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World War II:

A Student Companion

William L. O’Neill

Oxford University Press


WORLD WAR II
A Student Companion
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2
Student Companions to American History
WILLIAM H. CHAFE, GENERAL EDITOR

WORLD WAR II
A Student Companion

William L. O’Neill

Oxford University Press


New York
Oxford University Press

Oxford New York


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Copyright © 1999 by William L. O’Neill


Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication


may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

O’Neill, William L.
World War II : a student companion / William L. O’Neill.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–19–510800–0
1. World War, 1939–45––Juvenile literature. I. Title.
II. Title: World War Two. III. Title: World War 2.
d743.7.049 1999
940.53––dc21 98-54918

987654321

Printed in the United States of America


on acid-free paper

On the cover: (top left) Dwight D. Eisenhower; (top right) Adolf Hitler;
(bottom) USS Bunker Hill bombarded by kamikazes off Kyushu,
Japan, May 11, 1945

Frontispiece: Private Paul Oglesby of the 30th Infantry stands at the altar of
a bombed-out church during the Italian campaign, September 23, 1943.
CONTENTS


PREFACE


HOW TO USE THIS BOOK


WORLD WAR II:
A STUDENT COMPANION


APPENDIX 1:
IMPORTANT DATES DURING
WORLD WAR II


APPENDIX 2:
MUSEUMS AND HISTORIC SITES


FURTHER READING AND WEBSITES


INDEX
Image Not Available

Servicemen put out a fire aboard the USS West Virginia during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
7

PREFACE

T
he Second World War was the most from taking advantage of the opportunity
deadly and costly military struggle that the defeat of Japan gave them. But
ever fought. It is estimated that over the long term Communism has proved
some 60 million people died as a result of to be less of a threat to freedom than Nazi
it, most of them civilians. But this figure is Germany and Imperial Japan. It has shown
only a guess. Some countries did not want itself to be capable of reform, as in China,
to admit the full extent of their losses. The and even of being overturned, as in Russia
Soviet Union, for example, always used to and Eastern Europe.
claim that about 20 million soldiers and World War II remains, therefore, a
civilians died because of the war. But when struggle that was not less noble for being
he was still president of the USSR Mikhail imperfect. It was fought at times with
Gorbachev admitted that as many as 29 methods that are hard to defend today. It
million Soviet citizens may have perished. failed to solve all the problems of humanity.
Even this number could still be too low. But what it did do was save a large part
Despite the war’s frightful cost, the of the world from tyranny, and make possi-
Soviet Union and the Western democracies ble the salvation of other parts of the
had no choice except to resist the forces of world in the future. Every Allied nation
Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. To start can take pride in what it sacrificed for
with, of course, they fought to save them- this great outcome. No subject is more
selves. But there was more at stake than worth studying today for what it teaches
simple survival. Japan intended to enslave us about the meaning of freedom and
the peoples of East and Southeast Asia, democracy.
whom the Japanese regarded as racially The articles in this book have been
inferior. The Nazis also viewed most of the designed to explain the war as accurately
people of Europe as racially inferior to the as possible. Many of the topics covered
Aryan, or Nordic, “race,” of which they remain controversial to this day, so no
believed Germans to be members. The attempt has been made to present this
Nazi plan was to rule Europe, at the very material as the last word on any subject.
least, and to exterminate not only Jews, Readers will have to decide for themselves
but Gypsies and millions of Slavs. The whether this policy or that program was
wars against Germany and Japan were, in wise, or moral, or effective. Although the
this sense, wars against particularly mur- facts are correct to the best of my knowl-
derous forms of racism. They were also edge, the opinions expressed are my own.
wars fought to save democracy and free- They are products of long study and reflec-
dom. It was for good reason that General tion and are as well-reasoned as I could
Dwight D. Eisenhower called his autobiog- make them, but scholars with impressive
raphy Crusade in Europe. qualifications have often come to different
War is never the best way to handle conclusions. That is the nature of history as
political problems. And wars, even when a field, and part of its glory.
they end in victory, cannot cure every ill. Each entry is meant both to provide
After World War II Americans were unhap- essential information and to lead readers
py that Eastern Europe, and later China on to further study by pointing to other
and other nations, came under Communist entries, suggested readings, and significant
rule. That could not be helped. Without the films and videos. A general bibliography at
Soviet Union Nazi Germany could not have the end lists some of the most important
been defeated, and the Soviets could not be books on World War II, but the subject is
denied the spoils of victory. Neither could so vast that a complete listing would
the Communists in China be prevented require a separate volume.
8

HOW TO USE
THIS BOOK

T
he articles in this Companion are as follows: Fleets, armies and air forces are
arranged alphabetically, so you can spelled out; for example, Fifth Fleet, Third
look up words, concepts, or names Army, Eighth Air Force. Units below them
as you come across them in other readings. were assigned roman numerals; for exam-
You can then use the SEE ALSO listings at ple, IV Corps or XX Bomber Command.
the end of an article to find entries about More basic units were given Arabic num-
related subjects. Sometimes you may find bers; for example, Task Force 58, 4th
that the Companion deals with information Armored Division. Army companies were
under a different article name than what assigned letters, such as Company C, also
you looked up. The book will then refer known as Charlie Company. Battalions and
you to the proper article. For example, if regiments were numbered, as in 2nd Battal-
you look up Paratroops, you will find the ion, 354th Regiment.
notation “SEE Airborne Warfare.” If you American historians often apply Amer-
cannot find an article on a particular sub- ican terms to foreign units, except when
ject, look in the index to guide you to the they had distinctive names, such as Luft-
relevant articles. waffe for the German Air Force. If confu-
All people are listed alphabetically by sion sets in remember that the important
last name; for example the entry for Harry thing is to get the number right, whether
Truman is listed under T as Truman, Harry Arabic, roman, or spelled out.
S. In the case of military figures the rank or Notable individuals: If you want to
position given is the highest they held dur- know about a particular military or civilian
ing the war. For example the entry for figure in the war look up his or her last
Omar N. Bradley names him as Comman- name. There are also topical articles on
der of the 12th U.S. Army Group, although particular groups, such as African Ameri-
he held many other positions and would cans and Japanese Americans.
rise after the war to become chief of the Ordnance: Individual weapons or
Joint Chiefs of Staff. weapons systems sometimes have their own
You can also use this Companion topi- entries, for example the V-1 flying bomb
cally, by reading all the articles about a par- and the German U-boat (submarine). If you
ticular aspect of World War II. Below are do not find the weapon you are looking for
several groupings of topics around com- under its own entry try looking under
mon themes. general headings such as Small arms,
Battles and events: The names of bat- Artillery, and Bombers.
tles and events are those most commonly Origins of the war: The origins of
used, for example Bulge, battle of the; D- the war with Germany and the war with
Day; Dresden, bombing of; Malmedy Japan are explained in the articles on each
massacre. country. But their surrenders are treated in
Countries: Information on the war at separate articles, for example “Japan,
home for Britain, Canada, France, Ger- surrender of”.
many, Italy, Japan, Poland, and the Soviet Theaters of war: Theater is an old term
Union can be found in the articles named for a region of military operations. Howev-
for those countries. American life during er, in World War II the United States used
the war is listed separately under “Home theater only in the war against Germany, as
front.” Other articles on domestic matters in the European Theater of Operations
include “Financing the war,” “Labor,” (ETO). In the Pacific War theaters were
“Mobilization,” and “Motion Pictures.” called areas. Except for the Southwest
Military organizations: The United Pacific Area, which was an Army theater
States spells out or abbreviates major units commanded by General Douglas
9
• H O W T O U S E T H I S B O O K •

Image Not Available

Members of the 41st Engineers stand in formation at Fort Bragg, N.C.

MacArthur, the rest of the Pacific was Museums and historic sites: A partial
under the command of Admiral Chester list of museums and historic sites is includ-
Nimitz and known collectively as the Pacif- ed. Some of these, such as the Arlington
ic Ocean Area (POA). It was subdivided Cemetery in Washington, D.C., are not
into the South, Central and North Pacific limited to World War II, but all bear impor-
Areas, each being a separate theater. The tantly on the war experience. As a rule
article Pacific War covers all the fighting museums and sites do not provide a great
against Japan from Pearl Harbor in 1941 deal of information, but they often give
through the first half of 1942. Thereafter impressions or provide a sense of time and
combat operations are described in separate place that cannot be found elsewhere.
articles named for each area. Websites: There are a growing number
Further Reading: If you want to know of internet sites devoted to aspects of World
more about a specific topic, you can use the War II. The Further Reading section in the
FURTHER READING entries at the end of back of this book provides links to internet
each article as well as the Further Reading addresses and resources. Web pages for the
guide at the end of the book, which lists museums and historic sites listed in Appen-
more general sources. dix 2 have been included when available.
10

WORLD WAR II
A Student Companion
In 1942 African Americans were
African Americans still underrepresented in the military,
which was not only politically unwise
but a waste of manpower. Roosevelt
ordered the Navy, much against its will,
Negroes, the term used to describe to enlist blacks for general service. The
African Americans for most of the 19th Army General Staff suggested that
and 20th centuries, were the largest racially integrated units be formed. This
racial minority in the United States and proved to be too radical a step, even
suffered from segregation and discrimi- though it was more expensive to build
nation during the war just as they had segregated training camps. However, in
before it. Yet manpower shortages and all the service branches except the Army
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s need Air Corps, officer candidate schools
for black votes combined to temper were integrated to save money.
white intolerance. More important, At the end of 1944 there were more
gains made by blacks during the war set black officers than could be placed,
the stage for the civil rights revolution because of the Army’s rule that only
that would follow it. whites were to command black units.
Blacks in the Services Because the Another rule was that no black could be
leadership of the armed forces was prej- ranked higher than the lowest-ranked
udiced against blacks, the mobilization white in any unit, which meant that few
plan of 1940 called for only about half blacks could rise above first lieutenant.
as many blacks as whites to be drafted This was justified on the grounds that
in proportion to their respective pop- black troops were said to prefer white
ulations. Blacks were to be confined officers, which was untrue, particularly
largely to service rather than combat because so many white officers were
units and be excluded entirely from the southerners with racist attitudes offen-
Army Air Corps and Marines, and from sive to African-American troops.
the Navy except as waiters. However, White officers seldom wished to be
military discrimination became a politi- assigned to black units. If white officers
cal issue in the 1940 election, and to were hard on the troops, charges of dis-
hold the black vote Roosevelt forced crimination typically resulted, but if they
the Army to say that it would become stood up for their men they were often
10 percent black, giving roughly the scorned by their peers and accused of
same ratio of blacks to whites as in the being “nigger lovers.”
general population. To police African-American barracks,
This did not go far enough for white and prevent violence directed against black
liberals and black activists, and in response soldiers by whites, white officers often had
to further pressure the Army announced to take on extra patrol duties because
that it would form a number of black commanders would not entrust black offi-
combat units, promote a black colonel to cers with doing this. In the South, white
the rank of brigadier general, and appoint officers of black units were discriminated
black advisors to Secretary of War Henry against socially. Almost everyone believed
Stimson and the Selective Service chief, that they were assigned to command black
Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey. These troops as a punishment.
actions kept black voters in the Democrat- In addition, black soldiers were
ic party, even though blacks continued to often victims of violence, especially in the
serve in segregated units. South; scores were killed or wounded
11
• A F R I C A N A M E R I C A N S •

during the war. Often these cases re-


sulted from fights between black soldiers
and white soldiers and civilians, but even
minor violations of local racial codes
could prove fatal. In March 1942, for
example, Sergeant Thomas B. Foster of
the black 92nd Engineers Battalion was
shot to death by Little Rock, Arkansas,
police for questioning the methods being
employed by military police in arresting
a drunken black soldier. Image Not Available
Race riots and fights between black
and white servicemen broke out all over
the world, not just in the South. These
hurt the morale of black troops, and the
problem was not helped when Assistant
Secretary of War John McCloy blamed
poor morale on black oversensitivity
and a fault-finding Negro press. Since
the pressure did not go away, in 1944 he
ordered the desegregation of all facilities
on military posts—an edict that was
widely ignored. bat outfits in the Army and Army Air An African-
As late as the spring of 1943, only Forces were relatively few in number American Coast
79,000 out of a total of 504,000 black but disproved charges that African Guardman
soldiers were overseas, because they Americans could not, or would not, demonstrates
were not wanted as combat troops. The fight. The black 99th Pursuit Squadron, the assembly
and operation
Army’s solution was to train them as which was a great success, became the
of a 20 mm
service troops, who were accepted— core of an entire black fighter group—
gun to his
especially for menial work. Representa- known as the Redtails because of their fellow sailors.
tive Hamilton Fish (Republican–N.Y.), aircrafts’ markings—who were much in
who had commanded black fighting demand as escorts throughout the 15th
men in World War I, asked Secretary of Air Force because they never lost a
War Stimson to explain this policy and bomber to enemy fighters.
was told that blacks “have been unable A number of black ground units
to master efficiently the techniques of also performed well. The 761st Tank
modern weapons.” Stimson flatly lied Battalion had a brilliant record, while
when he said that the War Department the 969th Field Artillery Battalion won a
was not trying to keep blacks out of Distinguished Unit Citation. During the
combat. Thus, only one black division, Battle of the Bulge, African Americans
the 92nd Infantry, was ever in combat. in the Army Service Forces were allowed
The Navy assigned blacks to labor to volunteer for infantry platoons, and
units only after it was pressured to stop after six weeks of training, the 2,500
using them exclusively as waiters. It was who were accepted performed well in
not until after riots broke out that the combat. The tiny Coast Guard—which
Navy began to integrate a handful of totaled only 240,000 men compared to
noncombat ships. the Navy’s millions—gave African
Small- to medium-sized black com- Americans a chance to serve; it commis-
12
• A F R I C A N A M E R I C A N S •

sioned 700 black officers to the Navy’s survey made by the U.S. Employment
58. But, on the whole, blacks were Office found that more than half of the
neglected by the military in World responding defense contractors had no
War II, which, given the manpower intention of hiring blacks.
shortage, was a blunder as well as an This situation outraged A. Philip
injustice. Randolph, president of the Brotherhood
Despite everything, the black war of Sleeping Car Porters, the only Negro
experience had long-term benefits in union of any importance, who issued a
addition to the fact that African-Ameri- call for a black march on Washington to
can veterans took advantage of the GI protest job discrimination. Randolph
Bill of Rights. The war gave black veter- was the leading spokesman for black
ans a larger view of the world and of workers because the two most impor-
their own abilities. Many who were tant labor organizations had no black
drafted from southern states never officers. The American Federation of
returned to the region that had discrimi- Labor, an older establishment consisting
nated against them most fiercely. By of unions that organized workers by
1950 more than half of all black veter- craft—plumbers, mechanics, and car-
ans were living in a different part of the penters, for example—actively discrimi-
country from where they had been born, nated against blacks. The Congress of
compared to about a third of blacks in Industrial Organizations, which enrolled
the same age group who had not served its members industrywide, did have
in the military. black members, but, because it was only
Studies show that military service ben- a few years old, no prominent black
efited veterans after the war. In 1949 each officers. Because the all-black Brother-
additional year of age added $75 to the hood of Sleeping Car Porters was large
annual income of whites nationwide, but and established, both it and Randolph
only $20 to that of blacks in the South. If commanded great respect among
they had moved to the North, their African Americans.
income increase was the same as that of Despite the requests of Mayor
whites. For whites each year of military Fiorello LaGuardia of New York and
service was worth as much to their later others not to hurt the defense effort or
earning power as an additional year of embarrass President Roosevelt, Ran-
education. But for blacks each year of ser- dolph went forward with his plans for
vice was worth up to three years of educa- the march. It was expected that 50,000
tion. One of the few good things about the African Americans would turn out on
war was that the military, which did not July 1, 1941. Four days before the
want blacks and discriminated against scheduled march, FDR invited a group
them severely, benefited African Americans of leaders, including Randolph and Wal-
just the same. ter White, president of the National
On the home front For black Association for the Advancement of
civilian workers, World War II opened Colored People (NAACP), to meet with
up a host of new opportunities. This too him.
was unintentional, for, like the armed The result was Executive Order
services, industry had not intended to 8802, which established what became
recruit blacks. In 1940 there were the Fair Employment Practices Commis-
5,389,000 employed blacks, of whom sion (FEPC), an agency that worked on
3,582,000 were male, almost none of behalf of African Americans, Jews,
whom had high-paying defense jobs. A aliens, naturalized citizens, Asians, His-
13
• A F R I C A N A M E R I C A N S •

panics, and Native Americans. It would in Mobile, Alabama, white workers riot-
enjoy considerable success, aided greatly ed, seriously injuring 20 blacks. Two
by labor shortages that forced employers blacks were killed and 50 injured during
to lower old barriers. By 1944 blacks a race riot in Beaumont, Texas.
held 7.5 percent of all jobs in war indus- On June 15 and 17, 1943, there
tries. This was less than their share of were minor race riots in the Detroit area,
the population but a great improvement where black workers had flocked for
over 1940. automotive industry jobs, worsening an
The industries that resisted hiring already acute housing shortage. Sunday,
blacks, or hired them only at the lowest June 20, was unusually hot, and crowds
levels, were usually those dominated by of people jammed Belle Isle in the
racist labor unions. The machinists and Detroit River seeking relief. Many fights
boilermakers represented 30 to 40 per- broke out and by 11:00 p.m. the fights
cent of airframe workers and more than had turned into mob violence. Down-
20 percent of shipyard employees, but town, a black mob, inflamed by rumors,
the machinists were lily white and the seems to have rioted first, after which
boilermakers segregated blacks in power- whites retaliated, hunting down and
less locals. Of the 31 national unions killing blacks, with police support and
that openly discriminated against blacks, approval.
19 were in the railroad industry. Almost Federal troops were finally called in
all of them refused to change their prac- to restore order, by which time some 35
tices despite FEPC orders and court rul- people, a majority of them black, were
ings. White workers frequently went on dead, more than 700 wounded, and
Adam Clayton
strike to protest the hiring or promotion 1,300 under arrest. Seventeen blacks were
Powell, Jr.,
of blacks. When white workers at the shot by the police, all of them supposedly
addresses the
Philadelphia Transit Company went on looters. Whites looted and burned, too, Negro Free-
strike to protest the upgrading of eight but none were shot by policemen. dom Rally at
black porters to drivers, the company In light of the appalling amount of Madison
had to be taken over by the Army in racial violence during the war, some of it Square Gar-
order to keep the trains and buses run- caused by blacks to be sure, but most of den in New
ning. it a result of white racism, there was no York City,
Job discrimination was bad, but reason to be optimistic about an June 26, 1944.
racial violence was even worse. Attacks
on blacks were frequent in the South,
where lynchings continued throughout
the war. They also became common
elsewhere. A series of racial clashes
occurred in 1943. Fights between white
and black gangs in Newark, New Jersey,
caused the death of one black. A black
soldier was killed during a race riot in Image Not Available
Centreville, Mississippi. In El Paso,
Texas, a riot among soldiers caused two
deaths. At Camp Stewart, Georgia, gun-
fire was exchanged between black sol-
diers and military policemen that re-
sulted in five casualties, one fatal. After
12 blacks were promoted at a shipyard
14
• A F R I K A K O R P S •

improved climate for racial relations in SEE ALSO


the United States. Even so, amid the tur- GI Bill of Rights
moil, momentous changes were develop-
ing. Black voters were gaining strength in F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
17 northern states with a total of 281 Buchanan, Albert Russell. Black Ameri-
votes out of 531 in the electoral college. cans in World War II. Santa Barbara,
Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1977.
In New York City’s Harlem district, Clark, John. Black Soldier. Garden City,
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was already an N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968.
emerging leader. In 1944 he would be Dalfiume, Richard. Desegregation of the
U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two
elected to Congress, becoming the first Fronts, 1939–1953. Columbia: Univer-
black to represent an urban ghetto. Then, sity of Missouri Press, 1969.
too, rising wages and an increased politi- Moore, Brenda L. To Serve My Country,
To Serve My Race: The Story of the Only
cal awareness were leading blacks to join
African American WACS Stationed Over-
the NAACP in huge numbers. That orga- seas during World War II. New York:
nization would multiply tenfold during New York University Press, 1996.
the war, achieving a dues-paying mem- Motley, Mary, ed. The Invisible Soldier:
The Experience of the Black Soldier,
bership of half a million in 1945. World War II. Detroit: Wayne State Uni-
During the war there were some 230 versity Press, 1975.
black newspapers with 2 million readers Trotter, Joe William, Jr. From a Raw Deal
to a New Deal? African Americans
(among them one daily, the Atlanta Daily 1929–1945. New York: Oxford Univer-
World). There was also a black news ser- sity Press, 1996.
vice, the Associated Negro Press of
Chicago. The black press now played a
crucial role, because the white media
habitually ignored news of interest to Afrika Korps
African Americans. Many small changes
were taking place locally that together
would prove to be important. In Little
Rock, after the murder of Sergeant Fos- In January 1941 Adolf Hitler was dis-
ter, eight black officers were hired despite turbed by Italian defeats at the hands
local resistance. Later, as the result of a of British forces in the western desert
lawsuit, the federal court of appeals of Egypt and what is today Libya. In
ordered Little Rock to pay white and February he named Major General
black school teachers equally. These were Erwin Rommel to take command of a
small steps, but little by little segregation hastily assembled German force and
was being eroded. bail the Italians out. Rommel arrived in
Another important element, which October to head a command that,
people took for granted then but was a despite its impressive title—Deutsches
source of strength that would be greatly Afrika Korps (German Africa Corps)—
missed in later years, was that a majority consisted of nothing more than two
of black children were still being raised in randomly assigned German divisions,
two-parent families. Blacks were poor, assorted Italian units, and, later on,
but they lived in wholesome communities detachments from the German Air
and had a strong family system. These Force, the Luftwaffe.
resources, in addition to wartime Rommel turned this motley crew into
progress, would make the civil rights rev- a tightly integrated, highly loyal, superb
olution possible. fighting unit that would hand the British a
15
• A I R B O R N E W A R F A R E •

string of defeats. Although Rommel’s enough to carry troops were developed in


command expanded to become an entire the 1920s. Germany was the first nation
army group, the Afrika Korps remained to employ highly trained parachutists in
its most valuable asset. The Korps won its battle, dropping small numbers of them
last victory at the Kasserine Pass south- during its 1940 campaigns before staging
west of Tunis in February 1943, against a major drop on the Mediterranean
inexperienced U.S. troops, and was one of island of Crete in May 1940.
the last German units to surrender in May Because of the success of the Crete
when Tunisia fell to the Allies. campaign, the British Army, and later
the U.S. Army too, spent a great deal of
SEE ALSO
money training and equipping elite air-
North African campaign; Rommel, Erwin
borne divisions, which were used in the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Mediterranean and European theaters.
Forty, George. Afrika Korps at War. New
This decision was an expensive mistake.
York: Scribners, 1978. Extremely costly to build and maintain,
Editors of Time-Life Books. Afrikakorps. airborne divisions were easy to destroy,
Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1990. because jumping was so dangerous and,
Lewin, Ronald. The Life and Death of the
Afrika Korps. London: Batsford, 1977. because once on the ground, lightly
armed parachutists were no match for
regular infantry and armored divisions.
A quarter of the German parachutists
who landed on Crete were killed, with
Airborne warfare the rest so battered that Germany never
staged a mass drop again. It would have
been wise of the Allies to follow suit.
Allied parachutists played a small
The idea of surprising an enemy by jump- role in North Africa and a larger one in
ing out of a plane and landing behind its Sicily, where units of a U.S. airborne force
lines arose as soon as aircraft large were mistakenly fired on by Allied gun-

Waves of para-
troopers are
dropped from
planes during
operations in
Holland.

Image Not Available


16
• A I R C O R P S, U. S. •

ners, taking serious casualties even before Gavin, James M. On to Berlin: Battles of
reaching their drop sites. The most suc- an Airborne Commander. New York:
Viking, 1978.
cessful Allied drops were made on the Huston, James Alvin. Out of the Blue:
night of June 5–6, 1944, as the spearhead U.S. Army Airborne Operations in
of Operation Overlord, the code name World War II. West Lafayette, Ind.: Pur-
due University Press, 1972.
for the invasion of Normandy. One Ridgway, Matthew B. Soldier: The Mem-
British and two U.S. divisions (the 82nd oirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. New York:
and 101st Airborne) succeeded in taking Harper, 1956.
most of their objectives, more or less jus-
tifying themselves—although there is no
question but that Overlord would have
succeeded without them. Air Corps, U.S.
The greatest loss experienced by SEE United States Army Air Forces
paratroopers took place during Opera- (USAAF)
tion Market Garden when, beginning on
September 17, 1944, one British and
two U.S. airborne divisions, plus a Pol-
ish brigade, landed behind enemy lines Aircraft
in Holland. The plan was to secure
bridges, especially over the Rhine, but it
proved to be too ambitious, and heavy
Allied casualties produced few returns.
More than anything else, what distin-
Thereafter, except for an uneventful
guished World War II from previous
two-division drop behind the Rhine in
conflicts was the massive use of aircraft.
March 1945, most Allied paratroopers
Germany’s blitzkriegs (lightning wars)
fought as regular infantrymen. Even the
were made possible by powerful air
famed U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, which
attacks on enemy units, and on the
was brilliantly led by Major General
communication and supply lines behind
Matthew B. Ridgway, a paratroop com-
them. The defeat of Britain and France
mander, consisted largely of regular
in 1940 resulted in large part from their
infantry and armored units. Though they
having lost control of the air.
did a superb job, the use of trained para-
No nation made greater use of air-
chutists as ordinary infantrymen was in
craft than the United States. The Japan-
effect an admission that large-scale air-
ese Navy was defeated almost entirely
borne operations were not cost effective.
by U.S. naval warplanes. General Doug-
Apparently they still are not, for although
las MacArthur was able to bypass
the U.S. Army continues to maintain air-
strongly defended Japanese-held islands
borne divisions, it has not staged a mass
in the Southwest Pacific because they
combat drop since World War II.
were completely cut off by the Army Air
Forces and could not launch attacks or
SEE ALSO be reinforced or supplied.
D-Day The Axis forces in North Africa
were defeated after Allied air power iso-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G lated them from their sources of supply
Ambrose, Stephen E. Band of Brothers: E in Europe. The Allies gained control of
Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Air-
borne: From Normandy to Hitler’s
the air over Western Europe even before
Eagle’s Nest. New York: Simon & the invasion of Normandy and main-
Schuster, 1992. tained it afterward. Because the Ger-
17
• A I R C R A F T C A R R I E R S •

TBF Avengers irrelevant, too, as the blockade of Japan


(torpedo had already stopped the wheels of Japan-
bombers) fly ese industry when the air campaign got
in formation under way.
during exercis-
es over Nor-
SEE ALSO
folk, Virginia.
Bombers; Japanese Army; Japanese Navy;
Luftwaffe; Royal Air Force; Strategic
bombing; United States Army Air Forces;
Image Not Available United States Navy

Aircraft carriers

mans could only travel on land at night When the United States went to war, the
and in bad weather, their operations U.S. Navy possessed seven fleet carriers
were severely limited. When pressure (CVs). Two, Lexington and Saratoga,
from Allied ground forces threw them had been built on the hulls of battle
into retreat, and therefore into the open, cruisers, and with a displacement of
slaughter resulted. almost 34,000 tons were the largest ships
Air transportation was vital as well. in the fleet. None of the other five was
China was supplied entirely by air for larger than 18,000 tons. Under construc-
most of World War II. U.S. forces were tion were the first of the Essex-class air-
able to fight all over the world because craft carriers, which displaced 24,500
of the mighty U.S. Air Transport Com- tons and would begin joining the fleet in
mand (ATC), whose fleet of two- and 1942. Because their flight decks were not
four-engine planes served as freighters, armored, protection having been sacri-
troop carriers, ambulances, and tankers ficed for speed and carrying capacity, all
as needed. With a peak strength of were capable of speeds in excess of 30
3,700 aircraft, the ATC was an asset knots. The older carriers held about 70
unmatched by any other power and warplanes, whereas Essex-class carriers
envied by all. had room for more than 100.
Fighter-bombers and medium Before the war most admirals had
bombers served both the Allied and Axis believed that battleships would continue
powers well. But the American and to be the decisive weapons of naval war-
British investment in heavy four-engine fare. Carriers were seen as auxiliaries
bombers was a poor one. Heavy that would scout ahead of the battle line,
bombers were, according to air marshals achieve air superiority, attack enemy
and generals, supposed to win the war ships, and perform other useful services.
against Japan but never produced the But Pearl Harbor and Midway estab-
expected results or justified the resources lished the carrier’s primacy. Thereafter,
devoted to them. They were more useful battleships served as auxiliaries.
in the Pacific, where Japanese air defens- Because the carriers of the Pacific
es were light, but the strategic bombing Fleet were heavily outnumbered by
of Japan was essentially a failure. It was those of Japan, an emergency class of
18
• A I R C R A F T C A R R I E R S •

Construction enough clout that he did not have to


on the Essex- take no for an answer. He went directly
class carriers to Roosevelt, who reversed the decision.
began when In time Kaiser’s shipyards would be pro-
the war broke ducing one of these ships every week.
out. Although
Escort carriers were immensely valuable
the flight
to the Allies and, thanks to Roosevelt,
decks were
not armored,
they joined the fleet when most needed.
the carriers Deadly hunter-killer groups were
were faster built around the escort carriers, groups
Image Not Available that played havoc with German Admiral
and held more
planes than Doenitz’s U-boats. In the Pacific they
the Navy’s were useful too, providing close support
previous to amphibious troops from inshore
carriers. waters, where the fleet carriers dared
not go. Ultimately even King recognized
their value and they were built in large
numbers, especially the Casablanca
class, of which 49 were launched. In the
Battle of Leyte Gulf, escort carriers
nine light carriers (designated CVL) would engage a Japanese battleship
were built on cruiser hulls and entered force and save the invasion fleet.
service in 1943. Although they carried The Royal Navy and the Imperial
only about 30 aircraft apiece, they were Japanese Navy were the only other ser-
as fast as the fleet carriers and fought vices besides the U.S. Navy with large
alongside them. carrier fleets. Japanese carriers were con-
A third type, the small escort or structed along the same lines as those of
“jeep” carrier (designated CVE), proved the U.S. Navy: big, fast, lightly armored,
vitally important to the war effort. The carrying large air groups. The British
first few of these escorts were built on carriers were different, having heavily
the hulls of cargo ships, but the later armored flight decks and smaller air
classes were designed as carriers from groups—no more than 60 aircraft.
the keel up. They ranged from 7,000 to Although both Japan and the United
17,000 tons in size and could carry up States equipped their carriers with mod-
to 36 aircraft, but their slow speed made ern single-wing aircraft, Britain entered
them unusable in fleet actions. the war with obsolete planes. The
Airplanes based on escort carriers Swordfish, its primary torpedo bomber,
became the most effective antisubmarine was a slow biplane similar in appear-
weapons, though land-based aircraft ance to those used in World War I. For-
and surface warships remained impor- tunately for the Swordfish, neither Ger-
tant. This was Roosevelt’s doing, for if many nor Italy possessed any usable
Admiral Ernest J. King had gotten his aircraft carriers, which made it possible
way, there would not have been enough for Swordfish to help sink the Bismarck
escort carriers to go around. King and destroy three Italian battleships at
favored CVs, so that in June 1942 when anchor. The Royal Navy contributed a
the industrialist Henry J. Kaiser pro- carrier task force equipped with modern
posed building 30 escort carriers, the aircraft to the Battle of Okinawa.
Navy rejected his offer. Kaiser had Thanks to their armored flight decks
19
• A I R F O R C E , U . S . •

they stood up to the Japanese suicide including the Soviet Union, the term
attacks, while eight thin-skinned U.S. Grand Alliance was frequently used. The
carriers had to be withdrawn from com- Allies were also called the United
bat when their flight decks were pene- Nations well before the United Nations
trated by kamikazes. organization was formed in 1945.
SEE ALSO SEE ALSO
Battleships; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle Britain; China; France; Soviet Union;
of; Midway, Battle of; Okinawa, Battle of; United States
Pearl Harbor, attack on; Philippine Sea,
Battle of the

F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Hough, Richard. The Longest Battle: The
America First
War at Sea, 1939–45. New York: Mor- Committee
row, 1986.
Miller, David. Carriers: The Men and the
Machines. New York: Salamander, 1991.
Poolman, Kenneth. Allied Escort Carriers
of World War Two in Action. New York:
Blandford, 1988. The America First Committee led the
Reynolds, Clark G. The Carrier War. fight to keep the United States from
Alexandria, Va: Time-Life Books, 1982.
Y’Blood, William T. The Little Giants:
entering World War II. Because antiwar
U.S. Escort Carriers Against Japan. sentiment was particularly strong on col-
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, lege campuses, it was hardly surprising
1987. that the America First Committee (AFC)
grew out of a student group organized at
Yale University by Kingman Brewster (a
Air Force, U.S. future president of Yale) and R. Douglas
Stuart, a law student. Business and politi-
Bicycle riders
SEE United States Army Air Forces cal leaders responded enthusiastically to
in Vale, Ore-
this student initiative, and on September
gon, proudly
4, 1940, the AFC was launched in Chi- display their
cago with Robert Wood, chairman of patriotism and
Allies Sears Roebuck and Company, as national America First
chairman and Stuart as national director. allegiance in a
At its peak the AFC had some July 4th
800,000 members, the largest enrollment parade, 1941.
Following the World War I model, all
states at war with, or occupied by, the
Axis powers became known during
World War II as the Allies. The principal
member states were China, France,
Britain (also known as the United King-
dom) and its empire and common- Image Not Available
wealth, the Soviet Union, and the United
States. Because the Western Allies and
the Soviet Union conducted entirely sep-
arate war efforts, in common speech the
term Allies sometimes referred only to
the West. When making a point of
20
• A M E R I C A N F E D E R A T I O N O F L A B O R •

of any antiwar organization. More impor-


tant, its members were to a large extent Anzio, Battle of
influential business and professional peo-
ple and included national leaders such as
Senator Burton K. Wheeler and Charles
A. Lindbergh—at that time considered to A central mystery of the Italian campaign
be the greatest American hero. is why the Allies did not exploit their
Although dedicated to neutrality, the control of sea and air to land behind Ger-
AFC favored a strong defense, which many’s powerful defense lines. Then they
annoyed pacifists. This position led would have been attacking from the rear,
Harold Ickes, Roosevelt’s sharp-tongued where the Germans were weak, instead
secretary of the interior, to rename the of always launching costly frontal
group “America Last.” By this he meant attacks. Operation Shingle, the one effort
that if the AFC had succeeded in its aims, to do so, offers a partial answer.
the United States would not have gone to The repeated failure of Allied offen-
war until all its potential allies had been sives led President Roosevelt in December
beaten. 1943 to support British prime minister
Although well financed and Winston Churchill’s plan for an amphibi-
respectable, America First lost much sup- ous landing behind the enemy’s Gustav
port as a result of Lindbergh’s speech in Line in south central Italy by providing
Des Moines, Iowa, on September 11, 56 of the all-important Landing Ships
1941, in which he accused the Jewish Tanks (LSTs), as well as two divisions.
people of “agitating for war.” Thus the At first, Operation Shingle, as the
AFC was already in decline on December landing at Anzio was code named,
7, 1941, when Japan’s attack on Pearl seemed off to a promising start. The
Harbor put an end to it. U.S. VI Corps achieved complete sur-
prise when it went ashore at Anzio, near
SEE ALSO
Rome, on January 22, 1944. But its
Isolationists
objectives were unclear, it moved out
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
too slowly, and a supporting attack by
Cole, Wayne S. Charles A. Lindbergh and
the U.S. Fifth Army failed to break the
the Battle Against Intervention in World Gustav line, which lay only about 40
War II. New York: Harcourt, Brace, miles south of Anzio. Field Marshal
1974. Albert Kesselring reacted to Shingle with
Doenecke, Justus D., ed. In Danger
Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist lightning speed, containing the beach-
Movement of 1940–1941 As Revealed in head with six divisions and almost driv-
the Papers of the America First Commit- ing the VI Corps into the sea.
tee. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution
Press, 1990. A stalemate followed until late spring
Stenehjem, Michele Flynn. An American when the Gustav Line was finally
First: John T. Flynn and the America breached, enabling the VI Corps to break
First Committee. New Rochelle, N.Y.:
Arlington House, 1976.
out of its beachhead at Anzio and link up
with the Fifth Army. Allied casualties in
Anzio came to about 43,000, of which
7,000 were fatalities. Another 44,000
American Federation troops were lost to sickness and injury.
of Labor Although the primary reason that Shingle
failed seems to have been that the attack-
SEE Mobilization ing force was too small to do the job it
21
• A P P E A S E M E N T •

had been assigned, no further efforts were Robbins, Keith. Appeasement. Malden,
made to exploit Allied sea power. For the Mass.: Blackwell, 1997.
Taylor, Telford. Munich: The Price of
rest of the war Allied forces inched their Peace. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
way up the Italian peninsula by means of 1979.
costly frontal assaults.
SEE ALSO
Italian campaigns

F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Arcadia conference
D’Este, Carlo. Fatal Decision: Anzio and
the Battle for Rome. New York: Harper-
Collins, 1991.
Sheehan, Fred. Anzio, Epic of Bravery. Arcadia was the code name for the first
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1964. summit meeting held by the Americans
Verney, Peter. Anzio 1944: An Unexpected and the British after Pearl Harbor.
Fury. London: Batsford, 1978. Churchill and his chiefs met with Roo-
sevelt and his advisors in Washington
from December 22, 1941, to January
14, 1942. Among the decisions they
Appeasement made was to confirm their prewar com-
mitment to give the defeat of Germany
top priority. For the first time, they seri-
ously discussed an invasion of North
Appeasement is a term used to negatively Africa. The course of the war was
characterize the Anglo-French policy of reviewed and the U.S. agreed to much
attempting to prevent a European war by higher production quotas than those
agreeing to Hitler’s demand for addi- established when it was still neutral. A
tional territory—particularly Austria and unified command in the Far East called
the western tip of Czechoslovakia. In ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Aus-
1938 appeasement climaxed at the tralian) was formed. Roosevelt created
Munich conference. There an agreement the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a counterpart
was negotiated, primarily by Hitler and to the British body already in existence,
British Prime Minister Neville Chamber- and the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
lain, although France and Italy partici- which consisted of the British and
pated as well. The Munich agreement American chiefs to oversee the war as a
gave the western end of Czechoslovakia whole, was created.
to Germany, in return for Hitler’s prom-
SEE ALSO
ise to end his demands. His failure to live
Chiefs of Staff, Combined; Chiefs of Staff,
up to its terms meant the end of appease- Joint
ment and, soon, to the outbreak of war.

SEE ALSO
Chamberlain, Neville; Germany; Munich
agreement Ardennes campaign
SEE Bulge, Battle of the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
De Bedts, Ralph F. Ambassador Joseph
Kennedy 1938–1940: An Anatomy of
Appeasement. New York: P. Lang, 1985.
22
• A R M O R •

U.S. Army fielded the Grant tank first. It


Armor was already obsolete, because its 75-mm
gun was mounted in a side housing
instead of on the turret and had a limited
field of fire. By 1943 the United States
In 1939 the Allies had thousands of was producing a good medium tank, the
tanks and the Soviets even more. Ger- Sherman, which became the mainstay of
many had fewer tanks than Britain and both the British and U.S. armies.
France, and not very good ones at that. Unfortunately for the crews, what
But instead of using tanks as infantry was a good tank in 1943 became a bad
support weapons, in the manner of one a year later. When the Allies went
other armies, the German army ashore in Normandy their Shermans
employed them as the armored spear- were hopelessly outclassed by the Ger-
head of its attack force, deploying them man Panthers and all but helpless when
in massive formations to breach or faced with their Tigers. Apart from its
encircle enemy lines. This produced the power turret, the Sherman had no advan-
blitzkrieg (lightning war) victories tage over German tanks except that
against Poland in 1939 and the Western it could be manufactured in
Allies in 1940. immense quantities.
These battles were won chiefly with German and Soviet
the aid of lightly armored and gunned tanks were regularly
medium tanks known as the Mark III and upgraded. Ger- Image Not Available
Mark IV (also called the Pz III and IV). many’s incredible
But the Soviet Union was already working Tiger II, for exam-
on new models that would make these ple, weighed 68
German tanks obsolete. One was the tons and was practi-
heavy 43-ton KV 1B, the other the 26-ton cally invulnerable. Americans American Sher-
T34, one of the outstanding tanks of the tinkered with the Sherman, but the man tanks
war. The KV was so heavily shielded that improvements were usually minor or such as this
even the legendary German 88 mm could involved only a small number of units. It one were out-
not penetrate it, and the T34 was fast and was almost a crime that the much supe- classed by Ger-
well armored for its size. rior Pershing tank was not rushed into man Panthers
Germany’s first response was to production. And if the U.S. Army had in Europe, but
upgrade its Mark IIIs and IVs with more given every Sherman a heavier gun, as the United
armor and better guns. Improvements the British did with their Shermans, States did little
to upgrade
enabled Germany to continue using these thousands of lives might well have been
them.
prewar models, but its real answers were saved.
the Panther and Tiger tanks. These were
SEE ALSO
superb weapons. The Panther weighed
De Gaulle, Charles; Eastern front; France,
45 tons and had a highly effective 75- Battle of; France, fall of; Guderian,
mm gun with an extra-long barrel. The General Heinz
Tiger weighed 56 tons and was armed
with the 88-mm gun. Germany’s prob- F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
lem, one it never solved, was that it Dunnigan, James F. How to Make War: A
lacked the capacity to produce these for- Comprehensive Guide to Modern War-
fare. New York: Morrow, 1982.
midable weapons in sufficient quantities. Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. The Evolution of
Early in the war, American tanks Weapons and Warfare. Indianapolis:
were few and pitiful. To buy time, the Bobbs-Merrill, 1980.
23
• A R N O L D, H E N R Y H. •

Foss, Christopher, and Ian Hogg. Battle-


field: The Weapons of Modern Land
Warfare. London: Orbis, 1986.

Arnold, Henry H. Image Not Available


CHIEF OF THE U.S. ARMY AIR
FORCES, 1941– 46
• Born: June 15, 1886, Gladwyne, Penn.
• Education: U.S. Military Academy,
1903–07
• Military service: U.S. Army––2nd
lieutenant, 1907–13; 1st lieutenant,
1913–16; captain, 1913–17; major 1917; ders would want this aircraft, thwarted Henry H.
colonel 1917–20; major, 1920–31; them by having every B-29 assigned to Arnold sits at
lieutenant colonel, 1931–34; brigadier his desk in the
general, 1934–38; major general,
the Twentieth Air Force. He then per-
1938–41; lieutenant general, 1941–43; suaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take War Depart-
general, 1943–44; general of the army, command of the Twentieth and assign ment in Wash-
1944–49; general of the air force, 1949; ington, D.C.
chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps, him to act as their executive agent. Thus
After complet-
September 29, 1938; deputy chief of staff he ensured that nearly all Superfortresses ing his military
for air, October 30, 1940; chief of the would be used to bomb Japan. training at
U.S Army Air Forces, 1941–46; seated as
member of Joint Chiefs of Staff, February When high-altitude precision bomb- West Point,
9, 1942 ing proved to be impractical, Arnold Arnold was
• Died: January 13, 1950, Valley of the taught to fly by
made it known that low-level fire raids
Moon, Calif. the Wright
would do. He did not favor using atomic Brothers.
bombs against Japan, because he
believed that fire bombing alone would
Known to his peers and superiors as be enough to force Tokyo to surrender.
“Hap,” Arnold presented a different face In this he was almost certainly wrong,
to those who worked under him and because nearly every city in Japan had
were familiar with his quick temper and been burned out by August 6, 1945,
ruthlessness. He was a “bomber baron,” when Hiroshima was destroyed, but the
one of those air commanders who Japanese government was not much
believed that strategic bombing could closer to surrendering than it had been in
win the war and who pushed relentlessly March, when the incendiary raids began.
for the men and aircraft needed to lay
SEE ALSO
waste to military and civilian targets in
Atomic bombs; Strategic bombing
Europe and Japan. He took no interest
in grand strategy, which he was happy to F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
leave to the Army’s chief of staff, General Coffey, Thomas M. Hap: The Story of the
George C. Marshall. But he exercised U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built
tight control over those parts of the air It, General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold.
New York: Viking, 1982.
force that were engaged in major bomb- Copp, DeWitt S. A Few Great Captains:
ing campaigns. The Men and Events that Shaped the
When the B-29 Superfortress, which Development of U.S. Air Power. Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980.
could carry twice the load of a B-17 and DuPre, Flint O. Hap Arnold: Architect of
take it twice as far, became operational, American Air Power. New York:
Arnold, fearing that all theater comman- Macmillan, 1972.
24
• A R T I L L E R Y •

Artillery

Field guns were critical to the U.S. Army’s


success, inflicting more casualties on the
enemy than all other ground weapons
combined. American infantry divisions
were equipped with superb 105-mm and
155-mm guns that poured devastating
fire on enemy positions. American gun- Image Not Available
ners excelled at their technical art, guided
by forward spotters who flitted about in
tiny aircraft. Their specialty was the
“TOT,” or time-on-target concentration,
in which all available guns would com-
mence firing at intervals, depending on
their range and distance from the target,
so that the first round from every gun
arrived simultaneously. After that the
gunners would fire at will until a specified
time limit had been reached. The resulting
storm of fire that broke without warning
was the American tactic that German sol-
diers feared most. When it came to smaller guns, how- Artillerymen
The principles that made U.S. ever, the army was not so fortunate. It lay down a
artillery so formidable had been devel- never developed a good antitank gun, and barrage of fire
oped before the war, although the Army the tank destroyers that were supposed to on Japanese
then had almost none of the equipment make antitank guns unnecessary were no artillery posi-
tions in Balete
it would need to make them work. Lack- match for German panzers. The basic
Pass, Luzon,
ing modern guns, vehicles with which to tank destroyer was an open half-tracked
Philippine
move them, reliable communications, vehicle on which a low-velocity 75-mm
Islands.
and much else, artillery officers planned gun had been bolted. The gun could not
as if everything would be available when penetrate German armor, and the vehicle
needed. Thus they invented the principles was so top-heavy that great care was
and techniques that helped make the needed to prevent it from tipping over.
U.S. division an artillery-infantry team of Better tank destroyers were devised as the
enormous power. war went on, but as the Germans devel-
In addition to developing TOT, the oped better tanks, tank destroyers never
Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, caught up. Their best use, it turned out,
had worked hard to make field artillery was to serve as mobile assault guns in
both mobile and highly accurate. When support of infantry attacks.
the real war came, along with real American soldiers would have given
weapons, trucks, radios, and other much to have a weapon like the German
equipment, artillery officers had the doc- 88-mm gun. It had been designed as an
trine and training to make the most of antiaircraft, or “flak,” gun, a role in
what they were given. which it excelled. But, with its penetrat-
25
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •

ing power and accuracy, it also proved guns against the great Allied bomber
to be the best antitank gun of the war as fleets to the bitter end.
well as one of the best tank guns.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Although Germany and the Soviet
Baldwin, Ralph Belknap. The Deadly
Union produced large numbers of self- Fuze: The Secret Weapon of World War
propelled (SP) assault guns—artillery II. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press,
pieces mounted on tank bodies—the 1980.
Batchelor, John, and Ian V. Hogg.
United States and Britain did not, believ- Artillery. New York: Scribners, 1972.
ing that ordinary towed guns provided Blackburn, George G. The Guns of Nor-
the infantry with sufficient fire support. mandy: A Soldier’s Eye View, France
1944. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
Perhaps this was so, but the employ- 1995.
ment of tank destroyers as assault guns, Hogg, Ian V. British & American Artillery
a use for which they had not been of World War II. New York: Hippo-
designed and one that put crews at high crene, 1978.
Perret, Geoffrey. There’s a War to Be Won:
risk, suggests that a fully armored, large- The United States Army in World War
caliber American SP gun would have II. New York: Random House, 1991.
been valuable in Europe.
Antiaircraft (AA) guns were of two
types: light weapons for use against low-
flying planes and heavier guns designed
Atlantic, Battle of the
to reach high altitudes. The American
90-mm gun was a good example of the
latter, especially when firing rounds
equipped with “proximity” fuses. These Of all the battles fought in World War
were, in effect, tiny radar units that II, the Battle of the Atlantic was the
exploded AA rounds in the neighbor- most important. If it had been lost, there
hood of the target. First used in 1943 would have been no aid to Britain, no
against Japanese aircraft in the Pacific, Allied invasion of France, no Lend-Lease
proximity fuses were eventually directed convoys to Russia, and therefore no vic-
against ground as well as aerial targets tory. Shipping was critical to every
in both Europe and the Pacific. Its ability Allied operation and the greatest num-
to enable gunners to destroy their tar- ber of ships lost went down in the
gets without making a direct hit made North Atlantic. Yet, despite the life-and-
the proximity fuse a great asset. death struggle that Britain was waging
A German innovation was the “flak against Hitler’s U-boats, the U.S. mili-
tower,” a reinforced concrete structure tary had made no preparations of its
bristling with AA guns that was almost own to conduct antisubmarine warfare
impossible to destroy from the air. After (ASW) before Pearl Harbor. As a result,
the war, they proved so hard to level the Western Hemisphere became a
that in Berlin one was finally covered happy hunting ground for U-boat cap-
with earth to make an artificial hill. tains, beginning on December 31, 1941,
By 1944 U.S. air superiority above when they first reached U.S. waters.
the battlefield was so great that the During the next several months, 61
number of AA units could be sharply ships were sunk off the East Coast; in
reduced, freeing up a substantial number February and March, 42 ships went
of men for service in the infantry, where down in the Caribbean and 8 in the
they were desperately needed. Germany, Gulf of Mexico. U-boats struck at will,
on the other hand, fired its massed AA attacking on the surface even in broad
26
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •

U-boats stalked
ships along
coastal waters
and convoy
routes in the
Atlantic.
Groups of U-
boats were
called “wolf
packs.” Image Not Available

daylight. For ASW operations along the established a limited convoy system. By
East Coast of the United States, the the middle of May a coastal blackout
Navy had available perhaps 20 vessels, (needed because ships silhouetted by
not one of which was fast enough to lights on shore were easy targets) was in
catch a U-boat running on the surface. It force—despite numerous complaints
also had about 100 aircraft, none suited that it would damage the tourist season.
to ASW or capable of long patrols. Yet after six and a half months, the
The Army Air Forces (AAF) threw United States had sunk only 8 U-boats
in 100 two-engine aircraft, 9 B-17 while losing more than 360 merchant
bombers, and a handful of other planes ships. As late as June 15, two U.S. mer-
whose crews had no ASW training and chant vessels were torpedoed off Virginia
which were not equipped to track, much Beach in full view of bathers. Finally, by
less destroy, enemy submarines. Luckily, late summer enough ASW small boats
Germany was not building many U- and aircraft had been assembled to force
boats, but even the handful it deployed the U-boats to relocate to the western
were tremendously effective. If Hitler Caribbean. By the end of September, 173
had seen their value in time, the war merchantmen had been sunk there. On
might have gone far worse for the October 15, 1942, the 1st Bomber Com-
Allies. mand became the Army Air Forces’s
Gradually, under pressure from oil Antisubmarine Command (AAFAC). The
company executives alarmed by tanker Air Forces had discovered that the Very
losses, some obvious and overdue steps Long Range Liberator (VLR Liberator)
were taken. In March 1942 the Civil Air was its best weapon against the U-boat,
Patrol began making offshore flights and and also that searching out U-boats was
gradually the AAF’s 1st Bomber Com- more effective than simply escorting con-
mand acquired the means to fight U- voys—though that had to be done as
boats. By early April the Navy had well. Its views were opposed by the Navy,
27
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •

which wanted the VLR Liberators itself war, leaving Britain with no more than a
and still preferred to escort convoys. few months’ supply of food.
This interservice bickering and com- Roosevelt had already agreed, on
petition took place against a back- November 30, 1942, to assign Britain
ground of rising ship losses. Although 2.5 million tons of shipping. But much
waters in the Western Hemisphere grew of it was yet to be built. In the meantime
safer, the mid-Atlantic became increas- sinkings continued to rise while the
ingly dangerous. After January 1943 no needs of the Mediterranean were prov-
merchant ship was destroyed within a ing to be greater than expected. Military
600-mile radius of any Allied air base, operations in North Africa were sup-
yet the overall loss rate soared. This was posed to require only 66 ships a month
the work of Admiral Karl Doenitz, head for a four-month period, but they actu-
of the U-boat force and, since January ally used more than 400—much of the
30, commander in chief of the German excess provided by Britain. In January,
Navy. His promotion was a result of Churchill took the extreme step of
Hitler’s decision to forget the surface switching to Atlantic routes 52 of 92
fleet and concentrate on submarines. monthly sailings scheduled for India.
Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler did Despite such drastic measures Britain After 85 days
so too late, but Doenitz still managed to remained short of merchant vessels at a on a raft, three
wreak havoc by concentrating his vessels time when Americans were making ever survivors of a
torpedoed mer-
in a patch of the North Atlantic that greater demands on them. The gap be-
chant ship are
was beyond the reach of land-based air- tween what American planners wanted
rescued off the
craft. As many as 80 U-boats at a time and Britain could provide came to about coast of Brazil
worked the area, with devastating 6 million tons, more than a quarter of by a Navy
results. In the first three weeks of March the entire volume of cargo destined for patrol boat on
1943 alone, the Allies lost 750,000 tons U.S. forces overseas that year. January 24,
of shipping, a rate that if continued for Troop and cargo movements from 1943.
long would have destroyed their mer-
chant fleets, or at least those of Britain.
In 1942 the amount of U.S. shipped
goods to the British doubled, while
Britain transported many U.S. troops
and significantly increased the number
of warships that protected Atlantic con-
voys. Nonetheless, in 1942 Britain lost
almost 6 million tons of shipping, a
third more than in 1941, while U.S.
losses came to fewer than 2.5 million Image Not Available
tons. In the same year American ship-
yards turned out vessels able to carry
almost 4 million tons of shipping, giving
the United States a net gain of 1.5 mil-
lion tons, while Britain suffered a net
loss in excess of 2 million tons. This
combination of shipping losses and a
great increase in military cargo crippled
Britain’s merchant fleet. In January 1943
imports fell to the lowest level of the
28
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •

the United States to Britain almost Army could not fully use even the re-
ceased, thanks to the Allied invasion of duced tonnage made available to it, hav-
Africa and the great upsurge in U-boat ing asked for too much in the first place.
activity. On March 12, 1943, Britain Roosevelt won his gamble not only
revealed its shipping requirements to the because more shipping was built than
U.S. service heads. The figures seemed to anticipated but because ASW weapons
indicate that if 27 million tons of goods became better and more numerous.
were shipped to Britain, the least it Also, the navy became more coopera-
could get by with, there would be tive. But success was, in addition, a
almost no merchant vessels left to sup- result of decisions about how weapons
port U.S. forces. The U.S. Joint Chiefs should be deployed that Roosevelt made
demanded that Britain provide more personally. This involved managing
ships anyway, but Britain had none to details of the war that Hitler, Stalin, and
spare. Although no one questioned the Churchill did all the time but was
necessity of having the United States unusual for Roosevelt, who gave the ser-
meet its own shipping needs, if Britain’s vice chiefs a high degree of freedom. In
basic requirements were not met, the this respect, one reason for Germany’s
British national war effort—and there- success was that the U-boats were
fore the Allied one—would collapse. directed by a single commander while
The Joint Chiefs refused to admit this, the various Allied services often worked
however, insisting that the shipping at cross-purposes, each going its own
agreements made at the Casablanca con- way using different methods and failing
ference in January 1943, when shipping to cooperate or share information.
losses were not so great, be carried out Of all the Allied military shortcom-
anyway. ings, the intelligence failure was the
Only Roosevelt could break the most serious, for by 1943, ULTRA,
deadlock, which he was able to do Britain’s code-breaking operation, was
because the U.S. War Shipping Adminis- turning out a steady flow of decrypted
tration (WSA) believed that the Joint enemy radio messages. ULTRA was a
Chiefs were asking for too much. The great help in locating U-boats, not only
WSA’s figures indicated that, thanks to so that they could be attacked but also
increased shipbuilding, a modest cut- because convoys could be rerouted away
back in military shipping during the from U-boat “wolf packs,” easily the
third quarter of 1943 would make it most effective way of defending them.
possible to meet the essential needs of However, for lack of coordination, the
Britain at little expense to the U.S. war priceless data did not always reach those
effort. FDR accepted this analysis and who needed them. Further, the U.S.
took one of his bigger gambles. Navy retained operational control over
Overruling the Joint Chiefs, Roo- army air units and exercised it con-
sevelt stood by his promise to assign stantly, rather than laying down policy
Britain 2.5 million tons of shipping. In and allowing air officers to carry it out,
May he directed the WSA to provide the procedure followed with much suc-
Britain with 150 to 200 merchant ships cess by the Royal Navy and Royal Air
over a 10-month period. From a low Force Coastal Command.
point of 4.5 million tons in the first quar- Admiral Ernest J. King, the hard-
ter of 1943, British imports rose to 7.5 nosed U.S. naval chief, finally admitted
million tons in the second, exceeding that the Battle of the Atlantic was being
requirements. And, as it turned out, the lost, and on March 1, 1943, at his invi-
29
• A T L A N T I C , B A T T L E O F T H E •

Servicemen on
the deck of the
U.S. Coast
Guard cutter
Spencer watch
the explosion
of a depth
charge aimed
at destroying a
Image Not Available German U-
boat trying to
break into the
center of a
large convoy
off the Ameri-
can coastline.

tation, a secret Washington convoy con- entire Atlantic. Somehow Roosevelt,


ference opened with 100 participants who almost never concerned himself
representing the armies and navies of the with tactics, learned of this. On March
United States, Britain, and Canada. At 18, 1943, during the worst month of the
the end of 12 days they agreed to divide U-boat war, he asked for the exact loca-
the oceans into zones of responsibility tions of every VLR Liberator. Upon
for ASW purposes. being informed that they were mostly in
King then formed what was called the wrong places, he ordered what
the Tenth Fleet, an advisory group within proved to be a crucial transfer. Roo-
his own headquarters that became the sevelt’s lifelong interest in naval matters
nerve center of the U.S. ASW campaign. would now greatly benefit the Allied
Improved coordination and communica- cause.
tion were accompanied by, among other By mid-April, 41 VLRs were flying
measures, more sophisticated detection above the North Atlantic, and U-boats
devices, better use of ULTRA decryptions, could no longer surface without risk
and an increase in land-based aircraft and anywhere in it. The issue of which ser-
escort vessels, including small carriers. vice should command ASW aircraft was
An important change was ordered finally resolved, too. In the summer of
by Roosevelt himself. In 1943 the most 1943, air and naval officers agreed that
desperately needed ASW aircraft was the the Army should withdraw from the
VLR Liberator, a modified B-24 heavy antisubmarine war entirely, while the
bomber. The Navy had 112 of these, Navy would give up the idea of strategic
most of which King was hoarding in the bombing in exchange.
Pacific. AAFAC had two squadrons, but Admiral King vetoed the deal at first,
they were operating in North Africa. wanting to keep his heavy bomber force,
This left only 18 VLRs in the Royal Air but he relented in the end. and a trade
Force’s Coastal Command to cover the was agreed to. AAFAC gave its VLR Lib-
30
• A T L A N T I C C H A R T E R •

erators to the Navy in return for conven- SEE ALSO


tional B-24s. Its pride satisfied, the Navy Aircraft carriers; U-boats
finally admitted that the AAFAC doctrine
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
of search and destroy was more effective
Bateman, Robert. Race Against the U-
than simply escorting convoys. By mid- Boats. London: Cape, 1963.
May escort carriers could give air protec- Burland, Brian. A Fall from Aloft. Lon-
tion to convoys everywhere in the don: Barrie and Rockcliff, 1968.
Hough, Richard. The Longest Battle: The
Atlantic. During April and May 1943, War at Sea 1939–45. New York: Mor-
Admiral Doenitz lost 56 boats, a casualty row, 1986.
rate so high that he was forced temporar- Mason, John T., ed. Atlantic War Remem-
bered: An Oral History Collection.
ily to abandon the North Atlantic. The
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
British, who had been fighting U-boats 1990.
much longer than the United States, con- Morrison, Samuel Eliot. History of United
tributed immensely to this outcome, yet States Naval Operations in World War
II. Vol. 4. Coral Sea, Midway and Sub-
Roosevelt’s interventions may have pro- marine Actions. May 1942–August 1942.
vided the margin of victory. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949.
It had taken only five weeks to ———. History of United States Naval
Operations in World War II. Vol. 10. The
eliminate the U-boat menace. Two fig- Atlantic Battle Won. May 1943–May
ures sum things up. In April, Allied ship- 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956.
ping losses amounted to 245,000 tons,
but in June only 18,000 tons. It was the
most important defeat for German arms
since World War I. Soon U.S. shipyards Atlantic Charter
were producing in volume, and by Octo-
ber 1943 all the shipping capacity lost
since 1939 had been replaced. Doenitz
came back later with more and better U- On August 4, 1941, at a time when the
boats, but the Allies kept ahead of him. United States was not yet at war with
By 1944, despite a great increase in Germany or Japan, President Franklin
Allied traffic, the tonnage—not the D. Roosevelt slipped quietly out of New
number of vessels but their combined London, Connecticut, transferring at sea
weight—of U-boats lost exceeded that to the cruiser Augusta for a rendezvous
of all Allied merchant ships destroyed. with Britain’s prime minister Winston
Of 1,162 U-boats commissioned Churchill. They met at Argentia Bay in
during the war, 941 were sunk or cap- Newfoundland to pursue somewhat dif-
tured. Seventy-five percent of those who ferent agendas. Churchill hoped for U.S.
fought the undersea war for Hitler promises of additional support, especial-
became casualties, a rate unmatched by ly against Japan. Roosevelt wanted a
any other fighting service of any belliger- joint statement of principles that would
ent nation. Thanks to Roosevelt person- establish the basis for a democratic war
ally, to the U.S. Navy, which awoke to effort. Both believed that the United
the U-boat menace just in time, to those States would soon be at war, even
who fought the German submarines, though neither knew how this would
and to the dedicated civilian sailors of come to pass.
the Allied merchant fleets—thousands of The result of their meeting, a docu-
whom gave their lives—the Allies won ment that became known as the Atlantic
control of the Atlantic and, with it, the Charter, was not very important,
cause of freedom. although it would be cited repeatedly
31
• A T O M I C B O M B S •

Roosevelt had secretly agreed to invade


Europe. This was one claim that had no
basis at all in fact.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Brinkley, Douglas and David R. Facey-
Image Not Available Crowther. The Atlantic Charter. New
York: Macmillan, 1994.
Wilson, Theodore A. The First Summit:
Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay,
1941. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1991.

Franklin Roo- throughout the war as having established


sevelt (left) and the “Four Freedoms”—freedom of Atomic bombs
Winston speech and religion, freedom from want
Churchill dis- and fear—as Allied war aims. It declared
cuss wartime eight principles to be the goals of the war
goals on board effort, including self-determination of
the Augusta.
subject peoples (Churchill, who still Research conducted in the 1920s and
The resulting
hoped to save the British Empire, bet 1930s by physicists specializing in
Atlantic Char-
ter was
that he would not have to live up to this ultra-high energy, most of them Euro-
endorsed by part of the agreement at the end of the pean, opened up the possibility of
the Soviet war), freedom of trade, freedom of the unleashing a nuclear chain reaction
Union and 14 seas, disarmament, and eventually some that would produce tremendous
other Allied kind of permanent alliance. amounts of energy. By September 1939
states. Roosevelt was vague about Japan, Nazi Germany, where nuclear fission
but having already decided to do so, he had been discovered the previous year,
could promise the prime minister a U.S. was developing an atom bomb project
convoy system to protect marine ship- based on this research. At the same
ments from German U-boats on the pas- time in the United States, refugee scien-
sage across the Atlantic. Roosevelt’s tists, led by Leo Szilard of Hungary,
interest in supporting the Soviet Union who had been driven from Europe by
also received much encouragement, from Nazi anti-Semitism, were attempting to
Churchill and from events on the eastern persuade American officials of the need
front itself where the Soviets seemed to for such a program.
be holding their own. Things went slowly at first, but in
Because the conference was largely September 1942 Major General Leslie
symbolic, its value depended on the Richard Groves, an officer in the U.S.
weight given to its pronouncements. To Army Corps of Engineers, which had
Roosevelt and his supporters, the just finished building the Pentagon, was
Argentia meeting was a great success, assigned to oversee the nuclear develop-
which may have been true so far as ment program. In October he appointed
publicity went. To the British, who had J. Robert Oppenheimer as director of
hoped for more definite commitments, research for what was to be called the
the conference was disappointing, Manhattan Project. Oppenheimer, who
although as usual Churchill put the best would one day be seen as the father of
possible face on things. To isolationists, the atom bomb, was a theoretical physi-
the charter was a mask behind which cist with joint appointments at the Cali-
32
• A T O M I C B O M B S •

Image Not Available fornia Institute of most of them would be required to live
Technology and the on a remote mesa in New Mexico where
University of California the scientific work was to be consoli-
This implosion- at Berkeley. Although he dated at the Los Alamos Laboratory.
type plutonium was a brilliant scientist, Oppenheimer Oppenheimer also turned out to be a
bomb, called had never run a large laboratory and— natural leader, able to keep his collection
“Fat Man,” unlike the leading scientists of the Man- of geniuses and prima donnas hard at
was dropped hattan Project—had never won the work under spartan conditions.
on Nagasaki on
Nobel Prize. To make the fuel for an atomic
August 9, 1945.
Major General Groves insisted on bomb, an entire industry had to be built
making this appointment, overriding from scratch, at a cost of some $2 bil-
objections from scientists and Army lion—a gigantic sum at the time, espe-
counterintelligence, who opposed nam- cially because Congress could not be
ing someone whose former fiancée, wife, told what it was appropriating the
brother, and sister-in-law had all been money for. The manufacturing work
members of the Communist party, and was concentrated in two places—Oak
perhaps still were. In doing so, Groves Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Wash-
made his greatest contribution to the ington—each of which had the abun-
bomb project, for Oppenheimer, who dant supply of electrical power required
had what a colleague described as “intel- to make an atomic bomb. But otherwise
lectual sex appeal,” was able to enlist the manufacturing centers were com-
hundreds—and eventually thousands— pletely different, for the Manhattan
of scientists and engineers to work on a Project’s goal was to make not one type
program he could not reveal to them in of atomic bomb but two radically differ-
advance for security reasons. Further, ent weapons.

Soldiers exam-
ine the devas-
tating effects of
the atomic
bomb dropped
on Hiroshima.

Image Not Available


33
• A T O M I C B O M B S •

Oak Ridge had the easier job of history had taken place, the scientists left
refining uranium 235 until it achieved their bunkers to see the soon-to-become-
the level of purity that would cause a familiar giant, boiling, mushroom-shaped
chain reaction when two pieces of it col- cloud rising toward the heavens. Careful
lided. This was accomplished by fitting calculations revealed that the plutonium
them into a barrel and firing one piece weapon had a force of 18.6 kilotons,
at another. The theory behind this four times what had been expected.
weapon was so convincing that scientists It was a plutonium bomb, known as
did not even field test the device. The Fat Man, that exploded over Nagasaki,
first uranium-based explosion took Japan, on August 9, 1945, with a force
place over Hiroshima, Japan, on August estimated at 22 kilotons. Because of high
6, 1945, the product of a bomb known winds, Fat Man had to be dropped sev-
as Little Boy. The plane that carried the eral miles from the intended site, and it
bomb was Enola Gay, named after the was therefore less destructive than Little
pilot’s mother. It was estimated that the Boy, killing somewhere between 40,000
force of Little Boy equaled an explosion and 140,000 people.
of 12,500 tons of TNT. In the future, The extensive damage done to the
nuclear weapons would be designated human body by the radiation effect,
according to the number of such kiloton which caused people to die long after a
(one thousand tons) units of force they nuclear explosion, and which partially
would release. Little Boy is believed to accounts for the wide variation in casu-
have killed between 70,000 and alty estimates, was not anticipated by
200,000 people. The highest figure scientists. It would be years before the
includes those who died years, and in Los Alamos scientists and others
some cases many years, after the blast involved with the U.S. nuclear weapons
and is probably exaggerated. program would come to grips with what
Late in 1942, at the University of many regarded as the ugliest feature of
Chicago, a team led by Enrico Fermi, a nuclear warfare. Although few ques-
Nobel laureate from Italy, built the first tioned the decision to wage nuclear war
atomic reactor. At Hanford, Washington, at the time, a controversy developed
five reactors modeled on this prototype later that continues to this day.
created an artificial element called pluto- SEE ALSO
nium by bombarding uranium 238 with Japan, surrender of
neutrons. After many difficulties, suffi-
cient plutonium was produced to set off F U RT H E R R E A D I N G

a chain reaction. This was achieved by Cooper, Dan. Enrico Fermi and the Revo-
lutions of Modern Physics. New York:
surrounding pure plutonium with high Oxford University Press, 1999.
explosives that, when detonated, com- Goodchild, Peter. J. Robert Oppenheimer:
pressed the material, causing a chain Shatter of Worlds. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1980.
reaction faster and more efficiently than Hersey, John. Hiroshima. 1946. Reprint,
could be done in a gun barrel. In effect, New York: Knopf, 1985.
the plutonium was imploded to produce Maruki, Toshi. Hiroshima No Pika. New
a gigantic eruption. However, because of York: Lothrop, Lee, and Shepard, 1982.
Fiction.
its complexity, the implosion device had Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the
to be tested. This was done at the Alam- Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon &
ogordo Bombing Range in New Mexico Schuster, 1986.
Wyden, Peter. Day One: Before Hiroshima
on July 16, 1945. and After. New York: Simon & Schuster,
After the first atomic explosion in 1984.
34
• A X I S •

they surrendered in the end due to starva-


Axis tion, disease, and a near-total lack of sup-
plies. The Japanese were unprepared for
the large number of prisoners they took
and, despising prisoners of war (POWs)
in any case—they themselves rarely sur-
In 1936 Italy and Germany established
rendered—cared little whether the men
by treaty what became known as the
lived or died. They forced their exhausted
Rome–Berlin Axis. Later, Japan associ-
prisoners to walk 65 miles to the nearest
ated itself with the Axis, and in 1940
prison camp, killing those who fell by the
the “Tripartite Pact” allied the three
way, usually with great cruelty. No one
states. Germany’s client states, Romania,
knows the exact number of those who
Bulgaria, and Hungary, were also con-
died, but it certainly ran to the thou-
sidered Axis powers.
sands. By 1943 news of the death march
reached the United States, further inflam-
ing public opinion against the Japanese
Bataan death march and contributing to the extreme brutality
that marked the Pacific war.
SEE ALSO
MacArthur, Douglas; Pacific war; South-
west Pacific Area
On April 9, 1942, some 78,000 U.S. and
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Philippine troops surrendered to the
James, D. Clayton. The Years of
Japanese on the Bataan Peninsula of MacArthur. Vol. 2. Boston: Houghton
Luzon in the Philippine Islands. These men Mifflin, 1975.
had fought magnificently—and for much FitzPatrick, Bernard T. The Hike into
the Sun: Memoir of an American
longer than the Japanese had expected.
Soldier Captured on Bataan in 1942
Outgunned by the Japanese and and Imprisoned by the Japanese until
abandoned by the United States, includ- 1945. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &
ing at the end by General Douglas Co., 1993.
Villarin, Mariano. We Remember Bataan
MacArthur, and with little ammunition, and Corregidor: The Story of the Ameri-
less food, and almost no medical care, can & Filipino Defenders of Bataan and

American pris-
oners carry
fallen comrades
on their march
in Bataan.
This captured
Japanese pho-
tograph testi-
fies to the cru- Image Not Available
elty with which
POWs were
treated.
35
• B A T T L E S H I P S •

Corregidor and Their Captivity. Balti-


more: Gateway Press, 1990. ber 1941 on Pearl Harbor, during which
all the battleships of the Pacific Fleet
were sunk or badly damaged, and the
Battleships all-carrier Battle of Midway, it was clear
that the battleship was now the auxil-
iary and the carrier the main instrument
of naval warfare. Thereafter, the slower
battleships were used only to bombard
In 1939 most navies regarded the battle- enemy-held islands.
ship as their primary weapon of war. In Two fast battleships mounting 16-
the event of war with Japan, the U.S. inch guns and with a top speed of about
Navy had long planned to meet the 27 knots entered service in 1941. In 1943
enemy’s “battle line” (a line or column and 1944 they were joined by four more
of battleships) at sea and destroy it with of the Iowa class, bigger ships that could
gunfire. When the United States entered make 33 knots. This handful of fast bat-
the war, most battleships in service, des- tleships fought a number of surface
ignated BBs, had been built during or engagements in the Solomon Islands cam-
just after World War I, mounted 10 or paign, but their primary work for most
12 14-inch guns, and had a top speed of of the Pacific war was to provide antiair-
some 20 knots per hour. This meant craft protection for the carriers and fire
they could not keep up with the newer support for amphibious landings. This
aircraft carriers, which had speeds in outcome was a cruel disappointment for
excess of 30 knots. But because carriers the once-dominant “battleship admirals,”
were considered auxiliary ships, this did who had scorned aircraft carriers before
not seem a major problem. the war, only to find that the “air admi-
After the Japanese attack in Decem- rals” were right and battleships and bat-

The USS Iowa


conducts a bat-
tle drill, 1944.

Image Not Available


36
• B A Z O O K A S •

tleship tactics obsolete.


