, now strong as Rabaul, which was believed to
began to fade away as planners consid- have 150 aircraft besides the newly
298
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •
George Kenney, began flying the 32nd to Yet MacArthur was learning fast,
Papua—the first large-scale airlift ever and the experience would not be wasted.
undertaken by the U.S. Army. After the Papuan campaign he made a
The hardest fighting took place in promise, which he kept, that there would
the Buna-Gona area. It was the scene of be “no more Bunas.” During the next
one of the worst-directed U.S. battles of two years his troops would suffer fewer
the war, largely because MacArthur had than 20,000 deaths in the course of many
little understanding of the Army’s new operations, partly because of tactical
triangular division formation, an lessons he learned in Papua that would
infantry-artillery team which had make his later campaigns more efficient.
tremendous firepower. Unfamiliar with Among other things, he was learning the
the triangular division, MacArthur many uses of aircraft, whose value he
broke up the 32nd and sent it to Papua had previously sneered at.
without heavy artillery or tank support. MacArthur’s understanding of sea
Its luckless commander, Major General power was expanding too. His need for
Edwin Forrest Harding, was obliged to troop transports was glaringly exposed at
separate the division into undergunned Buna, because he had almost no ships
task forces and throw them against and thus could not stage landings to out-
defenses that were nearly impossible flank or isolate enemy fortifications. His
to take. complaints led the Navy to assign him a
In the Buna-Gona area, MacArthur specialist, Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey,
repeatedly ordered costly frontal attacks whose VII Amphibious Force would
that had no chance of success. His chief of stage 56 operations in the Southwest
staff, the much hated Major General Pacific Area. MacArthur also learned
Richard K. Sutherland, inspected the battle how to exploit the decrypted enemy
area and reported back that guns, not lead- radio messages provided by army and
ership, were needed. MacArthur then navy intelligence. They would play a key
relieved Harding and put Lieutenant Gen- part in future operations by helping
eral Robert L. Eichelberger in command, determine which enemy strongholds
saying: “I want you to take Buna, or not to could be bypassed.
come back alive.” MacArthur still did not have enough
Buna fell on January 22, 1943, the of anything—during the first year of cam-
first time Japan had sustained a perma- paigning in Italy the United States shipped
nent defeat on land. But a very heavy 2.3 million tons of provisions to the Italian
price was paid for victory in Papua, people alone, which was roughly equal to
which MacArthur refused to admit, say- the volume of supplies provided to
ing instead that no campaign in history MacArthur’s entire theater. The Aus-
had gained so much at so little cost. This tralians made up some of the difference,
was an absurd boast that the facts proved but his command would never be supplied
to be hollow. as well as U.S. troops in Europe. Nor
In Papua some 40,000 Allied troops would he ever have enough warships.
were committed, and the Army suffered Even so, MacArthur worked wonders.
8,546 casualties, including 3,095 killed—a In 1943 the Southwest Pacific Area
death rate more than triple that of Guadal- campaign concentrated on the advance
canal. The 126th Infantry Regiment was to Rabaul. MacArthur was disappointed
completely wiped out, and whole battal- when the Joint Chiefs canceled his
ions were reduced by disease and casual- assault on that fortress. However, in a
ties to a tenth of their normal strength. series of amphibious and air attacks
301
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •
American
troops wade
ashore the
heavily mined
beaches during
the invasion of
Cebu Island in
the Philippines.
MacArthur isolated it and laid the basis control over a vast region, which the
for his brilliant bypassing strategy. Oper- Japanese vainly contested until their air
ation Cartwheel required him to attack strength was wiped out.
west along the coast of New Guinea, The key to MacArthur’s success was
north to the Admiralty Islands, and east his use of tactical air, which was more
into New Britain while Admiral William important in the Southwest Pacific Area
Halsey’s South Pacific Area forces were than perhaps any other theater. The
working their way up the Solomons. Southwest Pacific is thick with islands
Some at home were discouraged by capable of providing numerous sites for
the campaign’s slow progress. In August airfields. But unlike in Europe, the
1943 Life magazine noted sourly that it enemy’s air defenses were weak,
had taken a year of fighting to advance enabling even heavy bombers to make
from Guadalcanal to the tip of New precise low-level attacks.
Georgia, a distance of 200 miles. At that MacArthur also had an outstanding
rate the United States would invade air commander in General George C.
Japan sometime in 1957. Kenney. Kenney taught MacArthur
But these early efforts were about what planes could do, starting with the
finding solid footing. As U.S. power airlift to Buna that had encountered so
built up, the pace quickened. In Febru- much skepticism. Gradually, Kenney’s
ary 1944 a daring surprise attack put team worked out a strategy of blockad-
MacArthur in the Admiralty Islands (lit- ing enemy strongpoints from the air,
erally, because on this occasion he covering and assisting Allied ground
accompanied the troops, which was a troops while, by advancing their for-
rare event), and he secured them a ward bases, bringing more and more
month later. This completed the encir- Japanese targets within bombing range,
clement of Rabaul and ensured Japan’s or inside what was commonly called the
defeat. The United States now had air bomb line.
302
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •
By 1944 MacArthur had the means cost of 159 U.S. dead. Of 7,000 Japanese
for his most daring effort yet, a long who escaped into the jungle barely 1,000
leap up the New Guinea coast that survived.
would carry his forces 580 miles beyond Flushed with success, MacArthur’s
the enemy’s lines and into their rear. forces then moved quickly forward, seiz-
This campaign would become widely ing one island or coastal base after anoth-
admired as one of the most beautifully er. Only on Biak, where the Japanese
planned and executed of the war. were strongly entrenched and did not
The conventional wisdom in April charge the beaches and expose themselves
1944, in both Japan and the United to naval gunfire, were there problems. All
States, was that Wewak or Hansa Bay in the same, on August 20, at a cost of 600
northeast New Guinea had to be the next U.S. casualties, Biak was secured. In less
target. They were inside the bomb line than two years MacArthur had advanced
and the Japanese occupation force of almost 2,000 miles, and 1,100 were cov-
55,000 men had to be destroyed, accord- ered in the last two months.
ing to orthodox doctrine, before U.S. There was only one drawback to
forces could move farther along the coast. this splendid achievement—many
The idea of bypassing Wewak bypassed Japanese garrisons still had to
developed after bombing attacks on air- be taken. Thus, while U.S. forces went
fields in and around Hollandia on to bigger things, the Australian Army
destroyed the Japanese air cover. Intelli- spent the rest of the war mopping up
gence reported that unlike Wewak, Hol- the Japanese in New Guinea—an
landia was lightly defended. When one unglamorous task that cost it many
of MacArthur’s planners brought this to casualties. Typically, MacArthur gave
his attention, MacArthur decided to the Australians no credit for this effort.
cancel the planned attack on Hansa Bay MacArthur had wanted to liberate
and leap over it to Hollandia. the Philippines ever since he had been
All went according to plan. The forced to abandon them in March 1942.
Fifth Air Force performed so well that Sentiment, politics, and personal vanity
the Japanese were left with only 25 all played a part in this, but there was a
planes in the whole of New Guinea. sound military reason, too, for retaking
Admiral Barbey’s amphibious force, the at least the northernmost island of
largest yet seen in the southwest Pacific, Luzon. Its Manila Bay was a great har-
consisted of 217 vessels carrying 80,000 bor, and aircraft based in Luzon would
troops, which had been brought to- command the South China Sea and finish
gether from three different staging areas the job of cutting off Japan from its
located up to 1,000 miles away. Southeast Asian empire.
The plan unfolded as air and naval Admiral King thought otherwise,
attacks on Wewak and Hansa Bay con- however. He wanted the Navy’s central
vinced the enemy that they were Pacific drive to end with the seizure of
MacArthur’s targets, so that when on Formosa, which did not have as good a
April 22 his fleet changed course the ele- harbor as Manila Bay but otherwise
ment of surprise was total. This opera- would serve the same purpose as Luzon.
tion hastened the liberation of New A final decision was deferred, but an
Guinea by several months and provided agreement was reached that MacArthur’s
the Allies with a magnificent harbor that next move should be to take the southern
became one of their most important Philippine island of Mindanao.
bases. All this was gained at an initial Accordingly, in September 1944
303
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •
Japanese Navy was, for all practical pur- business district were destroyed and
poses, destroyed. 100,000 civilians died. Among the other
Leyte proved a much tougher nut to world cities involved in the war, only
crack than expected because of weather Warsaw is believed to have sustained
conditions that deprived the invading more damage.
troops of land-based air cover and allowed During this time MacArthur sent
the Japanese to reinforce their garrison. Lieutenant General Eichelberger to liber-
This forced a delay in attacking Luzon, ate the rest of the archipelago in a cam-
but on January 9 when MacArthur’s paign that made little military sense and
troops went ashore at Lingayen Gulf they that the Joint Chiefs did not want, but
were as strong as they had ever been, that delivered many Filipinos from
amounting to 10 divisions, 5 regimental enemy hands and was a masterpiece of
combat teams (enlarged regiments compa- dash and daring. Eichelberger’s Eighth
rable to brigades), and various other Army, Barbey’s VII Amphibious Force,
units—more U.S. troops than would fight and Lieutenant General Paul B. Wurt-
together anywhere else in the war except smith’s Thirteenth Air Force came
on the western front in Europe. together to pull off 14 major and 24
So many Japanese troops and minor amphibious landings in 44 days,
weapons had been lost defending Leyte freeing most of the Philippine islands.
that General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Operations did not go so well in
famed as the conqueror of Malaya, had northern Luzon, however, where
decided not to defend Lingayen. Thus, Yamashita’s troops had withdrawn to the
the landings were no problem. Simply mountains. The fighting there was bitter
getting there was the hard part, for some and went on for the rest of the war, with
200 Japanese suicide planes took a heavy some 50,000 Japanese holding out until
toll on the invasion fleet, sinking 24 V-J Day, August 15, 1945. Some have
ships, seriously damaging 27 more, and criticized MacArthur for not beefing up
inflicting more than 2,100 casualties, of the 6th Army and crushing Yamashita.
whom 738 were killed. The Seventh Yet the slower approach saved many lives
Fleet’s little escort carriers did not have in a situation where haste was unneces-
the fighter strength to break up these sary. Even on its reduced scale, Luzon
kamikaze attacks, and the fleet carriers was the biggest campaign in the South-
of Task Force 38 were not there to do it west Pacific Area, with 8,300 Americans,
for them. Once again, having a divided 1,100 Filipino guerrillas, and 205,000
command resulted in extra losses. The Japanese dying during its course. Liberat-
good news was that after 200 Japanese ing the entire archipelago cost the United
suicide planes had gone down, there States some 48,000 casualties and 14,000
were no more kamikaze attacks. deaths, the great majority sustained on
On February 3, advance units of the Leyte and Luzon.
1st Cavalry Division were in Manila’s Considering the scale of the fighting,
northern suburbs, liberating Santo the number of casualties was actually
Tomas University and nearly 4,000 moderate. The enemy lost 350,000
Allied internees. But because the Japa- troops in the archipelago, making it far
nese commander put up a ferocious and away the most crushing defeat Japan
defense, it took a month to secure Ma- would sustain in the Pacific. On Oki-
nila, during which time 70 percent of the nawa, by comparison, 7,000 U.S. troops
city’s factories, 80 percent of its southern would be killed fighting an enemy force
residential area, and 100 percent of its less than a third the size of Japan’s
305
• S O V I E T U N I O N •
occurred before a single Soviet citizen half of 1941. In 1942, and for every year
was killed by the invading Germans. thereafter, Soviet production of aircraft,
Understandably, many Soviet citi- tanks, and other important weapons
zens, especially those in the Ukraine, exceeded Germany’s output. This was
which had been hardest hit by the accomplished even though Germany’s
famines, initially welcomed the German steel and coal production was much
soldiers as liberators. Wholesale confisca- greater than that of the Soviets through
tions and massacres soon made it clear, 1944. The Soviets also received substan-
however, that—impossible as it seemed— tial Lend-Lease aid from the United
Hitler’s rule would be even worse than States, although this program’s assistance
Stalin’s. This realization united the Soviets did not become important until 1943,
as Stalin could never have done and when the tide of battle had already
made possible an almost miraculous turned in the U.S.S.R.’s favor.
national recovery. Stalin exploited this The miracle of Soviet military pro-
national will to survive by naming the duction was achieved by sacrificing civil-
Soviet struggle the Great Patriotic War. ian goods production almost completely.
Only a united and determined peo- Agricultural production was hard hit
ple could have survived the terrible losses too, not only from the loss of farmlands
of 1941. Many millions of Soviet soldiers but because the agricultural workforce
were killed or captured. Germany occu- fell by a third (compared to a 12.5 per-
pied Soviet territories that included 40 cent decline in the industrial workforce).
percent of the country’s population, 60 Because few able-bodied men of military
percent of its armaments industries, 63 age remained on the farms, most work
percent of its coal, 58 percent of its steel was done by women, minors, and the
production, and similar large shares of aged. The loss of horses, oxen, and trac-
its industrial and agricultural output. tors meant that women had to serve as
The key to Soviet survival in the face draft animals to an astonishing degree.
of these staggering losses was relocation. Women made up a large part of the
Even as the fighting raged, not only did industrial work force as well, and
millions of people flee the invaded 800,000 served in the military, some in
regions, but they removed much of their combat jobs.
industry as well. A total of 2,593 plants Under these conditions, Soviet agri-
relocated to new sites in the Volga cultural output fell drastically. Because of
region, beyond the Ural Mountains, and German advances the total population—
elsewhere. Some 40 percent of the work- including Poles—fell from 194 million to
ers and technicians relocated as well. A 130 million. But while the population of
second, though smaller, relocation was the native Soviets alone fell to 67 percent
made necessary in 1942 as a new Ger- of its prewar size, potato production fell
man offensive threatened the Volga and to 31.3 of what it had been, grain to
Caucasus regions. 27.9 percent, and meat and fats to 38.3
Meanwhile, military production in percent. This meant that most Soviet citi-
unaffected areas increased at such a rate zens went through the war in a state of
that even while the relocation was going malnutrition, a condition worsened by
on, target levels set before the war were the fact that most of them, including
actually exceeded. Production still did children and the aged, were working
not meet requirements, but Soviet indus- harder and for longer hours than before.
try manufactured about as many Calorie allowances for dependents were
weapons as Germany did in the second set at 780 a day and for nonindustrial
307
• S O V I E T U N I O N •
West was known as a “front” to the produced the much more advanced Ger-
Soviets and was named after the military man economy in almost every important
district to which it was assigned. Each category of weapons. Although accurate
front had a varying number of armies of figures are hard to come by (which is true
varying sizes, depending on its mission. In throughout Soviet history), a few facts
1942 the first tank corps were formed, are suggestive. In December 1941, the
and then the first tank armies, which low point of the Soviet war effort, the
were designed as offensive units. In the Soviet and German forces each had about
same year, entire artillery divisions were 2,500 combat aircraft. By January 1945,
created to provide massive concentrations when both countries were close to their
of firepower, above and beyond the guns peak production levels, the Soviets had at
provided to each rifle (infantry) division. least 14,500 aircraft, the Germans not
In 1943 artillery corps were formed with quite 2,000.