Britain had a large battleship force,
Bazookas
its King George class being comparable to
the United States’s fast BBs. Because Ger-
many built very few large ships, British
battleships fought mainly against U-boats, The bazooka was a recoilless rocket
although they did engage in a handful of launcher, aimed and fired by one man; a
surface actions, notably the sinking of second man served as loader. It was first
the powerful German battleship the Bis- used as an antitank weapon in 1942,
marck, on May 27, 1941. The Royal with some success, but by 1944 the
Navy’s darkest day came on December 8, bazooka was all but useless in that role
1941, when the battleship Prince of Wales because its small warhead (2.36 inches)
(and its escort, the battle cruiser Repulse) could not penetrate the thick armor of
was sunk by Japanese aircraft. This forced Germany’s late-model tanks.
even the most conservative admirals to The Germans copied and improved
admit that a battleship without the sup- the bazooka. Their panzerschreck (tank
port of an aircraft carrier could not terror) fired a 3.4-inch rocket grenade
defend itself against serious air attacks. capable of penetrating 8.25 inches of
No nation invested more in battle- armor, which was more than enough
ships than Japan, which not only built a power to hole any Allied tank. The
large number of them but also had two somewhat smaller and more portable
super-battleships, Yamato and Musashi, Panzerfaust (tank fist) was almost as
which were in a class of their own. These effective. The British PIAT (Projector
enormous vessels displaced 64,000 tons, Infantry Anti-Tank) was inferior to the
compared to 46,000 for the Iowa, and bazooka and, like it, was useful only as
mounted nine 18.1-inch guns, making an infantry rather than antitank weapon.
Allied troops used captured Panzerfausts
them far and away the biggest and most
whenever they could in preference to
powerful surface ships in the world.
their own inferior weapons.
Nonetheless, even these behemoths were
no match for U.S. naval aviators. The
Musashi was sunk on October 24, 1944,
during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Yam- Berlin, bombing of
ato on April 7, 1945, while making a
suicide run for Okinawa.

F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, who


Dulin, Robert O. Battleships: United States headed the Royal Air Force’s Bomber
Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, Command, was obsessed with Berlin, so
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
much so that on November 3, 1943, he
Garzke, William H. Battleships: Axis and
Neutral Battleships in World War II. wrote to Prime Minister Winston
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Churchill as follows: “We can wreck
Gray, Edwyn. Hitler’s Battleships. London: L. Berlin from end to end if the USAAF
Cooper, 1992.
Kennedy, Ludovic Henry Coverly. Pursuit: will come in on it. It will cost between
The Chase and Sinking of the Bismarck. 400–500 aircraft. It will cost Germany
New York: Viking, 1974. the war.”
Yoshida, Mitsura. Requiem for Battleship
Yamato. Seattle: University of Washing- This statement was ridiculous on
ton Press, 1985. several counts. For one, U.S. air generals
37
• B E R L I N, F A L L O F •

at this stage of the war were dead set the air war that second thoughts could
against area bombing (indiscriminate not be permitted.
attacks on entire cities). And even if they
SEE ALSO
had wanted to cooperate with Harris,
Royal Air Force; Strategic bombing;
the U.S. Eighth Air Force was reeling United States Army Air Forces
from terrible losses in August and Octo-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ber that had, in effect, forced it to give
up bombing German cities until it could Cooper, Alan W. Bombers over Berlin: The
RAF Offensive, November 1943–March
be supplied with long-range fighter 1944. Wellingborough: P. Stephens, 1989.
escorts. What’s more, even if it had had Hastings, Max. Bomber Command. New
more bombers and fighters, daylight York: Dial, 1979.
Hawkins, Ian L., ed. Courage*Honor*
attacks on one of the most heavily Victory, B-17s Over Berlin: Personal Sto-
defended cities in Europe would have ries from the 95th Bomb Group. Wash-
been very costly, a fact that was proven ington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995.
Middlebrook, Martin. The Berlin Raids:
the following March when the Eighth R.A.F. Bomber Command Winter,
Air Force did attack Berlin—with a 1943–44. New York: Viking, 1988.
powerful fighter escort—but still suf-
fered heavy losses. Further, the small
bomb-load capacity of U.S. heavy
bombers, which had been designed for Berlin, fall of
precise attacks on industrial sites rather
than entire cities, meant that they would
contribute relatively little to the destruc-
tion of a great urban area like Berlin. Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin both
It is a mystery why Harris, or any- regarded Berlin as a highly valuable prize
one else, believed that leveling the capi- that would give whichever nation cap-
Two Russian
tal of Germany would cause the Nazi tured it great prestige and a degree of
officers salute a
government to surrender, since the great political benefit as well. For this reason
photographer of
bulk of Germany’s industrial might Churchill put heavy pressure on General the American
would remain untouched. It says much Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander in Signal Corps in
about the general pointlessness of the chief of Allied forces, to take Berlin before Berlin after its
Allied bombing offensives that Harris the Soviets could. It is not clear whether capture.
was allowed to act on this ill-conceived
campaign anyway. What Harris called
the Battle of Berlin started on August
23, 1943, and ended in the spring of
1944, when Bomber Command was
forced to concentrate on D-Day targets.
The Battle of Berlin ended in failure
for the Allies; the German capital con-
tinued to function, even though the
Eighth Air Force staged daylight attacks
Image Not Available
on Berlin during the last days of the war.
Harris lost 492 bombers during this
campaign, the United States fewer
because of its later start. Nothing much
was learned from this defeat, because
the Allies were by now so committed to
38
• B L A C K S •

this would have been possible, since by


late April 1945, the Red Army was closer Blitzkrieg
to Berlin than the U.S. forces were.
In any case, Eisenhower decided not
to try, believing that Berlin had little mil-
itary value and that the prestige gained Germany’s attacks on Poland in 1939
would not be worth the lives that would and the Allies in 1940, spearheaded by
be lost storming the German capital. fast-moving panzer (armored) divisions
That left the way open for the Soviets, supported by light and medium
who surrounded Berlin on April 25. bombers, were called blitzkriegs (light-
Hitler killed himself on April 30, and ning wars), because of the German
the city surrendered on May 2. Army’s speed and power. These wars
Eisenhower’s decision was much were also like lightning in being violent
criticized, then and later, but the Soviets and brief.
did not gain any benefits they would not After the invasion of Greece in
have gotten anyway under the terms of 1941, there were no more blitzkriegs.
the Yalta agreement in February 1945 Operation Barbarossa, the German
that divided up postwar Germany. The invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941,
Soviets are believed to have suffered began with blitzkrieg-style victories,
100,000 casualties taking Berlin, more but unlike France and Poland, the Sovi-
than the United States sustained in the et Union could not be made to surren-
Battle of the Bulge, the biggest engage- der. Although Germany would launch
ment ever fought by the U.S. Army. It major armored assaults in 1942, 1943,
was Soviet practice to squander lives for and as late as December 1944, the
the flimsiest of reasons, but that was not blitzkrieg era was over.
Eisenhower’s way, and thousands of GIs Russia could trade land for time
therefore owed their lives to him. for as long as it took to create addi-
tional powerful armies, which meant
SEE ALSO
that Germany’s armored attacks could
Germany, surrender of; Yalta conference
no longer be decisive. Once Germany
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G was forced to retreat in Russia, Africa,
Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower and and France, the fast, light tanks of the
Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the blitzkrieg years were increasingly
Elbe. New York: Norton, 1967. replaced by heavily armored models.
Brett-Smith, Richard. Berlin ’45: The Grey
City. London: Macmillan, 1966. These were extremely useful for defen-
Parrish, Thomas. Berlin in the Balance, sive purposes but too slow for the
1945–1949: The Blockade, the Airlift, rapid maneuvers that blitzkriegs
the First Major Battle of the Cold War.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1998. required.
Read, Anthony. The Fall of Berlin. Lon-
don: Hutchinson, 1992. SEE ALSO
Studnitz, Hans-Georg von. While Berlin
Burns: The Diary of Hans-Georg von France, fall of; Soviet Union (USSR)
Studnitz, 1943–1945. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. F U RT H E R R E A D I N G

Delaney, John. The Blitzkrieg Campaigns:


Germany’s ‘Lightning War’ Strategy in
Action. London: Arms and Armour, 1996.
Blacks Wernick, Robert, and the editors of Time-
Life Books. Blitzkrieg. New York: Time-
SEE African Americans Life Books, 1976.
39
• B O M B E R S •

17 Flying Fortress was the premier U.S.


heavy bomber, although the more vul-
Bombers nerable B-24 Liberator was used exten-
sively as well. On long missions both
typically carried bombloads of 4,000
pounds. Britain’s best heavy, the Lan-
caster, was less well armed and armored
Three types of bombers were used by and could carry a bombload in excess of
the great powers—heavy, medium, and 10,000 pounds. The greatest heavy of
light (also called dive-bombers and, the war was the Boeing B-29 Super-
later, fighter-bombers). Only Britain and fortress. It was used exclusively against
the United States employed four-engine Japan, could operate above 30,000 feet,
heavy bombers, mainly in costly offen- and was notable for its long range and
sives against Germany and Japan. They large bombload.
were also used in the Atlantic against Two-engine medium bombers were
This B-25
German U-boats, and the United States employed by all the great powers.
takes off from
used them against Japanese targets in Because they operated at 10,000 to the deck of the
the Southwest Pacific. 15,000 feet, they were more accurate USS Hornet to
“Heavies” operated at high alti- and versatile than heavy bombers. Typi- take part in the
tudes (above 20,000 feet) and carried cally they bombed behind enemy lines, first U.S. air
the largest bombloads. In Europe the B- striking at supply dumps, headquarters, raid on Japan.

Image Not Available


40
• B O U R K E - W H I T E, M A R G A R E T •

and other facilities. The best German


medium was the Junkers 88, which
Bourke-White,
could serve as a dive-bomber in addition Margaret
to making level attacks. The United PHOTOJOURNALIST
States’s best medium was the B-25
• Born: June 14, 1906, New York,
Mitchell, which in the Pacific was some-
N.Y.
times equipped with up to eight 50-cal- • Education: Columbia University,
iber machine guns mounted in the nose. University of Michigan, Cornell Image Not Available
This made it a formidable gunship able University, 1927
• Died: August 27, 1971, Stamford,
to destroy both ground targets and Conn.
small vessels.
In the Pacific both the U.S. and
Japanese navies employed dive and tor-
pedo bombers throughout the war.
Because of torpedo defects the U.S. A pioneer photojournalist, Margaret
Navy relied mainly on dive-bombers, Bourke-White was best known before
while the Japanese, who had a superb the war as a photographer of industry.
torpedo, made very good use of it. In The first issue of Fortune magazine in
Europe Allied fighter-bombers attacked 1929 featured her pictures. In 1930 she
all kinds of targets with great success became the first foreign photographer
and were especially useful in support of allowed to shoot pictures of Soviet
ground troops. industry and social conditions. In 1936
The leading U.S. fighter-bomber she was one of the first staff photogra-
was the P-47 Thunderbolt, which car- phers to be hired by Life magazine. She
ried a large and varied arsenal of also collaborated with her husband, the
weapons. The British Typhoon was a writer Erskine Caldwell, on several doc-
great tank-killer and the first fighter- umentary books.
bomber to be armed with air-to-ground Bourke-White’s reputation soared
rockets. The Soviets made extensive use during the war when she toured the bat-
of fighter-bombers as well. The famous tlefronts for Life. She was the first
German Stuka dive-bomber, already woman to be accredited as a photogra-
obsolete when the war broke out in Sep- pher by the U.S. Army Air Forces and
tember 1939, was useful only against the first to fly a combat mission. She
nations with weak air defenses. When became one of the best, and best
they were employed in the Battle of known, of the war’s great photojournal-
Britain, so many were destroyed that the ists. And unlike most of her male col-
Stuka had to be grounded. Neither Ger- leagues, she made a point of covering
many nor Japan used fighter-bombers to women’s contributions to the war as
the same degree as the Allies, partly well as combat operations. She recorded,
because they favored medium bombers for example, the experiences of female
and partly because by 1943 they had nurses and WACs (Women’s Army
lost control of the air over most battle- Corps) when the troopship they were on
fields. was torpedoed on its way to Africa. She
was among the first Western journalists
SEE ALSO
to cover the liberation of the Nazi death
Atomic bombs; Strategic bombing camps, which resulted in her powerful
book Dear Fatherland, Rest Quietly
(1946).
41
• B R A D L E Y , O M A R N . •

SEE ALSO eral Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was


Women the Allied supreme commander in the
Mediterranean. Bradley was assistant
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
commander of the II Corps under Lieu-
Ayer, Eleanor H. Margaret Bourke-White: tenant General George C. Patton in
Photographing the World. New York:
Maxwell/Macmillan, 1992. Africa, and then served as its comman-
Bourke-White, Margaret. The Photographs der in Africa and Sicily.
of Margaret Bourke-White. Sean Calla- Although not the most brilliant of
han, ed. Greenwich, Conn.: New York
Graphic Society, 1972. soldiers, Bradley was reliable and diplo-
Bourke-White, Margaret. Portrait of matic. Patton was more gifted, but he
Myself. New York: Simon & Schuster, did not always control his temper and
1963.
disliked the British intensely. Therefore,
Daffron, Carolyn. Margaret Bourke-White.
New York: Chelsea House, 1992. when General Eisenhower left the
Goldberg, Vicki. Margaret Bourke-White: A Mediterranean to become supreme com-
Biography. New York: Harper & Row, mander in Europe, he chose Bradley to
1986.
Keller, Emily. Margaret Bourke-White: A be First Army commander instead of
Photographer’s Life. Minneapolis: Lerner, Patton; this was because the job meant
1996. planning and working closely with the
Silverman, Jonathan. For the World to See:
The Life of Margaret Bourke-White. New British, especially the very difficult Gen-
York: Viking Press, 1983. eral Sir Bernard Law Montgomery.
On D-Day, June 6, 1944, Bradley
commanded America’s soldiers in France
as head of First Army, while Mont-
Bradley, Omar N. gomery was the overall commander of
COMMANDER OF U.S. 12TH Allied ground forces. On August 1 the
ARMY GROUP 12th Army Group became operational
and Bradley assumed command, the First
• Born: February 12, 1893, Clark, Mo.
• Education: West Point, 1911–15
Army going to Lieutenant General Court-
• Military Service: U.S. Army—second nay Hodges. On September 1 Eisenhower
lieutenant, 1915; first lieutenant, moved his headquarters to France and
1916; captain, 1918; major 1924; took direct control of the ground war.
lieutenant colonel, 1936; brigadier
general, 1941; major general, 1941; Montgomery ceased being Allied ground
commander of II Corps, 1943; commander, while retaining his 21st
commander of U.S. First Army, 1943;
commander 12th U.S. Army Group, Army Group. “Brad” and “Monty,” as
1944–45, lieutenant general, 1944; everyone called them, were now equals,
general, 1945; five-star general of the both reporting to Eisenhower.
army, 1950
Bradley’s group would eventually
• Died: April 8, 1981, New York, N.Y.
include 4 armies—the First, Third,
Ninth, and Fifteenth (which arrived late
and saw little action)—and number
A capable and soft-spoken man, Omar between 1.2 and 1.3 million men. It was
N. Bradley had the confidence and trust the largest field command ever held by a
of his superiors, which is why he rose so U.S. general.
high in the Army. After Bradley had After D-Day the Allies bogged
commanded two divisions in training, down in Normandy, whose hedgerows
Chief of Staff General George C. Mar- (high earthen walls around farm fields
shall sent him to North Africa in 1942 held together by the roots of bushes and
as a troubleshooter for Lieutenant Gen- trees) were powerful natural defenses,
42
• B R A D L E Y, O M A R N. •

which the Germans used well. Gradual- were driven from most of France and
ly, the Americans learned how to fight in much of Belgium. The River Seine was
the hedgerows, but the going was slow easily crossed and Paris liberated.
and the costs heavy. In order to achieve On September 4 the British took the
a breakthrough Bradley drew up plans great Belgian port of Antwerp intact.
for Operation Cobra. This attack in the This should have solved what were
south of Normandy would begin with a becoming very serious Allied supply
huge saturation bombing attack on the problems, as everything was still coming
German lines. After delays and a false in over the beaches of Normandy and
start, it took place on July 26. The Ger- being trucked for longer and longer dis-
mans held out for a few days longer tances as the armies advanced. However,
against repeated ground attacks, but by British delay enabled German troops to
the 28th their lines were crumbling. fortify their side of the Scheldt Estuary, a
Bradley then unleashed Patton’s 60-mile-long waterway that linked
Third Army, and the breakthrough Antwerp to the North Sea. It took
turned into a breakout, with two of Pat- Canadian troops months to clear the
ton’s corps racing east, then north. Most Scheldt, seriously handicapping Allied
of the Germans in France were now in operations. Further, the retreating Ger-
danger of being caught between British mans had dug in and rebuilt the West
and U.S. forces in the Falaise “pocket.” Wall, so the war of movement was over,
Two of Montgomery’s divisions, which and it was back to wearing the enemy
were to close the pocket, moved out down again.
slowly. Patton wanted to close the By December 1944 the Germans
Falaise pocket himself, but Bradley had cut Bradley’s headquarters in Lux-
would not hear of it. As a result most of embourg off from his First and Ninth
the Germans got away, although some armies, which came temporarily under
50,000 were still in the pocket when it British command. In January he
finally shut. regained the First Army, but the Ninth
This was Bradley’s most criticized Army stayed with Montgomery to beef
decision. If Patton had been allowed to up his 21st Army Group, which was
proceed, most of the Germans in France much smaller than Bradley’s and not
might have been taken. Nothing would getting any reinforcements. The Ameri-
have stood between the Allies and a cans were having manpower problems
sweep into Germany, for its West Wall too, but a few more divisions were still
(a line of frontier fortifications) was in on their way to the front. And infantry
need of repair and weakly held. replacements were found by taking men
Bradley restrained Patton because he from antiaircraft units and from non-
thought that the Third Army was overex- combat jobs behind the lines. Bradley
tended and its lead elements would be would not have all the men he wanted,
crushed by the retreating Germans. That but he would have enough.
may have been so, but had Patton failed In February the Allied combined
to close the gap, at worst a division or chiefs of staff agreed to Eisenhower’s
two might have been lost. If he had suc- plan for final victory. Montgomery’s 21st
ceeded, the war in the West would have Army Group was supposed to be the
been practically over. In hindsight, it main assault force, driving across the
appears to have been a risk worth taking. Rhine and the north German plain
All the same, the breakout was, on toward Berlin. The U.S. 6th Army
its own terms, a triumph. The Germans Group—which consisted of the U.S. Sev-
43
• B R I T A I N •

Omar Bradley
south. By April 7 nearly all his forces were
discusses strat-
in motion. The Ninth Army reached its
egy with Gen-
eral Dwight
stop line, the Elbe River, on April 11, hav-
Eisenhower. ing traveled 226 miles in 19 days. The
First Army linked up with the Soviets,
who were advancing from the east, on
April 25. Patton’s Third Army reached the
former Czechoslovakia at the beginning
of May, stopping to wait for the Soviets,
Image Not Available who would occupy the reborn state after
the war. In the north, Montgomery
moved forward with his usual caution.
Seeing that all the German fronts
were collapsing and Berlin was under
attack by the Soviets, Hitler killed him-
self on April 30. On May 7 the Ger-
mans formally surrendered to Eisen-
hower in Reims, France.
enth Army and the French First Army— These were Bradley’s salad days,
and Bradley’s 12th Army Group would which would in time bring him a fifth
play supporting roles by making local star, making him equal in rank to Eisen-
attacks in their areas. hower and other senior commanders.
All this changed on March 7, when As head of the largest army group in the
units of the First Army seized an intact West, he certainly deserved this honor.
bridge at Remagen on the Rhine. Eisen- Although some historians have been
hower allowed Bradley to expand his critical of Bradley for being overly con-
bridgehead on the east bank of the servative, his style meshed well with
Rhine, and on March 22 Patton’s Third Eisenhower’s broad front strategy.
Army crossed the Rhine also, giving Bradley remained in the Army after
Bradley two solid bases from which to World War II, becoming chief of staff in
expand. Montgomery crossed on the 1948 and chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
24th as planned, but Bradley’s forces in 1949. He held this position throughout
were moving so much faster that Eisen- the Korean War (1950–53), and in its
hower changed his plans. final months served again under Eisen-
When the First and Ninth armies hower, who had been elected President.
met on April 1, the German Army He retired from military service after a
Group B in the Ruhr was surrounded. truce agreement with China and North
On April 4 the Ninth Army rejoined the Korea was signed in the summer of 1953.
12th Army Group and Bradley was
given the job of ending German resis-
tance in the west. Montgomery’s 21st
Army Group, now much smaller, would Britain
guard his northern flank, with 6th Army
Group doing the same to his south. The
race for glory would be won by the
Americans rather than the British. In 1940 Britain had a population of 48
Bradley formed his three armies million. It was one of the world’s great
along a 140-mile front running north to powers, a leading industrial state, and
44
• B R I T A I N •

possessed a vast empire that spanned the sessed or controlled almost the entire
globe and occupied about one-fourth of continent of Europe. Little wonder
it. Although the army was relatively some in Britain believed that with all
small, the Royal Navy was the largest in hope of defeating Hitler apparently
the world, as was the British merchant lost, the time had come to make peace.
fleet. In Europe the Royal Air Force took Hitler, prepared to deal, proposed that
second place only to the German Luft- in return for peace he would allow
waffe. Together with those of France, Britain to retain its independence and
which was also a wealthy industrial state its empire. Britain would still rule the
with a huge land army and a modern waves, while he would continue to
fleet, these assets gave the Allies superior- rule Europe.
ity over the Wehrmacht (Germany’s com- Britain alone Thanks to inspired
bined military forces) on paper. leadership by Winston Churchill,
But, although it was superior to the Britain’s new prime minister, and their
German armed forces in sheer numbers, native stubbornness, the British stood
the Allies did not have the advantage in firm and saved their island from inva-
quality, as was demonstrated when Ger- sion by winning the Battle of Britain.
many attacked to the west in May 1940. The Royal Air Force (RAF) prevented
By the end of June it had conquered German troops from landing, but if it
France and driven Britain out of Europe. had failed, the invaders would not have
The British Army survived and returned been met by the British Army alone. A
home, thanks to the “miracle of “Home Army” of poorly armed overage
Dunkirk” in which civilian vessels men, mostly veterans of World War I,
joined the military to save many British was mobilized as well. As there was no
troops beached on the French coast. But invasion, they served the rest of the war
the Army arrived in England minus its in capacities where combat-ready sol-
vehicles and heavy weapons. diers were not required. Even so, the
Britain now found itself alone fac- willingness of aging and unprepared
ing a triumphant Third Reich that pos- men to fight was a measure of Britain’s

These English
policemen
escort a mother
and her chil-
dren from an
area where an
unexploded
German bomb
waits to be
defused. Image Not Available
45
• B R I T A I N •

This photo-
graph of a Lon-
don railway
station captures
the British
mobilization
effort. As
troops arrive
for training and
Image Not Available
defense, chil-
dren hurry to a
reception room
where they
await evacua-
tion from the
capital.

spirit in the dangerous summer of 1940. fight, for it would only be a matter of
At this stage of the war, everything time before an all-powerful Germany
was at stake, not just for Britain but for threatened U.S. interests and even its
democracy—even for the United States, national security. As no one could say
although many Americans refused to how long this would take, the British
admit this. Had Britain fallen, there soldiered on and did their best. It would
would have been no D-Day—in 1944, prove to be more than enough.
or ever—for the United States could not Mobilization for war Britain was
have liberated Europe alone. Without the most fully and efficiently mobilized of
Britain, the United States would have all the great warring powers. It mobilized
been the only surviving democratic so well because it had to, of course, but
great power in a world dominated by except for the United States, all the other
police states. great powers would eventually find them-
Could the United States have sur- selves in similarly desperate positions.
vived in such a world? Would it have None would match Britain’s achievement.
been able to remain democratic? These Britain’s success was based partly on the
are questions that have never had to be relative speed but also on the thorough-
answered, because the RAF and the ness with which it mobilized its
British people won out in what Churchill resources—especially its womanpower.
would rightly call their “finest hour.” Every nation drafted men and,
It remained true in 1940, however, except for the United States again, most
that while Hitler had lost the battle, he controlled the male labor force as well.
still seemed to have won the war. Britain But only the British actually conscripted
therefore adopted the only possible women. Single females between 19 and
course of action, a strategy announced 30 years old were drafted and given a
in plain words by Churchill. It would, choice between serving in uniform or
he declared, hang on by the skin of its working in a war industry. In practice
teeth and keep fighting Germany as best Britain mobilized every woman younger
it could until the United States entered than 40, except those with large family
the war. Churchill knew that sooner or responsibilities or ones who had to care
later the United States would have to for war workers assigned to their homes.
46
• B R I T A I N •

Women labored in the fields and did was allowed about one pound of meat a
every sort of industrial job, however dan- week, four ounces of bacon and ham,
gerous or dirty, except coal mining, a eight of sugar, and eight of cheese. Dur-
male area that few, if any, women cared ing an eight-week span, a consumer
to enter. could have a packet of dried eggs, equal
The result was that although 22 in theory (though not in taste) to a dozen
percent of the country’s workforce, male real ones. This rationing was far more
and female, served in the armed forces, strict than that practiced in the United
an even larger group, 33 percent, States, but it was widely accepted as fair.
labored in war industries. This enabled Food rationing did not really take
production to reach amazing heights. hold in the United States until March
Aircraft production rose from 3,000 1943, and there was actually a meat sur-
machines built in 1938 to 15,000 by plus that year because beef and pork
January 1940. During the next two production rose while rationing cut into
years, 30,000 aircraft were built, and by sales. Victory gardens, not possible in
March 1944, another 60,000 had gone crowded England, produced huge quan-
into service. This was an incredible pro- tities of fresh vegetables. At various times
duction feat that equaled, and may even coffee, sugar, whiskey, cigarettes, and
have exceeded, Germany’s effort. other goods were in short supply. But
Between 1939 and early 1944, when gasoline rationing ended on August 15,
Britain was building 105,000 planes, 1945, and most other forms ended soon
Germany turned out about 118,000 air- after. For Britons rationing continued
craft; however, only a handful of Ger- well into peacetime.
many’s planes were four-engined, as Surprisingly, the nation as a whole
opposed to thousands of Britain’s. ate better under rationing than it had
Because it was an island nation, before the war. In the 1930s high unem-
Britain built a huge number of ships. This ployment and low wages during the
was an area in which Germany could not worldwide Depression had combined to
compete, because the British destroyed leave many working-class families short
most of its small surface fleet and swept of food. But under rationing, and with
German merchant ships from the seas as real wages rising because of the labor
well. Britain, on the other hand, was build- shortage, workers could buy more
ing major warships at the rate of more expensive foods and often ate in factory
than 100 a year by 1942, and merchant lunchrooms where food was wholesome
shipping was well in excess of 1 million and plentiful. Cheap new restaurants
tons annually. Because Britain had the also sprang up in which food was “off
smallest population of any great power the ration.” Because of better nutrition,
and had to import every raw material it civilian death rates in Britain actually
needed except coal, this was a stunning declined during the war.
achievement. British taxation, though heavy, was
In World War II, Britain introduced fair also. Britain financed 55 percent of its
rationing at once, remembering its expe- war effort through income rather than
rience in World War I when it waited too borrowing, which was the highest rate in
long to start conserving. Gasoline was the world. (Even the United States paid
rationed in September 1939; meat, but- only 45 percent of its war costs through
ter, and sugar early in 1940; clothing in tax revenue.) The basic income tax rate,
1941. By 1942, when the U-boats had which had been 50 percent, rose to 95 per-
made the shortages most acute, an adult cent for the wealthy. This program
47
• B R I T A I N •

brought the rich and the poor closer


together, because while wages rose during
the war, unearned income—money gained
from stocks, bonds, and the like—declined.
Life in wartime Unlike the United
States, which found the war to be within
its means, Britain could not afford to
fight on the scale that was required. Image Not Available
British economic recovery from the war
would be long and slow as a result, a
measure of what the nation sacrificed
for the Allied cause.
Housing in Britain during the war
was in short supply because of heavy
German bombing and because workers
moved into industrial areas with inade- was probably highest in 1940 and 1941 Firefighters
quate housing stocks. Some idea of the when the German blitz of London and engage in war
resulting chaos may be gained from the other areas brought out the best in peo- exercises at the
fact that a civilian population of 38 mil- ple, as crisis often does. It may have been Greenwich fire
lion registered 60 million changes of lowest in 1944, when to war weariness station. Fires
erupting during
address between 1939 and 1945. By was added the strain of a new German
German air
1942 some 300,000 families were living bombing attack featuring V-1 “buzz
blitzes were a
in buildings that by prewar standards bombs” and V-2 rockets. These killed serious concern.
would have been seen as unfit for use. In fewer civilians than had died during the
that year two and a half million families blitz but were in some respects more
lived in bomb-damaged quarters that frightening. The buzz bomb had wings
had been hastily repaired. By the war’s and was powered by a small jet engine.
end perhaps another million families As long as you could hear the bomb you
found themselves in the same boat. were safe. But when the engine cut out,
Violent crime decreased in both the bomb began to fall, so that an eerie
Britain and the United States, although silence would precede the impact, fol-
juvenile delinquency rose. There were lowed by a large explosion.
fewer suicides. In both countries the The V-2 rockets went faster than the
birth rate, at an all-time low in the speed of sound and gave no warning at
1930s, began to rise. Many of these all, which was also highly frightening,
additional babies were illegitimate, tradi- since each breath you drew could be your
tional morals giving way to the pres- last—especially if you lived in London,
sures and excitement of wartime. where the majority of these rockets were
After the war, as also in the United targeted. Unlike conventional bombing
States, there was a rush to marry and attacks, when air raid warnings provided
start families. Britons had an additional time to find shelter, V-bomb attacks often
reason for their baby boom, though, one caught people in the open, another of
not felt in the United States. Some their dismal features.
60,000 civilians died as a result of Britons kept up their morale in part
bombing attacks, compared to about not only by shared risks and sacrifices
260,000 men in uniform who lost their but by government reforms. Unlike in the
lives during the war. United States, no general elections were
British morale ebbed and flowed. It held in Britain for the duration of the
48
• B R I T A I N •

war. Thus, the Conservative Parliament To Americans this election seemed to


elected in 1935 sat for 10 years, instead reflect a lack of gratitude for his out-
of the usual maximum of 6. But, standing leadership. However, the British
although it was dominated in name by were looking ahead. They would always
Conservatives, Britain was actually run respect Churchill, who would have a last
by a coalition government that in 1940 turn as prime minister in the 1950s. But
consisted of 15 Conservative ministers, 4 they had suffered much during the war
from Labour, and 1 representing the Lib- and as a reward wanted a better Britain
eral party. Although Churchill focused on than they thought the Conservatives
war issues and his party, the Conserva- could provide. To most Britons, World
tives, did not like social reforms, popular War II was a “people’s war,” and after it
demand forced the government to intro- they wanted a people’s state that would
duce them while the war was still on. protect them from cradle to grave.
In 1942 a committee of civil ser- The great British historian A. J. P.
vants issued a paper on social insurance Taylor would later write of the British in
that became known as the Beveridge 1945 that they were the only people who
Report. Its call for a full-scale welfare had gone through both world wars from
state met with widespread approval, as 9 beginning to end. (He is technically cor-
out of 10 persons interviewed by the rect: France surrendered to the Germans in
Gallup poll said it should be enacted. 1940, and Germany surrendered to the
This great a response could not be Allies in May 1945, but the war did not
ignored. Therefore, in November 1943 end until that following August.) In doing
Churchill appointed a minister of recon- so they had not lost their best national
struction to plan for the future. traits of tolerance, patience, and genero-
In 1944 a ministry of national insur- sity. Yet, while they remained a civilized
ance was created. The Education Act of people, they had changed. Taylor
that year guaranteed a secondary educa- described the British people as they were
tion for every British youth. Work was in August 1945: “Traditional values lost
also begun on a program for full employ- much of their force. Other values took
ment after the war, the payment of family their place. Imperial greatness was on the
allowances, and the building of a nation- way out: the welfare state was on the
al health service. way in. The British empire declined: the
The Conservative party itself became condition of the people improved. Few
a casualty of the public’s demand for now sang ‘Land of Hope and Glory.’ Few
social insurance. Churchill had wanted even sang ‘England Arise.’ England had
the general election delayed until after risen all the same.”
Japan had been defeated. But the Labour
SEE ALSO
party insisted on holding it after victory
was won in Europe. Although Churchill’s British Army; Churchill, Winston Spencer;
France, battle of; France, fall of; Germany;
popularity as a war leader was great, a
Royal Air Force; Royal Navy
majority of Britons did not trust the Con-
servatives to build the welfare state. F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
On July 26, 1945, while he was at Calder, Angus. The People’s War: Britain
the Potsdam conference in Germany with 1939–45. London: Jonathan Cape, 1969.
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and U.S. Churchill, Winston. History of the Second
President Harry Truman, Churchill World War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1948–54.
learned that the Conservatives had lost Taylor, A. J. P. English History, 1914–1945.
and promptly resigned as prime minister. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
49
• B R I T A I N, B A T T L E O F •

turned to bombing London, thinking that


Britain, Battle of would force RAF fighters into a massive
air battle that they would lose. The climax
came on September 15, thereafter known
as Battle of Britain Day, when Germany
After France fell to Germany in June threw every plane it had into the air and
1940 and the British Expeditionary Force suffered heavy losses. Two days later
had been evacuated from Dunkirk, Hitler Operation Sea Lion was indefinitely post-
had expected that Britain would negotiate poned. About 2,500 RAF pilots fought
a settlement with him. When Britain the Battle of Britain, leading Winston
decided to fight on instead, Hitler ordered Churchill to say, “Never in the field of
an invasion of England, code named human conflict was so much owed by so
Operation Sea Lion. If it was to succeed, many to so few.” But, while fighter pilots
Germany had to gain control of the air were the cutting edge, it was the British
over the English Channel and the invasion people as a whole—steadfast in their defi-
beaches, so on August 15, 1940, the Luft- ance of Hitler—who provided the sword.
waffe (German air force) launched an all- It was, as Churchill also said, their finest
out attack on the Royal Air Force (RAF), hour.
attacking its airfields, radar sites, head-
quarters, and the aircraft factories that SEE ALSO
supplied the RAF. The Luftwaffe came Britain; Royal Air Force
close to driving the RAF out of southeast-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ern England. Unaware of this, and in need
Parkinson, Roger. Summer 1940: The Bat-
of a quick victory before the weather tle of Britain. New York: David McKay,
turned bad, on September 7 the Luftwaffe 1977.

The Allied
Relief Fund’s
mobile can-
teens provided
food and drink
to London’s air
raid victims.

Image Not Available


50
• B R I T I S H A I R F O R C E •

sions, having been created only the pre-


British Air Force vious year. At its peak the army would
have 2.92 million men and 191,000
SEE Royal Air Force
women. Its combat forces ultimately
consisted of 11 armored divisions, 34
infantry divisions, and 2 airborne divi-
British Army sions. Because the empire had to be
guarded and policed, two armored and
nine infantry divisions—the equivalent
of an entire field army—never saw
In September 1939 the British Army was action. When the Army developed a
divided between the active duty regular manpower shortage after D-Day in
armies and a reserve force known as the 1944, these divisions would be sorely
territorial armies, similar to the U.S. missed. The Army suffered 570,000
National Guard. All were commanded casualties during the war, of which
by the chief of the Imperial General 144,000 were fatalities.
Staff, who also sat on the Chiefs of Staff The British Army, like that of the
Committee, which coordinated British United States, was organized from the
military operations and advised the bottom up, by companies forming bat-
prime minister and his cabinet. talions, battalions making up regiments,
The Home Guard In May 1940, regiments joined as divisions, divisions
after Germany launched its great offen- assigned to corps, corps assembled into
sive on the western front, Britain formed armies, and two or more armies becom-
what became known as the Home ing an army group. Unlike the U.S.
Guard as a last line of defense. It con- Army, however, the British Army, its
sisted at first of overaged males who, infantry in particular, was based on
although they were not called on to the regiment.
fight (except to man antiaircraft batter- Many regiments had hundreds of
ies), performed useful service as look- years of tradition behind them and
outs, guards, and checkpoint and road- their own distinctive badges and cus-
block soldiers. In 1942 the Home Guard toms. The individual soldier was
trained boys aged 17 and 18 before they encouraged to identify with his regi-
were drafted for active duty. At its peak, ment. Solidarity was further enhanced
the Home Guard consisted of 1.75 mil- by the fact that regiments were locally
lion men, whose average age was less based and drew their replacements
than 30. In December 1944, the need from the immediate geographic area.
for it having passed, the Home Guard When casualties were high, regiments
was dissolved. had to take what they could get, so
The British Army Because a partial men often found themselves assigned
draft had been in effect since April to strange regiments. On the whole,
1939, the Army had almost 900,000 however, this was an effective system
men when war broke out in September that did much to strengthen unit cohe-
that year, but many of them were sta- sion and morale. The drawback, as
tioned in India and elsewhere through- with the U.S. National Guard, was that
out Britain’s still vast empire. Further, when a regiment sustained heavy loss-
the Army did not as yet have a single es, the town or county where it was
armored division, the Royal Armored based would receive more than its
Corps, which included all armored divi- share of suffering.
51
• B R I T I S H N A V Y •

three great Allied powers, was the only


one to fight the war from beginning to
end and had good reason to conserve its
limited manpower.
SEE ALSO
Britain; Montgomery, Bernard

F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Fraser, David. And We Shall Shock Them:
Image Not Available The British Army in World War II. Lon-
don: Hodder & Stoughton, 1983.
War Department, U.S. The British Army in
World War II: A Handbook. Novato,
Calif.: Presidio, 1990.

British Navy
SEE Royal Navy
General Bernard Like all armies, the British Army did
Montgomery not always make the best use of its
leads British resources. It disdained tanks before the
troops in the war and never developed the doctrine and
Bulge, Battle of the
campaign to tactics that would have enabled its armor
liberate North
and infantry to work closely together. A
Africa.
British infantry division had more vehicles
than those of any other army, although The U.S. Army would meet its supreme
most of them had only two powered test in the Ardennes Forest of Belgium in
wheels. This put them ahead of the Ger- December and January 1944–45. The
mans, whose regular infantry divisions Battle of the Bulge—named for the large
depended on horses and oxen for trans- indentation made in the U.S. Army’s
port, but behind the U.S. Army, nearly all line—was the greatest clash on the west-
of whose vehicles had four-wheel drive ern front, and the biggest engagement
and could go off-road. the United States has ever fought, rang-
Britain relieved its front-line troops ing over an area that was roughly 60
more often than the United States did. miles wide and 30 miles deep. Some
Some historians feel that Britain in fact 600,000 U.S. soldiers were involved,
took its soldiers out of the line too and they took proportionate casualties:
often for maximum efficiency, but it 20,000 killed, 20,000 captured, and
seems more likely that Britain erred, if 40,000 wounded. Two U.S. infantry
at all, on the right side, whereas U.S. divisions were all but wiped out, and
troops were relieved only seldom and 800 tanks were destroyed.
then briefly. Terrible though these losses may
Another criticism is that the British seem, Germany’s were worse, totaling
were not aggressive enough. When the perhaps 100,000, or a third of their
forces were commanded by Bernard attacking force. At the Bulge, Hitler
Law Montgomery, this was certainly used up his manpower reserves, hasten-
true. But Britain, the weakest of the ing Germany’s defeat.
52
• B U L G E, B A T T L E O F T H E •

Hitler began planning his final


counteroffensive in northwest Europe,
aimed at splitting the Allies and recap-
turing Antwerp, Belgium, in late July
1944. At the time, he had just lost 25
divisions on the eastern front, and the
Allies were bursting out of Normandy
and had already taken Rome. The 25
Volksgrenadier (People’s Army) divisions Image Not Available
Hitler raised during the fall consisted
largely of teenagers and Hitler youth
who were poorly trained but highly
motivated. The Germans also assembled
ten panzer brigades (larger than a regi-
ment but smaller than a division), each
with 40 new tanks, including many
enormous Tigers and Panthers, both of
which outgunned and outclassed the
United States’s weakly armed Shermans. divisions holding the Ardennes front. American
In its final form, the attacking force Two of the infantry divisions were green infantrymen of
would consist of three armies amount- and two exhausted from the Battle of the 290th Regi-
ing to some 300,000 men, 1,900 the Huertgen Forest, which had cost the ment fight in
artillery pieces, and 970 tanks and U.S. First Army 34,000 casualties. The fresh snow
near Amonines,
armored assault guns. In the east these Germans expected to overrun these raw
Belgium, in
armies would have been swallowed up, or worn-out divisions. The Germans
January 1945.
but on the smaller western front they hoped to achieve a rout that would
might make a difference. Probably they cause U.S. morale to collapse, Allied
would not, but Hitler had nothing to bickering to reach new heights, and the
lose by trying. Grand Alliance to fall apart. Whether
The idea was to drive a wedge anyone actually believed this is hard to
between the U.S. 12th and British 21st say. However, because Hitler would not
Army groups where their fronts joined surrender and could not be replaced, the
in Belgium. SS general Josef “Sepp” Wehrmacht (consisting of all German
Dietrich’s Sixth SS Panzer Army was to ground forces) had to obey orders.
drive through the Ardennes Forest, cross Although the strategy behind this
the Meuse River as the Germans had attack was poor, the tactics and logistics
done in 1940, then wheel north to to carry it out were up to the usual Ger-
Antwerp. Supporting it on the left man standards. Three armies were assem-
would be the Fifth Panzer Army, while bled in the Eifel Mountains of Germany
the Seventh Army would hold open the without Allied intelligence’s knowledge, a
southern shoulder of the bulge against remarkable feat considering that the men
General George Patton’s expected coun- and supplies had to brought from as far
terattack. The Germans counted on bad away as Austria and Denmark.
weather to ground the Allied fighter- General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the
bombers, unleashing Germany’s armor. Allied supreme commander, knew that the
When Germany struck the U.S. Ardennes sector was weak, but he could
forces would have only a cavalry group, not reinforce it except at the expense of
one armored division, and four infantry limited offensives taking place elsewhere.
53
• B U L G E, B A T T L E O F T H E •

Those offensives were part of his broad- immediately ordered the 2nd Division to
front strategy, which was already being break off its attack and join its 23rd
executed with too few troops to provide a Infantry Regiment at Elsenborn. Hodges
margin of safety. On December 16 the ordered up the famed 1st Infantry Divi-
entire U.S. reserve consisted of the 82nd sion, “the Big Red One,” from Aachen,
and 101st Airborne divisions, both of where it too was recuperating. The 2nd
which were being refitted after suffering disengaged itself from the enemy in an
heavy losses. Although they would play extremely difficult operation that it exe-
important roles in the Bulge, a reserve cuted smoothly, evidence of how good
consisting of two undermanned divi- the Army had become since coming
sions—which even at full strength had ashore in France.
only 10,000 men apiece, no armor, and Meanwhile, the 99th’s battered
few guns—was close to being no reserve parts disengaged and passed through the
at all. 23rd Infantry to regroup and dig in on
After a short artillery barrage, the Elsenborn Ridge, where the 2nd and 9th
Germans attacked on December 16 along divisions would join them. By December
an 85-mile front, taking Allied Supreme 18 Elsenborn was proving its worth.
Headquarters by surprise. But what U.S. artillery laid down murderous bar-
should have been easy became terribly dif- rages from the ridge. Protected by fog
ficult, thanks to the undaunted if greatly and darkness, U.S. tanks and guns were
outnumbered Americans. Most remark- lying in wait along narrow roads, strik-
able was the defense put up by the 99th ing panzers from the side and rear,
Infantry Division, a new outfit that had where even the Tigers were vulnerable.
seen little action. Like other divisions in On the 18th, brute force having failed,
the Ardennes, it occupied a stretch of line Dietrich attempted to bypass Elsenborn,
that ought to have been held by a corps, but his attacking force was prevented
the next larger unit, which equaled two or from reaching the strategic Malmedy
even more divisions. Although caught off Road by elements of the Big Red One,
guard, the men of the 99th fought back which had arrived just in time.
furiously, to the point of calling friendly Together these four divisions, the
artillery fire down on their own positions. 2nd and 99th in the center and the 9th
The 99th was the northernmost divi- and 1st on their flanks, created an
sion to be attacked. Behind it lay Elsen- unbreakable line by December 20. As a
born Ridge, high ground covering two result of their determined stand the Ger-
critical road junctions without which the man counteroffensive was spoiled after
Sixth SS Panzer Army could not advance. only five days of battle. Dietrich realized
Though Dietrich did not know it, quite this and wanted to settle for limited
by chance the veteran U.S. 2nd Infantry gains, but Hitler insisted on continuing
Division was attacking just above him. the attack even though Elsenborn Ridge
As the 99th’s situation worsened, Major barred the Sixth Panzer Army from
General Leonard T. Gerow of the V Antwerp. This was sheer stubbornness
Corps, which was responsible for the on his part, as the operation now lacked
northern Ardennes, put the 2nd Divi- any strategic purpose.
sion’s reserve regiment in front of Elsen- Most accounts of the fighting turn on
born Ridge. the 101st Airborne and its defense of Bas-
On December 17, Lieutenant Gen- togne, which was indeed remarkable. But
eral Courtney H. Hodges of the First the key position in the Battle of the Bulge
Army gave Gerow a free hand. Gerow was Elsenborn Ridge. The holding of it by
54
• B U L G E, B A T T L E O F T H E •

the 2nd and 99th Infantry divisions, the lat- had taken him longer than he could
ter often fighting in small units out of afford. Before the 28th and the 106th
touch with higher command against went under they fought hard. The time
attackers who outnumbered them five or they won enabled Eisenhower to rush
more to one, was the outstanding achieve- support to the pivotal crossroad villages
ment of the battle. In the critical early days, of St. Vith and Bastogne. At St. Vith the
these two divisions repelled an entire Ger- 7th Armored Division held up an entire
man corps, the elite First SS Panzers. German corps for three days, ruining
At the southern end of the front the Manteuffel’s schedule and giving the
Germans were also in trouble. Although U.S. generals time to gain control of the
Germany’s Seventh Army greatly out- battle. During this critical period Eisen-
numbered the veteran U.S. Fourth hower was drawing men and supplies
Infantry Division, which had taken from other sectors of the front and
6,000 casualties in the Huertgen Forest pouring them into the Ardennes. He
and was still recovering, the 4th put up moved 250,000 men and 50,000 vehi-
a tremendous defense, slowing down the cles in the first week, a performance that
German advance and gaining time for no other army in history has ever
reinforcements to move up. As a result equaled.
another unbreakable line was estab- Although surrounded, Bastogne
lished, which forced the Germans to remained in U.S. hands, thanks to the
narrow their attack to the central 101st Airborne, Combat Command B of
Ardennes, in which there was little room the 10th Armored Division, and the
to maneuver. crack 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
The Fifth Panzer Army was now With the aid of breaks in the weather
playing the part originally assigned to the that permitted air support and resupply,
Sixth. Things were going much better for this mixed force held out until General
Germany in the central Ardennes, because Patton’s relief column could reach it on
of outstanding leadership by Lieutenant December 27. That same day, survivors
General Hasso von Manteuffel. His plan of the 2nd Panzer Division gave them-
of attack did not rely on brute force but selves up, having almost reached the
was marked by stealth and speed, with Meuse before being blocked by the U.S.
deep-penetration units racing through the 2nd Armored Division. That proved to
U.S. lines without benefit of artillery sup- be as far as the Germans would get.
port. These and other enterprising meth- As great as the U.S. victory was, the
ods smashed the veteran U.S. 28th Battle of the Bulge might have been
Infantry Division and wiped out the greater still. Eisenhower had reacted
106th, which had just arrived in the quickly to the German attack, sending
Ardennes and was an outfit that had been the 7th and 10th Armored divisions to
built from scratch by cannabilizing other Middleton’s sector on December 16
units. Further, it was deployed in a posi- despite General Omar Bradley’s reserva-
tion from which it could not retreat. As a tions. Hitler had told his generals that it
result it was cut to pieces. In addition to would take at least two days for Eisen-
heavy casualties, at least 7,000 men hower to realize the trouble he was in,
became prisoners of war (POWs)—the then two or three more to receive per-
largest number of U.S. POWs ever taken mission from Roosevelt and Churchill to
by Germany in a single action. call off his offensives and reinforce the
However, while Manteuffel had Ardennes. By then he intended that the
effectively destroyed two divisions, it Germans would be across the Meuse
55
• B U L G E, B A T T L E O F T H E •

them to the north at right angles across


his own lines of communication.
On December 20, with Bradley sep-
arated from his First and Ninth armies
by the German penetration, Eisenhower
gave temporary command of them to
Montgomery, leaving Bradley with only
the Third Army under his immediate
control. This decision, a result of
Bradley’s comparative isolation in Lux-
embourg, was a major mistake by Eisen-
Image Not Available hower that would have serious conse-
quences. For one, although Ike was
eager to begin enveloping the Bulge,
Montgomery, as always, dragged his
feet. Further, when he did attack, he
wanted to push the Bulge back into Ger-
many rather than cut it off. After a
meeting on the 28th, Eisenhower
believed that he had gotten Mont-
gomery’s promise to attack on January
1. But then Eisenhower was informed
that Montgomery would not jump off
until January 3 or later.
Eisenhower was furious with Mont-
gomery, forcing Freddie De Guingand,
Montgomery’s chief of staff, to shuttle
and on their way to Antwerp. Hitler’s back and forth between Supreme Head-
mistake was to assume that the Allied quarters and the 21st Army Group.
commanders were as tightly controlled While the debate was raging over what
as his own, and he did not understand Montgomery had promised to do, he
that Eisenhower had real authority— sent Eisenhower a letter demanding to
even over British troops, although be put in complete charge of the land
Montgomery did all he could to limit it. battle, which under his direction would
On December 17, Eisenhower sent feature a single thrust to Berlin—a bla-
more men to the Ardennes and put a tant attempt to take advantage of the
stop to Allied offensives elsewhere in crisis and impose his overall strategy
preparation for his retaliatory strokes. upon Eisenhower. Instead, Eisenhower
On the 18th, he met with his top com- returned the First Army to Bradley with
manders and told them to view the Bulge orders to pinch off the Bulge and pre-
as an opportunity, not a problem. Once pared for a showdown with Monty.
the Germans were further extended, he Montgomery did advance on January 3,
wanted to attack both their flanks and though not as strongly as Eisenhower
capture the whole force. By the 19th, wanted and not in the right direction. So
preparations for this double envelopment passed an opportunity to destroy three
were under way and Patton was begin- German armies, a result of Mont-
ning an intricate process of pulling three gomery’s obsession with a single-front
divisions out of his front and advancing strategy. Under pressure from both ends,
56
• B U R M A •

the Germans withdrew slowly in good tance of the Burma Road was that with-
order, inflicting maximum damage. The out it supplies for China had to be
Battle of the Bulge was declared at an flown in over the dreaded “Hump,” a
end on January 28, though the old lines series of high mountain ranges that lay
were not restored until February 7. between India and Kunming, China.
Because the United States regarded keep-
SEE ALSO
ing China in the war essential to victory,
Eisenhower, Dwight D.; France, Battle of;
Montgomery, Bernard Law; Patton, the loss of Burma forced it to open an
George S., Jr. air route to China that was extraordi-
narily expensive and dangerous to main-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G tain, yet could deliver only a fraction of
Ambrose, Stephen A. Citizen Soldiers. the goods China needed. In January
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. 1945, for example, a total of only
———. Eisenhower, 1890–1952. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. 15,000 tons was ferried to China, at a
Bradley, Omar N., and Clay Blair. A Gen- cost to the U.S. Air Transport Com-
eral’s Life: An Autobiography by General mand of 36 lives. (This was about equal
of the Army Omar N. Bradley. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. to the monthly tonnage moved over the
MacDonald, Charles B. A Time for Trum- Burma Road in 1941, but more than
pets: The Untold Story of the Battle of half of it was for American use.) In that
the Bulge. New York: Morrow, 1985.
same month an alternative route to
China, the Ledo Road, was completed,
after which the United States, its strate-
gic goal having been met, largely with-
Burma drew from Burma.
Although the Allies discussed a vari-
ety of more imaginative ways in which
Burma might be retaken, in whole or in
A British colony when the Pacific war part, the actual process involved gruel-
broke out on December 7, 1941, Burma ing land campaigns supported by air
was invaded by Japanese forces one power. The first offensive began in
week later. The Japanese aims were to October 1942. It achieved modest gains
protect their position in Malaya, to cut but ended in a stalemate. A long-range
the Burma Road, which was the princi- penetration by 3,000 British, Gurkha,
pal supply route to Nationalist China, and Burmese troops (called Chindits)
and to use Burma as a staging area for under the colorful Brigadier Orne
possible operations against India. After Wingate fought behind enemy lines, sup-
fierce fighting, Britain was driven from plied entirely by air, from February into
Burma in May, its troops making the April of 1943. The raid was highly pub-
longest fighting retreat in the history of licized and did prove that troops could
the British Army. The fight for Burma fight in this way, but the losses were so
would be Britain’s longest campaign of great (almost a third of Wingate’s force)
the war, ending only when the Japanese and the results so disappointing that it is
Empire laid down its arms. hard to see why another such raid was
Apart from a desire to avenge its authorized.
defeat, Britain’s objective in fighting so Nonetheless, in February 1944 the
hard and at such length in the terrifying British began flying in another long-
mountains and jungles of Burma was range penetration force of 9,000 men.
never entirely clear. The strategic impor- After Wingate was killed in a plane
57
• B Y R N E S , J A M E S F . •

crash in March, in April his force fell Chan, Won-loy. Burma, the Untold Story.
into a conventional role, supporting a Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986.
Grounds, Tom. Some Letters from Burma:
Chinese offensive under U.S. General The Story of the 25th Dragoons at War.
Joseph Stilwell. By August, when it was Tunbridge Wells: Parapress, 1994.
airlifted back to India, the group had
sustained 3,600 casualties. A U.S. force,
called Merrill’s Marauders after its com-
mander, Major-General Frank Merrill, Byrnes, James F.
was based on the Chindit model and
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE,
suffered comparably in support of Stil-
1945– 47 Image Not Available
well’s operations.
In the end the fight for Burma took • Born: May 2, 1879, Charleston, S.C.
place by conventional means. North • Political party: Democratic
Burma, including the vital town of • Education: Parochial school
• Government service: House of
Myitkyina, was taken by an Allied Representatives (Democrat–S.C.),
mixed but mostly Chinese force under 1910–24; U.S. Senate (Democrat–
Stilwell in 1944. Western, southern, and S.C.), 1930–41; U.S. Supreme Court
justice, 1941–42; director, Office of
central Burma fell to Britain’s largely Economic Stabilization, 1942–43;
Indian Fourteenth Army, commanded by director, Office of War Mobilization,
General Sir William Slim, regarded by 1943–45; secretary of state, 1945–47;
governor of South Carolina, 1951–55
many as Britain’s best field commander, • Died: January 24, 1972, Columbia,
in 1944 and 1945. Portions of eastern S.C.
Burma remained in Japanese hands until
August 28, 1945, when the Burmese gar-
rison surrendered. British and Common-
wealth casualties in Burma came to Jamess F. Byrnes was a conservative
71,200, Japanese to 106,000. The fight- Democrat, an early supporter of
ing in Burma was as fierce as anywhere Franklin D. Roosevelt for President and
else in the war, the environment equally a friend of the New Deal during his
difficult. As Burma was of little strategic years in the Senate. An able administra-
value, most of this effort was misplaced. tor, he, perhaps more than anyone else,
A limited campaign in the north to seize was responsible for imposing order on
and hold the territory through which the the chaotic mobilization process and
Ledo Road was to cross was probably was sometimes referred to by journalists
all that was needed. Yet even that limited as the “assistant president,” a term Roo-
aim might have been too much, because sevelt hated.
the road was completed so late in the As senators, Byrnes and Harry S.
war that it did little to benefit China. Truman had been allies and friends, so
much so that in 1944 Byrnes asked Tru-
SEE ALSO man to nominate him for Vice President
Chiang Kai-shek; China; China-Burma- at the 1944 Democratic National Con-
India theater vention. Truman agreed to do so, but
when Roosevelt made clear his prefer-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G ence for Truman, Byrnes withdrew, sav-
Allen, Louis. Burma: The Longest War, ing Truman considerable embarrassment.
1941–1945. New York: St. Martin’s, 1984. Truman, who placed great weight
Bidwell, Shelford. The Chindit War: Stilwell,
Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma, on friendship, asked Byrnes to serve as
1944. New York: Macmillan, 1980. secretary of state within hours of taking
58
• C A N A D A •

his oath of office. According to the law at Ward, Patricia Dawson. The Threat of
that time, Byrnes, as secretary of state, Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of
Foreign Ministers, 1945–1946. Kent,
would have succeeded to the presidency Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1979.
had anything happened to Truman. On
the face of it, friendship apart, there did
not seem to be any particularly good rea-
son for putting Byrnes, a man without Canada
experience in foreign affairs, in charge of
the State Department. One theory is that
Truman wanted Byrnes, who had been a
court reporter in his youth, because he By the time of World War II, Canada
had the only verbatim stenographic had long been a colony of Britain and
record made by any American at Yalta. It then a self-governing dominion of the
was an incomplete record, because Roo- British Commonwealth. In 1931
sevelt, with his usual shrewdness, had Britain’s Parliament enacted the Statute
allowed Byrnes to sit in on only those dis- of Westminster, which gave Canada and
cussions that would play well in the Unit- the other dominions control of their for-
ed States. As, in effect, Roosevelt’s sales- eign policies as well as domestic affairs.
man for Yalta, Byrnes did a good enough This meant that Canada was not obliged
job to make Truman think he would be to follow Britain’s lead in declaring war
highly useful at the State Department. upon Germany, but it did so anyway.
President Truman gave Byrnes a free On September 9, 1939, Canada’s gov-
hand at first, so he bore considerable ernment, reflecting the views of its Eng-
responsibility for the Potsdam confer- lish-speaking population, asked King
ence and the subsequent negotiations George VI to issue a declaration of war
with Japan that ended World War II. on its behalf. On September 10, a week
But the strong-willed Byrnes and Presi- after Britain, Canada was at war.
dent Truman soon fell out after the war, Although geographically one of the
and Byrnes secretly resigned in April largest countries in the world, Canada
1946, although the volume of work still then had a population of only 11.5 mil-
to be done required him to stay on until lion, most of it concentrated within 60
January 1947. Byrnes was out of his miles of the U.S. border. A third of the
depth as secretary of state and one of population was of French descent and
Truman’s weakest appointments. lived primarily in the province of Que-
bec. Because Francophones, as French-
SEE ALSO speaking Canadians are called, had
Japan, surrender of; Truman, Harry S.; resented being drafted in World War I,
Yalta conference Prime Minister Mackenzie King
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G promised that draftees would not be
Clements, Kendrick A., ed. James F. Byrnes sent abroad without their consent.
and the Origins of the Cold War. Those who refused service overseas—
Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, not all of them French Canadians—were
1982.
Messer, Robert L. The End of an Alliance:
deeply resented by the volunteers serving
Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Ori- in fighting units, who called them “zom-
gins of the Cold War. Chapel Hill: Univer- bies.” Riots at home against conscrip-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1982. tion by these so-called zombies were
Robertson, David. Sly and Able: A Political
Biography of James F. Byrnes. New York: deeply resented at the front. Despite
Norton, 1994. resistance to the war at home and a
59
• C A N A D A •

Canadian sol-
diers, driving
hard toward
the Rhine and
the defeat of
Germany, take
a break from
their duties for
mail call. Image Not Available

leisurely initial approach to mobiliza- men operating 37 usable aircraft. Yet, by


tion, Canada threw itself into war work war’s end, more than 1 million men and
after the fall of France in June 1940. women had served in the Canadian
Even though it had relatively few armed forces, of whom 42,000 were
workers compared to the United States, killed, 54,000 wounded, and 9,000
Canada was amazingly productive. taken prisoner. This high casualty rate
It had not built a single merchant ship resulted from the deployment of Cana-
before the war, but ultimately con- dian troops on some of the most danger-
structed 345. And, in addition to thou- ous battlefields in Italy—where a quarter,
sands of aircraft, Canada manufactured an enormous percentage—of the 93,000
707,000 military cars and trucks and Canadian troops became casualties, and
45,710 armored vehicles. All this was on the western front.
achieved by a mere 1.2 million workers. After D-Day (June 6, 1944), the
A large majority of the weapons and First Canadian Army took so many
equipment Canada produced, some 70 casualties that Prime Minister King was
percent, was used not by Canadian forced to break his promise that he
forces but given to its allies, Britain in would not send draftees to Europe
particular. This program, called Cana- against their will. But this decision was
dian Mutual Aid, was similar to the fiercely resisted and few conscripts were
United States’s Lend-Lease, except that forcibly sent to Europe. More than in
Canada devoted a larger share of its other Allied countries, therefore, the
budget to aiding its allies than the burden of combat was born by a rela-
United States did. tively small proportion of eligible males.
Before the war Canada was virtually Canada’s efforts at sea and in the
unarmed. The Royal Canadian Navy air were especially important to the
(RCN) had fewer than 2,000 men on Allied war effort. Although the Royal
active duty and 10 small warships, while Canadian Navy started with only 4
the Army consisted of 4,260 officers and modern destroyers, it would have 365
men, a few trucks, and 2 light tanks. The ships by 1945, including 2 heavy cruis-
Royal Canadian Air Force’s strength ers and 2 aircraft carriers, and would be
amounted to slightly more than 3,000 the third largest Allied navy. Convoying
60
• C A N A D A •

merchant ships along the vital North the European theater. For Canada, more
Atlantic lifeline, where it sank 33 U- than any other nation, the theory that
boats, was probably the RCN’s most making war by air would be cheaper in
important job, but it was also active in lives than fighting on the ground proved
the English Channel and, to a much to be an illusion.
smaller extent, in the Pacific. Twenty- In many ways the Canadian war
four Canadian warships were lost dur- effort resembled the U.S. experience.
ing the war. Inflation was brought under control,
Perhaps the greatest contribution and the combination of full employment
made to the air war by Canada was the and relatively high wages meant a rising
British Empire Air Training Scheme. At standard of living during the war with
Britain’s request Canada agreed in continued prosperity after it. Unlike the
December 1939 to establish a large air- United States, however, where domestic
crew training program. The plan was policy was conservative during the war,
for Canada to provide the facilities and Canada’s moved leftward. In September
training for British and other dominion 1943 its Liberal party government
air crews as well as for its own, who announced that it would create a wel-
would be in a minority. Originally fare state. Partly this was intended,
Canada promised to turn out 20,000 through heavy government spending, to
pilots and 30,000 other specialists and prevent a recession after the war. In part
to provide more than half of the $607 this change was forced on the Liberal
million it was believed the plan would party by the two opposition factions,
cost. This was a great deal to ask of a both of which had been advocating
small population and its tiny air force, social welfare measures with consider-
but Canada succeeded beyond all expec- able success. Although the idea of the
tations. In the end, Canada graduated welfare state would continue to be
168,600 flying personnel, of whom despised in the United States, Canada
more than 75,000 were pilots. More- proceeded to pay monthly family
over, it paid almost three-quarters of the allowances to mothers for every child
total cost of $2.2 billion, a remarkable and spend very large sums for housing
feat. Commonwealth fliers were trained while the war was still on.
in Australia, New Zealand, South Before the war, although diplomatic
Africa, and Rhodesia, too, but the and economic relations with the United
majority were produced by Canada. States were close, Canada had tried to
In addition, Canada was an impor- keep its mighty southern neighbor at
tant participant in the Royal Air Force arm’s length. But the war changed that. A
(RAF) Bomber Command’s war on Ger- Joint Canadian–U.S. Defense Board was
man cities. Its first bomber squadron established in 1940, more than a year
was made up Canadians who had before U.S. entry into the war. After Pearl
served in the RAF. But ultimately the Harbor was attacked in December 1941,
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) sent the U.S. and Canadian economies became
94,000 men and 48 squadrons of air- tightly integrated, and their military activi-
craft overseas. One-eighth of all the ties, especially in the U-boat war, were
bombs dropped by Bomber Command closely linked. Canada provided more
fell from Canadian planes. Counting support for the atomic bomb project than
accidents, 17,000 members of the RCAF any other country except Britain.
were killed during the war, which Inevitably, as the United States and
equaled the Canadian army’s losses in Canada grew closer together, Canada
61
• C A R R I E R S •

and Britain drew further apart. After the to the Battle of the Atlantic, which the
war, Canada and the United States would Allies were losing at the time. Britain
become each other’s closest friends and and the United States agreed that the
biggest trading partners. The United U.S. Army Air Force would bomb tar-
States could not have asked for, or gets on the European continent by day
dreamed of, a better neighbor and ally. while the RAF’s Bomber Command
would continue its nighttime area-
SEE ALSO
bombing (indiscriminate air attacks on
Atlantic, Battle of; France, Battle of; Ital-
ian campaigns; Lend-Lease; Strategic German cities). Under Operation Point-
bombing; Royal Air Force blank, as this program was called, the
United States would conduct its own air
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
war instead of joining forces with
Barris, Theodore. Days of Victory: Cana-
dians Remember, 1939–1945. Toronto: Bomber Command, as Churchill and the
Macmillan Canada, 1995. British had hoped.
Douglas, William A. B. Out of the Shad- Roosevelt announced at the confer-
ows: Canada in the Second World War.
New York: Oxford University Press, ence that the Allies would accept noth-
1977. ing less than the unconditional surren-
Granatstein, J. L., and Peter Neary, eds. der of the Axis powers. This would
The Good Fight: Canadians and World
War II. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995.
prove to be a controversial decision
Kirkconnell, Watson. Canada, Europe, and that, critics argued, lengthened the war.
Hitler. London: Oxford University Press, The French generals Charles de Gaulle
1940. and Henri Giraud were forced, despite
Minns, John A., ed. The Cinderella Army:
Canada’s First Army in Europe, 1944. being political antagonists, to join
Barrie, Ont.: RAM Press, 1993. forces in what became the French
Morton, Desmond. Canada and War: A National Committee for Liberation.
Military and Political History. Toronto:
Butterworths, 1981. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, consist-
ing of the U.S. and British chiefs, agreed
on Operation Husky, the invasion of
Sicily in July, and established August 1,
Carriers 1943, as the target date for invading
France. Husky, to no one’s surprise,
SEE Aircraft carriers forced that date to be pushed back, first
to May 1944, and ultimately to June.
Apart from giving the Battle of the
Atlantic high priority—a very important
Casablanca step—the decisions reached at Casablan-
conference ca have been criticized by many histori-
ans for delaying the invasion of Nor-
mandy and thereby lengthening the war.
Operation Pointblank, also known as
the Combined Bomber Offensive, was,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and at the very least, premature. Both the
Prime Minister Winston Churchill met U.S. and British bomber offensives
at Casablanca, Morocco, from January would be defeated, heavy losses causing
14 to January 24, 1943. This confer- them to be suspended until 1944. The
ence, code-named Symbol, resulted in effort, largely inspired by Roosevelt, to
several important decisions. It was make Giraud equal to de Gaulle also
decided there to give the highest priority ended in failure. By the end of the year
62
• C A S U A L T I E S •

it would be de Gaulle who commanded ties are thought to have numbered


the Free French. 3,211,000, of which 1,320,000 were
fatal. Millions of civilians were killed by
SEE ALSO
the Japanese or died of starvation
Atlantic, Battle of the; de Gaulle,
Charles; Italy, surrender of; Roosevelt, because of the war, perhaps 6 million in
Franklin D.; Strategic bombing; Uncondi- all, but the actual number of Chinese
tional surrender killed is probably much higher than the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G official figures suggest. Recently, China
Armstrong, Anne. Unconditional Surren- claims that its total losses as a result of
der: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy the Japanese war ran as high as 35 mil-
upon World War II. New Brunswick, lion lives.
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961.
Stoler, Mark A. The Politics of the Second German military losses seem to have
Front: American Military Planning and been something like 4 million dead, and
Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare perhaps 700,000 to 1 million civilians
1941–1943. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1977.
were killed by Allied bombers.
Roughly 2 million Japanese soldiers,
sailors, and airmen were killed, along
with perhaps 1 million civilians.
Casualties Soviet losses were so enormous, and
so impossible to keep track of because
the fighting swept back and forth across
huge areas of land, that estimates vary
Figures on the war’s human cost are widely. In 1990 the Soviet Union
notoriously inaccurate, except where the announced that 8,668,000 military per-
Western Allies are concerned, mainly sonnel had been killed in the Great Patri-
because the German, Japanese, and Ital- otic War. However, no one knows how
ian records were destroyed and those of many Soviet prisoners of war died in
the Soviet Union were carelessly kept. In German camps or were executed after the
round numbers China’s military casual- war by Soviet authorities who considered
Final rites are
given during
this memorial
service for
Americans who
died during the
Japanese raid
on Midway
Image Not Available Island in June
1942.
63
• C E N T R A L P A C I F I C A R E A •

surrender by their soldiers as treason. North Pacific Area, the South Pacific
Estimates range from some tens of Area, and the Southwest Pacific Area.
thousands to, as is more likely, several The Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was
million, so the official figure is clearly an Army theater; the others belonged to
unreliable. At a guess, 10 million Soviet the Navy and were commanded collec-
military personnel were killed and tively by Admiral Chester Nimitz under
another 18 million wounded, of whom the designation Pacific Ocean Area.
1 million died. The civilian dead may Although some ships went to the
have amounted to another 1 million SWPA and the Navy was heavily
killed by enemy action. Untold millions engaged in the South Pacific from 1942
more died of malnutrition-related dis- to 1944, the Central Pacific became its
eases, exposure, and other causes result- main theater. This was because Chief of
ing from the war. Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King
When one adds to these gruesome chose to make it so. King believed—
figures the losses of Australia (17,501 wrongly, some have argued—that the
dead), Canada (42,000 dead), Italy (over best way to defeat Japan was first to
300,000 dead), the United Kingdom take the scattered atolls and islands of
(270,000 military personnel and 60,000 the Central Pacific, then land on the
civilians dead), and the United States coast of China. From bases there, Japan
(405,000 dead), the millions slain in the could be bombed into surrendering or
Holocaust—perhaps 12 million persons, possibly be invaded. General Douglas
half of them Jewish—and the enormous MacArthur, the supreme commander of
civilian casualties sustained by Poland SWPA, thought that his theater should
and other occupied countries, the total have gotten the resources that went to
becomes astronomical. A common figure the Central Pacific. Many historians have
used to account for all deaths in the war since agreed with him, but King was a
is 60 million, a figure so huge that it is power on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
hard to grasp; it would be like losing the as a rule, he got his way in the Pacific.
entire current population of France. Yet Tarawa Thus, instead of aiding
even this vast number is probably too MacArthur, the largest fleet in the world
low, given the uncertainties of measure- attacked Tarawa and Makin atolls in
ment. All one can know for sure is that it the Gilbert Islands. On November 21,
was the bloodiest war in history—espe- 1943, after a brief bombardment, U.S.
cially for civilians whose deaths outnum- Marines assaulted Tarawa’s Betio Island
bered those of the military. in a bloody three-day engagement. The
Japanese had dug in, and the Marines
SEE ALSO
suffered 3,000 casualties, including
Medicine
1,000 dead, while Japan lost 4,500
men—all on an island of less than three
square miles.
Army casualties on Makin were
Central Pacific Area low, but on the fourth and last day a
Japanese submarine sank the escort car-
rier Liscomb Bay at a cost of more than
600 lives. Naval officers were not slow
In 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff divided to point out that had the Marines been
the Pacific into four theaters of war, sent to Makin they could have taken it
named the Central Pacific Area, the by storm and the Liscomb Bay would
64
• C E N T R A L P A C I F I C A R E A •

have been safely at sea when the Japan-


ese sub arrived. This was probably
unfair, since Makin was taken according
to a timetable agreed to by the Navy.
There is no way to resolve the old
Army-Marine controversy over speed
and safety; history offers examples to
support each argument. However, one Image Not Available
thing is certain: the possession of an elite
assault force enabled the Navy to stage
operations that the Army could not
manage. At Tarawa 40 percent of the
combat troops became casualties. In
other island assaults Marine regiments
would lose even more, up to a peak of
81 percent casualties sustained by the
29th Marines on Okinawa. In every case ber 1943, the British and American Two U.S. offi-
the carnage was to some extent option- Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) cers plant the
al, because unlike Bataan, or the Battle approved an “Overall Plan for the first American
of the Bulge, where soldiers had to stand Defeat of Japan” that called for Nimitz flag on Guam
and fight, the island assaults of the Cen- to take the Marshalls in January, the eight minutes
after Marines
tral Pacific were selected from among a Carolines and Truks in July, and the
and Army
range of choices. It is doubtful they Marianas in October.
assault troops
would have been made at all had there This course was taken over the objec- landed on the
been no Marine Corps. tions not only of MacArthur but also of island on July
The Navy learned a number of Admiral Nimitz plus his second in com- 20, 1944.
lessons at Tarawa, such as the need for mand, his chief of staff, and his head plan-
heavier artillery bombardments and ner, all of whom preferred to operate in
additional tracked landing vehicles, that the Southwest Pacific. They met with rep-
it applied to subsequent landings. But resentatives of Admiral William Halsey,
the fact remained that assaulting forti- commander in chief of the South Pacific,
fied strong points would always be and MacArthur at Pearl Harbor in Janu-
bloody work no matter how well sup- ary 1944 and agreed that the Central
ported the attacking troops were. Such Pacific was the wrong area for a major
attacks would become routine in the offensive. They especially did not want to
Central Pacific, but not in MacArthur’s take the Marianas, which had no good
theater, where geography and a lack of harbors, were within the range of Japanese
means inspired more creative solutions. land-based aircraft but beyond that of the
Support for the Central Pacific U.S. heavy bombers, and had no military
effort was most marked at the top, value except as B-29 bases. Instead of con-
thanks to King’s driving force and his tinuing westward, Nimitz seems to have
willingness to make deals. It was a favored the conference proposal to turn
source of great annoyance to him that south, take the Palau and Truks, and join
senior naval officers in the Pacific Ocean up with MacArthur for an assault on
Areas command did not share his enthu- Mindanao, the nearest Philippine island.
siasm for Central Pacific operations. But This meant having, if not a unified com-
King had the final say and persuaded mand in the Pacific, at least unity of
the Joint Chiefs to back him. In Novem- action, so that the whole of the United
65
• C E N T R A L P A C I F I C A R E A •

States’s increasing might in the Pacific summer the United States would sustain
could be applied to a single purpose. nearly 23,000 casualties in the process
Defenders of the Central Pacific of destroying at most three Japanese
campaigns argue that the two drives divisions.
were mutually supportive, yet this was Saipan and beyond Unhappily for
seldom the case. They required two many Marines, Nimitz did not run the
entirely separate lines of communica- Navy. When King, who did, saw the
tion with much duplication of effort, joint report drawn up at the Pearl Har-
and they competed with each other for bor conference in January he exploded,
scarce resources, notably landing ships leaving Nimitz no choice but to obey
and service personnel. SWPA never had orders. It was on to the Marianas and
enough service troops, engineers in par- their principal islands, Guam, Tinian,
ticular, and the Marianas made things and especially Saipan—which was
worse, because the great bomber bases invaded on June 15, 1944. The Marines
established there required large num- fought another bloody battle and suf-
bers of engineers to build and main- fered heavy losses.
tain them. One merit of this campaign, howev-
The plan suggested at Pearl Harbor er, was that it drew out the Japanese fleet.
would have put the Navy’s main effort The Imperial Japanese Navy had been
on MacArthur’s flank, required only one planning an attack on MacArthur’s forces
line of communications to serve both but sailed for the Marianas instead. This
campaigns, and enabled landing ships resulted in the Great Marinas Turkey
and carriers to shuttle between the two Shoot or, as it is more properly called, the
theaters as needed. These campaigns Battle of the Philippine Sea. When it was
would have been mutually supportive in over, Japanese naval aviation was finished
fact as well as theory. as an effective force.
There would also have been no On July 26, 1944, as the Marines
more battles like that at Tarawa, for in fought to clear Guam, Franklin Delano
the Southwest Pacific the enemy strong- Roosevelt sailed into Pearl Harbor. He
holds could usually be bypassed and was running for office again and wished
contained with land-based air attacks— to impress the electorate by showing his
as had happened at Rabaul, where flag as commander in chief. But he also
100,000 Japanese troops were dug in had real work to do, because the time for
behind fearsome defenses. To take a final decision on Pacific strategy was
Rabaul by storm would have cost more fast approaching.
U.S. lives than were expended on Iwo Events had overtaken the old plan
Jima. Instead, it was simply neutralized approved in 1943. At that time the goal
for the balance of the war. If Iwo Jima was to reach the South China coast and
and the Marianas had been treated simi- establish bomber bases there from
larly, thousands of lives would have which to reduce Japan or, perhaps, pre-
been saved. pare to invade it. But since then the
Between April and October of Japanese had seized more of China, and
1944, MacArthur’s forces advanced the Army Air Forces were preparing to
1,000 miles in Indonesia, from Hollan- launch its B-29 Superfortress bombers
dia (now Jayapura) to Morotai, destroy- from the Marianas. What to do next
ing nine Japanese divisions at a cost of was becoming the subject of heated
10,000 U.S. casualties, including 1,648 debate, with King wanting to invade
dead. Yet in the Marianas alone that Formosa, MacArthur the Philippines.
66
• C E N T R A L P A C I F I C A R E A •

These tank
lighters came
under fire
during the
invasion of
Saipan in 1944.

Image Not Available

General MacArthur was still insist- mosa as the fastest way to Japan.
ing that the whole Philippine archipel- MacArthur eloquently made the case for
ago had to be liberated, for political as Luzon’s being slower but surer.
well as military reasons. He argued that MacArthur may in fact have arrived at a
the United States would lose face abroad tacit agreement with Roosevelt by which
if it allowed the loyal Filipinos to lan- the President would support
guish needlessly. The voters at home MacArthur’s plan while the general
would be unhappy also, because the issued glowing communiques from his
nation felt guilty about having failed the theater in time for the November elec-
Philippines in 1942. And not only tions. Whether that was so or not, FDR
MacArthur, whose motives were trans- did endorse the plan, Admiral Leahy—
parently selfish and self-aggrandizing, Roosevelt’s personal chief of staff—
argued that bases in the Philippines favored it, too, and within six weeks of
should be established before conducting their conference Nimitz, who required
further operations. little persuasion, had fallen into line.
Chester Nimitz thought so too, as In the end even King had to agree, if
did most of his senior commanders. The only because his own planners had
naval officers’ main difference with found that Formosa could not be taken
MacArthur was that they did not agree without a huge number of army service
with him on the need to liberate the troops. Because they were not available
entire archipelago. Having the northern- in the numbers required, Formosa was
most island of Luzon was essential, definitely out. But in the Philippines,
however, for aircraft based there could where sympathetic local troops could be
cover the South China Sea and cut off recruited for much of the heavy labor,
Japan from Southeast Asia. In addition, additional army service workers would
Manila Bay was far superior as a fleet not be required.
anchorage to the Marianas. Iwo Jima and Okinawa In the
In Hawaii, Nimitz loyally presented Philippine Islands the two Pacific wars
King’s argument for the invasion of For- came together briefly, for the Navy
67
• C H A M B E R L A I N , N E V I L L E •

loaned its mighty Third Fleet to


MacArthur in support of his invasion of Chamberlain, Neville
Leyte. But in 1945 the Central Pacific PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN
drive resumed its bloody course. In Feb-
ruary, U.S. forces invaded Iwo Jima, a • Born: March 18, 1869, Birmingham,
England
small volcanic island about halfway • Political party: Conservative
between the Marianas and Japan. There • Education: Rugby College, 1882–87
the Marines lost three divisions so that • Military service: None
the Army Air Forces could have emer- • Government service: Lord mayor of
gency airfields. Birmingham, 1915–16; member of
Parliament, 1918–40; chancellor of
Iwo Jima was a terrible battle, but the exchequer, 1923, 1931–37;
Okinawa was even worse. After U.S. minister of health, 1924–29; prime
troops went ashore on April 1, 1945, minister, 1937–40
• Died: November 9, 1940, Heckfield,
some of the heaviest fighting in the Hampshire, England
Pacific war took place. Eighty days later,
when the battle finally ended, 7,000
men had been lost on land and 4,900 at
sea. In addition, 32,800 men had been
wounded. Due to kamikaze (suicide) Neville Chamberlain belonged to a promi-
attacks, 20 percent of all casualties sus- nent political family and was active in
tained by the U.S. Navy in World War II business and civic affairs in Birmingham
were taken in the waters off Okinawa. It before entering Parliament. As prime min-
was a gruesome foretaste of what an ister of Britain from May 1937 to May
invasion of Japan would have caused. 1940, he carried out the policy of “appeas-
Although planning for this operation ing” Hitler. He is best remembered today
was far advanced, Okinawa marked the as the man who sold out Czechoslovakia
end of the Central Pacific campaign, to Germany at Munich in September
because the atomic bomb forced a quick 1938, thereby strengthening Adolf Hitler’s
Japanese surrender. hand and making a general European war
inevitable. However, Chamberlain was
SEE ALSO
well liked and respected by his fellow
Iwo Jima, Battle of; Japan; King, Ernest J.;
MacArthur, Douglas; Nimitz, Chester W.; Tories in Parliament, and what is now
North Pacific Area; Okinawa, Battle of; called appeasement was then popular with
Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Saipan, Battle the British people. Most hoped, as Cham-
of; South Pacific Area; Southwest Pacific
Area; Tarawa, Battle of berlain did, that it would keep the peace in
Europe. His mistake was in believing that
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Hitler could be trusted to keep his agree-
Feiffer, George. Tennozan: The Battle of ments, a belief widely shared at the time.
Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb. New The disastrous Norwegian campaign,
York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992.
Manchester, William. Goodbye Darkness: in which Hitler’s troops occupied Nor-
A Memoir of the Pacific War. Boston: way during the spring of 1940, led to
Little, Brown, 1980. public demands that Chamberlain step
Reynolds, Clark G. The East Carriers: The
Forging of an Air Navy. New York:
down. Though the Conservative mem-
McGraw-Hill, 1968. bers of Parliament greatly preferred
Ross, Bill D. Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor. Chamberlain to Winston Churchill, they
New York: Random House, 1985. also recognized that the nation had lost
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun:
The U.S. War with Japan. New York: confidence in him. When the Labour
Free Press, 1985. party refused to serve in a coalition gov-
68
• C H I A N G K A I - S H E K •

ernment under Chamberlain, he was The future generalissimo of China


forced to resign as prime minister, joined the Nationalist party in 1908 and
although he remained leader of the Con- participated in its overthrow of China’s
servatives in Parliament until shortly last imperial dynasty, the Manchu, in
before his death. He never seems to have 1911–12. Because China was in con-
doubted his prewar policy, and in one of stant turmoil, his subsequent career in
his last letters defended the Munich politics and the military is poorly docu-
agreement as having bought Britain time mented. It is known, however, that in
to rearm. 1922 he had become important enough
to hold the position of chief of staff to
SEE ALSO
the commander in chief of the National-
Appeasement; Churchill, Winston S.;
Munich agreement ist army.
Other assignments fol-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
lowed, and Chiang periodi-
Chamberlain, Neville. The Struggle for cally left the army, on one
Peace. London: Hutchinson, 1939.
Dilks, David. Neville Chamberlain. New occasion even supporting
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. himself as a broker on the
Parker, Robert Alexander Clarke. Chamber- Shanghai stock exchange.
lain and Appeasement: British Policy and
the Coming of the Second World War. In 1924 he served as first
New York: St. Martin’s, 1993. commandant of the Wham-
Image Not Available
poa Military Academy in
Canton. After the death of
Sun Yat-sen, the republic’s
Chiang Kai-shek founding father, in 1925,
PRESIDENT AND Chiang had himself put in
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, command of the Northern
REPUBLIC OF CHINA Punitive Expedition,
charged with defeating or at least con- Although Chi-
• Born: October 31, 1887, Chi Kou, trolling five major warlords, or regional ang Kai-shek
Zhejiang Province, China
rulers. As commander of the National rose to power
• Political party: Kuomintang
(Nationalist) Revolutionary Army, he secured 10 quickly, he
• Education: Paoting Military Academy, provinces in central and south China, struggled to
1906–07; Preparatory Military including the important cities of Shang- control the fac-
Academy (Tokyo), 1907–09 tions of his
• Military and political service: hai and Nanking.
own govern-
conspired to overthrow Manchu A complex power struggle followed
dynasty, 1911; conspired to overthrow ment while
between Chiang and his noncommunist engaging in
the successor government of Yuan
Shih-Kai, 1913–16; aide to Sun Yat- rivals in the Nationalist, or Kuomintang, war with
Sen, 1917; chief of staff to commander party (KMT). At the same time, he was Japan.
in chief, 1922; commandant of the struggling against communist members
Whampoa Military Academy and
army commander, 1924–28; head of of the party. By 1928 the communists,
government under various titles and who had tried to seize power by force,
generalissimo in charge of all Chinese
Nationalist Forces, 1928–49; leader of had been driven from the KMT. A small
rump government in Formosa remnant under the leadership of Mao
(Taiwan), 1949–75. Zedong had retreated to the mountains
• Died: April 5, 1975, Taiwan
of Kiangsi Province and seemed to pose
no threat. Chiang then resumed the
Northern Expedition, captured Beijing,
the ancient capital, and was named
69
• C H I A N G K A I - S H E K •

chairman of the State Council and gen- would. Japan won all the battles and
eralissimo. He established his capital at ended up controlling much of the coast
Nanking, an inland city near Shanghai. and some 170 million Chinese. But it
Chiang’s rise to power had been could not catch the retreating Chinese
rapid, but the power he actually exer- forces or dislodge Chiang from his new
cised was less than it seemed. He did not capital of Chungking, deep in the interior.
replace the leaders he defeated with men Though cut off from most of the
loyal to himself, so the warlords were world, except for modest amounts of
constantly rising against him and having aid that reached him over the Burma
to be defeated or negotiated with. Road or from Soviet Russia, Chiang and
Chiang’s actual rule did not extend his forces survived. The Japanese now
beyond the provinces of China con- found themselves locked in a war of
trolled by his army. The number of attrition that they could not afford and
provinces varied considerably but may could not end—except by leaving China.
have averaged around 10. The rest of This was out of the question for Japan’s
China’s 28 provinces were ruled by war- militarists, who had planned the inva-
lords. Although in theory subordinate to sion and now would have to live with
Chiang and the national government, in their mistake—one that would ulti-
practice they did as they pleased in their mately be fatal to them.
holdings. Beset by the warlords, pressing In 1941 Japan decided to cut off
him from the provinces he did not con- China from outside aid and strangle
trol; the communists, who began to Chiang’s government. Because this
grow again; and challenges to his rule would probably mean war with the
from within the KMT, Chiang was United States, Japan seized the initiative
always at war. by destroying much of the Pacific Fleet
Matters grew worse for him in at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December
1931 when the Japanese seized the terri- and seizing virtually all of Southeast
tory of Manchuria’s warlord, who was Asia and the western Pacific.
aligned with Chiang. Further incidents In the years that followed, U.S. aid to
followed, ending with the outright inva- Nationalist China increased. Supplies
sion of China by the Imperial Japanese were flown to China from India, and U.S.
Army in 1937. During these years warplanes operated out of bases on
Chiang continued to extend his rule and Nationalist soil. Allied forces gradually
succeeded in driving the communists out retook most of Burma, and by 1945 a
of southern China. Late in 1936 Chiang new road, the Ledo, ran from India to
was kidnapped and, while being held China. Throughout this period Chiang
captive, agreed to form a joint anti- contributed as few troops as possible to
Japanese front with the communists. the war against Japan, keeping his best
The agreement was never formalized, units along his northwest frontier with
however, and nothing really changed. Communist China. This infuriated many
Chiang does not seem to have been Americans who had to deal with Chiang,
weakened by the experience, as he had since their only interest was in defeating
actually conceded little. Japan. He wanted to see Japan defeated
When Japan invaded, Chiang put as well, but he was counting on the Allies
into effect a strategy of retreat he had doing it while he prepared for his post-
developed earlier, trading space for time war showdown with the communists.
until the Japanese were overextended. Successful in the short run, Chiang
Events unfolded as he had thought they would fail in the end because his regime
70
• C H I A N G K A I - S H E K, M A D A M •

was brutal, incompetent, and corrupt, China. Her father, Charles Jones Soong,
and because as a leader he fell far short was a Methodist missionary and mer-
of Mao Zedong, leader of Communist chant who supported Sun Yat-sen, the
China and a master of intrigue and pro- father of the Republic of China. Soong
paganda. In the postwar struggle for had three daughters and three sons, the
power, Chiang would be outmaneu- third of whom, T. V. Soong, held a vari-
vered, his popular support would fall ety of offices under Chiang, including
away, and army desertions to the com- foreign minister and premier.
munist side would take place on an One daughter, Ch’ing-ling, became the
enormous scale. In 1949 Chiang and the second wife of Sun Yat-sen. Soong Ai-ling,
Kuomintang party were driven from another daughter married H. H. K’ung, a
China. Chiang spent the rest of his life future president of Nationalist China.
as the ruler of the island of Formosa In 1927 Soong Mei-ling married
(later renamed Taiwan), cherishing futile Chiang Kai-shek. Charming, beautiful,
hopes of one day returning in triumph intelligent, and courageous, she was
to the mainland. also hot-tempered and arrogant. How-
ever, these less attractive qualities did
SEE ALSO
not prevent her from being a great asset
Chiang Kai-shek, Madam; China; China-
Burma-India theater to her husband, particularly during
World War II.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
After Eleanor Roosevelt, she was
Berkov, Robert. Strong Man of China: The the most famous wife of a head of state
Story of Chiang Kai-shek. Freeport, N.Y.:
Books for Libraries Press, 1970. and was greatly admired in the United
Chiang, Kai-shek. China’s Destiny. 1947. States, where she had been educated.
Reprint, New York: Da Capo, 1976. She used her celebrity and fluent En-
Crozier, Brian. The Man Who Lost China:
Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Scribners, glish to promote China, notably during
1976. a highly successful tour of the United
Dolan, Sean. Chiang Kai-shek. New York: States from November 1942 to May
Chelsea House, 1988.
1943. There she spoke effectively at ral-
lies, got her picture on the cover of Life
magazine (a great distinction at the
Chiang Kai-shek, time), and secured additional aid for
China. The willingness of the press to
Madam (Soong take her at face value helped Nationalist
Image Not Available Mei-ling) China conceal its defects for a long
WIFE OF CHINA’S PRESIDENT time.

• Born: 1898, Shanghai, China SEE ALSO


• Education: Wesleyan College, Macon,
GA, 1913–17 Chiang Kai-shek

Madame Chi- F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ang Kai-shek Eunson, Roby. The Soong Sisters. New
and her hus- York: Franklin Watts, 1975.
band laugh dur- Seagrave, Sterling. The Soong Dynasty.
ing a photo New York: Harper & Row, 1985.
session while Madam Chiang was the third wife of Thomas, Harry J. The First Lady of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Born in China: the Historic Wartime Visit of
visiting the Mme. Chiang Kai-shek to the United
United States in 1900 as Soong Mei-ling, she belonged States in 1943. New York: International
1940. to one of the best-known families in Business Machines Corp., 1943.
71
• C H I E F S O F S T A F F , C O M B I N E D ( U . K . – U . S . ) •

Navy. Each service went its own way,


Chiefs of Staff, a cavalier system that was adequate in
Combined (U.K.–U.S.) peacetime but made little sense during
a major war. At Arcadia, the first
Allied war conference, which was held
in Washington during December 1941,
it became evident that the United
The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) States needed a counterpart to the
committee brought together the chiefs of British Chiefs of Staff Committee.
staff of the British and U.S. military. Accordingly, President Roosevelt cre-
Prime Minister Churchill and President ated on the spot a body known as the
Roosevelt agreed to form the CCS at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
Arcadia conference, which met in Wash- In its final form, the JCS consisted
ington during December 1941. The CCS of General George Marshall, the
held strategy meetings periodically Army’s chief of staff; General Henry
throughout the war, at which all major Arnold, head of the Army Air Forces,
Allied operations were decided. The which Marshall treated to a large
CCS was headquartered in Washington. extent as a separate service; and
The CCS established a Combined Admiral Ernest King, chief of naval
Munitions Assignment Board to allo- operations. The JCS was chaired by
cate supplies and weapons. Because the Admiral William Leahy, Roosevelt’s
British chiefs would be absent most of personal chief of staff.
the time, a Joint Staff Mission was While the JCS had its own staff
formed to represent them. Its first head, and planners, all important decisions
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, enjoyed were personally made by the Joint
particularly close relations with General Chiefs, who frequently disregarded the
George Marshall, the U.S. Army’s chief advice given them by their staffs.
of staff. Although meetings of the CCS Often these decisions were the result
were often stormy, because the British of hard bargaining and horse trading
and U.S. chiefs differed on important in which one service would approve
strategic issues, as an institution the an operation of the other in order to
CCS was highly effective. As a mecha- gain approval for its own. The mili-
nism for coordinating an allied war tary side of the U.S. war effort was,
effort it has never been surpassed. therefore, run by a committee—
although General Marshall, its most
SEE ALSO
admired member and the chief of the
Arcadia conference
largest service, was clearly first among
equals.

Chiefs of Staff, Joint SEE ALSO

(U.S.) Arcadia conference; Arnold, Henry H.;


King, Ernest J.; Marshall, George C.

F U RT H E R R E A D I N G

Hayes, Grace P. The History of the Joint


Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War
Before Pearl Harbor there was no against Japan. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
institution linking the U.S. Army and Institute Press, 1982.
72
• C H I N A •

als, and others. Chiang played the fac-


China tions in it off against one another to his
own advantage.
In retreating to the west Chiang had
been forced to abandon the southern
When Japan attacked the U.S. naval and central provinces where he had the
fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, most support. But he had always led
1941, China had already been at war China from a position of weakness,
with Japan for more than four years. because the KMT was a fragile political
Almost without industry and desperately vehicle held together mainly by corrup-
poor, China had survived the Japanese tion, self-interest, and fear. There had
onslaught in 1937 chiefly because of its been frequent power plays against
great size and enormous population. Chiang in the past, and independent
Somewhere between 400 and 500 mil- warlords always controlled large parts
lion people were believed to live in of China during the Kuomintang era.
China, making it the most populous Chiang’s power rested on the National
nation on earth as well as one of the Army, which was poorly armed, trained,
poorest. paid, motivated, and led. However, the
In attempting to seize China, Japan warlords’ armies were worse, so it usu-
had made a monumental mistake. ally defeated them.
Although the Japanese Army won every By virtue of its superior numbers,
battle and occupied much of the coast the National Army had often beaten the
and most major cities, it could not catch communists, but Chiang had never been
the Chinese forces, which withdrew into able to crush the CCP. Under the leader-
the vast interior. This retreat compelled ship of wily Mao Zedong it had re-
Japan to fight an endless war on the treated to Shensi Province in northern
margins of its conquered lands, as well China, where it was out of Chiang’s
as against guerrilla forces operating reach—and beyond that of the Japanese
behind Japanese lines. Japan attempted Army as well. Although technically a part
to terrorize the Chinese into surrender- of Nationalist China, Communist China
ing by raping, torturing, and killing was in fact completely independent.
them, systematically and at random. But Circumstances forced the KMT and
Chiang Kai-shek’s national government the CCP to follow similar strategies.
was located in distant Chungking, From 1937 to about 1942, each was
which the Japanese could not reach. preoccupied with questions of survival.
Nor could they get to the northern However, once the Allies were at war
region controlled by the Chinese Com- with Japan, both sides took it for granted
munist party (CCP). The Chinese people that the Allies would win, and they pre-
refused to give in, despite a level of suf- pared for the struggle to follow. Each
fering not exceeded anywhere. side had to take some action against
Chiang Kai-shek ruled Nationalist Japanese forces to remain credible to the
China from his wartime capital through Allies and the Chinese people. But both
the Kuomintang party (KMT), just as the KMT and the CCP viewed anti-
he had before the war. Although Japanese operations in the context of the
Nationalist China was a one-party more critical struggle for power that
state, the KMT was far from unified. It would follow Japan’s defeat.
consisted of a strange collection of war- In the wartime jockeying for posi-
lords, landlords, merchants, intellectu- tion, the communists far exceeded the
73
• C H I N A •

A Chinese sol- of 1.5 million. The communists


dier, age 10, responded to the Japanese invasion and
waits to board occupation by sending troops and politi-
a plane back to cal workers behind Japanese lines to link
China after up with centers of resistance, establish
fighting on the underground governments, and launch
front lines dur-
guerrilla actions. In the expanding areas
ing the Burma
they controlled, communists brought the
campaign.
Image Not Available same reforms they had instituted in
Shensi. They also cooperated with non-
communist elements, encouraged local
initiatives, and confiscated and redistrib-
uted the assets of wealthy “traitors.”
The result was that by 1945 the CCP
had more than 1.2 million members and
governed territories in which, according
to Mao, some 96 million Chinese people
Nationalists in ability and success. The lived. This is probably an inflated figure,
KMT was fatally handicapped by its but all the same, communist growth
corrupt nature and its unwillingness, or during the war was astonishing, includ-
inability, to control the exploitative ing the building of an army of some
practices of the landlords, petty war- 900,000 men.
lords, and other camp followers who There was no way that the Nation-
belonged to it. The National Army was alist government could equal the com-
vastly inferior to Japan’s forces. And it munist political success. But Chiang
was hard to get starving, unpaid sol- commanded substantial military forces
diers—no matter how patriotic—to fight during the war and could draw on a
under well-fed officers who were in the much larger population and resupply
habit of pocketing their men’s wages. base. Nationalist China was poorly
In contrast, the CCP was scrupu- located to receive aid, but the relatively
lously honest. The peasant populations small amounts it received were vitally
under its control benefited from commu- important. Support from Soviet Russia
nist land reforms and were taxed and overland through Central Asia, never
treated fairly by Chinese standards. great, was ended by Stalin in 1940. A
Thus, while the KMT aroused little trickle of aid, mainly over the Burma
enthusiasm, communist rule was popu- Road, came to an end in 1942 when
lar. And the communist army, though Japan seized Southeast Asia. By 1944
relatively small, was well trained and led the United States was managing to bring
and highly motivated. Through a skillful in a fair amount of supplies by air over
combination of policies aimed at civil- dangerous mountain ranges known col-
ians, and deft, small-scale military lectively as “The Hump”. But much of
actions, the CCP expanded greatly dur- these went to U.S. forces in China,
ing the war, laying the foundations for doing the KMT little good.
its later success. U.S. military leaders in China,
In 1937 the CCP had about 40,000 notably Lieutenant General Joseph W.
members and governed, in addition to Stilwell, were infuriated by Chiang Kai-
Shensi, parts of two other desperately shek’s failure to be more aggressive.
poor provinces with a total population Americans generally had an exaggerated
74
• C H I N A – B U R M A – I N D I A T H E A T E R •

was done at the expense of the KMT


and could not be practiced by govern-
ment forces. In any case, Chiang’s post-
war survival no longer depended on his
fighting Japan but rather on being able
to beat the communists after Japan was
defeated. Wasting his assets by attack-
ing the Japanese would have threatened
his survival, a point Americans never
understood.
The main contribution Nationalist
China made to the war was accom-
plished simply by surviving. Because it
did, and because the communists did,
too, Japan had to maintain large forces
Image Not Available in China, at a great cost to its war
effort. This was no small thing, even if it
fell short of what U.S. leaders had
expected of Nationalist China.

SEE ALSO
Chiang Kai-shek; China-Burma-India
theater; Japan

F U RT H E R R E A D I N G

Boyle, John Hunter. China and Japan at


War, 1937–1945. Stanford, Calif.: Stan-
ford University Press, 1972.
Chi, Hsi-sheng. Nationalist China at War:
Military Defeats and Political Collapse.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1982.
Eastman, Lloyd E. Seeds of Destruction:
This U.S. con- view of Nationalist China’s abilities. Nationalist China in War and Revolu-
voy, which Reporters in China, both before and tion, 1937–1945. Stanford, Calif.: Stan-
operated during the war, wanted China saved and ford University Press, 1984.
between Chen- tended to misrepresent it so as to build
Yi and support in the United States for the
Kweiyang,
Nationalist government. They empha-
China, ascends
sized the heroic aspects of China’s resis-
the famous 21
tance to Japan, passing over the KMT’s
China-Burma-India
curves at
Annan, China. numerous failings. theater
This favorable publicity made
China seem morally better and more
effective than was actually the case. The
truth was that Chiang’s forces were Nowhere else did U.S. policy fail so
never strong enough, or well enough utterly as in the China-Burma-India the-
supplied, to carry out major offensive ater. This was ironic, because it was for
actions. The kind of expansion by infil- China’s sake that the United States had
tration that the communists practiced gone to war. Had Roosevelt not made
75
• C H I N A – B U R M A – I N D I A T H E A T E R •

Japan’s withdrawal from China an king, where Chiang had established his
essential condition for lifting sanctions wartime capital, had radically different
in 1941, the United States could proba- agendas. Whereas Roosevelt meant to
bly have struck a temporary deal with strengthen Chiang’s government as a
Japan. To knowingly risk war on its weapon against Japan, Chiang was pri-
behalf is the most one nation can do for marily interested in destroying the Chi-
another, yet Americans, including the nese Communist Party (CCP). After
President, knew almost nothing about Pearl Harbor, Chiang’s policy was to let
the country they were trying to save. the United States beat the Japanese
Despite this lack of knowledge there while he prepared for war with the com-
was a large body of support in the munists. Under intense pressure, Chiang
United States for China, especially after would cooperate militarily with the
it was invaded by Japan. Following United States, but on the smallest scale
Pearl Harbor, China became the United possible.
States’s favorite ally. Most Americans Despite a stream of negative reports
seem to have been at least honorary from U.S. diplomatic and military per-
members of what would later be called sonnel on the incompetence and unpop-
the China lobby. ularity of Chiang’s regime, Roosevelt
Even though China had been the refused to admit that his China policy
United States’s reason for entering the was fatally flawed. Nor would he accept
Pacific war, Washington could do little the view of his ambassador in Chung-
to help it during the dark days after the king, Clarence Gauss, that the country
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, could never be more than a “minor
1941, beyond maintaining a volunteer asset” to the United States and had the
U.S. fighter group, the Flying Tigers, potential to become a “major liability.”
that had been established there earlier Chiang had skillful representation in
that year. Once the Pacific war broke the United States and was the China
out, the Flying Tigers became part of the lobby’s favorite leader. For political rea-
Tenth, then the Fourteenth, Army Air sons, Roosevelt could not turn his back
Force. The United States had few on Chiang, and the military saw China
weapons to spare at first. And China as the logical springboard from which to
could not be easily supplied, because invade Japan. Then, too, Roosevelt
Japan controlled all the convenient ports wanted China to be one of his “Four
and the Burma Road to India. Neverthe- Policemen,” who would maintain peace
less, Roosevelt was determined to build after the war was over. Necessity thus
up Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s gov- became the mother of self-deception.
ernment and expand his territory as a In 1942 U.S. Army Chief of Staff
base from which to invade Japan, and so George C. Marshall sent Lieutenant
that China could serve as a useful ally in General Joseph W. “Vinegar Joe” Stil-
the postwar era. Much bitterness would well, an expert on China, where he had
result from this unfortunate decision. served for many years, to command in
The truth about China was that it China and Burma.
would never be able to offer much help. Stilwell had been military attaché to
But because Americans believed that a the U.S. embassy in Beijing, when Japan
strong China was essential to the war attacked in 1937, and sympathized with
effort, truth could not be allowed to the Chinese. He was an outstanding field
stand in the way of policy. Neither could commander, having distinguished himself
the fact that Washington and Chung- in prewar maneuvers by his flair and
76
• C H I N A – B U R M A – I N D I A T H E A T E R •

imagination. In addition to his theater supplied only by air over the treacherous
command, Chiang named him chief of Himalayas—called by fliers “The
staff of the Nationalist Chinese Army, an Hump”—an extraordinarily dangerous
empty gesture, since Chiang had no route that claimed the lives of many.
intention of allowing an American to This trickle of supplies, when a torrent
command his troops. They would not be was needed, ruled out major operations.
of much use anyway, for the 3-million- In his effort to open Burma, Stilwell
strong National Army of the Republic of found his greatest enemy to be Generalis-
China looked impressive only on paper. simo Chiang Kai-shek, whom he private-
Most of its 300 divisions were ill trained, ly called Peanut, and his next greatest
malnourished, disease ridden, horribly Claire Chennault, who led the Flying
led, and, for the most part, outside Tigers and its successor, the U.S. Four-
Chiang’s jurisdiction. Warlords ran most teenth Air Force. Chennault, who wanted
of these divisions, with Chiang com- to be independent of Stilwell, was mak-
manding no more than 30. What few ing absurd promises to defeat Japan if he
resources he did have available went to were provided with 147 aircraft.
the 400,000 men who stood guard The actual situation, as Stilwell
against the CCP in North China, leaving pointed out, was that if Chennault
little for the fight against Japan. annoyed the Japanese too much they
Stilwell reached China in March would simply take his airfields. He
1942, just as the Japanese invaded argued that the correct strategy was to
Burma, where the British fought badly secure a land route to India first, then
and the Chinese worse. Chiang gave undertake more ambitious land and air
Stilwell nominal command of his troops operations. However, Roosevelt
in Burma, but once there, Vinegar Joe favored Chennault’s idea—because
discovered that he had no real authority Chiang liked it and because it would be
over them. In lightning attacks the easier to supply a small air force than a
Japanese destroyed the Allied front, and large ground army. At the Trident con-
Stilwell personally led a column of 114 ference in May 1943 in Washington,
survivors out of the jungle to India, the Churchill and Roosevelt produced a
only group of escapees to make it with- compromise, dividing the supplies sent
out loss of life. to China between Stilwell and Chen-
Throughout the campaign, Ameri- nault, although Chennault had the
can journalists had published evasive higher priority.
reports. Upon reaching India, Stilwell In March 1944 Japan launched two
put things right at a press conference major offensives that prompted impor-
with the blunt statement: “I claim we tant changes. One drive along the
took a hell of a beating. We got run out Burma–India frontier threatened the
of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I Chinese “X-Force” operating in Burma
think we ought to find out what caused under Stilwell’s command. This drive
it, go back and retake it.” These finally led Washington to warn Chiang
remarks made him famous. that all U.S. aid to him would be cut off
Stilwell would spend the next two unless he put the companion “Y-Force”
and a half years trying to build up a under Stilwell also. Chiang had been
Chinese force of 30 divisions able to accepting aid but keeping most of his
retake North Burma and defend a new troops out of battle, which could no
land route from India in place of the old longer be tolerated.
Burma Road. Until then, China could be Chiang complied, permitting a
77
• C H I N A – B U R M A – I N D I A T H E A T E R •

Sino–Anglo–United States offensive to


take place in Burma. This drive, which
was ultimately successful, served no
strategic purpose once the Joint Chiefs of
Staff decided not to use China as a stag-
ing area from which to invade Japan.
This decision came too late to call off the
Burma campaign, thus fully justifying
Britain’s persistent lack of enthusiasm for Image Not Available
it. So did Japan’s new offensive in south-
eastern China, which overran many of
Chennault’s airfields. Constructed and
supplied at enormous cost, in the end
they accomplished nothing.
Japan’s offensive proved that Stilwell
had been right about Chennault’s bases unnecessary to keep Stilwell as theater Chinese sol-
being indefensible. It also gave Roosevelt commander. His special abilities would diers train in
an interest in utilizing the Chinese com- not be required for what was now a foxholes for
munists, a step Chiang feared and that routine assignment. combat on the
he had thus far prevented. On July 6, at Accordingly, on October 18, 1944, frontlines.
China pre-
Marshall’s urging, FDR cabled Chiang Roosevelt recalled Stilwell and replaced
ferred to leave
that the crisis made it imperative for Stil- him with Lieutenant General Albert C.
fighting the
well to take “command of all Chinese Wedemeyer. This pleased the generalis-
Japanese to the
and U.S. forces . . . including the com- simo, who failed to understand the real Americans,
munist forces.” reason why the change had come about. holding sol-
Apart from the military advantages, Stilwell’s recall led to a flood of sto- diers in reserve
Roosevelt apparently hoped that a uni- ries at home detailing, almost for the to fight a civil
fied command might enable the KMT first time, the manifold shortcomings of war against the
and the CCP to settle their differences. Chiang and the ruling Kuomintang Communists
Chiang agreed in principle but took no (KMT) party. Although the China lobby instead.
other action, so in September Washing- would continue to exercise great influ-
ton said there would be no more aid ence, the U.S. love affair with China
unless Stilwell was empowered at once. was over. Thereafter, Wedemeyer and
Vinegar Joe delivered the message to the U.S. ambassador to China made cer-
Chiang personally and with great relish, tain that there would be no aid to the
writing doggerel verses afterward to cel- CCP and no political concessions made
ebrate having kicked Peanut in the to it. U.S. aid to Chiang increased
pants. substantially in 1945, even though the
Stilwell’s elation proved to be pre- KMT made little effort to combat the
mature, however, for instead of giving in Japanese, and the Reds, too, were hus-
to official U.S. pressure, Chiang forced banding their strength for the coming
FDR to choose between him and Stil- civil war.
well. By this time, U.S. military leaders The British would retake much of
had lost faith in China and, with the Burma by war’s end, aided by substan-
war going well in the Pacific, no longer tial U.S. forces, including a famous unit
saw it as essential to Japan’s defeat. called Merrill’s Marauders that operated
Ironically, because the China-Burma- behind Japanese lines. Chennault’s air
India theater no longer mattered, it was force made a modest contribution too,
78
• C H U R C H I L L, W I N S T O N S P E N C E R •

but the entire China-Burma-India the- the century and was very well known
ater never justified the resources that both at home and abroad.
were, with such difficulty, devoted to it. Early life Although Churchill was
the grandson of a duke, he was techni-
SEE ALSO
cally a commoner, because titles of
Chiang Kai-shek; China
nobility passed only to eldest sons. His
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
father, Lord (a courtesy title) Randolph
Sun, Youli. China and the Origins of the
Churchill, was the third son of the sev-
Pacific War, 1931–1941. New York: St. enth duke of Marlborough and there-
Martin’s, 1993. fore did not inherit the dukedom. Lord
Tuchman, Barbara W. Stilwell and the U.S. Randolph was a Conservative politician
Experience in China, 1911–1945. New
York: Macmillan, 1971. of note, rising to become chancellor of
the exchequer (in charge of the trea-
sury). He married Jennie Jerome, an
American heiress, but her money never
Churchill, Winston came down to Winston, who was ob-
liged to earn his living by his pen for
Spencer most of his adult life.
PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN, After attending prep school at Har-
1940–45 row, which he hated, and the military
• Born: November 30, 1874, Blenheim academy at Sandhurst, which he liked,
Palace, England Churchill joined the cavalry and served
• Political parties: Union, Liberal, in India, Cuba, and the Sudan. He had
Conservative
many adventures during these years,
• Education: Harrow, 1886–92; Royal
Military College at Sandhurst, 1893–94 most of them as a journalist on leave
• Military service: British cavalry 2nd from his regiment in India, where little
lieutenant, 1895–1900; major, 1915; was happening. At the 1898 Battle of
lieutenant colonel of infantry, 1915–16
Omdurman in Sudan during Britain’s
• Previous government service: House of
Commons, 1900–1904; undersecretary war with the Dervishes, Churchill took
of state for the colonies, 1905–1908; part in the last great cavalry charge
president of the Board of Trade,
1908–10; home secretary, 1910–11;
made by the British Army. He also cov-
first lord of the Admiralty, 1911–15; ered the Boer War in South Africa as a
minister of munitions, 1917–18; reporter, was captured by the Boers, and
secretary of state for war and air,
1918–21; secretary for the colonies, then escaped, which made him an
1921–22; chancellor of the exchequer, instant celebrity.
1924–29; first lord of the Admiralty, Churchill resigned his commission in
1939–40
• Died: January 24, 1965, London,
1900 and stood for Parliament as a Con-
England servative. His own fame, augmented by
already extensive writings, and his
famous name, ensured his election. In
1905 he bolted the Conservative party
Winston S. Churchill is best known in and became a Liberal, a step perhaps
the United States as Britain’s wartime even more rare in Britain than in the
prime minister, particularly for his hero- United States. As a Liberal he quickly
ic leadership in 1940 and 1941 when rose to become civilian head of the Royal
Britain stood alone against Germany. Navy, which, because Britain still ruled
But Churchill had been a major figure in the waves, made him a world figure. He
British politics since the early years of championed the doomed Gallipoli,
79
• C H U R C H I L L, W I N S T O N S P E N C E R •

Turkey, campaign in 1915, and its failure Winston


seemed likely to end his career in politics. Churchill
But, after service in the trenches, he was speaks before
brought back into government by Prime a joint session
Minister David Lloyd George, a former of the U.S.
Congress on
cabinet colleague and now head of the
December 26,
wartime coalition government.
1941.
After World War I Churchill “re-
ratted,” as he put it, becoming a Con-
servative again, and was rewarded with
Image Not Available
the chancellorship of the exchequer in
the first postwar Conservative govern-
ment. He lost his job when the Conserv-
atives were defeated in 1929, and
although they regained power later, he
was not offered another post. Most
Conservatives disliked and mistrusted
Churchill, with the result that he did not
hold office again until after World War
II broke out.
During his “wilderness years,” not have a leadership position is called,
Churchill earned a great deal of money he still had his eloquent tongue and pen.
by writing numerous books and articles, He used them to fight the policy of
including a four-volume biography of “appeasement” that the Conservative
the first duke of Marlborough. He had government of Britain was pursuing,
to, because his opulent style of life on further annoying his party.
his country estate, Chartwell, required Rise to power After the war broke
constant infusions of cash. out, Churchill’s long record of anti-
Churchill had a reputation for being Nazism forced Prime Minister Neville
politically untrustworthy, which he did Chamberlain to bring him back to the
not improve by taking a reactionary cabinet again, once more as head of the
stand on self-government for India and Admiralty. After the disastrous 1940
other issues. He also backed King Norwegian campaign, for which
Edward VII’s attempt to marry a Churchill had been as responsible as
divorced American woman without giv- anyone, Chamberlain was forced to step
ing up his throne, which most of the down. Most Conservative members of
British people opposed. When Edward Parliament would have preferred almost
was forced to abdicate, with him went anyone else to Churchill but, in a rare
any hope, it appeared, of Churchill’s instance when public opinion forced the
returning to the cabinet. issue, were obliged to accept him as
But there was more to Churchill Britain’s leader.
than his misadventures. He was the first Churchill became prime minister on
important British politician to warn May 10, 1940, the very day Germany
against the threat of Adolf Hitler. Dur- launched its stunningly successful sur-
ing the 1930s, his was the loudest voice prise attack through the Ardennes Forest
in Britain calling for rearmament. into France. His first days in office were
Although only a “backbencher,” as a spent presiding over Britain’s defeat on
British member of Parliament who does the Continent and the evacuation of
80
• C H U R C H I L L, W I N S T O N S P E N C E R •

Allied troops from Dunkirk, which was and guarded by the British Fleet, would
completed June 3. carry on the struggle, until, in God’s
The British expeditionary force was good time, the New World, with all its
saved, but all else was lost. The Army power and might, steps forth to the res-
returned to Britain minus most of its cue and the liberation of the Old.”
weapons. France surrendered in June. His listeners were deeply moved,
With Germany having won the Conti- one Labour member writing that the
nent, and the United States on the side- speech “was worth 1,000 guns and the
lines, there were many in Britain who speeches of 1,000 years.”
felt that the time had come to accept For his leadership in that desperate
Hitler’s terms for peace—which were time, Churchill will always be honored.
that Britain could keep the Empire In a rare moment of modesty, Churchill
while Germany retained Europe. If once said that it was the British people
Britain had dropped out of the war who had the lion’s heart; it fell to him
there would have been no way for the only to give the roar. This was to allow
United States to intervene in Europe himself too little credit, for no other
and little chance of defeating Hitler. It British politician could have rallied the
was at this critical juncture, with the British as he did—none had his com-
fate of the world hanging in the bal- mand of the language, his ability to sum-
ance, that Churchill realized his full mon the past in aid of the present, his
promise at last. Insisting on a fight to faith in Britain’s greatness. Who else
the finish, he led the British people with could have convinced the British when
never-to-be-forgotten eloquence and all seemed lost that they were actually
force as they stood alone against enjoying what he would later call “their
Hitler’s war machine. finest hour”?
On June 4 Churchill addressed the Churchill as war leader After the
House of Commons, ending with these Soviet Union and the United States
defiant lines: became allies of Britain, Churchill prob-
“Even though large tracts of Europe ably did the war effort more harm than
and many old and famous States have good. As prime minister and minister of
fallen or may fall into the grip of the defence, he strongly influenced British
Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of strategy, often for the worse. No one
Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. was more responsible than he for the
“We shall go on to the end. We shall Royal Air Force’s bombing attacks on
fight in France, we shall fight on the seas Germany, which killed hundreds of
and oceans, we shall fight with growing thousands of civilians and consumed at
confidence and growing strength in the a minimum 25 percent of Britain’s war
air, we shall defend our island, whatever effort, while contributing little to victory.
the cost may be. Like the U.S. air war over Europe, it
“We shall fight on the beaches, we was not only a crime but a blunder—
shall fight on the landing grounds, we one which, unlike the United States,
shall fight in the fields and in the streets, Britain could ill afford.
we shall fight in the hills; we shall never More serious still was Churchill’s
surrender. absolute determination to prevent, or at
“And even if, which I do not for a least delay, the Allied invasion of France,
moment believe, this island or a large the only way for the Allies to ensure
part of it were subjugated and starving, Germany’s early defeat and, in addition,
then our Empire beyond the seas, armed minimize the Soviet Union’s postwar
81
• C H U R C H I L L, W I N S T O N S P E N C E R •

Churchill
(below fore-
ground lamp-
post) waves
and gives the
famous V-for-
victory sign to
a mob of peo-
ple on May 8,
1945, after
Image Not Available
making his V-E
Day speech in
London.

position in Europe. This was a return to by resisting for as long as he could the
the marginal strategy Churchill had creation of a second front. It was the
advocated in World War I, which had postponement of what became Opera-
ended in defeat at Gallipoli. It proved a tion Overlord, not Stalin’s guile or Roo-
poor strategy in World War II as well, sevelt’s innocence, that let the Red
tying down most of the West’s strength Army occupy so much of Europe.
in North Africa and Italy while the Declining influence After D-Day,
buildup for the attack across the English Churchill’s influence in the Grand
Channel languished. Alliance of Britain, the Soviet Union,
If D-Day, the invasion of France, and the United States diminished. The
had taken place in 1943, as General United States was now providing not
George C. Marshall and other U.S. only the bulk of Allied military strength
strategists wanted, Germany would in the West and 25 percent of Britain’s
most likely have fallen at least a year weaponry but many other forms of aid
earlier than it did, with a great saving as well. In the bargaining with Stalin
of human lives on the battlefield and in that occupied much of Roosevelt’s last
the Holocaust. Also, all of central months, FDR went his own way—drag-
Europe, and maybe part of eastern ging Churchill behind him.
Europe as well, would have ended up The unkindest blow of all fell on
outside the Soviet empire. Conservative Churchill in July 1945, during a confer-
Americans used to argue that if only ence of the Big Three in Potsdam, Ger-
Roosevelt had listened to Churchill many. Britain held its first general elec-
there would have been no sellout to tion in 10 years and, to the surprise of
Stalin at Yalta. The opposite is more Americans, threw the Conservatives
likely true, however: although out. Churchill, preoccupied with war
Churchill’s ancient anti-Bolshevism— and diplomacy, had failed to recognize
which dated all the way back to 1917— that the British people, who had suf-
resurfaced near the end of the war, no fered so much, were now determined to
one had done more to ensure that com- have a welfare state, which only the
munism would rule in the East than he, Labour party could give them.
82
• C I V I L D E F E N S E •

Churchill, though deeply hurt, took Kimball, Warren F. Forged in War: Roo-
his defeat with the greatness of charac- sevelt, Churchill, and the Second World
War. New York: Morrow, 1997.
ter that always redeemed his quick tem- Rose, Norman. Churchill: The Unruly
per, heavy drinking, and other faults. Giant. New York: Free Press, 1994.
He was bathing when he got the news,
and remarked: “They are perfectly enti-
tled to vote as they please. This is
democracy. This is what we have been
fighting for.” Although entitled to
Civil defense
return to Potsdam for the conference’s
end, Churchill went to Buckingham
Palace at the end of election day and The office of Civilian Defense (OCD)
gave his resignation to the king. was established in May 1941 by Presi-
Churchill then issued a statement wish- dent Roosevelt, who named the peppery
ing the new government well. In pri- mayor of New York, Fiorello
vate, his words carried more bitterness. LaGuardia, as its chief. OCD was sup-
When his wife remarked that this might posed to coordinate civilian efforts to
be a blessing in disguise, Churchill prepare for war, but its authority was so
replied that it seemed “quite effectively vague, its mission so unclear, and public
disguised.” enthusiasm for its mandate so slight,
In recent years British authors have that little came of it at first. Then, after
written books highly critical of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December
Churchill. It is true that he had serious 1941, a vast tide of civilian enthusiasm
faults and made many mistakes, but overwhelmed the OCD. Citizens com-
when he rallied the British in 1940, he, mittees sprang up everywhere. Hospitals
and they, saved everything. Their finest reeled before hordes of people eager to
hour is Churchill’s monument and his donate blood for the armed forces. In
claim to greatness. With his books, arti- Chicago 23,000 block captains were
cles, and especially speeches, he proved sworn in at a mass ceremony. OCD’s
once again that words above all deter- inability to channel this surge of support
mine the fate of nations. It was not just aroused numerous complaints—that it
Britain’s good fortune but the world’s did not have a women’s division, for
that when all seemed lost, it was led by example—although any civilian effort
a man who could mobilize the full would have to depend on women to a
power of the English language in the very large extent.
service of liberty. In time the OCD did make use of
female volunteers, especially after the
SEE ALSO President appointed his wife Eleanor to
D-Day; Foreign policy; France, fall of; Ital-
give LaGuardia a hand. But the OCD
ian campaigns; Mediterranean theater; never became a major government
Potsdam conference; Strategic bombing; agency, in large part because the United
Yalta conference States was never attacked, making a civil
defense effort on the European scale
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
unnecessary. For the most part, civilian
Churchill, Winston S. The Second World contributions to the war effort were
War. 6 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, handled by other agencies, by a vast
1948–54.
Gilbert, Martin. Churchill: A Life. New number of independent organizations
York: Henry Holt, 1991. like the Red Cross, or not at all.
83
• C O N C E N T R A T I O N C A M P S •

The Civilian Air Warning System, beating, and starving them, frequently
amateur aircraft spotters, enrolled a half to death.
million members. A partial blackout of At first Nazi Germany had many
the East Coast was imposed in 1942. such camps, but in 1934 the system was
First aid classes drew hundreds of thou- reorganized under the Schutzstattel (SS)
sands of students, as did classes on how and put under the supervision of special
to survive an air raid. By February 1952 Death’s Head formations. By 1937 there
5 million Americans belonged to some were only three important camps:
type of volunteer civil defense organiza- Dachau, Sachsenhausen, and Buchen-
tion. That summer some 11,000 Local wald. The Allied troops who liberated
Defense Councils carried 10 million vol- these camps in 1945 were horrified by
unteers on their rolls, some directly the mass graves, fiendish instruments of
involved in civil defense, others in torture, and brutalized inmates they dis-
numerous war-related activities, such as covered there. But for all their ghastli-
scrap drives and Victory gardens. ness, they were small-scale affairs com-
pared to the death camps of the
Holocaust, which lay to the east of Ger-
many. The victims of concentration
Concentration camps camps numbered only in the tens of
thousands, whereas perhaps 12 million
people—half of them Jews—perished in
the death camps.
The Nazis began establishing concentra-
tion camps for political prisoners soon SEE ALSO
after coming to power in 1933. The Holocaust
first and most notorious of these was F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Dachau, located near Munich. These
Auerbacher, Inge. I Am a Star: Child of the
camps were atrocious places and Holocaust. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
designed to be so. The Nazis meant to tice-Hall, 1986.
terrorize their enemies—and potential Buechner, Howard A. Dachau: The
Hour of the Avenger (An Eyewitness
enemies—by inflicting inhuman punish- Account). Metairie, La.: Thunderbird
ments on them, including torturing, Press, 1986.

Two prisoners
(in foreground)
support a
comrade dur-
ing a roll call
at this German
concentration
camp because
Image Not Available
fainting was
frequently used
as an excuse
for guards to
“liquidate”
useless inmates.
84
• C O N G R E S S, U. S. •

Baldwin, Margaret. The Boys Who Saved because the war had not been going well
the Children. New York: Julian Messner, up to that time. President Roosevelt had
1981.
Feig, Konnilyn G. Hitler’s Death Camps: hoped that Operation Torch, the inva-
The Sanity of Madness. New York: sion of French North Africa, would turn
Holmes & Meier, 1981. the electorate around. But Operation
Geehr, Richard S., ed. Letters from the
Torch came on November 8, just a few
Doomed: Concentration Camp Corre-
spondence 1940–1945. Lanham, Md.: days after the election. To his credit,
University Press of America, 1992. Roosevelt did not flinch when informed
Phillips, Walter Alfred Peter. The Tragedy of the invasion’s delay, which he knew
of Nazi Germany. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1969. would hurt Democrats at the polls. In
Smith, Marcus J. The Harrowing of Hell: the new 78th Congress the Republicans
Dachau. Albuquerque: University of New were just 13 seats short of a majority in
Mexico Press, 1972.
the House and 9 seats behind in the Sen-
ate. Because of by-elections held to fill
vacated seats, the Democrats actually
Congress, U.S. lost their majority in the House,
although it was not reorganized under
Republican leadership because the 1944
elections were so near.
Beginning in 1937, Congress, although Although it continued to support
nominally under Democratic control, Roosevelt in military and foreign affairs,
was really dominated by a coalition of the new Congress killed off as many
Republicans and conservative southern New Deal agencies as it could. Young
Democrats. Because Congress was people were hardest hit, losing the
strongly influenced by isolationism (the National Youth Administration, the
desire of most citizens for the United Civilian Conservation Corps, and other
States to stay out of world affairs in gen- programs targeted at them. These were
eral and World War II in particular) not needed during the war, when most
before the bombing of Pearl Harbor in young people were in the armed services
December 1941, Roosevelt was reluctant or at work on a full- or part-time basis.
to prepare adequately for war, and slow But they would be missed afterward.
to aid the Allies after Hitler invaded Congress would not expand the
Poland in September 1939. draft in 1944 when the military man-
Nevertheless, Congress, by very nar- power crisis hit. It consistently refused to
row margins, did enact a bill creating the draft women for noncombat jobs, even
Selective Service System (which adminis- though public opinion polls showed that
tered a military draft) in 1940, extended most Americans, including young women
it in 1941 (by a single vote in the of draft age, would accept such a mea-
House), and passed the important Lend- sure. It would not pass a national service
Lease Act (which provided war machin- bill that would have required civilians to
ery to Britain and its allies) in 1941. work at assigned jobs, although again the
Once the United States entered the war, polls were favorable. But in 1944 it did
Congress gave Roosevelt an almost com- pass the GI Bill of Rights, a sweeping
pletely free hand when it came to defense program of veterans’ benefits that was
and foreign policy issues. both very popular and a great success. In
In the off-year election of 1942, the 1944 elections Democrats regained
Republicans made big gains, partly be- control of Congress again, too late to
cause voter turnout was light and partly make any difference to the war effort.
85
• C O R A L S E A, B A T T L E O F T H E •

SEE ALSO control of the Coral Sea and neutralize


Election of 1942; Election of 1944; GI Bill Australia. As usual the enemy plan was
of Rights; Lend-Lease; Selective Service exceedingly complex, requiring not only
System great skill on the Imperial Japanese
Navy’s part but also that U.S. forces
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
would respond as the Japanese expected.
Burns, James MacGregor. Roosevelt: The Moreover, the Japanese paid little atten-
Soldier of Freedom. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1970. tion to security. That lapse was more
Colegrove, Kenneth Wallace. The Ameri- dangerous than they knew, because,
can Senate and World Peace. New York: although it was outnumbered and out-
Vanguard, 1944.
Porter, David L. The Seventy-sixth Con- gunned, the U.S. Navy had an over-
gress and World War II, 1939-1940. whelming intelligence advantage.
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, Naval Intelligence was in fact moni-
1979.
toring 60 percent of Japan’s radio trans-
Ritchie, Donald A. The Young Oxford
Companion to the Congress of the Unit- missions over its Mid-Pacific Direction-
ed States. New York: Oxford University Finding Net. This chain of stations
Press, 1993. tracked individual ships over thousands
of miles of ocean by a process known as
radio traffic analysis. Because of a self-
imposed radio silence, the Japanese fleet
Coral Sea, Battle of the that had bombed Pearl Harbor had been
missed by U.S. Naval Intelligence. How-
ever, radio silence was not characteristic Although the
of the Imperial Japanese Navy, whose Lexington was
In the six months after the bombing of ships were always chattering away, to hit with Japan-
Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the the great benefit of the U.S. Navy. Navy ese torpedoes
Japanese ran wild in Southeast Asia and code breakers were able to decrypt a sig- and bombs dur-
ing the Battle of
the western Pacific, sweeping all before nificant amount of the Japanese Navy’s
the Coral Sea, it
them. Yet at the pinnacle of Japan’s suc- operational code, which yielded invalu-
was not until
cess, the tide of war would turn as a able data. the fleet carrier
result of two crucial sea battles. The By April 20, 1942, Admiral Chester was heading
first of these, the Battle of the Coral Nimitz, who commanded the Pacific home that its
Sea, put an end to Japanese expansion. Fleet, knew that in two weeks’ time a ruptured gas
At Midway its main attack force would Japanese carrier task force would enter tanks exploded.
be shattered.
These defeats came about partly
because in the late spring of 1942 many
Japanese officers were suffering from
what they came to call “victory disease,”
the symptoms being euphoria and care-
lessness. Drunk with success, rather than Image Not Available
consolidating its gains after taking the
Philippine archipelago, Japan proceeded
at once with further offensive actions.
Their first effort was to occupy
Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and other
points in the region, notably Port
Moresby, New Guinea, so as to gain
86
• C R U I S E R S •

the Coral Sea bound for Port Moresby. the Navy, was famous as a happy ship
Although this area was in General Dou- and was greatly missed by her crew. She
glas MacArthur’s theater, a divided com- was also missed by Admiral Nimitz, for
mand arrangement stipulated that fleet now he was left with only three carriers
carrier operations would remain under to face the Japanese onslaught.
Navy control wherever they took place. The loss of Lexington made the bat-
Accordingly, Nimitz sent Vice Admiral tle of the Coral Sea a tactical win for the
Frank Jack Fletcher to defend the Coral Japanese, who had inflicted more harm
Sea with two fleet carriers, Lexington than they suffered. But it remained a
and Yorktown. Nimitz had no replace- strategic victory for the United States,
ment for these priceless warships, but because after the battle Japan was ob-
the Allies could not afford to lose Aus- liged to call off its invasion of Port
tralia, so the risk had to be taken. At the Moresby for lack of air support. In the
Coral Sea, Nimitz’s courage would be Coral Sea the United States’s sailors and
rewarded, and not for the last time. airmen saved Australia.
On May 1 both U.S. carrier groups The Battle of the Coral Sea was the
were in place. They and the Japanese high-water mark of Japan’s advance in
strike force, which included two fleet the Pacific, as it turned out, and a crucial
carriers and one light carrier, blundered setback. Because of it, two damaged
back and forth for days, always missing Japanese fleet carriers would not return
each other. Battle was finally joined on to service in time for Midway—much
May 7. When it was over, Japanese reducing the odds in that all-important
planes had sunk a U.S. destroyer and an engagement. The Coral Sea was the first
oil tanker and scored numerous but not naval battle fought entirely by aircraft,
fatal hits on Lexington and Yorktown. and both sides made many mistakes. But
The “Lady Lex” suffered most, because the Japanese committed more of them,
she had been built on a battle cruiser and the U.S. Navy was learning fast. The
hull and was less maneuverable than next time, at Midway, it would do better.
Yorktown, a carrier from her keel up. At
SEE ALSO
this point the U.S. Navy was far ahead,
Midway, Battle of; Pacific war
the Japanese having lost a light carrier
and the use (temporarily) of its big carri- F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ers, the Shokaku for two crucial Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. Blue Skies and
months, and the Zuikaku until June 12, Blood: The Battle of the Coral Sea. New
York: Eriksson, 1975.
because of heavy damage to its air Millot, Bernard. The Battle of the Coral
group. Sea. London: Allan, 1974.
But the balance changed when Lex-
ington started erupting. She had taken
two torpedoes and three bomb hits during
the battle, but her crew gained control of Cruisers
the fires, relit her boilers, and she was
steaming home at 25 knots when gasoline
fumes from her ruptured tanks exploded. After battleships and carriers, cruisers
Remarkably, although 36 planes were the largest warships in the U.S.
went down with her, only some 200 Navy. Like most navies, the U.S. Navy
lives were lost out of a complement of had two basic cruiser types, heavy (more
nearly 3,000. The Lexington, with than 10,000 tons’ displacement), and
Saratoga, the biggest combat vessel in light. Heavy cruisers were armed usually
87
• D - D A Y •

with 8-inch guns, lights with 5- or 6-


inch guns. D-Day
Traditionally, cruisers had been
scout and fast attack vessels ranging
ahead of the battle line. But as World
War II progressed, the cruiser’s scouting Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion
and fast attack roles were taken over by of France on June 6, 1944, today looks
airplanes, and cruisers were increasingly like it would be a sure thing. The Allies
devoted to antiaircraft and antisubma- had firm control of the sea and air. Only
rine work. one of the five invasion beaches was
Cruisers lost some of their heavy hard to take, and at the end of the
guns and eventually all their torpedo “longest day” (the term writer Cornelius
tubes, which were replaced with antiair- Ryan used to describe D-Day years
craft (AA) guns. As so few fast battle- later), some 156,000 men were ashore.
ships were built, cruisers, with their high But Overlord was actually a high-risk
rate of speed (as fast as 38 knots), pro- operation. Germany had some 55 divi-
vided most of the AA support for fast sions defending France on D-Day, while
carrier groups. the Allies could muster only 35. Because
The Baltimore class of heavy cruis- the standard military guideline is that
ers, which began entering service in attackers must outnumber defenders,
1943, were the best of their type in the invading France was, on the face of it, a
world. Large (13,600 tons), heavily hopeless task.
armed and armored, they were also fast What the Allied planners counted
(33 knots) and, thanks to their size, on were certain advantages they had
could sail for long distances without that they hoped might offset their short-
refueling. However, because of steel age of troops. For one, Germany could
A Coast Guard
shortages, only six or seven of this class not deploy all its forces on the English
landing boat
were constructed in time to see action. Channel, because the rest of France had puts American
They were the largest class of cruiser to be defended as well, especially the soldiers on the
ever built, and would have been larger Mediterranean coast. Second, the Soviet coast of France
still had not nine of them been convert- Union had agreed to launch an offensive under heavy
ed to Independence-class light carriers. at the same time as Overlord, to prevent Nazi fire.
The mainstay of the light cruiser
force was the Cleveland class, of which
27 saw service. The best U.S. light cruis-
ers, Clevelands were at least equal to
their best foreign counterparts. At
10,000 tons’ displacement they were
armed with a dozen 6-inch guns in addi-
tion to numerous AA guns and made a
top speed of 33 knots. Image Not Available
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Musicant, Ivan. U.S. Armored Cruisers: A
Design and Operational History.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1985.
Whitley, M. J. Cruisers of World War
Two: An International Encyclopedia.
London: Arms and Armour, 1995.
88
• D - D A Y •

the Germans from bringing up rein- the Germans pressed into service, and
forcements from the eastern front. temporary bridges. These attacks se-
A third factor favoring the Allies verely limited Germany’s ability to move
was that they had broken Germany’s troops and supplies around in France.
military codes and could read its radio Deception Equally important, the
traffic. ULTRA, as this information was Allies leaked false plans that kept Hitler,
called, had been most useful in Africa, who made the key decisions, from con-
where radio was the principal medium centrating his troops in Normandy.
of communications. It would be of less There were 6 primary plans plus 36 sec-
value on the Continent, where secure ondary ones, entailing leaked informa-
land lines reduced German radio use. tion, guerrilla raids by resistance forces,
Yet the Allies could usually count on Allied military actions, and a host of
knowing the enemy’s strength—referred other activities that misled Germany and
to in military terms as “the order of kept its troops dispersed.
Image Not Available battle”—giving them an intelligence One of the best deception opera-
advantage. tions was Fortitude North, a low-cost
Preparations Although the Allies’ plan that required only a handful of
efforts to destroy the German-controlled men and women. The Allied command
French rail yards with heavy bombers created a fictitious British Fourth Army
did not have the hoped-for results, Allied headquartered at Edinburgh Castle in
fighter-bomber attacks were highly suc- Scotland and, by pouring out radio mes-
cessful. By D-Day, Major General Lewis sages, convinced German intelligence
H. Brereton’s Ninth Air Force had 11 that the Allies were about to invade
medium bomber groups, each consisting Norway, which Germany had occupied
of 64 aircraft, and 18 fighter groups since June 1940. As a result, the 27 Ger-
with 75 planes apiece, which he used to man divisions in Norway remained
destroy bridges. At the time, critics there instead of defending France.
argued that bridges were poor targets, The most important deception plan,
Division patch- because they said it would take 1,200 code named Fortitude South, had two
es were worn tons of bombs to destroy a single bridge parts. First it had to persuade Germany
on American across the Seine. But on May 10, 1944, that the main Allied effort would be at
military uni- a flight of P-47 Thunderbolts dropped the Pas de Calais, where the English
forms for quick two 1,000-pound bombs on a rail Channel was narrowest. After D-Day
identification.
bridge, completely destroying it. the job of this force was to suggest that
They were
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expe- the Normandy landings had been
especially use-
ful during large
ditionary Forces (SHAEF) then drew up intended to mislead, the real target still
operations, a plan to destroy bridges all over north- being Calais.
such as the ern France. They would isolate the Nor- In a major counterintelligence tri-
Normandy mandy beaches, all the while keeping umph, the British had “turned” an
invasion. Germany in the dark as to where the entire German spy network, which was
Allied landings would take place. The now working for the Allies and giving
campaign began on May 24. the Reich a flood of misinformation.
By D-Day the U.S. Ninth Air Force But the heart of this massive deception
and the RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force effort was a fake army group supposed-
had destroyed all nine Seine railroad ly consisting of 50 divisions and 1 mil-
crossings and a dozen highway bridges. lion men in the southeast of England
Allied air units then kept them closed, by commanded by Lieutenant General
bombing repaired structures, boats that George S. Patton, Jr. To support the
89
• D - D A Y •

illusion, imitation landing craft were


moored in rivers, and what seemed to
be ammunition dumps, hospitals, field
kitchens, and weaponry of all kinds,
including rubber tanks, were scattered
over the countryside.
So realistic were the means
employed that German intelligence
became convinced that the 1st U.S. Army
Group did exist and was going ashore at
Calais. Accordingly, the Germans braced
themselves for an assault by upward of Image Not Available
90 divisions instead of the 35 that were
actually on hand.
While deliberately misleading Ger-
man intelligence, the Allies had available
to them a mountain of data gathered by
agents in France and from the French
resistance, aerial photographs, underwa-
ter specialists, and commandos. On the
basis of this information, plans could be
laid and troops trained with a high
degree of precision. Furthermore, for
this campaign the British had developed The visibility had to be at least three President
a variety of special armored weapons: miles for naval gunfire to be accurate, Franklin Roo-
amphibious tanks, tanks that could and the cloud base no lower than 3,000 sevelt signed
blow up minefields by beating them feet to allow fighter-bomber support. this memo to
with chains, flame-throwing tanks, mor- Eisenhower’s big decision It was Marshal Joseph
Stalin, inform-
tar-firing tanks, bridge-laying tanks, and ultimately the weather that forced Gen-
ing him that
other specially developed weapons. eral Dwight Eisenhower, who com-
General
Although Operation Overlord was manded the operation, to make one of
Dwight Eisen-
the best-planned Allied operation of the the toughest decisions of the war. Over- hower was to
war, it was still risky. Everything had to lord had been scheduled for June 5 and head Opera-
go just right, particularly the deception the assault troops were already on tion Overlord.
plans. And the Allies needed to be lucky, board ship when a channel storm A Roosevelt
for the weather had to meet rigid grounded the all-important air support. aide then sent
requirements. There were only three At 4:30 a.m. on June 4, Eisenhower it to Eisen-
days in each two-week period in June ordered a postponement and met again hower for him
when low tide and first light came that night with his commanders. He to keep it as a
together, the conditions that gave land- had to decide whether to go ahead on memento.
ing craft their best chance of survival. Tuesday, June 6, or stand his forces
And the massive parachute drops that down until the 19th, the next date
would begin the attack had to take place when high tide and first light would
during a rising full moon—reducing the coincide. It was raining hard at the
available days to only three. Further, on time, but RAF Group Captain J. M.
these three days the onshore winds Stagg, SHAEF’s chief meteorologist,
could not exceed 12 miles per hour, and reported that an area of decent weather
the offshore winds 18 miles per hour. had formed and would shortly provide
90
• D E G A U L L E, C H A R L E S •

36 hours of reasonably clear air over the F U RT H E R R E A D I N G


Channel. Ambrose, Stephen E. D-Day. New York:
Weather forecasting depended more Simon & Schuster, 1994.
Ryan, Cornelius. The Longest Day. New
on guesswork in 1944 than it does York: Popular Library, 1959.
today, but the good weather did exist
and was being tracked by Allied planes
and radar. Thus, the next morning at
4:15, with the rain still pouring down, de Gaulle, Charles
Eisenhower ordered the attack to begin.
COMMANDER, FREE FRENCH
Within minutes, 5,000 ships were
FORCES
putting out to sea. Ike knew the risk he
was taking, since if bad weather contin- • Born: November 22, 1890, Lille,
ued Overlord would fail. In that case, if France
• Education: Saint-Cyr military
the losses were heavy, there might not be academy, second lieutenant, 1912
time to mount another assault on France • Military service: Infantry officer,
in 1944. 1912–16; prisoner of war, 1916–18;
Despite the odds, Overlord suc- instructor and staff officer, 1918–37;
tank commander, 1937–40
ceeded. High winds and nervous pilots • Government service: Undersecretary
caused many paratroopers to be of war, 1940; leader of Free France,
dropped outside their landing zones, 1940–1944; president of provisional
government, 1944–46; president of
resulting in heavy casualties. High waves France, 1958–69
sank dozens of amphibious tanks, • Died: November 9, 1970, Colombey-
whose inflatable canvas covers were les-Deux-Eglises, France
never designed for rough water. The
casualties at Omaha Beach, where a
strong German force poured heavy fire
down from high cliffs, ran to several Charles de Gaulle knew even as a child
thousand. Of 225 men from the 2nd that he was destined for greatness. After
Ranger Battalion, who climbed the sheer graduating from Saint-Cyr, France’s
cliffs of Pointe du Hoc under heavy fire, equivalent of West Point, de Gaulle
only 90 were still standing by nightfall. served bravely as an officer in World War
But Fortitude South worked, the I, performing heroic feats during the Bat-
landings succeeded, and Germany’s sub- tle of Verdun, in which he was taken pris-
sequent efforts to reinforce the defenders oner. As a prisoner of war he made fre-
were smothered by Allied air power, quent—if vain—escape attempts.
naval guns, and French resistance forces, Between the wars, de Gaulle became
which blew up bridges, cut telephone famous in the army for well-written lec-
lines, and attacked road convoys. At tures, articles, and books in which he put
sunset on June 6, 1944, the European forward his ideas about the coming age of
Theater of Operations at last included armored warfare, arguing that tanks
the Continent. The Allies were now too should not be scattered among infantry
strongly entrenched to be driven off the regiments, as was the French practice, but
beaches, and the fate of the Third Reich concentrated as the army’s shock force.
was no longer in doubt. The failure of France’s senior officers to lis-
ten to him contributed to France’s defeat
SEE ALSO in 1940.
Eisenhower, Dwight D.; European Theater One of the few French generals to
of Operations; France, Battle of achieve any success during the fall of
91
• D E G A U L L E , C H A R L E S •

France to the Ger- President Roosevelt, who made his


mans in June 1940, friend Admiral William D. Leahy
de Gaulle was serv- ambassador to Vichy—which had some
ing as undersecretary authority in southern France, the rest of
of war in the cabinet the country being occupied and directly
in 1940 when it administered by the Germans.
decided to ask for an FDR did so mainly to help Vichy
end to the fighting France under Marshal Henri Petain keep
Image Not Available that amounted to its fleet and colonies out of German
total surrender. With hands. Roosevelt confirmed Vichy con-
his usual farsighted- trol of French possessions in the Ameri-
ness he had already cas (such as Martinique) in return for
recognized that the continued neutrality of the French
France was doomed forces stationed there. He also assured
and saw that the Marshal Petain—who had saved France
fight must go on during World War I but now was seen
overseas. For that to by the Free French as a traitor—that the
Charles de be possible, however, Britain had to sur- United States would respect Vichy
Gaulle is wel- vive. This explained de Gaulle’s remark colonies in North Africa as well.
comed to Chad to Churchill in 1940 after the prime This policy put the United States on
in 1942 by minister had refused to throw his last a collision course with de Gaulle, who
Governor-Gen- fighter squadrons into the hopeless was seizing French possessions wherever
eral Felix
defense of France: “It is you who are he could and was particularly interested
Eboune, the
right.” For this support Churchill was in the small islands of Saint-Pierre and
first African
prepared—and would be required—to Miquelon just off Newfoundland. The
leader to rally
to the Free forgive much. British, who were giving de Gaulle
French cause. The French National Committee financial backing, had no objection to
Britain took de Gaulle under its wing this because a powerful radio station on
because he was the only French official Saint-Pierre was broadcasting Vichy pro-
of note in 1940 to reject the armistice. paganda. But Washington wanted the
However, de Gaulle did not head a gov- seizure to be undertaken by Canada, to
ernment in exile, only an organization spare Vichy feelings. Churchill said
called the French National Committee, much later that de Gaulle had agreed to
whose resources consisted initially of the this arrangement but then, without
7,000 French troops evacuated during warning, ordered his little navy to take
the June 1940 British escape from the islands, which it did just before
Dunkirk who did not return to France. Christmas 1941.
The administrators of a few minor This action was popular locally—the
colonies also threw in their lot with Free inhabitants voted overwhelmingly to join
France, or Fighting France, as it was Free France—and the U.S. press was
also called, as did the crews of some favorable, too. Churchill thought de
small warships and perhaps a quarter of Gaulle’s action made little difference, but
the French merchant fleet. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell
Refugees excepted, most Frenchmen Hull were furious, all the more so
overseas, including those living in the because of de Gaulle’s refusal to compro-
United States, accepted the legality of mise on how the islands should be gov-
the Nazi puppet government headquar- erned. Although after much protest Hull
tered in Vichy. More importantly, so did allowed the issue to die, the Free French’s
92
• D E G A U L L E , C H A R L E S •

relations with the United States were per- offended by this intransigence were unwill-
manently poisoned by this adventure. ing to see that for me, intent as I was on
De Gaulle as war leader Charles beating back innumerable conflicting pres-
de Gaulle was an outsized figure even in sures, the slightest wavering would have
an age of giants, but unlike other world brought collapse. In short, limited and
leaders he was not chief of a great state. alone though I was, and precisely because
De Gaulle started out as the leader of I was so, I had to climb to the heights and
practically nothing, yet through persis- never then to come down.”
tence and strength of character, he This proved to be no idle boast but
spearheaded the drive to restore French became an exact description of the
honor. His insignia, the two-barred course he followed. No one less arro-
Cross of Lorraine, would everywhere gant, unbending, insensitive, ungrateful,
come to be seen as the symbol of and self-confident than de Gaulle could
France’s rebirth. It took immense per- have forced the Allies to accept him as
sonal powers and unbending determina- the leader first of North Africa, then of
tion to accomplish this. liberated France, and finally the head of
To Roosevelt, and even to Churchill, a great power entitled to share in the
who was more sympathetic, de Gaulle occupation of Germany at the end of
appeared to have major faults. Utterly the war. Inevitably, this brought down
dependent on Britain and the United on him the anger of Churchill but espe-
States, he made a habit of biting the cially Roosevelt.
hands that were feeding him. Churchill But, however mistaken de Gaulle
claimed that de Gaulle once said to him may have been in matters of detail, as
that if he were too cooperative he would over Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, his
be regarded by the French as being a tool devotion to France would make possi-
of the Allies. If that was the danger, he ble its salvation. Few Frenchmen
clearly succeeded in avoiding it, leading appreciated this at first. Most accepted
to Churchill’s well-known remark that German rule as final: some passively,
the heaviest cross he had to bear was the many others by actively cooperating
Cross of Lorraine. with the Nazis. Among the latter “col-
The fundamental disagreement laborators” were those responsible,
between de Gaulle and his allies was that among other crimes, for the deaths of
they were determined to treat him as the many of the 75,000 to 100,000 French
commander of a small allied force, while Jews who were sent to Nazi death
he insisted upon being treated as the camps. It was de Gaulle’s major
leader of France. In his outstanding war achievement that, over time, he and his
memoirs, de Gaulle explained his strategy, movement made it impossible to be
which he adopted immediately upon both a good French citizen and a col-
reaching England in 1940. Although laborator. This situation first angered
grateful to Churchill, de Gaulle had rea- and embarrassed many, but finally it
son to feel that the great powers would became the means to restore the self-
pursue their war aims at the expense of respect of the French.
France if necessary—which he was deter- De Gaulle and Roosevelt The com-
mined to prevent against all odds. bination of his relatively low rank and
From the first, de Gaulle’s idea was his high aims made it easy to underesti-
that since he had nothing, he could not mate de Gaulle at first, as did Roosevelt.
give an inch. As he wrote in his memoirs: In October 1942 he began giving Lend-
“Those who, all through the drama, were Lease aid directly to de Gaulle’s French
93
• D E G A U L L E , C H A R L E S •

General de
Gualle addresses
the Algiers Con-
sultative Assem-
bly on June 17,
1944.