700 guns apiece. At war’s end there were For tanks and self-propelled guns,
10 of these corps. the 1941 figures were 1,700 Soviet and
Stalin never accepted the concept of 1,500 German. The 1945 figures in this
the strategic retreat. And he insisted on category were 11,000 and 4,000, respec-
massing troops so that defeats became tively. Most Soviet tanks were compara-
catastrophes. However, once the Red ble to the best German tanks, something
Army went over to the offensive in 1943 that was never true on the western front.
these mistaken ideas no longer mattered. No other state—not even Germany
Although the Red Army’s perfor- and Japan—suffered losses on the
mance improved enormously during the immense scale that the Soviets did. And
course of the war, some of its problems no other nation made as great a contribu-
were never solved. German optics and elec- tion to the defeat of Germany. A few sim-
tronics were always better, as was German ple statistics make this clear. Germany’s
leadership, especially on the middle and armed force suffered more than 13 mil-
lower levels. Stalin squandered men by lion casualties—killed, wounded, cap-
insisting, for example, that the infantry tured, and missing in action—in the entire
attack without tank support, with Soviet war. Of these, 10 million were sustained
armor being kept in reserve to exploit fighting the Soviets on the eastern front.
breakthroughs. It appears also that on at
least some occasions minefields were SEE ALSO
cleared by having low-grade troops or pun- Eastern front; Finland; Germany; Japan,
ishment battalions march through them. surrender of; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad,
Battle of
These unfortunate tactics led to huge
and avoidable losses. By one estimate the
F U RTHER READING
Red Army lost more men taking Berlin
alone than the U.S. Army lost in action in Dunn, Walter S. Hitler’s Nemesis: The Red
Army, 1930–1945. Westport, Conn.:
the entire European theater. In all, it Praeger, 1994.
appears that some 11 million Soviet ser- Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. Boul-
vicemen and women were killed in action der, Colo.: Westview, 1983.
Salisbury, Harrison. The Siege of
or died of their wounds. This figure com-
Leningrad. New York: Avon, 1969.
pares with fewer than 300,000 U.S. battle Temkin, Gabriel. My Just War: The Mem-
deaths for the entire war. oir of a Jewish Red Army Soldier in
Despite these horrendous losses, World War II. Novato, Calif.: Presidio,
1998.
which led to severe manpower shortages Werth, Alexander. Russia at War,
in Soviet defense plants, the Soviets out- 1941–1945. New York: Avon, 1970.
309
• S P A A T Z , C A R L A . •
relieved of his job and made the senior air what was called the Transportation Plan.
officer in the Mediterranean theater. Gen- The idea behind it was to disrupt the
eral Spaatz, who had been commanding French rail and road systems so that
in the Mediterranean, was sent to Britain Germany could not reinforce and resup-
as commander of a newly formed entity, ply its forces in Normandy.
the United States Strategic Air Forces Although Eisenhower’s desire to see
Europe (USSTAF). His command includ- some visible support from the heavy
ed the Eighth Air Force and a newly bomb groups was understandable, in
formed Fifteenth Air Force based in the this instance Spaatz was right. There
Mediterranean. In addition, Spaatz was was in fact no need for USSTAF to
put in charge of all other U.S. air units in attack transportation targets in France,
the European Theater of Operations. because Bomber Command, which by
Since Eaker tended to defer to Spaatz, mid-1944 had achieved a high degree of
Spaatz became, in effect, the director of all accuracy, could attack rail yards as well
U.S. air operations in both theaters. or better. Also, the Allies had big tactical
In practice, however, Spaatz was air formations that were extremely effec-
primarily concerned with strategic tive against transportation targets.
bombing. In February 1944 the USSTAF Spaatz persisted, however, bootleg-
resumed its attacks on Germany, this ging oil attacks as often as the Trans-
time with the support of long-range portation Plan allowed. By the fall of
fighter escorts that previously had not 1944 he was finally free to concentrate
been available. This cover enabled on oil targets. Eventually the Oil Plan
USSTAF to gain control of the daylight would succeed, but the problem was
skies over Germany and reduce the Ger- that oil plants had to be bombed visu-
man fighter force, for the most part, to ally, and clear days came only about
night operations. That was the major once a month. Thus, in practice USSTAF
contribution made by heavy bombers to was forced to bomb blind most of the
the success of Overlord, the Allied inva- time, using H2X radar sets that could
sion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. not find a target smaller than a city.
During the preinvasion period, and Because visibility was too poor for
for a time afterward, Spaatz fought hard precision bombing, the attacking aircraft
to keep his bombing attacks confined to would bomb cities as their secondary
strategic targets. The ones he most targets. These bombings were area
wished to destroy were oil plants, attacks, and therefore in their effects lit-
refineries, and factories that turned coal tle different from the terror raids made
into synthetic gasoline. This campaign by the RAF.
was known as the Oil Plan. But General The USSTAF terror raids became a
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied public issue after the bombing of Dres-
supreme commander in Europe, who den in 1945. Bomber Command
had gained direct control of USSTAF and attacked this previously unbombed city
the RAF’s Bomber Command during the on the night of February 13–14, creating
invasion period, disagreed. He and other a firestorm that virtually leveled it. On
Allied commanders had too often seen the 14th, USSTAF made two separate
heavy bomber commanders make claims attacks on Dresden, aiming, as usual, at
for strategic bombing that were not its marshaling yards, not knowing that
borne out in practice. Thus he insisted they had already been destroyed. Unlike
that the heavy bomber forces attack rail most such attacks, the bombing of Dres-
marshaling targets in France as part of den became an issue in the United States.
311
• S P R U A N C E , R A Y M O N D A M E S •
Its apparent brutality and pointlessness July 1903–08; ensign, 1908; lieutenant,
sparked reports that the Allies were now j.g., 1911; lieutenant, 1913; lieutenant
commander, 1917; commander, 1918;
committed to terror attacks. Spaatz captain, 1932; rear admiral, 1940;
strongly defended USSTAF’s policies, commander of carrier task force at
Battle of Midway, June 4–6, 1942; vice
arguing that precision bombing was admiral, 1943; commander Fifth Fleet,
still the goal, with the area attacks 1943; admiral, 1944.
being made only out of necessity. Most • Died: December 13, 1969, Pebble
Americans seemed to have accepted Beach, Calif.
this position.
It became apparent that the
USSTAF’s strategy was successful at the
time of Germany’s surrender. By then its Raymond A. Spruance was the best
rail system had been put out of commis- American seagoing admiral of World War
sion by attacks on the rail yards. Its oil II, and perhaps in the entire history of the
industry was defunct as well. Still, the United States. In his time he was less
fact remains that Germany surrendered famous than his outspoken partner,
not for these reasons but because it had William Halsey, who became a five-star
been overrun by Allied and Soviet forces. fleet admiral, while Spruance retired with
Spaatz’s legacy was, therefore, ambigu- only four stars. But Spruance was a better
ous, both morally and with respect to seaman than Halsey, and made better
the value of strategic bombing. decisions in the heat of battle. He was
also a quiet man, highly intelligent, cour-
SEE ALSO
teous, and publicity-shy.
Arnold, Henry H.; Berlin, bombing of;
Royal Air Force; Schweinfurt, bombing of; Spruance worked his way up the lad-
Strategic bombing der of promotion as a commander of sur-
face ships. When the Pacific war broke
F U RTHER READING out on December 7, 1941, he was in
Davis, Richard G. Carl A. Spaatz and the charge of Cruiser Division 5, part of
Air War in Europe. Washington, D.C.: Halsey’s carrier task force. In May 1942
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.
Mets, David R. Master of Airpower: Gen- naval intelligence learned that the Japa-
eral Carl A. Spaatz. Novato, Calif.: Pre- nese main fleet was going to attack Mid-
sidio, 1988. way Island, the westernmost one of the
Hawaiian chain. Its purpose was to lure
the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s carriers into a trap
Spruance, Raymond and destroy them.
Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander
Ames in chief of the Pacific Fleet, decided to
AMERICAN ADMIRAL, meet the Japanese force because even
VICTOR OF THE BATTLES OF though the Americans would be outnum-
MIDWAY AND THE bered and outgunned in every type of ship
PHILIPPINE SEA and weapon, they would have the advan-
tage of surprise. Halsey should have been
• Born: July 3, 1986, Baltimore, Md.
• Political party: none
in command of this battle, but he was
• Education: U.S. Military Academy, hospitalized with a skin condition. When
B.S., 1914; Air Service Tactical School, Nimitz asked Halsey who should take
1924–25; Command and General over his command, he picked Spruance.
Staff School, 1934–35
• Military service: U.S. Navy:
This was unheard of because the Navy
midshipman in U.S. Naval Academy, believed that only aviators could com-
312
• S P R U A N C E , R A Y M O N D A M E S •
mand aircraft carriers and task forces, and more days. Yorktown, already damaged
Spruance was not a pilot. But except for by Japanese planes, finally was sunk by
Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who an enemy submarine. Spruance’s aircraft
would command the fleet at sea, there sank a Japanese cruiser. Finally, low on
were no other carrier admirals available. fuel and planes, Spruance, who now had
Nimitz therefore put his faith in Spruance, operational command of the fleet, turned
and would be richly rewarded. its ships toward home.
Spruance and Fletcher commanded Until Midway the Japanese had
separate task forces. Spruance had two enjoyed seven months of unbroken suc-
carriers, Enterprise and Hornet, while cess. But the defeat suffered by the Imperi-
Fletcher had only one, Yorktown. When al Japanese Navy (IJN) on June 4 was a
the enemy fleet was sighted on June 4 blow from which it never recovered. After
by a Midway search plane, Spruance, Midway Japan was forced to assume a
who had been given a free hand by defensive position and would never have
Fletcher, made one of the most impor- anything in the future but local successes
tant decisions of the war at sea. He that changed nothing. Midway, the most
attacked the Japanese immediately with strategically important battle of the Pacific
all his strength at the maximum range of war, was won by U.S. courage and luck,
his torpedo bombers. Fletcher attacked but also to a large extent because of Spru-
an hour later. ance’s good judgment and willingness to
The battle did not go as expected. take calculated risks.
All the air groups had trouble locating After serving as chief of staff to
the Japanese force, which consisted of Nimitz from August 1943 to November
four carriers and a number of support- 1945, Spruance was made co-comman-
ing ships. The torpedo plane squadrons der of a fleet of ships that had previously
found the carriers first and, attacking been known as the Pacific Fleet. Com-
with little or no fighter protection, were mand of the fleet alternated between
nearly wiped out without scoring a sin- Halsey and Spruance; while one man
gle hit. Land-based aircraft from Mid- took it out to sea, the other planned its
way also failed to damage the Japanese. next operation. It was called the Third
Although the dive bombers from Hornet Fleet under Halsey and the Fifth Fleet
never did find the enemy and had to under Spruance. The Fifth Fleet, and its
land on Midway for lack of gas, the companion, the amphibious Central
other two dive bomber squadrons found Pacific Force, successfully assaulted the
all four enemy carriers, their decks Gilbert Islands (November 1943), the
crammed with aircraft, and their defen- Marshalls (January 1944), the Marianas
sive fighter patrol, which had been (June 1944), Iwo Jima (January 1945),
shooting down torpedo planes, flying at and Okinawa (April 1945).
low altitudes. At once the Americans The most important of these was
began their bombing runs and within the attack on the Marianas—Spruance’s
minutes three Japanese carriers were second most important victory against
aflame and sinking. the IJN. When the Fifth Fleet began its
Later that day Spruance sent a mixed air attacks on the Marianas on June 11,
force, including planes from Yorktown, 1944, Japanese naval leaders intent on
which had been attacked and could not achieving a decisive victory sent the
recover its aircraft, against the remaining largest fleet they could assemble from
Japanese carrier, which was then de- bases in the Philippines. Spruance
stroyed. The battle continued for several learned of its approach on the 15th and
313
• S S ( S C H U T Z S S T A F F E L N ) •
made plans to receive it. His first con- force. If Mitscher had been given a free
cern was for the invasion force of trans- rein, all nine Japanese carriers would
ports and support ships, which he probably have been sunk. Strategically,
assumed the Japanese planned to attack. though, this would have made little dif-
Therefore he placed Task Force 58, ference because without air crews the
which had all his fast carriers, and his remaining carriers were nearly useless.
fast battleships and cruisers in front of Although his victory could have been
the enemy fleet, but limited them to the even greater, Spruance won a crucial bat-
waters near Saipan. tle with little risk to his own men. Faced
The Japanese, however, did not with a similar decision at the Battle of
attack the invasion force on June 19. Leyte Gulf in October 1944, Halsey went
Instead, they assaulted Task Force 58 on the attack at once and nearly lost an
with both land-based and carrier air- entire U.S. landing force.
craft. Unlike the battle at Midway, U.S.
SEE ALSO
planes and pilots were now superior,
Central Pacific Area; Halsey, William F.;
and the result was a slaughter. The Midway, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of
Japanese lost about 375 planes while
Task Force 58, commanded by Vice F U RTHER READING
Admiral Mark A. Mitscher, lost only 25. Buell, Thomas B. The Quiet Warrior: A
This fight was informally named “The Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spru-
Marianas Turkey Shoot.” ance. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1987.
The enemy fleet, now in retreat,
was not located until late the following
day. Mitscher then launched his air
groups at maximum range, and with the
light fading they managed to sink one SS (Schutzsstaffeln)
more Japanese carrier in addition to two
that were destroyed by U.S. submarines
on the 19th. Many planes ran out of gas
on the long flight back to Task Force The SS (Schutzsstaffeln, literally “protec-
58, but most of their crews were later tion squads”) began as Hitler’s squad of
rescued. In this two-day engagement, personal bodyguards in 1923. In 1929
known as the Battle of the Philippine command of it was given to Heinrich
Sea, the Japanese lost 476 planes and Himmler, who expanded it from a few
445 aviators, Spruance, 130 planes and hundred men to over 200,000 by 1933.
43 men. Even though most of the Japa- Known as the “black order” because of
nese carriers got away, the Japanese the color of its uniforms, the SS became
Fleet Air Arm was destroyed because of Hitler’s elite organization with its own
the loss of so many aviators who could political police, the dreaded Gestapo. It
not be replaced, although the Allies did ran the concentration and death camps,
not realize this at the time. owned its own businesses, and was a
Spruance was much criticized, both great empire that penetrated many areas
at the time and later, for not sending Task of German life.
Force 58 and his fast battleships to meet The largest department of the SS
the enemy as soon as it was sighted. In was its field army, the fierce and feared
hindsight, however, this was clearly the Waffen-SS, which, by the end of the war
right course because the Japanese were consisted of 800,000 men organized
after Mitscher’s carriers, not the invasion into 38 divisions. The first 3 divisions
314
• S T A L I N , J O S E P H •
were formed in 1939, against the will of Bulge, Battle of the, Eastern front, German
Gestapo offi-
Army
cials record the German Army, which saw the Waf-
data on incom- fen-SS as a rival for men and resources. F U RTHER READING
ing prisoners at In time the Waffen-SS was fully inte- Lumsden, Robin. The Waffen-SS. London:
a German con- grated into the Army on the command Allan, 1994.
centration level, while remaining under Himmler’s Stein, George. The Waffen-SS: Hitler’s
camp. Those Elite Guards at War. Ithaca, N.Y/: Cor-
authority in other areas, such as person-
waiting to be nell University Press, 1966.
nel and replacement training. Competi-
questioned are
seated on the
tion was further reduced by severe
ground (left) restrictions on the Waffen-SS’s ability to
under guard. recruit inside Germany. Although fric-
tion never died out, army commanders
Stalin, Joseph
came to appreciate the Waffen-SS for its ABSOLUTE RULER OF THE
dedication, drive, and willingness to take SOVIET UNION
high casualties. • Born: December 9, 1879, Gori,
Because of the limits placed on it, Georgia
the Waffen-SS depended heavily on • Political party: Communist
• Military service: Red Army: political
recruits. It often forcibly enrolled men commissar, 1918–20; marshal of the
from ethnic German communities out- Red Army, 1943; generalissimo, 1945
side the Third Reich. In addition, volun- • Government service: Commissar of
teers were obtained from other Nordic nationalities, 1918; member, Central
Committee of Communist party;
countries such as Norway and Holland. member, Political Bureau of the
Manpower needs were so great, how- Communist party (Politburo),
Organizational Bureau of the
ever, that by 1943 the SS also included Communist party (Ogburo) and
men from all over Eastern Europe and commissar of state control, 1919;
the Balkans. These non-Germans fre- general secretary of the Central
Committee, 1922–1952
quently volunteered because of threats
• Died: March 5, 1953, Moscow,
or false promises, and therefore they Russia, U.S.S.R.
lacked motivation. As a result, the Waf-
fen-SS lost much of its elite character.