Image Not Available

National Committee, but while Allied This deal, which the Allies considered
military cooperation improved some- practical, was to de Gaulle merely a crude
what, the Free French were not only attempt by Roosevelt to take Free France
excluded from the invasion of French out of the picture. If so, the policy failed
North Africa but were not even badly. The French authorities in Tunisia
informed of it. De Gaulle had no doubts defied Darlan’s order to surrender, giving
about what FDR meant. It was the Pres- Hitler time to rush in troops and prevent
ident’s intention, de Gaulle believed, to an Allied victory. And, after Darlan was
gain control of French affairs and the assassinated on December 24, 1942, the
Free French army. Allied attempt to replace him with Giraud
This explanation appeared to de aroused little enthusiasm.
Gaulle to be the reason why the Ameri- Throughout the critical year follow-
cans had first tried to make General ing the North African invasion, de
Henri Giraud the leader of French Gaulle played his cards with great
North Africa but then struck a bargain shrewdness. He did not blame the Allies
with Admiral Jean Darlan, the comman- for failing to include Free France in their
der of Vichy armed forces who had been invasion of French territory but instead
in North Africa on November 8, 1942, called on Frenchmen to assist it. Never
when the Allies invaded it. The so-called challenging Roosevelt directly, he contin-
Darlan deal made this Nazi collaborator ued to extend his influence and build
the high commissioner of French North grass roots support.
Africa (with Giraud under him as head In time it became clear that the
of the military) in return for ordering French in North Africa would not
the Vichy French forces to lay down accept Giraud and his Vichyites as their
their arms. lawful rulers. A clumsy power-sharing
94
• D E S T R O Y E R S •

arrangement with de Gaulle worked no from his position as head of state in 1946
better. Finally, Giraud resigned as co- when he encountered opposition instead
president of the French Committee for of using the army to stay in power. Thus
National Liberation—now the umbrella de Gaulle was well placed in 1958 to
group covering all anti-Vichy French- save French democracy once again when
men—and closed his separate recruiting it was threatened by an armed revolt led
offices. In 10 months de Gaulle had by generals determined to win the losing
swallowed him up. struggle to retain Algeria.
French Committee for National
SEE ALSO
Liberation On November 9, 1943, de
France; Mediterranean theater
Gaulle created a government in exile.
From that day on there was one army, F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
one navy, and one leader of all the Free Aglion, Raoul. Roosevelt and de Gaulle:
French for the first time since 1940. In Allies in Conflict: A Personal Memoir.
New York: Free Press, 1988.
his memoirs de Gaulle is honest about Cogan, Charles G. Charles De Gaulle: A
how he forced himself and his govern- Brief Biography With Documents. New
ment upon the reluctant Allies, saying York: Bedford, 1995.
Cook, Don. Charles De Gaulle: A Biogra-
only that they came to terms with what phy. New York: Putnam, 1983.
they could not prevent. It was in fact De Gaulle, Charles. The Complete War
greatly to France’s advantage to have Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1967.
de Gaulle in command, for he was a Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Rebel,
fierce and successful defender of French 1880–1944. New York: Norton, 1990.
interests. But the Allied cause did not Shennan, Andrew. De Gaulle. New York:
suffer as a result, despite Roosevelt’s Longman, 1993.
reluctance to accept de Gaulle as a legiti-
mate leader.
Roosevelt made a final effort to put
de Gaulle in his place before D-Day, Destroyers
when he insisted that de Gaulle’s follow-
ers not be allowed to govern the liberated
areas of France, but this ploy also came
to nothing. On June 14, 1944, after the Before the development of destroyer
Allied beachhead was established, de escorts during World War II, destroyers
Gaulle arrived in Normandy, toured the were the smallest naval warships. Fast,
liberated area, and as he left General maneuverable, armed with naval guns,
Bernard Montgomery’s headquarters, torpedo tubes, depth charge launchers,
said to the British commander that he and a wide variety of antiaircraft
was leaving an officer behind to “look weapons, destroyers were among the
after the population.” With these words most useful of fighting ships.
Charles de Gaulle established his author- The most common U.S. destroyer of
ity over liberated France, and because it World War II was the Fletcher class, of
could not be removed except by force, which at least 175 were built. Capable of
Roosevelt had to accept it. making 38 knots, with their five 5-inch
Under de Gaulle, France made guns and 10 torpedo tubes they packed a
important contributions to the war effort, sizable punch. At first they were less
especially in Italy and on the western effective than Japanese destroyers,
front. And de Gaulle proved himself to because of seriously defective torpedoes
be genuinely democratic, stepping down and inferior tactics. But when these faults
95
• D E S T R O Y E R E S C O R T S •

were corrected, the Fletcher class came to


be regarded as the best destroyers of the Dresden, bombing of
war. They were used in action in both the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
SEE ALSO
The destruction of Dresden, Germany,
Submarines in the Pacific; U-boats
from the air on February 13–14, 1945,
remains the most controversial attack of
the European air war.
A charming old city on the Elbe
Destroyer escorts River in eastern Germany, Dresden had
been largely untouched by Allied
bombers, because of its military insignifi-
cance. Why Dresden was bombed at all is
The enormous demand for ships capable still something of an open question. One
of escorting Atlantic convoys led Britain, reason was that killing German civilians
and then the United States, to create was the number one priority of Air Mar-
antisubmarine vessels smaller in size shal Sir Arthur Harris, head of the RAF’s
than destroyers but cheaper and easier Bomber Command. He never stopped
to build. The United States produced believing that Germany could be made to
two classes of destroyer escorts. stop the war as the result of terror
These two classes ranged in length attacks. The fact that Dresden was
from 289 to 306 feet. They had a maxi- swollen with refugees would have made
mum crew size of 208, compared to it a particularly attractive target from this
destroyers, which could be as long as point of view.
381 feet and carry up to 340 men. Some historians have argued that
Destroyer escorts were slow ships the Western Allies wished to impress the
compared to destroyers, with top speeds Soviets, who were approaching Dresden,
that did not exceed 24 knots. And they with the power of their air arms. How-
were even less comfortable and less sea- ever, military concerns came into play as
worthy than their big brothers, the well. The Soviets had asked for air sup-
rough-riding “tin cans.” Still, they were port, and Dresden had recently become
invaluable in the war against the U- a regional command and communica-
boats. Three hundred seventy-three of tions center, meaning that bombing it
them saw active service. would impair Germany’s defenses in the
east. No doubt some combination of
SEE ALSO
these reasons lay behind the decision to
Atlantic, Battle of the; U-boats attack Dresden.
On the night of February 13, 1945,
some 800 RAF Lancaster bombers
Diplomacy dropped a sufficient number of high-
explosive and incendiary bombs to start
SEE Foreign policy the intended “firestorm,” in which sepa-
rate fires combine to form one great in-
ferno that sucks oxygen up at such a rate
that people untouched by the fire or blast
Draft still suffocate in their shelters. On Feb-
SEE Selective Service System ruary 14 a daylight raid by Flying
96
• E A S T E R N F R O N T •

Fortresses of the U.S. Eighth Air Force tured). Of these, more than 10 million
wiped out Dresden’s civil defense workers. were sustained on the eastern front.
It is not known how many perished Hitler and most of his generals
in the firestorm, since most of the dead underestimated the difficulties they
were hurriedly buried in mass graves. At would face in Russia. For one thing,
a rough guess, some 50,000 people were they believed—with good reason—that
killed in Dresden. Prime Minister the Red Army would be easy to beat.
Churchill, a supporter of this operation Stalin had murdered most of his senior
at first, backed away from it when crit- officers during the purges of the 1930s.
ics challenged the morality of making Then, too, the Red Army had performed
war on civilians. badly in its Winter War with Finland in
1939–40. As part of the Stalin-Hitler
SEE ALSO
Pact of August 23, 1939, the Soviets
Arnold, Henry H.; Hamburg, bombing of;
Strategic bombing were allowed to invade Finland in that
year. Stalin wanted to strengthen Rus-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G sia’s security at Finnish expense by seiz-
Irving, David. The Destruction of Dres- ing various territories, notably lands
den. New York: Ballantine, 1963. north of Leningrad and west of Mur-
McKee, Alexander. Dresden 1945: The mansk. When the Finns refused to give
Devil’s Tinderbox. New York: Dutton,
1984. in to Soviet demands, the Red Army
Vonnegut, Kurt. Slaughterhouse-Five. attacked on November 30.
1959. Reprint, New York: Dell, 1999. The Soviets won in the end, but
Fiction.
only at a remarkable cost. Although Fin-
land had some 200,000 troops and the
Soviets 1.2 million, the Finns were
Eastern front highly motivated, well trained, and ably
led. Leaderless and demoralized, the
Red Army floundered, then ground to a
halt. A new offensive that began on
The eastern front opened on June 22, February 1, 1940, did better, after the
1941, when the Wehrmacht, Germany’s Soviet forces had been reorganized and
armed forces, swept over the country’s reequipped. They broke the Manner-
border into the Soviet Union. Operation heim line across Finland’s Karelian
Barbarossa, the code name for this Peninsula and destroyed the Finns’ fall-
assault, was designed to seize European back positions as well.
Russia with its coal, oil, and grain fields. The armistice concluded on March
These newly conquered territories were 12, 1940, gave Stalin just what he had
to provide Germany with unlimited raw asked for. Even so, 200,000 Russian
materials and living room (in German, troops had been killed, while Finnish
lebensraum) beyond what anyone previ- losses were only one-eighth as great.
ously had thought possible. Understandably, military experts around
Yet, despite Germany’s early successes the world concluded that the Red Army
there, the eastern front would become the was far more feeble than its huge num-
graveyard of that army and cost Hitler the bers of men and weapons suggested.
war. A single statistic tells it all: In World Besides the issue of military might,
War II, German forces are believed to Germany believed that the Soviet Union
have taken more than 13 million casual- was politically fragile. Stalin’s rule was
ties (dead, wounded, missing, and cap- based on terror, and many of the Soviet
97
• E A S T E R N F R O N T •

“republics,” such as Ukraine and the


former Baltic states, were known to
want independence. Then, too, the Ger-
man blitzkrieg (literally, “lightning
war”) had been so effective against
Britain and France, with their much
more modern forces, that Germany did
not believe the Red Army could stand
up to a similar assault.
These arguments inspired Germany
to go east, although Britain still
remained unconquered on Germany’s
Image Not Available
western front. There would be time
enough to deal with Britain later, Hitler
thought, which turned out to be another
serious mistake.
Barbarossa At first it seemed as if
the experts who predicted an easy victo-
ry were right. Germany attacked with
overwhelming force—some 3.2 million
men—including troops from other Axis
states, 3,600 tanks, and 2,700 aircraft.
Against them stood 2.9 million Soviet
troops, 10,000 to 15,000 tanks, and
about 8,000 aircraft. But the Soviet
troops were unready, Stalin having in-
sisted, despite plenty of warnings from
Britain, the United States, and, more
importantly, his own spies, that his
forces remain on a peacetime footing.
Furthermore, nearly all the Soviet tanks
were obsolete, as were Soviet aircraft— and between the Dnieper and Donets
most of which were destroyed on the rivers. When Army Group Center was
ground in any case. As a result, Soviet finally reinforced and allowed to move
soldiers—outnumbered, outgunned, in strength against the Soviets, fall rains
and with the Germans breaking through made the roads useless—and then came
their lines at will, surrendered by winter. Despite the usual victories and
the millions. mass Soviet surrenders, Army Group
All the same, victory eluded the Center ground to a halt in December
Wehrmacht. No doubt it could have with the spires of Moscow’s Kremlin in
taken Moscow had not Hitler insisted sight. It was then thrown back by troops
on establishing three separate fronts. He from Siberia, which had been kept in
divided his troops into Army Groups reserve for this purpose.
North, South, and Center, none of them During the winter of 1941–42, Ger-
strong enough to achieve their aims. many held its ground, but the troops suf-
Army Group North was stopped at fered greatly. They had been issued no
Leningrad, Army Group South at the winter gear and were unprepared for
Donets Basin, north of the Sea of Azov days when the temperature dropped to
98
• E A S T E R N F R O N T •

40 degrees below zero. Water froze in Moreover, the German strategists


locomotive boilers, oil in crankcases, had failed to allow for the vast distances
grease in the army’s guns. Wounded Ger- in European Russia and the Soviet
man troops died where they fell, victims Union’s enormous manpower reserves.
of shock and frostbite. One hundred Stalin could, and did, trade land for
thousand horses died over the winter and time, drawing the Wehrmacht deeper
were eaten by starving troops. The Soviet and deeper into what would finally
forces, which were trained and equipped become a trap. While he did so, he had
for such weather, were also much closer many Soviet factories dismantled on the
to their sources of supply and made it run and relocated behind the Ural
through the winter easily. Mountains, where Germany could not
Although Germany was still far from get them. This feat, which was the
beaten, apart from its battlefield victories equivalent of moving the industrial cities
little had gone according to plan. The of Detroit and Pittsburgh to California,
Soviets’ resistance had proven stronger would have been an incredible accom-
than expected, and the Germans could plishment even in peacetime. Only a
not take advantage of the anticommunist people made desperate by the Nazis’
feelings that ran high in the territories savagery could have accomplished such
they were occupying. Hitler had ordered a thing while fighting a terrible war.
that these Slavic peoples be treated bru- But more important than Hitler’s
tally as future slaves of the Third Reich. political and military errors was his one
These ethnic minorities, already unwilling overwhelming strategic mistake. He failed
Soviet citizens, had believed that no rule to see that the Soviet Union was just too
could be worse than Stalin’s, which, given enormous to be beaten by military means
their experience to date with the Soviets, alone. Even if Moscow had fallen, as it
was perfectly reasonable. On that basis nearly did, Stalin could have retreated to
many had welcomed the German troops strongholds in and beyond the Urals and
as liberators at first. But Hitler’s forces continued the war indefinitely.
were even worse than the devil they By the end of 1941 the Soviet
knew, forcing the Soviet people to fight Union remained unconquered, even
for their lives, even if this also meant though Germany had won nearly every
fighting for Stalin. battle. In doing so, it had sustained
If Hitler had taken a softer line, almost 1 million casualties, nearly a
which is to say if he had not been a Nazi, third of the attacking force. The Soviets’
the conquered anticommunist ethnic suffering was even worse, with more
groups might have become German allies than 3 million men having become pris-
and the war would have turned out quite oners of war and additional millions
differently. Hitler’s racial prejudices, killed or wounded. But the Soviet Union
which were central to Nazi ideology, could afford its losses; Germany could
were also his greatest weakness and not. Thus, while the Red Army would
would bring him down in the end. Stalin grow and improve, the Wehrmacht
cleverly exploited the Nazis’ weaknesses, would never be as strong again as when
downplaying his own communist ideol- it had first invaded Russia.
ogy and declaring Russia’s fight for sur- In the spring Germany attacked
vival to be the “Great Patriotic War.” again, aiming to win the war. For this
Hitler had been right in believing that the drive, called Operation Blue, which Hitler
Soviet Union was politically weak, but by had planned himself, he had some 2.5
his racial policies, he made it stronger. million troops stretched along a 1,500-
99
• E A S T E R N F R O N T •

A German
motorized col-
umn comes
under attack
by Soviet air-
craft during the
early weeks of
the war on the
eastern front.

Image Not Available

mile front. Over the winter he sent only the Black Sea, fell at last, and the Ger-
7,500 new vehicles to replace 75,000 that mans seized additional territory else-
had been lost. Equally serious for an where in southern Russia and the Cau-
army that still relied on draft animals to casus, between the Caspian and Black
transport its infantry, of 180,000 horses seas. But the main German thrust came
and oxen that had been lost, Germany to grief in the city of Stalingrad.
could replace only 20,000. And, because With 500,000 inhabitants when the
German industry was still on a peacetime war broke out, Stalingrad commanded
footing, Nazi aircraft and tank shortages the Volga River basin and produced more
were also acute. than a quarter of all Soviet tanks and
Meanwhile, Soviet production was mechanized vehicles. German General
booming. Factories—often without heat Friedrich Paulus and his Sixth Army
or even roofs, and staffed by women, old reached Stalingrad in November 1942,
men, and children—were churning out but, although he nearly destroyed the city,
weaponry. By the end of 1942, the Soviet he succeeded only in taking part of it. The
assembly lines were producing 2,000 Soviets launched flanking attacks to the
tanks a month and 30,000 planes per Sixth Army’s rear and, on November 23,
year, whereas Germany would build only completely encircled it. Paulus requested
4,000 planes in all of 1942. The aircraft permission to break out, but Hitler, rely-
were good, too; the tanks even better. ing on Reich Marshal Goering’s promise
More than half the Soviet tank produc- to supply the Sixth Army by air, refused
tion consisted of the excellent T-34, which to permit a retreat. The Luftwaffe, or Ger-
Germany would not match until its Pan- man Air Force, took heavy losses and
ther was deployed in 1943. And even could not meet the minimum needs of the
then, the Panthers would be produced in embattled Sixth Army. Paulus surrendered
small numbers compared to T-34s. to the Soviets on January 31, 1943. In a
Despite these shortages, the German few more days, the Battle of Stalingrad
offensive went well at first, resulting in was over. Later in February, the Caucasus
the expected victories. The Crimea, in was cleared of Germans for good.
100
• E A S T E R N F R O N T •

Stalingrad proved to be the turning erately, some believed) to allow German


point of the European war. The Red forces to crush an uprising in the city of
Army emerged from it as a first-class the Polish Home Army. The Poles had
fighting force that would never again hoped to install a national government
suffer a strategic defeat. The Wehrmacht there before the Soviets arrived, which
was now forced to fight defensively for would have been awkward for Stalin,
the rest of the war. It did launch one last who had formed a communist govern-
great eastern front assault in 1943, ment of Poland in Lublin.
aimed at Kursk in the Soviet heartland. However, while Stalin certainly wel-
On July 5 the Wehrmacht pushed comed the destruction of a potential
700,000 troops, 2,400 tanks and assault rival, the main reason why the Red
guns, and 1,800 aircraft into the Kursk Army stopped short of Warsaw seems to
salient, or bulge. It was defended by a have been that it was worn out by its
Soviet force that included 1.3 million long advance. In any case, the last Polish
men, 3,400 tanks and assault guns, and resistance ended on October 2, by which
2,100 aircraft. Hitler had not hoped to time Warsaw had been leveled and its
win the war in the East with so small a entire population of 700,000 were either
force, but rather to slow the Soviet tide. in concentration and death camps (the
However, with the Red Army well dug vast majority) or else had become slave
in, well armed, and well led, and under laborers in Germany.
attack by a smaller force, the outcome On September 12 Romania surren-
was never in doubt. dered to the invading Soviets. As part of
On July 12, 1943, the German II SS the terms, it contributed upwards of 16
Panzer Corps met the Soviets’ Fifth divisions which fought on the Soviet side
Guards Tank Army. In the resulting battle for the rest of the war. On September
the panzers, outnumbered three to one by 19, Finland made peace with the Soviet
900 Soviet tanks, were decisively beaten. Union, giving up the territories the
This, the greatest single tank fight of USSR had first seized in 1940 but had
World War II, was the end of Germany’s never occupied. By the end of 1944, the
last serious offensive. In late July and Balkans had been largely cleared of Ger-
August, Soviet forces made further mans and the Baltic states retaken.
advances. A total of 4 million men, 13,000 Then, on January 12, 1945, Stalin
armored vehicles, and 12,000 aircraft launched the single greatest offensive of
(three-quarters of them Soviet) fought in World War II, sending almost 4 million
these engagements, making Kursk one of troops against German forces that were
the largest battles of World War II. frequently outnumbered 10 to 1.
From then on it would be Germany Although they fought desperately and at
that traded land for time, until it ran out times slowed the Soviets, the necessary
of both. By January 1944 Soviet forces miracle did not take place. Berlin fell on
had reached the southeast corner of pre- May 2. The last German troops laid
war Poland and lifted the siege of down their arms in the former Czecho-
Leningrad. Germany sustained further slovakia on May 11.
losses during the spring, and on June 23, It is not sufficiently recognized that
Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov launched a the largest battles of World War II were
great offensive that took him into the fought on the eastern front. Millions of
rear of Army Group Center and cost the men and hundreds of divisions were
Germans 350,000 men. In August the employed by each side. To appreciate the
Soviets reached Warsaw, pausing (delib- difference in scale, on the western front
101
• E I S E N H O W E R , D W I G H T D . •

the largest separate command was the SEE ALSO


army group, consisting of two or more Poland; Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph; Stal-
field armies. At their peak the Western ingrad, Battle of, Zhukov, Georgi K.
Allies deployed three such groups. The
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Soviet equivalent of an army group was
a front, of which the Soviets fielded no Bartov, Omer. Hitler’s Army: Soldiers,
Nazis, and War in the Third Reich. New
fewer than 37 at various times. The dis- York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
tances in the east dwarfed those of the Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad.
western front as well. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.
Salisbury, Harrison. The 900 Days: The
The fighting on the eastern front Siege of Leningrad. New York: Avon,
involved a level of viciousness never 1969.
exceeded in modern times. This was, for Werth, Alexander. Russia at War,
1941–1945. New York: Avon, 1970.
the most part, Germany’s fault. Admit-
tedly, Soviet troops committed atrocities
at times, and once they reached German
soil they developed a reputation for
crimes against captured civilians, partic- Eisenhower, Dwight D.
ularly women. But the Wehrmacht—not SUPREME COMMANDER,
just the SS units but the German Army ALLIED EUROPEAN THEATER
as a whole—pursued a “scorched earth”
policy (in which the military destroys • Born: October 14, 1890, Denison,
Tex.
property and murders civilians while in • Political party: Republican
retreat) in Russia that defies description. • Education: United States Military
On the western front, German Academy, B.S., 1915; U.S. Army
troops by and large observed the rules Command and General Staff School,
1925–26; Army War College,
of the Geneva convention governing 1927–28
captors’ conduct toward prisoners. • Military service: U.S. Army––2nd
There, prisoners of war were correctly lieutenant, 1915; major, 1918; Office
of Assistant Secretary of War,
treated as a rule. Atrocities were rare, 1929–33; aide to General Douglas
almost always committed by Nazi fanat- MacArthur, Office of Army Chief of
ics in the SS and similar formations. But Staff, 1933–35; assistant military
advisor, Commonwealth of the
on the eastern front, sadistic violence Philippines, 1935–39; colonel, 1939;
was commonplace. Villages were major general, 1941; commander of
U.S. forces in Europe, 1942; Allied
torched for no apparent reason, and commander for invasion of North
prisoners and civilians were murdered Africa, 1942–43; Allied supreme
by the millions, with the Wehrmacht commander in Europe, 1943–45;
general of the army, 1945; commander
behaving like a barbarian horde rather in chief of U.S. armed services as
than a civilized army. President, 1953–61
Taught from childhood to regard • Died: March 28, 1969, Washington,
D.C.
Jews and Slavs as subhuman, and deprived
of their own humanity by Nazi doctrine
and the primitive conditions under which
they fought, German soldiers behaved
worse than beasts. The Holocaust of the Eisenhower was the third son of hard-
death camps is vividly remembered today; working, devout, German-American
the other holocaust, in the East, is not. But parents in Abilene, Kansas, once a
it was just as homicidal and equally famous cow town but in Eisenhower’s
deserving of remembrance. youth just another midwestern village
102
• E I S E N H O W E R , D W I G H T D . •

lacking in diversity, the Because in the peacetime army pro-


citizens to a large degree motion was slow, this achievement,
being white, Protestant while it made him known to his superi-
Republicans with similar ors, did not bring immediate benefits.
ideas about everything. However, in 1933 Eisenhower became
Eisenhower always an aide to General Douglas MacArthur,
Image Not Available regarded it as an ideal then army chief of staff, whom he
community just the same, served in Manila as well as after
because its class lines were MacArthur took command of the
not sharply drawn and Philippine armed forces. In 1940, only a
there was a strong empha- lieutenant colonel after 25 years of ser-
sis on democracy, moral- vice in which he had earned the highest
ity, achievement, and hard praise from MacArthur as well as Con-
General Eisen- work. However, Eisenhower was rela- nor, Eisenhower became a regimental
hower consults tively unprejudiced and had a knack for executive and battalion commander in
with Free dealing with all kinds of people. These the 3rd Infantry Division.
French leader gifts would help make him the outstand- The Army was now on the verge of
Charles de ing leader of coalition forces in World tremendous growth, and Eisenhower
Gaulle in Nor-
War II. would rise with it. In January 1941 he
mandy.
Eisenhower attended West Point for was made chief of staff to General Wal-
the free education rather than because he ter Krueger’s Third Army, receiving
dreamed of military glory, and his early much of the credit when Third Army
career showed little promise. When Eisen- defeated Second in the big Louisiana
hower graduated in 1915, he ranked 61st training maneuvers of August and Sep-
in a class of 164 and seems not to have tember. On December 12, 1941, five
impressed anyone. Then in 1922 he was days after Pearl Harbor, General George
assigned to the Panama Canal Zone as C. Marshall summoned Eisenhower to
executive officer to General Fox Connor, the War Department, and by April
who changed his life. Eisenhower had become a major general
Connor, a student of military science in charge of planning. On June 11,
and history, became Eisenhower’s men- 1942, he was appointed to command
tor, leading the young officer through a the new European Theater of Opera-
program of study with a particular aim tions, which brought him the third of
in mind. Connor believed that there was his eventual five stars.
going to be another world war in which When Britain and the United States
U.S. generals would lead allied forces, decided to invade French North Africa
and he wanted Eisenhower to be one of in 1942, Eisenhower was the obvious
these favored commanders. After Eisen- choice to lead the operation. He knew
hower’s three-year tour in Panama was many of the leading British officers, got
up, Connor used his influence to have along with them well, and was already
Eisenhower admitted into the Command displaying the political skills that a coali-
and General Staff School at Leaven- tion commander needed to have. The
worth, Kansas. Attendance at Leaven- invasion itself was untidy, but luckily the
worth was a requirement for promotion forces of Vichy France put up little resis-
to the highest ranks. After a year of tance. The real problems came when
study, Eisenhower graduated at the top Hitler decided to pour troops into
of his class of 275 officers, all selected Tunisia, which he imprudently insisted
for their ability. on trying to keep.
103
• E I S E N H O W E R , D W I G H T D . •

It would take until May 1943 to FDR’s decision turned out to be


defeat Germany and the Axis powers in among his most important. Apart from
North Africa, during which time U.S. Marshall’s gifts as a leader and military
soldiers did not always perform well, executive, the main argument for giving
especially at the beginning. This was Overlord to him was as a reward for his
only to be expected of raw troops and services. If Overlord resulted in victory,
untried commanders and was not held its commander would be seen as the
against Eisenhower by General Marshall, foremost U.S. general of the war. After
whose opinion meant everything. An- building up the U.S. Army from scratch,
other invasion, Operation Husky, the Marshall had earned the right to lead it
conquest of Sicily, proved more difficult in its greatest battles and enjoy the
than it should have been, but Eisenhow- resulting glory.
er could not be faulted because the Otherwise, trading Marshall for
British had done the planning for it. The Eisenhower had nothing to recommend
invasion of Italy in September 1943 was it. Each would have to learn a new and
a near disaster, and the U.S. troops that very different job. Each would lack the
landed near Salerno were nearly driven experience that had helped make the
off the beach. Here Eisenhower showed other successful. Marshall was the mili-
his military talents for the first time, sal- tary man Congress trusted most, Eisen-
vaging the operation with timely rein- hower the American in whom Britain
forcements and troop movements. had the greatest confidence. Many men
By the end of 1943 Eisenhower had had died to qualify Eisenhower for
behind him not only a fast rise in rank supreme commander. It made no sense to
even by wartime standards, but the waste their lives and what Eisenhower
experience of commanding three had learned in those battles to implement
amphibious landings on enemy shores. what was ultimately a sentimental deci-
This background made him the logical sion. Roosevelt had the right men in the
person to take charge of Operation right jobs and wisely kept them there.
Overlord, the scheduled invasion of Eisenhower would fully justify the
France, which would be the greatest trust that had been placed in him. Over-
such operation in history. Yet at the lord, under his direction, was the best-
time people took it for granted that planned Allied operation of the war.
because he had created the forces that Thanks to him, the British and U.S. offi-
would take part in it, General Marshall cers who staffed his Supreme Headquar-
would command Overlord. Eisenhower ters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)
was expected to replace Marshall as in London worked together effectively
chief of staff. and with a minimum of friction. When
However, on December 5, 1943, all was ready, Eisenhower made what
President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked was, perhaps, the hardest decision
his chief of staff what position he required of any U.S. commander in
wished to have next. Marshall in fact World War II.
wanted to command Overlord, but he The invasion of Normandy, France,
told the President that he would cheer- was scheduled for June 5, 1944. The
fully do whatever he was asked. Roo- men and equipment were aboard their
sevelt then said, “Well, I don’t feel I ships on June 4 when bad weather
could sleep at ease if you were out of struck the English Channel. Eisenhower
Washington.” So it was Eisenhower who delayed the attack for a day, but on June
won the prize assignment of the war. 5 he had to decide whether to give the
104
• E I S E N H O W E R , D W I G H T D . •

After long, hard fighting the Allies


broke out of Normandy in August,
crossed the Seine River, and expelled the
German forces from most of France. On
August 30 General George Patton’s Third
Army, which had led the U.S. charge, ran
out of gas—literally. Because the Allies
did not have an intact seaport, their fuel
and supplies were being unloaded on the
beaches of Normandy. There was not
enough of anything to go around,
Image Not Available although fuel was in the shortest supply.
In a much-criticized decision, Eisenhower
gave preference for supplies to the British
21st Army Group at the expense of the
U.S. 12th, which included the Third
Army. While Patton fumed, the British
staged Operation Market-Garden, an
effort to seize a bridge that crossed the
Rhine in the Netherlands. Market-
Garden failed, and the great Allied ad-
vance from Normandy came to an end.
From then on, until almost the close
Eisenhower, go-ahead signal or not. If he ordered the of the war in Europe, the Allies pursued
accompanied invasion to begin and the weather did Eisenhower’s “broad front” strategy,
by General not break, Overlord would fail. It would which applied pressure to the Germans
Omar Bradley be months before the Allies could try all along their newly reformed front. This
(middle right), again, and by then the element of sur- tactic was, and remains, controversial.
inspects art
prise would be lost. General Omar Bradley, commanding all
treasures stolen
At the moment of decision, the Ger- the U.S. ground forces in the European
by the Nazis
man leaders still did not know where the theater, and Field Marshal Bernard Law
and hidden in a
salt mine in attack would take place and had divided Montgomery, the British commander,
Germany. their forces to cover the most likely sites. both disliked this strategy. Each would
Once they became sure, however, they have preferred to have the bulk of the
could concentrate all their forces in Nor- Allied resources committed to his own
mandy and very possibly repel the inva- command for a decisive strike.
sion. The temptation must have been In hindsight, it would probably
strong for Eisenhower to play it safe by have been best to have concentrated on
waiting for better conditions. But he a narrower front and broken through
made the hard choice instead, gambling Germany’s western defenses in the fall of
that the weather would clear in time for 1944. Bradley’s command was the logi-
his landing craft to make the long pas- cal force for this role, because it was
sage from their troopships to the enemy stronger and faster than Montgomery’s.
shore. In the end, fortune favored the But politics appears to have ruled this
brave: the weather did clear on June 6 out. The British would have been furi-
for just long enough, and D-Day became ous if Eisenhower had assigned them to
a great victory, made possible by Eisen- a supporting role. For the sake of Allied
hower’s bold decision. unity, then, he chose to make a slow
105
• E L E C T I O N O F 1 9 4 2 •

advance along a broad front as the prac- was all in favor of such a dash, but the
tical course, if not the best strategy. territory that would have been gained by
From September 1944 until March it had been promised to the Soviet Union
1945, the Allies advanced slowly. Then, at the Yalta conference in February 1945
late in December 1944, Hitler surprised and would have had to be turned over to
the Allies by launching one last offen- it in any case. Furthermore, Berlin was a
sive, through the Ardennes Forest of political prize but had no strategic value,
Belgium, where the U.S. line was weak. and taking it would have been very
Eisenhower was at his best in this crisis, costly. Eisenhower therefore did the sen-
telling his commanders to see this as an sible thing, notifying Stalin that his forces
opportunity rather than a setback. would stop along the line agreed to at
Eisenhower pulled men out of the Yalta. Soviet troops then went on to
long U.S. front and rushed them in huge take Berlin, suffering, at the very least,
numbers to the bulge created by Ger- 100,000 casualties for the sake of this
many’s advance. This engagement, the empty honor.
Battle of the Bulge, was the greatest
SEE ALSO
ever fought by the U.S. Army and
Bulge, Battle of; D-Day; France, Battle of;
ended in victory, as Eisenhower knew Italian campaigns; Marshall, George C.;
it would. North African campaign; Patton, George
Eisenhower’s broad-front approach S., Jr.; Sicily, Battle of
began paying off in March 1945, when
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
the German lines started to crumble.
Although Montgomery was supposed Ambrose, Stephen. Eisenhower: Soldier and
President. New York: Touchstone, 1991.
to cross the Rhine River first, units of ––––––. Eisenhower: Soldier of the Army,
the U.S. Ninth Army under Bradley’s President-Elect, 1890–1952. New York:
overall command, seized an intact Simon & Schuster, 1983.
Darby, Jean. Dwight D. Eisenhower: A
Rhine bridge at Remagen, and Eisen- Man Called Ike. New York: Lerner, 1989.
hower gave Bradley free rein to exploit Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower at War,
this opportunity. 1943–1945. New York: Random House,
1986.
What followed was another great Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe.
surge forward like the one after the Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948.
breakout from Normandy, with U.S. Lee, R. Alton. Dwight D. Eisenhower: A
armored units running wild and captur- Bibliography of His Times and
Presidency. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly
ing entire German armies. On May 7, Resources, 1991.
following Hitler’s suicide on April 30, Sandberg, Peter Lars. Dwight D. Eisen-
Admiral Karl Doenitz, who now com- hower. New York: Chelsea House, 1987.
manded the Third Reich, surrendered to
Eisenhower at 2:41 a.m. in Reims,
France. Eisenhower, the Allies, and the
cause of freedom had triumphed. Election of 1942
After the war, Eisenhower would be
criticized for failing to take Berlin, which
might have been possible. The Soviets
had been closer to it than U.S. troops in In 1940 the Democratic party retained
March, when German resistance in the control of both houses of Congress. But
West began to collapse, but Bradley’s President Franklin D. Roosevelt was
troops were more mobile and perhaps often frustrated by Congress, because
could have reached Berlin first. Churchill many Democrats in it were conservative
106
• E L E C T I O N O F 1 9 4 4 •

southerners who were closer on many for longer periods than was good for
issues to the Republican party than to combat efficiency.
Roosevelt’s New Deal program.
In the off-year elections of Novem-
ber 1942, the conservatives won so
many seats that during the next two
years the legislative branch was, in all Election of 1944
but name, a Republican Congress.
Because of a light Democratic turnout
(possibly caused by a lack of confidence
in Roosevelt), and because most of the By the fall of 1944, business was boom-
war news to that point had been bad, ing while abroad one victory followed
the Republicans fell only 13 seats short another. Under these circumstances and
of a majority in the House and missed with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
controlling the Senate by just 9. reelection a sure thing, it was hard to
If North Africa had been invaded a generate interest in politics.
week earlier than it was on November In 1944, unlike in 1940, Roosevelt
8, the election results might well have made an early announcement of his
been different, for Operation Torch was intention to run, draining the GOP nom-
popular at home, and its impact would ination of its value. Thomas E. Dewey,
have benefited the Democrats. Instead, formerly a mob-busting district attorney
their margin was so thin that in 1944, and now governor of New York, ac-
just before the general election, the cepted it anyway. Because Dewey repre-
Democrats would lose their majority sented eastern, internationalist Republi-
altogether. cans, the Republicans balanced their
The 1942 election results strength- ticket by nominating as his running mate
ened the conservative wing of each the isolationist governor of Ohio, John
party. Southern Democrats frequently Bricker, a darling of the party’s right
voted with Republicans, which is how it wing. Having no fresh ideas, the GOP
came about that the 78th Congress ran against the New Deal again, exciting
ended many New Deal programs. few but the party faithful.
Although Congress normally supported The Democratic convention proved
the President in military and foreign to be much more lively, because even
affairs, in 1944 it refused to enact a though the Presidential nomination had
national service bill. This measure been settled, the choice of a Vice Presi-
would have given the federal govern- dent remained open. The incumbent,
ment considerable authority over the Henry A. Wallace of Iowa, was popular
civilian labor force, so that workers among liberal Democrats, but south-
could be kept on the job or sent wher- erners hated him, as did the big-city
ever they were most needed. Congress bosses, who still had great power. FDR
also refused to increase the military draft was willing to dump Wallace if neces-
when asked to do so. sary, and because he ignored his Vice
Both congressional decisions hurt Presidents anyway, he did not have a
the war effort. Congress’s failure to strong personal preference.
expand the draft was especially serious, The choice of the party’s leaders
because in 1944 a military manpower was Harry S. Truman of Missouri, who
shortage developed. This forced the had been a little-known U.S. senator
army to keep fighting men on the line until 1941. In that year he became chair
107
• E L E C T I O N O F 1 9 4 4 •

of the Senate Special Committee to It seems fair to say that if Roo-


Investigate the National Defense Pro- sevelt’s campaign methods were a little
gram, a job he performed well and that misleading, his motives for wanting a
gained him much respect. Truman had fourth term stand up to examination. By
voted consistently this time the Presi- In 1944, most
for New Deal legis- dent had enjoyed Americans felt
lation but was per- all the power and that Roosevelt
sonally liked by glory that a should “stay
conservative Senate human being and finish the
Democrats, which might want; what job,” despite
made him ideal as a remained was to doubts about his
compromise figure. finish the job. health.
Given FDR’s Image Not Available With Germany
failing health, it and Japan losing
must be asked if he on the battlefield,
was wrong to run the war no longer
again. At the time vitally interested
he stood for reelec- FDR.
tion, Roosevelt was The great
becoming forgetful unfinished task
because a combina- was to secure the
tion of very high peace, which Roo-
blood pressure, sevelt hoped to do
congestive heart failure, anemia, and by cementing the Grand Alliance of
congestion in his lungs prevented suffi- Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United
cient blood from getting to his brain. Yet States. No other statesman, he rightly
his memory lapses, although they had believed, had the experience and skill
become more frequent, were short-lived. needed to deal with Churchill and Stalin.
There is no evidence that his mental Like most great men, Roosevelt believed
capacity was otherwise impaired, and his that no one could replace him, and in
enfeebled condition did not keep the Pres- truth, even as his powers declined, he was
ident from hitting the campaign trail hard. still better qualified to steer the ship of
Roosevelt used one of the first state through troubled waters than any
important political pollsters, Hadley other American.
Cantril, and tailored his campaign The election campaign of 1944
according to Cantril’s findings. Thus, in plodded slowly along until Roosevelt
the fall, when polls showed that voters made a brilliant speech to the Teamsters
had doubts about his health, Roosevelt Union on September 23, indicting the
spoke outdoors in Ebbetts Field, home GOP for telling lies about his pet dog
of the Brooklyn Dodgers, then rode for Fala. This attack stung Dewey, and from
four hours through pouring rain in an then on, he and Bricker passed up no
open car, exposing himself to both the chances to sling political mud. Dewey
elements and the voters, after which he claimed that Roosevelt was a left-winger
gave a major address to the Foreign Pol- and Truman a Ku Klux Klansman.
icy Association. He exhibited stamina According to Bricker, New Dealers had
several more times before the election, gotten the country into the war as a cure
undermining charges about his ill health, for unemployment. But such slander
although they were in fact true. failed to slow the President down. He
108
• E N I G M A •

climaxed the campaign in Boston by the theater of war commanded by Gen-


making fun of Dewey’s desperate tactics, eral Dwight D. Eisenhower. Initially
quoting from different speeches given on consisting only of the Britain, after
the same day in which Dewey had Operation Overlord it grew to include
accused the President of allowing com- France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
munists to seize power and of planning western Germany.
to make himself king.
The newspapers anticipated an
SEE ALSO
extremely close election, but Roosevelt
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedi-
led Dewey by 3.6 million ballots and tionary Forces (SHAEF)
carried 36 states, with a total of 432
electoral votes to Dewey’s 99. The elec-
tion of 1944 was FDR’s narrowest mar-
gin of victory, although a clear one, Fair Employment
which carried over into the House of
Representatives, where the Democrats
Practices Commission
returned to power. Many isolationists
went down to defeat at last, easing the A young man
path of U.S. entry into the organization receives
later to be known as the United When the United States began to mobi- machine shop
Nations. lize for war in 1940 and 1941, racial training in
Probably the most important cir- minorities, particularly blacks, were preparation for
cumstance of this election was that in denied entry to almost all of the well- work in the
reelecting Roosevelt, the voters were paid new jobs in defense industries. To defense indus-
try. The Fair
also, without knowing it, choosing Tru- protest the government’s failure to cor-
Employment
man as their next President. Although rect this injustice, A. Philip Randolph,
Practices Com-
Democratic leaders had selected Truman head of the most important black union,
mission ensured
for narrowly partisan reasons, they, and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, that blacks and
the country, were in luck, for Truman called for a march on Washington to other minorities
would be a better President than anyone take place on July 1, 1941. The Roo- would not be
could have expected, considering his sevelt administration tried to persuade denied war-
limited experience. Randolph to call off the march. That industry posi-
failing, the President met with Randolph tions.

ENIGMA
SEE Intelligence, military

European Theater of Image Not Available


Operations

The name European Theater of Opera-


tions was commonly used to describe
109
• F A S C I S M •

and other black leaders a few days authoritarian (that is, they did not toler-
before the scheduled event. The result ate differences of opinion or political
was that the march was canceled in protest), militaristic, and anti-intellectual.
exchange for FDR’s issuing of Executive While these qualities often made
Order 8802, establishing what became them attractive to criminals and ultrana-
the Fair Employment Practices Commis- tionalists, no fascist party ever came to
sion (FEPC). power by means of a free election. And
The FEPC opened up many defense fascist regimes’ ultranationalism—their
industries not only to blacks but to most central trait—also made it difficult
Jews, aliens, Hispanics, American Indi- for them to cooperate with each other.
ans, and other groups suffering from job There was no coalition on the Axis side
discrimination. Thus, the march on equal to that of the Anglo-American
Washington of 1941 that never took alliance, which set the standard for joint
place was more successful than most of planning and teamwork.
the actual civil rights marches of later
SEE ALSO
years, which usually failed to produce
Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Italy; Mussolini,
such immediate and tangible benefits. Benito.
SEE ALSO
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
African Americans
Griffin, Roger, and W. J. Krazanowski,
eds. Fascism. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1995.
Payne, Stanley G. A History of Fascism,
1914-1945. Madison: University of Wis-
Fascism consin Press, 1995.
Stille, Alexander. Benevolence and Betrayal:
Five Italian Jewish Families Under Fas-
cism. New York: Penguin, 1993.

Technically, facism was the political doc-


trine of Benito Mussolini’s National Fas-
cist party of Italy. However, it is used as Financing the war
a general term to include all the right-
wing totalitarian movements that sprang
up after World War I. These included
the National Socialists of Germany, the
Spanish Falangists, the Romanian Iron Taxation was the government’s most
Guard, and the Hungarian Arrow Cross important economic tool to pay for the
parties. enormous cost of war. An effective infla-
Unlike Marxism, fascism had no tion fighter, it also raised huge amounts
central body of theory, but rather certain of money. However, taxes were not the
traits common to its various movements. only way the federal government could
Fascists were invariably superpatriotic obtain cash. It could sell war bonds
and usually believed that their people directly to individuals and institutions. It
were racially superior to others. They could force people to save money, then
were intensely anticommunist. They all borrow the funds thus created. The Vic-
put their nation’s mission and destiny tory tax of 1942 had a compulsory sav-
ahead of individual rights. Fascist parties ings feature which proved so unpopular
and regimes were typically brutal, that Secretary of the Treasury Henry
110
• F I N A N C I N G T H E W A R •

Morgenthau led a successful fight to This is why regressive, or “flat,” taxes


repeal it the next year. are generally popular among the rich.
Far more successful was the Rev- The new tax formula aroused little
enue Act of 1942, which revolutionized opposition outside of government, with
the tax structure. This act was based on patriotism being one reason and the psy-
The artist the ideas of Beards- chology of it anoth-
Thomas Hart ley Ruml, the trea- er. The Internal Rev-
Benton created surer of Macy’s and enue Service
this poster as something of a discovered, as mer-
part of the gov- financial genius. chants had earlier,
ernment’s cam- Ruml led a body of that individuals
paign to businessmen, called found small install-
encourage the the Committee for ment payments to
purchage of Economic Develop- be fairly painless,
war bonds. Image Not Available
ment, who were ded- compared to having
icated to remodeling to pay in one large
the federal tax struc- sum. The govern-
ture. Ruml’s group ment made it easier
favored lowering the still by its payroll
amount of income withholding plan.
that would not be Even people who
subject to tax so as had never heard of
to include the non- “pay as you earn”
paying majority of liked the idea at
Americans. once. Gallup pollers
The Revenue Act of 1942 made this found that as late as December 1942
change, and the next year Congress only 44 percent of respondents knew
adopted another idea of Ruml’s, the what the Ruml plan was. However,
“collection at the source” or “pay as when “pay as you earn” was explained
you go” income tax plan, whereby tax to them, 71 percent endorsed it. By Jan-
payments were deducted from employ- uary 1943, when the government’s pub-
ees’ paychecks. Thus, although only 7 licity had done its work, 81 percent of
million Americans had filed income tax Americans knew about the Ruml plan,
returns in 1941, in 1944 some 42 mil- and 90 percent of them favored it.
lion would do so. Not only did this new Thanks in part to the new income
way of taxing people help finance the tax, during the war years the distance
war but it was also fair, because it taxed between high- and middle-income earn-
people on the basis of their ability to ers narrowed. For instance, in 1937 the
pay. This tax was “progressive,” mean- richest 5 percent of Americans earned
ing that the more you made the higher 27 percent of all income, but by 1944
your rate of taxation became. their share had fallen to 16 percent. It
A national sales tax, on the other was the only time in modern history
hand, which Morgenthau rejected, when this happened.
would have been “regressive,” because Borrowing was another important
everyone, rich and poor, would have way in which the federal government
paid at the same rate. This scheme financed the war. Secretary Morgenthau
would have burdened the poor, while believed that bonds should be sold in such
the rich would hardly have noticed it. a way as to inspire support for the war
111
• F I N L A N D •

effort. Because to sell bonds was to sell


the war, bond drives were aimed at aver- Finland
age Americans rather than wealthy
investors. This meant in turn drawing
heavily on the popular culture. Movie
stars played major parts. Hollywood
organized tours that played in 300 com- Finland was the only democracy to fight
munities. Dorothy Lamour, the co-star of on the Axis side in World War II. There
a series of movies with Bob Hope and was a simple reason for this.
Bing Crosby, was credited with selling On November 30, 1939, the Soviet
$350 million worth of bonds. Carole Union invaded Finland after the Finns
Lombard, a popular movie actress, gave refused to hand over territory that the
her life to the effort, dying in a plane USSR wanted. Some of the frontier land
crash on her way home from a bond tour. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin demanded
In addition to bonds, war stamps was of no great value. But Soviet designs
costing only pennies were sold, mainly on the province of Karelia, the border of
to children. Every form of marketing which was only a few miles from
was employed in this cause, with few Leningrad, required Finland to give up a
Americans managing to escape it. prosperous and thickly settled region.
It cost the United States $318 bil- Stalin had expected an easy victory,
lion to wage World War II, of which 45 because the heavily outnumbered Finns
percent was paid for out of current rev- were poorly armed. Instead, the Finns,
enues. In no other American war was who were well trained and tremen-
such a large share of the cost paid for dously motivated, fought the Soviets to
during the duration. The percentage of a standstill in the Winter War of
national income that went to pay federal 1939–40. The Red Army won in the
taxes rose from 7.1 percent in 1940 to end, because of its enormous size and
an impressive 24.2 percent in 1945— firepower compared to that of tiny
without inflation or raising interest Finland, and because the other democ-
rates. The way in which government racies gave Finland little support. Thus
paid for the war was one of its biggest the Soviets acquired what they wanted,
achievements, which contributed in chiefly the port of Karelia and the
important ways both to winning the war north shore of Lake Ladoga. Four
and to increasing the real income of hundred thousand Finns became refu-
most Americans. gees as a result.
After the Winter War, Finland
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G rearmed and, having nowhere else to
Barber, William J. Designs within Disor- turn, accepted aid from Germany. When
der: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Econo- Germany invaded the Soviet Union in
mists, and the Shaping of American Eco-
nomic Policy, 1933–1945. New York: June 1941 Finland did, too, regaining
Cambridge University Press, 1996. most of its lost territory. It then went on
Lipsitz, George. Rainbow at Midnight: the defensive until an armistice with the
Labor and Culture in the 1940s. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1994.
Soviets could be concluded on Septem-
Sutton, Antony C. Wall Street and FDR. ber 19, 1944. The terms of this agree-
New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, ment forced Finland to give back what it
1975. had regained and provide the Soviet
Vatter, Harold G. The U.S. Economy in
World War II. New York: Columbia Uni- Union with money and goods as com-
versity Press, 1985. pensation for the war.
112
• F L A M E T H R O W E R S •

After Soviet
planes bombed
this Finnish
town, women
returned to sal-
vage what they
could from
their ruined
homes.
Image Not Available

The two wars cost Finland, which


had a population of just 3.6 million in Flamethrowers
1938, some 92,000 lives and ruined its
economy. But the Finns’ valor (“sisu,”
the national motto) and patriotism seem
to have convinced Stalin that Finland as
an occupied state would be more trouble A flamethrower functioned by combin-
than it was worth. As a result Finland ing the contents of a tank of thickened
remained independent and democratic, gasoline with pressurized nitrogen from
the only nation within the Soviet sphere a second tank. The nitrogen propelled
of influence to have achieved this status. the gasoline, which was ignited as it left
The Soviet Union’s Finnish policy the device’s nozzle. The introduction of
ended up costing it dearly. Had Stalin napalm (made from gasoline, other
left Finland alone, it would have fuels, and a gelling agent consisting of
remained neutral, like its neighbor Swe- napathenic and palmitic acids) in 1943
den. This would have saved the Red made the flamethrower even more terri-
Army hundreds of thousands of men fying and effective. Those carried by a
and much material that would otherwise man had a flame that extended up to 50
have been available to the Soviet Union yards. Armored vehicles were equipped
in 1941 and 1942, when it was fighting with much larger flamethrowers that
for its life and every man and gun was had greater ranges.
needed. Thus, the Soviet invasion of Fin- Although every army used them,
land was not only unjustified but a bad flamethrowers were most often
blunder as well. employed by British and U.S. forces in
Europe, and by the Americans in the
SEE ALSO Pacific. The chief defect of the hand-car-
Eastern front ried version was that it made the user an
113
• F L Y I N G T I G E R S •

easy target. Thus flamethrowers were when the United States was still neutral,
most effective against pillboxes (small, Chennault persuaded Washington to pay
enclosed fortifications) and bunkers that for air units in China that would be
had already been seriously weakened. manned by volunteers from the U.S.
One-man flamethrowers were, therefore, Army and Navy. By November 1941
primarily mopping-up weapons, unlike three AVG squadrons consisting of 100
the armored models, which could be pilots were training in Burma.
used offensively. Even in mopping-up When Japan attacked Burma (then
operations, casualties among those who still a British colony) in December, the
operated flamethrowers remained high. AVG joined with Royal Air Force (RAF)
units to put up a remarkable defense.
Although heavily outnumbered, the
Allied squadrons repeatedly broke up
Flying Tigers Japanese air attacks, particularly those
aimed at Rangoon. These successes
enabled the British first to reinforce the
Burmese capital and then, when its fall
became certain, to withdraw from Ran-
The American Volunteer Group (AVG) goon in good order. The Japanese occu-
in China was known as the Flying Tigers pied it on March 8, 1942, only because
because of the fangs painted on the long Allied air strength was down to 10
noses of their P-40 fighters. fighters, some barely airworthy.
The AVG was formed by Captain After leaving Burma, AVG pilots
Claire Chennault, a retired U.S. Army operated from bases in China until their
flying officer who was an advisor to contracts ran out in July 1942. Chen-
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In 1941, nault had hoped that most of the pilots
A Chinese sol-
dier guards a
line of Ameri-
can P-40 fight-
er planes (Fly-
ing Tigers) at
an unidentified
flying field in
China. The
American pur-
suit planes had
a 12-to-1 vic- Image Not Available
tory ratio over
the Japanese.
114
• F O R R E S T A L, J A M E S V. •

would stay on under his command in vast powers. This struggle continued
what would become the U.S. Tenth Air when Forrestal succeeded Knox after the
Force, but only five did so, most prefer- secretary’s death on April 28, 1944.
ring to rejoin their old outfits. A member of the Urban League,
Except for delaying the fall of Ran- which worked to improve economic
goon and permitting a safe evacuation, opportunities for blacks, Forrestal
the Flying Tigers did not significantly immediately assigned more blacks to
change the course of events. But their large auxiliary vessels, such as supply
courage and skill were legendary and ships and tankers. Previously, African
gave both the United States and China Americans had only served in the Navy’s
something to cheer about in the darkest most menial jobs. Under Forrestal,
days of the war. many skilled occupations were opened
to blacks, and 60 became officers. He
SEE ALSO
also opened the previously all-white
China-Burma-India theater
WAVES (Women Accepted for Volun-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
tary Emergency Service) to blacks.
Bond, Charles R. A Flying Tiger’s Diary.
Forrestal worked hard to improve
College Station: Texas A&M University the Navy’s public relations, despite
Press, 1984. Admiral King’s notorious reluctance to
Chennault, Claire Lee. Way of a Fighter. tell the press anything. A frequent visitor
New York: Putnam, 1949.
Howard, James H. Roar of the Tiger. to the Navy’s far-flung battle areas, he
New York: Orion, 1991. witnessed the Marine Corps’s bloody
Schultz, Duane. The Maverick War. New assault on Iwo Jima in February 1945.
York: St. Martin’s, 1987.
Forrestal was deeply moved by the sacri-
fice and suffering he saw on Iwo, and
his former mere dislike of war turned to
Forrestal, James V. absolute hatred as a result.
Forrestal played a small but impor-
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
tant role in the surrender of Japan. On
• Born: February 15, 1892, Beacon, August 10, 1945, after two atomic
N.Y.
bombs had been dropped on it and the
• Government service: Undersecretary
of the navy, 1940–44; secretary of the Soviets had entered the Pacific war,
navy, 1944–47; secretary of defense, Japan broadcast to the Allies that it
1947–49 would surrender on the condition that
• Died: May 22, 1949, Bethesda, Md.
“the prerogatives of His Majesty as a
Sovereign Ruler” be maintained. Most
of Truman’s advisors believed that this
Beginning as a bond salesman on Wall offer should be accepted because the
Street, Forrestal worked his way up to emperor would, in fact, be subordinate
become president of a large brokerage to General Douglas MacArthur, who
house, Dillon, Read and Co., in 1938. would head the occupation of Japan.
As undersecretary of the navy, he super- Only Secretary of State James Byrnes
vised its procurement and production insisted that nothing less than uncondi-
program. He worked closely with Secre- tional surrender would meet with public
tary Frank Knox and was a dependable approval. Forrestal broke the standoff
ally in Knox’s struggle to keep the arro- by suggesting that Japan’s condition be
gant chief of naval operations, Admiral accepted, but that its surrender still be
Ernest King, from adding to his already called unconditional.
115
• F R A N C E •

SEE ALSO Troops in an


King, Ernest J.; Knox, William Franklin American
armored car
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
parade victori-
ously past the
Forrestal, James. The Forrestal Diaries.
New York: Viking, 1951. Arc de Triom-
Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley. phe during the
Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of liberation of
James Forrestal. New York: Knopf, Image Not Available France.
1992.

France

When war broke out in 1939, France recovered psychologically from its enor-
was one of the world’s great powers mous losses in World War I. The attitude
and a leading industrial state. It still of the French Army reflected this loss of
retained a vast colonial empire, with spirit. It thought only in defensive terms,
particularly large holdings in Africa and although the best defense is the ability to
Southeast Asia. It was also a fully func- deliver an effective counterattack. The
tioning democracy with a greatly French Army had done this in 1914,
admired high culture. flanking a German host on the Marne
In the late 1930s, France had spent River and saving France from defeat.
heavily on defense, with the result that it But there would be no “Miracle of
had large, well-equipped armed forces, the Marne” in World War II. When the
including the world’s fourth-largest fleet German blitzkrieg (lightning war) struck
and a 5-million-man army. Its frontier in May 1940, France and Britain were
with Germany was defended by the defeated by an enemy inferior in numbers
Maginot Line, a chain of modern, linked of men and tanks to the Allied force but
underground forts of unequaled size and superior in just about everything else.
strength. The Maginot Line was at the As the western front collapsed,
time believed to be impossible to break. defeatists in the French cabinet refused
Further, France was allied with Britain, Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s
an even richer and more powerful state request that the seat of government be
with a larger empire and the world’s moved to North Africa. From there,
biggest navy. Unlike the situation in protected by its own fleet as well as the
1914, when it had few troops, Britain Royal Navy, and with an empire to
was raising a large army. draw on for men and material, France
But France had great liabilities, too. could have fought on.
France’s population of 41 million was Instead, France abandoned all resis-
smaller than Britain’s and barely half tance and signed a humiliating armistice
that of Germany. Its empire, like with Germany. Most of France was
Britain’s, was too large to defend—espe- annexed or occupied by the Germans,
cially French Indochina. and Italy received a small occupation
Furthermore, French morale was zone in the French Riviera. On July 10,
poor. Unlike Germany, which under 1940, the French National Assembly
Hitler regained its nerve, France had never voted overwhelmingly to give control of
116
• F R A N C E •

what remained of France to Marshal In addition, about 600,000 French


Philippe Pétain. Petain had been a great workers were sent to Germany after
hero in World War I, but he would dis- France surrendered to the Nazis. A
grace himself, and France, by collaborat- larger number were forced to work in
ing with the Nazis. All that remained of French factories and mines whose out-
French honor now resided in the tiny put also went to the Germans. All told,
forces of Brigadier General Charles de France’s contribution was equal to
Gaulle, who escaped to Britain. There about one-quarter of the German gross
he set up a government in exile that was national product. Without French coop-
recognized by only a handful of small eration on this massive scale, Germany
French colonies. would have been defeated much sooner.
Petain’s government was called Had the French authorities refused
Vichy France, because of its location in to collaborate, or had done so as little as
the small resort city of Vichy, in the cen- possible, Germany would still have
ter of the country, where it had been exploited the French economy, but much
forced to move when Paris became the less effectively. This was demonstrated
seat of the German military government. late in the war when the Vichy govern-
Petain and his followers regarded collab- ment began to collapse.
oration as the only course for France to Despite its initial popularity, Vichy
take, because they assumed that Ger- began to lose support as huge transfers
many would win the war. In this spirit of wealth to Germany drove down
they faithfully obeyed German direc- France’s standard of living. The resis-
tives, passed anti-Semitic laws, and tance movement grew in spite of savage
cooperated with the Gestapo (the police German punishments. Low-level offi-
department of the SS) in rounding up cials began refusing to obey orders, or in
Jewish refugees and shipping them to various ways undermined them. By June
death camps. The Vichy government 1944, when the Allies invaded Nor-
also consented to having 1.6 million mandy, Vichy was all but dead and the
French prisoners of war kept in Ger- Germans were losing their grip on the
many as workers. This amounted to French economy.
slave labor and was a violation of the Germany never had the means to
rules of war established by the Geneva govern France directly and had to depend
Convention. And, when French resis- on collaborators for this. But when col-
tance became active, the Vichy state laboration became a dirty word, Ger-
assisted Germany’s efforts to suppress it. many could maintain effective control
The Vichy government, together only over the services essential to its army
with French collaborators in the occu- in France. And once the Allied invasion
pied zones, was of immense value to the began, even this became difficult.
German war effort, chiefly for economic After D-Day, June 6, 1944, Charles
reasons. By 1943 some 40 percent of de Gaulle established a temporary govern-
France’s economic output was going ment manned by members of his Free
directly to the Germans. At least 55 per- French movement and leaders of the resis-
cent of Vichy revenue went to Germany tance organizations. Although de Gaulle
as payment for occupation costs. remained firmly in charge, his government
Because of its prewar wealth and indus- was broadly based and widely accepted.
try, France became by far Germany’s Fears that the conservative and high-
most important supplier of raw materi- handed de Gaulle would prevent the
als, manufactured goods, and services. return of democracy proved unfounded.
117
• F R A N C E , B A T T L E O F •

Local elections were held in April and and 160,000 people were deported from
May 1944, a national election in October. France for political or racial reasons.
De Gaulle accepted the results, even The total French deaths, the majority of
though more than 80 percent of the seats them civilians, came to some 600,000.
in France’s new legislature went to left-
SEE ALSO
wing parties, which opposed him.
De Gaulle, Charles; France, Battle of;
At the time of France’s liberation, France, fall of
one French army had been fighting with
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
distinction in Italy for the better part of
two years. After liberation de Gaulle Burrin, Philip. France under the Germans:
Collaboration and Compromise. New
formed a second army in France, basing York: New Press, 1996.
it on the resistance fighters of the Paxton, Robert O. Vichy France: Old
Maquis, an underground army that had Guard and New Order. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972.
fought the Germans in occupied France. Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the
As the First French Army it too fought Third Republic. New York: Simon &
with distinction as part of the U.S. 6th Schuster, 1969.
Tunis, John R. His Enemy, His Friend.
Army Group. New York: Morrow, 1967.
When the war ended, the French
Army had a total of 18 divisions, a
respectable force under the circum-
stances, though small compared to what
France had fielded in 1939–40. Still, the France, Battle of
French contribution to victory was suffi-
cient for de Gaulle to demand, and be
granted, an occupation zone in Germany
alongside those of the United States, After the Allies landed in Normandy on
A woman
Britain, and the Soviet Union. He was D-Day, June 6, 1944, the plan was to cheers the
not invited to the critical Yalta conference clear Normandy by June 23, reach the return of the
in 1945, because France was still more of mouth of the Seine River by July 10, French Army
a dependent state than an equal ally. But and then drive eastward. But, despite and the libera-
in the years after the war France would Allied air supremacy, the Germans man- tion of France
rise again, thanks largely to de Gaulle, aged to bring in reinforcements and put by the Allies.
the Free French, and the resistance.
France lost more people in the war
than either Britain or the United States,
despite their larger populations. All told,
including some resistance fighters and
40,000 men from Alsace and Lorraine
drafted into the German Army, 210,000
French military personnel died. Added
to that figure were 60,000 French civil-
Image Not Available
ians killed by bombers—mostly Allied
aircraft—and another 90,000 civilians
and resistance fighters who were massa-
cred, executed, or otherwise killed by
the Germans. Further, 40,000 French
prisoners of war died, another 40,000
French workers in Germany were killed,
118
• F R A N C E , B A T T L E O F •

up tremendous resistance. British attacks ing that the two Allied armies would
on the key city of Caen were beaten end up firing on each other, Bradley pre-
back by Germany’s powerful Tiger vented Patton from closing what became
tanks. U.S. Army assaults bogged down known as the Falaise gap. Many Ger-
in the hedgerow country of southern mans thus managed to escape, but when
Normandy, known as the Bocage. the gap was closed on August 21, some
All the same, inch by inch, in the 50,000 German troops were captured,
face of heavy casualties, the Allies with another 10,000 killed in the bloody
expanded their beachhead. On July 25 Falaise pocket.
General Omar Bradley kicked off Oper- With the Allies in hot pursuit, the
ation Cobra, a massive attack designed surviving Germans raced for the Seine
to break the German front. After five River, which they crossed in a week.
days it was successful, and the Battle of Although they had to leave much equip-
France began. ment behind and were down to a hun-
On the 27th, Bradley had given dred tanks, 240,000 German troops
Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., escaped. This was enough, together with
command of a corps, with the rest of reinforcements, to rebuild and defend
Patton’s new Third Army to follow on Germany’s West Wall, or Siegfried Line,
August 1. On July 30 the 4th Armored a belt of fortifications on its western
Division seized Avranches, at the base of border. Four Allied armies crossed after
the Cotentin Peninsula, opening up not them, soon to be joined by a fifth. It had
just Brittany but southern Normandy as landed on France’s Mediterranean coast
well. U.S. Army pressure forced the Ger- in mid-August and in early September
mans out of cover during daylight, moved into position on Patton’s right,
exposing them to fighter-bomber attacks. completing the Allied front.
In three days Patton poured seven The Allies made good progress for a
divisions through the narrow Avranches while after crossing the Seine. Patton
bottleneck onto open ground beyond it advanced a hundred miles to the Meuse,
in one of his more amazing feats. Meet- Brussels fell to the British, who then
ing little resistance, he asked for permis- took the great port of Antwerp with its
sion to junk the cautious original plan docking facilities intact. Unfortunately,
and break out of Normandy to the east. British commanders failed to occupy the
Given his head, Patton unleashed his far side of the Scheldt River, a 60-mile-
armor, which raced east, then north, cre- long estuary that linked Antwerp to the
ating one side of a large pocket in which open sea. It would take Canadian troops
parts of three German armies were several months to clear the Germans
trapped. In a week one of his corps was out, during which time Allied supply
at Le Mans, and by August 13 it was problems would end the great advance.
driving for Argentan. As of September 1944, the Allies did
On the 7th, the Germans had not have a single usable port and were
launched a desperate counterattack on still bringing their supplies in over open
Mortain, which failed. Now, finding English Channel beaches hundreds of
themselves in danger of wholesale cap- miles from the front. The more the Allied
ture, they turned around and scrambled armies advanced, the fewer supplies they
frantically to escape the pocket before it could receive. Shortages forced Supreme
could be closed by Patton’s troops Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower to
advancing from the south and Canadi- ration supplies in a way that, as it turned
ans moving down from the north. Fear- out, was chiefly at Patton’s expense. Thus
119
• F R A N C E , B A T T L E O F •

Image Not Available

he literally ran out of gas and the Third operation failed because it tried to go “a
Army ground to a halt. (The other Allied bridge too far.” The larger problem was
armies did too, partly because of stiffer that without Antwerp the Allied armies
German resistance, but mostly from lack could not be adequately supplied.
of supplies and because their vehicles Although there would be much hard
were wearing out.) fighting over the winter, the Allies would
All hope of continuing the drive not roll again until the spring of 1945.
now rested upon the success of Opera- General Omar Bradley’s decision to
tion Market-Garden, an ambitious plan halt Patton at Falaise and Eisenhower’s
to drop Allied airborne divisions deep refusal to give Patton the gas he needed
into enemy territory on crucial river to keep moving in September have been
crossings. The farthest of these, the Rhine severely criticized. There was some risk at
bridges at Arnheim, Holland, were some Falaise, to be sure. Patton could have
60 miles behind German lines. The plan closed the gap when he wanted to, but
was that the British Second Army would whether he could have held it shut
then drive through the corridor thus cre- against the desperate Germans will never
ated and cross the Rhine. be known. And it was true that the Allied
But this plan, which was exception- forces might have accidentally fired at
ally daring for Field Marshal Sir Bernard each other as they drew closer together.
Law Montgomery, the normally cau- But if Patton had succeeded, the
tious British commander, exceeded the Germans would have lost most of their
Allies’ ability. British airborne troops, in divisional and corps leaders and staffs,
one of the most remarkable small-unit making it all but impossible for them to
actions of the war, did seize the end of a establish a new line of defense. The war
bridge at Arnheim, but they could not would then have been all but over. Here,
hold it. The British Second Army failed it seems, was a risk worth taking. Eisen-
to break through the German defenses hower’s decision, though it was partly
to relieve the paratroopers at Arnheim. political—he could not allow Patton to
The Allies ground to a halt. In hind- win more glory by taking supplies away
sight, it is clear that Operation Market from the British—is easier to defend.
Garden was overly ambitious. As one The Third Army, attacking on its own,
British officer memorably put it, the had it gotten into Germany, would have
120
• F R A N C E , F A L L O F •

been extremely vulnerable to flank which were neutral before the German
attacks. Because of this perhaps the risk blitzkrieg (lightning war) began but
was too great. would fight when invaded, the Allies
The Battle of France, even if it did may have had as many as 4 million men
not bring total victory in the West, was compared to Germany’s 2 million. They
still one of the greatest wins of the war. also had more guns and tanks than Ger-
The Germans had lost half a million men many, which outnumbered them only in
since D-Day and been driven out of the air.
France. Germany’s final defeat, as all Few outside Germany believed that
could now see, was but a matter of time. you could successfully attack a force up
to twice the size of your own. On the
SEE ALSO
contrary, a common rule of thumb was
D-Day; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Germany,
surrender of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard; that the assault force had to be twice
Patton, George S., Jr. the enemy’s size, because fighting on the
defensive was so much easier than
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
attacking.
Ambrose, Stephen C. Citizen Soldiers.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. If Germany had followed its origi-
Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower at War, nal plan, it probably would have been
1943–1945. New York: Random House, stopped. The German General Staff’s
1986.
Knight, Clayton. We Were There at the first thought had been to attack through
Normandy Invasion. New York: Grosset the Low Countries again, as in World
& Dunlap, 1956. War I. But the Allies expected this and
Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1974.
placed their forces to meet such an
Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieu- assault. Germany would not attack the
tenants: The Campaign of France and mighty Maginot Line along its border
Germany, 1944–1945. Bloomington: with France, they reasoned. And the
Indiana University Press, 1981.
Ardennes Forest could not be crossed by
armored vehicles. Therefore, Germany
had no choice except to go through the
France, fall of Low Countries, where the Allies were
ready to establish a defensive line as
soon as Germany’s guns opened up.
Hitler had wanted to invade the
In 1940 the Allies were confident that West immediately after Poland fell, but
they could hold the western front. Dur- bad weather and other problems forced
ing the winter of 1939–40, known as Germany to wait. During that time, the
the “Phony War” because little action full difficulty of attacking a superior
took place, France had time to fully force became obvious and Hitler was
mobilize and Britain to send it more persuaded to drop his original plan. The
than 10 divisions. “Hitler has missed the Low Countries would still be attacked,
boat,” Prime Minister Neville Chamber- to suck the Allies in, but the main thrust
lain declared. What he meant was, by would be through the lightly defended
the standards of World War I, to which Ardennes. Lieutenant General Hans
the Allies were still clinging, they had Guderian, the army’s armor expert, was
more than enough men and weapons to certain his tanks could get through the
stop a German attack. Ardennes and split the Allied front.
Including Belgium and the Nether- Guderian was right. On May 10,
lands, known as the Low Countries, 1940, the Germans struck hard, batter-
121
• F R A N C E , F A L L O F •

ing the Belgians and Dutch, then draw- Hitler (center)


ing the main Allied formations north and top aides
just as Hitler wanted. The Netherlands parade in tri-
fell in four days, and panzers were soon umph before
roaring through Belgium. Meanwhile, the Eiffel
Tower in Paris.
unnoticed, the main German armored
The Germans
force was driving carefully through the
were to hold
Ardennes Forest. By May 12 the Ger- the city for
mans were on the Meuse River, France’s more than four
main line of defense in the region. On years.
the 13th they crossed it. By the next day Image Not Available
they had opened a hole 50 miles wide in
the French line and were driving hard
for the English Channel.
Even some Germans were alarmed
by their own success, for their attacking
panzers had wide-open flanks that were
protected only by the Luftwaffe, Ger-
many’s air force. A strong French coun-
terattack could slice through the infantry
advancing on foot, then roll the panzers
up. The German high command, fearing
just such a movement, ordered the degree turn and break out of their trap
armor to slow down until the infantry by attacking south. But, disorganized
could arrive. and under heavy air attacks from a Luft-
Guderian and his commanders, waffe that now ruled the skies, this task
determined not to miss their chance, was simply beyond them. Thoughts of
asked for permission to send out home now came to Lord John Gort,
patrols, then charged ahead full blast. who commanded the British Expedi-
By the time their disobedience became tionary Force (BEF). He asked for, and
clear, it was too late to stop them. On received, permission to assemble his
May 21 German forces reached the troops on the coast where the Navy
coast, cutting off the Allies’ northern could pick them up.
armies. Guderian had gambled that the Gaining permission turned out to be
French could not mount a flank attack one thing, removing the men another. At
and was proved right. first the Royal Navy thought it would
It turned out that the French were be lucky to return as few as 50,000
even worse off than Guderian guessed. troops to England. As it turned out,
On May 16 Winston Churchill, the new however, the Navy rescued 215,000
British prime minister, had flown to British and about 125,000 French and
Paris. As the attackers were so strung other Allied troops.
out, he inquired, why did not the French The “miracle” of Dunkirk was made
throw their reserves at the open German possible because the Germans decided to
flank? When Churchill was informed to slow down and isolate the beachhead by
his horror that there were no reserves, air. This could not be done, though,
he knew that all was lost. because Churchill risked fighter
The encircled British and French squadrons that were being saved for the
armies were ordered to make a 180- defense of England to rescue the BEF.
122
• F R A N C E , F A L L O F •

Further support came from French and ated an armored force instead of distrib-
Belgian units left behind that fought a uting its numerous tanks among the
gallant rear-guard action. infantry. Before the war Charles de
And, finally, the British sent every- Gaulle, France’s leading authority on
thing that could sail to the French tanks, had begged Premier Leon Blum to
coast—fast destroyers, private yachts, fer- insist on such a force. But the French
ries, ancient gunboats. The Mosquito Army ignored de Gaulle’s warnings, so
Navy, as they called it, was the most when Germany’s panzers crossed the
peculiar fleet of vessels ever assembled for Meuse River they were unstoppable. Yet
a military operation. Hundreds of them the armored fist that won the battle was
were lost in the process, but the BEF got made up of only seven armored and two
home. motorized infantry divisions. The rest of
The miracle of Dunkirk, which the attacking host consisted of slow-
came to an end on June 4, 1940, was a moving infantry divisions that advanced
marvelous achievement, good for British on foot and depended on horses and
morale as well as for Britain’s chances of oxen to move their heavy weapons and
survival. But it resulted from the worst supplies. De Gaulle’s armored force, had
British defeat since 1066, a beating that it existed, could have stopped them cold.
destroyed the French Army and made Instead, the panzer attack, together with
Hitler master of Europe. Although the superior German planning, training,
BEF got away, the Germans had no leadership, and tactics, won the day.
trouble mopping up France’s weary The Luftwaffe was important too in
troops. The Germans took Paris without the fall of France, for it quickly won the
a fight on June 14. The Maginot Line air battle. The British did not have
was taken from the rear, where it had enough modern planes to achieve air
no weapons. The Italians attacked in the superiority over the battlefield and at the
south but were thrown back by a small same time protect Britain, and the
French force in a victory that changed French Air Force performed feebly.
nothing. On June 22 France signed a Once the Allied front was broken,
truce in the same railway car where the French leaders lost all confidence and
triumphant Allies had accepted Ger- promptly surrendered, rather than
many’s surrender in 1918. ordering the Army to fall back or relo-
There is much disagreement over the cate to North Africa. As a result, after
extent to which defeatism and low the fall of France, Britain remained the
morale were responsible for the fall of only power still at war with Hitler. Its
France. At one time they were consid- turn would be next.
ered vital to Germany’s success. In recent
years, however, explanations have SEE ALSO
focused on a combination of Allied mis- Britain, Battle of; de Gaulle, Charles;
takes and German advantages. For France
instance, almost a third of France’s avail-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
able troops were used to garrison the
Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. Divided and Con-
Maginot Line and therefore missed the quered: The French High Command and
decisive battles. If large numbers of them the Defeat of the West, 1940. Westport,
had been placed in a mobile reserve they Conn.: Greenwood, 1979.
might have made all the difference. Taylor, Telford. March of Conquest: The
German Victories in Western Europe,
Furthermore, success would have 1940. New York: Simon & Schuster,
been even more likely if France had cre- 1958.
123
• G E N O C I D E •

A Nazi soldier
Genocide carries ammu-
nition boxes to
the front lines
to support the
German
The literal meaning of genocide is the
counter-offen-
effort to deliberately and systematically
sive in Decem-
destroy a race or nation of people. The ber 1944.
term seems to have been coined by Ra-
phael Lemkin, a Polish-born legal expert
who served during the war as an advisor Image Not Available
to the U.S. War Department. He formed it
by joining the Greek word genos (race or
tribe) with the Latin suffix -cide (to kill).
Lemkin first used it in his book Axis Rule
in Occupied Europe (1944).
The need for a new term to describe
the slaughter of Europe’s Jews, Gypsies,
and other minority groups was strongly The German Army was the best in
felt at the time, Churchill having called the world when war broke out and may
what was then going on “a crime that have remained so as late as 1943. By
has no name.” then, however, the enormous losses sus-
tained on the eastern front compelled
SEE ALSO
Germany to take whatever soldiers it
Holocaust
could get as replacements. Not only
were under- and over-age Germans
drafted, but to fill out the ranks Ger-
many took men from many nations,
German Air Force including Russian prisoners of war and
SEE Luftwaffe Muslims from Yugoslavia. Even these
often reluctant warriors were not
enough to keep the German Army up to
strength. Whereas in 1939 an infantry
division had 17,734 men, by 1944 the
typical division was down to 12,700—
German Army including 1,700 non-Germans.
The strengths of the German Army,
its great size apart, were numerous. Ger-
man weaponry was always first class, as
were German munitions. German plan-
At the outbreak of war in 1939, the ning was unrivaled, enabling major
German Army consisted of 3.74 million campaigns and offensives to be launched
men, a figure that would rise to more on short notice. A classic example was
than 6.5 million in 1943–44. At that the Norwegian campaign that began on
time (1943–44) the army was organized April 7, 1940. Hitler had not given the
into 11 groups, each consisting of two order for it until February 21, which
or more field armies, of which there meant that his staff officers had only
were 26 in all. about six weeks to put together an oper-
124
• G E R M A N A R M Y •

ation that was brilliantly planned and with under- and overage men and even
carried out. Of all the armies in the the handicapped.
world, only Germany’s could have More serious still was the failure of
pulled this off. Then, too, German disci- German industry to put the Army on
pline was harsh. On the eastern front wheels. Of the 304 divisions that it pos-
some 15,000 troops were executed for sessed in 1945, only 31 were armored
cowardice or other failings, frequently and 13 motorized. Most of the rest
on the spot. relied on horses and oxen to move their
Even so, fear was not what drove supplies, equipment, and heavy
the German Army. Unlike the myth weapons. Even the Red Army was more
that German soldiers were mindless mobile, thanks to the 450,000 vehicles it
robots, individual initiative was prized was provided with by the United States.
and encouraged at every level. German And, despite the fact that Germany
commanders had more freedom of invented armored warfare, from 1941
action than was usual in the West. onward it never had enough tanks.
Once a mission plan was laid down, Because Germany was not equipped to
they could change it as needed. Divi- produce tanks in volume, it tried to
sional commanders led from the front, make up for what it lacked in quantity
sometimes with just a radioman and a with superior design. Its Panthers and
driver. Hundreds of German generals Tigers were among the best tanks of the
were killed after putting themselves war, but for every Panther Germany
thus at risk, but the results spoke for produced, Russia built two and one-half
themselves. of its comparable T-34s. The heavy
All ranks were taught the führer, or Tiger was king of the western battle-
leadership, principle. Every soldier was fields. However, barely more than 1,000
encouraged to think two ranks above saw service, a tenth the number that
his own so that if his immediate supe- Germany needed.
rior fell, he could step into the open As the war went on, a lack of
position. More than anything else, this mobility and armor and the steadily
was what kept the German Army declining quality of German military
together until the very last days of the manpower drained the army’s strength.
war. Obedience combined with the Although the German Army remained a
führer principle made it possible for the very tough foe to the end, by 1944 both
surviving fragments of destroyed divi- the U.S. and Soviet armies were superior
sions to be assembled virtually on the to it in most respects.
battlefield and returned to combat as
effective units. No other army could SEE ALSO
do this. Bulge, Battle of the; Eastern front; France,
Good as it was, the German Army Battle of; Germany, surrender of; SS
(Schutzsstaffeln)
had serious defects. The pool of Ger-
man manpower was not sufficient for
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
the army to field hundreds of divisions
Bartov, Omer. Hitler’s Army. New York:
of equal quality. Unlike in the West, Oxford University Press, 1991.
where all infantry divisions were more Görlitz, Walter. History of the German
or less similar, German infantry ranged General Staff. New York: Praeger, 1953.
Guderian, General Heinz. Panzer Leader.
in quality from assault divisions consist- London: Michael Joseph, 1952.
ing of well-trained, able-bodied men to Manstein, Erich. Lost Victories. Chicago:
support and garrison divisions manned Henry Regnery, 1958.
125
• G E R M A N Y •

The original
caption to this
captured Nazi
photograph
reads, “Austria
becomes Ger-
man. Entry of
German police
into Imst.”
Image Not Available

city of Weimar, was saddled with heavy


burdens from the start. Extreme Ger-
Germany man nationalists never accepted their
defeat, claiming that the German Army
had not been beaten on the battlefield
but had been “stabbed in the back” by
The second great European war of this Jews, communists, and other disloyal
century grew out of the first. Most Ger- elements who overthrew the kaiser, or
mans regarded the Treaty of Versailles, emperor, of Germany and made a
which established the conditions under treacherous peace. The German officers
which Germany would have to live knew better, however, for the army was
after World War I, as much too severe. in retreat when the empire collapsed
The treaty, signed on June 28, 1919, but wanted to refight the war anyway
forced the new German republic that in order to reverse its outcome.
had replaced imperial Germany to The rise of Hitler Shortly after
admit all responsibility for the war. It the war, a former corporal of the Ger-
deprived Germany of its colonies, man Army, Adolf Hitler, established his
restored the provinces of Alsace and National Socialist German Workers’
Lorraine to France, and redrew Ger- (Nazi) party. Hitler’s aim was to de-
many’s boundaries to the advantage of stroy the Weimar Republic, establish
some of its neighbors. The size of Ger- himself as dictator of Germany, rearm
many’s armed forces was strictly limited the German state, and eliminate Ger-
by the treaty, and it was required to pay many’s Jews, communists, socialists,
a large sum (the figure to be arrived at and others whom he detested. (He
later) to the victorious Allied nations. included the word “socialist” in his
The new democratic Germany, party’s name to placate left-wingers.)
which moved its capital to the small He then proposed to lead this newly
126
• G E R M A N Y •

strengthened and purified nation in an von Hindenburg, who was old and
anticommunist, anti-Slav war that politically incompetent, to issue emer-
would provide Germans with additional gency decrees that concentrated all
living space. power in Hitler’s hands. It was the end
Far from making a secret of his of German democracy. After Hinden-
plans to destroy democracy and subju- burg died in 1934 Hitler took over the
gate Europe, Hitler laid them out in presidency as well, naming himself to
Mein Kampf (My Struggle), a book that the new office of Führer (leader) and
other leaders in Germany and the rest of Reich chancellor. Germany was now
the world failed to take seriously. It was officially the Third Reich (the first was
written in 1924, while Hitler was in the medieval Holy Roman Empire; the
prison for having attempted to seize second, imperial Germany).
control of Munich, the capital of In 1935, having turned Germany
Bavaria, by force. Although his small into a police state, Hitler canceled the
band of revolutionaries was easily military provisions of the Treaty of Ver-
defeated, Hitler’s decision to take power sailles and officially launched his rear-
legally proved to be all too successful. mament program. On March 7, 1936,
Hitler turned his small party into a he marched troops into the Rhineland
national movement by exploiting Ger- section of Germany (on the border with
man anti-Semitism, anticommunism, France), which had been demilitarized
and resentment of the Versailles Treaty. by the Versailles Treaty. Although his
But had it not been for the Great army was very small at this time,
Depression, it is unlikely that he would Britain, but especially France—which
have been able to seize power. had enough troops to sweep the
In the 1928 general election, Rhineland clean of German forces in a
Hitler’s party gained only 800,000 matter of days—did nothing. This was
votes. Then, on September 14, 1930, as the first of Hitler’s bloodless victories
the German economy was falling apart, that would make Germany the domi-
the Nazis won 6.5 million votes—more nant power in Europe. Britain and
than 18 percent of the total that were France believed they had to choose
cast. On July 31, 1932, with the econ- between war (which both desperately
omy in ruins because of the Great wanted to avoid) or tolerating German
Depression, the Nazis doubled their expansion. In the end, they wound up
representation in the Reichstag, Ger- with both.
many’s parliament. They won 37 per- On March 12, 1938, Hitler’s troops
cent of the popular vote and elected marched into the independent state of
230 of about 545 delegates. They were Austria, absorbing its largely German-
now the largest German political party. speaking population into the Third
The Weimar Republic had held its last Reich. Hitler then turned his attention
free election. As the economy continued to Czechoslovakia, where about 3 mil-
to worsen, Adolf Hitler, through a series lion ethnic Germans lived in the Sude-
of complex political maneuvers, suc- tenland, the area bordering Germany.
ceeded in having himself appointed Although Czechoslovakia had a military
chancellor of Germany. alliance with France, Hitler believed,
Hitler in power As Germany’s chief correctly, that the Allies would continue
executive, Hitler rapidly consolidated his to appease him. He was also correct in
power by appointing Nazis to key posi- thinking that the Allies would continue
tions. He also persuaded President Paul to ignore the Soviet Union, which,
127
• G E R M A N Y •

alarmed by Germany’s growing appetite,


was trying to promote unity of action
among the anti-Nazi states of Europe.
Amid a crisis atmosphere, and faced
with a Nazi deadline, the leaders of
Britain, France, Italy, and Germany met
in Munich on September 29, 1938. On Image Not Available
the next day it was agreed that Germany
was to have the Sudetenland, while
Poland and Hungary would also acquire
Czech territory. The Czech government,
abandoned by its allies, went down with-
out a fight. When he returned home,
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of
Britain waved a copy of the Munich
agreement in the air and said, “This
means peace in our time.” “Our time” generals had organized a conspiracy to On August 23,
lasted slightly less than one year. unseat Hitler, as they obviously would 1939, Soviet
Since 1938 Munich has symbolized have to do if the Allies stood firm at foreign minister
the wrongness of seeking to buy off Munich. Their failure confirmed Hitler Molotov signs
aggressors by submitting to their as the man who was always right, the German-
Soviet nonag-
demands. It was the low point of the era putting an end to the plot against him. It
gression pact.
of appeasement and the prelude to war. also deprived the Allies of a vast store of
Stalin (standing
It was also the result of a major failure Czech armaments that Germany would second from
by the Allies to understand the political use against them. right), witnesses
and military realities of Europe in 1938. After promising at Munich that the historic
Britain and France did understand that there would be no more annexations, on event.
another great war, even if they won it, March 15, 1939, Hitler seized what was
would finish them as world powers. left of Czechoslovakia. Britain and
What Britain and France did not see France at once gave guarantees of mili-
was that Hitler’s plans could be realized tary support to Poland, Romania,
only by another great war and, that being Greece, and Turkey, all of which feared
so, the best time to fight him would have military attack by Germany. As it turned
been in 1938. Germany’s war mobiliza- out, the promise that mattered most was
tion plan would not be completed until the one given to Poland.
1942. At the time of Munich the German Poland was the wrong place to
Army was far weaker than it would be a draw the line, however, because it had
year later. Czechoslovakia’s army had 35 no strongly fortified border with the
well-armed divisions, equipped by the Reich and was too far away for the
mighty Skoda works, the greatest arms Allies to support. There now remained
manufacturing complex in Europe, and only one more step for Hitler to take
powerful fortifications along its border before launching a general war.
with Germany. If Britain and France had On August 23, 1939, the world
come to Czechoslovakia’s aid, the odds learned that Germany and the Soviet
were that Germany would have been Union had signed a nonaggression
beaten. treaty, usually known as the Stalin-
The German high command was so Hitler Pact. The Allies were stunned, for
certain of losing that certain prominent Hitler’s anticommunist views were
128
• G E R M A N Y •

widely known, while the Soviets had for ber 28 Germany and the Soviet Union
years been seeking an alliance with the divided Poland between them. The
West. Hitler’s motives were obvious. Allies declared war on September 3 but
With the Soviet Union out of the way took no real action against the Third
he would not have to fight a two-front Reich, resulting in the so-called “Phony
war, as Germany had been forced to do War” of 1939–40. This period ended in
in 1914–18. The Soviet’s motives were April 1940, when Germany seized Den-
less clear. At the time, communists mark and invaded Norway. Allied
praised the pact as a master stroke efforts to aid Norway were futile, and it
that would give Russia time to rearm. surrendered on June 9, by which time
Nonetheless, when war did come to Germany had driven the British out of
the Soviets in 1941 they were unready Europe and all but defeated France. On
for it. June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the
A more likely explanation for the Soviet Union.
Soviets’ signing of this pact is that Stalin This was the final result of the|
had decided that the Allies would not Stalin-Hitler Pact, which came close to
accept him as a partner, which was true destroying the Soviet Union. As Winston
at the time, since they feared him as Churchill said in the memoirs he wrote
much as Hitler. That being so, a war after the war, these events showed Stalin
between the Allies and Germany would and his henchmen to be “the most com-
probably drag on for years, as it had pletely outwitted bunglers” of the war.
after 1914. This presented Stalin with Millions of Soviet citizens would pay
an opportunity to grab land, with Ger- with their lives for Stalin’s blunders, as
man permission, in return for Soviet would other innocent millions whose
neutrality—without, as he saw it, risk- graves would cover Europe.
ing very much. Stalin believed that, as a Role of the United States The
result of the pact, the Soviet Union United States’s policy during this period
would gain a large chunk of Poland, was much the same as that of Britain
the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and France, although it pursued the
and Estonia, parts of Romania, and— policy independently, because the Unit-
after hard fighting, which Stalin had ed States did not belong to the League
not expected—Finland. In return, the of Nations and was not allied with any-
Soviets were to provide Germany with one. Public opinion polls, which had
huge amounts of oil, grain, and other become important in the United States
raw materials, a promise Stalin scrupu- by the mid 1930s, showed that a large
lously kept. majority was opposed to fighting in
Of all Stalin’s blunders this pact Europe for any reason. Congress
was certainly the greatest. But for it, responded to this sentiment with a series
Hitler would not have dared to invade of Neutrality acts that tied the Presi-
France for fear of a Soviet attack. Or, if dent’s hands. Accordingly, President
he did, he would have had to leave such Roosevelt had little choice except to
large forces on his eastern frontier that hope that appeasement would work.
France would not have fallen. As it was, When the Spanish Civil War broke out
Stalin’s greed very nearly undid the in 1936, he followed the Allied lead in
Soviet Union. embargoing arms both to the democrati-
The outbreak of war Hitler in- cally elected government of Spain and
vaded Poland on September 1, 1939, the Fascist rebels, as he was required to
defeating it in four weeks. On Septem- do by the Neutrality acts. And after the
129
• G E R M A N Y •

Munich agreement was signed, Roo- had little to spare.


sevelt congratulated Prime Minister What Britain needed to win its
Chamberlain for having kept the peace. lonely war with Hitler was to have the
After war broke out, the United United States as a full-fledged ally, not
States remained neutral, as required by simply a provider of aid. This remained
law. However, the Allies were able to true even after Germany invaded the
purchase commodities and war materi- Soviet Union in June 1941, as the Sovi-
als in the United States while Germany ets were not expected to survive the
could not, because of a British blockade. Nazi onslaught. In fact, now that the
After the fall of France in June 1940, Soviet Union had entered the war, it was
Roosevelt sent as many weapons as pos- more important than ever for the United
sible to the British Army, which had left States to get in, too.
most of its arms behind during the evac- Although Germany was not yet in a
uation from the northern French port of position to threaten the United States, if
Dunkirk in June 1940. it defeated Britain and the Soviets that
By ransacking its arsenals and day would surely come. Waiting for
armories, the United States was able to Germany to invade the United States, as
transfer a total of 970,000 rifles, 87,500 polls showed Americans wished to do,
machine guns, and 895 field guns, would mean battling Germany without
together with large quantities of ammu- Allies, on U.S. soil. Obviously, one
nition, to the British. Although most of would think, the time to fight was while
these arms were leftovers from World Britain and the Soviet Union were still
War I, they were useful for training pur- in the war. And the best place to fight
poses and for arming Britain’s Home was as far from the United States as
Guards—overaged civilians who would possible.
fight as a last resort. In September Roo- Roosevelt’s efforts to join the war
sevelt announced that agreement had By the summer of 1941, Roosevelt
been reached with Britain to exchange seems to have reached this conclusion,
50 or 60 obsolete U.S. destroyers for the but because the American people had
American right to use British bases in not, he was prepared to take action him-
the Western Hemisphere. self. The result was an undeclared naval
Roosevelt wished to do more, but war against Germany designed to pro-
U.S. isolationists were already furious voke incidents that would either lead
with him for the steps he had taken thus Hitler to declare war on the United
far. This mattered, because he had de- States or lead Americans to demand that
cided to run for an unprecedented third Congress declare war against Germany.
term and could not afford to antagonize On July 7, 1941, a U.S. occupation
any more voters. Once safely elected, force landed in Iceland, giving the
though, Roosevelt called for a program United States a forward base from
to aid Britain and its allies by lending, or which it could command the sea-lanes
leasing, weapons to them that would to Britain. In August, Roosevelt met
supposedly be repaid in cash, or in kind with Winston Churchill and signed a
(a term that Roosevelt never clarified), statement of war aims that was called
after the war. Lend-Lease, as it came to the Atlantic Charter. He was making
be called, would make a great difference plans to have U.S. naval ships escort
in the end. But it would help Britain convoys when, on September 4, the
very little in the short run, because the destroyer USS Greer was torpedoed by a
United States was underarmed itself and German U-boat. Roosevelt used this
130
• G E R M A N Y •

A mass roll call


of several of
Hitler’s armies
at a rally in
Nuremberg
attests to their
strength and
organization.

Image Not Available

incident to begin convoying, while also and a geographic area of 226,288 square
instructing the U.S. Navy to shoot Ger- miles. At the peak of its power in 1941,
man warships “on sight.” the Third Reich, having annexed vast ter-
A Gallup poll in September 1941 ritories on all three of its prewar fron-
showed that, although they still hoped to tiers, had 116 million inhabitants and
stay out of the war, 62 percent of Ameri- covered an area of 344,080 square miles.
cans supported the President’s shoot-on- Even before this great expansion,
sight order. But even after a U-boat sank however, Germany was the largest coun-
the USS Reuben James on October 31, try west of the Soviet Union and the eco-
killing 115 sailors, polls showed that the nomic giant of Europe. Thanks to Hitler’s
public still would not support a declara- rearmament program, there was no
tion of war against Germany. With Hitler unemployment. At the time, many Amer-
obstinately refusing to take the bait, Roo- icans believed that the German state and
sevelt’s strategy had failed. In that dark economy were models of Teutonic preci-
hour the cause of freedom seemed lost, sion and police-state efficiency. But in fact
and it might have been had Japan not the Nazi state was a shambles, remark-
attacked U.S. military installations, able for its overlapping authorities and
including the great naval base at Pearl plagued by bureaucratic chaos. Personali-
Harbor on December 7. Four days later ties were vitally important, with favored
Hitler, too, declared war on the United administrators expanding their little
States. U.S. entry into World War II had empires at the expense of those outside
become a reality at last. the magic circle of power.
German home front In 1939 Ger- Germany’s economic planning
many had a population of 79.5 million shared these same defects and was further
131
• G E R M A N Y •

handicapped because the supreme leader maintaining peacetime standards of com-


did not wish the military mobilization to fort and luxury. As late as 1944, factories
annoy civilians. Accordingly, although manufacturing such domestic items as
Hitler increased armament production rugs and picture frames were still not
before the war, he resisted stockpiling converted to producing war materials.
essential materials. German munitions For these and other reasons Germany’s
were produced over and above consumer ammunition production never reached
goods to a much greater degree than World War I levels, though its paperwork
might be expected. Germany made up for was far greater, the Ordnance Office
domestic shortages by plundering captive alone having a staff 10 times as big as in
nations, but robbery had its limits. In the previous war. Captured resources, the
1942 Hitler was obliged to put the econ- exploitation of occupied lands, and wide-
omy on a war footing at last. spread use of slave labor (7.8 million
After the death of Minister of Arma- forced laborers in 1944, compared to
ments and War Production Fritz Todt, 28.6 million German workers) enabled
Hitler installed Albert Speer, his favorite Germany to carry on for a long time.
architect, as head of mobilization. In Even so, there were never enough work-
1942 and 1943, Speer tripled war pro- ers, and by 1944 food, oil, and other
duction. In some areas he did more than essentials were running short as well.
that, increasing tank production sixfold After D-Day, Hitler was finally forced to
in two years, for example. Yet still more mobilize the Reich fully—a move that
could have been done, for Speer never came too late in the war to affect its out-
had full control of the domestic war come.
effort. Manpower was directed by anoth- The result was that, despite Speer’s
er minister, who seldom took account of best efforts, Germany’s war production
Speer’s requirements. And powerful lead- did not meet its needs. During the war,
ers, such as Nazi party chief Martin Bor- German aircraft plants turned out at
mann, opposed total mobilization as most 118,000 aircraft, only about as
being harmful to civilian morale. many as Britain did. The United States
There were other reasons why Speer had built more than 300,000 planes by
was unable to make the best use of Ger- war’s end.
many’s human and material resources. In tanks, too, Germany was heavily
Hitler made a practice of assigning one or outproduced. During the war years, Ger-
more agencies or individuals to perform many produced some 64,000 tanks, but
the same task. “That way,” he used to few of these were Panthers and Tigers,
tell Speer, “the stronger one does the the best German models. The United
job.” Another handicap was that Nazi States built about 86,000 tanks, most of
dogma prevented Speer from mobilizing them comparable to the average German
German women. Businessmen showed tank, but the Soviets manufactured more
Speer photographs of workers changing than 100,000 assault guns and tanks.
shifts in the same ammunition factory 24 Further, the Soviets had medium and
years apart. Yet while in 1918 the heavy tanks that were comparable to
employees had been predominantly Germany’s Panthers and Tigers but were
women, in 1942 most were men. To produced in far larger numbers.
Speer’s disgust they remained so, with Nazi Germany was a unitary state.
Nazi leaders refusing to actively recruit All power was derived from Hitler per-
women despite the labor shortage. sonally, and his rule was enforced by the
Furthermore, the Nazis insisted on SS, which directly controlled all police
132
• G E R M A N Y , S U R R E N D E R O F •

and internal security agencies. Opponents Princeton University Press, 1984.


of the Nazis were executed or sent to Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the
Third Reich. New York: Simon & Schus-
concentration camps. Increasingly the ter, 1960.
country was administered, as well as led, Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. New
by the Nazi party rather than by govern- York: Macmillan, 1970.
Weinberg, Gerhart L. The Foreign Policy
ment ministries. A shadow and, finally, a of Hitler’s Germany. Chicago: University
real government based on regional party of Chicago Press, 1980.
leaders called gauleiters, paralleled the
departments of state. All Germans were
expected to be members of one or more
Nazi organizations.
Instead of trade unions, German Germany, surrender of
workers were required to join the Ger-
man Labor Front. In 1942 it had 25 mil-
lion members, and its farmers’ equivalent,
the Reich Foodstuffs Corporation, 15 On January 12, 1945, while the Battle of
million. German children between 10 and the Bulge was still raging, the Soviets
18 years of age belonged to Hitler youth kicked off their long-awaited offensive
organizations. As an administrative body, and the eastern front promptly crumbled.
therefore, the Nazi state was a nightmare The German economy was on the verge
and an obstacle to efficiency. As a police of collapse. Yet with Germany on its last
state, however, it was highly effective and legs, its cities burned out, and the noose
kept Germany’s population in line to the around it tightening, the German Army
very last day of the war. fought on without hope or purpose.
Some veterans would later say that
SEE ALSO by continuing the war they were
Atlantic Charter; France, fall of; German attempting to save as much of Germany
Army; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; Japan; as they could from being overrun by the
Luftwaffe; Poland; Soviet Union; SS
(Schutzsstaffeln); Stalin, Joseph
Soviets. This argument would be plausi-
ble if German resistance on the western
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G front had faltered. Instead, right up to its
Bidwell, Shelford. Hitler’s Generals and final days the German Army was still
Their Battles. New York: Random fighting hard in the West, blowing
House, 1998.
Forman, James. Horses of Anger. New
bridges and doing all it could to delay
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1967. the Allied advance. Desperate as condi-
Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and tions were, however, they might have
the Struggle for Collective Security in been worse. Hitler’s final orders, which
Europe, 1933–39. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 1984. were not carried out because of the obvi-
Heinrichs, Waldo. Threshold of War: ous madness behind them, were for the
Franklin D. Roosevelt & U.S. Entry into Army to destroy everything of value in
World War II. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1988. Germany and then fight to the last man.
Hildebrand, Klaus. The Foreign Policy of While those on the inside could see
the Third Reich. Berkeley: University of that Germany was finished, the Allies
California Press, 1973.
Jäckel, Eberhard. Hitler’s World View: A
did not. The Battle of the Bulge seemed
Blueprint for Power. Cambridge, Mass.: to show that Germany could still take
Harvard University Press, 1981. offensive action. It was known that Ger-
Murray, Williamson. The Change in the man industry was still producing fighter
European Balance of Power, 1938–1939:
The Path to Ruin. Princeton, N.J.: planes in quantity despite all the bomb-
133
• G E R M A N Y , S U R R E N D E R O F •

ing attacks. Luftwaffe pilots still had


plenty of aircraft, which were increas-
ingly jets, while the first Allied jet was
not expected to enter service before
October—another nine months away.
In addition, General Omar Bradley’s
“hurry up” offensive, which he launched
to take advantage of Germany’s retreat
from the Bulge, stalled. On February 1,
he was up against the West Wall, Ger-
many’s lines of defense, and going
nowhere fast. At the same time, losses
were continuing to mount. The U.S.
Image Not Available
Army’s casualties, including those result-
ing from illness or injury, totaled 134,400
in December, 136,700 in February, and
would come to 101,000 in March.
Meanwhile, on March 3, the last
U.S. divisions arrived in Europe. Except
for individual replacements, there were
no troops left in the States, forcing Eisen-
hower to consider transferring his newest
armored divisions to the infantry. By late
January he was short 82,000 infantry-
men and the deficit was growing.
Fortunately for all concerned, the
war was nearly over. At Malta, on their
way to the Yalta conference, U.S. and
British chiefs met to plan their final
offensives. One last British effort to give
Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Mont-
gomery 16 U.S. divisions for a single
thrust into northern Germany, plus com-
mand of all land forces, was stopped for defensive, Bradley would be allowed to
good by General George C. Marshall. mount a secondary advance on Frankfurt-
While Britain cited the Battle of the Kassel. He was content with this, certain
Bulge as evidence that the Allies were too that Montgomery would attack too late
weak for more than one offensive, Eisen- and move too slowly. Moreover, although
hower had drawn the opposite conclu- this was unclear as yet, retraining pro-
sion. He was convinced that the Allies grams, transferring men from the air
needed to launch several attacks in order forces and rear areas, together with
to keep Germany from concentrating all Germany’s increasing weakness, would
its available forces against a single one. provide sufficient riflemen for a big
However, Montgomery would still get U.S. push.
12 U.S. divisions, and his next two offen- Bradley’s plan The British com-
sives would be strongly supported. menced Operation Veritable on Febru-
But whereas Britain wanted the ary 8, 1945, but covered only 17 miles
remaining U.S. armies to go over to the during the next two weeks. Meanwhile,
134
• G E R M A N Y , S U R R E N D E R O F •

General George S. Patton’s Third Army, sive that would rival, and perhaps
which had been ordered to conduct an replace, Montgomery’s, which was not
“active defense,” had broken through to start for two weeks.
the West Wall on a 40-mile front. The Eisenhower, also excited by the turn
U.S. Ninth Army and the British 21st of events, gave permission to put four
Army Group jumped off together on divisions over the Rhine. On March 13
February 23 and made the long-awaited Eisenhower instructed Bradley to secure
breakthrough, advancing 53 miles in the bridgehead at Remagen and attack
two weeks, capturing 30,000 German toward Frankfurt, junking Operation
troops, and clearing 34 miles of the Undertow. He also approved Bradley’s
Rhine’s west bank. “right hook” plan, knowing full well, or
Meanwhile, Bradley was working so Bradley believed, that while Plunder
on a plan of attack that would put his was still supposed to be the major oper-
own armies on the Rhine as well. This ation, the U.S. attack would actually
strategy went beyond the supportive role become the main one. Hitler also recog-
he had been assigned and would enable nized the importance of losing the
his armies to cross the Rhine before Ludendorff bridge. The officers held to
Montgomery if Montgomery failed to be responsible for the loss were shot.
pick up speed. On March 7 both armies The U.S. offensive On March 13
reached the Rhine. Patton set off, followed by the Seventh
Supreme Headquarters planned for Army. After hard initial fighting they
Montgomery to cross on March 24 with speeded up, capturing 90,000 Germans
32 divisions. But Bradley intended to between them in the largest seizure of
take advantage of the room Eisenhower prisoners since the Germans lost North
was giving him to merge Third and Sev- Africa. On the 23rd, Patton called
enth armies, plus French First, for a mas- Bradley to say he was over the Rhine,
sive sweep to Frankfurt. This in turn having crossed on the fly without even
would enable the U.S. First Army to firing an artillery barrage. He was excit-
cross the Rhine and the combined Franco- ed over beating Montgomery, who had,
American force of 40 divisions to drive as usual, spent too much time making
on to Kassel. his arrangements. Montgomery crossed
Plunder, the British operation, was easily on the 24th as scheduled. Mean-
supposed to be the main event, with while, U.S. troops were pouring across
Bradley’s, code named Undertow, a sec- the Rhine on boats and pontoon
ondary operation. If all worked as bridges. Their effort to contain the U.S.
Bradley expected, however, the U.S. drive Army and conduct the war-winning
would change that. offensive having failed, the British had
On the evening of March 7, fate no choice but to accept a revised plan
gave Bradley a hand. He received a call that had U.S. forces driving for the
from Lieutenant General Courtnay H. Elbe—where the Allies and the Soviets
Hodges saying that the 9th Armored would meet—while Montgomery pro-
Division of his First Army had just cap- tected their northern flank. Mont-
tured the Ludendorff railway bridge at gomery’s 21st Army Group, having
Remagen, the Germans having failed to moved too slowly, would now have to
blow it. Bradley ordered Hodges to play the supporting role.
cross in strength and hold the bridge at On April 4 Eisenhower returned the
all costs. Bradley was elated—now he Ninth Army to Bradley, who now com-
had an opportunity to launch an offen- manded four U.S. armies with 48 divi-
135
• G E R M A N Y , S U R R E N D E R O F •

An aerial view
of the medieval
German city of
Wurzberg
reveals the dam-
age inflicted by
an Allied bomb-
ing raid on
April 1, 1945.
Strategic bomb-
ing often turned
into terror
bombing, and
many German
Image Not Available
city centers were
completely
destroyed.

sions and 1.3 million men, the largest Eisenhower notified Stalin that he ex-
ground force ever commanded by a U.S. pected to meet the Soviet forces roughly
general. With it he would promptly win along the lines established at Yalta.
the war in the West. Although this decision was heavily criti-
Originally the Americans, like the cized at the time, it now seems that Eisen-
British, had seen Berlin as the great prize hower was right to make it. Saving
toward which their efforts should be American lives was more important than
directed. But at the Yalta conference, the empty honor of taking Berlin.
Britain took the lead in agreeing to The war ended abruptly. The Ninth
occupation boundaries that put Berlin Army reached the Elbe River on April
well within what would become the 11 after traveling 226 miles in 19 days.
Soviet zone, although the city itself was On the 16th, Soviet forces attacked
to be divided among the victors. In late Berlin. Two days later German resis-
March, with German resistance crum- tance in the Ruhr ended, with the Allies
bling, it suddenly became possible for taking 317,000 prisoners. While Mont-
the 12th Army Group to drive straight gomery moved carefully across northern
for Berlin. But all knew that whoever Germany, more American troops
attacked Berlin would take heavy losses. reached the Elbe and Patton drove into
Any responsible U.S. commander Czechoslovakia.
was bound to shrink from the idea of los- The German retreat quickly became
ing many men for territory that would a rout, with the U.S. 18th Airborne
then have to be given up. Thus, at the Corps alone capturing 360,000 enemy
end of March, on his own initiative, soldiers. Hitler committed suicide in his
136
• G I B I L L O F R I G H T S •

Berlin bunker on April 30. The next day to 52 weeks to ease the
Germany’s last units in Italy surren- transition from war to Image Not Available
dered. On May 7 Admiral Karl Doenitz, work. Among other things,
who had taken command of the Third the bill provided low-cost,
Reich, surrendered it to Eisenhower at no-down-payment home loans,
2:41 a.m. in Reims, France. The war in lent money to start businesses or
Europe was over. run farms, and, most important, pro-
vided tuition and some living costs for Veterans wore
SEE ALSO
veterans wanting to enroll in high this discharge
Bulge, Battle of; Eastern front; Eisenhower,
schools, trade schools, and colleges. emblem, which
Dwight D.
Congress had not wanted this bill they irreverent-
to be thought of as social legislation. ly called “the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ruptured
Ambrose, Stephen A. Eisenhower and But owing to the huge number of World
duck,” on civil-
Berlin: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe. War II veterans, the GI Bill had the
New York: Norton, 1967. ian clothing
same effect as a major social reform. By after the war.
Benary, Margo. Dangerous Spring. New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1961. 1950 the 16 million veterans and their
Montgomery, Rutherford G. Rough Riders families made up fully a third of the
Ho! Philadelphia: David McKay, 1946. population. In 1945 there had been a
Ryan, Cornelius. The Last Battle. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1966. colossal housing shortage. Five years
Toland, John. The Last 100 Days. New later it was over, thanks largely to the
York: Random House, 1966. 4.3 million home loans provided by the
GI Bill. Nearly 8 million veterans went
back to school, learned a trade, or
attended college under the bill.
GI Bill of Rights The money spent directly by the
federal government rippled through the
whole economy, providing jobs in con-
struction, manufacturing, retail sales,
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, and other areas to people who were not
popularly known as the GI Bill, was veterans. Further, the bill made possible
passed by Congress in January 1944. the baby boom, for veterans could now
After the Civil War and World War I, afford to start families while they were
Congress had voted cash bonuses for still in school, which millions of them
veterans. These benefits had become did. The soaring birth rate, which rose
political footballs, especially the World year by year until the end of the 1950s,
War I bonuses. When it came time to created the largest generation in history.
consider veterans’ benefits for World These baby boomers had to be housed,
War II, everyone remembered the two fed, and educated, creating additional
“bonus marches” of the Depression millions of jobs.
era, one of which had ended in vio- The members of the war generation
lence, when thousands of veterans had became the best-educated and most
marched on Washington demanding prosperous Americans ever seen up to
early payment of their bonuses. that time because of a much-deserved
After World War II, thanks to the GI tribute to them that benefited the entire
Bill, there would be no bonus armies, no nation. The GI Bill showed government
violence, and no attempts to buy veter- at its best, rewarding veterans for their
ans’ votes. One feature of the bill pro- sacrifices and helping them to reach
vided veterans with $20 a week for up their full potential.
137
• G R E N A D E S •

F U RT H E R R E A D I N G runs more or less alongside of southeast-


Kennett, Lee B. G.I.: The American Soldier ern New Guinea. Guadalcanal (code
in World War II. New York: Scribners, named Cactus by the military) is the
1987.
Linderman, Gerald F. The World Within largest of the southern Solomons.
War: America’s Combat Experience in In 1942 the Japanese were building
World War II. New York: Free Press, 1997. an airfield on it. The U.S. Navy’s chief,
Admiral Ernest King, was determined
to seize Guadalcanal, although there
Great Britain was no compelling reason to do so.
Japan already had a great network of
SEE Britain
naval and air stations in the region at
Rabaul. The airfield on Guadalcanal
could never equal Fortress Rabaul, and
Grenades it was farther from New Guinea, where
the Japanese forces were under heavy
pressure from General Douglas
Grenades were used by all the armies in MacArthur.
World War II to lay smoke (as markers) The reason King wanted Guadal-
and to kill or knock out the enemy. canal was probably that otherwise the
Antipersonnel grenades were designed to Navy would have nothing going on in
break into pieces, spraying deadly shrap- the Pacific in 1942 to match Mac-
nel. Concussion grenades were hurled Arthur’s efforts there, putting it at a dis-
by advancing troops to stun the enemy advantage in its continuous rivalry with
without doing harm to themselves. Rifle the Army. The War Department had
grenades could be fired longer distances well-grounded fears that the Navy was
than a man could throw and packed a too weak to mount such an offensive
greater punch. The U.S. M9A1 armor- and would soon be calling for help.
piercing grenade was especially good, Nonetheless, as part of the ceaseless bar-
with many GIs preferring it to the rocket- gaining between the services, it reluc-
firing bazooka. Because of their smaller tantly gave its consent.
size, U.S. grenades could be thrown far- Operation Watchtower, or Opera-
ther than German or Japanese ones. tion Shoestring, as the men called it,
The long-handled German “potato consisted of three elements. Its landing
masher” grenade was more powerful party was built around the 1st Marine
and easier to throw accurately than U.S. Division, which was not yet fully
grenades. Japanese grenades, like so trained and prepared for combat. The
many of their explosives, were frequently invasion fleet included three of the
duds. There were cases of Japanese sol- Navy’s four remaining carriers under
diers attempting to commit suicide with the command of Rear Admiral Frank
grenades that only gave them headaches. Jack Fletcher. The third element,
Amphibious Force South Pacific, was
made up of the vessels transporting the
1st Marines and their gear. It was com-
Guadalcanal, Battle of manded by Rear Admiral Richmond
Kelly Turner, formerly a planner on
King’s staff. Known as “Terrible”
Turner because of his bad temper and
The Solomon Islands are a chain that abusive language, he would become the
138
• G U A D A L C A N A L , B A T T L E O F •

A mechanic
hoists up the
tail of this Cor-
sair at an
airstrip in
Guadalcanal in
order to align
the plane’s
guns properly.
Image Not Available

navy’s leading expert on amphibious 12 dive bombers, the beginnings of the


operations. “Cactus Air Force.” Its planes controlled
Watchtower nearly failed at the out- the air and sea by day, confining the
set because of Fletcher’s lack of faith in it enemy to night attacks and limited, high-
and his fear of losing carriers. For these speed, nocturnal supply runs. This
reasons he sailed away only 36 hours “Tokyo Express” enabled Japanese
after the Marines had landed and before troops to keep fighting on Guadalcanal,
they were half unloaded. He left only but in the race to build up their respec-
cruisers and destroyers to defend the tive forces Japan would be the loser.
invasion force. Fletcher’s career never Guadalcanal might have gone the
recovered from this mistake, because other way if Japan had made a maxi-
even as he fled, Japanese heavy cruisers mum effort. Instead, the Japanese rein-
were storming down the “Slot” formed forced their position piecemeal, frittering
by the Solomon Islands. At 1:30 a.m. on away their troops. Even so, as a direct
August 9, 1942, they took the Allied result of Watchtower, the Navy was
cruisers by surprise, destroying four— reduced at one point to a single carrier in
three U.S. and one Australian. The Battle the Pacific. To hold Guadalcanal would
of Savo Island, the U.S. Navy’s worst cost the United States 24 ships and make
defeat at sea, did much to make the the waters between it and Savo and
Guadalcanal campaign a prolonged Florida islands—Ironbottom Sound to
nightmare. Since Turner now had no air the Allied sailors—the largest naval
cover, Amphibious Force South Pacific graveyard of the war.
weighed anchor at noon, leaving the The fight to secure Guadalcanal
Marines stranded. would last for six months, involve six
As the Allies were stretched so thin, major naval engagements, the loss of six
Watchtower might have ended disas- Allied heavy cruisers and two fleet carri-
trously but for a stroke of luck. The ers, and the commitment of 60,000 sol-
Japanese had nearly finished their airfield diers and Marines. For four of those
on Guadalcanal, which the invading months, the Marines would be partially
Marines captured. Then on August 20 isolated, dependent on a handful of
the Marines received 19 U.S. fighters and pilots and a few blockade-runners. The
139
• G U D E R I A N , H E I N Z •

Marines hung on by their fingertips, was the world’s foremost exponent of


inspiring James Michener to compare the armored warfare. In that capacity he
“Canal” to Valley Forge and Shiloh. invented the blitzkrieg form of attack
After Guadalcanal was secured, it that swept the enemy from the field in
seemed logical to clear the rest of the Poland and France.
Solomons, which would take most of During the years between the world
1943 and, like Guadalcanal itself, confer wars, Guderian was one of a handful of
few benefits beyond the destruction of prophets of armored warfare, a small
Japanese weapons and personnel. group that included Charles de Gaulle
Although the Marines covered themselves of France, J. F. C. Fuller in Britain, and
with glory in this fight, they endured Major Dwight D. Eisenhower and
almost 6,000 casualties on Guadalcanal, Colonel George S. Patton of the U.S.
of which 1,600 were fatal. Together with Army. Most armies then regarded the
the Navy’s losses, this was a high price to tank as an infantry support weapon.
pay for marginal real estate. Only this small group of visionaries real-
ized that the mobility and striking
SEE ALSO
power of an armored force made it
Halsey, William F.; South Pacific area;
Southwest Pacific area capable of spearheading an army’s
attack. It could then either pierce the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
enemy’s line or flank it, that is, go
Bergerud, Eric. Touched with Fire: The around it and cut it off, leading to a
Land War in the South Pacific. New
York: Viking, 1996. quick victory in either case.
Leckie, Robert. Challenge for the Pacific: Unlike the others, Guderian was
Guadalcanal, the Turning Point of the able to put this idea into practice during
War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.
Merillat, Herbert. Guadalcanal Remembered. the 1930s because he enjoyed the
New York: Dodd, Mead, 1982. patronage of Adolf Hitler. Although
Hitler was eager for war in the 1930s,
he understood that Germany did not
have the resources to win a war of attri-
Guderian, Heinz tion. It was critical, therefore, that ways
be found to neutralize the superiority in
GERMAN GENERAL AND manpower and industrial resources that
PANZER COMMANDER Germany’s potential enemies enjoyed.
• Born: June 17, 1888, Germany Hitler believed that part of the
• Political party: National Socialist answer lay in forming the world’s best air
• Education: Cadet School, 1907; War force. The rest of the solution, he con-
School, 1908; War Academy, 1914
cluded, could be provided by a tank-led
• Military service: General Staff Corps,
1918; chief of staff of Panzertruppe, army. Guderian stood out among Ger-
1934; commander, Panzer Group many’s tank experts, both because of his
Guderian, 1940; acting chief of staff, ability and because of his book Achtung!
Army High Command (OKH), 1944
• Died: May 14, 1954, Wurnburg, Panzer!, which drew attention to his ideas
Germany when it was published in 1937.
As chief of staff of the Panzertruppe,
Germany’s first real armored force, which
was Guderian’s creation, he had been
Although Heinz Guderian did not rise to able to prove in practice what he had
the top of the German Army, as he argued for in theory. As a relatively junior
should have given his genius for war, he general, and because the high command
140
• G U D E R I A N , H E I N Z •

was not entirely persuaded by his ideas, In 1943 Guderian was brought out
Guderian was allowed to command only of retirement and made Inspector Gener-
a single corps during the 1939 attack on al of Armored Forces: in effect, Hitler’s
Poland. In the main, however, the Polish advisor on tanks. Following a failed
campaign vindicated Guderian’s theories. coup attempt against Hitler in July 1944,
For the attack in the west, Guderian was Guderian became acting chief of the
again given only his XIX Corps, but it army high command, but with German
was assigned the most important task: to forces everywhere in retreat and under
lead the assault through the Ardennes Hitler’s suspicious eye there was little he
Forest that was to split the Allied line and could do. Guderian made every effort to
win a stunning victory. keep Hitler from squandering what
Guderian and his corps performed remained of the Army’s strength but
brilliantly, breaking through to the En- failed even in this. After opposing the
glish Channel in a matter of days. Had Ardennes campaign, or the Battle of the
the German advance not been brought to Bulge, Guderian was relieved of duty
a halt at Hitler’s orders, it would certainly again in February 1945.
have taken the British Expeditionary Of all the Nazi generals only a few,
Force (BEF) and the French First Army. notably Guderian and Marshal Erwin
Even though the BEF escaped through Rommel, would be well regarded by
the “miracle of Dunkirk” by which civil- Westerners after the war. In Guderian’s
ian and military shipping combined to case, this was in some measure a result
save many British troops, the victory of his autobiography, Panzer Comman-
remained a major achievement that made der (1952), a best-seller in the United
Guderian famous. In the final assault on States. However, both were admired for
French forces, his augmented command, their professionalism, for how they led
Panzer Group Guderian, advanced south from the front and being popular with
to the Swiss border and captured their troops, for not participating in
250,000 French troops in a series of bril- Hitler’s crimes, and for having waged
liant maneuvers. war as honorably as possible.
Guderian opposed the invasion of For example, Guderian refused to
Russia (Operation Barbarossa) in 1941, obey Hitler’s infamous order that Ger-
because Britain had not been defeated man soldiers were not to be punished for
yet and he was also concerned about the killing Russian civilians. At the time,
strength of Soviet armor. All the same, he Guderian invoked professional reasons
was given command of Panzer Group 2, for disciplining offending German sol-
which later became the Second Panzer diers, saying that allowing murder would
Army, the strongest of Germany’s four be prejudicial to discipline. After the war
panzer groups. More brilliant victories he added that murdering civilians was
followed until in December the German contrary to the “dictates of Christian
advance came to a halt because of the conscience.” Both explanations may well
onset of winter. Guderian, with other have been true.
officers, argued strongly for a strategic
SEE ALSO
retreat from the gates of Moscow. Bulge, Battle of the; Eastern front; France,
Denied permission by Hitler, he made fall of
such a withdrawal anyway, only to be
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
relieved of his command in the purge of
Macksey, Kenneth. Guderian: Panzer Gen-
some 30 senior officers that followed. He eral. London: MacDonald and Janes,
never led troops in the field again. 1975.
141
• H A L S E Y , W I L L I A M F . •

At the time, U.S. forces were having


Halsey, William F. difficulty holding on to Guadalcanal.
COMMANDER, U.S. THIRD Naval action in the Solomon Islands had
FLEET, 1943–45 reduced the United States’s carrier
Image Not Available strength in the entire Pacific to a single
• Born: October 30, 1882, Elizabeth,
N.J. ship. The headquarters of the South
• Education: U.S. Naval Academy, Pacific Area reeked of defeatism.
1904; Naval War College, 1932–33; Halsey was supposed to breathe
Army War College, 1933–34
new life into the Solomons campaign,
• Military Service: midshipman, 1904;
ensign, 1906; lieutenant, 1909; raise morale, secure Guadalcanal, and
lieutenant commander, 1915; take the rest of the island chain. As the
commander, 1918; captain, 1927; U.S. forces were still stretched thin, this
commander of Saratoga, 1935;
commandant, Pensacola Naval Air was no easy assignment, but Halsey
Station, 1936–38; commander, filled the leadership gap. Under his direc-
Aircraft Battle Force, 1940–41;
commander, South Pacific force and tion, and with the aid of reinforcements,
South Pacific area, 1942–43; the entire South Pacific Area was in
commander, Third Fleet, 1943–45 Allied hands by spring of 1944.
• Died: August 15, 1959, Fisher’s In September 1944, Halsey took
Island, N.Y.
command of the main force of the Pa-
cific Fleet, which included all the fast
carriers. Previously, under the command
of Admiral Raymond Spruance, it had
William “Bull” Halsey was the most pop- Fifth Fleet. Thereafter, the two admirals
ular U.S. admiral of World War II. would alternate command, the force
Although not the most brilliant fleet offi- being the Third Fleet when Halsey led,
cer, Halsey was a hard driver. He won the the Fifth Fleet under Spruance. This
confidence of his men by his concern for unique command arrangement enabled
their welfare and by his aggressive leader- one admiral to plan the next operation
ship and forceful language. while the other was at sea.
Halsey was a destroyerman for most Admiral Marc Mitscher commanded
of his career, not becoming interested in the fast carriers under both men. His
naval aviation until 1934, when he was unit was designated Task Force (TF) 38
offered command of the carrier Saratoga. when under Halsey and TF 58 under
Only flying officers were given carrier Spruance.
commands, so Halsey first had to qualify Halsey led the Third Fleet in many
as an aviator. He did so, which meant successful actions and one controversial
that he was one of the very few admirals fight. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf
qualified to command carrier task forces (October 24–25, 1944), he fell for a
once war with Japan broke out. Japanese deception plan. The Imperial
After Pearl Harbor, Halsey led some Japanese Navy had decided to attack the
of the first carrier raids against Japanese U.S. amphibious force that was landing
positions. He also led the Doolittle raid, on Leyte with most of its remaining
the first air raid on Tokyo using bombers cruisers and battleships. Because the
launched from the U.S.S. Hornet in April Japanese attacking force would have lit-
1942. But Halsey’s greatest contribution tle air support, it was important to draw
to victory resulted from his being away TF 38 from Leyte Gulf. The
appointed commander of the South Japanese accomplished this by sending
Pacific Area in October 1942. their remaining carriers to the north.
142
• H A L S E Y , W I L L I A M F . •

Image Not Available

These carriers were harmless, having It was the divided command of the
lost most of their aircraft, but the Amer- Pacific war that was really at fault, not
icans did not know that. Halsey’s decision—even though it put
Halsey took the bait, driving north the invasion force at risk. Had he
with all his fast carriers and battleships guarded the beaches instead of going
when the enemy carriers were sighted. after what was thought to be a powerful
This enabled the enemy’s battle line to carrier group, he would have been criti-
attack the troop and supply ships of the cized for that decision too. This had
invasion fleet, which were defended by been the fate of Admiral Spruance after
just three task forces built around small the Battle of the Philippine Sea, when he
escort carriers. The defenders put up was accused of allowing Japanese carri-
such a furious fight, however, that the ers to escape, out of a misplaced con-
Japanese commander believed he was cern for the Saipan invasion force.
under attack by TF 38 and retreated But, while questions may be raised
from Leyte Gulf. about Halsey’s performance at Leyte
Halsey’s decision to go after the Gulf and about his seamanship (he twice
Japanese carriers has attracted many sailed his fleet into typhoons), his place
defenders. He believed that his main in history seems secure. He raised U.S.
duty was not to protect the invasion morale in the darkest days of the war
force but to destroy the Japanese Fleet. with his carrier raids and pugnacity. As
Because Halsey reported to the Navy’s commander of the South Pacific Area,
Admiral Nimitz, while the admiral com- he turned a demoralized command into
manding the invasion reported to the a winning one and led the Third Fleet to
Army’s General MacArthur, confusion numerous victories. Few admirals
reigned. accomplished as much.
143
• H A M B U R G , B O M B I N G O F •

SEE ALSO that 150-mile-per-hour winds arose as


Guadalcanal, Battle of; Leyte Gulf, Battle air was sucked into the vacuum. People
of; South Pacific Area untouched by the flames died of gas poi-
soning in their homes and air raid shel-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
ters for lack of oxygen.
Potter, E. B. Bull Halsey. Annapolis, Md.: Perhaps 42,000 people perished in
Naval Institute Press, 1985.
Hamburg, and 1 million more fled the
city. In one week Bomber Command
and U.S. bombers had killed more civil-
ians than the Luftwaffe had slain in its
Hamburg, bombing of entire eight-month blitz of England in
1940–41. Yet, like other terror raids,
this did not drive German morale to the
point of surrender, as had been hoped.
The first firestorm (in which separate Nor did it destroy many industrial tar-
fires combine to form one great inferno gets, because most lay outside the devas-
that sucks oxygen up at such a rate tated city’s center. According to some
that people untouched by the fire or accounts, military production actually
blast still suffocated in their shelters) to rose in greater Hamburg after the raids,
result from a bombing attack took place because workers previously employed in
in Hamburg, Germany. On July 24, shops and stores burned out by the
1943, the Royal Air Force’s Bomber attack sought employment in defense
Command launched 791 aircraft. It was industries.
the largest attack Bomber Command
SEE ALSO
had made to that date. For the first
Royal Air Force; Strategic bombing
time, bundles of narrow foil strips,
called windows, were employed to con-
fuse German radar. It was highly suc-
cessful, with 306 bombers of the attack-
ing force dropping their bombs within Hirohito
three miles of the aiming point. For a
EMPEROR OF JAPAN, 1926–89
night operation this was a very good
score. • Born: April 29, 1901, Tokyo, Japan
On July 25 and 26, 235 heavy • Education: Peer’s School, 1908–20
bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air Force • Military service: none
• Previous government service: regent,
attacked Hamburg again, during day- 1921–26
light. And on the night of July 27, with • Died: January 7, 1989, Tokyo, Japan
much of Hamburg already in flames,
Bomber Command once more attacked.
Of 787 planes dispatched, 722 hit Ham-
burg, 325 of them within three miles of Much controversy surrounds the role
the target. Although Bomber Command Hirohito played before and during the
attacked Hamburg twice more, it was Pacific war. In theory he was an
the raid of July 27 that ignited the absolute ruler and commander in chief
firestorm. of the armed forces. In practice he sel-
Around the aiming point, tempera- dom expressed an opinion when major
tures exceeded 1,500 degrees Fahren- decisions were being discussed. When he
heit, consuming oxygen at such a rate did speak, it was in vague and confusing
144
• H I R O H I T O •

Japan’s victories over the West, begin-


ning with Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941, aroused the emperor’s enthusi-
asm. And he still seems to have hoped
that peace could be achieved: by force of
arms as late as 1943 and by negotiated
settlement until 1945.
Critics have judged the emperor
harshly for not asserting himself when
the tide of war turned against Japan. But
to attempt, in his role as commander in
chief, to order a cease-fire and negotia-
Image Not Available
tions would have been a high-risk strat-
egy. Defenders of the emperor maintain
that if he had done so the military would
simply have deposed him and put some-
one more compliant on the throne.
There is little doubt, however, that
the two atomic bombs dropped on
Japanese cities on August 6 and 9, 1945,
spurred the emperor to action. He did
assert himself then, while the cabinet
was arguing over what course to take,
and ordered his government to accept
the Allied demand for unconditional
Emperor Hiro- terms that usually left considerable surrender. No one can say what would
hito (seated, room for interpretation. have happened had he done so earlier.
left) accompa- Some emperors before him had But if he had not acted when he did, it is
nies former been more forceful, exercising real highly probable that the cabinet might
Qing emperor rather than symbolic leadership, but this well have decided to fight on. Or, if it
Pu Yi to an
was not Hirohito’s way. His main con- had voted to surrender, it might have
official event.
tribution was to remain passive, as become the victim of an attempt to
In 1932 the
when the Japanese Army seized remove Hirohito staged by fanatical die-
Japanese occu-
pied Manchuria Manchuria in 1931 and then abolished hard younger officers. Such an effort
and installed party government in Japan the following was indeed made, but the emperor had
Pu Yi as a year. He also did not try to prevent the forced fast action on the government
Japanese pup- army from launching an ill-fated war that gave the opposition too little time
pet leader. with China in 1937. to come up with an effective plan for
Yet at times the emperor did assert seizing power. For this, at least, he
himself, for example, by failing to make deserves considerable credit.
appointments recommended by the cabi-
net. Some historians have argued that, SEE ALSO
as he did show initiative on occasion, he Japan; Japan, surrender of
would have had the power to prevent
Japan from going to war. Since he did F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
not do so, the presumption remains that
Irokawa, Daikichi. The Age of Hirohito:
he actually approved of the wars con- In Search of Modern Japan. New York:
ducted in his name. It does appear that Free Press, 1995.
145
• H I R O S H I M A •

power more conventionally. By 1929


Hiroshima the Nazis had a membership of 178,000
and were winning substantial shares of
SEE Atomic bombs
the vote in provincial elections. But it
seems unlikely that Hitler would have
prevailed without the aid of the world-
wide economic depression of the 1930s.
Hitler, Adolf By 1933 one in three German workers
GERMAN FÜHRER, 1934–45 was unemployed, and in desperation
• Born: April 20, 1889, Braunau-am- many turned away from the Social
Inn, Austria Democratic party to the radical com-
• Political party: National Socialist munists. An alarmed middle class
• Education: Left high school without looked more and more to the Nazis as
degree, 1905
the means to restore the German econ-
• Military service: German Army,
1914–20 omy and forestall a communist takeover.
• Previous government service: Reich The German state established after
chancellor, 1933–34 World War I, known as the Weimar
• Died: April 30, 1945, Berlin,
Germany
Republic, was democratic, but democ-
racy had shallow roots in Germany and
would not survive the depression.
In July 1932 the Nazis won 230
Little in Hitler’s early life suggested the seats in the Reichstag, Germany’s parlia-
man he would become. After flunking ment, which made them the largest
out of high school in Linz, Austria, in political party. They lost 34 of these in a
1905, he moved to Vienna in 1907. November election, but this setback did
There he dabbled in the arts, barely sup- not matter because Germany’s leaders
porting himself by selling his drawings were planning to scrap the Weimar con-
and paintings. In 1913 he moved to stitution. It was their intention to estab-
Munich, where he enjoyed a similar lack lish a new authoritarian government
of success. He did better in the army, that would eliminate the communist
where he rose to the rank of corporal threat. This could not be done without
and won the Iron Cross, First Class, for Nazi support, and the price of it was
bravery, an award seldom given to that Hitler be appointed Reich chancel-
enlisted men. lor, the equivalent of prime minister.
After the war Hitler returned to This was done on January 30, 1933.
Munich and joined a right-wing organi- Hitler quickly consolidated his
zation called the National Socialist Ger- power by appointing Nazis to the key
man Worker’s party (NSDAP)—Nazi positions of government. Paul von Hin-
party for short. In November 1923 denburg, the old and feeble president,
Hitler and the Nazis attempted to seize was persuaded to issue decrees that
power in Munich by force. Their “Beer allowed Hitler to bypass the Reichstag.
Hall Putsch” was quickly suppressed, In March even this small obstacle was
and Hitler was convicted of treason. He removed. The Reichstag passed an
served only one year of his four-year sen- Enabling Act that legalized Hitler’s dicta-
tence, time enough to write his political torship. Those opposition parties that
testament, Mein Kampf (My Struggle). did not disband were crushed. Within a
The Beer Hall Putsch attempt hav- year Germany had become a one-party
ing been a fiasco, Hitler resolved to take police state. On August 2, 1934, when
146
• H I T L E R , A D O L F •

President Hindenburg died, Hitler Hitler’s minister of munitions, Speer was


announced that the offices of Reich mesmerized by Hitler and followed him
chancellor and president would be com- slavishly to the end. Only a figure of
bined in the single office of Führer unrivaled charismatic power could have
(leader) and Reich chancellor. won over both the masses and the elite
Hitler’s rise was astonishing. He had in this way. And only a Hitler could
gone from corporal to dictator in a mere have led Germany into the most lethal
13 years, despite having little education of all European wars and to commit the
and no civilian job experience except as most unspeakable crimes.
party leader. Several things explain his In the years that followed Hitler’s
climb. Hitler was a great orator, the best seizure of power, full employment
German speaker of his age. Hitler was returned, thanks to massive government
also something of a political genius. He expenditures for public works and arma-
turned a small right-wing party, little dif- ments. The Wehrmacht was expanded far
ferent from many others, into a mighty beyond what the Versailles Treaty allowed,
movement. Apart from the Munich fi- Hitler thumbing his nose at France and
asco, he made very few mistakes and Britain. In Mein Kampf, Hitler had laid
was a superb judge of what he could get out his program for Germany and
away with and when it was time to act. Europe. It was to make Germany master
What he lacked in education he made of the continent, expel the Jews, destroy
up for, to an extent, with a nearly pho- communism, and acquire lebensraum (liv-
tographic memory. He could process ing room) for the German people to
huge amounts of information, and was expand into at the expense of Slavic
always surprising his generals with his nations. Western leaders tried to dismiss
detailed knowledge of weaponry and this terrifying shopping list as political
troop deployments. propaganda, but it was what Hitler
But above all, Hitler’s power lay in wanted and would almost get.
his ability to inspire personal loyalty and Always impatient, Hitler got an
devotion. He saw himself as a messiah, early start on his program of acquisi-
a savior of the German nation and he tions. He failed to seize Austria in 1934
made millions of others see him in that when Mussolini forced him to back off.
light. The Nazi party was built initially But in 1935 the Saar region of Germany,
on the fury of young thugs, ultra-nation- which had been under League of
alists who were enraged by Germany’s Nations’s control, voted overwhelmingly
defeat in the war and who hated democ- to rejoin Germany. On March 7, 1935,
racy. They were hot for revenge— Hitler sent troops into the Rhineland,
against the Allies, of course, but also Germany’s frontier with France, a move
against those who had supposedly forbidden by the Versailles Treaty, which
“stabbed Germany in the back”—Jews, had demilitarized the region. Although
communists, and Social Democrats. France could easily have crushed Hitler’s
However, to these violent men Hitler small force, which had orders to with-
added a huge following drawn primarily draw if attacked, it did nothing. Nor did
from the middle and farming classes, the Allies respond effectively when Ger-
respectable people who fell under his many seized Austria on March 12,
spell. Worshiped by masses of Germans, 1938. He then set his sights on the Sude-
he also won over men superior to him in tenland, Czechoslovakia’s German-
culture and sophistication—men such as speaking frontier with the Reich. He
Albert Speer. An architect who became acquired it in October 1938 after Britain
147
• H I T L E R , A D O L F •

and France pressured the Czechs into


giving up the territory.
On October 14–15 Germany seized
the rest of Czechoslovakia, in violation
of the Munich agreement that had given
it the Sudetenland. Britain and France
then guaranteed the independence of
Poland. They were forced to declare war
on Germany in September when it
invaded Poland anyway. Hitler moved
so rapidly because he was impatient, Image Not Available
also because the German economy was
in trouble. Rearmament was proceeding
at too high a rate. Nazi economic plan-
ning was disastrously bad. Forced to
choose between retrenchment and
expansion, Hitler chose the latter.
As usual, it appeared Hitler could
do no wrong. Poland was quickly beaten
and divided with the Soviet Union, as
provided for by the nonaggression pact
with Germany that it had signed in
August. In the spring of 1940 Germany
took Denmark and Norway. On May
10 it attacked in the west, defeated the grew stronger and stronger. On Febru- The cult of per-
French and British armies, occupied ary 2, 1943, the Sixth Army surren- sonality sur-
France, and moved to invade England. dered, giving the Soviets a permanent rounding Adolf
Although defeated in the Battle of strategic advantage. Hitler was
Britain, the first to be fought almost Hitler made many other mistakes as enormous.
Here, crowds
entirely by aircraft, Hitler was now mas- well. He declared war on the United
gather to cheer
ter of Europe. In 1941 he ordered his States after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor
him on at a
armies to invade the Soviet Union, but on December 7, 1941. Though allied
Nazi rally in
after the usual lightning victories, his with the Japanese, he was not required Nuremberg.
offensive stalled at the gates of Moscow. by treaty to take this step, which guar-
In attacking the Soviets, Hitler had anteed that Germany would be defeated
overreached himself, a step that would in the west as well as in the east. Hitler
be fatal to him and his Third Reich. The did not order full mobilization of the
Soviet Union was simply too vast, and German people and economy until late
its military potential too great. The Red in the war, when it could no longer
Army could trade space for time until make a difference. He squandered Ger-
German forces were overextended. Ger- many’s limited manpower and industrial
many won almost every battle from resources on the V-1 buzz bomb, and
June 22, 1941, when it rolled into Soviet especially the V-2 rocket. These were
territory, until November 1942, when its purely terror weapons and produced no
Sixth Army was surrounded at Stalin- military benefits.
grad. But in doing so, Germany lost the This list of errors could be ex-
war. The longer it fought the weaker the tended, for Hitler made many military
Wehrmacht became, while the Soviets decisions himself that cost the German
148
• H O B B Y , O V E T A C U L P •

Army dearly—such as his order to the dropped out of col-


Sixth Army that it hold onto Stalingrad lege when he was
instead of breaking out. But the biggest elected to the state
of all his blunders was to attack the legislature. In 1925,
Soviet Union in the first place, and his at the age of 20, she
downfall began there. Slowly the Ger- became parliamen-
man Army fell back until it was reduced tarian of the Texas
to making hopeless last-ditch stands on legislature.
the soil of the Reich. After D-Day on Although she Image Not Available
June 6, 1944, the Wehrmacht was owed the job to her
retreating on two fronts. When the Sovi- father, she made a
ets entered Berlin, Hitler and his mistress name for herself by
Eva Braun committed suicide and their a book she wrote
bodies were burned so they could not be called Mr. Chair-
put on display. So ended the Third man, which became
Reich. a widely used text.
She later ran for the
SEE ALSO Given the rank
legislature herself but was defeated by an
Britain, Battle of; Eastern front; France, opponent who accused her of being a of colonel by
Battle of; France, fall of; Germany; Ger-
Unitarian as well as a parliamentarian, the U.S. Army,
many, Battle of; Germany, surrender of;
Stalingrad, Battle of which many voters appeared to think Oveta Culp
Hobby led the
were disqualifications for office.
Women’s Army
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G In 1931 Oveta Culp married
Corps to great
Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. William P. Hobby, a former governor of
New York: Harper & Row, 1964. accomplish-
Texas who was then publisher and sub- ment and
Fest, Joachim. Hitler. New York: Har-
court, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973. sequently owner of the Houston Post- praise. General
Dispatch, where she worked in the circu- Douglas
lation department. Although she owed MacArthur
her first executive position on the paper once called the
to her marriage, she demonstrated so Corps “my
Hobby, Oveta Culp much managerial ability that her reputa- best soldiers.”
COMMANDER OF THE tion grew along with the media empire
WOMEN’S ARMY CORPS that she and her husband were building.
It was this executive experience, which
• Born: January 19, 1905, Killeen, Tex.
few women had at the time, that the
• Political party: Democratic
• Education: Mary Hardin Baylor Army wanted. Thus, in 1941 she was
College, Waco, Tex. asked to serve as commander of the
• Military service: Women’s Army newly formed Women’s Auxiliary Army
Corps, 1941–45 Corps, later renamed the Women’s Army
• Died: August 16, 1995, Houston, Tex.
Corps (WAC), with the rank of colonel.
Despite having no real precedents to
go by, and in the face of tremendous
hostility against the WAC inside the
Oveta Culp Hobby was one of the most Army as well as out, Colonel Hobby
able women of her generation, rising made it into a service organization of
from modest middle-class origins to posi- great usefulness to the Army. Her success
tions of great power and responsibility. led the Navy, which had at first been
The daughter of a small-town lawyer, she opposed to enlisting women, to form its
149
• H O L O C A U S T •

own female branch, known as the


WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Holocaust
Emergency Service).
Although most WACs served in the
United States, they were greatly appreci-
ated by many overseas commanders, Holocaust has become the preferred
who were pleased to have as many of term to use for the Nazi campaign of
them as possible. General Douglas extermination directed against Europe’s
MacArthur, for instance, called them Jews. It is properly called genocidal as
“my best soldiers,” a view that was well, though genocide refers to all such
widely shared. All told, some 140,000 crimes, while Holocaust is specific to
WACs served in the Army and the Army World War II.
Air Forces, easing the military manpower Hitler’s original intention had been
shortage, which by 1944 was severe. to force Germany’s Jews to emigrate by
The shortage could have been ended separating them from other Germans
altogether if U.S. women had been sub- and seizing their property. This fre-
ject to the draft. Polls showed that quently involved great violence, notably
women in the draftable age group on November 9–10, 1938, called
favored conscription for noncombat Kristallnacht (night of broken glass).
jobs by extremely large margins, but During an orgy of destruction, 7,000
Congress refused to pass such a law. Jewish businesses and homes were
This prevented the WAC from achieving destroyed, 100 Jews killed, and, after-
the size it needed because, while women ward, 30,000 imprisoned in concentra-
were willing to be drafted, they could tion camps. As late as 1940, after the
not easily volunteer for military service. fall of France, SS leaders were still think-
A public campaign waged against ing in terms of expelling Jews from
women in the military by word of Europe. One plan involved forcing them
mouth, and by some newspapers, made to relocate on the island of Madagascar,
accusations of promiscuity that were off the southeast coast of Africa, since
utterly false. WACs in fact had fewer no other country would accept Jewish
instances of giving illegitimate birth than refugees in the number required.
civilian women their age, but this did The second phase of Hitler’s war
not sway public opinion. By the time the against the Jews began in 1941 when
war was over, the high quality and Germany invaded the Soviet Union.
superb achievements of the WACs had Special killing teams called Einsatz-
finally become common knowledge. gruppen fanned out behind the advanc-
In January 1945, Colonel Hobby ing troops, gunning down Jews or gas-
was awarded the Distinguished Service ing them in specially equipped trucks.
Medal for her outstanding leadership In 1941 and 1942, 1 million Jews are
and service, which was “without guid- thought to have been murdered by the
ance or precedents in U.S. military his- Einsatzgruppen.
tory.” She may have made a greater But mass murder conducted in this
contribution to the war effort than any way had serious drawbacks from a Nazi
other woman in the United States. point of view. For one, it was a slow
Hobby later served in President Dwight process. Many in the Einsatzgruppen
Eisenhower’s cabinet as the first secre- were not considered sufficiently dedi-
tary of the Department of Health, Edu- cated; others found the work sickening.
cation, and Welfare. Furthermore, while it was easy to com-
150
• H O L O C A U S T •

mit butchery and remain more or less of this did not bother Hitler and the SS.
undetected in the wide-open spaces of Perhaps more surprisingly, neither did
Russia, there was too much risk of the harm done to the German war
exposure in the heavily populated areas effort. The SS was slaughtering able-
of central and western Europe. To avoid bodied men and women at a time when
bad publicity, murder by stealth was German industry was desperately short
what Hitler wanted. of labor. Many were taken directly from
The answer was what the Nazis war plants to Auschwitz. Some victims
called the Final Solution (of the Jewish even worked for a time at real factories
“problem”), meaning the total annihila- in the death camps before being mur-
tion of Europe’s Jews. The Jewish vic- dered. But as a labor source, these peo-
tims would be transported to camps ple were largely wasted.
located in a remote area for death and Also wasted were the transportation
disposal. In the summer of 1941, resources required for the Final Solution,
Rudolph Hoss, commandant of the for the death trains had top priority,
Auschwitz concentration camp in even over military shipments. It appears
Poland, received orders to expand and that, with defeat staring him in the face,
transform his facility into a giant death Hitler regarded the Final Solution as his
factory. Five other death camps were monument. He was determined to see it
established in or near the General Gov- carried through at whatever cost to the
ernment of Poland (as the Nazi-occu- war effort.
pied territory was called), but Auschwitz Like so many war statistics, the
was the most destructive. total number of Holocaust victims can
Two technical problems needed to only be approximated. The best estimate
be solved before death could be put on is that between 5 and 6 million Jews
an industrial basis. The first was how to perished in the Holocaust, or about 80
kill people on the largest possible scale; percent of European Jewry. That any
the second how to dispose of the mil- survived at all was partly a result of
lions of bodies. The first problem was many heroic individuals and groups
solved by building large chambers in who rescued Jews from the Holocaust.
which people could be gassed. The sec- Oskar Schindler, a businessman,
ond was handled by erecting huge ovens more or less single-handedly saved 1,300
called crematoria to burn the corpses. Polish Jews who were workers in his fac-
Hoss was proud of his methods, tory and their families. A Swede, Raoul
which were much more advanced than Wallenberg, with the aid of U.S. funding
those employed at Treblinka, a neigh- and a network of assistants, saved at least
boring camp. While Treblinka’s 10 gas 100,000 Hungarian Jews. The villagers of
chambers could hold only 200 people Le Chambon, a French town on the
each, at Auschwitz the chambers held Swiss frontier, saved thousands of Jews
2,000. And, while Treblinka relied on by hiding them until they could be spir-
monoxide gas, at Auschwitz zyklon-B ited over the border. Most of occupied
(prussic acid), did the killing much more Denmark’s Jews—some 6,000 of them—
efficiently. were brought to Sweden and safety by
In March 1942 the first shipment of boat in a single night.
Jews reached Auschwitz, and in the But most of the Jews who survived
months and years that followed death were citizens of the lesser Axis states.
trains steamed into Poland from the Mussolini refused to ship Jews to the
four corners of Europe. The inhumanity death camps. His armies protected large
151
• H O L O C A U S T •