Only about a dozen Waffen-SS divisions
were really effective. They were used as Despite his two years as a political com-
troubleshooters, moving from front to missar with the Red Army and his lofty
front wherever the need was greatest. titles, Iosif Vissarionovich Djugashvili,
315
• S T A L I N , J O S E P H •
ern Europe turned out to be not in the sonally ordered untold millions of Soviet
best interests of the Soviet state. “Staliniz- citizens put to death before, during, and
ing” the east was a disastrous choice. It after World War II. He insisted on mili-
guaranteed that World War II would be tary strategies and tactics that caused mil-
followed by a cold war, which would lions of Soviet soldiers to die who other-
prove to be ruinously expensive for the wise would no doubt have lived. Cruel as
Soviets. Probably Stalin dealt harshly he was to the peoples of Eastern Europe,
with the east for personal reasons rather he was crueler still to his own people. It
than reasons of state. It extended his cannot be denied that without the Sovi-
power, which he loved to exercise. ets, Nazi Germany would not have been
Furthermore, the cold war gave defeated. The Soviet Union’s victory was
Stalin an excuse for maintaining the achieved under Stalin’s leadership; this
Soviet Union as a police state, which in too cannot be contested. But the price of
the absence of enemies would have been victory was terribly high—for the Soviets
harder to do. The United States and most of all.
Britain were eager to have good rela-
SEE ALSO
tions with Stalin after the war. Had he
Eastern front; Finland; Germany;
Finlandized Eastern Europe there would Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Soviet Union
have been no important barriers to (U.S.S.R.); Teheran conference; Yalta
good relations between East and West. conference
This suggests that the Stalinization of
Eastern Europe was designed to pro- F U RTHER READING
voke the West, thereby creating the per- Barros, James. Double Deception: Stalin,
manent enemies that would justify Sta- Hitler, and the Invasion of Russia.
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University
lin’s dictatorship. Press, 1995.
The legend of Stalin as a master of Bialer, Seweryn. Stalin and His Generals:
statecraft is therefore largely false. The col- Soviet Military Memoirs of World War
II. New York: Pegasus, 1969.
lapse of Germany and Japan left the Soviet Ulam, Adam. Stalin: The Man and His
Union and the United States as the only Era. New York: Viking, 1973.
remaining great powers. Stalin then had a
choice between alienating the United States
and maintaining the two countries’
wartime alliance. Had he chosen the latter,
the Soviet Union would have gotten Mar- Stalingrad, Battle of
shall Plan aid and would not have needed
to maintain great armed forces.
Under these circumstances the Soviet
Union might have enjoyed enough eco- Stalingrad is usually regarded as the
nomic success to have survived in some turning point of the European war. In
form or other. While claiming to act in 1942 the Wehrmacht (the German mili-
the name of the Soviet Union and com- tary) was weaker than in 1941 when it
munism, Stalin launched policies that had failed to capture Moscow. Just the
were ultimately destructive to both— same, Hitler ordered another offensive
hardly the mark of a great leader. Like in Russia that was supposed to be deci-
Hitler, Stalin did as he pleased, regardless sive. Known as Operation Blue, it was
of the cost or the consequences. intended to defeat the Soviets by, among
Stalin’s reputation as a blood-soaked other things, cutting them off from their
monster is not legend but fact. He per- oil supplies in the Caucasus.
318
• S T I M S O N, H E N R Y L E W I S •
bomber went down, half its crew usually propeller-driven fighter. It was originally
perished. built by North American Aviation for ser-
Out of 291,557 U.S. battle deaths in vice with the RAF, which on delivery
World War II, 52,173 were army airmen. found it to be underpowered. The British
This is an enormous number considering then fitted it with their own superb air-
that bomber crews made up a small part craft engine, the legendary Merlin. Thus
of the military as a whole. Their non- equipped, it could outperform any pro-
combat death rate was higher as well, peller-driven fighter, but it still lacked the
because of the hazardous nature of air range to accompany deep attacks. The
operations. A total of 35,946 airmen solution to this problem came from an
were killed accidentally, 43 percent of all intervention by Robert A. Lovett, the
such deaths in the Army. During the U.S. assistant secretary of war for air.
worst months of the air war in Europe, a Unlike Arnold, whose “hands were
study tracked 2,051 airmen through tied by his mouth,” Lovett said later, he
their duty tour of 25 missions, and only was not limited by having previously
559, or 26.8 percent, completed it, with championed the idea of a self-defending
1,195 being killed or missing in action. bomber. He demanded results from
The odds improved somewhat for Arnold, who dropped the problem on his
U.S. airmen once the Luftwaffe was new chief of staff, Major General Barney
beaten as a daytime force (though not M. Giles. The decisive Giles had North
for Bomber Command, because German American Aviation take out a big radio
night fighters remained active to the from behind the pilot’s seat and replace it
end). Still, bombing Germany was never with a 100-gallon fuel tank, while also
safe, and overall a high price was paid installing bulletproof tanks in the wings.
by American youth in support of the Fears that 300 additional gallons of fuel
USAAF’s faith in daylight precision bom- would be more than the wings and land-
bardment. ing gear could support were proven wrong
Victory in the air The USAAF when a test showed that the rugged little
responded to its defeat with very little Mustang could take it. Thanks to Lovett
delay. In December 1943, General Henry and Giles, bomber crews would now have
“Hap” Arnold—whose nickname belied a good chance of survival.
his impatience, hot temper, and ruthless- In February 1944 the strategic air
ness—replaced the Eighth’s commander, forces—reorganized, reinforced, and
Major General Ira Eaker, with Major defended by a large number of fighter
General James H. Doolittle, hero of the groups—were ready to take on the Luft-
first bombing raid on Tokyo in 1942. waffe once again, this time in Operation
This change was part of a general reorga- Pointblank. On February 20, when bad
nization that merged the Eighth Air Force weather over Germany finally lifted,
with the Fifteenth Air Force (a new com- “Big Week” began. The Eighth Air
mand operating from Mediterranean Force committed 16 combat wings (a
bases) to create the U.S. Strategic Air battle formation consisting of 63 heavy
Forces in Europe (USSTAF). Lieutenant bombers) and 17 fighter groups, most
General Carl Spaatz was made chief of being equipped with P-47 Thunder-
USSTAF, with Eaker taking over all bolts and P-38 Lightnings, whose ranges
Allied air forces in the Mediterranean. had been extended with belly and
A more important development was wing tanks.
the arrival of the desperately needed long- These aircraft had varying combat
range P-51 Mustang, the last and greatest ranges, but two groups consisting of
323
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •
fighter force, which was now desperately ably, for sheer mindless violence Britain’s
short of pilots. Bomber Command took first place. It
These attacks were costly, especially began to carry out terror bombing
for the 15th Air Force, since Ploesti was because it could not attack Germany in
the third-best-defended target in Europe any other way. But under Air Marshal
(the first was the Ruhr). The Fifteenth Harris, it went on raiding German cities
also attacked Vienna, which had the sec- long after it was capable of accurately
ond-best air defense. Accordingly, Fif- bombing real strategic targets.
teenth’s losses were higher than those of Bomber Command committed the
Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command, two worst crimes of the European air
amounting to a loss of 318 heavy war: the bombings of Hamburg in 1943
bombers in July, Fifteenth’s worst month. and Dresden in 1945. Both attacks, the
During August it actually lost more men second deliberately, created huge
than the Allied armies in Italy. But when firestorms that consumed oxygen faster
the Red Army reached Ploesti a month than it could be replaced, killing thou-
later it found that oil was no longer being sands of people by carbon monoxide poi-
produced there—an exploit that had cost soning who were untouched by flame or
the Fifteenth Air Force 350 bombers. blast. Furthermore, Dresden had limited
By September 1944 Germany’s petro- strategic value and the war was nearly
leum output was reduced to 23 percent of over. The USAAF, in contrast, made seri-
the pre–Oil Plan levels, ending German ous efforts to bomb precisely and killed
tank training altogether and drastically far fewer German civilians.
reducing the training time of Luftwaffe But the differences between the two
pilots. At the end of 1944 Germany had air forces were greater in theory than in
only four crude oil refineries in operation practice. More than half of all U.S.
and five or six synthetic plants running. attacks ended up with the bombs being
By February 1945 air attacks had brought dropped through “undercast” (clouds
industry to a halt completely. and fog seen from above in a plane),
On April 7 the RAF discontinued which was in fact area bombing, what-
area bombing, and on the 16th Spaatz ever the military called it. In time Ameri-
informed his commanders that the cans employed terror bombing intention-
bomber offensive was over. Except for ally. One series of such attacks, on
tactical targets there was nothing left to February 22 and 23, 1945, code-named
attack. By this time Germany’s trans- Clarion, was aimed at small cities and
portation system had been destroyed as towns that had little or no military
well, since it was the habit of USSTAF to importance. The “Thunderclap” bomb-
have its bombers attack cities when the ing of Berlin on February 3, which was
weather did not permit raids on Oil Plan purely a terror raid, killed up to 25,000
targets—which was most of the time. As civilians. Four other attacks on Berlin
a result of frequent area attacks by U.S. were similar in character.
and British bombers, all of Germany’s USSTAF also supported Britain’s
cities were eventually burned out, includ- attack on Dresden in February and, when
ing their precious rail yards. criticism of area bombing developed,
Analysis of the bombing of Germany issued a statement saying that there had
British air historians, embarrassed by the been no change in policy, an obvious
record of Bomber Command, tend to falsehood, since it was policy to area
hold up the USAAF as the model that bomb whenever precision bombing was
ought to have been copied. And, undeni- impossible. Ultimately, U.S. air strikes
325
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •
killed fewer Germans than those of the than that of Germany. It began in 1944
British, mainly because they dropped when the new Boeing B-29 Superfortress
smaller bomb loads. The touch of moral was based in China for long-range
superiority over the RAF that may attacks on the Japanese home islands.
remain after noting these exceptions This campaign failed because all the sup-
leaves little to celebrate. plies for the bombing effort had to be
Not just a crime, the air war was also flown in from India over the “Hump,” a
a blunder. Even the official historians of the series of mountain ranges. This expensive
USAAF admit that daylight attacks on Ger- and dangerous enterprise cost many
many should not have been undertaken planes yet never managed to deliver
before February 1944, when long-range enough fuel and munitions to make air
fighter escorts became available. Although raids from China effective. So the effort
they did not admit this, the constantly shift- was canceled and the planes sent to bases
ing rationales of the bomber barons gave in the Mariana Islands.
their game away. Strategic bombing was Few senior officers outside the air
supposed to defeat the German nation, but force were enthusiastic about strategic
in actual practice the bomber campaign bombing by this time, and there was con-
became a war of attrition between the stant pressure to use heavy bombers in
Allied air forces and the Luftwaffe. direct support of troops. This was why
Control of the skies was supposed to General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold had
be won by destroying Germany’s aircraft persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
industry. Because this proved impossible, make B-29s independent of theater com-
control was won by raids whose principal manders in the Pacific. He would person-
function was to attract German fighters, ally direct the Twentieth Air Force, to
with the supposedly war-winning Allied which all Superfortresses were assigned,
heavy bombers serving simply as bait. with operations to be run by the heads of
The air war succeeded in the sense its bomber commands.
that virtually all the strategic targets in Given the vast resources that had
Germany were destroyed by war’s end. been committed to the B-29, and consid-
But this achievement came so near to the ering the Navy’s skepticism in particular
end of the ground war that it actually about it, the USAAF had much at stake
made little difference. Bombing Germany in its bombardment of Japan. Although
had other uses as well, mainly the diver- the Marianas were far superior to China
sion of German resources to air defense. as a base of operations and Tokyo was
Yet victory could have been achieved as only 1,200 miles from Saipan, the XXI
quickly, and perhaps even sooner, had the Bomber Command (the principal striking
huge Allied investment in strategic bomb- force) accomplished very little.
ing been put into the ground war instead. The B-29 still suffered from technical
None of this criticism applies to the difficulties, its maintenance was poor to
fighters and medium bombers (known as begin with, and the long flights to Japan
tactical air) directly supporting the consumed more fuel than expected, leav-
ground troops, which were an outstand- ing little margin for error. The USAAF
ing success. This support enabled Allied had not been prepared for the tremendous
armies that would otherwise have been winds and heavy cloud cover frequently
too small for the job to prevail over the found over Japan. Its very first attack,
German Army. launched from the Marianas on Novem-
Japan The strategic bombing of ber 24, 1944, was made by 111 aircraft.
Japan was even more futile and mindless Of these 17 aborted and returned to base,
326
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •
Miniatures of
Japanese tar-
gets, such as
this model of
Tokyo Bay in
the back-
ground, were
constructed on
sound stages
and used to
brief crews
preparing to Image Not Available
bomb Japanese
targets.
6 could not bomb because of mechanical the Eighth Air Force, understood that he
failures, and those that made it to Tokyo was supposed to terrorize Japan.
could not see the target because of under- Firebomb raids Once accuracy
cast and were swept along by 120-knot became unimportant, a battery of new
winds that made even radar useless. A methods could be used to burn out
mere 48 bombs fell on the primary target. Japanese cities, which were especially vul-
Although only one Superfortress was lost nerable because of their flimsy construc-
to enemy air defenses, 29 ran out of gas tion. Area bombing could take place after
and had to ditch in the ocean. This futile dark, because Japan had few night fight-
attack was followed by others. As a result ers, and could be carried out at low alti-
of poor visibility and winds as high as tudes, where the B-29 consumed less fuel
200 knots an hour, accuracy was nearly and could carry heavier bomb loads.
impossible. The skies over Japan were more
Arnold solved the problem by firing often clear at night than during the day,
Major General H. S. Hansell, the chief of the winds at low altitudes were not as
the XXI Bomber Command and a be- great as at higher ones, and loran, a radio
liever in precision bombing. His offense navigation system, also worked better at
seems to have been failing to launch fire- night. This was an important point,
bomb raids against Japanese cities. because at night bombers could not fly in
Hansell did not understand that the formation and every plane had to find its
USAAF was now committed to area own target by itself.
bombing, its prewar theory of strategic The first firebomb raid on Japan
bombardment having been proven took place on the night of March 9–10,
wrong. His replacement, Major General 1945, when 334 Superfortresses carrying
Curtis E. LeMay, the tactical wizard of six-ton bomb loads attacked Tokyo. The
327
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •
resulting devastation consumed almost but after January 1945 by the surface
16 square miles of the city and one- navy and tactical air units.
fourth of its buildings. One million peo- Minelaying The blockade of Japan
ple were made homeless and at least was completed by the Army Air Forces.
100,000 killed. It was the single most There was considerable irony in this,
destructive air attack of the war—includ- because the XXI Bomber Command’s
ing the atomic bombings—and was fol- greatest success was forced on it by the
lowed by many others. Navy. By 1945 Japan’s open-ocean con-
When Japan surrendered, 40 percent voy routes had been closed by a mix of
of its 66 major cities had been destroyed, naval and tactical air power. Much of
perhaps 400,000 people killed, some 9 what traffic remained went through Shi-
million forced to move to the country, monoseki Strait, and experience had
and 13 million made homeless. The XXI shown the Navy that heavy bombers
Bomber Command had practiced terror could do this best.
bombing on an entirely new scale, far The USAAF agreed to do so, and
surpassing the RAF’s attacks on German General Arnold ordered a mining cam-
cities. Little effort was made to determine paign to begin on April 1, 1945. Mining
the usefulness of firebombing, the policy the Tsushima and Shimonoseki straits
being simply to smash and burn until and the ports of Kobe and Osaka proved
Japan gave up. in fact to be sensationally effective. The
As with Germany, the bombardment tonnage of shipping received in Kobe
of Japan was both morally wrong and declined from 320,000 tons in March to
a waste of U.S. resources. It is true that 44,000 in July. Once Major General Cur-
legitimate targets were sometimes de- tis LeMay realized this, he stepped up the
stroyed, but most were marginal. Even effort, overwhelming Japan’s minesweep-
the official USAAF history is candid ing force. By this time Japan had given
about this, admitting that it was the up trying to import anything but food-
blockade rather than the bombing that stuffs and was failing even at that.
destroyed Japan’s defense effort. By In the last four and a half months of
April 1945 the flow of oil into Japan had the war, mines accounted for half of all
been cut off completely. It was only a Japanese shipping losses. The Army Air
matter of time, and not much of it at Force’s mining operations played an
that, before the wheels of Japanese indus- important role in completing the block-
try stopped turning. ade and did more to secure victory than
On June 26, the XXI Bomber Com- the celebrated firebomb raids. They were
mand launched an “oil plan” of its own, also more humane. Only 16 aircraft were
similar to the one employed with such lost out of 1,528 sent out to plant mines.
success against Germany. But after the While it is not known how many Japan-
war it was found that the Japanese ese seamen were killed, the number had
refineries were operating at only 4 per- to be small, because mining was done in
cent of their capacity when the campaign shallow waters close to land, giving crews
against them started. Thus, though it was a good chance of survival.
hugely destructive, firebombing con- Had the atomic bomb not become
tributed little to the defeat of Japan and available, the combined blockade and
alone would never have produced a sur- bombardment of Japan would have
render. The most effective Allied military forced a surrender in time, although it is
campaign against Japan was the block- impossible to know how much time
ade, originally conducted by submarines, would have been required.
328
• S U B M A R I N E S I N T H E P A C I F I C •
Sailors run
drills in this
submarine off
the coast of
North Carolina
in preparation
for combat in
the Pacific.
that was reduced to 10 million tons. In a mariners had destroyed 1,314 enemy
single year the Japanese merchant fleet, vessels, including one battleship, eight
excluding tankers, was cut in half, carriers, and eleven cruisers. A force of
bringing it down to 2 million tons. 16,000 men accounted for 55 percent of
Tanker capacity remained constant at all enemy ship losses, driving its mer-
860,000 tons, but only because Japan chant fleet from the high seas and
built 204 additional ships. Without putting Japanese industry out of busi-
them the tanker tonnage would have ness for lack of oil.
fallen by about two thirds. Even so, at In doing so, 3,500 U.S. submariners
the end of the year oil imports were perished, the highest loss rate of any
down to 200,000 tons a month from U.S. combat arm, and yet a very low fig-
700,000 in September. At that rate there ure compared with the number of
would be none at all very soon. Americans being killed on land. Despite
To all intents and purposes the sub- almost two years of bungling, the sub-
marine war came to an end in December marine was far and away America’s
1944, when Japanese merchant ships most effective Pacific weapon.
abandoned the open ocean. From then
on, they kept to the narrow waters of F U RTHER READING
the Sea of Japan or the Yellow Sea, sail- Blair, Clay, Jr. Silent Victory: The Ameri-
ing close to shore and anchoring in har- can Submarine War Against Japan. New
bors at night. York: Bantam, 1976.
Calvert, James F. Silent Running: My Years
While this protected Japanese ships on a World War II Attack Submarine.
against torpedo attacks, it also drasti- New York: Wiley, 1995.
cally limited their usefulness. During the Galantin, I. J. Take her Deep! A Subma-
Okinawan campaign not a single Japa- rine Against Japan in World War II.
Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin, 1987.
nese supply ship reached the island. After Mendenhall, Corwin. Submarine Diary.
the war it was calculated that U.S. sub- Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin, 1991.
330
•SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED E X P E D I T I O N A RY FORCE•
Teheran conference
At Teheran, each of the Big Three against Japan within months of V-E
nations—the United States, Britain, and Day.
the Soviet Union—had a different In Europe, Russia would gain
agenda. Churchill, to the despair even of Konigsberg, Germany, half of East Prus-
British diplomats, was still trying to stop sia, a third of the Italian fleet, and a free
the Overlord invasion planned for hand with Finland. During a conversa-
France and promote his Mediterranean tion with Stalin, FDR revealed that he
strategy. Stalin was determined to have a would not challenge a possible Soviet
second front opened in France and annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and
would not discuss anything else until its Estonia.
main features had been agreed upon. In East Asia, Darien would be a free
Roosevelt was most interested in the port, while Russia would acquire the
postwar settlement, which he believed southern half of the Sakhalin Islands in
depended on establishing a good rela- addition to the Kuriles. Most of all, Rus-
tionship with Stalin. sia would move its European boundary
As a result of Churchill’s stubborn- west to the so-called Curzon Line, at the
ness, most of the Teheran conference expense of Poland, despite the opposi-
was given over to wrangling about tion of Poland’s government-in-exile in
Overlord. For days the Big Three argued London. Stalin agreed to join a global
about when it should take place, about collective security organization after the
who should be in command if and when war. He gave his blessing to Roosevelt’s
there should be a supporting invasion of plan for partitioning Germany.
southern France, and over prospective Turkey never entered World War II,
operations in the Mediterranean. At var- despite heavy British pressure on it to do
ious times both Churchill and Roosevelt so, and it was lucky for the Turks that
attempted to curry favor with Stalin at they didn’t. If an Allied force had been
the other’s expense. sent to Turkey this would only have
Stalin, for his part, issued the cus- provided Stalin with an excuse to follow
tomary veiled threats to make a separate suit. And once in, the Soviets would
peace if Overlord were canceled. have been difficult to get out. Other-
Churchill gave in finally, agreeing that wise, the understandings arrived at in
Overlord would take place in May 1944 the Teheran conference determined the
and that there would be landings in the postwar settlement. The Yalta confer-
French Riviera associated with it. There ence of February 1945 mainly con-
was never any doubt of this once Stalin firmed what had already been agreed
made it clear, as he did almost immedi- upon.
ately, that he backed the U.S. position.
After rushing through many sub- SEE ALSO
jects, the Big Three ended their talks Yalta conference
with a flurry of pledges and pronounce-
ments. They issued an ambiguous state- F U RTHER READING
ment on the future of Iran. They Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and
American Foreign Policy, 1932–45. New
promised to support the Yugoslav parti- York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
sans in various ways in their fight Eubank, Keith. Summit at Teheran. New
against the Germans. Turkey would be York: Morrow, 1985.
encouraged to enter the war. Stalin was Mayle, Paul D. Eureka Summit: Agree-
ment in Principle and the Big Three at
to launch an offensive in support of the Tehran, 1943. Newark: University of
invasion of France and enter the war Delaware Press, 1987.
333
• T O J O , H I D E K I •
Tokyo, bombing of
SEE Strategic bombing
Truman, Harry S.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1945–53
• Born: May 8, 1884, Lamar, Mo. which he knew more than most college Franklin Roo-
• Political party: Democrat graduates. A member of the Missouri sevelt (right)
• Education: high school National Guard, he had been elected cap- hosts his new
• Military service: U.S. Army: captain, running mate
1917–19 tain of an artillery unit in World War I,
leading it with distinction. The “boys” of Harry Truman
• Government service: road overseer,
Jackson County, Mo., 1914; at a lunch on
Battery D, mostly Irish Catholics from
postmaster, Grandview, Mo., 1915; the lawn of the
Jackson County judge, 1922–24, and
Kansas City, would be the core supporters
White House.
presiding judge, 1926–34; U.S. Senate, of this small-town Baptist when he entered
1935–45; Vice President, 1945 politics—early evidence of his ability to
• Died: December 26, 1972, Kansas rise above the prejudices of his youth.
City, Mo.
Western Missouri was at the time
dominated by the political machine of
T. J. Pendergast. Truman would not have
had a political career if he had failed to
Like so many leaders of the period, go along with it, yet he remained com-
Harry Truman came from the midwest- pletely honest. He served eight years as
ern heartland of the United States. He presiding judge of Jackson County, an
was born in a small town near Joplin, administrative post similar to that of
Missouri, raised near Independence, and county executive elsewhere, which pro-
was about as typically American as you vided many opportunities for graft in the
could get. Yet, like Eisenhower, his “plain awarding of contracts for roads, bridges,
vanilla” exterior concealed a formidable and other public works. But when the
personality. 50-year-old Truman arrived in Washing-
A poor speaker whose seat in the ton in 1935, he was literally broke. After
Senate was his reward for loyalty to a renting a modest apartment for himself,
political leader, “Boss” Pendergast, Tru- his wife, and daughter, he had to take out
man had previously been best known for a bank loan to pay for the furnishings.
his careful grooming (“dapper” was the People initially thought little of Tru-
word always used) and modest friendli- man when he arrived in Washington, call-
ness. These appearances were deceptive. ing him the “senator from Pendergast.”
While he had no education beyond high But they found, as his fellow Missourians
school, Truman was a serious reader of had, that he was hard-working and hon-
history, biography, and the classics, about est, which, with his other good qualities,
335
• T R U M A N , H A R R Y S . •
made him popular in the Senate. Truman were doing well in their jobs, and Truman
was allowed to form his Special Commit- retained them. He tried as best he could to
tee to Investigate the National Defense follow Roosevelt’s conciliatory policy
Program out of courtesy more than any- toward the Soviet Union. However,
thing else, few sharing his belief that cor- because Truman had a quick temper, this
ruption in defense spending could be was not natural to him and he was soon
dealt with by legislators. responding to tough talk by the Soviets
The skeptics were wrong. Truman’s with sharp language of his own.
committee could not detect every scam, Truman’s best-remembered wartime
but it did a remarkably good and honest decision was to make nuclear war against
job of discovering waste, incompetence, Japan. Actually, he made no decision as
and fraud. This was a direct result of such, but rather he allowed military lead-
Truman’s determination, his efforts to ers to go forward with their plans to
create policy by including Republicans as drop the first two available atomic
well as Democrats, and his experience in bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Missouri, which had taught him where to Characteristically, however, Truman
look for the dirt. Within a year, citizens accepted responsibility for employing
respected his congressional committee atomic bombs and always maintained
more than any other. Newspapers called that the decision to drop them was his
him the “billion-dollar watchdog,” which alone. Technically he was correct in that
proved to be a considerable underestima- he had the power to cancel the drops had
tion of what he would eventually save he chosen to do so.
taxpayers. However, Truman followed General
Truman, unlike Henry A. Wallace, George C. Marshall’s lead in this and
his predecessor as Vice President, was other matters. Like Marshall, Truman
everything party leaders wanted. Well worried most of all about the many Amer-
known and admired, he was acceptable icans who would surely die if Japan had to
to labor and northern liberals because of be invaded. Under the circumstances, he
his pro–New Deal voting record and to felt that no other decision was possible.
southerners because he was, or at least Truman was convinced that he had done
appeared to be, one of them. Few if any the right thing and never regretted it.
delegates to the Democratic National
SEE ALSO
Convention in 1944 seem to have asked
Atomic bombs; Japan, surrender of; Pots-
if he was qualified to run the nation, yet dam conference
in selecting Truman the delegates were
also unwittingly naming the next Presi- F U RTHER READING
dent. All knew that the likelihood of Hamby, Alonzo L. Man of the People: A
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s dying in Life of Harry S. Truman. New York:
office was great. But they chose to ignore Oxford University Press, 1995.
McCullough, David. Truman. New York:
this for the sake of a balanced ticket. Not Simon & Schuster, 1992.
since 1864, when Lincoln’s vice president Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. Garden City,
was chosen, had the Vice Presidential N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955.
decision been so important. Wainstock, Dennis. The Decision to Drop
the Atomic Bomb. Westport, Conn.:
No thanks to the political process, Praeger, 1996.
Truman would prove to be a better than Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt and Utter
average President. He was sworn in quick- Destruction: Truman and the Use of
Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel
ly on April 12, 1945, after FDR’s sudden Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
death. By that time Roosevelt’s appointees 1997.
336
• U - B O A T S •
U-boats
that peace would be maintained in the groundwork that would turn it into a
future by what he called the “Four mighty force had been laid before war
Policemen” (China, the United King- broke out. When General George C.
dom, the United States, and the Marshall became chief of staff in 1939,
U.S.S.R.), or at least the “Three Police- he brought to his job a vision of a new
men” (the previous four minus China). army based on his experience as a
Before long, however, it became clear trainer and leader of troops. The old
that the postwar world would have only “square” division consisting of four regi-
two policemen, who would be rivals in ments and some 20,000 men was
the cold war rather than partners. Thus, replaced by a “triangular” division con-
the UN evolved in ways unanticipated sisting of three regiments and about
by any of its planners. 15,000 men. Leaner and more flexible
than the square division, it also possessed
F U RTHER READING
greater firepower, because of its artillery
Hilderbrand, Robert. Dumbarton Oaks:
The Origins of the United Nations and
battalions. In time, the typical infantry
the Search for Postwar Security. Chapel division would also have a tank battalion
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, attached to it. Because of their many
1990. vehicles, most infantry divisions were
Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley.
FDR and the Creation of the UN. New actually motorized. In addition to high
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. mobility, self-propelled guns enabled U.S.
Patterson, Charles. The Oxford 50th divisions to start fighting immediately
Anniversary Book of the United Nations.
New York: Oxford University Press, upon arriving at the battlefield.
1995. The three regiments of an infantry
Roberts, Adam. Presiding Over a division consisted of three battalions of
Divided World: Changing UN Roles,
1945–1993. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner,
about 850 men each, which were subdi-
1994. vided into three rifle companies and one
heavy weapons (mortars and machine
guns) company, a headquarters company
with six 105-mm howitzers, a service
United States Army company, and an antitank company.
It was not accidental that a division
came to have three regiments and the
regiments three battalions. Marshall
In September 1939 the U.S. Army con- believed in the holding attack, according
sisted of only 190,000 officers and men. to which one unit would fix the enemy
Behind this minuscule force was a in place, a second would seek to flank,
National Guard of 200,000 civilian vol- or go around, the enemy, and a third
unteers who trained on weekends and would be held in reserve ready to sup-
for two weeks in the summer. The guard port the other two or take advantage of
was mobilized in 1940 at the same time opportunities as they arose.
as the Selective Service System was cre- The first armored divisions, of
ated to supply soldiers through a limited which there would ultimately be 16,
military draft of civilians. In practice, consisted of two regiments of tanks and
National Guardsmen proved to be one of armored infantry, supported by
poorly trained and required extensive three artillery battalions. However, in
training to perform well in combat. practice U.S. armor rarely made massive
Although the regular army was “blitzkrieg-style” assaults, and in 1943
underequipped and far too small, the the armored divisions were reorganized
339
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y •
This mammoth
274 mm
railroad gun
captured during
the U.S.
Seventh Army
advance near
Rentwertshausen
easily holds
the 22 men lined
up on the barrel. Image Not Available
to achieve greater flexibility. The regi- never had enough manpower, what the
ments were replaced by three battalions U.S. Army did have instead was superb
each of infantry, tanks, and artillery. air and artillery support. Although pre-
These units were assigned as needed by war artillery officers often had to train
divisional headquarters to two smaller without guns, the plans they made
field headquarters known as combat proved to be tremendously effective when
commands. war came. Eventually there would be 326
In 1943 Marshall decided to cap the artillery battalions armed with highly
Army’s size at 90 divisions. In all, the effective 105-mm and 155-mm guns.