Death books
from Mau-
thausen con-
centration
camp record
the deaths of
prisoners in
painstaking
detail. Death
rates were as
high as 40 per- Image Not Available
cent a year
because of
deliberately
inadequate
food, clothing,
and shelter.

numbers of Jews in the areas of France attempts to rescue Jews enable us to


and the Balkans that they controlled. retain our faith in human nature. But it
When Germany took direct control of remains true that the Holocaust was one
Italy in 1943, the Italian Army was dis- of the most atrocious crimes in history
armed and the Holocaust reached Italy and came quite near to complete suc-
and the former Italian zones of occupa- cess. It should be remembered, too, that
tion. Even so, most of Italy’s 40,000 Jews the victims of the Holocaust were out-
survived the war, in part because the numbered by the non-Jews who were
Holocaust came to Italy late, but also starved, shot, or worked to death by
because Italians hid the Jews from the German authorities. Forty percent of
Germans. Europe’s 1 million Gypsies, whom the
As long as Hungary remained inde- Nazis had marked for total destruction,
pendent, it too refused to send Jews to were killed. So too were 4 million Poles,
the slaughter. When Germany occupied Ukrainians, and Byelorussians, and per-
Hungary in 1944, the death trains from haps 3 million Soviet prisoners of war.
there began to roll, but again because of The total figure of non-Jews slain by the
the late start, and in this case Raoul Wal- Nazis cannot be less than 10 million. In
lenberg’s intervention as well, 350,000 of the Holocaust Hitler and his minions
a total population of 750,000 Hungarian unleashed a storm of death over Europe
Jews survived the war. so vast and horrible that the mind can-
Although Romanian troops partici- not comprehend it, the true legacy of the
pated in the killing of foreign Jews, the Third Reich, as Hitler meant it to be.
Romanian government refused to partic-
ipate in the Holocaust. It succeeded in SEE ALSO
saving perhaps half of its 600,000 Jews. Concentration camps; Eastern front; Geno-
The Bulgarian government saved all of cide; Wallenberg, Raoul
its Jewish citizens—about 60,000. F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
The brave men and women who Aaron, Chester. Gideon, A Novel. New
risked, and sometimes lost, their lives in York: Lippincott, 1981.
152
• H O M E F R O N T •

Dawidowicz, Lucy. The War Against the Japan’s 3.8. Beyond that, however, the
Jews, 1933–1945. New York: Holt, Rine- Americans were a proud people who sub-
hart & Winston, 1975.
Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the scribed to a common culture based on
European Jews. New York: Holmes & work, family, respect for institutions, and
Meier, 1985. faith in self and nation. It was these qual-
Lustig, Arnost. Darkness Casts No Shad-
ities, as well as more measurable factors,
ow. Washington, D.C.: Inscape, 1976.
that the Axis powers failed to take into
account when declaring war on the
United States.
Home front However, when Pearl Harbor was
attacked, on December 7, 1941, the
United States was unprepared to fight
either Germany or Japan, let alone both.
There were 133.4 million Americans in The process of developing a war econ-
1941, of whom 13.7 million were classi- omy was proceeding at a leisurely pace.
fied by the Census Bureau as “Negro and Rearmament crawled along too, and
other.” The great majority of black adults although the army had drafted 1 million
were employed as laborers, laundry- men beginning in 1940, they were still
women, domestic servants, and similar being trained. The armed forces could
unskilled, low-wage occupations. Racial not absorb the huge numbers of men
segregation was universal, enforced by who rushed to enlist after Pearl Harbor.
law in the southern states and everywhere Nor was industry ready to absorb the
else by custom. millions of civilian volunteers who also
White women were better off than wished to help the war effort.
blacks, but unlike today their choices As government struggled to mobilize,
were limited and most served as full-time many civilians took matters into their
housewives. In 1940, of 65.6 million own hands, forming a huge variety of
women in the population 13.8 million volunteer organizations to serve in civil-
were employed, and of them, all but 4.2 ian defense, roll bandages, sell war
million were single. bonds, and collect scrap metal, rubber,
Most working women were young fats, and many other increasingly scarce
and expected to leave the workforce items and commodities. Volunteerism
after marriage. The majority of employed became a big part of U.S. life, which
women were unskilled factory operatives, helped somewhat to offset government’s
servants, shop clerks, secretaries, and cler- failure to plan ahead.
ical workers. Others served in the helping Far more than any other warring
professions, like teaching and nursing, nation, the United States would depend
that were poorly paid and lacked oppor- on volunteers, and especially women, to
tunities for advancement. organize the home front. The Red Cross,
While the United States had few with 3.5 million female volunteers, was
armed defenders—only 458,000 service- far and away the most important body
men in 1939—it was better prepared to engaged in volunteer war work. But many
make war than it might have looked on more served in organizations like the
paper. Despite hard times, it was the Women’s Ambulance and Defense Corps
world’s foremost industrial nation. It had of the United States, which also trained
produced in the previous year 28.7 per- volunteers to serve as air raid wardens,
cent of world manufacturing output, security guards, and messengers. There
compared to Germany’s 13.2 percent and were thousands of war-related volunteer
153
• H O M E F R O N T •

These giant
gears in a
machine shop
in Massachu-
setts would
become part of
U.S. warships.
To build even
one battleship
or aircraft car-
rier was a Image Not Available
monumental
task.

groups, which did everything from staging ular jobs if assigned to them by govern-
advertising campaigns for the armed ment. But Congress was afraid to enact
forces to collecting scrap metal. what was essentially a labor draft, no
It was civilians who put together the matter what the polls reported.
great salvage drives that became such a Unquestionably the greatest achieve-
prominent feature of domestic life. And it ment on the home front was the enor-
was civilians who made successes of the mous increase in production that made
seven war-bond sales campaigns that raised the United States, as Roosevelt called it,
many billions of dollars. With no federal the Arsenal of Democracy. A tanker fleet
support at all to begin with, the so-called with a total capacity of 2.5 million tons
Victory gardens sprouted in backyards, in 1941 grew to 11.4 million tons in
courtyards, parks, and public spaces. Indi- 1945, despite heavy losses in the early
viduals and local governments pitched in to war years. To equip the nation’s factories,
grow vegetables for themselves and their the machine tool industry produced $4.7
neighbors. This allowed more of the com- billion worth of tools between 1940 and
mercial crops to be canned for use by the 1945, 20 times what had been made in
military and U.S. allies. the previous decade.
During most of the war, polls When the President asked for 50,000
showed that people were willing to sacri- aircraft in 1940, people thought he was
fice even more than the government crazy—but by 1945, 300,000 aircraft
asked. It was clear that Americans would had been built, 245,000 for the Army
have accepted a military draft of young and Navy, the rest for the Allies. Other
women if Congress had passed such a munitions figures were similarly gigantic.
bill. They also supported President Roo- From May 1940 to war’s end, U.S. indus-
sevelt’s proposal for national service. This try turned out 8,243 warships, 64,000
would have required all able-bodied landing vessels, and 86,000 tanks. A new
adults—with some exceptions, such as type of cargo vessel called the Liberty
mothers of young children—to fill partic- ship, which was relatively cheap and easy
154
• H O M E F R O N T •

to make, was designed during the war. more difficult. Consumers had to return
The U.S. yards built 2,710 of them. used toothpaste tubes in order to buy
In some industries, such as steel, new ones, while tinfoil and cellophane
which had been underused before the simply disappeared, as did bobby pins,
war, output could be raised just by going which were replaced by wooden tooth-
to full production. In 1940 steel mills picks and thread. New clothes lacked
were running at 82 percent of capacity elastic thread and webbing, metal but-
and pouring 67 million tons a year. In tons, zippers, hooks and eyes, silk, nylon,
1945 the mills poured 89 million tons, canvas, duck, and sometimes leather.
half the world’s total—with the same-size Coats could not have pleats, gussets, bel-
workforce. As a rule, the existing plants lows, or yokes. A “victory suit,” which
and mills could greatly expand their pro- would have carried economy to the point
duction simply by going to double or of eliminating lapels, was ruled out, but
triple shifts. to save wool double-breasted suits could
But thousands of facilities had to be not have vests, and no suit could come
greatly enlarged, while others were built with more than one pair of pants. Cloth
from scratch. And about 16 million men could not go over cloth, eliminating
served in the military during the war, cre- trouser cuffs and patch pockets.
ating an industrial manpower shortage. It Women’s skirts were limited in
was solved by hiring older men and boys length and circumference; certain dyes,
and paying more overtime, but chiefly by especially greens and browns, were some-
recruiting married women. Because 90 times unavailable. Girdles, still everyday
percent of the munitions jobs were new wear for women, had to be made of bone
and there were few men to fill them, the or piano wire instead of rubber. Shoes,
strong prejudice against hiring women when you could get them, came in only
for what were seen as male jobs had to six colors, three of them shades of
be put aside. brown. Almost anything from coffee to
The war changed everything except canned goods (half the 1943 production
human needs and desires. Many once- went overseas) could run out without
ordinary tasks became fiendishly difficult notice, and cigarette shortages were hard
to perform under wartime conditions. on this nation of smokers.
Numerous goods previously taken for A striking feature of the war effort,
granted were replaced by inferior substi- and a source of many problems, was the
tutes or simply disappeared altogether. A enormous increase in the movement of
48-hour work week and long commutes people from one place to another. Includ-
became the rule for all workers, regard- ing service personnel, 27.3 million people
less of gender. Because so many goods moved from their original county of resi-
and services—including household appli- dence during the war. In the period
ances and supplies, certain types of food, 1935–40, an unusually active one
domestic help, and medical care—were in because men were moving often in their
short supply, wives and mothers (whether search for work, total civilian mobility
employed or not) had to devote more amounted to 2.8 million persons a year.
time to housework, getting their children But during each of the peak war years it
to doctors, and shopping, which was fur- averaged 4.7 million.
ther complicated by the use of ration With automobile use restricted, most
books and the need to go from store to long-distance travel was by train, putting
store looking for scarce items. enormous stress on the rail system as well
Shopping has probably never been as the passengers—jammed into over-
155
• H O M E F R O N T •

in uniform, most crimes declined, except


possibly rapes, although as they were sel-
dom reported the statistics are not very
useful. But the total number of murders
in the country, a more reliable figure, fell
from 8,329 in 1940 to a low of 6,675 in
1944. Auto thefts went up in 1942 when
new cars became unavailable, but the
total number of reported crimes followed
Image Not Available the same curve as murders, falling after
1940 and rising again only in 1945 when
veterans began reentering civilian life. Sui-
cides declined by a third, from a total of
about 19,000 in 1940 to some 13,000
four years later. The war, it seems, had
made life more worth living.
As there was so little to buy, and life
was more difficult than before the war,
some of the extra income earned by
Black women crowded and poorly maintained cars that Americans was spent on entertainment.
plant flowers were slow and often late because of Movies were, after radio, the most
and place flags breakdowns, or from having been side- important medium. Most of the 2,500
on graves in tracked for high-priority troop trains. motion pictures that Hollywood turned
the Negro sec- Difficult as travel became, starting out during World War II reflected the
tion of Arling-
over in strange places was worse. Adoles- demand for amusement. Hollywood
ton National
cents were particularly affected, not only never stopped making comedies and
Cemetery, Va.,
on Memorial
because relocation is emotionally most musicals, and although after Pearl Har-
Day, 1943. difficult at that age, but also because so bor war films increased in number, 1943
Esther Bubley many were also going to work full-time being the peak year, by 1944 service pic-
took this pho- or entering the services. In 1940 the num- tures were becoming fewer and better.
tograph as part ber of employed persons between the Popular music played a crucial part,
of a govern- ages of 14 and 17 was 1.7 million. In too, by entertaining people and lifting
ment documen- 1944 it came to 4.61 million, of whom morale. For the most part, songs com-
tary project on 1.43 million were part-time students. posed for or about the war were not as
racism. During World War II the decline in popular as romantic ballads, or lyrics that
child labor was temporarily reversed, as spoke to those separated from their loved
was the trend toward longer periods of ones. The biggest hit of the war was Irv-
education. Total school attendance for ing Berlin’s 1942 song “White Christ-
the 14- to 19-year-old age group in 1940 mas,” introduced by Bing Crosby in the
came to 9.16 million persons. By 1944 it movie Holiday Inn. It became the first
had fallen to 7.93 million. The number of song in a decade to sell more than 1 mil-
boys and girls aged 14 to 18 who were lion copies of sheet music, and led the Hit
employed rose from 1 million in 1940 to Parade—music’s equivalent of Nielsen rat-
2.9 million in 1944. The number of girls ings in television—nine times, rebounding
working in mills alone rose from 271,000 again during the Christmases of 1943 and
to 950,000. 1944.
Since so many young males—the The most popular song of 1944 was
principal crime-committing group—were the touching “I’ll Be Seeing You,” and in
156
• H O M E F R O N T •

that same year “I’ll Be Home for Christ- the 1940s. New records were constantly
mas” (with its melancholy ending “if being set for tickets sold for shows, trains,
only in my dreams”) was a hit also. horse races—even book purchases were
Songs like this meant much to battle- up. All this was a function of the national
hardened troops as well as to the folks incomes having reached $150 billion at a
back home. In memoir after memoir, vet- time when only $95 billion worth of
erans noted how much popular music goods and services was available for pur-
meant to them. This was particularly true chase. Flush times were the result.
in Europe, where soldiers with access to a The Battle of the Bulge that began in
radio could receive American pop songs December 1944 came as a shock to
from the U.S. Armed Services Network, Americans, who were under the impres-
the British Broadcasting Company, and sion that Germany had all but been
even from German stations. defeated. It provoked a burst of demands
By 1944 everyone at home smelled for more sacrifices and greater efforts on
victory and saw no need to keep working the home front. In response, government
without a letup, especially since war pro- closed the racetracks, ended the reconver-
duction was being cut back. Once gov- sion of war plants to consumer goods
ernment began reducing defense orders, production, and placed a midnight cur-
no appeal for voluntary sacrifice could be few on bars and nightspots.
expected to have much effect. Good har- Supposedly these steps were to con-
vests reduced the incentive to maintain serve fuel and essential services, but
Victory gardens. The wheat yield in 1944 everyone knew that their primary pur-
was the largest in American history, the pose was motivational—and it didn’t
corn crop second only to the record har- work. Those most affected by the curfew
vest of 1942. People responded accord- were servicemen on leave and night-shift
ingly. While in 1943 some 21 million workers, who bitterly protested the point-
families had planted Victory gardens, in lessness of denying them a little fun. The
1945 only 17 million would do so. With curfew proved so unpopular that it could
plenty of money on hand and no appli- not be enforced. Late-night bars reap-
ances or new housing to buy, consump- peared; drinking and sexual relations
tion of whatever remained was bound to became more open and commonplace
increase. Hence the contradiction that as than ever. After three months officials
the war entered its bloodiest phase, at reopened the tracks and lifted the curfew.
home the good times were rolling. Although the Pacific war was
In 1944 farmers made a total of $20 approaching its climax, demobilized ser-
billion, compared to an average of $8 bil- vicemen were coming home in ever-
lion in the late 1930s, although the farm growing numbers. The halting reconver-
population shrank by more than 8 mil- sion to a peacetime economy deprived
lion people. Workers in 1944 earned $44 people of jobs without adding to the
billion, as against $13 billion in 1939. war effort. Moralizers blamed people
Department stores were packed with for being self-indulgent, yet the polls did
buyers of luxury goods despite a shortage not support this.
of salespeople. Restaurants were mobbed, A 1943 Gallup poll showed that 78
movie and stage theaters teemed, night- percent of respondents favored drafting
clubs flourished. 4Fs (able-bodied men who had escaped
Hotels were booked solid weeks in military service because of minor physical
advance, even though the best rooms cost handicaps) into war plants. After the Bat-
as much as $105 a day, a lot of money in tle of the Bulge, 56 percent favored a gen-
157
• H O M E F R O N T •

eral labor draft, with only 36 percent of Small flags


those questioned objecting. were displayed
In short, people knew they had it in many Amer-
easy. In February 1945 the Gallup orga- ican windows
nization released a poll in which only 36 during the war.
percent had answered yes to the question, The color of
the star in the
“Have you had to make any real sacrifice
Image Not Available center indi-
for the war?” The most common reason
cated specific
for an affirmative answer was having a information,
loved one in the armed forces, not any such as the
loss of comforts. death of a son
There was always more support for overseas.
a greater war effort than Congress would
authorize. It was hard to blame people
for letting their Victory gardens go to
seed after years of bumper crops, or for imagination alone—which, if not literal-
buying whatever they could with the sur- ly true, points in the right direction.
plus income Congress would not tax, or Americans could have done more,
for holding nonessential jobs in the but what they did do was more than
absence of a labor draft. These were poli- enough. The United States provided the
cy issues, not questions of conscience. margin of victory in Europe and did
Moreover, it became public knowledge at more than any other country to defeat
the end of February 1945 that the army Japan. That democracy survived the war
planned to release between 200,000 and was—with all due respect for Britain’s
250,000 soldiers a month after the war in vital contribution—a uniquely American
Europe was over, which would end the achievement. Afterward, the United
civilian labor shortage. No wonder States would take the lead in rebuilding
appeals for sacrifice fell upon deaf ears. not only the economies of the Allied
In any case, the American people states but those of its former enemies too.
had nothing to apologize for. Not only Seldom, probably never, had civilization
had they raised and armed the most pow- owed so much to a single nation.
erful military force in the world, more
SEE ALSO
than 12 million strong at its peak, but
they had fed and armed their allies as African Americans; Election of 1942; Elec-
tion of 1944; Financing the war; Japanese
well to a considerable extent. Americans; Labor; Mobilization; Women
Furthermore, some 400,000 Ameri-
can men died in the war, almost F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
300,000 of them in combat. And U.S. Blum, John Morton.V Was for Victory:
support for the war was remarkably Politics and the American Culture Dur-
ing World War II. New York: Harcourt,
high, considering that it was the only Brace, Jovanovich, 1976.
great power not fighting for its life. All Brier, Howard M. Swing Shift. New York:
the others were invaded or, in the cases Random House, 1943.
of Britain and Japan, heavily bombed O’Neill, William L. Democracy at War:
America’s Fight at Home and Abroad in
and in danger of invasion. The threats World War II. New York: Free Press,
of invasion had a highly stimulating 1993.
effect on morale that the United States Perrett, Geoffrey. Days of Sadness, Years
of Triumph: The American People,
utterly lacked. The Americans fought 1939–1945. Madison: University of Wis-
the war, as one foreigner put it, on consin Press, 1983.
158
• H U L L , C O R D E L L •

Tamar, Erika. Good-bye Glamour Girl. maintained by the victorious great pow-
New York: Lippincott, 1984. ers acting together. Others took a more
hopeful view of the United Nations,
which was why Hull received the Nobel
Hull, Cordell Peace Prize in 1945. Hull was a popular
secretary and a political asset to Roo-
SECRETARY OF STATE, 1933–44 sevelt, who regretted his resignation.
• Born: October 2, 1871, Pickett, Tenn. Worn out and frustrated, Hull left office
• Political party: Democratic immediately after the 1944 Presidential
• Previous government service: election.
Tennessee state representative,
1893–97; judge, fifth judicial circuit, F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Tennessee, 1903–7; congressman,
Gellman, Irwin F. Secret Affairs: Franklin
1907–21, 1923–31; senator, 1931–33
Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner
• Died: July 23, 1955, Washington, Welles. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
D.C. versity Press, 1995.
Hull, Cordell. Memoirs. New York:
Macmillan, 1948.

Cordell Hull was appointed secretary of


state by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
because he believed Hull had influence
Imperial Japanese
with southern Democrats and was a Navy
moderate internationalist. The President, SEE Japanese Navy
who intended to be his own foreign sec-
retary, did not often consult Hull. Roo-
sevelt’s favorite diplomatic aide was his
friend Sumner Welles (the undersecre-
tary of state from 1937 to 1943), a rela-
Inflation
tionship that Hull resented. He also SEE Wage and price controls
resented Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau, another friend of Roo-
sevelt, who had much more influence
with him than did Hull. Intelligence, military
Secretary Hull’s chief prewar goal
was to sign trade agreements with other
nations. After the United States entered
the war, Hull’s slight authority declined Military organizations seek to gather
further. According to Hull, he was fre- information about the enemy in various
quently not even allowed to see the ways. Sometimes actual spies are used,
communications between Roosevelt and like the legendary Mata Hari during
Prime Minister Churchill. World War I. In World War II the So-
However, the President did allow viets were especially successful in this
Hull a free hand in designing postwar area. They placed a spy named Richard
institutions like the United Nations in Sorge in Germany’s Tokyo embassy. He
which the United States would partici- provided them, among other things,
pate. This was probably because Roo- with exact information about Operation
sevelt had little faith in the UN, and Barbarossa, the German invasion of
expected instead that peace would be Russia. The Lucy Ring was a Soviet
159
• I N T E L L I G E N C E , M I L I T A R Y •

espionage network in Germany that also “MAGIC,” that had military as


provided valuable military intelligence. well as political value. Especially
However, most intelligence was gath- revealing was the information
ered by means of technology. Much bat- gained from reading messages
tlefield intelligence was provided by aerial enciphered by a Japanese For-
photography. In addition, intelligence eign Ministry machine which
officers served near the front, interrogat- Americans called “Purple.”
ing prisoners and identifying enemy units. The first Purple text to be
Image Not Available
And deception operations were important deciphered was read on
to both sides. The Japanese attack on September 25, 1940.
Pearl Harbor in December 1941 took the From that time until
United States by surprise in part because the end of the war,
deceptive signals and strict radio silence U.S. intelligence
kept U.S. intelligence officers from know- was able to read
ing where the enemy carriers were. Like- Japan’s diplomatic
wise, the Allied landings in Normandy on traffic.
D-Day surprised Hitler because numer- Thanks to
ous Allied deception programs had con- MAGIC, for example, Wash-
vinced him that the attack would take ington knew that Japan was trying to The Germans
place farther north. The Germans secretly use Moscow as a mediator to negotiate used ENIGMA
assembled three armies for their Decem- an end to the Pacific war in 1945. But cipher machines
ber 1944 assault in the Ardennes Forest the same source revealed that the terms to encode all of
thier military
(also known as the Battle of the Bulge) Japan’s military leaders were insisting
radio transmis-
without Allied intelligence being any on were so far removed from actual
sions. What
the wiser. surrender that they were not worth they did not
But while both sides enjoyed intelli- discussing. know was that
gence victories, the Allies’ signals intelli- U.S. and British intelligence had Polish intelli-
gence was better than that of the Axis considerable success in breaking Japan- gence had pro-
powers and contributed much to win- ese military codes as well. The informa- vided the Allies
ning the war. Signals intelligence begins tion gained in this way was often called with ENIGMA
by receiving enemy radio messages. It MAGIC, too, although, strictly speaking, machines.
includes tracking the location of enemy decrypted military messages should be
broadcasters by means of these intercep- referred to by the code name ULTRA.
tions. And it is most valuable when the After Pearl Harbor, U.S. code break-
transmissions can be decoded, or ers made an all-out attack on the Japan-
decrypted, and their content analyzed. ese Navy’s operational code, known as
Although their Pearl Harbor attack JN-25. It was never broken as com-
force kept quiet, Japanese radio disci- pletely as Japan’s diplomatic codes. But
pline was usually poor. This enabled U.S. when the Japanese were planning their
listening stations to acquire considerable attack on Midway Island in 1942, U.S.
information about enemy movements, Naval Intelligence at Pearl Harbor was
even before analyzing their messages. able to read a good deal of their radio
Perhaps the single greatest achieve- traffic. Because of this, Admiral Nimitz
ment of U.S. intelligence in World War II knew when and where the Japanese
was to break the Japanese diplomatic planned to strike. That information was
codes and ciphers. This ability provided what made it possible for a heavily out-
U.S. leaders with a great deal of intelli- numbered U.S. naval force to win the
gence, known by the code name Battle of Midway. In 1942 changes in
160
• I N T E L L I G E N C E , M I L I T A R Y •

the JN-25 code stumped U.S. code In July 1939, Polish intelligence gave
breakers, but in 1943 they began read- one ENIGMA machine each to Britain
ing it again. With some lapses, they and France. Britain proceeded to con-
would do so for the rest of the war. struct a huge code-breaking operation at
Japanese Army messages were Bletchley Park, giving the information
harder to crack, and it was not until derived from breaking ENIGMA ciphers
1943 that code breakers in the Southwest the code name ULTRA. Gathering
Pacific Area began to make progress ULTRA data was a continuous process,
decrypting them. A major breakthrough as the Germans regularly introduced new
was finally achieved in January 1944 keys and made changes to the machine
when the code books of a retreating itself. Beginning in January 1944, Ameri-
Japanese division were unearthed. The cans participated in the work of Bletchley
army’s code could then be read for some Park, though in a lesser role.
months. By the time it was changed, code ULTRA was a considerable aid to
breakers had already learned where a Britain’s Fighter Command during the
Japanese barge bearing the new code Battle of Britain. It was also very helpful
books had been sunk. When divers in the long war Britain fought with Ger-
brought them up, this produced another man and Italian forces in North Africa.
intelligence triumph. The great British victory at El Alamein, in
In the summer of 1945 additional particular, was made possible by ULTRA.
code books were discovered in the Philip- ULTRA played an important part in
pines and Okinawa. Decryptions the Battle of the Atlantic, enabling the
obtained by their use made it clear that Allies to divert convoys from areas to
Japan’s preparations for defending the which U-boats had been ordered. ULTRA
home islands against an invasion were far also enabled Allied planners to tell
stronger than had been thought. It is pos- whether the elaborate deception plans
sible that the planned invasion might designed to draw German attention away
have been canceled, therefore, even if the from Normandy prior to D-Day were
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima working. But ULTRA proved most useful
and Nagasaki had failed to produce a in North Africa and at sea, where the
Japanese surrender. Germans could not communicate by
Although British intelligence played secure land lines.
an active part in the effort to crack Throughout the war, German radio
Japanese codes, Americans did the largest traffic generated ULTRA information of
share of the work. In the war against considerable value. The Germans never
Germany, however, these positions were realized that ENIGMA had been broken,
reversed. Britain had been at war with thanks in part to incredibly tight Allied
Germany for more than two years before security. Indeed, not until the 1970s was
the United States came in, and thus had a the existence of ULTRA made public.
significant lead in signals intelligence. This information required the rewriting
British intelligence owed much to the of many military histories.
Poles, who had built duplicates of the
SEE ALSO
German “ENIGMA” code machine.
All of Germany’s armed forces used D-Day
ENIGMA to encipher their radio com-
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
munications, believing that its millions of
Ambrose, Stephen E. Ike’s Spies: Eisen-
possible combinations made ENIGMA’s hower and the Espionage Establishment.
ciphers unbreakable. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981.
161
• I N T E R N M E N T •

Dulles, Allen Welsh. From Hitler’s


Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence
Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942–1945.
University Park: Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity Press, 1996.
Hinsley, F.H., and Alan Stripp, eds. Code-
breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley
Park. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993. Image Not Available
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. Captains Without
Eyes; Intelligence Failures in World War
II. New York: Macmillan, 1969.
Lewin, Ronald. Ultra Goes to War. Lon-
don: Hutchinson, 1978.
———. American Magic. New York: Far-
rar, Straus, & Giroux, 1982.
Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded:
The Secret History of American Intelli-
gence and the Japanese Navy in World
War II. New York: Random House,
was to be of Japanese descent. Not until The Hirano
1995.
after the 1944 elections were the first family was
internees released from their bleak forced to live
camps. German and Italian aliens were at the Col-
interned as well, but in much smaller orado River
Internment numbers. Relocation
Center, Poston,
Although it in no way excuses this
Arizona. In
unfortunate action by the United States
this ironic fam-
against its own citizens, the fate of ily portrait, the
Both sides in World War II detained or enemy civilians who fell into Japanese Hiranos dis-
imprisoned (interned) citizens of the hands was far worse. They were not play their
states they warred with. Neutral nations treated as savagely as were prisoners of patriotism.
usually interned military personnel of war, but the U.S., British, and Dutch
belligerent states who strayed into their civilians interned in Southeast Asia suf-
territories. Britain interned a large num- fered extreme hardships. Beatings and
ber of German and Austrian nationals, other forms of mistreatment were com-
frequently failing to distinguish between mon. Food rations diminished as the
Nazis and anti-Nazi refugees. war went on. Many died before they
Harsh conditions in the internment could be liberated. Those who lived
camps, and the death of 661 enemy were sometimes as starved as the sur-
aliens when a vessel transporting them vivors of Germany’s concentration
to Canada was sunk, led to severe criti- camps. Germany, for its part, interned
cism of these policies. By the summer of few civilians. Its policy was simply to
1942, few aliens remained in British murder unwanted noncombatants.
detention camps. The maltreatment of internees in
Internment became the fate of every World War II was hardly remarkable in
Japanese and Japanese American on the a war waged to a remarkable degree
West Coast of the United States who against civilians. No one knows how
had escaped arrest in the roundup that many people—in and out of uniform—
followed Pearl Harbor. It was the great- were killed in World War II, estimates
est U.S. violation of human rights during range from 60 to 85 million. But that a
the war. Those interned had no charges majority of the dead were noncombat-
brought against them. Their only crime ants is beyond dispute. Gassed, bombed,
162
• I S O L A T I O N I S T S •

and starved to death by the tens of mil- States itself, would be able to survive
lions, civilians stood little chance of hav- under these conditions. It was a risk
ing their human rights respected in Americans should have been unwilling
internment camps. to take. The fact remains that they did.
Democrats and Republicans alike—
SEE ALSO
but the latter more strongly—agreed
Japanese Americans
throughout the prewar years that the
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
United States should not rearm and
Christgau, John. “Enemies”: World War II
should stay out of Europe’s affairs. No
Alien Internment. Ames: Iowa State Uni- one did more to encourage these beliefs
versity Press, 1985. than Charles A. Lindbergh, the greatest
Collins, Donald E. Native American American hero of his generation.
Aliens: Disloyalty and the Renunciation
of Citizenship by Japanese Americans The first man to fly solo across the
during World War II. Westport, Conn.: Atlantic, Lindbergh won the nation’s
Greenwood Press, 1985. heart, not only for the feat itself but for
Smith, Page. Democracy on Trial: The
Japanese American Evacuation and Relo- his supposed modesty. He protected his
cation in World War II. New York: privacy as much as a celebrity could,
Simon & Schuster, 1995. but Lindbergh had a high opinion of
Taylor, Sandra C. Jewel of the Desert:
Japanese American Internment at Topaz.
himself and a low one of humankind.
Berkeley: University of California Press, The kidnapping and murder of his first
1993. child, the media circus surrounding it,
and the trial of the boy’s killer only
deepened his dislike of the masses.
Charles Lindbergh had supported
Isolationists the crusade of his father, Congressman
C. A. Lindbergh, against U.S. interven-
tion in World War I, a stand that
destroyed the elder Lindbergh’s political
Americans who were opposed to enter- career. This experience was much on
ing World War II before Pearl Harbor Lindbergh’s mind during his own simi-
was attacked in December 1941 were lar campaign a generation later. So too
called isolationists. After World War I, a was the idea that another great war, no
majority of Americans, both liberals matter who won it, would destroy
and conservatives, decided that entering Western civilization and leave Soviet
the war had been a mistake. When communism as the only real victor, a
Hitler dragged Europe into war in 1939 common view among conservative
most people failed to understand that, isolationists.
unlike in 1917, the United States had a Through the efforts of a U.S. mili-
great deal at stake in the outcome. tary attaché in Berlin, who hoped Lind-
In World War I a German victory bergh would learn something useful, he
would not have made much difference made several visits to Germany at the
to Americans. But a German victory in invitation of the Nazis. The first was for
World War II would have left the Unit- eleven days in July and August 1936,
ed States as the only democratic power followed by two others, one of several
in a world of police states and empires. weeks in 1937, and a final one October
For the United States to adopt a policy 11–29, 1938. During these visits the
of isolationism meant running the risk Nazis managed to fool Lindbergh into
that democracy, and perhaps the United thinking that the Luftwaffe (German
163
• I S O L A T I O N I S T S •

Next to a por-
trait of Adolf
Hitler, the
American avia-
tor Charles
Lindbergh
(left) meets
with Nazi
leader Her-
mann Göring
(right). Lind-
Image Not Available
bergh was per-
haps the best-
known
advocate of
American isola-
tionism in the
years preceding
the war.

Air Force) was so strong as to be nization devoted to keeping the United


unbeatable. Ignorant of history and pol- States at peace whatever the cost.
itics, and with some Nazi sympathies, In April 1941 Lindbergh began
Lindbergh was an easy mark. Until the speaking under the auspices of the
war broke out, Lindbergh, who was America First Committee. Lindbergh
then living in England, made every and America First lost much of their
effort to encourage the policy of giving standing after Lindbergh’s speech of
in to Hitler that Britain pursued until September 11 that year in which he
the spring of 1938. accused Jews of conspiring to drag
When war broke out in Europe, the United States into the war. But,
Lindbergh severed his informal connec- as the polls showed, most Americans
tion with the Army Air Corps, freeing were against declaring war on Ger-
himself to fight against U.S. interven- many| right up to Pearl Harbor. (Curi-
tion. A conservative commentator ously, Americans did come to favor
named Fulton Lewis, Jr., arranged for declaring war on Japan under certain
Lindbergh to air his opinions over the conditions—apparently because they
Mutual Radio Network. His talk, believed the Japanese would be easy
which was actually carried by three net- to beat.)
works, proved to be one of five nation- After the fall of France in 1940,
ally broadcast radio addresses Lind- Americans supported aid to Britain,
bergh would give in the first 15 months which is why President Roosevelt was
of the war. He would also speak at two able to have his Lend-Lease bill pass
public meetings, testify before two com- Congress early the next year. They sup-
mittees of Congress, write three articles ported aid to the Soviet Union too, after
for national magazines, and advise it was invaded. Still, Americans
many leaders. All this activity occurred remained convinced that the time to
before he joined the America First fight Hitler was when he attacked the
Committee, a large, well-financed orga- United States. The arguments that this
164
• I T A L I A N C A M P A I G N S •

would mean waiting until all of the quently put it. Their argument was that
nation’s potential allies had been beat- aircraft based in Italy could strike Ger-
en, and that defeat would then be likely, many and targets in the Balkans. Also,
did not carry much weight. taking Italy would make clearing the
Nor were the advantages of fighting rest of the Mediterranean simpler, a
abroad, rather than at home, evident to high priority for the British. With Italy
many. Isolationism was not based on a in hand, it would then be easier to
rational analysis of what course best open a second front in the Balkans,
served the United States’s interests. which the British preferred to invading
“American boys must not die in foreign France.
wars” was a frequently repeated chant. U.S. planners were unhappy about
Few asked why it would be better to invading Italy, however, because doing
have them killed at home, along with so would not weaken Germany much.
many civilians. Indeed, some argued that Italy in Ger-
man hands would actually be an Allied
SEE ALSO asset. Germany would then have to
America First Committee; Germany;
occupy it, tying up more than a few
Japan divisions. But if the Allies invaded
Italy, they would take unnecessary
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G casualties. And then they would have
Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse: Its to supply its civilian population with
Twentieth-century Reaction. New York: at least the bare necessities, which
Abelard-Schuman, 1957. would require ships that were needed
Cole, Wayne S. Charles A. Lindbergh and
the Battle Against American Intervention
elsewhere.
in World War II. New York: Harcourt, The Invasion However, by the
Brace, Jovanovich, 1974. time Sicily fell it was too late in the
———. Roosevelt & the Isolationists, year to organize an invasion of France,
1932–45. Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press, 1983. while forces already on the island could
Mosley, Leonard. Lindbergh: A Biography. quickly be moved to the Italian main-
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976. land. Thus, on September 3, General
Bernard Law Montgomery’s Eighth
Army crossed the Strait of Messina.
U.S. forces were scheduled to invade
Salerno and drop from the air on
Italian campaigns Rome. Mussolini had been arrested in
July (he would be rescued later by Ger-
man commandos) and replaced by
Marshal Pietro Badoglio.
After the capture of Sicily in August On September 8, Badoglio surren-
1943, the Allies invaded the Italian dered Italy to the Allies without a
mainland, as much out of momentum struggle. On September 9, General
as for any strategic reason. There had Mark Clark’s U.S. Fifth Army, consist-
been much discussion as to whether ing of four divisions plus special forces,
this was a good idea. The British, espe- went ashore at Salerno (code named
cially Prime Minister Winston Avalanche). There it met with such
Churchill, his cabinet, and his chiefs of fierce German resistance that it was
staff, were keenly in favor of “knock- almost driven off.
ing Italy out of the war,” as they fre- The Germans seized control of
165
• I T A L I A N C A M P A I G N S •

Image Not Available

Rome and most of the country, with Allies’ narrow win at Salerno that they
Badoglio fleeing south to the protection could be stopped. Hitler required little
of Britain’s Eighth Army, which was persuasion, so the German Army
encamped in the toe of Italy’s “boot” quickly dug in. Now, instead of an easy
in the extreme south. The Italian fleet takeover, the Allies found themselves
set sail for various Allied ports. Italy’s caught up in a grueling struggle that
soldiers abroad became German pris- would go on almost to the day Ger-
oners, while those at home were dis- many surrendered.
armed and released, or else sent to Ger- The fight for Italy Italy saw some of
many as slave laborers. the hardest fighting of the entire war.
Eisenhower canceled the planned The Germans dug themselves into moun-
assault on Rome and dropped some of tainous positions from which they had to
the paratroopers intended for it on be blasted out by Allied troops fighting
Salerno instead. Heavy fire from naval uphill. In many places the ground was
guns and a maximum air effort secured so rough that supplies had to be deliv-
the beachhead. In two weeks the ered by mules. The winter fights were
Eighth Army arrived from Calabria, especially cruel. When a German posi-
giving the Allies a continuous line tion finally fell, there was always anoth-
across Italy. er right behind it.
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, The Allied buildup was so slow
commander of Germany’s forces in that when winter came to Italy the Ger-
southern Italy, was persuaded by the mans had 20 divisions in place, the
166
• I T A L I A N C A M P A I G N S •

Allies only 14. Over time, more divi- er-bombers and with Allied forces hav-
sions arrived, giving the Allies a slight ing sealed off the Alps, it surrendered
numerical advantage. But, because of on May 2. By then Hitler and Mussoli-
U.S. reservations and British weakness, ni were already dead. Mussolini had
the Allies never were strong enough been shot by Italian partisans on April
to punch through Germany’s lines 28, and Hitler had killed himself on
of defense except with the greatest April 30.
difficulty. The Allies sustained 189,000 casu-
After a series of failed attacks, the alties in Italy, the Germans 435,000. In
Allies sought to break the Gustav Line a strictly numerical sense, therefore, the
by landing above it at Anzio in January Italian campaign might be said to have
1944. Although the idea behind Opera- paid for itself. But many of the German
tion Shingle was sound, the force that casualties were prisoners of war taken
landed was a feeble one and Kesselring at the very end. During most of the
easily contained it. fight for Italy, a smaller German force
Breaking the Gustav and held a larger Allied one at bay. If the
Gothic lines All that remained was to Allies had chosen not to invade Italy,
batter at the German line in hopes it the 20-odd Allied divisions stuck there
would collapse. In the winter and could have hastened the day of Hitler’s
spring of 1944, the U.S. Fifth and defeat by fighting on the western front.
British Eighth armies fought a series of Meanwhile, the Germans would still
punishing battles to seize Monte Cassi- have had to keep many divisions in
no, the key to the Gustav Line. The Italy for fear of an Allied attack. Thus
fighting lasted from January 12 to May the mere threat of an invasion would
18. After the first attack failed, the have weakened Germany at almost no
Allies decided to bomb a 6th-century cost. With all respect for the brave men
monastery that overlooked the town, in who fought it, the Italian campaign was
the mistaken belief that it had been for- an error.
tified by the Germans. Not only a crime
against culture, the attack was also an
outright blunder, because the Germans SEE ALSO

proceeded to fortify the ruins, making Anzio, Battle of; Italy; Italy, surrender of;
Mussolini, Benito; Sicily, Battle of
their position even stronger.
Eventually the Polish II Corps took
Monte Cassino, the Gustav Line was
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
pierced in several places, and the embat-
Blaxland, Gregory. Alexander’s Generals:
tled U.S. VI Corps broke out of Anzio. The Italian campaign, 1944–45. London:
But, as so often in the war, the Allies W. Kimber, 1979.
moved too slowly, the Germans too Bluemenson, Martin. Salerno to Cassino.
Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
fast. Kesselring merely pulled his troops Military History, 1969.
out and retired to the Gothic Line Botjer, George F. Sideshow War: The Ital-
above Rome, so the whole cycle had to ian Campaign, 1943–1945. College Sta-
tion: Texas A & M University Press,
be repeated. After another cruel winter 1996.
of fighting, the Gothic Line was finally Fisher, Ernest F. Cassino to the Alps.
broken. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
This time, with the Third Reich on Military History, 1977.
Jackson, W. G. F. The Battle for
the verge of collapse, the German army Italy. New York: Harper & Row,
group did not escape. Harried by fight- 1967.
167
• I T A L Y •

Shepperd, G. A. The Italian Campaign, plus the Dodecanese Islands in the


1943–45, A Political and Military
eastern Mediterranean. To them Mus-
Re-assessment. New York: Praeger,
1968. solini would add Ethiopia (then
Wallace, Robert. The Italian Campaign. called Abyssinia) in 1936 and Albania
Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1978. in 1939.
Italy had a population of 42 million
in 1936, making it one of the most pop-
ulous states in Europe. But it lacked raw
Italy materials and the industrial and techni-
cal resources of a great power. In 1938
it consumed 13 million tons of coal (all
but 1 million of it imported), while
France was producing 47 million tons
From 1861 until 1922, Italy had been a and Britain 230 million tons. The
parliamentary democracy with a consti- national income of Italy was less than
tutional monarch. In 1922 Benito Mus- half that of France and only a quarter of
solini came to power; in 1925, he abol- Britain’s. While motor vehicles were
ished democracy but retained King now required to move any army, Italy
Victor Emmanuel III. At the time, Italy produced only 71,000 of them in 1939.
possessed as colonies Libya, Eritrea, That same year France manufactured
and Italian Somaliland, all in Africa, 227,000 vehicles and Britain 445,000.
Moving up
through the vil-
lage of Prato,
Italy, men of
the 370th
Infantry Regi-
ment slowly
make their way
up the Italian
peninsula.

Image Not Available


168
• I T A L Y •

The great differences between Italy’s pushed ahead during the winter of
means and Mussolini’s aims would be 1940–41. This setback, embarrassing for
fatal to Italian fascism—and to many Mussolini, interfered with Germany’s
Italians. Despite its rich culture and beau- plans for the Balkans and forced Hitler to
ty, Italy was a nation of the second or bail Italy out.
third rank that Mussolini treated as if it To attack Greece, the Germans need-
were a great power. Among many vain- ed permission to cross Yugoslavia. On
glorious gestures, one may stand for all. March 25, 1941, it was granted by the
In 1936 Italy seized Ethiopia, most of Yugoslavian government, which also
whose people still lived in the Stone Age. joined the Axis. But the existing govern-
Mussolini then announced the birth of a ment was then promptly overthrown by
new Roman Empire. patriots who reversed the decision. An
Although he was jealous of Hitler, infuriated Hitler ordered the seizure of
Mussolini was naturally drawn to an Yugoslavia as well as Greece. Ten days
alliance with Germany. It was a fascist later, on April 6, 1941, the German
police state like Italy and, like Italy forces struck. Yugoslavia fell almost at
again, bent on conquest. The Allies once and an armistice was signed on the
would certainly have accepted Italy, 17th. Without pausing for breath, the
and offered some material benefits to it. Germans rolled into Greece, and took it
But the Allies would not have gone in a matter of weeks.
along with Mussolini’s expansion plans, Italy was allowed to occupy most of
while Hitler did. Thus Mussolini Greece and part of Yugoslavia. While
forged a “Pact of Steel” with Germany the Italian Army had failed to distin-
in 1939 and seized Albania. Then, after guish itself in war, it behaved honorably
a prudent interval to make sure that as an occupation force by refusing to
Germany would win the battle, Italy implement Hitler’s anti-Semitic policies.
attacked France on June 10, 1940— More than that, Italian officers pro-
unsuccessfully, as the French easily tected Jews in their zones of occupation.
drove the Italian Army back. But Hitler In France the Italian Army prevented
rewarded Mussolini all the same by Germans and police from the pro-Nazi
giving Italy an occupation zone in Vichy government—sometimes at gun-
southern France. point—from seizing the 240,000 Jews
The Italian Army’s poor showing who were under its protection. In
against France ought to have made Mus- Yugoslavia it saved some 600,000 Jews
solini rethink his position, but did not. In from anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi Croat-
1940–41 Italy and Britain fought a series ian forces.
of naval battles for control of the The seeds of Italy’s next defeats had
Mediterranean, which the British usually already been sown before it advanced
won. In an especially bold stroke a hand- into Greece. In August 1940 an Italian
ful of obsolete British carrier planes crip- army stationed in Ethiopia easily occu-
pled half the Italian fleet at Taranto on pied British Somaliland. The next month
November 11, 1940. Italian units advanced out of Libya about
On land it was worse. In October 60 miles into Egypt, which was indepen-
1940 Mussolini’s army invaded Greece, dent in theory but actually controlled by
which had rejected various unreasonable Britain. In December the British struck
Italian demands. But after gaining some back, driving deeply into Libya. After
ground, the Italians were forced back. eight weeks of fighting, Italian casualties
With British air support, the Greek Army (mostly prisoners of war) came to
169
• I T A L Y •

130,000, while the British lost fewer than


2,000 men.
The British could have eliminated the
Italians entirely. Instead, the British com-
mander, General Richard O’Connor, was
forced by orders from London to halt.
Most of his troops were then sent to
Greece as part of the vain British effort to
save it. This change of plan gave Hitler
the opportunity to rescue Mussolini
again.
But Italy’s humiliation was not yet
complete. In May 1940, after a three- Image Not Available
month campaign, British forces regained
British Somaliland and liberated Ethiopia.
Italian losses, chiefly prisoners of war
again, came to almost 300,000. The
British took 1,200 battle casualties,
although 75,000 men caught vicious local
diseases, chiefly dysentery and malaria.
This victory was more than offset,
however, by British losses in Libya and
the western desert of Egypt. To keep the
Italians from losing Libya, Hitler sent
two divisions there under the command
of General Erwin Rommel. At the end of leadership. Rationing began in 1939 and Members of
March 1941, Rommel attacked the by 1941 gasoline was no longer available Mussolini’s
British, driving them back into Egypt and to civilians. Newspapers were limited to Fascist Youth
capturing General O’Connor. It was the two pages. One pair of shoes or a few (standing) wel-
start of a two-year struggle during which pieces of clothing, but not both, could be come a mem-
ber of the
Rommel, the “Desert Fox” to his ene- bought per person each year. Food con-
Hitler Youth to
mies, would punish the British severely sumption fell below 1,000 calories a day,
a meeting in
for having failed to take Libya when they less than a two- or three-year-old child Italy.
had the chance. had needed in peacetime. On the black
The Italian units under Rommel’s market, butter sold for 10 times its pre-
command fought better than they had war price, olive oil even more.
alone, easing somewhat the sting of their These sacrifices were the result of an
earlier defeats. Still, in the end, defeat armament effort that was far beyond
could not be avoided. When Tunisia, what Italy could afford. Even before war
where the Axis forces made their last broke out, Italy was spending more
stand in Africa, fell in May 1943, more money than France on its military, despite
than 250,000 men—half of them Ital- being so much poorer. At the peak of the
ian—became Allied prisoners of war. By mobilization it supported an army of 91
the time the Allies took Sicily in August, divisions, more than it could arm. Sol-
Mussolini had fallen; Italy would soon be diers fought with weapons from World
out of the war. War I, and some that were even older.
The Italian people and nation suf- Italian armor was not taken seriously
fered terribly as a result of Mussolini’s by anyone. The M11 tank—small, slow,
170
• I T A L Y •

lightly armored and gunned—was con- Germany as slave laborers. While the
sidered the worst in the world. Italian air- civilian losses can only be estimated, per-
craft were similarly poor, and Italian war- haps 300,000 were killed in bombing
ships were notable for their obsolete raids; others died while fighting as parti-
technology. Bad management and admin- sans or as workers in Germany.
istration—test reports of naval vessels After the German occupation
were faked to make ships seem faster began, Italy was doomed to be fought
than they were, for example—were often over for the rest of the war. In the
responsible for these faulty products. north, Germany established a puppet
Between January 1940 and April government, called the Italian Social
1943, the Italian aircraft industry manu- Republic (ISR), led by Mussolini, whom
factured 10,545 aircraft, with production German commandos had rescued. At
reaching a high of only 241 units a first many surviving fascists enlisted in
month. Meanwhile, British aircraft con- Mussolini’s armed forces. But before
struction during this time exceeded 2,000 long it became clear that the Germans
a month. Of some 4,500 fighters pro- meant to plunder Italy, not treat the ISR
duced, fewer than 300 were equal to the as an ally. The Bank of Italy’s gold went
British Hurricane. In the same period to Germany, along with many other
only one battleship, three light carriers, assets and resources. Life was unspeak-
and five destroyers joined the Italian fleet. ably grim in the ISR and not much bet-
These were pitifully small numbers for a ter in liberated Italy, to whose people
nation that meant to defeat Britain in the the Allies could provide only the bare
Mediterranean, and more pitiful still con- necessities.
sidering their lack of quality. Italian honor was redeemed some-
Italy suffered heavy losses in the war. what by the lack of Italian anti-Semitism.
Eight percent of its industrial plants was As long as the Italian Army survived,
destroyed, along with 2 million rooms of Jews in Italian zones of occupation were
civilian housing out of a total of 36 mil- protected. At home, too, although Mus-
lion. Sixty percent of its locomotives were solini issued anti-Semitic decrees, fascists
destroyed and 90 percent of its trucks. did not kill Jews. It was not until the Ger-
Five thousand bridges were blown up. man occupation of Italy that Jews were
Agricultural production fell by 60 percent. murdered there, or sent to the eastern
The human cost was excessive, too. death camps.
At peak strength the Italian Army had The Italian people paid a fearful
about 2 million men, the Navy 260,000, price for their obedience to Mussolini,
and the Air Force several hundred thou- however. Although most Italians had fol-
sand. While fighting on the Axis side, lowed Mussolini, most had done so with
200,000 Italian servicemen were killed little enthusiasm. The eagerness of Italian
(including 80,000 on the eastern front soldiers to surrender to the Allies was the
and 50,000 in the Balkans), an unknown result of lack of faith rather than cow-
but larger number wounded, and ardice. Still, the Italians had followed
600,000 made Allied prisoners. their leader for many years and suffered
After September 8, 1943, when Italy accordingly.
surrendered, its forces were disarmed by
the Germans. Italian units sustained SEE ALSO
another 19,000 casualties when they
Italian campaigns; Mediterranean theater;
attempted to resist. After being disarmed, Mussolini, Benito; North African cam-
600,000 uniformed Italians were sent to paign; Sicily, Battle of
171
• I T A L Y , S U R R E N D E R O F •

F U RT H E R R E A D I N G The last German troops in Italy were


Adams, Henry Hitch. Italy at War. Alexan- not killed or captured until the war in
dria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1982. Europe was over.
Lamb, Richard. War in Italy, 1943–1945:
A Brutal Story. New York: St. Martin’s, SEE ALSO
1994. Italian campaigns; Italy; Mussolini, Benito
Smith, Dennis Mack. Mussolini’s Roman
Empire. New York: Viking, 1976.
Wiskemann, Elizabeth. Fascism in Italy: F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Its Development and Influence. New Davis, Melton S. Who Defends Rome?
York: St. Martin’s, 1969. The Forty-five Days, July 25–September
8, 1943. New York: Dial, 1972.
Smyth, Howard M., and Albert N. Gar-
land. Sicily and the Surrender of Italy.
Washington, D.C.: Department of the
Italy, surrender of Army, 1965.

After the Allied landings in Sicily in July Iwo Jima, Battle of


1943, the Grand Fascist Council of Italy
met for the first time since 1939. This
meeting established that Benito Musso-
lini had little support, and on July 25, The Battle of Iwo Jima was among the
1943, King Victor Emmanuel III accord- worst-planned operations conducted by
ingly had him arrested. He was replaced U.S. forces in World War II. It took
by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who place because Iwo Jima, a small volcanic
assured Germany that Italy would fight island, only 4.5 miles by 2.5 miles in
on, while at the same time he opened size, annoyed the U.S. Army Air Forces.
secret talks with the Allies. These talks Iwo Jima lay between B-29 bases in
were slowed by the Allied insistence on the Mariana Islands and their targets in
unconditional surrender and by Italian Japan. Japanese fighters based on Iwo
attempts to bargain. Jima forced the American Superfor-
A particular sticking point was that tresses to fly around it, consuming addi-
Badoglio wanted the Allies to land in tional fuel at the expense of their
Italy with 15 divisions, which was many bombload. Iwo Jima’s radar picked them
more than they had available. A Ger- up anyway, warning the home islands. In
man military buildup in Italy was going U.S. hands, Iwo Jima would instead pro-
forward at top speed when General vide fighter escorts for the B-29s and
Eisenhower, the Allied commander, emergency landing strips, which was why
announced over public radio that Italy’s the Joint Chiefs ordered it to be taken.
government had agreed to surrender in As it turned out, Iwo Jima was one
principle. This left Badoglio no choice of the best-defended Japanese positions
but to take the Allies’ terms. that U.S. troops would ever be called
The armistice was announced on upon to storm. When the Marines came
September 8. Badoglio fled south from ashore on February 19, 1945, Iwo Jima
Rome to take shelter with the British, became a slaughterhouse.
who had already landed in the toe of Although by this time U.S. mastery
Italy’s “boot.” Germany took control of of the art of amphibious warfare was
Italy and, with great violence when units complete, the assault force was poorly
resisted, disarmed Italy’s armed forces. supported. Carriers and battleships pro-
172
• I W O J I M A , B A T T L E O F •

savageness of the fighting.


When it was over, 6,821 Americans
had been killed and almost 20,000
wounded. Most of the enemy—more
than 20,000 men—were killed too. But
for the only time in the Pacific war, the
total Japanese casualties were less than
those sustained by Americans. Three
marine divisions were used up in this
bloodbath, half the corps’ total strength.
One-third of all marines killed in the
Image Not Available Pacific died on Iwo Jima.
The painful truth is that Iwo Jima
should have been bypassed. The failure to
do so was excused afterward by citing
the number of army bombers—2,400—
that made landings on the island. Because
each B-29 carried a crew of 11, it was
later argued that taking Iwo Jima saved
more than 25,000 lives. This is a feeble
defense, for many of the landings were
nothing but scheduled refueling stops. Of
the crews that were actually in trouble,
some would have made it home. Others
that went down in the sea would have
From the crest vided only 4 days of bombardment been picked up by submarines assigned
of Mount Surib- instead of the 10 that the marines had to that duty or by specialized air-sea res-
achi, the Ameri- requested. This was a serious error cue units.
can flag waves because, while nothing could reach the In short, there is no way of proving
in triumph over enemy’s deep bunkers, artillery positions that the lives lost on Iwo Jima were offset
Iwo Jima after
near the surface were vulnerable to naval by the number of B-29 crewmen who
U.S. Marines
gunfire. Thus, when the Marines hit the were saved by landing on it. But even if
had fought their
way inch by
beach many known gun positions there was some small gain in lives, B-29s
inch up its steep remained intact, more so than on any played a smaller role in defeating Japan
lava-encrusted other Pacific island. The U.S. casualties than did the Marine Corps. Had Japan
slopes. would reflect this. been invaded on schedule, the sacrifice of
Iwo Jima is best known for the pic- three assault divisions for the sake of
ture taken by Associated Press photogra- emergency landing strips would have
pher Joe Rosenthal of a large U.S. flag been recognized as the blunder it was.
being raised atop Mount Suribachi. That
SEE ALSO
event actually took place early in the bat-
Central Pacific
tle, which raged on until the end of
March and featured savage infantry F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
actions in places like the “Meat Grinder” Ross, Bill D. Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor.
and “Bloody Gorge.” Twenty-seven New York: Random House, 1985.
marines and naval corpsmen (medics) Thomey, Tedd. Immortal Images: A Per-
sonal History of Two Photographers and
won the Medal of Honor on Iwo Jima, a the Flag Raising on Iwo Jima. Annapolis,
measure not only of U.S. bravery but the Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996.
173
• J A P A N •

fered a defeat that cast doubt on the


Japan Army’s East Asian plans. However,
Japanese fortunes took a turn for the
better when war broke out in Europe.
For one thing, the Army-Navy debate
In 1937, when Japanese forces invaded over grand strategy came to an end as
China bent on conquest, Japan had a the Army now saw the value of South-
population of 70 million. It was the east Asia.
first Asian nation to build an industrial Origins of war The United States
economy, an amazing feat for a country went to war with Japan primarily out of
endowed by nature with very few raw a desire to aid China. Americans had
materials. Nearly everything industry been sympathetic to China for many
required—coal, iron ore, rubber, even years, because Christian missionaries
wood—had to be imported. Japan paid operating there had molded public opin-
for these imports chiefly by exporting ion in favor of what was misrepresented
cloth, especially silk goods. As a result, as a progressive, modernizing China.
the textile industry employed 38 per- Relatively few in number, these mission-
cent of the work force, more than any aries had been sent out by large, power-
other sector. ful churches in the United States whose
During the Great Depression of the millions of members formed a kind of
1930s, Japan’s civilian government gave lobby on behalf of Chinese interests.
way to rule by the military. This process In the 19th century, the main dan-
was hastened by the so-called Young ger to China—at that time an empire
Tigers, extremist junior officers who itself—came from such European imper-
were in the habit of assassinating politi- ial powers as Britain, France, and Ger-
cians who disagreed with the military. many, which had carved out what were
Because the Army and Navy had dif- called “spheres of influence” there. By
ferent goals, government by the military the 20th century, however, and espe-
did not mean quick agreement on nation- cially after World War I, the greatest
al policy. Both services were imperialistic, threat to China was posed by Japan.
but looked in different directions. The Wars with China and Russia had
Navy favored a southern strategy: to gain enabled Japan to acquire Formosa (now
control of the rich resources of Southeast Taiwan), Korea, and south Manchuria,
Asia and make Japan self-sufficient. The but had not satisfied the appetites of
Army, which had seized much of Japanese expansionists.
Manchuria in 1931, preferred East Asia The Manchurian “incident” In
as a field of conquest. It had forced the September 1931 Japan’s Kwantung
issue by invading China without getting Army occupied the rest of Manchuria,
the navy’s agreement. Army leaders had which had been controlled by a Chinese
expected to seize China quickly and warlord and belonged to China in theo-
exploit its resources, but China turned ry. In fact, however, China, a republic
out to be too big to conquer. since 1911, was too weak to enforce its
Events finally decided which way rule. The United States regarded the
Japan was to go. At the same time as it occupation of Manchuria as a violation
was bogged down in China, Japan of various treaties that Japan had
clashed with the Soviets. An undeclared signed. To Japan, however, the seizure of
Manchurian border war with the Manchuria was not illegal, and in any
U.S.S.R. in 1939 ended when Japan suf- case, was seen as essential to its own
174
• J A P A N •

security. Manchuria was the only place inland. Japan offended world opinion
to which Japanese citizens could emi- by behaving in this barbarous way, yet
grate, as virtually all of the world’s failed to pacify China.
major nations denied them permission The U.S. reaction War in China
to enter as immigrants. presented President Roosevelt’s adminis-
Manchuria was also the source of tration with a dilemma. Viewed strictly
essential raw materials for Japan, such in terms of American self-interest, there
as iron ore and coal, as well as of criti- was much to be said for tolerating Japan
cal foodstuffs. And it was Japan’s buffer in the short run. The United States had a
against the Soviet Union, which also had large stake in maintaining good relations
designs on Manchuria. with Japan, where U.S. investments
Further, the Great Depression of the totaled $466 million, twice as much as
1930s ruined Japan’s export trade, and in China. Forty-eight percent of U.S.
the prohibitive Smoot-Hawley Tariff of exports to the Far East went to Japan,
1930 closed Japan’s markets in the Unit- and 21 percent of the United States’s Far
ed States. These events made Manchuria Eastern imports came from it—in dollar
even more important to Japan. terms much less than before the stock
War with China In July 1937 market crash of 1929, but still a sub-
Japan, whose government was now con- stantial figure. U.S. commerce with
trolled by the Imperial Japanese Army, Japan was three times that with China
made an incredible blunder by invading and produced a favorable balance of
China. The Japanese assumption was trade. If the United States were forced to
that China, where power was shared choose between the two countries, eco-
between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek nomics dictated that it side with Japan.
and assorted regional warlords, would The alternative, which was to chal-
be easy to seize and hold. But China’s lenge Japanese imperialism, meant risk-
military weakness turned out to matter ing a war that would damage trade and
less than its size. endanger the Philippines—the United
Japan won every battle in China but States’s Far Eastern commonwealth that
could not win the war. Chiang relocated it could not protect and yet had to
his capital to Chungking, a mountain defend. Such a war would cost much in
stronghold deep inside China that the lives and money and, if won, still leave
Japanese could not reach. They occu- East Asia vulnerable to the Soviets. If
pied all the major cities and much of Japan refused ever to leave China, the
China’s coast, but because China refused United States would someday be forced
to surrender, the Japanese found them- to act, but to do so later instead of
selves bogged down in a ruinous war. sooner was clearly the wisest path.
Apparently thinking that the Chi- At first the government and people of
nese people could be terrorized into giv- the United States were as reluctant to
ing up, the Japanese Army committed fight Japan as to fight Germany. But as
terrible atrocities in China. During what Japan continued to violate China, sup-
became known as the Rape of Nanking, port for sanctions grew. On July 26,
for example, some 250,000 Chinese lost 1939, after Britain made concessions in
their lives during a six-week orgy of vio- China as a result of Japanese pressure,
lence. Many of these acts took place in Roosevelt decided to give the six-month
full view of Western journalists and notice required to cancel a commercial
diplomats, for Nanking had been treaty with Japan that dated from 1911.
Chiang’s capital before he moved it This step met with the approval of 81
175
• J A P A N •

Tokyo women
help clean up
debris in the
war-scarred
capital some
weeks before
the Japanese
surrender on
August 14,
1945.