Army would deploy 11 field armies. The services’ radio communications
Each army consisted of two or more were first rate, and the introduction of
corps, which typically were made up of small planes made artillery spotting
two infantry divisions and one armored highly effective as well. Army gunners
division, plus supporting units. By the specialized in the technique of time-on-
war’s end, 26 corps would be deployed, target (TOT) method of bombardment,
with a total of 68 divisions going to according to which all guns fired their
Europe and 22 to the Pacific. first rounds at intervals timed to bring
Marshall’s decision to limit the every round on target at the same
Army to 90 divisions turned out to be a moment. The resulting storm of fire that
mistake because it meant, particularly in broke without warning was the U.S. tac-
Europe, that there would never be a tic the Germans feared the most.
strategic reserve and divisions could not Of the approximately 16 million
be rotated out of combat on a regular Americans who served in World War II,
basis. This put a great burden on the some 10 million were in the Army
U.S. combat soldier, who spent more Ground Forces. Unlike sailors and air-
time in battle than his British, and even men, most soldiers were draftees, and
German, counterparts. the Army’s makeup was heavily influ-
Although Eisenhower in particular enced by Selective Service priorities.
340
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y •
Americans did not think fathers should devote more of its resources to trans-
be drafted, as a result of which the aver- portation and logistics. But because so
age age of soldiers in 1944 was 26, many men were working to provide
while it was 23 for sailors and 22 for goods and services to the troops, U.S.
Marines. soldiers enjoyed a higher standard of liv-
The Army found itself drafting sin- ing than those of other nations.
gle men in their forties but sparing mar- The Army sustained 949,000 casu-
ried men half their age. This practice alties, of which 175,000 were killed in
had to change as casualties mounted. action. Thus the chance of being hit was
Thus, although fathers made up only 6 less than 1 in 10, and of being killed less
percent of those drafted in October than 1 in 50. But in a combat unit, the
1943, by the following April more than odds underwent a radical shift, with the
half the draftees were fathers. infantry suffering 264 casualties per
Another change as the war devel- 1,000 men per year and the armored
oped was the process of “skimming,” units 228. Combat engineers, field
whereby the Army Service Forces (the medics, and tank destroyer groups had
noncombat support branch of the similar casualty rates.
Army) got most of the men with techni- Even this summary understates the
cal skills and the Army Air Forces (AAF) risk, because casualties were not spread
received the pick of those who scored throughout an infantry division but
highest in qualification tests. As a result, were concentrated in its rifle companies.
Wool field combat soldiers were less educated than Additionally, these figures are for the
jackets (this other military personnel (having a year entire war, while the heaviest ground
one with a dis- of high school on average), and were fighting took place between June 1944
charge emblem also shorter and lighter. and June 1945. For the last six months
on its lapel) In 1943 the AAF lost its skimming of 1944, between 12,000 and 18,000
worn by Army
privileges. In 1944 General Marshall GIs were killed each month and 40,000
personnel were
closed down the Army’s specialist acade- to 60,000 wounded. In a typical rifle
nicknamed
“Ike” jackets
mic programs and the training of air company, combat losses would normally
because Eisen- cadets as well. The transfer of person- equal the number of men originally
hower was nel—some 30,000 air cadets alone—to assigned to it. Few riflemen escaped
rarely seen the infantry was one reason, in addition unharmed.
without one. to experience, why U.S. divisions Even though the greatest number of
improved with time, whereas casualties was sustained in Europe, men
almost everyone else’s preferred it to the Pacific. Overall casualty
were worn down. rates were lower in the Pacific, chiefly
Most U.S. sol- because 60 percent of all casualties were
diers saw little or caused by shells and the Japanese had
no combat, inferior ammunition. There were actual
because they cases of Japanese who attempted to com-
Image Not Available played supporting mit suicide with hand grenades and only
roles to the men bruised themselves. In Europe the “lethali-
who actually ty” rate for shrapnel wounds was 25 per-
fought. The U.S. cent but in the Pacific only 16 percent.
Army fought at However, the Pacific was a much
such a distance less healthy place to fight in than
from its bases at Europe, which resembled home to some
home, it had to extent and had towns and liquor and
341
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y A I R F O R C E S •
women. Except for beer and illegally World War II. Novato, Calif.: Presidio,
distilled spirits, the Pacific had little to 1998.
Perret, Geoffrey. There’s a War to Be Won:
offer. Most fighting took place in jungles The United States Army in World War
where heat and humidity were high and II. New York: Random House, 1991.
the disease rate enormous. Malaria was Province, Charles M. Patton’s Third Army:
A Daily Combat Diary. New York: Hip-
everywhere, as were dengue fever, para- pocrene, 1992.
sites, scrub typhus, diarrhea, swimmers’
itch, tree sap dermatitis, and every other
skin ailment known to man, plus a mys-
terious disease called “blue nail,” which
the doctors never did figure out.
United States Army
When first sent into battle, U.S. Air Forces (USAAF)
divisions composed of draftees and
National Guardsmen were not very
impressive, the inevitable result of mobi-
lizing too little and too late. But with In June 1941 the U.S. Army Air Corps
experience, more realistic training, more became the U.S. Army Air Forces
and better weaponry, and the abandon- (USAAF). However, most people called it
ment of the practice of skimming, U.S. the Air Force, as if it were a separate ser-
soldiers became as good as, if not better, vice equal to the Army and Navy. After
than those of any other nation. the war it would become a separate
As evidence one may offer the expe- branch of the military, but even during
rience of the 99th Infantry Division. It the war it maintained a great deal of
was a green division that went on the independence from the army command,
line in Belgium only weeks before the because General George C. Marshall, the
Battle of the Bulge began in December Army’s chief of staff, usually went along
1944. Yet, despite its absolute lack of with the USAAF’s commander, General
experience, and though heavily outnum- Henry Arnold, on air matters. Further-
bered and outgunned, the 99th stopped more, Arnold had a seat along with
the Sixth SS Panzer Army dead in its Marshall on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
tracks. It destroyed the German plan of Although all the services grew enor-
attack and won the precious time mously during the war, none equaled the
needed for Eisenhower to redeploy his USAAF in percentage terms. In 1939 the
forces and turn defeat into victory. Air Corps had 20,000 men. In 1945, 1.9
Many such stories could be told, all million men and women served in the
demonstrating the point that the U.S. USAAF. By then it had risen from 11
Army prevailed on the battlefield not percent of the Army’s total strength to
because it heavily outnumbered the more than 22 percent. In 1939 the air
enemy, which it seldom did, but because corps possessed 2,470 aircraft, nearly all
of its men and its methods. of which were obsolete. In 1944, when it
reached its peak, the USAAF had 80,000
SEE ALSO aircraft in service, most of which had
France, Battle of; Germany, surrender of; been built after Pearl Harbor was
Marshall, George C.; Southwest Pacific
Area
attacked in December 1941.
In addition, the USAAF employed
F U RTHER READING 422,000 civilians, including female ferry
McManus, John C. The Deadly Brother- pilots, who were known as WASPS, and
hood: The American Combat Soldier in the Civil Air Patrol, which performed a
342
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y A I R F O R C E S •
variety of duties, including searches for of February 1945 the air force had a total
German U-boats. Some 1.5 million men of 26 very heavy bombardment groups
and women are estimated to have served and 72.5 heavy bombardment groups.
in the Ground Observer Corps, which Each very heavy group had 45 aircraft
turned out not to be needed because the and 2,000 men, while heavy groups fly-
enemy aircraft they were supposed to ing B-17s and B-24s had 72 aircraft and
spot never arrived. 2,300 men. By comparison, there were
The USAAF included a great number 71 single-engine fighter groups, each with
of services and commands, which existed fewer than 1,000 men, 28.5 medium
to support the 16 separate air forces bombardment groups with 1,800 men
raised during the war. They were num- apiece, and 32 combat cargo groups,
bered according to the order in which each with fewer than 900 men. In addi-
they were formed. The First, Second, tion, there were miscellaneous squadrons
Third, and Fourth Air Forces remained in of light bombers, twin-engine fighters,
the continental United States for training troop carriers, and such specialized units
and defense purposes. The Sixth Air as mapping and photo-reconnaissance
Force protected the Panama Canal, while squadrons. Even so, the imbalance is
the Eleventh was based in Alaska. All the clear; strategic bombing got much more
rest were deployed overseas. than its share of resources.
The Twentieth Air Force, to which all Heavy and very heavy bombers
the USAAF’s B-29 very heavy bombers were often useful, especially in the
belonged, was unique also. It was com- Mediterranean Theater and the South-
manded by General Arnold himself. This west Pacific Area, where targets were
was a maneuver designed to prevent B- plentiful and lightly defended as a rule.
29s from being diverted to duties other But the majority of the heavy bombers,
than bombing Japan. In practice, the and all the very heavy ones, were de-
Twentieth’s operations were directed by voted to bombing Europe and Japan,
Arnold’s representative in the field. with results that did not justify the cost
The USAAF’s greatest achievements in planes and men—especially in
in the war were providing air support Europe. The USAAF was, therefore,
for ground troops and transporting men both lopsided and excessively large.
and materials all over the world. But Although strategic bombing was sup-
Arnold and the air generals were dedi- posed to save lives, as compared to the
cated above all to the theory of strategic heavy costs of ground warfare, it did not.
bombardment, according to which Ger- Some 40,000 airmen were killed in the
many and Japan would be defeated by war, plus an additional 35,000 who died
daylight precision bombing of essential in training or other noncombat missions.
military and industrial targets. Although Considering that the great majority of men
USAAF bombers destroyed large parts and women in the USAAF were ground
of Germany and Japan and killed many personnel, this was a very high total.
civilians, ultimately strategic bombing
SEE ALSO
failed to persuade either country to sur-
Arnold, Henry H.; Spaatz, Carl A.; Strate-
render. Nonetheless, it consumed the gic bombing
largest part of the USAAF’s resources.
F U RTHER READING
The basic air unit was the squadron,
which ranged in size from 7 B-29s to 25 Craven, Wesley F., and James L. Cate. The
Army Air Forces in World War II. 7 vols.
single-engine fighters. The typical group Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
consisted of three or four squadrons. As 1948–58.
343
• U N I T E D S T A T E S M A R I N E C O R P S •
destroyed (half of the corps) to acquire commander of the American Legion and
emergency landing strips for the Army an insurance executive. For some reason,
Air Force. lawyers played important roles in the sur-
While the Navy did many things vey, which also included young men such
supremely well, it committed itself to a as George Ball, Paul Nitze, John Kenneth
costly and unwise strategy. After the Galbraith—and even the poet W. H.
bloody battle at Betio Island in Tarawa Auden, who had not yet become famous.
Atoll, naval planners came up with bet- After Germany’s defeat, the USSBS
ter tactics while clinging to the strategy made a quick study of bombing results
that would produce additional, unneces- and in mid-June returned home. Survey
sarily bloody battles at Saipan, Peleliu, experts recommended to the U.S. Army
Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Air Force, on the basis of what they had
seen in Germany, that the system of target-
SEE ALSO
ing Japan be changed. At the time Major
Atlantic, Battle of the; Central Pacific
Area; King, Ernest J.; South Pacific Area; General Curtis LeMay was firebombing
Submarines in the Pacific Japanese cities in a terror campaign that
was forcing Japanese civilians to move
F U RTHER READING
into the countryside but which had not yet
Davidson, Joel R. The Unsinkable Fleet:
The Politics of the U.S. Navy Expansion persuaded Tokyo to surrender.
in World War II. Annapolis, Md.: Instead of this approach, called area
Naval Institute Press, 1996. bombing, the USSBS recommended that
Gunter, Helen Clifford. Navy WAVE:
Memories of World War II. Fort Bragg, LeMay concentrate on railways and
Calif.: Cypress House, 1992. coastal shipping or what was left of it,
Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. Now Hear This: The as well as oil, chemical, and electrical
Story of American Sailors in World War
I I. New York: Marlowe, 1994. power plants. Their advice was ignored,
Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United however, because the Air Force had
States Naval Operations in World War attempted daytime precision bombing in
II. 15 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, late 1944 and early 1945 and failed.
1947–62.
———. The Two-Ocean War: A Short The strong winds that prevailed over
History of the United States Navy in the Japan made accuracy impossible, hence
Second World War. Boston: Little, the terror attacks.
Brown, 1989.
Spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun: Little controversy surrounds the
The American War with Japan. New USSBS report on bombing results in
York: Free Press, 1985. Germany, but its report on Japan is still
debated. That is because, after an exam-
ination lasting not quite two months,
the USSBS announced that Japan would
United States have surrendered by November 1, 1945,
Strategic Bombing or December 31 at the latest, even if the
atomic bomb had not been used and
Survey (USSBS) there had been no Allied invasion. This
report has played a key role in the con-
tinuing historical argument over
whether the United States was justified
The United States Strategic Bombing Sur- in waging nuclear warfare against
vey was launched in late 1944 to evaluate Japan.
the air wars against Germany and Japan. But the USSBS report was seriously
It was led by Franklin D’Olier, a former flawed. Although some 1,000 USSBS
347
• V - 1 F L Y I N G B O M B •
which reached speeds of 2,500 miles per tion. A sizable strip along France’s Ital-
hour, there was no defense. Since this ian border, including the major port of
rate far exceeded the speed of sound, the Marseilles, was occupied by Italy. The
V-2 gave no warning. The first indica- most industrialized and populous area,
tion of danger was the explosion that which included Paris and the English
blew you up. However, like the V-1 fly- Channel and
ing bomb, the V-2 could not be targeted Atlantic coasts of
against anything smaller than a city and France, was occu-
so had little military value. Furthermore, pied by Germany.
the V-2 was far more complicated and What remained, a
expensive to build than the V-1 and largely rural area
strained Germany’s technical resources including most of
to the limit. Had Hitler not been so southern France Image Not Available
committed to these frightening but and part of the
largely useless weapons, the Germans Mediterranean
might well have developed an atomic coast, had a limit-
bomb. At the very least, the highly ed amount of self-
advanced conventional weapons the rule. Marshal
Germans were introducing—a subma- Henri Petain, a
rine that could stay underwater for hero of World
weeks at a time, a wire-guided antitank War I who came
missile, the first ground-to-air missile, out of retirement to preside over Henri Philippe
among others—could have been made France’s surrender to Germany, estab- Pétain headed
operational in time to affect the course lished his seat of government in the France’s Vichy
of the war. resort town of Vichy in central France. government.
The V-2 put Londoners on the front From Vichy, Petain’s government A military hero
from World
line again, as during the blitz of exercised direct control over what was
War I, Pétain
1940–41. But the development of the V- called the zone libre, or “free zone,”
was convicted
2 greatly reduced Germany’s ability to while it administered occupied France of treason after
defend itself. About 2,700 Londoners under German control. The Vichy World War II
were randomly killed by the V-2, but a regime broke sharply with France’s for his collabo-
far larger number of Allied soldiers sur- republican past and attempted to stage ration with
vived the war who would otherwise what it called a national revolution Nazi Germany.
have been killed had Germany’s based on traditional and authoritarian
resources been more intelligently values. It replaced all elected officials
employed. with appointees loyal to itself and perse-
cuted Jews, communists, and its real, or
potential, political enemies.
On November 11, 1942, following
Vichy France the Allied invasion of French North
Africa, Germany occupied the zone
libre. But it did not acquire the sizable
fleet, moored in Toulon since the
After its defeat in June 1940, France Armistice of June 1940, which was scut-
was divided up and greatly reduced in tled by the French Navy. Now directly
size. Large sectors on the German fron- under German control, Vichy retained
tier were either directly annexed by Ger- its administrative functions and, as resis-
many or reserved for future coloniza- tance to it mounted, conducted ever
349
• V I C T O R Y G A R D E N S •
Wallenberg, Raoul
RESCUER OF JEWS Image Not Available
Image Not Available
• Born: August 4, 1912, Stockholm,
Sweden
• Education: University of Michigan
School of Architecture, 1935
• Military service: Swedish Army,
1930–31
• Government service: Secretary to
Swedish legation in Hungary, 1944–45
• Died: Time and place of death
unknown
The cost of unionized workers would be rewarded
living in the for their restraint, most labor leaders had
United States pledged not to strike while the war
rose during the lasted. But by freezing wages, govern- Raoul Wallenberg was one of the great-
war until mea- ment had eliminated the main reason for est heroes of World War II and the fore-
sures by the
joining a union, and in 1942 their mem- most savior of Jews. Little in his early
government
bership declined—sharply in some cases. life suggested he would play such a role.
to keep it in
check became
To save organized labor, the WLB His family was one of the richest and
effective. agreed to help the unions hold and recruit most influential in Sweden but was also
members. In return for a no-strike pledge devoted to public service. After his grad-
and assurances of union cooperation with uation from the University of Michigan,
government, the WLB insisted that union- Wallenberg traveled widely, holding var-
ized employers include in their labor con- ious jobs in Europe and elsewhere. He
tracts what was called a “maintenance of returned to the safety of neutral Sweden
membership” clause. As defined in June after the war in Europe broke out.
1942, it stipulated that workers in orga- A few things about Wallenberg
nized plants automatically became union seem important in retrospect. He was an
members unless they refused to do so early critic of Adolf Hitler. His great-
within 15 days of being hired. Thanks to great-grandfather was Jewish. He had
this device, the fall in membership was worked for six months in Haifa, Pales-
halted and organized labor grew from a tine, which was largely Jewish. These
total membership of 8.7 million in 1940 few personal details do not go very far,
to 14.3 million five years later. Workers however, toward explaining the fantastic
continued to resent the wage freeze, but courage and zeal he would bring to the
on the whole it worked well and did not task of saving Hungarian Jews.
cause undue hardship. Many currents met to bring Wallen-
SEE ALSO berg to Budapest, Hungary, on July 9,
Financing the war; Labor; Mobilization; 1944. The Allied and neutral states had
Office of Price Administration done little about the Holocaust previous-
ly, but in 1944 the American War
F U RTHER READING
Refugees Board was formed and charged
Lichtenstein, Nelson. Labor’s War at
Home: The CIO in World War II. New with, among other things, saving Jews if
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. it could. Sweden, which cooperated with
352
• W A L L E N B E R G , R A O U L •
Hitler in many ways in order to maintain ”safe houses,” where Jews could stay
its neutrality, was growing bolder, until they could be taken out of the coun-
because numerous German defeats were try, and much more. These methods
making it clear that the Axis powers were worked in part because Horthy, who was
losing the war. Thus, when the plight of still regent of Hungary and retained some
Hungary’s Jews became known, Sweden authority, let them go ahead.
and the United States were willing to take However, on October 15, 1944,
action on their behalf. Horthy announced over the radio that
Although Hungary was a member Hungary was prepared to surrender to
of the Axis, its ruler, Admiral Miklos the Soviets. The Germans immediately
Horthy, did not support the Holocaust. put a puppet in his place, the leader of
Because of Horthy’s protection, in the the Hungarian fascist movement called
beginning of 1944 most Hungarian Jews the Arrow Cross. Wallenberg and his
were still alive. But Hungary’s role as a colleagues now redoubled their efforts,
safe haven ended on March 19, 1944, Wallenberg personally pulling Jews off
when Germany occupied Hungary to death trains and demanding that their
prevent it from surrendering to the So- documents, usually provided by his
viet Union. The roundup of Jews began organization, be respected. He risked his
the next day, under the supervision of liberty, and perhaps his life, time and
Adolf Eichmann, a leading exterminator. again in daring trips into the very heart
By July 7 the provinces had been cleared of the Nazi death machine. Arguing that
of Jews, hundreds of thousands having Germany had lost the war and continu-
been shipped to death camps in Poland. ing with the killing of Jews would only
Several hundred thousand Jews make it worse for the losers after the
were still alive in Budapest, and the U.S. war, Wallenberg tried to persuade Eich-
War Refugees Board, the Swedish Red mann to call off the slaughter. But Eich-
Cross, and the Swedish government mann and his fellow butchers were
resolved to save them. Since Sweden was already so drenched with innocent
to front the operation, because of its blood that they had nothing to lose.
neutral status, the rescue supervisor had Eichmann left Budapest on Decem-
to be Swedish. In the small world of ber 23, 1944, when the Red Army was
Sweden’s elite, Wallenberg stood out at knocking on its gates. He left orders that
once. He was young, single, his family the central ghetto was to be cleared of
name was famous and would afford him Jews. But Wallenberg prevented that,
some protection, and he was available pointing out to the SS officer in charge
and willing to go. that when he went to trial for crimes
Wallenberg’s job as secretary of the against humanity after the war, sparing
Swedish legation enabled him to issue the ghetto would count in his favor. No
protective passes and other documents one knows how many Jews were saved
to Jews that in theory should, and in by Wallenberg and his operation, but it
practice often did, save them from the cannot have been less than 100,000.
Holocaust. Wallenberg counted on the Wallenberg was eager to make con-
German respect for paperwork and pro- tact with Soviet authorities to arrange for
cedure, and it did not fail him. the completion of his rescue work. He
Under Wallenberg’s leadership an left Budapest on January 17, 1945, with
extensive network of rescuers was devel- two Soviet officers, and was never seen
oped that included Jewish youth, friendly again. After years of international agita-
legations (notably that of the papacy), tion on Wallenberg’s behalf, during which
353
• W A R B O N D S •
meant, in turn, drawing heavily on the bat zone in which the Western Allies
popular culture. and Germany fought. In World War I,
The war-bond drives, of which the front was a continuous line of
there were seven, entertained Americans trenches running from Switzerland to
as well as raised money. Movie stars the English Channel. In World War II
played important parts, with Hollywood there was no single fortified line, but the
organizing seven tours that played in invasion of Normandy by Allied forces
some 300 communities. Dorothy La- on June 6, 1944, established a new
mour, the star of many movies, was western front. To the U.S. Army there
credited with selling $350 million worth was no western front in World War II,
of bonds. Carole Lombard, another but rather a European theater of opera-
popular movie actress, gave her life to tions. “Western front” was, therefore,
the cause, dying in a plane crash on her an unofficial term.
way home from a bond tour. In addition
SEE ALSO
to bonds, war stamps costing only pen-
France, Battle of; Germany, surrender of
nies were sold—mainly to children.
Every form of salesmanship was
employed in this cause, and few Ameri-
cans managed to escape it. Willkie, Lewis
War-bond purchases were volun-
tary, although some thought that apart Wendell
from the “educational” value of war- REPUBLICAN NOMINEE FOR
bond drives it would be more effective PRESIDENT, 1940
to make them mandatory. Morgenthau
• Born: February 18, 1892, Elwood,
shrank from this, however, believing (no Ind.
doubt correctly) that Congress would • Political party: Republican
simply reduce the income tax to offset • Education: Indiana University, B.A.,
1913, LLB, 1915
the added burden. Even so, war-bond
• Military service: U.S. Army, 1917–19;
sales to individuals amounted to $49 bil- captain, 1919
lion, one-sixth of the war’s total cost. • Government service: none
• Died: October 8, 1944, New York, N.Y.
SEE ALSO
Financing the war; Office of Price Admin-
istration; Wage and price controls
these jobs as well as, if not better than, cooking modeled on that of the Army.
men, thus freeing able-bodied males for Some 25,000 women volunteered for the
combat. Early in 1942, the Army agreed Women’s Ambulance and Defense Corps
to accept 10,000 volunteers for a of America, whose slogan was “The Hell
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps—later We Can’t.” Its more than 50 chapters
renamed the Women’s Army Corps trained women to serve as air-raid war-
(WAC)—only because a bill introduced in dens, security guards, and messengers for
Congress by Representative Edith Nourse the armed forces. However, most who
Rogers (Republican–Mass.) forced its wished to contribute joined the Red
hand. The Navy went on refusing to Cross, which, with 3.5 million female
accept women in any capacity. There were volunteers, was by far the most impor-
plenty of men who were as yet not draft- tant outlet for patriotic women.
ed, the military’s reasoning went, which Some government agencies recog-
was true at the time, but this surplus did nized opportunity when they saw it. The
not last, forcing a later change of heart. Office of Civilian Defense employed a
Washington’s attitude toward number of female volunteers. The Office
women was particularly annoying in light of Price Administration used 50,000
of the popular support for a more serious women in five states to conduct a three-
war effort. In January 1942 a Gallup poll day canvass in July 1942 during which
reported that 68 percent of the public they briefed 450,000 retailers on the new
favored a labor draft for women aged price regulations. For the most part,
21–35—among women the majority in though, except for defense contractors,
favor rose to 73 percent. The women in who gradually warmed to the idea of hir-
the suggested age group were the most ing women workers, volunteer organiza-
enthusiastic of all: fully three-quarters of tions remained the main outlets.
those questioned asked for such a draft. Of these, the most controversial was
In March 1942 another poll dis- the American Women’s Voluntary Services
closed that the support for registering all (AWVS), founded by a group of society
adults and assigning as many as needed women in 1940 to prepare women for
to war work—what later would be called emergency work in the event of a Lon-
national service—was supported by a don-style blitz. It soon enrolled 350,000
ratio of almost two to one. It seems clear members in almost every state. To refute
that a selective labor draft, focusing on mockers who accused them of being
young women but including other social butterflies out on a spree, the
women (and men as well) who met cer- AWVS cast a remarkably broad net for
tain criteria, had all the support it needed. the times, organizing several units in
Magazines regularly predicted the enact- Harlem, at least one Chinese chapter, a
ment of legislation to that effect. But number of Hispanic units, and one affili-
Congress refused to pass such a bill, even ate consisting entirely of Taos Pueblo
in 1944 when President Franklin D. Roo- tribeswomen in New Mexico. Defying
sevelt finally got around to asking for it. local taboos, the New Orleans chapter
Lacking official outlets for war bravely included African-American
work, women formed numerous paramil- women.
itary groups of their own, including the When it became evident that the
Powder Puff Platoon of Joplin, Missouri, United States was not going to be
the Home Guard of Kalamazoo, Michi- attacked by German bombers, the AWVS
gan, and the Women’s Defense School of took on new assignments. In New York
Boston, which taught a course in field its members sold $5 million worth of war
358
• W O M E N •
bonds. In California there were AWVS was the efforts of the millions of wives
“chuck wagons” that delivered food, and mothers who fed and clothed their
including late-night snacks, to Coast families and kept their children in school,
Guard stations and remote military sites. sometimes under extremely difficult con-
In San Francisco, AWVS women taught ditions. Rationing, including that of gas,
Braille to blinded veterans. Others orga- made everyday life much harder than
nized agricultural work camps in Califor- before. Shortages, a complex rationing
nia and Colorado. Some New York sub- system in which the number of “points”
urbs had ambulances staffed entirely by required to buy rationed items was con-
AWVS members. stantly changing, long lines, and an over-
Although it was the biggest such burdened transportation system could
agency, the AWVS was by no means the make shopping and getting children to
only volunteer women’s organization that school and to appointments a nightmare
made a place for itself in the war effort. by prewar standards. Housewifery, never
At least three other women’s groups pro- an easy job, was never harder in modern
vided land and air ambulance services. times than during World War II.
There were also volunteer groups of Working women had to do all those
working women, such as WIRES things plus toil long hours at what were
(Women in Radio and Electric Service), frequently hard and demanding jobs,
WAMS (Women Aircraft Mechanics), especially in defense plants. The govern-
and WOWS (Women Ordnance Work- ment did little to make things easier for
ers), who collectively by 1943 had a them, an astonishing oversight consider-
membership of 33,000 in dozens of ing the seriousness of the manpower
munitions plants. shortage. This was a problem to which
As part of an elaborate recruiting women presented the obvious solution.
campaign, Oldsmobile created WINGS A few figures make this clear. Of the
(also known as the “Keep ’Em Winning 9 million additional persons who entered
Girls”), workers who were given uni- the labor force during World War II,
forms with a torch and wing insignia on some 3.3 million represented a natural
the front pocket. So that housewives increase, with the balance coming from
should not feel excluded, the Ladies’ people who would not otherwise have
Home Journal organized WINS (Women been employed. Boys and girls left school
in National Service), saying that house- early to work in factories, or at least
wives were “the largest army in the replace those who had given up lower-
nation fighting on the home front.” The paying jobs to do so. Old men came out
outpouring of female volunteers in a host of retirement to fill in for youths who
of organizations enabled women to had been drafted. But the most numerous
accomplish much, and suggested how new adult workers were married women,
much more they might have done had despite the prejudice against them.
there been a system in place to take full In 1936 a Gallup poll disclosed that
advantage of their enthusiasm. Even as it 82 percent of the men questioned, and 75
was, in April 1942, when 10,000 women percent of the women, believed that
volunteers marched down Fifth Avenue wives with employed husbands should
in New York, there were so many differ- not work. War did not change these atti-
ent uniforms that no one could identify tudes as much as might be supposed, for
them all. U.S. democracy had not yet reached the
Probably women’s greatest contribu- point where women were seen as having
tion to national well-being in wartime the same rights as men.
359
• W O M E N •
married women out of 10 between the For U.S. industry as a whole, female
ages of 18 and 40 were either in the employment patterns varied widely dur-
armed services or industry. ing the war. In Detroit women held 20
Although U.S. support for women percent of the jobs in aircraft factories,
workers was never this good, the work while at Boeing’s facilities in Seattle they
force changed anyway. In 1940 about made up 47 percent of the workforce.
half of the 11 million working women Also in Seattle women held 1.8 percent of
held poorly paid clerical, sales, and ser- the jobs at one shipyard but 21 percent at
vice jobs. The one-fifth engaged in manu- another. Yet, despite regional differences,
facturing were concentrated at the low the total number of women in the war
end, mostly in textile and clothing facto- industries soared, in Detroit alone the fig-
ries. Four years later, the percentage of ure rising from 46,800 to a high of
the female labor force in clerical, sales, 215,000 female industrial workers.
and service jobs had declined to 34 per- Apart from patriotism, the chief rea-
cent—because 3 million women had son why women poured into factories—
taken jobs in industry. Of these, about dirt, noise, and danger notwithstanding—
half had not worked at all before the was money. Even without wage equality,
war, while about a quarter had trans- women earned more as factory workers
ferred to manufacturing from the service than in their previous jobs. By 1945 at
industries. Ford’s Willow Run plant in Michigan,
Officially, the U.S. view was that one-third of the women workers had
married women were only working for experienced pay raises of 100 percent
the duration of the war and would return since the war began, compared to one-
home when it was over. There were many ninth of the men.
exceptions to this rule even in 1940, Although the prejudice against work-
when 15 percent of married women held ing women declined, or was at least sus-
outside jobs. But after that the proportion pended for the war, one thing that did
of married women who joined the labor not change was a refusal to take full
force increased to one in four in 1950, advantage of women’s potential. Black
and then to more than half in 1980. The women were discriminated against in war
proportion who were active mothers rose plants even more than white women, not
as well, so that by 1980 three out of five only by employers but by workers. Dur-
married women with children aged 6 to ing one two-week period in Detroit there
17 were in the work force, and so were were five “hate” strikes caused by the
two out of five with children younger employment of black women. Yet black
than 6. women were even more eager than
By June 1987 more than half of all whites to work.
women, 51 percent to be exact, who had While the participation rate of all
given birth during the previous year were women in the Detroit workforce rose
gainfully employed. Thus, while the from 29.5 in 1940 to 39.7 percent in
prominent role played by married 1944, the rate for nonwhite women went
women in wartime was seen as a tempo- from 31.6 to 48.8 percent. By 1945 the
rary expedient, it marked an historic percentage of employed black women
change from a relatively small female who were in private household service
work force dominated by young singles had declined from 60 to 45. One black
to an immense force comprised for the woman told an investigator that it was
most part of older, married, or formerly Hitler who had gotten them out of white
married women. folks’ kitchens. They would not go back.