Image Not Available

percent of the Americans polled by the China’s links to the outside world.
Gallup organization. By 1935 public Accordingly, Tokyo demanded that the
opinion polls had become frequent and Allies withdraw their support of China,
reliable enough to influence public poli- ordered France to stop all traffic between
cy. Roosevelt appears to have been Indochina and China, and insisted that
guided by them to a considerable extent Britain shut down China’s supply lines
in his conduct of prewar diplomacy. through Hong Kong and Burma.
The outbreak of war in Europe in Japan also declared the “regions of
1939 further weakened Britain’s position the South Seas” to be part of its Greater
in Asia. Avoiding a Japanese conflict East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The
was more important than ever, yet the Sphere was a device by which Japan
tight focus of the European imperial hoped to rally the oppressed peoples of
powers on Germany created fresh Asia to its side. Represented as a policy
opportunities for Japanese expansion. It of “Asia for the Asians” at a time when
was essential to Britain that China con- much of the continent was still ruled by
tinue fighting and thus tie down the Europe, the slogan had considerable
Japanese Army. But being stuck in appeal. Asians knew much about mis-
China would lead Japan to seek a solu- treatment by Europeans. Of Japan’s far
tion to its problem by widening the war. more dangerous aims, they as yet had
That was hinted at on September 15, little knowledge.
1939, when Japan signed an armistice The United States Acts to Contain
with the Soviet Union, putting an end to Japan Britain, France, and China called
the undeclared war between them. vainly on Washington to assist them
The European war created a tempta- against Japan. But Roosevelt and Secre-
tion for Japan’s military leaders that they tary of State Cordell Hull feared that
could not resist. Having failed to crush strong action, such as economic reprisals
China, they saw in the weakening of the against Japan, might trigger a war that
colonial powers an opportunity to cut the United States was unprepared to
176
• J A P A N •

fight. Some felt that sanctions would be by acquiring the Netherlands East Indies
effective, because Japan was so depen- and their rich oil fields.
dent on the United States, which provid- Japanese planners had been work-
ed it with 80 percent of its oil, 90 per- ing on the conquest of Southeast Asia
cent of its gasoline, 74 percent of its for months, although no target date had
scrap metal, and 60 percent of its been set. They knew that the campaign
machine tools. But Roosevelt was might lead to war with the United
unwilling to gamble on this assumption. States, but Japan hoped that the United
Finally, however, after much bureau- States, which was weak militarily and
cratic jockeying, on July 25, 1940, Roo- had its eyes turned toward Europe,
sevelt signed an order embargoing avia- would not fight. These were, in fact,
tion fuel and lubricants and the type of compelling motives for a U.S. policy of
scrap metal used in making steel. restraint. The United States was unpre-
Japan was not deterred by this lim- pared for war with Germany, Roo-
ited embargo. In August and September, sevelt’s efforts to provoke one notwith-
Tokyo forced Britain to withdraw its standing, still less for a second conflict
troops from Shanghai, the Dutch to con- with Japan. London and Washington
sider making economic concessions in agreed that Germany, as the greater
the East Indies, and the French to recog- menace, must be disposed of first.
nize Japanese claims in Indochina. On But by the summer of 1941 an Anglo-
September 26, 1940, when it appeared American war with Japan was looming,
that the Battle of Britain was won and despite numerous diplomatic contacts and
after Japanese troops had entered discussions. The United States was still
Indochina, Roosevelt embargoed all iron deadlocked with Japan over China. Japan
and steel scrap. The next day Japan insisted on retaining a free hand in China,
signed the Tripartite Pact with Italy and while the United States demanded that it
Germany, which specified that they withdraw altogether.
would help each other if any of them At this time Japan had come to
went to war with a nation at present regard war with the United States as
neutral. unavoidable. This attitude resulted from
On April 13, 1941, Washington the U.S. response to its occupation of
learned that Japan and the Soviet Union southern Indochina, which began on
had signed a nonaggression pact, speci- July 24. The United States knew some-
fying that if one went to war with a thing was about to occur, thanks to
third power, the other would remain Operation MAGIC, a triumph of the
neutral. The implications were obvious. code breaker’s art, which enabled U.S.
If the pact held, Japan would gain free- intelligence to read Japanese radio traf-
dom of action in Southeast Asia. That it fic. The Japanese diplomatic code,
would hold became clear after June 22 named Purple by U.S. code breakers,
when Germany invaded Russia. To was yielding up priceless information.
Washington this attack meant that Because of decrypted Japanese
Japan’s rear was safe because the Soviets diplomatic messages and other forms of
would not want to fight in both Asia intelligence, Washington was aware of
and Europe. The way was now clear for Japanese ship movements, although not
Japan to take Southeast Asia, isolating their destination. Yet, wherever the
China from outside aid. Japan could Japanese were going, it did not appear
also free itself of dependence on U.S. oil that they could be stopped, because the
177
• J A P A N •

combined forces of the Netherlands, the 25th, they confined themselves to


Britain, and the United States were fee- discussing how Japan could be manipu-
ble compared to those of the Japanese lated into firing first. On November 26,
Empire. For this reason the U.S. service with full awareness that the deadline
chiefs had urged Roosevelt to avoid war had passed and that Japanese troop con-
in the Pacific. voys were in the South China Sea, the
Steps toward war Nevertheless, on administration called again on Japan to
July 26 President Roosevelt federalized withdraw from China. Diplomacy had
the Philippine military and restored its come to an end.
head, retired general Douglas MacArthur, On November 27 the U.S. Army
to active duty as commander of U.S. and Navy sent war warnings to their
Army Forces in the Far East. Roosevelt Pacific commanders. The Navy cau-
also froze Japanese assets in the United tioned that it anticipated a Japanese
States and began licensing the sale of oil attack against the Philippines, Thailand,
to Japan so as to limit its flow. the Kra Isthmus (where Thailand and
In September 1941 it was decided Malaya meet), or Borneo. In the event
to cut off Japan completely. The result- of an attack on Thailand alone the
ing embargo included Latin America United States would not intervene;
and the Netherlands East Indies, leaving otherwise, it would.
Japan with no source of oil. Given the War with Japan On December 6,
history of modern Japan, which always Washington time, Roosevelt learned that
preferred fighting to backing down, war Japanese convoys were entering the Gulf
was now inevitable. of Siam. He immediately sent a peace
MAGIC revealed that the Japanese message to Emperor Hirohito, but it was
government had established a Novem- essentially meaningless because it con-
ber 25 deadline for making diplomatic tained no new offer. The next morning,
progress. If none was made, military Japanese aircraft destroyed most of the
operations were to follow. Yet when U.S. fighter force in Hawaii on the ground
Roosevelt and his advisors assembled on and wrecked the battleship fleet in Pearl

This captured
Japanese pho-
tograph of a
pilot rally was
taken on an
aircraft carrier
before the
attack on Pearl
Harbor on
Image Not Available
December 7,
1941.
178
• J A P A N •

Harbor. Some hours later Japan struck three great industrial states
again, crippling Philippine defenses. plus Holland made little
On December 8, 1941, the United sense until 1940, when the
States declared war on Japan, and on Asian balance of power
the 11th Hitler issued a declaration of was tipped by events in
war against the United States. At last the Europe.
long wait was over. The early defeat and
Image Not Available
Roosevelt’s political enemies were occupation of Holland and
soon charging that he had known in France meant that their
advance about the Japanese plan to lightly defended colonial
attack U.S. military bases in Hawaii but empires in Asia could not
allowed the Japanese to go ahead so as to be reinforced. Britain’s plan
enter the war against Hitler. There is no in case of war with Japan
evidence to support this charge. Thanks had been to send its fleet to Malaya. Japan’s war
to MAGIC, Washington knew that Japan From “Fortress Singapore” the Royal with China
was going to attack, but it believed that Navy would then control Southeast began in July
Hawaii was safe because it was so far Asia. But with Britain fighting Ger- 1937, more
from Japan and so strongly defended. many, few ships could be spared for ser- than four years
The real charge against Roosevelt’s vice in Asian waters. This left only the before the
United States
administration is not that it deliberately United States as an obstacle to Japan.
entered the
allowed Pearl Harbor to be attacked, However, the United States’s Far
war. The
but that its Far Eastern policy was a Eastern forces were weak and could do American pub-
shambles. After deciding that Germany nothing in the short run to stop Japan. lic, however,
was the greater threat to vital U.S. inter- Thus, the way was open for Japan to supported the
ests, the administration should have seize the resources of Southeast Asia Chinese cause
bent over backward to reach agreement and, at the same time, cut off China from the very
with Japan. At the very least, it should from outside help. start.
have stalled for time, since the United Accordingly, the Japanese Army and
States was not yet strong enough to Navy agreed to exploit these opportuni-
fight Germany alone, still less Japan as ties. In the summer of 1940, Japan occu-
well. But Washington did nothing, pied the northern part of French
allowing a Japanese deadline that it Indochina. Then in July 1941 it secured
knew meant war to pass without mak- the south as well. This brought relations
ing any effort to avoid or postpone the between Japan and the United States to
conflict. That this was the popular a head. Washington demanded that the
course and supported by opinion sur- Japanese withdraw not only from Indo-
veys did not make it good policy. Events china, but from China too. When the
dictated Roosevelt‘s course, actions that Japanese refused, President Franklin
were too little and too late if boldness Roosevelt organized an oil embargo.
was needed, too belligerent if it was not. Japan would receive no more oil from
The conquest of Southeast Asia the United States, its biggest supplier.
The trouble with the southern strategy, And the Netherlands East Indies, Mexi-
however, was that it meant taking on co, and other oil producers agreed not
the great colonial powers. The United to sell to Japan either.
States held the Philippines, France held Japan possessed only about a year’s
Indochina, Holland held the Nether- supply of oil and had just two ways of
lands East Indies, and Britain held responding to Roosevelt’s demands. It
Burma and Malaya. For Japan to fight could either give in on the United
179
• J A P A N •

States’s terms or seize oil fields on its was falling short. Expecting a brief war,
own. Few were surprised when Japan Japanese leaders had not developed their
chose the latter course. war industries on a large enough scale.
What did surprise Westerners was Too few ships had been built, and indus-
the speed and ferocity of Japan’s attacks, try remained disorganized. In 1943, with
and the ease with which it defeated all the war going badly for Japan, Prime
the colonial powers. In six months it Minister Tojo Hideki created a new min-
acquired a vast new empire in Southeast istry of munitions with sweeping powers
Asia and the western Pacific. The Nether- that was supposed to eliminate corrup-
lands East Indies fell, as did Burma, tion and inefficiency. However, it was
Malaya, and the Philippines, along with sabotaged by military interference and
miscellaneous islands and territories. In uncooperative industrialists.
one of the greatest military campaigns of Desperate measures did bring some
all time, Japan gained the raw materials it gains in production, though. Draining
needed to go on making war. stockpiles of raw materials, for example,
Japan’s military leaders knew that in enabled aircraft production to go up. In
the long run the United States’s vast 1942 the aircraft industry produced only
industrial advantages would make it 5,000 planes, but in 1944 it turned out
impossible to beat. Their hope was that, 28,000. This was a feat that could not
discouraged by early losses, the Ameri- be repeated, however, because the air-
cans would quickly give up. Instead, the craft and other industries had used up
U.S. Navy defeated the Japanese at Mid- their material reserves. There were plen-
way Island in June 1942 and invaded ty of raw materials in Southeast Asia,
Guadalcanal in August. Japan was now but the Japanese could not use them
committed to a war of attrition that it because U.S. submarines were destroy-
could not possibly win. The price of its ing their merchant fleet.
aggression would be utter ruin. The production figures for other
On the home front The Japanese industries show how badly the U.S.
people were already suffering when blockade hurt Japan. In 1941 some 500
Tokyo started the Pacific war. Since the medium-sized tanks were built; in 1945
invasion of China in 1937, fuel restric- only 89 were completed. Japan built six
tions had severely hampered civilian aircraft carriers in 1942, its best year,
travel. Rice, charcoal, clothing, and and four as late as 1944, but in 1945
other essential goods and services were production fell to zero. Destroyer pro-
rationed and in short supply. Govern- duction peaked at 31 in 1944, then fell
ment price controls failed to stop infla- to 6 the next year.
tion from destroying the value of money. Collapse and defeat By 1944 the
The home ministry set up a system fabric of Japanese life was beginning to
that put every village and neighborhood shred. All kindergartens in Tokyo were
under its direct control. In time every closed. Sugar became impossible to buy.
residential area would have meetings at Few passenger trains were allowed to
the same time to receive directives and carry civilians. Food shortages produced
listen to identical radio broadcasts. In packs of wild dogs in the streets of
this way, the entire population was Tokyo, which some people tracked
mobilized and organized, down to and down, killed, and ate. Then came the
including schoolchildren. firebomb raids. Tokyo was the first to
Yet, by 1942, despite its overseas be hit. On March 9 and 10, 1944, it
conquests, Japan’s military production was carpeted with incendiary bombs,
180
• J A P A N , S U R R E N D E R O F •

which killed perhaps 100,000 people. was dwarfed by the many more millions
As its cities burned, 10 million of people in China and Southeast Asia,
Japanese fled to the country, flight being mostly civilians, who were killed by the
Japan’s substitute for civilian defense. Japanese or died of disease and starva-
Workers left their jobs to scavenge for tion as a direct result of Japanese acts of
food, which actually did little harm to aggression.
production, because fuel shortages had SEE ALSO
closed most of the factories. The U.S. Atomic bombs; Chiang Kai-shek; China;
naval blockade, now supported by fight- Hirohito; Hull, Cordell; Japan, surrender
er-bombers from carriers and bases in of; Japanese Army; Japanese Navy; Pearl
Harbor, attack on; Tojo, Hideki
Okinawa and mines dropped by B-29s,
closed off Japan from the mainland. F U RTHER READING
Even travel between the home Borg, Dorothy. The United States and the
islands became difficult, owing to the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–38. Cam-
destruction of ferries. Trains could not bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1964.
run by day, and movement by night was Boyle, J. H. China and Japan at War,
hampered by downed bridges and 1937–1945. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
blocked roads. Japan’s collapsing trans- University Press, 1972.
Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking: The
portation system, as well as its shortages Forgotten Holocaust of World War II.
of food and everything else, would have New York: Basic Books, 1997.
caused massive civilian deaths from star- Crowley, James B. Japan’s Quest for
Autonomy: National Security and For-
vation and disease had the war lasted
eign Policy, 1930–1938. Princeton:
much longer than it did. The atomic Princeton University Press, 1966.
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Heinrichs, Waldo. Threshold of War:
Nagasaki were terrible engines of Franklin D. Roosevelt and U.S. Entry
into World War II. New York: Oxford
destruction. But they did force Emperor University Press, 1988.
Hirohito to put an end to the war on Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War: World
August 15, 1945, saving many Japanese War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945.
New York: Random House, 1978.
as well as American lives. Toland, John. Rising Sun: The Decline and
By then much of Japan lay in ruins, Fall of the Japanese Empire. New York:
and Southeast Asia and the western Random House, 1970.
Pacific were dotted with Japanese
graves. Although Japan never had more
than 6 million men in uniform at any
given time, a total of 10 million served Japan, surrender of
in the armed forces. Of these, more than
2 million were killed, but only 150,000
were wounded, because Japanese ser-
vicemen were supposed to fight to the The main problem facing U.S. leaders
last man, and usually did. when President Franklin D. Roosevelt
About 500,000 civilians were killed died on April 12, 1945, was how to
by U.S. bombers, and more than bring about a Japanese surrender.
600,000 were wounded. In addition, Although the U.S. blockade had sealed
250,000 troops taken prisoner by the its fate and firebombs were making
Soviets in Manchuria at war’s end never Japanese cities uninhabitable, Japan’s
returned to Japan. Total Japanese deaths leaders still would not admit that further
for the war came to about 3 million. resistance was useless. They meant to
Immense though it was, this death toll fight to the last man, woman, and child
181
• J A P A N , S U R R E N D E R O F •

if Japan was invaded. If the Americans


did not come ashore, they were pre-
pared to see everyone starve rather than
surrender. The self-destructive course
pursued by Japan for years offered little
hope that Tokyo would give up within
the foreseeable future.
On May 25, 1945, Washington
issued an order for Allied forces to
assault Kyushu, the southernmost home
island of Japan, on or about November 1. Image Not Available
This order was given reluctantly,
because the closer Americans came to
Japan the higher their casualties would
be. President Harry Truman had been
informed by Admiral William Leahy, his
chief of staff, that the casualty rate on
Okinawa had been about 35 percent.
This meant that with 767,000 men par-
ticipating in Operation Olympic, the
attack on Kyushu, they had to expect
that 268,000 men would be killed or
wounded—more casualties than had
been taken in the entire Pacific war to
date. The Army Medical Corps was
expecting that Operation Olympic would
produce as many as 395,000 casualties. acquired a “peacefully inclined and
Since the Japanese had assigned more responsible government.” On July 28
than 3 million troops to defend the home Japan rejected this offer.
islands, seizing all of Japan would proba- Meanwhile, the U.S. 509th Com-
bly have cost the United States 1 million posite Bomb Group under Colonel Paul
casualties. Tibbets was making its final arrange-
On July 26 the Allied leaders set ments. On August 6, 1945, the Super-
forth the conditions of Japan’s surrender fortress Enola Gay, with Tibbets at the
in the Potsdam Declaration. The United controls, rose from its runway on Tinian
States, Britain, and China called on Island in the Marianas carrying “Little
Japan to surrender unconditionally or Boy,” the first uranium bomb. At 8:16
face “prompt and utter destruction.” a.m., local time, Little Boy detonated at
The terms of surrender included an end an altitude of 1,900 feet over the city of
to Japanese militarism, the punishment Hiroshima, turning it to ashes. Perhaps
of war criminals, an occupation of 70,000 Japanese were killed by the com-
Japan, the evacuation of all territories bined effects of the blast and the heavy
except the home islands themselves, and doses of radiation that followed it, both
complete disarmament. In return the at the time and over the next few
Allies promised to establish a demo- months. Others would die in later years
cratic political order, to allow the from diseases induced by radiation.
rebuilding of Japanese industry, and to On August 9, Japan having failed to
end the military occupation when Japan surrender, “Fat Man,” the first plutonium
182
• J A P A N , S U R R E N D E R O F •

bomb, was dropped on Nagasaki. It did Continuing to blockade and bom-


not fall on the targeted point, so fewer bard Japan would have brought it to its
died in Nagasaki than in Hiroshima. Even knees in time. The problem was that no
so, many thousands perished, then and in one could say how long that might take,
later years. On August 10, Washington and during that period, however long it
received word that Japan would surrender was, Allied troops would go on fighting
if the Potsdam Declaration “did not com- and dying. The Pacific war was still rag-
prise any demand which prejudices the ing—in the air over Japan, in New
prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sover- Guinea and Burma, in Pacific waters,
eign Ruler.” Although this offer involved where Japanese submarines still prowled,
a condition, there seemed no reason to and elsewhere in the vast region. After
quibble. Accordingly, just after midnight the war, once it became known that a
on August 12, Tokyo learned that its pro- way to end the fighting quickly had been
posal had been accepted. Japan surren- invented but then not used, reputations
dered officially on August 15. and careers would have been ruined.
Eventually, the decision to wage Critics write about the decision to
nuclear warfare against Japan, which had drop the bomb as if U.S. leaders had had
been highly popular at the time, became a choice. But in a democracy the exis-
controversial. Critics would argue that tence of a weapon that would save Amer-
diplomatic means should have been ican lives—and probably a great many
employed instead. If diplomacy failed, other lives as well—compelled its use.
continuing the bombardment and block- The only real decisions were tactical ones,
ade of Japan would eventually have such as when and where to drop the
forced a surrender, according to this line bombs. They were important questions,
of thinking. Some would even maintain however. Since only two bombs were
than invading Japan would have been a available in August 1945, they had to be
better option and would not have cost all employed for maximum effect.
that many lives. This is why the bombs were dropped
This last position makes no sense, only three days apart. The idea was to
because an invasion would have been make Japanese leaders think that the
bloody beyond belief. Recently declassi- United States had an unlimited supply of
fied intelligence reports show that by the atomic bombs that could lay waste to the
summer of 1945, Japan was even more entire country, which was not true.
strongly defended than planners had Atomic bombs were effective only against
thought when drawing up Operation cities, and most Japanese cities had
Olympic. And diplomacy stood no already been burned out. The few that
chance of success. Because U.S. intelli- remained had been saved specifically to
gence could read the Japanese diplomatic demonstrate the bomb’s power.
code, the United States knew that over- Atomic bombs were all but useless in
tures were being made to Moscow to ref- the field because there were thousands of
eree a settlement of the war. But the same military targets in Japan, only a handful of
intercepted messages revealed that Japan’s which could be destroyed in any given
military leaders wanted a peace that month. The bomb, therefore, was essential-
involved no occupation of Japan and that ly a bluff. If Japan had not surrendered
would leave them in power. This was so when it did, the military would have found
far removed from the terms of the Pots- this out and probably prolonged the war.
dam Declaration that there was nothing That nothing less than atomic war-
left to talk about. fare would have forced a surrender is a
183
• J A P A N , S U R R E N D E R O F •

In New York to fight on were seriously weakened.


City’s China- Even so, the surrender was a close
town, celebra- thing. Individual military leaders sent out
tions erupted conflicting signals because, in addition to
with the news their own varying degrees of fanaticism,
of Japan’s
they were under heavy pressure from the
unconditional
militaristic Young Tigers, whose “rule
surrender.
Image Not Available from below” was one of the worst fea-
tures of Japanese politics. To guard
against a surrender, junior officers were
conspiring to seize Hirohito and take
charge of the government, their excuse
being that the emperor had been misled
by evil advisors and had to be kidnapped
for his own good. Notices appeared in
public places naming members of the
peace party and calling for their deaths.
conclusion supported by actual events. On August 14, no further steps hav-
The Hiroshima bomb had little effect on ing been taken, Hirohito called an imper-
Japan’s military leaders. They were ial conference, the first since 1941, when
shaken, but did not change their minds, war with the West was agreed upon. At it
when the Soviet Union declared war on he once again commanded weeping offi-
August 8 and entered Manchuria. The cials to accept the Potsdam terms. It was
Soviets had promised at the Yalta confer- the most emotional event in the history of
ence in February 1945 that they would Japanese government. Yet even this was
join the war against Japan soon after not enough to guarantee obedience.
Germany fell. When Hiroshima was Early on August 15, a handful of
bombed, the Soviets were ready to act rebellious junior officers demanded that
and promptly did so. These events were the commandant of the imperial guards
followed by the atomic bombing of division, which protected the emperor,
Nagasaki on August 9, which brought join them in seizing Hirohito and pre-
quick results. On the 10th, there was a venting any surrender. When the general
meeting between the emperor and the refused, they killed him and, using forged
Supreme Council for the Direction of the orders, took command of the guard and
War, which actually ran the country. At sealed off the palace. Troops led by these
this time the Supreme Council was divid- Young Tigers then searched the House-
ed over whether or not to surrender, the hold Ministry for the recording they
army still insisting on terms that were knew Hirohito had made to inform his
obviously unacceptable to the Allies. people of the surrender. At the same time,
Ordinarily, Emperor Hirohito did other conspirators seized local radio sta-
not even speak at official meetings. But tions and death squads searched for lead-
this time he did, ordering his shocked lis- ers of the peace party.
teners to accept the Potsdam terms. This rebellion failed when the gen-
Although in theory the emperor was only eral commanding the Tokyo area arrived
supposed to give advice, by coming for- at the palace and took charge. On August
ward he broke the stalemate. Now civil- 15 the emperor’s recording was aired.
ians who favored peace had the imperial Although Hirohito’s statement was
blessing, while the military who wished accepted by most Japanese, it did not pre-
184
• J A P A N , S U R R E N D E R O F •

vent further acts of defiance. Isolated when the invasion of Japan was to begin.
kamikaze attacks were made against U.S. It also suggests that the timing of the
ships and positions. Several hundred bombings was important as well, for by
army trainees seized a Tokyo park for dropping the two bombs closely together,
two days, after which the majority sur- the United States forced Hirohito and the
rendered while their leaders committed high command to move so fast that plot-
suicide. Rebellious young warriors dug ters and potential rebels were unable to
into the summit of a hill near the palace, organize quickly enough. Because emo-
where they holed up for four days before tions were running so high, even a week
all 12 killed themselves. or two of delay might have made a cru-
Diehards made many attacks on gov- cial difference.
ernment buildings, radio stations, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be
post offices in the provinces. A conspir- remembered as examples of the horrors
acy among naval air officers to keep on of war. But the memory of what hap-
fighting was discovered and crushed. Vice pened to those cities in 1945 should not
Admiral Matome Ugaki led a flight of be used to indict U.S. leaders as war
Japanese planes on a kamikaze attack criminals—which seems to lie behind
against the U.S. fleet, with all 11 aircraft much of the criticism. Faced with a cruel
mysteriously disappearing at sea. foe who showed no sign of surrender-
On August 16, Emperor Hirohito ing, President Truman and his lieu-
sent three princes away to overseas tenants took the only course that
headquarters, so that no one could pre- remained open to them. In doing so they
tend that the order to surrender was a saved not only Allied lives, but many
fake. Later he dispatched two more Japanese lives as well.
princes to restrain military fanatics in Millions of Japanese would have per-
the home islands. All the same, more ished as the result of an invasion. And
than 1,000 officers and hundreds of millions would probably have died had
civilians took their own lives. Many did bombardment and blockade been
so in a plaza before the ruins of the employed instead, mostly of starvation
imperial palace, which ran with blood and diseases resulting from the complete
for days after the surrender. collapse of Japan’s transportation system.
These events took place after the fire- With no easy choices available to them,
bomb raids had done their work, after the U.S. leaders made the best of a bad
millions had fled to the countryside, after situation. They have been acquitted by
the Soviets had declared war, after two history, if not always by historians.
atomic bombs had fallen on Japan, and
after the emperor had twice ordered the SEE ALSO
government to surrender. Many of these Atomic bombs; Hirohito; Japan; Japanese
acts came after Japan had actually sur- Army; Japanese Navy; Kamikaze
rendered, the emperor had explained this
to the nation, and an imperial order had F U RTHER READING
been sent to all Japanese commands Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy:
Hiroshima and Potsdam. New York:
demanding their obedience. Vintage, 1965.
This level of resistance strongly sug- Brooks, Lester. Behind Japan’s Surrender:
gests that if the atomic bombs had not The Secret Struggle that Ended an
forced the emperor’s hand, there would Empire. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.
Feifer, George. Tennozan: The Battle of
have been no surrender, not in August Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb. New
and perhaps not even by November, York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992.
185
• J A P A N E S E A M E R I C A N S •

Japanese Americans

The greatest domestic violation of


human rights in the United States during
the war was its mass internment of
Japanese Americans. On the day that
Image Not Available
Pearl Harbor was attacked, December 7,
1941, there were 117,000 Americans of
Japanese origin or descent living on the
West Coast, mostly in California. They
had been under investigation for being
possible spies and traitors by the Office
of Naval Intelligence (ONI) since 1935,
and since 1939 by the Federal Bureau of John L. DeWitt, chief of the Western The owner of a
Investigation (FBI) as well. In 1940 a Military Command, had been urging the Los Angeles
committee made up of the directors of removal of all enemy aliens from the grocery, a Uni-
the FBI, the ONI, and Army Intelligence West Coast to the interior of the United versity of Cali-
drew up a list of alien suspects. Many States. He also wanted to raid their fornia graduate
of Japanese
names on the list resulted from the homes and confiscate cameras, radios,
descent, had
ONI’s having burglarized the Japanese and weapons that might be used for dis-
placed the “I
consulate in Los Angeles. The arrest of a loyal purposes. Over the objections of AM AN
Japanese naval officer who had orga- FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, such mass AMERICAN”
nized an espionage ring yielded addi- raids took place but turned up nothing. sign on the
tional information. Meanwhile, tremendous political storefront the
When the United States went to pressure was put upon President Roo- day after Japan
war, the three agencies were confident sevelt by Californians and their con- bombed Pearl
that they had identified everyone who gressmen to intern all Japanese Ameri- Harbor.
might be a threat to national security. cans. The result was his executive order,
Within three weeks of Pearl Harbor, essentially a blank check authorizing the
2,192 Japanese aliens were arrested on War Department to do as it pleased. A
the mainland and 879 in Hawaii. Most bill to enforce it then sped through Con-
of them were members of the first gener- gress, with Senator Robert Taft of Ohio,
ation of Japanese Americans, known as who called it the sloppiest criminal law
Issei, who had long been residents of the he had ever seen or heard of, making
United States. With the completion of the only protest.
these arrests the FBI and the Justice On March 18, FDR signed another
Department were satisfied that Japanese Executive Order, 9102, establishing the
Americans no longer posed any threat to War Relocation Authority (WRA),
the United States. which was to share responsibility with
Yet, on February 19, 1942, Presi- the War Department for internees. The
dent Roosevelt signed Executive Order result was that by June 7, 1942, most
9066 directing Secretary of War Henry Japanese Americans were behind barbed
Stimson to establish military zones from wire, first in temporary centers and then
which anyone could be excluded for in more permanent camps, where some
security reasons. Lieutenant General 112,000 men, women, and children
186
• J A P A N E S E A M E R I C A N S •

would be held for an average of 900 science began working behind the scenes
days under harsh conditions in rural to undo this injustice. On December 3,
areas and wastelands. There were 10 1943, Attorney General Nicholas Biddle
major camps: two each in California, requested that President Roosevelt order
Arizona, and Arkansas, and one each in a liberal “release and return” program.
Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado. In February 1944 Secretary Harold
All the camps had much more severe cli- Ickes, whose Interior Department con-
mates, both in winter and summer, than trolled the WRA, made similar requests.
the internees were used to. When FDR continued to ignore them,
The camp at Poston, Arizona, was Ickes assigned Undersecretary Abe
desert country, lacking in shade and Fortas to work on the problem. Fortas
whipped by dust and sand. When the visited the camps and, horrified by their
internees began arriving in July, many conditions, brought back strong argu-
passed out from the intense heat. One ments in favor of early release.
said later: “People kept falling down. General Charles H. Bonesteel, the
We thought it was Devil’s Island.” Seven new military commander for the West
victims of heat stroke died in the first Coast, opposed internment and worked
days. Many internees believed this was ceaselessly against it, which was proba-
intentional, Poston being in their eyes a bly why he was transferred after serving
death camp. The army-style barracks in less than six months at his headquarters
which they lived offered no shelter from in San Francisco. The tide had turned all
the heat, were overrun with insects, and the same. At the first cabinet meeting
were impossible to keep clean. after Roosevelt’s reelection in 1944, Bid-
Camp Minidoka in Idaho was hot in dle asked Roosevelt to release all the
the summer but had temperatures that internees certified by the Justice Depart-
fell to 25 degrees below zero in the win- ment as loyal.
ter. Tule Lake in California, despite its This time, having nothing to lose,
pretty name, was a dry lake bed located FDR agreed. On December 10 the new
at an elevation of 4,000 feet. Winter tem- commanding general issued Public
peratures there fell to 29 below zero. In Proclamation No. 21, which was writ-
all the camps, sanitation was poor by any ten by Bonesteel, lifting the evacuation
standard and there was a complete lack and exclusion orders and allowing most
of privacy. Overcrowding, boredom, and internees to return to the West Coast.
hard work were the rule at all camps. Ironically, while their relatives were
The national policy of imprisoning in prison camps, the elite 442nd Regi-
and persecuting Japanese Americans mental Combat Team, composed en-
was upheld by the Supreme Court tirely of Japanese Americans, was fight-
because its respect for civil liberties less- ing against the Germans in Italy. With
ened in wartime, and because the gov- an average strength of about 3,000 sol-
ernment falsely claimed that there was diers, during its 11 months in combat it
no time to screen Japanese Americans suffered a total of 9,486 casualties and
individually, although such a screening became the most decorated unit in the
had taken place before Pearl Harbor. Army. All told, some 33,000 Nisei, or
The government also suppressed the second-generation Japanese Americans,
evidence it did have, which was consid- served in the armed forces with great
erable, that undermined the case for distinction, fighting and dying for the
internment. sake of a country that had put their
Early on, men and women of con- families in prison.
187
• J A P A N E S E A R M Y •

SEE ALSO intelligence and strategy. Orders from


Internment Imperial General Headquarters were fre-
quently mistaken or unclear, which
F U RTHER READING forced field officers to make their own
Collins, Donald E. Native American decisions. These were often poor
Aliens: Disloyalty and the Renunciation because the Japanese military saw no
of Citizenship by Japanese Americans
during World War II. Westport, Conn.: difference between caution and cow-
Greenwood, 1985. ardice. It also rated spiritual strength
Hoobler, Dorothy and Thomas. The above material strength, so Japanese sol-
Japanese American Family Album. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995. diers were always being given tasks that
Ichihashi, Yamato. Morning Glory, they lacked the means to accomplish.
Evening Shadow: Yamato Ichihashi and The organization of the Japanese
his Internment Writings, 1942–1945.
Army was different from that of its
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1997. Western counterparts. A Japanese divi-
Irons, Peter. Justice at War. New York: sion could have as many as 29,000 men,
Oxford University Press, 1983. making it the size of two U.S. divisions.
Okihiro, Gary Y. Whispered Silences:
Japanese Americans and World War II. In 1941 Japan had a total of 31 divi-
Seattle: University of Washington Press, sions. Until 1943 all of these were
1996. infantry, because Japan followed the
Smith, Page. Democracy on Trial: The
Japanese American Evacuation and Relo- old-fashioned practice of scattering its
cation in World War II. New York: tanks in small units among the infantry
Simon & Schuster, 1995. instead of forming separate armored
Taylor, Sandra C. Jewel of the Desert:
divisions.
Japanese American Internment at Topaz.
Berkeley: University of California Press, The Army had its own troop and
1993. supply ships as well as its own warships,
including escort carriers. In the same
spirit, the Navy had its own infantry Japanese
troops assault
units. In 1941 the Army had 151 air
a pill-box with
Japanese Army squadrons. They were organized into air
flame throwers
divisions, which had no fixed size. Most during their
of its aircraft were land-based. capture of the
The Japanese Army was poorly Bataan penin-
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) armed. Its basic rifle, designed in 1905, sula in the
fought so well because of the fanatical had not been improved since. Japanese Philippine
loyalty of its troops, not because of its ammunition was also inferior. Japanese Islands, 1942.
leadership. In theory, both of the armed
services were commanded by Imperial
General Headquarters (IGH). In prac-
tice, the IGH Army Section and the IGH
Navy Section operated independently of
each other and were in fierce competi- Image Not Available
tion. Some decisions were made jointly,
but much of the time each service went
its own way.
Commanders were selected accord-
ing to seniority, so the best men received
the best jobs only by accident. Little
attention was paid to such vital areas as
188
• J A P A N E S E N A V Y •

soldiers were poorly led in the field as well It not only damaged the Japanese war
as at the top, a favorite tactic of the offi- effort but also caused Allied troops to
cers being the suicidal frontal attack. On fight harder than ever, to the death if
the other hand, Japanese soldiers were necessary, rather than risk capture.
highly motivated and refused to give up. In 1943 the tide of battle turned
It has been noted that every army against the Imperial Japanese Army. It
swore to fight to the last man and the lost the Solomon Islands and other terri-
last bullet, but only the Japanese actu- tories. Most Japanese units in New
ally did so. Despite, or maybe because Guinea were destroyed. It was able to
of, their small stature, Japanese troops take the offensive only in China, which
could travel and fight for days with only in did in 1944, gaining local victories
the food and ammunition they carried while it continued to lose the war. Else-
on their backs. where it fought fierce defensive battles
Against their best traits, it must be that always ended in defeat. When it
said that their cruelty denied these fine lost Okinawa in 1945, the IJA had lost
soldiers the respect they would other- the war, even though large numbers of
wise have earned. This trait was deliber- troops were still stationed in China and
ately encouraged by army leaders. They Manchuria.
believed that people in occupied territo- The Imperial Japanese Army raised
ries would be easier to rule if they lived 170 infantry, 13 air, 4 tank (beginning in
in terror. In China the Army had 1943), and 4 antitank divisions for over-
thought that if it raped, tortured, and seas service. These units totaled some
murdered enough civilians the Chinese 2,340,000 men, of whom about 1.5 mil-
government would give up, but these lion were killed. The lucky Japanese sol-
ideas proved both evil and false. Instead, diers were the 3 million assembled in the
terror promoted the growth of resistance home islands in 1945 to repel an Allied
movements in many occupied lands. The invasion that never took place.
Chinese Nationalists, though frequently
SEE ALSO
beaten, refused to surrender.
Central Pacific area; China; Pacific war;
In the case of prisoners of war, there South Pacific area; Southwest Pacific area
appears to have been no particular rea-
F U RTHER READING
son for cruel treatment. Prisoners often
possessed valuable skills and, since the Costello, John. The Pacific War,
1941–1945. New York: Rawson Wade,
Japanese used them as workmen, were a 1981.
labor force with much potential. Yet the Toland, John. Rising Sun: The Decline and
Japanese starved, tortured, and mur- Fall of the Japanese Empire. New York:
Random House, 1970.
dered them from the start. Some have
said that this was because the Japanese
regarded surrender as dishonorable, and
prisoners of war were therefore viewed Japanese Navy
with contempt.
However, this does not explain
much, because many of the prisoners the
Japanese took—the Marines on Wake The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) shared
Island, U.S. and native troops in the many of the army’s defects: poor plan-
Philippines—had fought with great ning, a lack of interest in intelligence
courage. Whatever the reasons for it, the work, promotion by seniority rather than
Japanese Army’s brutality was shameful. by merit, poor control over field officers,
189
• J A P A N E S E N A V Y •

and a culture that confused recklessness The first aerial


with bravery. In addition, the navy photo taken of
favored attack plans that were too com- one of Japan’s
plex and depended on the enemy’s doing Yamato-class
exactly what the Japanese expected. battleships cap-
tures it making
On the other hand, the Japanese Navy
a sharp turn.
was a very big, very high-quality force
The 45,000-ton
when the Pacific war began. It was the Image Not Available battleship was
third largest in the world, and although sunk on April
smaller than to the U.S. Navy, was supe- 7, 1944.
rior to it in the Pacific. On December 7,
1941, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor,
its Navy had a total of 391 warships,
including 10 carriers (to the U.S. Pacific
Fleet’s 3) and many more cruisers and
destroyers than the Pacific Fleet.
In quality the IJN was superior too.
Its “Long Lance” torpedo was the best This mistake, and others to follow, was
in the world, far stronger, faster, and a result of many of Japan’s best admirals
more reliable than the U.S. Navy’s infe- having been purged in the 1930s. With
rior models. Japanese naval aviators were the exception of Admiral Isoroku
the best in the world as well, having Yamamoto, who planned the Pearl Har-
sharpened their skills in combat while bor attack, Japanese naval leaders
the United States was still at peace. tended to be second-rate.
The Japanese Navy had better air- Its superior intelligence and leader-
planes also. The IJN’s model of the ship enabled the U.S. Navy to defeat a
famous Zero fighter outclassed the U.S. much stronger Japanese fleet at Midway
Navy’s Wildcat in almost every respect. Island in June 1942. Lacking both, the
The IJN’s torpedo bomber was far IJN engaged in costly operations that
ahead of the Devastator, the U.S. Navy’s wore away its strength. The Japanese
“flying coffin.” Furthermore, the IJN Navy had planned for a quick victory at
excelled at night fighting, as the U.S. sea. Instead it got a war of attrition in
Navy would learn to its sorrow in the which the enemy grew stronger while its
Solomon Islands campaign. own strength declined. Particularly
Although in time the U.S. Navy harmful was a policy of using up vet-
would dwarf the IJN, at first it had only eran airmen in combat, rather than send-
two advantages over Japan’s many supe- ing them home to train others, as the
rior assets: better intelligence and leader- U.S. Navy did. The result was a sharp
ship. The Japanese attack on Pearl Har- decline in the quality of the IJN pilots.
bor, although a brilliant success, failed The weakening effects of this policy
to cripple the Pacific Fleet, because the became clear at the Battle of the Philip-
Japanese admiral commanding the pine Sea in June 1944. When the fight
attack refused to order a second strike. ended, Japan had lost 243 carrier aircraft
If it had been launched, it would have and most of its pilots. It was the end of
taken out oil and gas storage tanks, dry- Japan’s fleet air arm. In the next, and
docks, and other supply and repair facil- last, great sea battle of the Pacific war,
ities, thereby forcing the Pacific Fleet to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Japanese carri-
retire to its bases on the West Coast. ers would be used as bait, for lack of air
190
• K A I S E R, H E N R Y J. •

crews. In this battle, which was actually


a series of actions, the Japanese surface
fleet was nearly wiped out as well. After
that, except for submarine and kamikaze
attacks, the IJN was helpless.
The Imperial Japanese Navy com-
missioned 451 surface warships and Image Not Available
submarines during the war. By the time
Japan surrendered, 332 of these vessels
had been sunk and just 37, or 8.2 per-
cent of the total, remained in use.
SEE ALSO
Central Pacific Area; Leyte Gulf, Battle of;
Midway Island, Battle of; Pacific war;
Pearl Harbor, attack on; Philippine Sea,
Battle of the; South Pacific Area, South- December 1940 to build cargo ships for At the Kaiser
west Pacific Area
Britain. It was the beginning of a legend shipyards in
F U RTHER READING for, although he knew nothing about Richmond,
Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Impe- ships, Kaiser was a production genius. He California,
rial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapo- would go on to build 13 types of vessel, Eastine Cown-
lis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1958. er, a former
Spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun: but his fame resulted from the class of
waitress, works
The American War with Japan. New vessel called the Liberty ship. This was a
as a scaler to
York: Free Press, 1985. 10,000-ton merchant vessel that could be construct the
manufactured quickly and cheaply. Liberty Ship SS
While other yards took about two George Wash-
months to build a Liberty ship, Kaiser ington Carver,
Kaiser, Henry J. could turn one out in 30 days. In 1942 launched on
INDUSTRIALIST one of his yards built a cargo ship in 4 May 7, 1943.
days, 15 hours, and 26 minutes. Invent-
• Born: May 9, 1882, Sprout Brook, N.Y.
ing new methods was the key to Kaiser’s
• Education: left school at age 13
success. Among other improvements, his
• Died: August 24, 1967, Oahu, Hawaii
yards were the first to build sections of
vessels before final assembly and the first
to weld steel plates together instead of
using rivets.
Between 1895, when he left school, and Kaiser did his country another
1910, when he entered the construction important service by persuading the Navy
industry, Kaiser had a variety of jobs to order escort carriers. The Navy did not
and businesses on the East and West want them at first, but Kaiser had
coasts. In 1914 he started his own con- enough clout to go over the head of the
struction business in Vancouver, British Department of the Navy. He persuaded
Columbia. Until 1940, usually in part- President Roosevelt that small carriers,
nerships with other firms, Kaiser built which would be easy to build in quantity,
roads and dams in the western United were desperately needed at sea. And they
States and Cuba. were, as even the admirals, who preferred
Knowing that the war would make big ships, would later admit.
enormous demands on shipping, Kaiser By war’s end Kaiser had built 1,490
and his partners won a big contract in vessels. These included 821 Liberty ships
191
• K A M I K A Z E •

and 291 Victory ships, which were


slightly improved versions of the Liberty.
Although cargo ships were his specialty,
Kaiser also built 107 warships, of which
50 were escort carriers.
In addition to being a great builder,
Kaiser was a good boss. To the degree
wartime shortages allowed, he provided
housing for his 200,000 employees. He
also gave them what became the Kaiser Image Not Available
Permanente medical care program, one
of the first and best of the early health
maintenance organizations. Kaiser was
perhaps the most publicized American
industrialist of the war and deserved
every bit of praise he received. In the
United States, only Andrew J. Higgins, a
brilliant maker of landing and assault
craft and ships, could be compared with
Kaiser. Abroad he had no equal. After
the war Kaiser moved from shipbuilding
to the manufacture of steel, aluminum,
and cement. His only real failure was
the Kaiser-Frazer corporation, which The use of kamikazes on a mass Two kamikazes
manufactured unpopular automobiles. basis became Japanese policy late in hit the USS
1944, when a shortage of pilots was Bunker Hill
SEE ALSO
crippling Japanese air power. The first within 30 sec-
Carriers onds of each
kamikaze waves were launched against
F U RTHER READING other and set it
ships of the U.S. Navy on October 25,
Adams, Stephen B. Mr. Kaiser Goes to afire on May
1944, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Washington: The Rise of a Government 11, 1945, off
Kamikazes were employed on a far
Entrepreneur. Chapel Hill: University of Kyushu, Japan.
North Carolina Press, 1997. greater scale after the invasion of Oki-
Foster, Mark S. Henry J. Kaiser: Builder in nawa in June 1945.
the Modern American West. Austin: Uni- When the battle was over, the U.S.
versity of Texas Press, 1989.
Navy had lost 36 ships and landing
craft. About 4,900 U.S. sailors were
killed by kamikazes and almost as many
Kamikaze wounded. This made Okinawa the
bloodiest battle fought by the U.S. Navy
in World War II. Japan is believed to
have lost roughly 5,000 kamikazes.
The kamikaze (Japanese for “divine
SEE ALSO
wind”) was a pilot who deliberately
Okinawa, Battle of
crashed his airplane into a target. There
were other suicide weapons, such as F U RTHER READING
human torpedoes and midget sub- Lamont-Brown, Raymond. Kamikaze:
marines, but kamikazes were far and Japan’s Suicide Samurai. New York: Ster-
away the most effective. ling, 1997.
192
• K I N G, E R N E S T J. •

headstrong and arrogant, he seldom


King, Ernest J. sought or accepted advice, and he made
CHIEF OF NAVA L little distinction between his personal
OPERATIONS, 1941–45 opinions and naval policy.
Image Not Available By appointing King to the dual
• Born: November 23, 1878, Lorain, position of commander in chief of the
Ohio
• Political party: none
U.S. Fleet and chief of naval operations,
• Education: U.S. Naval Academy, B.S., President Roosevelt made him the most
1904 powerful naval officer in U.S. history.
• Military service: captain, 1918; These appointments ensured that in the
commander, Lexington, 1930–32; rear
admiral, 1932; vice-admiral, 1938; critical opening months of the Pacific
commander, Atlantic Fleet, 1940–41; war the naval chain of command would
commander in chief, U.S. fleet, and be direct and clear. It also meant that
chief of naval operations, 1941–45;
fleet admiral, 1945 King would be able to put his personal
• Died: June 25, 1956, Portsmouth, N.H. stamp on naval policy to an unusual
degree. Whether Roosevelt’s decision
was correct is hard to say. King used his
power to accomplish much, but also to
A brilliant student, King had commanded force issues in such a way as to achieve
submarines as well as air units and air- his own goals.
craft carriers and had served in a variety The clearest and most important
of staff and shore positions during his example of his personal style came soon
naval career before World War II. Presi- after Pearl Harbor. In planning for a
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt did not know war with Japan, the Navy had always
him personally. For most officers this assumed that it would be a naval con-
ruled out being assigned high command flict commanded by an admiral. But
in the Navy, and it is surprising that King Japan’s numerous land victories, espe-
advanced as far as he did in the 1930s. cially in the Philippines, made the old
King was assigned to the General theories out-of-date. General George C.
Board, a group that advised the secre- Marshall, the army chief of staff, there-
tary of the navy, because he was sched- fore proposed that a Southwest Pacific
uled for retirement in 1940. But he theater be formed with General Douglas
impressed the outgoing secretary of the MacArthur as supreme commander. He
navy, who recommended him to Roo- would have charge of all naval forces
sevelt. So, instead of being retired, King required to perform his mission. King
became commander of the Atlantic was furious. He would never allow a
Fleet, and then of the entire Navy. general to have supreme command over
After the Pearl Harbor defeat in what the Navy regarded as its private
December 1941, Roosevelt wanted the war with Japan.
Navy shaken up, and the forceful King A compromise was arrived at on
was the right man for such a job. He March 30, 1942. MacArthur would get
was also, in many ways, the officer best his Southwest Pacific Area. It would
qualified to command the Navy, because contain Australia, New Guinea, the
he had drive, energy, and intelligence. Netherlands East Indies, and many
King was one of only a handful of admi- other islands—including possibly the
rals with command experience in the Philippines. Everything else in the Pacific
fleet air arm, which was about to Ocean would be reserved for the Navy.
become very important. But he was This agreement meant having a divided
193
• K I N G, E R N E S T J. •

command and two separate war efforts. time the Pacific Fleet would be essenti-
Duplication, waste, and confusion ally idle. Meanwhile, MacArthur’s forces
would be the inevitable results. The two were continuously in action and could
campaigns would be fought so far apart have made good use of the vast military
that they would compete for the same resources stockpiled in the central Pa-
resources instead of supporting each cific by the Navy.
other. Only the Japanese and the U.S. Because the southwest Pacific con-
Navy benefited from the arrangement. tained many Japanese strongpoints,
When it lost the Southwest Pacific MacArthur employed a variety of meth-
Area to MacArthur, the Navy was ods. He could threaten Japanese posi-
forced to make the Central Pacific Area tions that he was not in fact going to
its primary theater of war. King ordered attack, keeping the enemy off balance.
a series of amphibious attacks in 1943 MacArthur might land in the enemy’s
against Japanese-held atolls in the cen- rear or bypass him entirely. Cleverness
tral Pacific. The Mariana Islands to the and surprise saved many lives in the
west would be taken in 1944, followed southwest Pacific.
by landings on the China coast. In the Central Pacific Area, on the
In 1944, when Japan seized the other hand, targets were few and far
coastal areas of China, King argued that apart. They could not be taken by sur-
the island of Formosa should be invaded prise and had to be stormed, often at
instead. The Navy, however, did not have great cost. Some admirals, including
the troops required to take Formosa, and Chester Nimitz himself, thought that
the Army would not provide men for an taking unimportant islands in this fash-
operation that would conflict with its own ion was wrong. They favored operations
plans. Accordingly, MacArthur was that would parallel those of MacArthur
allowed to liberate the Philippines and and enable the two drives to support
both services agreed that Okinawa would each other. King personally put a stop to
be liberated next, followed by Japan itself. talks aimed at achieving this result.
Yet even for the invasion of Japan Responsibility for the central Pacific
there was going to be no supreme com- strategy, therefore, was solely his.
mander. The army and naval forces Where interservice rivalries were not
would continue to fight under their own involved, King fully supported General
leaders. If the two disagreed, bargaining Marshall, the figure most responsible for
and haggling would presumably settle U.S. grand strategy during the war.
their differences. Luckily, Japan surren- Although some ships—the vital landing
dered before this strange command ships tank in particular—were never
structure could be put in place. numerous enough, King always man-
Some historians still argue that the aged to produce some when they were
two-front war of the Southwest and needed in European waters. A good
Central Pacific Areas made sense. But strategist himself, King was against the
the central Pacific drive was extremely ill-fated invasion of Italy in 1943. He
wasteful. Huge armadas had to be doubted rightly, as events showed, that
assembled to invade insignificant islands air power alone could win the war. He
that were often strongly defended. The opposed having an independent air force
resulting casualties were very high in like Britain’s RAF, which he saw as a
relation to the number of men involved. bad use of military resources.
Months often went by between one King believed in secrecy to such an
operation and the next, during which extent that if it had been up to him the
194
• K N O X, W I L L I A M F R A N K L I N •

Department of the Navy would never Knox was raised in Grand Rapids,
have held a press conference. Any infor- Michigan, and served briefly under
mation that the Japanese received, no Theodore Roosevelt as a Rough Rider in
matter how insignificant, was a security the Spanish-American War. In 1902 he
threat. When carriers were lost he kept entered the newspaper business in
the news even from Secretary of the Michigan, first as a reporter, then as a
Navy Frank Knox, who was supposed publisher. In 1912 he became co-owner
to be his boss. He tried to keep the great and publisher of two papers, the Man-
U.S. victory at Midway a secret too, but chester, New Hampshire, Union and
of course that information could not be Leader.
kept from the Japanese. Despite his age (42), Knox joined
King will always be remembered for the Army as a private during World
having led the Navy to victory in World War I. He saw action in France and
War II. But all leaders make mistakes, and rose to the rank of major of artillery. In
like many others he fell victim to the intense 1931 Knox became part owner and
partisanship that so often put the Army and publisher of the unprofitable Chicago
Navy at odds. King was very much an offi- Sun, which he restored to financial sta-
cer of his time and place, so his likes and bility. He was the Republican nominee
dislikes were widely shared. Whether any for Vice President in 1936.
other admiral could have done better is As World War II neared, Knox
something we will never know. argued for a strong defense. When fight-
ing broke out in Europe in 1939, he
SEE ALSO
favored all possible aid to the Allies
Central Pacific Area; Nimitz, Chester W.;
Pacific war; United States Navy short of outright intervention. This
stand required courage on the part of a
F U RTHER READING
Midwestern publisher, because the
Buell, Thomas B. Master of Sea Power: A region was strongly isolationist.
Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J.
King. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. In the summer of 1940, President
King, Ernest Joseph. Fleet Admiral King, A Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Knox
Naval Record by Ernest J. King and Wal- to be secretary of the navy, and he
ter Muir Whitehill. New York: Norton,
1952. joined the cabinet in August. His
appointment was made at the same time
that another leading Republican, Henry
L. Stimson—by coincidence another ex-
Knox, William artillery officer—was nominated as sec-
Image Not Available
Franklin retary of war. These nominations
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, strengthened Roosevelt’s cabinet and
1940–44 gave it a bipartisan flavor in time for the
Presidential election of 1940.
• Born: January 1, 1874, Boston, Mass. As civilian head of the Navy, Knox
• Political party: Republican presided over the greatest expansion in
• Education: Alma College, 1893–96
the service’s history, seeing it rise from a
• Military service: U.S. Cavalry, 1898;
U.S. Army, 1917–18; Secretary of the force of some 200,000 (including
Navy, 1940 –44 Marines) in 1940 to one numbering 3.5
• Died: April 28, 1944, Washington, D.C. million (with 500,000 Marines) at the
time of his death. Knox provided the
Navy with important leadership. After
only a month in office, he negotiated
195
• L A B O R •

many of the details concerning an to an end. This excess manpower


exchange of U.S. destroyers for British enabled President Franklin D. Roosevelt
bases in the Western Hemisphere. He to delay thinking about labor issues for
called for U.S. escorts of Lend-Lease several years.
program convoys in the summer of Instead, the government’s man-
1941, leading isolationists to demand power policy was aimed at preventing
that he be removed from office. He was strikes, a problem that could not be
never more decisive than in the dark avoided or delayed because in 1941
days that followed Pearl Harbor on there were 4,228 walkouts involving
December 7, 1941. some 2.4 million men and women. It
The day after the Pearl Harbor was the biggest year for strikes since
attack, Knox left Washington for Hawaii. 1919. Although workers usually had
On returning he told reporters that both good reasons to strike—low wages and
the Army and Navy had been caught poor working conditions, among other
napping. He then relieved Admiral Hus- issues—they threatened the mobilization
band E. Kimmel of duty as commander effort and could not be allowed to con-
of the Pacific Fleet, replacing him with a tinue.
man who was to become one of the The 1941 walkouts were hard to
Navy’s greatest leaders, Admiral Chester handle, because organized labor had
W. Nimitz. Knox also made Admiral become a major ally of President Roo-
Ernest J. King, a brilliant if ruthless offi- sevelt. When he was first elected in
cer, commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet 1932, the trade union movement was
and chief of naval operations. still dominated by the nonpolitical
Among Knox’s best civilian American Federation of Labor (AFL).
appointees were Adlai E. Stevenson, But then the Congress of Industrial
who served as his special assistant, and Organizations (CIO) came along, and
Undersecretary James V. Forrestal, who most of its leaders were early and con-
would succeed him. Both were able stant supporters of Roosevelt. In 1935
managers and notable for their integrity Roosevelt had thrown his weight
and character. A hearty, vigorous, pro- behind the passage of the Wagner
fane man, Knox died in office after a Labor Relations Act, which legalized
series of heart attacks. collective bargaining and made possible
a great union movement. The CIO sup-
ported Roosevelt’s reelection campaign
the following year by contributing half
a million dollars—a huge sum at the
Labor time—and supplying thousands of cam-
paign volunteers.
These were the main reasons why
Roosevelt’s answer to strikes against
defense plants would not be a harsh
As war spread across Europe and Asia, one. Instead, FDR intended to retain
no one in the United States worried labor’s support through democratic
much about manpower issues, because means. He created the National Defense
unemployment remained high as a result Mediation Board (later the National
of the Depression. In 1940, 9 million War Labor Board—WLB), which devel-
men were still out of work, and it was oped a mediation process that would
not until 1943 that unemployment came outlast the war. The WLB was unusual
196
• L A B O R •

among war agencies because the general that workers in organized plants auto-
public was represented on it in addition matically became union members unless
to labor and management groups. For they refused to do so within 15 days of
most of its life, the board was directed being hired. This device reversed the fall
by William H. Davis, a successful lawyer in union membership. Largely as a result
and Democrat. Under his leadership, the of the union shop policy, organized
board worked to establish industrywide labor grew from a total of 8.9 million
wage patterns and labor practices. It workers in 1940 to 14.7 million in
also sought to prevent strikes by pres- 1945. Meanwhile, the civilian labor
suring union heads to calm militant force shrank by 1.8 million workers, to
local chapters. 53.9 million.
In order to avoid inflation at a time The wage freeze remained through-
when increased government spending out the war because the government
was pushing up prices, Roosevelt had to simply could not afford to give indus-
control wages as well as prices. To do trial workers the increases they wanted.
this, on April 27, 1942, he asked for Nor was there any strong reason to do
higher taxes, price controls, and a wage so. Like almost everyone else not in uni-
freeze to be worked out by the War form, those employed in manufacturing
Labor Board. The board finally decided benefited from the war, with their real
that wages should be kept at the level wages rising by 22 percent between
existing on January 1, 1941, plus 15 1940 and 1944.
percent. This indexing resulted in aver- This increase was not, however, as
age hourly industrial wages rising by large as those others enjoyed. Net farm
more than a quarter, from 66 cents at income doubled between 1941 and
the beginning of 1941 to 85 cents as of 1945. The after-tax profits of corpora-
January 1, 1943. Consumer prices tions had increased by 57 percent
increased by 16.4 percent during this between 1941 and 1943. The fact that
period. industrial workers gained less gave
The wage freeze reduced inflation, them a valid complaint. Yet the wage
but at the expense of industrial workers. freeze did not apply when a worker
After, Pearl Harbor most labor leaders moved to a better job or had his job
had pledged not to strike while the war upgraded. Millions received hourly
lasted. They believed that unionized increases in this way. Many also saw
workers would be rewarded for giving their fringe benefits improve, which
up the strike weapon. But by freezing benefited them financially even when
wages, the federal government had elim- pay rates remained stable.
inated the main reason for joining But the main reason why workers
unions, and in 1942 their membership earned more than before the war was
declined—sharply, in some cases. that they spent more time on the job: an
To save organized labor, the War average of 45.2 hours per week in 1944
Labor Board fell back on a practice compared with fewer than 38 before the
called the union shop. In return for a war. As prices had risen as well, it
no-strike pledge and promises of union appeared to some that they were work-
cooperation with government, the WLB ing harder but earning less, which was
insisted that employers include in their untrue. Still, as the wage freeze grew in
labor contracts what was called a unpopularity, strikes became more fre-
“maintenance of membership” clause. quent. There were 2,000 walkouts in
As defined in June 1942, it stipulated 1942, 3,700 in 1943, and nearly 5,000
197
• L A B O R •

in 1944, of which 41 involved more asked for, the resulting inflation would
than 5,000 workers. The proportion of have canceled out most if not all of their
all workers involved in strikes quadru- pay raises. The CIO’s restraint was polit-
pled after 1942, returning, in effect, to ically wise, but it was also patriotic and
peacetime levels. in the workers’ best interest. Moreover,
There were differences in wartime workers were profiting from the war, if
strikes all the same. Most of these less so than others. Their feelings of
strikes were being treated A Government
“quickie” stop- unjustly were propoganda
pages that halted nothing compared poster implied
work for one shift to those experi- the terribe fate
or less. Congress enced by GIs, who in store for
of Industrial Orga- saw walkouts as American fami-
nization leaders stabs in their lies if workers
remained faithful backs. were to strike.
to the no-strike GIs may have
pledge, cracking felt bitterness
Image Not Available
down on locals toward disgruntled
that walked out workers on the
and giving the home front, yet
Roosevelt adminis- strikes more than
tration more than anything else sym-
they received in bolized for service-
return. It was a men the unfairness
hard war for them, of wartime. Despite
trapped as they the deep commit-
were between an ment of Americans
irritated member- to the war effort,
ship and a War as a whole it
Labor Board that became more strict resembled an upside-down pyramid. On
over time. top a majority of civilians were living
Life was simpler for the AFL, which well. Meanwhile, at the bottom a com-
had not tied itself to the Democratic parative handful of fighting men bore all
party and felt no need to punish its locals the suffering. Nothing much could be
for breaking the no-strike pledge. This done about this. Some people called for
live-and-let-live policy made it more “equality of sacrifice,” but in war that is
attractive to resentful workers, and AFL impossible. Fighting men risk their lives;
unions grew, to some degree at the CIO’s civilians, at most, some income.
expense. Were it not for the WLB’s
SEE ALSO
“maintenance of membership” policy, the
Mobilization; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano
shift would have been even greater.
Strikes in wartime greatly angered F U RTHER READING
the public. Still, they were almost always Lichtenstein, Nelson. Labor’s War at
brief and did not hurt the war effort. Home: The CIO in World War II.
The appearance that workers at home New York: Cambridge University Press,
were betraying the boys overseas was 1982.
Vatter, Harold G. The U.S. Economy in
far less serious than the reality. If strik- World War II. New York: Columbia Uni-
ing workers had gotten what they had versity Press, 1985.
198
• L A N D I N G S H I P S A N D C R A F T •

large—was 158 feet long. The oceango-


Landing ships and ing LCT was actually a ship.
craft Far and away the most desired
assault vessel was the 328-foot-long
landing ship tank (LST). Designed with
British aid by the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of
Specialized assault vessels were an after- Ships in 1941, the LST was a clever
thought in the U.S. war effort. Before compromise between cargo ship and
the war, U.S. and British planners had landing craft. In the front it had a flat
not expected that most of their cam- bottom so it could be grounded on or
paigns would begin with amphibious close to the beach (it would winch itself
landings. The British started developing off after unloading, using anchors previ-
landing craft for commando operations ously dropped astern). Its bow consisted
in 1940. That same year an American of clamshell doors that opened to let
who had invented an amphibious vehi- down a ramp connected directly to the
cle with caterpillar treads called the Alli- tank deck. If necessary, as when under
gator modified it for military use. It fire, an LST could be emptied in min-
would be called the landing vehicle utes. Though slow and hard to handle at
tracked, or LVT. Armored and carrying sea, LSTs were invaluable, and every the-
a tank gun, it would prove the ideal ater commander wanted more of them
vehicle for storming enemy beaches. The than he could get.
LVT was especially useful against beaches The basic problem with landing
protected by coral reefs, which it simply ships and craft was that they were not
climbed over. Later an amphibious 2-ton produced on the basis of a long-range
truck was designed that was code plan. Instead, they were turned out as
named the DUKW, or duck. needed for particular operations. In the
In 1941 Andrew Jackson Higgins, a case of small landing craft, this lack of
New Orleans boatbuilder, produced an system was far from fatal, but major
open 36-foot landing craft with a bow landing craft took more time to build,
ramp, designated the LCVP because it and LSTs required half a year in produc-
could carry either personnel or vehicles. tion at first.
Easy and cheap to build, Higgins’s boats The invasion of North Africa was
would be manufactured in enormous delayed for months by a shortage of
numbers and were the primary Allied landing craft. In 1943 and 1944 military
assault craft. Higgins would become one operations all over the world continued
of the production heroes of the war. He to be hampered by a lack of assault ves-
was to assault craft what Henry J. Kaiser sels. The British were especially annoyed
was to cargo ships. that operations they would have liked to
Most landing craft were small, stage in the Mediterranean were unable
designed to be carried to the invasion site to go forward because they had no LSTs.
on “combat loaders,” oceangoing cargo Britain’s dependence on the United States
and troopships. But it was obvious that was its own fault. The British had over-
larger vessels would be needed. The basic invested in heavy bombers, leaving them
landing craft tank, or LCT, was 108 feet without the means to build assault ves-
long, although some versions were much sels of their own. In the entire war,
larger. Designed by the British, most Britain built only 24 landing ships, 21 of
LCTs were built in the United States. The them in 1945, too late to matter. It did
landing craft infantry, LCI(L)—for build 1,264 major landing craft and
199
• L E A H Y, W I L L I A M D. •

2,867 minor ones, but U.S. production


totals came to 1,573 landing ships, 2,486
major craft, and 45,524 minor units.
The absence of a long-range plan
was responsible for many shortages.
Assault vessels, LSTs in particular, were
transferred from Europe to the Pacific,
Image Not Available
but never moved in the opposite direc-
tion. The Navy argued, perhaps correct-
ly, that the vast distances of the Pacific
made it impractical to transfer LSTs to
Europe once they were there. As the
Pacific received the lion’s share of LSTs,
the Navy often used them as ordinary
cargo vessels or floating warehouses. Yet
even if LSTs and major landing craft regarded as the main ships of the fleet, Leahy and
were always in short supply, enough commander of the Battle Force (later President Roo-
remained to win the war. renamed the Pacific Fleet), and chief of sevelt take time
naval operations, which was the Navy’s out during a
SEE ALSO flight to Lon-
highest position.
Kaiser, Henry J. don to look at
Leahy owed his success to great
pictures of
ability as well as the fact that President
Trinadad.
Franklin D. Roosevelt had known him
since World War I, when Leahy served
Leahy, William D. under FDR in the Navy Department.
CHIEF OF STAFF, 1942–49 The quiet admiral and the sociable Presi-
dent could not have been more different,
• Born: May 6, 1875, Hampton, Iowa
but Roosevelt trusted Leahy as he did
• Political party: none
• Education: U.S. Naval Academy, B.S.,
few others. That is why he insisted on
1897 retaining Leahy’s services after the admi-
• Military service: lieutenant, 1904–9; ral retired in 1939.
captain, 1918–27; commander, As Roosevelt’s ambassador to
battleship USS New Mexico, 1926–27;
commander, Battleship Divisions, France, Leahy found himself in a tricky
Battle Force, 1935–36; admiral, position, because Vichy France was col-
1937–39, 1942–44; chief of naval
operations, 1937–39 laborating with the Nazis. But the
• Government service: governor of French colonial empire was still large,
Puerto Rico, 1939–40; ambassador to and Roosevelt felt it important to
France, 1940–42; chief of staff to remain on good terms with Vichy any-
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman,
1942–49 way. The French Navy (which included
• Died: July 20, 1959, Bethesda, Md. a fleet in the Caribbean) remained sig-
nificant too.
After Pearl Harbor was attacked in
December 1941, Roosevelt directed the
When Admiral William Leahy retired U.S. Army and Navy, which previously
for the first time, in 1939, he had been had had no direct link, to form the Joint
chief of the Navy’s two most important Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to direct military
bureaus, commander of all the battle- operations. At first the JCS consisted of
ship divisions at a time when they were three men, Admiral Ernest King, who
200
• L E M A Y, C U R T I S E. •

headed the Navy; General George C. under Roosevelt had been important to
Marshall, the army chief of staff; and the smooth working of the U.S. military
General Henry Arnold, chief of the machine. Under Truman, however, espe-
Army Air Forces. Marshall feared that cially at first, Leahy had real power.
Admiral King, because he was outnum- Typically, he used it with care.
bered on the JCS, might be tempted to Leahy was the least known of the
go directly to the President when dis- nation’s top military leaders of World
agreements arose. He solved this possi- War II. His work was bureaucratic and
ble problem with an inspired solution. diplomatic and did not involve making
He asked Roosevelt to recall Leahy to command decisions. He was not associ-
active service as chief of staff to the ated with any faction or party. He had
President with a seat on the JCS, whose no pet theories about how the war
meetings Leahy would chair. should be waged. But in his quiet way
This solved the King problem to the he was a model officer and did his coun-
degree that it could be solved, and gave try a great service.
Roosevelt a close and trusted advisor on
F U RTHER READING
all military matters. Admiral Leahy had
Adams, Henry H. Witness to Power: The
offices in the White House, saw the Presi- Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.
dent every day, and in time was asked by Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
Roosevelt to help with many problems 1985.
Leahy, William D. I Was There. 1950.
that had little, if anything, to do with mil- Reprint, North Stratford, N.H.: Ayer,
itary affairs. Although not as close to 1980.
Roosevelt as Harry Hopkins, FDR’s main
troubleshooter in civilian affairs, Leahy
played a similar role in the military.
When Hopkins was too ill to work, LeMay, Curtis E.
which happened several times during the COMMANDER OF XXI
war, Leahy did Hopkins’s job as well as BOMBER COMMAND
his own. Close-mouthed, industrious, and
• Born: November 15, 1906, Columbus,
orderly, Leahy was the perfect chief of Ohio
staff for a President whose habit it was to • Political party: none
surround himself with chaos. • Education: Ohio State University,
1924–28, B.S.
Leahy made his greatest contribu-
• Military service: U.S. Army second
tion to the war effort when Harry S. lieutenant, 1928–37; captain,
Truman became President in 1945. Roo- 1940–41; colonel, 1942–43; brigadier
sevelt had done nothing to prepare Vice general, 1943–44; major general, 1944
• Died: October 1, 1990, March AFB,
President Truman for the Oval Office in Calif.
case his own health, which was poor,
failed. Thus, when Truman was sworn
in on April 12, 1945, he knew almost
nothing about Roosevelt’s foreign and A tactical genius, Curtis LeMay had
military policies. It therefore fell to trained for years with the Boeing B-17
Leahy, who knew more about both than Flying Fortress before the war. He was
anyone else except Roosevelt himself, to given the 305th Bombardment Group
brief the new President. Further, unlike not long after Pearl Harbor was
Roosevelt, who did as he pleased, Tru- attacked in December 1941. The B-17
man not only listened to Leahy but fre- was the world’s first operational four-
quently took his advice. Leahy’s job engined heavy bomber. Heavily armed
201
• L E M A Y, C U R T I S E. •

and armored, it was designed to force its air war would have to wait for the
way through enemy fighters in daylight arrival of long-range fighters.
and drop its relatively small bombload After his service in Europe, LeMay
exactly on target. was made chief of the XX Bomber
When LeMay took his group to Command based in India and China.
Britain in 1942 he soon discovered that The XX was equipped with the new
the formation in use there did not Boeing B-29 Superfortress, a much larg-
enable B-17s to provide each other with er, stronger, faster aircraft than the B-17.
overlapping fields of machine-gun fire. But its bases were too far from major
Accordingly, he designed the Lead-High- targets, and its China bases were too
Low combat box. This formation, hard to supply. Even the long-range B-
which permitted between 18 and 21 29 could not bomb effectively under
bombers to give each other maximum these conditions. When the Allies took
fire support, was adopted by all the the Mariana Islands in 1944, the Army
heavy bomb groups of the Army Air Air Force based its XXI Bomber Com-
Forces. He pioneered in other ways too, mand on them. The B-29s of LeMay’s
developing methods that won wide- XX Bomber Command were then trans-
spread acceptance. ferred to the XXI, which LeMay took
LeMay often led his group into bat- over on January 19, 1945.
tle and provided it with such effective The XXI Bomber Command had
leadership that he was promoted to been trying unsuccessfully to destroy tar-
command the 3rd Air Division of the gets in Japan with precision bombing
Eighth Air Force in 1943. In that capaci- from high altitudes. The trouble was
ty he led it in one of the most costly air that at high altitudes, the B-29s encoun-
attacks of the war. tered enormous winds. If the winds were
On August 17, 1943, LeMay per- behind them, the aircraft flew up to a
sonally led the 3rd Division to Regens- hundred miles per hour faster than nor-
burg, Germany, where it successfully mal, making accuracy impossible. And if
bombed an aircraft plant in an experi- they flew into the wind, their speed was
mental mission before flying on to reduced by the same hundred miles per
Tunisia. Twenty-four of the 127 planes hour, in this case making them easier
he commanded went down that day, targets.
giving his division an unbearably high LeMay’s assignment was to aban-
loss rate of some 20 percent. don precision bombing and instead burn
No one blamed him for this. LeMay down Japan’s cities. By this stage of the
had attacked the target accurately and war, the United States’s earlier prejudice
on time, unlike the 1st Air Division, against terror bombing of civilians had
which was supposed to attack Schwein- largely faded away. Accordingly, LeMay
furt, Germany, at the same time as brought his usual enthusiasm and tech-
LeMay’s raid on Regensburg. Bad nical skill to this challenging problem.
weather over England had delayed it for Since accuracy no longer mattered,
hours because, unlike the 3rd Division, he decided to have his B-29s attack by
its pilots had not been trained to take night at low altitudes. Because they used
off guided only by instruments. In any less fuel at low altitudes than when fly-
case, operations over Germany were ing high, they could carry less gas and
making it clear that heavy bombers more firebombs. He further increased
could not make their way to the target the bombloads by removing the B-29s’
without fighter support. Victory in the guns and all but one of the gunners. On
202
• L E N D - L E A S E P R O G R A M •

the nights of March 11 and 12, 1945, F U RTHER READING


LeMay sent 313 bombers, flying singly Coffey, Thomas M. Iron Eagle: The Tur-
because they could not form up in the bulent Life of General Curtis LeMay.
New York: Crown, 1986.
dark, to set Tokyo on fire. The resulting LeMay, Curtis E., and MacKinlay Kantor.
firestorm was the greatest urban fire in Mission with LeMay: My Story. Garden
history and killed the most people of City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.
any single air attack in the war. It is
believed that something like 100,000
Japanese died in the Tokyo firestorm,
more than would be killed by either of
the two atomic bombs dropped on Lend-Lease program
Japan. More than just a big fire, the
firestorm was so hot that it burned up
the oxygen around it and suffocated
many victims who were never touched When Britain went to war, its cash
by the flames. reserves were sufficient to cover only a
LeMay followed this success with few months of fighting. Somehow the
other attacks, which destroyed all but British muddled through, but by the fall
five of Japan’s urban areas. Kyoto was of 1940, they were out of money. Presi-
spared because Secretary of War Henry dent Franklin D. Roosevelt had pledged
Stimson, who disliked terror bombing that in 1941 they could buy enough
anyway, knew it was a center of Japan- equipment for 10 divisions and 12,000
ese religion and culture and would not more aircraft from the United States in
let it be touched. The other four cities addition to the 14,000 already commit-
were reserved for the atomic bomb so ted, but he did not wish to confront the
that the extent of its destructive power issue of payment while he was still run-
could be accurately measured. Other- ning for reelection in 1940.
wise, LeMay burned urban Japan to the London held its tongue until
ground, as instructed. Had the war gone November 23, 1940, when British
on much longer than it did, most of his ambassador Lord Lothian cheerfully
planes would have been grounded for told U.S. reporters: “Well, boys, Britain’s
lack of targets. broke; it’s your money we want.” With
These firebomb raids were the Britain fighting on alone, everything
moral low point of the U.S. war effort. hung in the balance. American isolation-
They contributed little to victory, ists opposed aid to Britain for fear of
because the U.S. naval blockade had being drawn into the war, but Britain
already brought most of Japan’s indus- had to have aid if it, and the cause of
try to a halt. They also failed to per- freedom as well, was to survive. The
suade the Japanese government to sur- times called for inspired leadership.
render. What the firebomb raids did do Roosevelt would provide it.
was to murder at least half a million After a vacation he met with the
Japanese civilians for no good purpose. press and announced his answer to
LeMay no doubt accomplished this task Britain’s need, the program that became
faster and more efficiently than anyone known as Lend-Lease. This turned out
else could have. to be simply a method to supply Britain
on credit, which was just what the isola-
SEE ALSO tionists had feared, but Roosevelt pack-
Japan, surrender of aged it cleverly. The United States was
203
• L E N D - L E A S E P R O G R A M •

that Americans wanted to do the right


thing and would act responsibly if
offered a face-saving way to ignore the
popular isolationist slogans of the day.
Years of antiwar propaganda had made
it hard to face the truth that Britain’s
fight was the United States’s as well, yet
Image Not Available people were waking up.
Roosevelt capped this performance
with a fireside chat on December 29,
1940, assuring his radio audience that
he was not speaking of war but rather
about national security. The issue, he
said, was how to keep the nation “out
of a last-ditch war for the preservation
Before the not going to loan the British money, he of American independence and all the
United States said, still less would it give away muni- things that American independence
officially tions. It was simply going to remove the means to you and to me and to ours.”
entered the “silly, foolish old dollar sign,” by lend- Never in American history had the dan-
war, the Lend- ing armaments to the British, which they ger been so great, because the Axis pow-
Lease Act
would later pay for in kind, or return. ers were seeking world domination. If
allowed it to
Roosevelt compared Lend-Lease to Britain fell, all Americans would live at
assist the Allies
with war
a garden hose, which you lend to a the point of a gun, and to survive, “we
materiel such neighbor if his house is on fire, receiving would have to convert ourselves perma-
as this M-3 it, or a replacement, back once the fire is nently into a militaristic power on the
Grant tank out. Reporters asked whether this meant basis of a war economy.”
destined for escorting goods to Britain, which would This was a great speech in support of
Africa. involve the U.S. Navy. Roosevelt denied a grand decision. The timing was right
it, possibly even to himself. He acknowl- also, for a Gallup poll released just before
edged that Lend-Lease would require his speech showed that 60 percent of the
congressional approval, but refused to American people favored aid to Britain,
admit that it increased the risk of war. even at the risk of war. The Lend-Lease
No one asked what repayment “in bill, HR-1776, passed with very large
kind” meant, although this was the key majorities in the Senate on March 8,
question. If it referred to leftover 1941, and in the House three days later,
weapons after the war, Lend-Lease aided by polls showing that thanks to
would actually be a gift. Reporters failed favorable publicity the public now sup-
to ask this question probably because ported it by a margin of two to one.
they did not wish to hear the answer. Although the Lend-Lease program
Thanks to the support of the lifted British morale (Churchill called it
reporters, the press conference was a tri- a “new Magna Carta”), Lend-Lease ini-
umph. Introducing Lend-Lease in this tially had little effect, because the
casual way made it seem less significant weapons Britain could buy with its new
than it was. That the garden hose com- charge account existed only on paper.
parison worked despite its being essen- Although $14 billion was appropriated
tially untrue could be interpreted to under Lend-Lease, in 1941 Britain
mean that the public of the time was would receive only $1 billion worth of
very easy to fool. A better explanation is munitions—all that could be spared,
204
• L E Y T E G U L F , B A T T L E O F •

given U.S. unreadiness. ensure Japan’s defeat if, indeed, its fate
But once U.S. industry shifted into was not already sealed.
high gear, immense quantities of goods Since there was no point in holding
and weapons would go out under Lend- back, the Japanese Navy determined to
Lease, to Britain and its allies, and to make a maximum effort. It still had nine
Soviet Russia too after Germany in- battleships, including the world’s largest,
vaded it in the summer of 1941. Ulti- the Yamato and the Musashi, together
mately, 38 nations would receive Lend- with a dozen heavy cruisers. It also had
Lease supplies valued at somewhere four fast carriers, but all told they could
between $42 and $50 billion. Britain, launch only about 100 planes manned by
and its empire and commonwealth, green pilots because the Japanese fleet air
received about half of this, the Soviet arm had been destroyed in the Battle of
Union some $10 billion worth of aid. A the Philippine Sea in June. Therefore, the
few figures will suggest what these dol- Japanese decided to use the carriers as
lars actually bought. decoys. They would lure away the U.S.
At war’s end the Soviet Union pos- Third Fleet, with Admiral William Halsey
sessed 665,000 motor vehicles, 400,000 commanding, while two surface units
of them made in the United States. The would meet in Leyte Gulf to wipe out the
United States also supplied the Soviets Leyte invasion force, which Halsey was
with 2,000 locomotives, 11,000 freight supposed to be guarding.
cars, and 540,000 tons of rail, with At about 1:00 a.m. on October 23,
which the Soviets laid more track than 1944, two U.S. submarines sighted a
during the last decade before the war. strong Japanese fleet. Under the com-
Food shipments alone were equal to the mand of Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, it
entire wartime consumption of the Red consisted of 5 battleships, including the
Army. At the same time, the United States Yamato and the Musashi, plus 10 heavy
was providing Britain with much of its and 2 light cruisers and more than 12
armaments, rising to a peak of 28.7 per- destroyers. Prompt U.S. air and subma-
cent of all British military equipment in rine attacks forced it to turn back.
1944. As Roosevelt had predicted in In the meantime, naval aircraft detect-
1941, the United States became the arse- ed a second force under Vice Admiral Shoji
nal of democracy, as well as its granary. Nishimura, including two battleships, a
cruiser, and four destroyers, making for the
Surigao Strait at the southern end of Leyte.
But Halsey and Admiral Thomas C.
Kinkaid, commanding MacArthur’s Sev-
Leyte Gulf, Battle of enth Fleet, were awaiting news of the
Japanese carriers before committing them-
selves. At about five in the afternoon, Vice
Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s carriers were
The greatest naval battle ever fought, the sighted far to the north of Leyte Gulf.
Battle of Leyte Gulf marked the doom of Halsey now took the bait. He and
the Japanese surface fleet. This turning Kinkaid, not knowing that the carriers
point resulted from the U.S. invasion of had few planes and pilots, took it for
Leyte, an island in the Philippine archipel- granted that this was the Japanese main
ago in October 1944 (as shown in map force. On hearing a false report that the
on p. 142.) The Imperial Japanese Navy enemy carriers were accompanied by bat-
knew that losing the Philippines would tleships, Halsey drove north with all his
205
• L E Y T E G U L F , B A T T L E O F •

Taffy 2 arrived in time to join the battle,


sending torpedo planes that helped
destroy three enemy cruisers.
So furious were these attacks that
Kurita lost his nerve. Even though
Image Not Available Sprague had only one destroyer left and
the escort carrier Gambier Bay was in
flames and sinking, Kurita failed to rec-
ognize that he was battling escorts, not
Halsey’s fast carriers. Fearful of addi-
tional losses, and believing that the U.S.
carriers were outrunning him, Kurita
General Dou- fast carriers and battleships. He would broke off the engagement at 9:30 a.m. on
glas MacArthur destroy the toothless Japanese carrier October 25 and swiftly fled the scene.
(fourth from force, while Kinkaid’s old battleships The Battle of Leyte Gulf had been
right) wades would similarly sink all but one of the one of the most astonishing in naval his-
ashore during Japanese warships in the Surigao Strait. tory. Taffy 3, hopelessly outgunned and
the initial land-
Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Kurita, outnumbered, did not, on the face of it,
ings at Leyte,
who had doubled back, was passing have a chance of survival. If Kurita had
Philippine
Islands, in
undetected through the San Bernardino kept his ships together and driven for the
October 1944. Strait, to the east of Leyte Gulf. Most of beaches he could have sunk the invasion
his assault fell on Taffy 3, one of three fleet and mopped up Taffy 3 later. The
groups of U.S. escort carriers supporting battle showed again how far the Imperial
the Leyte operation. Taffy 3 consisted of Japanese Navy had declined and how
five escort carriers each mounting a single much better the Americans had gotten.
five-inch gun. With their top speed of 17 Sprague himself summed it up nicely,
knots, they could not outrun a Japanese crediting the result to “our successful
submarine, much less a battleship. In smoke screen, our torpedo counterattack,
addition to them, Rear Admiral Clifton continuous harassment of the enemy by
T. Sprague commanded only three bomb, torpedo and strafing air attacks,
destroyers and four destroyer escorts. timely maneuvers, and the definite partial-
Despite his apparently hopeless position, ity of Almighty God.” Luck played a part,
Sprague launched his aircraft and in a to be sure, but courage, skill, and leader-
running battle worked his way toward ship were what saved the beachhead.
Taffy 2, 60 miles to the south. It was a smashing U.S. victory, and
Sprague’s aircraft had few torpedoes probably would have been almost as
and no armor-piercing bombs. When great even if Ozawa’s air groups had been
their torpedoes and bombs were gone, at full strength. The United States lost the
they dropped depth charges and what- light carrier Princeton, two escort carri-
ever else was at hand. Finally, when they ers, two destroyers, one destroyer escort,
had nothing left, Sprague’s pilots made and fewer than 3,000 men. The Japanese
dummy runs on the Japanese ships to were deprived of four fleet carriers, three
draw attention from the invasion force. battleships including the mighty Musashi,
Meanwhile, his destroyers and destroyer six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, nine
escorts made smoke to screen the carriers destroyers, and some 10,000 men.
and repeatedly charged the enemy ships, In Leyte Gulf the Imperial Japanese
firing their guns and making the last tor- Navy met its end. Leyte Gulf also gave
pedo attacks ever executed by destroyers. birth to the “divine wind,” the
206
• L I B E R T Y S H I P S •

kamikaze suicide attacks that were now ter understanding the world that had
Japan’s only hope, had their beginning. resulted.
As for the publishing industry itself,
SEE ALSO
the war spurred economic developments
Kamikaze; Halsey, William F.
that shook up the genteel book trade
F U RTHER READING
and helped democratize American read-
Falk, Stanley W. Decision at Leyte. New
ing. It abetted the paperback revolution,
York: Norton, 1966. begun in 1939 with Pocket Books’ cau-
tious release of ten paperbacks selling
for 25 cents each. Wartime paper
rationing, which squeezed books into
Liberty ships smaller formats, helped make paper-
backs respectable, and a mobile public
SEE Kaiser, Henry J. liked the slim, light volumes. The Armed
Services Editions became the biggest
mass publishing venture in American
history. Sixty million books, ranging
Lindbergh, Charles A. from Charles Dickens and Joseph Con-
SEE Isolationists rad to mysteries and westerns, poured
into the hands of soldiers and sailors––
free. Charges of censorship flared as
zealous officers tried to circumscribe
Literature what GIs might read, but the venture
was a huge success, shaping both how
and what was read after the war.