361
• W O M E N A C C E P T E D F O R V O L U N TA RY E M E R G E N C Y S E RV I C E •
Even when labor was in shortest Anderson, Karen. Wartime Women: Sex
supply, little was done to relieve women Roles, Family Relations, and the Status
of Women during World War II. West-
of domestic duties that impaired their job port, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981.
effectiveness. In Seattle’s war industries Campbell, D’Ann. Women at War with
during 1943, women workers were more America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
than twice as likely to be absent from Press, 1984.
work as men. The War Manpower Com- May, Elaine Tyler. Pushing the Limits:
mission believed that 100,000 worker American Women, 1940–1961. New
hours were lost per month in Detroit York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Poulos, Paula Nassen, ed. A Woman’s War
alone because women took days off to do Too: U.S. Women in the Military in
their laundry. In Baltimore the quit rate World War II. Washington, D.C.:
for women workers was 6.16 percent, National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration, 1996.
compared to 4.78 for men. If shopping Weatherford, Doris. American Women and
and laundry services, hot take-out meals, World War II. New York: Facts on File,
and more and better nurseries had been 1990.
more widely available, all these losses
could have been cut. It would probably
have made some difference too if women
workers had been promoted and paid Women Accepted for
equally with men, which seems not to
have happened anywhere. This discrimi- Voluntary Emergency
nation helps to account for their much Service (WAVES)
lower wages, $31.21 per week in 1944
compared to $54.65 for men. Even the
high degree of unionization during
wartime had no effect, since union lead- The Navy called its female sailors
ers developed little interest in the special Women Accepted for Voluntary Emer-
problems of women. gency Service, so that they could be
Given the stereotyping and the pre- called WAVES. At first the U.S. Navy
vailing bias against employment of did not want women in the service, but
women, and the mass media’s habit of when Congress began working on a bill
trivializing what they did, what is to that end in 1942, the Navy benefited
remarkable is that so many women did from the Army’s mistakes and insisted
find jobs in defense plants. They were that women be admitted to service on
essential to the war effort, yet, like racial the same terms as men. However,
minorities, they could have contributed WAVES were held to higher standards
even more but for the prejudices against than the army’s Women’s Army Corps
them. Here, as well, American democracy (WAC). They were required to have a
had far to go and much to learn. college degree or two years of college
and at least two years of work experi-
SEE ALSO
ence in areas of use to the Navy. This
Mobilization; Women Accepted for Volun-
tary Emergency Services (WAVES);
made the average WAVE far better edu-
Women’s Army Corps (WAC) cated, and older too, than most enlisted
men.
F U RTHER READING
The Coast Guard, which was con-
American Women in a World at War: Con- trolled by the Navy Department during
temporary Accounts from World War II.
Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, eds. wartime, followed suit. Its female per-
Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1997. sonnel were known as SPARS, from the
362
• W O M E N ’ S A R M Y C O R P S •
1939 1942
Sept. 1 Apr. 9
Germany invades Poland Bataan peninsula in the Philippines falls
to the Japanese
Nov. 4
United States Neutrality Act passed May 6
Corregidor Island falls, and the
Philippines surrender to the Japanese
1940
May 4–8
May 10 Battle of the Coral Sea
Germany attacks in the west
June 4–7
June 22 Battle of Midway
France signs armistice with Germany
Aug. 7
American troops land on Guadalcanal
1941 Nov. 8
Allies land in Morocco and Algeria
March 11
(Operation Torch)
U.S. Lend-Lease Bill becomes law
June 22
Germany invades the Soviet Union 1943
Aug. 9 Jan. 14–24
Conference in Newfoundland between Casablanca Conference
Churchill and Roosevelt begins and
Feb. 2
results in Atlantic Charter
Soviets win the Battle of Stalingrad
July 26
May 13
The United States freezes Japanese assets
Axis forces surrender in North Africa
and restricts oil sales to Japan, a restric-
tion that soon becomes an embargo July 10
Anglo-American forces invade Sicily
Dec. 7
Japan attacks American military targets Aug. 17
in Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor Sicily falls to Allies
Dec. 8 Sept. 3
The United States declares war on Japan Allies land in Italy
Dec. 11 Nov. 20–23
Germany and Italy decare war on the Battle of Tarawa
United States
Nov. 28–Dec. 1
Dec. 23
Teheran Conference
Japan invades the Philippines
Dec. 24
Wake Island falls to the Japanese
372
• A P P E N D I X 1 •
Feb. 4–11
1944 Yalta Conference
Jan. 22 Feb. 19–March 26
Americans land at Anzio in Italy Battle of Iwo Jima
Jan. 25 Mar. 9–19
Allies secure Papua Americans initiate first firebomb raids
Feb. 20–25 on Japan
“Big Week,” Allied offensive turns tide April 1–June 21
of the air war over Germany Battle of Okinawa
June 4 April 12
Rome falls to Allies President Franklin D. Roosevelt dies
June 6 April 28
D-Day, the Allied invasion of France Italian partisans shoot Benito Mussolini
(Operation Overlord)
April 30
June 15–July 9 Adolf Hitler commits suicide
Battle of Saipan
May 2
June 19–20 Berlin falls to Allies
Battle of the Philippine Sea (The Great May 2
Marianas Turkey Shoot) German troops in Italy surrender
July 28 May 8
Americans lead the breakout from V-E Day (Germany surrenders)
Normandy
July 16
Aug. 15 American scientists test atomic bomb
Allied landings in southern France at Alamogordo in New Mexico
(Operation Dragoon)
July 17–Aug. 2
Aug. 25 Postdam Conference
Allies liberate Paris
Aug. 6
Sept. 17–25 United States drops the atomic bomb
Operation Market Garden “Little Boy” on Hiroshima
Oct. 20 Aug. 8
Americans land on Leyte in the Soviet Union declares war on Japan
Philippines
Aug. 9
Oct. 24–26 United States drops the atomic bomb
Battle of Leyte Gulf “Fat Man” on Nagasaki
Dec. 16 Aug. 15
Germans launch the Battle of the Bulge V-J Day (Japan surrenders)
Sept. 2
Japanese sign instrument of surrender
1945 aboard USS Missouri
Jan. 28
Battle of the Bulge ends
373
APPENDIX 2
Saipan Museum
World War II History Sites American Memorial Park
National Park Service
Admiral Nimitz Museum and
P.O. Box 5198-CHRB
Historical Center
Saipan, MP 96950-5198
P.O. Box 777
(670) 234-7207
304 East Main Street
www.nps.gov/amme
Fredricksburg, TX 78624
(830) 997-4379
USS Bowfin Submarine Museum
and Park
Allied Air Force, Inc.
11 Arizona Memorial Drive
1730 Vultee Street
Honolulu, HI 96818-3145
Allentown, PA 18103
(808) 423-1341
(610) 791-5122
www.aloha.net/~bowfin
INDEX
References to illustrations are Arnold, Henry H., 23, 71, 309, 322, Britain, 43–48, 63. See also Britain,
indicated by page numbers in 325, 327, 341, 347, 364 Battle of; British Army; Cham-
italics. References to main article Artillery, 24–25 berlain, Neville; Churchill, Winston;
entries are indicated by page Assault guns, 25 France; Germany; Royal Air Force;
numbers in boldface. Associated Negro Press of Chicago, Royal Navy; specific battles
14 Britain, Battle of, 40, 49
Atlantic, Battle of the, 25–30, 61, 160 British Air Force. See Royal Air Force
Adams, Charity, 363 Atlantic Charter (1941), 30–31, 129 British Army, 50–51
Admiralty Islands, 301 Atomic bombs, 21, 31–33, 144, 180, British Empire Air Training Scheme, 60
African Americans, 10–14, 114, 155, 181–83, 184, 216–17, 246, 327, British Expeditionary Force (BEF),
249, 350 335 121–22, 140
Afrika Korps, 14–15. See also North Attlee, Clement, 270 British Navy. See Royal Navy
Africa; Rommel, Erwin Auden, W. H., 346 Brooke, Alan, 292
Agriculture: Soviet Union, 306; U.S., Auschwitz concentration camp, 150 Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
156. See also Victory gardens Australia, 63, 85, 86, 138, 252, 286, 108
Airborne warfare, 15–16. See also 287, 295, 296, 299, 302 Brown, Prentiss M., 250
Paratroopers; Strategic bombing Austria, 126 Buckner, Simon Bolivar, 252
Air Corps, U.S. See U.S. Army Air Axis, 34. See also Germany; Italy; Bulgaria, 151, 276
Forces Japan Bulge, Battle of the, 51–56, 105, 132,
Aircraft, 16–17. See also 133, 156, 262
Antiaircraft guns; Bombers; Badoglio, Pietro, 164, 171 Burke, Edward R., 232
Strategic bombing Ballistic missiles, 347–48 Burke-Wadsworth Act, 355
Aircraft carriers, 17–19, 35 Banzai (suicide), 247 Burma, 56–57, 76, 77–78, 113–14,
Air Force. See Luftwaffe; Royal Air Barbarossa, Operation, 38 229. See also China-Burma-India
Force; U.S. Army Air Forces Barbey, Daniel E., 211, 300 theater
Air power theory, 207 Baruch, Bernard, 231 Buzz bombs, 347
Albania, 167, 168, 240 Bataan death march, 34 Byrnes, James F., 57–58, 231
Aleutian Islands, 225, 246, 247 Battle of San Pietro, The (film),
Alexander, Sir Harold, 294 236 Caldwell, Erskine, 40
Allied Relief Fund, 49 Battleships, 35–36, 188 California Institute of Technology, 32
Allies, 19. See also Britain; China; Bazookas, 36 Campbell, Abbie, 363
France; Soviet Union Belgium, 42, 118, 120–21, 233. See Canada, 42, 58–61, 63, 286
America First Committee, 19–20, 163 also Bulge, Battle of the Cantrill, Hadley, 107
American Federation of Labor (AFL), Berlin, 36–38, 100, 105, 308. See also Cartwheel, Operation, 297
12, 195, 197 Germany; Strategic bombing Casablanca (film), 236
American Volunteer Group (AVG), Berlin, Irving, 238 Casablanca conference, 61–62
113 Bernard, Lyle, 261 Casualties, 62–63. See also Germany;
American War Refugees Board, 352 Beveridge Report, 48 Holocaust; Medicine; Soviet Union;
American Women’s Voluntary Services Biddle, Nicholas, 186 specific battles
(AWVS), 357–58 Bismarck (battleship), 18, 36, 288 Catholic Church, 240
Antiaircraft guns, 24–25, 87 Blacks. See African Americans Central Pacific Area, 63–67, 193, 246,
Anti-Semitism, 170, 240. See also Blackshirts (Italy), 239 343. See also Iwo Jima, Battle of
Jews Blitzkrieg, 16, 22, 38, 97, 115 Chamberlain, Neville, 21, 67–68, 79,
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 25–26, Blum, Leon, 122 120, 127
28, 29–30 Bolton, Frances, 249 Chennault, Claire, 76, 77, 113–14
Anzio, Battle of, 20–21, 166 Bombers, 17, 23, 39–40. See also Chiang Kai-shek, 68–70, 75, 76–77,
Appeasement, 21, 67, 79. See also Atomic bombs; Strategic bombing 174. See also China
Munich pact Bonesteel, Charles H., 186 Chiang Kai-shek, Madam (Soong Mei-
Arcadia conference (1941), 21, 71 Bormann, Martin, 131 ling), 70
Ardennes campaign. See Bulge, Battle Bourke-White, Margaret, 40 Children: Britain, 45; Germany, 132;
of the Bowles, Chester, 250 U.S., 155, 359
Armor, 22 Bradley, Omar N., 41–43, 55, 104, China, 62, 65, 72–74, 173–75, 188
Army. See British Army; German 104, 118, 119, 133–34, 262 China-Burma-India theater, 74–78
Army; Imperial Japanese Army; Red Braun, Eva, 148 Churchill, Winston, 21, 27, 30, 31,
Army; U.S. Army Brereton, Lewis H., 88 37, 44, 45, 48, 49, 61, 71, 78–82,
Army Medical Corps, 249 Brewster, Kingman, 19 92, 121, 164, 215, 220, 270, 278,
Army Nurse Corps (ANC), 248, 249 Bricker, John, 106, 107 332, 337, 355, 365
378
• I N D E X •
Civil Air Patrol, 26, 341–42 Denmark, 128, 147, 150, 276 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Civil defense, 82–83 “Der Führer’s Face” (song), 238 185
Civilian Air Warning System, 83 Destination Tokyo (film), 237 Fermi, Enrico, 33
Civilians. See Home front; Human Destroyers, 94–95 Field guns, 24
rights; Slave labor; Strategic Dewey, Thomas E., 106, 107–8, 285 Fighting Seabees, The (film), 237
bombing DeWitt, John L., 185 Films, 155, 236–37
Coast Guard, 10–11, 361–62 Dietrich, Josef, 52, 53 Financing, of war, 109–11. See also
Cobra, Operation, 42, 118 Dill, Sir John, 71 Taxation
Codes and code breaking, 159–60, Dive-bombers, 40 Finland, 96, 100, 111–12, 316
176, 225–26. See also Intelligence; Doenitz, Karl, 27, 30, 105, 136 Fire bombing, 22, 95–96, 143,
Navajo Code Talkers D’Olier, Franklin, 346 179–80, 202, 326–27
Collaborators, 92, 116. See also Donovan, William J., 250 Fish, Hamilton, 11
Resistance movements Doolittle, James H., 225, 322 Flak tower, 25
Colonialism, 178 Douhet, Giulio, 320 Flamethrowers, 112–13
Combat fatigue, 219 Draft. See Conscription Fletcher, Frank Jack, 86, 137, 138,
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 71 Dresden, bombing of, 95–96, 226, 227, 296, 312
Combined Munitions Assignment 310–311, 324 Flying Tigers, 75, 113–14
Board, 71 Dunkirk, evacuation from, 44, 80, 91, Forrestal, James V., 114
Command Decision (film), 237 121–22, 140 Foster, Thomas B., 11
Communist party (China), 68, 69–70, France, 115–22. See also D-Day; De
72–73, 75 Eaker, Ira, 309–310, 322 Gaulle, Charles; French Army;
Concentration camps, 83, 151, 314. Eastern Europe, 284–85, 316–17. See Normandy; Resistance movements;
See also Holocaust also Czechoslovakia; Poland Vichy France; specific battles
Congress, U.S., 84. See also Elections Eastern front, 96–101. See also Soviet Franco, Francisco, 240
of 1942 and 1944 Union French Army, 117
Congress of Industrial Organizations East Indies, 176, 179. See also French Canadians, 58–59
(CIO), 12, 195, 197 Indonesia French National Committee, 61,
Connor, Fox, 102 Education, 136, 214 91–92, 94
Connor, Howard, 242 Egypt, 14, 168, 169, 240, 241
Conscription, 84, 149, 153, 232, 292, Eichelberger, Robert L., 300, 304 Gauss, Clarence, 75
339–40, 357, 363–64. See also Eichmann, Adolf, 352–53 General Federation of Women’s Clubs,
Selective Service System Einsatzgruppen, 149 356
Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), 231 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 37–38, 41, Geneva Convention of 1929, 271
Convoys, North Atlantic, 26 43, 52–53, 54–55, 89–90, 101–105, Genocide, 123. See also Holocaust
Coral Sea, Battle of, 85–86, 259–60 118, 119, 133, 134–35, 165, 217, George, David Lloyd, 79
Cowner, Eastine, 190 221, 223, 233, 234, 261–62, 294, German Army, 123–24. See also
Crete, 15 310, 323, 330, 364 Bulge, Battle of the; Eastern front;
Crime, 47, 155 El Alamein, battle of, 223, 232–33, France; SS
Crosby, Bing, 155, 238 278 German Labor Front, 132
Cruise missiles, 347 Elections of 1942 and 1944, 105–8 Germany, 105, 125–36, 324–25. See
Cruisers (warships), 86–87 Elsenborn Ridge (Belgium), 52, 53–54 also Berlin; Dresden; German
Czechoslovakia, 67, 126–27, 146–47, Embargo, of Japan, 176 Army; Hamburg; Hitler, Adolf;
321 England. See Britain Luftwaffe; Nazis; specific battles
ENIGMA code machine, 159, 160 Gerow, Leonard T., 53
Dachau concentration camp, 83 Enola Gay (airplane), 33, 181 Gestapo, 314. See also SS
Darlan, Jean, 93, 222, 223 Enterprise (aircraft carrier), 225, 226, Ghormley, Robert, 245, 297
Das Boot (film), 237 227, 228 G.I. Bill of Rights (1944), 12, 84, 136
Davis, William H., 196 Escort carriers, 18, 30 Gilbert Islands, 63–64
Dear Fatherland, Rest Quietly Ethiopia, 167, 168, 169, 240 Giles, Barney M., 322
(Bourke-White), 40 European Theater of Operations, 108. Giraud, Henri, 61, 93, 223
Declaration on Liberated Europe, See also France; Germany; Italy Göring, Hermann, 163, 207, 318
285, 367 Gort, Lord John, 121
D-Day, 87–90, 104, 215, 233. See Fair Employment Practices Gothic Line (Italy), 166
also Overlord, Operation Commission (FEPC), 12–13, 108–9 Government: Britain, 47–48; Canada,
De Gaulle, Charles, 61, 90–94, 102, Falaise gap (France), 118, 119, 233 60; France, 94; Germany, 125–26;
116–17, 122, 223. See also France Fascism, 109. See also Germany; Italy; Japan, 143–44, 173; U.S., 84,
De Guingand, Freddie, 55 Nazis 105–8, 356. See also Churchill,
379
• I N D E X •
Luftwaffe, 49, 99, 122, 207–9. See Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law, 41, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 32–33
also Strategic bombing 51, 55–56, 104, 119, 134, 223, O’Connor, Richard, 169
Luxembourg, 276 232–34 Office of Civilian Defense (OCD),
Morale, 47, 237. See also Home front 82–83, 280, 357
MacArthur, Douglas, 16, 63, 64, 65, Morgenthau, Henry, 109–10, 110–11, Office of Economic Stabilization, 231
66, 102, 149, 177, 192–93, 205,, 234–35, 353 Office of Emergency Management,
209–13, 246, 258, 259, 298–304, Morocco, 222–23 230
345, 364 Mortars, 235 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI),
Machine guns. See Small arms Motion pictures, 155, 236–37 185
MAGIC (code breaking), 159, 176, Mr. Chairman (Hobby), 148 Office of Price Administration, 250,
177, 178 Munich pact (1938), 21, 127, 240. 357
Maginot Line (France), 115, 120, 122 See also Appeasement Office of Production Management
Makin Atoll, 63–64, 330–31 Murrow, Edward R., 273 (OPM), 230
Malaria, 217–18, 341 Musashi (battleship), 36 Office of Strategic Services, 250–51
Malaya, 179, 367 Music, popular, 155–56, 238–39 Office of War Mobilization (OWM),
Malmedy massacre, 213 Mussolini, Benito, 150–51, 166, 167– 231
Manchuria, 173–74. See also China 68, 170, 171, 239–41. See also Italy Okinawa, battle of, 64, 66–67,
Manhattan Project, 31–32 212–13, 251–53
Manila Bay. See Philippines Nagasaki, Japan, 32, 33, 180, 182, Omaha Beach (France), 90
Manteuffel, Hasso von, 54 183, 184. See also Atomic bombs Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 31–32
Mao Zedong, 68, 70, 72 Nagumo, Chuichi, 226–27, 257, 265 Overlord, Operation, 16, 81, 103–4,
Maquis (French underground), 117, Napalm, 110, 241 215, 216. See also D-Day
277 National Association for the Ozawa, Jisaburo, 267
Mariana Islands, 64, 65, 289, 312–13 Advancement of Colored People
Marines. See U.S. Marine Corps (NAACP), 12, 14 Pacific Fleet, 254–55
Market Garden, Operation, 16, 104, National Guard, 232, 338 Pacific Ocean Area, 256. See also
119, 233–34 National Velvet (film), 237 Central Pacific Area; Pacific War;
Marshall, George C., 71, 75, 102, Native Americans, 242–43 Southwest Pacific Area
103, 133, 192, 213–17, 292, 335, Navajo code talkers, 242–43 Pacific War, 256–60, 340–41. See also
338–39, 340, 341, 362 Naval Nurse Corps (NNC), 249 Pacific Ocean Area; U.S. Navy; spe-
McCloy, John, 11 Navy. See Imperial Japanese Navy; cific battles
McClusky, Clarence, 228 Royal Navy; U.S. Navy; U-boats Panzerfaust (tank fist), 36
McNutt, Paul, 359 Nazis (National Socialist German Papua, New Guinea, 210, 300
Medicine, 217–20. See also Workers’ party), 125, 145–46, Paratroopers, 15–16, 90, 207. See also
Casualties; Nurses 243–44. See also Hitler, Adolf Airborne warfare
Mediterranean theater, 220–24. See Nelson, Donald, 230–31 Patton, George S., Jr., 42, 54, 55, 104,
also North Africa Netherlands, 120–21, 176, 276–77 118–19, 134, 217, 222, 260–63
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 126, 145, 146 New Deal, 84, 106, 266, 283 Paulau Islands, 302
Memphis Belle (film), 236 New Guinea, 299–300, 301–2. See Paulus, Friedrich, 99, 318
Mental health, 218–20 also Papua; Port Moresby; Rabaul; Pearl Harbor, attack on, 35, 69, 72,
Merrill, Frank, 57 Southwest Pacific Area 75, 130, 152, 159, 177–78, 244,
Mexican Americans, 369 Newspapers, 14 256–57, 264–65
Michener, James, 139 New Zealand, 252, 286, 287 Penicillin, 218
Mid-Pacific Direction Finding Net, Nimitz, Chester, 63, 64, 66, 85–86, Percival, Arthur, 367
85 193, 212, 227–28, 244–47, 251–53, Perkins, Frances, 266
Midway, Battle of, 35, 189, 224–28, 254–55, 259–60, 289, 311–12, 344 Pétain, Henri Philippe, 91, 116, 222,
245, 259, 312, 366 Nishimura, Shoji, 204 348
Milch, Erhard, 208 Normandy, Battle of, 41–42, 103–4, Petrillo, James C., 238
Mines and minesweeping, 228–29, 262. See also D-Day Philippines, 34, 65–66, 177, 179, 187,
327 North Africa, 27, 93, 102–3, 169, 209, 212, 248, 258–59, 301,
Mister Roberts (film), 237 198, 220, 221–24, 278–79, 291–92 302–4. See also Leyte Gulf, Battle
Mitchell, William, 309, 320 Northern Punitive Expedition (China), of; Pacific War
Mitscher, Mark A., 141, 313 68–69 Philippine Sea, Battle of, 65, 189,
Mobilization: Britain, 45–46; North Pacific Area, 247. See also 266–67, 313
Germany, 131; U.S., 230–33. See Aleutian Islands Pius XII, Pope, 240
also Industry Norway, 67, 123–24, 128, 147, 276 Pointblank, Operation, 61
Monte Casino, Italy, 166 Nurses, 248–49, 286, 364 Poland, 38, 63, 100, 127, 140, 147,
381
• I N D E X •
267–70, 277, 305 60, 143, 286–87, 320, 321, 323. Spruance, Raymond, 141, 226, 227,
Poliomyelitis, 282 See also Britain, battle of 244–45, 252, 267, 311–13
Port Moresby, New Guinea, 85, 86, Royal Canadian Air Force, 59, 60 SS (Schutzsstaffeln), 313–14
299 Royal Canadian Navy, 59 Stagg, J. M., 89–90
Potsdam Declaration (1945), 181, Royal Marines, 288 Stalin, Joseph, 37, 73, 111–12, 127,
182, 270–71 Royal Navy, 121–22, 252, 287–88 128, 285, 293, 314–17, 331–32,
Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr., 13, 14 Ruml, Beardsley, 110 364, 365
“Praise the Lord and Pass the Run Silent, Run Deep (film), 237 Stalin-Hitler pact (1939), 127–28,
Ammunition” (song), 238 Russia, 305. See also Soviet Union 147, 315
Prisoners of war (POWs), 34, 54, 188, Ryan, Cornelius, 87 Stalingrad, Battle of, 99–100, 317–18
213, 248, 268, 271, 316 Stilwell, Joseph W., 57, 73, 75–76,
Psychiatric casualties, 218–20 Saint-Pierre and Miquelon Islands, 91 77
PT boats, 272 Saipan, battle of, 65, 246, 289–90 Stimson, Henry L., 11, 194, 202, 216,
Saratoga (aircraft carrier), 17, 86 318–19, 362
Quebec, 58 Savo Island, Battle of, 138, 296, 297 Story of G.I. Joe, The (film), 236–37
Quinn, Don, 272 Schindler, Oskar, 150 Strategic bombing, 17, 23, 135, 216,
Quisling, Vidkum, 276 Schweinfurt, bombing of, 290 287, 290, 309–310, 320–27, 342,
Seabees, 291 346–47
Rabaul, New Guinea, 65, 297–98 Sea Lion, Operation, 49 Strikes, 195–97. See also Labor
Race riots, 11, 13 Second front, 291–92. See also Stuart, R. Douglas, 19
Radio, 272–73. See also Music Eastern Front Submachine gun, 294–95
Ramsey, Bertram H., 330 Selective Service System, 84, 292. See Submarines, 179, 328–29, 344–45.
Randolph, A. Philip, 12, 108–9 also Conscription See also Antisubmarine warfare; U-
Rationing, 46, 169, 250, 273–74, 358 Sherman, Frederick C., 298 boats
Reagan, Ronald, 243 Sherman tanks, 22 Sudetenland, 126, 146
Red Army, 96–101, 307–8, 368–69. Shingle, Operation, 20 Suez Canal, 220, 221
See also Soviet Union Shipping: Britain, 46; Japan, 327, Superfortress (B-29 bomber), 23, 39
Red Cross, 152, 356, 357 328–29; U.S., 25–30, 129–30, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Refugees, 274–75 190–91. See also Atlantic, Battle of Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), 88,
Regimental Combat Team (RCT), the 103, 323, 330
343 Sicily, 15–16, 164, 224, 261, 292–94 Sutherland, Richard K., 300
Relocation camps, 275 Singapore, 367 Sweden, 351–53
Resistance movements, 117, 268, Slave labor, 131, 269 Syphilis, 218
276–77 Slavs. See Czechoslovakia; Soviet Szilard, Leo, 31
Revenue Act of 1942, 110 Union
Rhineland, 126, 146 Slim, Sir William, 57 Taft, Robert, 185, 285
Ridgway, Matthew B., 16 Small arms, 294–95 Taiwan, 70
Riefenstahl, Leni, 236 Smith, Walter B., 330 Tanks, 22, 24, 36, 99, 100, 124, 131
Rochefort, Joseph J., 226 Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930), 174 Tarawa, battle of, 63–64, 330–31,
Rogers, Edith Nourse, 357, 362–63 Solomon Islands. See Guadalcanal, 345
Romania, 100, 151 battle of; South Pacific Area Taxation, 46–47, 109–10. See also
Rome-Berlin Axis, 34 Somaliland, 168, 169 Financing
Rommel, Erwin, 14–15, 140, 233, Soong, Charles Jones, 70 Taylor, A. J. P., 48
241, 277–79 Sorge, Richard, 158 Tedder, Arthur W., 330
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 82, 280–81 South Africa, 286 Teheran conference (1943), 331–32
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 18, 20–21, 27, Southeast Asia, 176, 178 Thach, James, 227–28
28, 29, 30, 31, 57, 61, 65, 71, 75, South Pacific Area, 141–42, 295–98 Thailand, 177
77, 84, 91, 92–93, 94, 103, 106–8, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 63, Theobald, Robert A., 247
128–30, 158, 176, 177, 178, 185, 65, 193, 210–12, 298–304 Third Reich, 126. See also Hitler,
186, 192, 195–96, 199, 202, 215, Soviet Union, 62–63, 96–101, 268, Adolf; Germany
216, 220, 221, 230–32, 234, 249, 269, 270, 307–8. See also Red Tibbets, Paul, 181
250, 266, 274, 279–81, 282–86, Army; Stalin, Joseph Tito, Joseph, 277
331–32, 334, 337–38, 344, 345, Spaatz, Carl A., 309–11, 322, 323 Todt, Fritz, 131
355, 362, 364, 365 Spanish Civil War (1936), 128, 240 Tojo, Hideki, 333
Rosenthal, Joe, 172 SPARS (Coast Guard), 361–62 Tokyo, bombing of, 175, 178–80, 202
Roundup, Operation, 215, 216 Speer, Albert, 131, 146 Torch, Operation, 84, 215, 221–24,
Royal Air Force (RAF), 44–45, 49, Sprague, Clifton T., 205 278, 334
382
• I N D E X •
PICTURE CREDITS
American Red Cross: 271; Archive Photos: 43, 93, 121, 159; courtesy of The Army
Museum collection: 22, 88, 136, 157, 340; Corbis: 307; Corbis/National Archives:
169, 345; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: 89; Express Newspapers/Archive Photos:
369; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library: 11, 107, 117, 203, 285, 349, 353, 356; Hulton-
Deutsch Collection/Corbis: 59, 175; Imperial War Museum/Archive Photos: 32, 99,
144, 207; Library of Congress: 19, 31, 40, 49, 62, 68, 77, 79, 81, 83, 83, 91, 102,
108, 110, 135, 138, 155, 163, 183, 199, 231, 236, 240, 244, 266, 269, 274, 283,
287, 299, 301, 309, 314, 315, 319, 321, 323, 331, 351, 348, 365; Los Almos
Scientific Library, courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library: 32; National Archives:
cover (top left), cover (top right), cover (bottom), frontispiece, 6, 9, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24,
27, 29, 33, 35, 37, 39, 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 64, 66, 70, 73, 74, 87, 104, 112, 113, 115,
123, 125, 127, 130, 147, 148, 151, 153, 161, 167, 172, 178, 177, 185, 187, 189,
190, 191, 193, 197, 205, 209, 214, 218, 221, 229, 233, 237, 238, 244, 245, 248,
250, 252, 255, 259, 261, 264, 265, 278, 280, 289, 291, 295, 297, 299, 326, 329,
333, 334, 336, 339, 343, 355, 359, 363; National Museum of Naval Aviation: 141,
192, 227, 362; National Park Service, courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library: 57;
Tallandier/Archive France/Archive Photos: 276; Gary Tong: 13, 26, 34, 55, 97, 133,
142, 165, 181, 210, 222, 253, 257, 263, 303; The Raul Wallenberg Committee of the
United States: 351; UPI/Corbis: 13
384