World War II gave birth to a body of lit- CLASSIC AMERICAN


erature that is still being written today. WORLD WAR II NOVELS
Personal and group stories, fictional his- Heller, Joseph. Catch-22. 1961.
tories, and novels focusing on the war Reprint, New York: Simon & Schuster,
have been highly popular. For a genera- 1994.
tion of Americans World War II was the Hersey, John. A Bell for Adano. 1971.
pivotal event of their lives, and a natural Reprint, New York: Vintage, 1988.
interest arose in the less public details of Hersey, John. Hiroshima. 1946.
the war, the stories and personal adven- Reprint, New York: Vintage, 1990.
tures (true or not). The war was a great Jones, James. From Here to Eternity.
epic, with intrigue, defeat, revenge, and 1952. Reprint, New York: Dell, 1998.
triumph—an ideal literary setting for a Jones, James. The Thin Red Line.
public hungry for war stories. Historians 1947. Reprint, New York: Dell, 1998.
were also busy producing social, politi- Mailer, Norman. The Naked & the
cal, and economic histories of the war in Dead. 1948. Reprint, New York:
Henry Holt, 1998.
the years that followed. Together, these
fictional and non-fictional works helped Vonnegut, Kurt. Slaughterhouse-five.
1959. Reprint, New York: Dell, 1999.
people digest the battery of information
that had become available. As the war Wouk, Herman. The Caine Mutiny.
1951. Reprint, New York: Little,
receded into the past, these resources Brown, 1992.
became an aide to reflection and to bet-
207
• L U F T W A F F E •

Luftwaffe

The German Air Force, known as the


Luftwaffe (literally, “air weapon” in En- Image Not Available
glish), was developed from scratch by the
Nazis and was Hitler’s favorite service. He
believed the “air power” theory developed
in the 1920s and 1930s, which held that a
nation could be defeated by air attacks
alone. Curiously, Germany failed to pro-
duce four-engine heavy bombers, and as a
result it never had a weapon powerful
enough to test the theory. because Göring said his pilots would A German
The “air power” believers were in supply it by air, which they could not Heinkel III
fact wrong. Germany’s lack of heavy do. By 1944 Göring was losing interest bomber flies
bombers was not a serious problem, in the Luftwaffe (thanks to morphine over the River
except when Hitler attempted to “blitz” addiction and pursuit of other hedonis- Thames in Lon-
don during an
London in 1940 and 1941. The one- tic pleasures), while Hitler was interfer-
aerial raid in
and two-engine bombers of the Luft- ing more and more, making a bad situa-
1940. The Luft-
waffe, which had been designed to sup- tion worse. waffe’s lightly
port ground troops, could not carry The Luftwaffe was organized very armed bombers
enough bombs to destroy such a huge differently from Allied air forces and had neither the
target. As a ground support force, how- included elements usually assigned to payload nor the
ever, the Luftwaffe had no equal in the armies. Flak (antiaircraft) guns were defensive arma-
early war years. manned by the Luftwaffe. Parachutists ment to effec-
A bigger problem than its lack of were in the Luftwaffe too, although tively cripple
heavy bombers for the Luftwaffe was after the seizure of Crete in 1941 Ger- Britain’s mod-
incompetence at the top of the ranks. many staged no further combat drops. ern air-defense
Hitler made Hermann Göring, a World Ultimately, nine Luftwaffe paratroop system.
War I flying ace, commander in chief of divisions fought as conventional infantry
the Luftwaffe and Reich aviation minis- under Army command. The service had
ter. Because of Göring, the Luftwaffe 21 regular field divisions, which also
would be badly led and its aircraft pro- came under the Army’s control in 1943.
duction mismanaged. As commander in The Luftwaffe was unconvention-
chief, Göring relied on inexperienced ally structured internally too. It was
young officers who did not understand divided vertically into air fleets (luftflot-
the limits of the Luftwaffe. ten), each of which possessed all the var-
As a result of his mismanagement, ious types of aircraft. Each air fleet was
Göring was always promising Hitler responsible for all the operations in a
goods he could not deliver. He pledged given region. This structure gave the
to defeat the Royal Air Force in 1940 Germans less flexibility than Western air
and failed. His effort to bomb England forces had, which were organized hori-
into submission that same year failed as zontally by function.
well. The German Sixth Army was The most important reason for the
destroyed at Stalingrad, Russia, largely Luftwaffe’s defeat in the long run was
208
• L U F T W A F F E •

lack of production. Germany produced Hitler, however, insisted that the jet
relatively few aircraft in 1940 and 1941, be reconfigured as a bomber, despite its
because Hitler was expecting a short short range and limited bomb capacity.
war. Erhard Milch, a skillful airline So much time was wasted attempting to
executive in private life, gained control make the 262 perform a function
of air supply and procurement in 1942, unsuited to it that it did not go into
and he increased aircraft production. action as a fighter until 1944. There
Although aircraft production rose were too few pilots by then, and fewer
sharply, it was never enough. When still with adequate training. Tactics
1942 ended, German industry was pro- appropriate for a jet fighter were still to
ducing 50 percent more aircraft than in be worked out. Units of 262s scored a
1941. But while Germany turned out an handful of impressive victories, but these
average of 367 fighters a month in did not affect the course of the war.
1942, Britain, Canada, and the United German designers produced many
States averaged 1,959. Germany aver- impressive propeller-driven aircraft. The
aged 349 bombers a month, the three Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter was supe-
allies 1,378, many of them four-engine rior to the British Hurricane, although it
heavies that Germany did not make. was not quite as good as the Spitfire.
German aircraft production, along with The newer Focke-Wulf 190 was as fast
weapons manufacturing as a whole, as or faster than any Allied fighter
reached its peak in 1944. In April, Ger- except for the U.S. P-51 Mustang. The
many produced more than 2,000 fight- JU 88 medium bomber was highly ver-
ers in a month for the first time. In Sep- satile: it could dive-bomb in addition to
tember, 3,375 fighters were turned out, bombing in level flight and was useful
a German wartime record. for reconnaissance and other purposes.
Impressive though they may be, these The 88 was produced in greater num-
figures are misleading. Germany was still bers than all other German bombers put
far behind the Allies in aircraft produc- together.
tion. A lack of fuel was crippling the In addition to the Me 262, German
Luftwaffe too. As a result, many aircraft designers produced air-to-air and ground-
had to be grounded. Training slowed to-air rockets, a rocket-powered fighter,
drastically, and early in 1945 it came to a and were working on a jet bomber,
stop. among other things. But, as German
The Luftwaffe did have a weapon qualitative superiority was not matched
that might have forced the Allies to sus- by its production capacity, these
pend their daylight bombing attacks on advanced weapons did the Reich little
Germany. This was the Messerschmitt good. Some never became operational.
262, the world’s first jet aircraft. As a Those that did were too few, too late.
fighter it could have entered squadron Had German aircraft production
service in 1943, when it became opera- reached its peak in 1942 instead of
tional. The Me 262 was 100 miles an 1944, and if the resources wasted on the
hour faster than Allied propeller-driven V-2 rocket had been applied to jets and
fighters. The Allies would not have jets of other advanced weapons, things may
their own until late in 1945. Thus it was have turned out differently.
possible that a large-scale deployment of A few incidents suggest what might
the 262 would have forced the United have been. In April 1945, 6 Me 262s
States to suspend, probably for most of armed with R4M air-to-air rockets
the war, daylight raids on Germany. destroyed 15 Allied B-17s. A few days
209
• M A C A R T H U R , D O U G L A S •

later a squadron of Focke-Wulf 190s in 1898 as part of the peace settlement


similarly armed shot down 40 heavy of the Spanish-American War. Young
bombers. Luckily for the Allies, the Ger- Douglas followed his lead, graduating
mans could not overcome years of mis- first in his class from West Point. During
management and poor leadership this World War I, MacArthur became the
late in the war. youngest brigadier general in the Army,
enabling him to become the
SEE ALSO
only U.S. commander to
Strategic bombing
serve as a general officer in
F U RTHER READING both world wars. In 1935
Galland, Adolf. The First and the Last: he was named military advi-
The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter sor to the Philippine Com- Image Not Available
Forces, 1938–1945. New York: Ballan- monwealth, which, in
tine, 1957.
Killen, John. A History of the Luftwaffe. preparation for its coming
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968. independence, was forming
Mitcham, Samuel W., Jr. Eagles of the its own defense force. In
Third Reich: The Men Who Made the
Luftwaffe. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1936 he was promoted to
1997. field marshal in command
of the Philippine Army. He
retired from the U.S. Army in 1937 but General Dou-
returned to active duty in 1941 as com- glas MacArthur
MacArthur, Douglas mander of U.S. and Philippine forces in was a popular
SUPREME COMMANDER OF the Far East. figure on the
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC MacArthur’s defense of the Philip- home front,
even though he
AREA, 1942–45 pines when it came under Japanese
achieved mixed
attack in December 1941 after Pearl
• Born: January 26, 1880, Little Rock, results during
Ark. Harbor could hardly have been worse.
the early years
• Political party: Republican Half his air force was destroyed on the of the war.
• Education: U.S. Military Academy, ground 12 hours after the Pearl Harbor
B.S., 1903; U.S. Army Engineering attack. The rest soon followed. He failed
School, 1906–7
• Military service: U.S. Army—second
to fortify or provision the Bataan Penin-
lieutenant, 1903; captain, 1911; sula of Luzon, to which he was forced
colonel, 1917; brigadier general, 1918; to retreat. Thus, his heavily outgunned
commander of 84th Infantry Regiment,
1918; major general, 1925; commander forces had to fight without sufficient
in chief of U.S. forces in the food, medicine, or ammunition. They
Philippines, 1928–30; U.S. Army chief fought magnificently even so, delaying
of staff, 1930–35; commander of the
Philippine Army, 1936–42; commander the Japanese for months and probably
of U.S. Army forces in the Far East, saving Australia. President Roosevelt
1941–42; general of the army, 1944
ordered MacArthur to Australia (so he
• Died: April 5, 1964, Washington, D.C.
would not be killed or captured) in
March 1942, well before Bataan (April)
and Fortress Corregidor (May) were
Soldiering was in MacArthur’s blood. compelled to surrender.
His father, Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur should probably have
MacArthur, had commanded troops been fired for incompetence. But the
during the Philippine insurrection, which courage of his starving men won them
took place after the United States great glory, which spilled over onto him.
bought the Philippine Islands from Spain Because the public did not know about
210
• M A C A R T H U R , D O U G L A S •

Image Not Available

his failures, MacArthur became a great MacArthur resolved to expel them, doing
national hero. Roosevelt thus had to give so in a crude and costly way. Again and
him a job equal to his fame, which is again he threw his two poorly-trained
why he became the supreme commander and prepared National Guard divisions
of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). against heavily fortified Japanese strong-
This appointment was part of a deal points in the Buna-Gona region. On Jan-
according to which the Army gained a uary 22, 1943, Buna fell. This was the
theater for MacArthur while the Navy first time the Japanese had experienced a
got everything else in the Pacific, which permanent defeat on land.
was organized by the Navy as the Pacific MacArthur denied that the cam-
Ocean Area under Admiral Chester paign had been unnecessarily bloody for
Nimitz. This meant there would be no his troops. But in fact, due to his poor
unified command in the Pacific, rather leadership, the troops who took Buna-
two different and competing wars against Gona had a death rate three times as
Japan, involving much delay and waste. high as the Marines sustained on
MacArthur’s first campaign as Guadalcanal, one of the bloodier cam-
supreme commander of the SWPA was in paigns of the war. This fact undercut
the Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea. MacArthur’s claims that his victory had
Papua, essential to the defense of Aus- been won at a reasonable cost. But,
tralia, had been invaded by Japanese although MacArthur went on deceiving
forces soon after war broke out. Aus- outsiders, he and his staff knew better.
tralian troops had managed to save Port After the Papuan campaign, MacArthur
Moresby, its most important harbor, and made a promise, which he kept, that
drive the Japanese back over the Owen there would be no more Bunas.
Stanley Range. But the Japanese still held MacArthur was learning fast, and
the peninsula’s northwest coast. the experience would not be wasted.
211
• M A C A R T H U R , D O U G L A S •

Over the next two years his troops Stanleys. Gradually the air commanders
would suffer fewer than 20,000 casual- worked out a strategy of blockading
ties in the course of many operations, enemy strongpoints from the air, cover-
partly because of tactical lessons learned ing and assisting Allied ground troops,
in Papua that would make later cam- while, by advancing their forward bases,
paigns more efficient. Among other bringing more and more Japanese targets
things, MacArthur was learning the within bombing range, or what was
many uses of aircraft, whose value he commonly called the bomb line.
had previously sneered at. And his At first, progress was slow, for
understanding of sea power was MacArthur did not have enough of any-
expanding too. MacArthur’s need for a thing. But as his forces expanded and
sea lift (i.e., troop ships and assault ves- his tactics improved, his troops
sels) was glaringly exposed at Buna, advanced faster and faster. In April
where he had almost no ships and thus 1944, in his most daring move to date,
could not stage landings to outflank or MacArthur moved his troops 580 miles
isolate enemy fortifications. His com- beyond their lines on the northwest
plaints in this regard led the Navy to New Guinea coast to seize the town of
assign him a specialist, Rear Admiral Hollandia, now Jayapura, in Indonesia.
Daniel E. Barbey, whose VII Amphibi- Because this involved bypassing enemy
ous Force would stage 56 operations in strongpoints, the Japanese were taken
the Southwest Pacific Area. MacArthur by surprise. In less than two years
also learned how to exploit the decoded MacArthur advanced almost 2,000
enemy radio messages provided by miles, 1,100 of it in the last two months.
Army and Navy intelligence. They After a shaky start MacArthur
would play a key part in future opera- developed into a commander worthy of
tions by helping to determine which his reputation. The sharpness and timing
enemy strongholds could be bypassed. of his operations, his close coordination
The key to MacArthur’s success was of land, sea, and air forces, and the
his use of tactical air, which was more boldness and success of his strategy of
important in the SWPA than in perhaps bypassing enemy strongholds have justly
any other theater. The southwest Pacific been admired ever since. In the SWPA,
is thick with islands that provided his victories were won by cunning and
numerous sites for airfields. But, unlike stealth as often as not, saving many U.S.
the Germans’ defenses in Europe, Japan- soldiers’ lives.
ese air defenses were weak, enabling Meanwhile, the Navy’s central
even heavy U.S. bombers to make pre- Pacific drive was proving to be very
cise low-level attacks. expensive. Japanese positions in that
MacArthur also had two outstand- part of the Pacific were few and small.
ing air commanders in General George They could not be outflanked, or taken
C. Kenney and Lieutenant General from the rear. Thus, at Saipan and Iwo
Ennis C. Whitehead. Kenney taught Jima, among others, Marines were
MacArthur what planes could do, start- obliged to make frontal assaults against
ing with an airlift of troops to Buna. heavily fortified Japanese positions and
Many on MacArthur’s staff doubted that suffer terrible losses.
men could be flown directly to the battle MacArthur argued for much of the
area. Kenney proved them wrong and war that the Navy’s campaign should
saved most if not all of MacArthur’s men parallel his own. That way the two
from having to cross the dreaded Owen advancing forces could readily support
212
• M A C A R T H U R , D O U G L A S •

each other. The fast carriers and precious little cost. MacArthur’s forces sustained
landing ships tank (LSTs) needed for 62,000 casualties, including 14,000
amphibious landings could be moved deaths. While this was a large figure for
back and forth between MacArthur and the Pacific war, it was small when seen in
Admiral Chester Nimitz as needed, the context of Japanese losses, which
instead of idling in the central Pacific in came to 350,000. In the central Pacific,
the off time between operations. Admiral however, U.S. casualties were relatively
Nimitz apparently thought so too, but higher. On tiny Iwo Jima, for example,
was overruled by his domineering superi- U.S. casualties actually exceeded those of
or, Admiral Ernest King. the Japanese defenders.
In 1944, at a conference in Hawaii MacArthur’s less admirable character
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and traits loom large in many accounts. A
Admiral Nimitz, MacArthur finally chronic liar, he was likewise boastful,
received permission to retake the Philip- arrogant, remote, and vain. Most commu-
pines. Although he had personal motives niques from the SWPA named only one
for wanting to do so, to erase his earlier man, himself. His commanders soon dis-
defeat, there were good reasons for liber- covered that he deeply resented any pub-
ating the islands. The United States needed licity they might receive. They learned to
to show that it cared for the people it had avoid the press, which is why names like
failed to protect in 1942. Furthermore, Walter Kruger, Robert Eichelberger, and
Luzon was a strategic prize. Missions George C. Kenney are unfamiliar today
launched from Luzon air bases would compared to those of General Dwight D.
give American forces control of the sea- Eisenhower’s lieutenants in the European
lanes between Southeast Asia and Japan, theater. Yet, in the end, MacArthur
depriving the Japanese of such essential achieved much. After Buna he learned
raw materials as oil, rubber, and tin. Tak- from his mistakes, took the advice of his
ing Luzon certainly made more sense generally excellent commanders, and
than invading Formosa, which was what launched a series of brilliant campaigns
Admiral King wished to do. In the Philip- that were classics of their kind.
pines, U.S. forces would be met with MacArthur was hated by most of
open arms, while the Formosan response his men for his lack of apparent concern
could not be predicted. for them. Yet his skill kept many alive
The Philippine campaign won addi- who would have perished under a more
tional laurels for MacArthur. Leyte, the conventional leader. The Okinawa cam-
first island to be attacked, was more paign, directed by less imaginative gener-
strongly defended than MacArthur had als, was proof of this. There the United
been led to expect. Luzon was tougher States had complete control of the sea
still. In fact, when the war ended, one of and air, making possible numerous
MacArthur’s field armies was still fighting amphibious and airborne operations.
a strong Japanese force in the mountains Instead, soldiers and Marines made one
of northern Luzon. But MacArthur’s frontal assault after another, battering
forces liberated the other islands with away at the Japanese lines until they
speed and dash. finally collapsed. About 35 percent of
The Philippine campaign as a whole the Americans who fought in the Battle
was a smashing success, even though it of Okinawa became casualties, a ratio
was not quite completed by the end of exceeding even that of MacArthur’s
the war. Again, with local exceptions, Papuan campaign, which was his worst
much had been accomplished at relatively and never was repeated. In the end,
213
• M A C H I N E G U N S •

MacArthur earned his job as supreme gium civilians almost at once. The worst
commander and made the most of it. such event, known as the Malmedy mas-
sacre, took place in Belgium on Decem-
SEE ALSO
ber 17, 1944, and resulted in the deaths
Iwo Jima, Battle of; King, Ernest J.; Leyte
Gulf, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester W.; Oki- of 86 U.S. prisoners.
nawa, Battle of; Pacific war; Southwest
Pacific Area

F U RTHER READING Manchuria


Breuer, William B. MacArthur’s Under- SEE China; Japan
cover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas,
and Secret Missions. New York: Wiley,
1995.
James, D. Clayton. The Years of
MacArthur: Vol. 2, 1941–1945. Boston: Manhattan Project
Houghton Mifflin, 1975.
Manchester, William. American Caesar:
SEE Atomic bombs
Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1978.
Perret, Geoffrey. Old Soldiers Never Die:
The Life of Douglas MacArthur. New
York: Random House, 1996.
Marines
Schaller, Michael. Douglas MacArthur: SEE United States Marine Corps
The Far Eastern General. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989.

Marshall, George C., Jr.


Machine guns ARCHITECT OF VICTORY

SEE Small Arms • Born: December 31, 1880, Uniontown,


Ky.
• Political party: none
• Education: Virginia Military Institute,
B.S., 1901; Army School of the Line,
Malmedy massacre 1906–07; Army Staff College, 1907–08
• Military service: U.S. Army—second
lieutenant, 1902; captain, 1916;
operations officer of the 1st Division,
1917; lieutenant colonel, 1918; chief of
staff of VIII Corps; aide-de-camp to
As a rule, all the forces in western General John Pershing, 1919–24;
Europe—Axis and Allied alike— assistant commandant of Infantry
observed the Geneva convention, which School, 1927–32; colonel, 1933; major
general, 1938; chief of staff of the army,
specified how prisoners should be 1939–45; general, 1939; five-star
treated. However, there were isolated general, 1944
instances on both sides of soldiers being • Died: October 16, 1959, Washington,
D.C.
murdered after giving themselves up.
The worst atrocities took place in the
Battle of the Bulge, in December and Jan-
uary 1944–45. Most of them were com- George Catlett Marshall, Jr., was the
mitted by Taskforce Peiper, a regiment of greatest chief of staff the U.S. Army has
the 1st SS Panzer Division under Lieu- ever had. Although he graduated from
tenant Colonel Joachim Peiper. It led the Virginia Military Institute rather than
northern assault on U.S. lines and began from West Point, which is usually seen
shooting U.S. prisoners of war and Bel- as a career liability, Marshall’s service in
214
• M A R S H A L L, G E O R G E C., J R. •

World War I established him as one of


the Army’s most brilliant staff officers.
However, his lack of seniority and the
Army’s glacial promotion system meant
that he did not become a general until
he had served 32 years as a commis-
sioned officer.
After World War I, with one excep-
tion, he served mostly in obscure posts Image Not Available
before becoming chief of staff. During his
years at the Army’s Infantry School, he
invented new doctrines and tactics for the
Army. He made the holding attack the
tactic of choice. During such an attack,
one group of men advanced and pinned
the enemy down with fire. Meanwhile, a
second group tried to hit the enemy in
the flank or rear. If possible, a third
group would be held in reserve. tion of the Army when he became chief General
Marshall also experimented with of staff in 1939. George Mar-
infantry battalions to determine their As chief, Marshall rebuilt the Army shall hurries to
optimum size, which proved to be about from scratch. Working with a small core his car follow-
850 men—the standard still used today of professional officers, and with ideas ing a confer-
ence at Mena
in most armies. He disliked the U.S. tested in the excellent army schools, he
House in
Army’s World War I “square” infantry built a mighty weapon. Its basis was the
Cairo, Egypt,
division of four regiments. His experi- 12 million citizen-soldiers who would
1943.
ments established that a triangular divi- serve under him during the war, the
sion of three regiments was more mobile best-educated men of any army.
and efficient. Between 1900 and 1920 there had
To make up for his divisions’ been a revolution in U.S. education,
smaller size Marshall added firepower: a with free public high schools becoming
field artillery battalion to each regiment, open to nearly everyone. Marshall had
a heavy weapons company (mortars and seen the results firsthand when he was
machine guns) to each battalion, and a assigned to Roosevelt’s Civilian Conser-
weapons platoon to each company. vation Corps in 1933, which put unem-
Later he attached a tank battalion to ployed young men to work on outdoor
most infantry divisions. This addition projects. He was impressed by these
gave the triangular division several times youngsters and as chief of staff based
the firepower of its predecessor. It also the Army’s training camps and schools
met the needs of a holding attack, pro- on the assumption that they would
viding one unit for maneuver, one for make fine troops. A well-educated sol-
fire support, and keeping one in reserve. diery would become the U.S. Army’s
The result of his labors was the work invisible weapon.
Infantry in Battle (1934), a text pro- Winston Churchill called Marshall
duced by the Infantry School that com- “the architect of victory,” which was
municated his ideas and methods generous, considering how often they
throughout the Army. It also laid the were at odds over military planning.
groundwork for Marshall’s transforma- Marshall was distinguished by his intelli-
215
• M A R S H A L L, G E O R G E C., J R. •

gence, fairness, strength of character, would require a buildup of forces that


and integrity. Most who worked for or could later be used to invade France.
with him held Marshall in awe and were Marshall fought hard against what
at least slightly afraid of him, not became Operation Torch, but he was
because he was a bully (although he did overruled by Roosevelt. Torch began in
have a temper), but because to fail Mar- November 1942. However, instead of
shall was unthinkable. the quick victory that Marshall needed
Despite being aloof and formal, for Operation Roundup, his projected
Marshall brought out the best in his attack on France, the war in North
senior officers. Most owed their Africa bogged down. Victory finally
appointments and promotions to having came in May 1943, perhaps just in time
previously impressed him. Two hundred to launch Roundup in August or Sep-
men that he met at Fort Benning, Geor- tember. But Roosevelt agreed with
gia, alone would become generals, their Churchill that with all the firepower at
names taken from a little black book in hand, the Allies might as well invade
which he recorded his opinions. Even Italy, which they did beginning with the
though he lacked the common touch, island of Sicily in July. The invasion of
Marshall was respected by Congress for the Italian mainland in September was
his knowledge, authority, and directness. by then inevitable.
This high regard was of immense value Marshall and the War Department
to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. resented every one of these steps. He
After Pearl Harbor was attacked in rightly guessed that in the end Torch
December 1941, Marshall wished to would doom Roundup. But after Italy,
focus all the Army’s energy on invading Marshall and his planners were strong
France. From the start he resisted enough to insist that Operation Over-
Churchill’s efforts to involve the Allies in lord, the new code name for the projected
Mediterranean operations. Events and invasion of France, go forward without
political necessity prevented Marshall further delay. Churchill tried to drag his
from getting his way, however. feet again, because he always preferred
Public outrage over the attack on to fight in the Mediterranean, where
Pearl Harbor meant that the Pacific War fewer casualties could be expected. This
would be waged on a far greater scale time, however, the Americans would not
than Marshall desired. Operations in be denied. On D-Day, June 6, 1944, the
Europe would suffer accordingly. At the greatest amphibious attack in history
same time, Roosevelt could not wait was launched by General Dwight D.
until 1943—the earliest year when the Eisenhower.
Allies would be strong enough to land in Everyone had expected that Mar-
France—to begin the war against Hitler. shall would command Overlord, with
Apparently he feared that unless U.S. Eisenhower replacing him as chief of
troops went into action against Ger- staff. But when it came to the moment
many within a year, the public pressure of decision, President Roosevelt wanted
to put the Pacific war first would Marshall to remain at his side as chief of
become irresistible. If speed was of the staff. On December 5, 1943, Roosevelt,
essence, then, as it probably was, the who hated to deliver bad news, finally
British plan to invade French North indicated to Marshall that he would be
Africa filled the bill. It could be staying in Washington.
launched in 1942. It would involve Marshall took the blow without
fighting at least a few Germans. And it flinching and continued to serve as bril-
216
• M A R S H A L L, G E O R G E C., J R. •

liantly as before. Roosevelt had made the hard for air power before Pearl Harbor, at
right decision, for Marshall really could a time when Congress was reluctant to
not be spared. In effect, as the master pay for it. But once the great air forces
U.S. planner and strategist he was run- had been built, neither paid much atten-
ning the war—and doing it better than tion to how they were used. At the top,
anyone else could. Next to Roosevelt only Secretary of War Henry Stimson
himself Marshall was the most indispens- worried about killing civilians, and most
able man in the United States. of his cries fell on deaf ears.
By the same token, many soldiers On the big strategic issues Marshall
had died in the Mediterranean in order was usually right. He correctly opposed
for Eisenhower to learn his job. This had the Mediterranean operation on military
been much too expensive an education to grounds. He was convinced that however
waste. He was better qualified than Mar- necessary it was for political reasons to
shall to be the supreme commander. Hav- invade North Africa, taking Sicily made
ing appointed the right men to the right little sense and Italy even less. If Opera-
jobs, FDR kept them there. tion Roundup had gone forward in 1943
Because Marshall participated in it would have been against a relatively
making almost every strategic decision, easy target, for France had significantly
his biography comes close to being a his- weaker defenses in 1943 than it would a
tory of the U.S. war effort. However, year later.
when things went wrong it was rarely Even so, had Marshall not kept
because Marshall had erred. More often everyone focused, there might have
it was because, for whatever reason, he been no Operation Overlord at all, or
had not been involved. This was true perhaps not until 1945. This seems to
even in matters far removed from grand be what Churchill had in mind, as by
strategy and army building. For example, then the Soviets would have all but fin-
one explanation that has been offered for ished the Nazis off. Of course, they
the failure to provide U.S. troops in would also have overrun most of
Europe with a good tank is that Marshall Europe as well, a significant drawback
was not interested in weapons. The impli- to the Mediterranean strategy Churchill
cation is that if Marshall had been as favored.
interested in weaponry as he was in strat- Marshall was right about the atomic
egy and tactics, all the U.S. ground and bomb as well. Had it not been used
air weapons would have been the best. against Japan, the Pacific war would have
But Marshall was overworked as it was had one of two possible conclusions. One
and had to delegate authority in so many scenario was that the planned invasion
areas that he could not afford to look at would have gone ahead, with hideous
any smaller pictures. casualty tolls for the Allies and worse for
A greater pity is that Marshall never the Japanese. The only other alternative
took the issue of strategic bombing very was to let the blockade and the air
seriously. He treated the Army Air Forces attacks do their work. This tactic would
as a separate service in most respects. This have resulted in victory, no doubt, but
approach allowed the “bomber barons” would have taken considerable time.
of the air force a free hand to kill German During that time Americans would have
and Japanese civilians in great numbers, been getting killed every day in various
to little real purpose. Marshall’s indiffer- parts of the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
ence was shared by Roosevelt, which And Japanese civilians would have been
seems equally strange. Both had fought dying too, from conventional bombs and
217
• M E D I C I N E •

starvation and disease as Japan’s trans- years of the Cold War following World
portation system collapsed. War II) he was second only to Eisen-
Marshall was a great talent scout. hower. As a man he was second to none.
Douglas MacArthur had been forced on
SEE ALSO
him by the public. But most of the
Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Japan, surrender
Army’s other commanders were men of; MacArthur, Douglas; Mediterranean
Marshall knew personally and whose theater; Patton, George S.; Roosevelt,
careers he had advanced. Recognizing Franklin Delano; Strategic bombing
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s worth was cer-
F U RTHER READING
tainly his biggest coup.
Eisenhower was a very junior general Eisenhower, Dwight D. Dear General:
Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to
when Marshall picked him to command Marshall. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Operation Torch, and he seemed an University Press, 1971.
unlikely choice. However, Marshall had Marshall, George C. Infantry in Battle. Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1934.
watched Eisenhower closely in Washing- Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall.
ton and given him more and more 4 vols. New York: Viking, 1963–87.
important jobs. When he finally gave
Eisenhower what proved to be the prize
appointment of the war, it was because
the general had performed superbly. Medicine
Likewise, the corps command that
Marshall gave George S. Patton for Torch,
which seems so obvious an appointment
now, was hardly a unanimous choice at
the time. Patton had done brilliant work As in most wars, disease and accidents
in maneuvers and training troops. Yet were more common in World War II
many officers regarded him as too unsta- than battle wounds. Two-thirds of hos-
ble and eccentric to lead men into battle. pital admissions—on both sides—
Patton was, indeed, profane, theatrical, resulted from sickness or injuries not
and given to making peculiar remarks and received in combat. Typhus was the
gestures. Marshall believed that much of scourge of the eastern front, while in
this was only for show, however, and that North Africa dysentery, hepatitis, malar-
in the field Patton would be business-like ia, and skin diseases were rampant,
and effective—as he had been in World especially among the Germans.
War I. Patton—and others too, although Malaria was universal throughout
less spectacularly—would more than Asia and the South Pacific. There was no
repay Marshall’s confidence. cure for it, but antimalaria drugs existed,
Marshall was indeed the “architect as did mosquito nets. The failure to pro-
of victory” in many ways: a hugely gifted vide either of these to U.S. and Filipino
planner and manager, farsighted, incisive, troops defending Bataan in 1942 had
unique. He was a model officer as well, ruinous consequences. Hospital admis-
notable for his enormous integrity, self- sions for malaria ranged from 500 to
lessness, and devotion to duty—the 1,000 a day. Up to 80 percent of the
noblest Roman of them all. In a war led troops on the line are thought to have
by showoffs of every kind, Marshall’s been infected with it. Along with short-
character stood out. As a soldier-states- ages of food and ammunition, disease
man (he would serve as secretary of state was the main reason why the Bataan gar-
and secretary of defense in the darkest rison surrendered when it did.
218
• M E D I C I N E •

Venereal diseases have been a prob-


lem throughout history for almost every
army, including those of the United States.
Prevention was the best approach, espe-
cially because penicillin did not become
widely available until 1944. The military
staged propaganda campaigns designed to
create “syphilophobia,” and thereby
frighten men into abstinence. These drives
proved ineffective, however, for troops
facing death in battle could not be made
to fear a curable social disease.
Image Not Available
Rejecting inductees found to be suf-
fering from syphilis, for example, was not
workable either. Of the first 2 million
men inducted, 48 in every 1,000 had it,
and among blacks the rate was 272 per
thousand. Most black inductees were
from the South, and southern males,
black and white, had a venereal disease
rate four times that of northerners. Early
in 1942, the Army began treating infected
men instead of declaring them 4F (physi-
cally unfit for induction). By 1945,
170,000 inductees had been cured of year were lost on account of venereal Venereal disease
syphilis, a process that took about 10 disease, but by 1943 the figure was only became a serious
days (before antibiotics became available). 368. This improvement was a public medical problem
Prevention was effective too. Once health victory of great importance. as the military
the military conceded that enlisted men Many medical gains in this period spread through-
could not be scared away from having were directly related to the war. Peni- out the globe,
sex, it established hundreds of prophy- cillin was still in the research stage when and posters such
as this one con-
lactic stations in the United States as war broke out, which inspired the
veyed the mes-
well as overseas to treat men medically British scientists involved to redouble
sage that time
after intercourse. Large quantities of their efforts. Because manufacturing the lost to disease
condoms were passed out as well—some drug was beyond Britain’s means, it was gave the Axis
50 million a month—and became so arranged for a U.S. firm to do so. As a a winning
popular that by the end of the war result of crash programs, wounded sol- advantage.
demand outstripped supply. diers were being treated in the field with
Although the commonsense penicillin as early as 1943. Progress was
approach to social disease offended reli- also made in surgery and anesthetics.
gious groups, the military could not No achievement was more impres-
afford to give it up. Thus, while in 1940 sive than the new treatments devised for
the venereal disease rate for the army combat fatigue, known to the army as
was 42.5 cases for every 1,000 men, by neuropsychiatric cases, or NP, for short.
1943 it had fallen to 24. For the entire Although wounded rates were higher in
war it came to 37 per 1,000, about the Europe, NP disorders were more fre-
same rate as among civilians. In 1940, quent in the Pacific, which was a far
for every 1,000 soldiers, 1,278 days a worse environment in which to fight.
219
• M E D I C I N E •

After three months of combat on New led to men keeping men in action for
Georgia in the Solomon Islands, a force excessive periods of time. Even before
of 30,000 men had 13,000 hospital doctors thought to address the problem,
admissions for illness and injury. Of officers had noticed that men reached
these, 27 percent were wounded in their peak of efficiency after about 90
action, 15 percent were otherwise days on the line. Then they all started to
injured, 21 percent had malaria, 18 per- deteriorate, regardless of their individual
cent diarrheal diseases, and 19 percent strength or courage. A survey of platoon
neuropsychiatric disorders. The inci- leaders in two veteran infantry divisions
dence of NP cases on New Georgia was carried out by the Army Research
not exceptional by World War II stan- Bureau revealed that when asked which
dards, however, for it was a rule of soldiers they would most hate to lose,
thumb that the longer an action lasted the greatest concentration among en-
the more NPs there would be, regardless listed men was those with four to five
of other conditions. months of experience (including days
In Europe the Army would experi- spent in rear areas).
ence 110,000 NP cases as a whole, but Both groups reached their highest
they were highly concentrated. During level of performance between their third
one 44-day period of intense combat on and seventh months, and after eight
the Gothic Line in Italy, 54 percent of all months they were less effective than
casualties were neuropsychiatric. men with less combat time. Contrary to
The high incidence of NPs caught the earlier view that some individual
both psychiatrists and army leaders by types of men were predisposed to break
surprise, despite the relatively large num- down, it was now found that after
ber of mentally damaged soldiers that enough time in battle—with 200 days
World War I had produced. These had being about the maximum, and some-
been so many and so serious that as late where between 140 and 180 the aver-
as 1942 some 58 percent of all patients in age—everyone broke down. Mental
Veteran’s Administration hospitals were health experts recommended that men
World War I “shell shock” victims. be given more time behind the lines to
World War II psychiatrists believed ease the stress of battle, and doctors
they had developed a screening process wanted soldiers to be rotated home
that would keep most men liable to before they reached the breaking point.
become NP cases out of the Army. Their But in an Army where there were never
confidence in this process was such that enough riflemen to go around, these
of 5.2 million men who appeared at proposals were out of the question.
army recruiting stations 1.6 million were Although the Army did not change
rejected for “mental deficiencies.” All its way of doing business, psychiatrists
the same, psychiatric discharges from did, introducing more aggressive thera-
the Army would be two and a half times pies. North African NP casualties had ini-
as common as in the previous war. tially been sent to hospitals hundreds of
Every army suffered from combat miles to the rear, from which fewer than
fatigue, which was inevitable given the 10 percent returned to duty. Later, a
horrors of modern war. But in addition series of psychiatric care levels were
to war itself, many NP cases resulted established that started with battalion
from how men were employed in it. The surgeons operating close to the front.
basic problem in the U.S. Army by 1944 They provided psychiatric first aid, con-
was that a military manpower shortage sisting mostly of mild sedation, a good
220
• M E D I T E R R A N E A N T H E A T E R •

night’s sleep, and hot food. action until Hitler was defeated. General
More serious cases went to division George C. Marshall, the army’s chief of
clearing stations two to five miles farther staff, wanted that invasion to take place
back, where they were sedated longer and in 1943. In the meantime, troops and
allowed to bathe. For tough cases the next munitions would be assembled in
level of treatment was at “exhaustion cen- Britain until the invasion date. The code
ters,” where patients might receive actual name for this planned attack was Oper-
psychiatric treatment. Then, after a week ation Roundup.
or 10 days, if all else had failed, the most British prime minister Winston
seriously disturbed went into neuropsychi- Churchill, on the other hand, wanted to
atric hospitals, from which they seldom concentrate on the Mediterranean.
returned to combat. Because the Axis powers controlled the
This approach produced impressive Mediterranean’s western approaches,
results, with about 60 percent of NPs British ships could not use the Suez
returning to their outfits within five days. Canal and thus had to go the long way
Some 70 percent of those hospitalized to India around South Africa. Further-
were later given noncombat assignments, more, campaigns in the Mediterranean
where they replaced men fit for battle. By would support Britain’s Eighth Army,
revolutionizing neuropsychiatric care, which had been fighting Rommel in the
U.S. doctors made their biggest contribu- western deserts of Egypt for months.
tion to victory. Churchill always represented the
Improvements in conventional medi- Mediterranean as a place of wonderful
cine also helped soldiers recover, but they opportunities for the Allies, but the
were offset to a large degree by develop- Americans were skeptical.
ments in weaponry and munitions. Thus, Many believed that Churchill’s
despite the fact that by World War II med- enthusiasm derived from the belief that
ical care had progressed enormously since Britain would not sustain huge casual-
the 1860s, battlefield death rates remained ties in the Mediterranean. This relative
similar to those of the Civil War. It was safety made it preferable to western
only in psychiatry and hospital treatment Europe, which the Germans would fight
that doctors made real advances. hard to retain and where big losses
could be expected.
F U RTHER READING
However, waging a series of small
Herman, Jan K. Battle Station Sick Bay:
Navy Medicine in World War II. campaigns in the Mediterranean while
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, Soviet Russia did most of the fighting
1997. against Hitler’s legions in Europe did
not seem like a good idea to General
Marshall. Further, the U.S. Army’s her-
itage was one of directly engaging the
Mediterranean enemy with maximum force and batter-
theater ing it into submission, not gradually
wearing it down. It had done this in the
Civil War and World War I and planned
to do so again in this one.
Even before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. The strategic decision was up to
Army had been planning to defeat Hitler Roosevelt, who came down on
by invading France. A war with Japan, Churchill’s side, ordering that North
should it take place, was to be a holding Africa be invaded in 1942. This cam-
221
• M E D I T E R R A N E A N T H E A T E R •

During the
invasion of
Sicily on July
11, 1943, an
American
cargo ship is
hit by a bomb
from a German
plane and its Image Not Available
cargo of muni-
tions explodes.

paign would be known as Operation “chief enemy,” with only 34 percent


Torch. Roosevelt did not deny Mar- nominating the Germans. Thus, if the
shall’s point that making war on the North African operations were mainly
margins of his empire would do little to political, they remained essential for just
weaken Hitler. But President Roosevelt that reason.
had serious political problems. He had On the larger issue of 1943, Mar-
promised Stalin to open a second front shall cannot be faulted. The victories in
in Europe in 1942, which the Soviets North Africa and the Mediterranean
desperately wanted, and there was no added the equivalent of 2 million tons of
possibility of invading France that year. shipping when the Suez Canal finally
Furthermore, if no U.S. troops went became accessible as a result of them, but
into action against Germany until 1943, they otherwise did little to defeat Hitler. It
there would be great pressure on Roo- was clear that Germany had to be beaten
sevelt to send additional men and muni- in Europe. The more time that was spent
tions to the Pacific. Americans hated the on campaigns at the edges of western
Japanese even more than the Nazis, and Europe, the longer the war would last.
American planners always had to struggle Hence the importance of Roundup and
to keep the Pacific war from overwhelm- the danger posed by Torch.
ing the strategically much more impor- In its final form, Torch, under the
tant struggle with Germany. An invasion command of Marshall’s favorite, Lieu-
of French North Africa would be easy, at tenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
least if Germany did not come in. Such a became larger than Marshall desired but
drive could be represented, however fee- was a more cautious affair than if
bly, as a second front, and would justify a Britain had gotten its way. The plan was
military buildup that could later be used for three task forces of 35,000 to
to invade France. 40,000 men each to land simultaneously
The polls bore out Roosevelt. In at widely separated points. A western
February 1943, after U.S. troops had task force would sail directly from the
been mauled in Tunisia and the Allies United States to land near Casablanca,
were facing some 250,000 Axis troops on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. A
there, 53 percent of Americans still central task force, also consisting en-
thought Japan was the United States’s tirely of U.S. troops, would sail from
222
• M E D I T E R R A N E A N T H E A T E R •

Britain to Oran, on the Mediterranean


coast. And a joint Anglo-American east-
ern task force would seize Algiers.
The great flaw in this plan, as the
British had maintained from the start
and Eisenhower soon realized, was that
taking Casablanca offered no important
benefits. Tunisia, only 100 miles from
Sicily and the best place for a German
buildup, was the real strategic prize. If
the Allies could arrive there first, Hitler Image Not Available
would lose General Erwin Rommel’s
army and with it North Africa. But
Marshall was firm about not pursuing
this course, thinking Tunisia too much
of a risk, so the best chance of making
Torch pay off was lost before it started.
Everyone hoped that the French
forces in North Africa would welcome
the Allies as liberators. The problem was
that these forces were under the com-
mand of the Vichy occupation govern-
ment, which collaborated with the
Nazis. Complex negotiations designed
to win over the Vichyites in North
Africa preceded Operation Torch. Admi-
ral Jean Darlan, the head of France’s
armed forces, which still had a powerful
fleet in Toulon, France, that the Allies
wanted, was also approached by the
Allies. But the Allies, justifiably afraid of
leaks, did not entrust their French con- tary intelligence and inexperience,
tacts with the date. Therefore, on although its commander, Major General
November 8, 1942, when the landings George S. Patton, Jr., would soon prove
commenced, what the French would do himself to be one of the war’s outstand-
was still uncertain. ing combat leaders. Even so, luck was
Admiral Darlan, who by accident with the Americans. Along the treacher-
was in Algiers on November 8, initially ous Moroccan coast, the landing condi-
ordered his forces to resist, then that tions were ideal, with the seas calmer
evening announced a cease-fire in Algiers than usual. The Vichy French could not
and two days later extended it through- bring their superiority in manpower to
out North Africa. However, Marshal bear because of the lack of transporta-
Pétain in Vichy promptly canceled these tion and general confusion. Spain, which
instructions. Amid the resulting confusion had 100,000 troops in its part of Moroc-
in Oran and Morocco, fighting—some of co, chose not to enter the war. U.S. divi-
it heavy—continued for days. sional commanders displayed initiative
The Moroccan operation turned out after failing to make contact with Patton,
to be a shambles, thanks to poor mili- and American forces quickly gained con-
223
• M E D I T E R R A N E A N T H E A T E R •

trol of the sea and air. The French which in time would become the real
defense collapsed after three days. government of France.
At this point the Germans immedi- While all this intrigue progressed, the
ately occupied the rest of France, ending war continued. Only a few days before
the pretense that the Vichy government Operation Torch began, Britain’s Lieu-
represented an independent country. But tenant General Bernard Montgomery and
they did not secure the French fleet, his Eighth Army administered a severe
which was scuttled in Toulon by French defeat to General Rommel at El Alamein
admirals. The Allies had hoped it would in the western desert of Egypt. El
sail to join them, but destruction was the Alamein became the farthest point of
next best thing and one the Allies could Germany’s advance in North Africa, and
live with. Britain’s victory there ensured the safety
General Eisenhower put Admiral of Egypt and the vital Suez lifeline.
Darlan in charge of French North Africa. Although it was slow off the mark,
He alone, the theory went, could guaran- the Eighth Army eventually began pursu-
tee an orderly transfer of authority and, ing Rommel while, from the opposite
most important of all, induce the Vichy direction, Allied units advanced to within
troops in Tunisia, where there had been 12 miles of Tunis. Then the rainy season
no Allied landings, to cooperate. The and stronger German defenses put the
chances of this happening were fading offensive on hold and gave Hitler time to
fast on November 11 when Eisenhower send in more troops.
made the Darlan appointment, but con- Hitler seems to have reinforced
sidering the stakes, a slim chance was Tunisia because he could not bear to
better than none at all. admit defeat or tolerate losses of territory.
The French in Tunisia, however, By doing so, he prolonged the fighting
decided to let German forces land, thus there for up to five additional months.
dooming the Allies to a long and bitter During that time and partly because of
campaign instead of the walkover they the Tunisian campaign, the Allies aban-
had hoped for and needed. Had the doned their plan to invade France in
French in Tunisia responded to Darlan’s 1943, thus enabling the Nazi regime to
call, enabling the Allies to arrive there survive for an additional year. From this
first, the infamous agreement would have standpoint, Hitler’s refusal to leave Africa
been easier to take. Bad as it was in other proved to be a tactical mistake that, in
respects, the worst thing about the “Dar- one of war’s cruel ironies, nevertheless
lan deal” was that it yielded few benefits. brought him strategic benefits.
Democratic principles had been sacrificed On May 11, 1943, the last Axis
in vain. army in Tunisia surrendered, costing
Luckily for the Allied cause, Darlan Hitler another 250,000 men, in addition
was soon assassinated by a French civil- to many more killed or evacuated
ian. But because FDR hated Charles de because of wounds. The North Africa
Gaulle, the logical choice for leader of the campaign had been messy, and long.
Free French forces, General Henri Giraud During it the U.S. Army experienced
was put in Darlan’s place instead. Giraud what would turn out to be its only
was unacceptable to most of the French defeats by the German Army—losing at
in North Africa, however, so de Gaulle Sidi bon-Zid and at the Kasserine Pass in
brushed him aside and assumed power Tunisia in February.
himself. Then, on November 9, 1943, de Yet Operation Torch had paid for
Gaulle created a government in exile, itself in many ways. By committing so
224
• M I D W A Y , B A T T L E O F •

many resources to it, Hitler made Africa years, whereas if Roundup had succeeded
a significant front that eased the pres- in 1943, it might have been over in one.
sure on Russia. And in addition to end- Italy, which was supposed to have been
ing in victory for the Allies, it was a an easy win, became a horror for the
valuable learning experience for U.S. Allies. Some of the worst fighting of the
commanders. Politically essential in any war occurred there and it became a
case, it might have been strategically strategic liability, as some Americans had
important as well had it not led the predicted it would. The Italian campaign
Allies to invade Sicily and then the Ital- used up divisions that would have been
ian mainland. more useful in France. And, because the
After Tunisia fell, General Marshall Italians under Allied control had to be
wished to move most of the Allied troops supplied with food and fuel to stay alive,
in Africa to Britain. From there they much of the shipping freed up by Opera-
would be positioned to invade France tion Torch went to serve civilian instead
some time in the summer of 1943. Doing of military purposes. The Mediterranean,
so would have been feasible, for France a sea of dreams for Britain, thus became
was weakly defended at the time and the a nightmare for General Marshall and
Allies already controlled the English the U.S. War Department.
Channel and much of the air over France.
But U.S. leaders were uncertain about SEE ALSO

this course, whereas the British were Casablanca conference; Italian campaigns;
Sicily, Battle of
united on the need to take Sicily, which
would strengthen the Allied grip on the F U RTHER READING
entire Mediterranean. FDR therefore Blumenson, Martin. Kasserine Pass.
gave his consent to the invasion, code Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.
named Operation Husky. Carver, Michael. Dilemmas of the Desert
War: A New Look at the Libyan Cam-
It might have been possible to have paign, 1940–42. Bloomington: Indiana
both Husky and Overlord in the same University Press, 1986.
year—if the Allies had moved at top Grigg, John. 1943: The Victory That
speed. During the months before Tunisia Never Was. New York: Hill & Wang,
1980.
fell, General Patton had been training Howard, Michael. Mediterranean Strategy
troops in Morocco. These forces could in the Second World War. New York:
have been used to take Sicily in May or Praeger, 1968.
Lucas, James. War in the Desert: The
early June, when it was undefended. Eighth Army at El Alamein. New York:
Instead, the Allied high command sched- Beaufort, 1983.
uled Husky for July 10, by which time Sainsbury, Keith. The North African Land-
ings, 1942. Newark: University of
Germany had moved three divisions to Delaware Press, 1976
the island.
The Sicilian campaign was poorly
run. It took 43 days to defeat the Ger-
mans, most of whom then escaped to the Midway, Battle of
Italian mainland. As Operation Roundup
was now out of the question, the Allies
invaded Italy next, partly because the
British wanted it but partly through sheer
momentum. Midway, the first great U.S. victory of
This series of bad decisions meant the Pacific war, prevented Japan from
that the war would last for two more renewing its march across the Pacific. It
225
• M I D W A Y , B A T T L E O F •

resulted from a decision by the Imperial Even less effective was the obsolete
Japanese Navy (IJN) to draw out the Douglas Devastator, a torpedo plane that
U.S. carriers. Attacking Midway, the lacked self-sealing fuel tanks and was so
westernmost of the inhabited Hawaiian slow that if unescorted it was easy to
islands, would lure the Pacific Fleet to shoot down. In addition, the U.S. Navy’s
its doom, Japanese naval leaders Mark XIII aerial torpedo had a small
believed. Taking Midway would also warhead, a tendency to rise to the surface
close a gap in Japan’s defensive screen of the water, unreliable firing mecha-
through which a U.S. task force had nisms, and so little speed that at long
slipped to launch 16 army medium range a Japanese ship could outrun it.
bombers against Tokyo. This famous The Japanese Long Lance torpedo was
raid, led by Lieutenant Colonel James literally 10 times better. Japan’s torpedo
H. Doolittle on April 18, 1942, did little bomber, which Americans called the
material damage. But in principle it had Kate, was also far superior to the Devas-
endangered Emperor Hirohito’s life and tator. Only U.S. dive bombers were up-
humiliated the military. As a result, Mid- to-date.
way, which some planners had thus far Admiral Yamamoto, who had
considered unimportant, overnight planned the brilliant attack on Pearl Har-
became an essential target. bor, this time came up with a poor one
On paper the IJN was impossible to for Midway. Some of his vessels, includ-
beat at this stage of the war. For the ing two light carriers, were to support an
attack on Midway, Admiral Isoroku invasion of the Aleutian Islands off
Yamamoto would have at his disposal 11 Alaska to mislead the U.S. Navy, four big
battleships, 5 fleet carriers and 3 light air- carriers of his First Mobile Force were to
craft carriers, 12 cruisers, 43 destroyers, bomb Midway, then a Midway occupa-
and some 700 aircraft. The United States tion force was to take it. Far behind them
would be able to deploy only 3 fleet car- would be the main body with a light car-
riers with 233 combat aircraft, 8 cruisers, rier and the rest of the surface fleet. Thus,
15 destroyers, and a further 121 planes in the decisive carrier duel the odds
based on Midway Island. would be about even, rather than over-
To make matters worse for the whelmingly in Japan’s favor if Yamamoto
Americans, the Japanese carriers were in had assembled all his forces into one
prime condition and were manned by great fleet.
seasoned crews and aviators. On the In addition to Japanese mistakes, the
other hand, although the USS Enterprise U.S. Navy would benefit from its mastery
was in good shape, the Yorktown had of cryptanalysis, or the breaking of codes.
been damaged at the Battle of the Coral By April 1942, following a lapse, the
Sea in May 1942, and the Hornet was code breakers at Station Hypo in Pearl
brand new and its air group lacked expe- Harbor, plus those in Washington and
rience. Worse still, by this time the Navy Australia, were once again reading many
knew that its aircraft were inferior to of the enemy’s radio messages. Thanks to
those of Japan. The Grumman Wildcat the code breakers, Admiral Chester
fighter was no match for Japan’s Zero, a Nimitz had been able to deploy his carri-
splendid fighter plane that came as a ers to best advantage in the Coral Sea.
nasty surprise to U.S. military leaders Now Naval Intelligence scored its
(although it shouldn’t have because it had greatest coup of the war, by decrypting
been used in China for years). Yamamoto’s plan for Midway. Luckily,
226
• M I D W A Y , B A T T L E O F •

it had been sent over the air in full and danger. However, the most important
the crack code breakers of Fleet Radio tactical decisions of this battle were
Unit, Pacific, headed by Commander made by Spruance, who, if he had done
Joseph J. Rochefort, could read it chap- nothing more in his career, would still
ter and verse. As a result, when the U.S. rank with the greatest U.S. admirals.
carriers sailed, they knew exactly where The strategic planning for Midway
to go. This time they—and not Vice must be credited to Nimitz, who took
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who had the risk of placing full trust in his code
commanded at Pearl Harbor and was breakers. He elected not to play it safe,
doing so now at Midway—would do despite the odds, but to defend Midway
the unforeseen. at all costs. He ordered his task forces to
On May 27, 1942, Yorktown take their station northeast of Midway,
arrived at Pearl Harbor from the Coral out of range of enemy scouts, while air-
Sea with internal damage and serious craft from the island would do their
leaks caused by bomb explosions. The searching for them. As he had hoped,
first estimate for repairs was that it the U.S. carriers retained the element of
would take 90 days. Nimitz gave the surprise and were well placed to strike
yard 72 hours. Fourteen hundred skilled the enemy as soon as it was discovered.
workers immediately swarmed over the On June 3, a long-range Catalina
ship. On May 29th, on schedule, the Flying Boat spotted the Japanese Mid-
Yorktown was out of drydock and load- way occupation force approaching and
ing fuel and replacement planes, acquir- it was attacked all day by planes from
ing an air group composed of elements the island, one of which managed to
from three different carriers. The next slightly damage a tanker. On June 4,
day, at 9:00 a.m., with hundreds of Nagumo launched a strike against Mid-
workmen still aboard (they would be way. Soon after, another Catalina spot-
taken off before the battle), it sailed for ted his carriers at last. While the Japan-
Midway. ese launched their strikes, the U.S.
Enterprise and Hornet were already carriers, still undetected, turned south-
at sea, under the command of Rear west to close in on the enemy.
Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who had Nagumo’s aircraft easily wiped out
never before been responsible for even a the obsolete Marine fighters based on
single carrier. Admiral William F. Halsey, Midway, but heavy antiaircraft fire
an experienced and popular carrier destroyed 38 Japanese planes and put
leader, should have led at Midway, but he 30 more out of action. Nagumo was
had come down with a skin disease. In deprived of a third of his combat air-
choosing Spruance to replace Halsey, craft and now had fewer warplanes than
Admiral Nimitz found exactly the right the advancing U.S. carriers. In addition,
commander, because Spruance would he had to attack Midway again, because
prove himself a master of carrier warfare. it had still not been put out of action.
Command of the battle was given to This meant having to rearm his torpedo
Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher on the planes with bombs and change the
Yorktown, who made several important bombs of his dive bombers from armor
decisions, one of them being to have the piercing to high-explosive.
two task forces operate separately and at While this dangerous procedure was
a distance from each other. As a result, taking place, Nagumo was repeatedly
when the Yorktown came under attack attacked by planes from Midway, which
the other two carriers would be out of did no damage to his fleet while suffering
227
• M I D W A Y , B A T T L E O F •

order his squadrons to attack singly


instead of in air groups, his planes were
off by 8:00 a.m. Fletcher began launching
a much smaller force at 8:30.
Image Not Available The U.S. squadrons were sup-
posed to time their flights so
that the dive bombers went in
ahead of the vulnerable torpedo
planes, which would then attack
under fighter protection. But
many pilots lacked the experience
heavy losses. At this point Nagumo needed to bring three different types of
was warned of the presence of at aircraft with different flying speeds and
TBF Avenger least one U.S. carrier. Although he launching times to the target in forma-
torpedo had 36 dive bombers now ready to go, tion, and some squadrons lost sight of
bombers first Nagumo, cautious as ever, chose to wait each other. Because Nagumo had
saw combat in until all his planes had been fueled and changed course and Midway had
the Battle of rearmed once again with antiship neglected to report this to Spruance, the
Midway. They
bombs, so he could send out a balanced Hornet’s fighters and dive bombers
were equipped
attack force. He did so in part because never found their targets.
with an electri-
the U.S. planes attacking from Midway These mistakes left Lieutenant
cal powered
gun turret and without fighter protection were being all Commander J. C. Waldron’s squadron,
an internal but wiped out. Thus, by encouraging Torpedo 8, on its own. It was a green
bomb-bay capa- Nagumo to be conservative, the U.S. unit, with most of its pilots having never
ble of carrying fliers at Midway made an important taken off with a torpedo aboard, let
four 500 lb. contribution to the battle despite their alone fired one in combat. Although
bombs or an lack of hits. they knew they were flying to almost
aerial torpedo. Admiral Fletcher gave Spruance, certain death, not one held back when
whose task force was closer to the enemy, Waldron led them into battle. All 15
orders to attack it when he was ready. U.S. planes were destroyed, and few if
Given a free hand, Spruance decided to any of them even released their torpe-
hit the Japanese early and hard, in hopes does. Only one man from Torpedo 8
of catching them with their decks full of lived to tell the story.
planes still being serviced. At the maxi- Torpedo 6, from the Enterprise,
mum range, his torpedo planes could fly made the next run. Unlike Waldron’s
and still have enough fuel to get back, so men, these were experienced aviators,
he launched everything he had—68 dive but without fighter support all that their
bombers, 30 torpedo planes, and 20 skilled piloting could do was to save 4
fighters—retaining only the Wildcats of of the 14 planes that attacked, with
his combat air patrol. none scoring a hit.
This bold decision was a difficult The Yorktown’s Torpedo 3 arrived
one, for it meant that the torpedo planes last, escorted by six fighter planes of
might not have the fuel to make it back if Fighting 3 led by Lieutenant Commander
they had to alter their course. The fight- James Thach, whose obsolete Wildcats
ers too were jeopardized: as it happened, were heavily outnumbered by the supe-
all the Hornet’s fighters would be forced rior Japanese Zeros. Torpedo 3 lost 10 of
to ditch in the ocean. After a slow and its 12 Devastators, again without hitting
ragged start, which obliged Spruance to a target. But at that moment, 10:22 a.m.,
228
• M I N E S •

Thach recalled, he saw a glint in the sun killed at a time when it had only 1,000
and then a “beautiful silver waterfall.” It carrier pilots and was producing per-
was the dauntless dive bombers of Enter- haps 100 more a year. The loss was also
prise and Yorktown screaming down aggravated by the IJN’s self-defeating
through the empty sky. habit of keeping its veteran flyers in ac-
By pure accident, the Yorktown’s air tion until they were killed or wounded.
group had arrived at the same time as As the war progressed, its naval aviators
Lieutenant Commander Clarence became greener and greener, whereas
McClusky of the Enterprise and his 32 those of the U.S. Navy, whose veterans
dive bombers, who had finally found the were rotated home to train new pilots,
Mobile Force after a desperate search in became more numerous and skillful.
which they had used up most of their Although Japan would build new carri-
fuel. As the Japanese combat air patrol ers, its naval air arm was never again as
had been drawn down to sea level by good as it had been at Pearl Harbor.
the torpedo plane attacks, all four Midway was the United States’s revenge
enemy carriers were for the moment for Pearl Harbor and the assurance of
unprotected. final victory. From that time on, the
Enterprise pilots delivered lethal empire of Japan was forced to fight a
blows to Akagi and Kaga, while planes war of defense.
from Yorktown left Soryu a flaming
hulk. In three minutes the Pacific war SEE ALSO
had turned against Japan. Only Hiryu Coral Sea, Battle of the; Pacific war
survived, to launch two waves against
F U RTHER READING
Yorktown, with her veteran pilots
breaking through the U.S. defenses to Barker, A. J. Midway. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983.
put three bombs and two torpedoes into Layton, Edwin T. ‘And I Was There’: Pearl
the great carrier. But the Hiryu’s Harbor and Midway—Breaking the
moment of glory was brief. In the Secrets. New York: Morrow, 1985.
Prange, Gordon W. Miracle at Midway.
evening, 24 dive bombers from Enter- New York: Penguin, 1982.
prise and 10 from Yorktown found the
last Japanese carrier and sent her to the
bottom of the sea.
Yorktown failed to return from the
battle of Midway. The ship survived two Mines
air attacks but was almost dead in the
water when a Japanese submarine fired a
round of torpedoes that sank the ship.
Notwithstanding this major loss, Midway The land mine was a new weapon devel-
gave the IJN a blow from which it would oped between the two world wars to
never recover. With heavy odds against attack tanks. Since antitank mines were
them, the Americans had inflicted much large and relatively easy to find, antiper-
more harm than they suffered, losing one sonnel mines, aimed at individual sol-
fleet carrier to the enemy’s four, less than diers, were devised to protect their larger
1,000 men to the enemy’s 3,000, and 150 cousins.
aircraft (including those based on Mid- The first use of mines in World War
way) to Japan’s 322. II was by Italian forces in North Africa.
Japan would desperately miss the As a rule, mines were most common
more than 100 veteran pilots who were where tanks were in use, hence their
229
• M I N E S •

presence in North Africa and on the


eastern front. As antipersonnel mines
were more likely to cripple than to kill,
the Germans invented the “jumping”
mine. This fiendish device was spring-
loaded so that when a soldier stepped
on its trigger, the mine flew up to chest
level before exploding.
The Red Army was very short of
mines when Germany invaded the Soviet
Union in 1941. This lack forced Soviet
Image Not Available
troops to employ improvised gasoline
bombs, known as Molotov cocktails,
against German armor. But supply even-
tually caught up to demand, and by
war’s end, the Soviets were believed to
have laid 200 million mines of all types.
Mine clearing has always been and
continues to be a dangerous task. Elec-
tronic mine detectors existed as early as
1942 but were not always reliable.
Then, too, the Germans began making
wooden mines that were undetectable.
Steel pipes filled with explosives, called
Snakes or Bangalore torpedoes, could be deliver mines while flying as high as The mine sap-
pushed into suspect areas and set off to 15,000 feet. American B-29s mined pers (demoli-
detonate mines. The British pioneered in Japan’s harbors and shallow waters so tion specialists)
developing tank appliances such as effectively in 1945 that even coastal traf- of the 82nd
plows and drums, for example, to deto- fic became severely limited. West African
Division move
nate mines quickly and safely. Contact mines were cleared by
forward on the
The most effective British mine- sweep wires, hence the term minesweep-
road to Buthi-
clearing devices were flail tanks, which ing. Acoustic mines, which were set to daung, Burma.
employed a rotating drum with chains explode when a ship’s propellers were Mine detection
attached to beat a path through mine- heard, could be detonated by sonic was a danger-
fields. The Soviets sometimes used sweeps. Magnetic mines were likewise ous task
untrained infantry, or punishment bat- set off by magnetic sweeps, although the because equip-
talions, to clear minefields by marching best defense was a technique known as ment was not
through them. Other armies, however, degaussing, which removed the magnetic always reliable.
employed more conventional methods. field of a steel ship.
Sea mines went back to the 19th Pressure mines were introduced by
century and were further refined during Germany in 1944. Against pressure
World War II. Most of the 500,000 sea mines, set off by the water pressure gen-
mines laid during the war were contact erated by a passing ship, there was only
mines: steel balls with hornlike detona- one defense—slowness. The only way
tors that went off when struck by a ship. found to deal with them was to decrease
Acoustic and pressure mines were usual- a ship’s speed to the point where it did
ly parachuted in by low-flying aircraft. not change the water pressure enough to
By 1944, however, Allied planes could detonate a mine.
230
• M O B I L I Z A T I O N •

that it had two directors, who were to


Mobilization carry out the orders of a four-man
board, to which the co-directors
belonged. Roosevelt was never able to
explain to reporters how this contrap-
The United States was poorly prepared tion was supposed to work. Further,
when it entered World War II. Before after the Lend-Lease bill passed, which
November 1940 the lack of preparation made inflation a real threat, he created
resulted from President Franklin D. an Office of Price Administration and
Roosevelt’s decision not to antagonize Civilian Supply instead of giving control
peace-loving Americans and isolationists of prices to the OPM.
who wanted to keep the United States In the meantime, contracts were
out of the war. But even after he had being signed, production was rising, and
won reelection for an unprecedented shortages were becoming acute. For lack
third term and no longer needed to be of central direction chaos reigned, and it
as concerned about the political effects was every industrialist for himself. Yet,
of increased preparedness, he continued on the other hand, many industries were
to drag his feet. Roosevelt could be not converting at all, notably the auto
exceedingly cautious politically, doing companies. Roosevelt’s solution to
two contradictory things at once, such bureaucratic confusion and production
as delaying mobilization of the nation’s delays was, predictably, another mon-
resources while at the same time strosity, the Supplies Priorities and Allo-
announcing the Lend-Lease program cations Board (SPAB). Created on August
with Britain in December 1940. At that 28, 1941, while the Soviet Union was
time the United States had barely begun fighting for survival, SPAB was meant to
to convert its industries to war produc- establish the policies that the OPM
tion. It could not arm itself yet, much would then implement.
less anyone else. What mobilization required was a
Baby steps toward preparation single agency with real power. What
Roosevelt’s method of preparing for Roosevelt established instead was a
war, a baffling one, was to keep creating bureaucratic maze with cross-appoint-
new agencies without giving them real ments that bewildered even those who
power. On May 25, 1940, as France fell, held them. For instance, FDR chose a
Roosevelt created an Office of Emer- businessman named Donald Nelson to be
gency Management in the White House. the executive director of SPAB, without
This step seemed to mean that he relieving him of his post with the OPM.
intended to run the mobilization effort Thus, Nelson remained William Knud-
himself, which was obviously impossi- sen’s subordinate as director of purchas-
ble. He did appoint prominent men to ing for the OPM, while becoming his
an advisory commission, but its weak- superior as head of SPAB.
ness was such that the usual word used After Pearl Harbor was attacked in
to describe it was monstrosity. December 1941, it was obvious that a
When the advisory commission’s director of mobilization with real power
ineffectiveness could no longer be con- had to be appointed. Thus, in 1942 Roo-
cealed, Roosevelt replaced it with some- sevelt created the War Production Board
thing called the Office of Production (WPB), with Donald Nelson as its head.
Management (OPM), another monstros- But the WPB did not have sufficient
ity. A unique feature of the OPM was authority either. The armed services con-
231
• M O B I L I Z A T I O N •

A potentially crippling shortage of


rubber was solved after Roosevelt
appointed a special committee to investi-
gate the problem. It was headed by
Bernard Baruch, a Wall Street speculator
who had been the mobilization czar in
World War I and was widely respected.
It recommended that synthetic rubber be
Image Not Available made of petroleum and called for a rub-
ber administrator to be named by the
WPB. Nelson was appointed to this
position. The committee wanted a
national speed limit of 35 miles per hour
to save wear and tear on tires and a
gasoline rationing program sufficient to
bring down the average distance trav-
eled by automobiles from 6,700 to
Guns and tinued to place orders themselves, and 5,000 miles a year.
wingtips have Nelson was not up to his job. In the first Given a green light, Nelson moved
not yet been six months of 1942, $100 billion worth quickly for once, and although only
added to some of war contracts were placed, requiring 234,000 tons of synthetic rubber would
of the planes levels of output that could not be be manufactured in 1943, annual pro-
on this final achieved in one year—or possibly even duction ultimately rose to 800,000 tons.
assembly line
two. Meanwhile, competition for scarce Meanwhile, gasoline rationing stretched
for B-24E
materials led to crippling shortages. To the natural rubber supplies to cover the
(Liberator)
bombers at
ease them Nelson put forward a Produc- gap.
Ford’s Willow tion Requirements Plan that, by allow- Finally, Roosevelt took a decisive
Run plant. ing any manufacturer with a contract to step. In May 1943 he created the Office
set his own priorities, made everything of War Mobilization (OWM), with
worse. Byrnes as its head. The WPB remained in
It was time for yet another agency, place, but under the OWM’s direction.
the Office of Economic Stabilization, To general surprise, the OWM proved to
which Supreme Court Justice James F. be workable. At long last, the nation
Byrnes was appointed to direct. His job finally had a mobilization czar with real
was to cut the rate of inflation in half, authority. Byrnes brought order out of
which he did with the Controlled Mate- chaos, at least to the degree Roosevelt
rials Plan (CMP). The CMP established permitted, and industrial mobilization
a strict priority system for three vital proceeded at an accelerating pace.
materials—steel, copper, and alu- Military mobilization Military
minum—which were doled out accord- mobilization was an easier job than the
ing to the user’s order of importance. civilian effort. When the war in Europe
This approach gave Byrnes control over broke out in 1939, the U.S. Army had
production. Thanks to the CMP, muni- fewer than 190,000 men in uniform. By
tions production reached a level of $60 1940, after the fall of France, anyone
billion in 1943 and rather more than could see that the military had to grow
that in 1944. Little known at the time enormously and quickly. Yet, with isola-
and quickly forgotten, the CMP was tionist sentiment strong, the President
critical to the entire war effort. was reluctant to act himself and would
232
• M O N T G O M E R Y, B E R N A R D L A W •

not let Democratic legislators do so Miller, Sally M., and Daniel A. Cornford,
either. Finally, after tireless lobbying by eds. American Labor in the Era of World
War II. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995.
alarmed private citizens, two Republi- Schwartz, Jordan A. The Speculator:
cans—Representative James Wadsworth Bernard M. Baruch in Washington,
of New York and Senator Edward R. 1917–1965. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1981.
Burke of Nebraska—introduced a bill
providing for a military draft.
That Roosevelt was being overcau-
tious is suggested by the fact that a poll
taken just before passage of the Burke-
Montgomery,
Wadsworth bill showed that 71 percent Bernard Law
of Americans favored the bill, including COMMANDER OF THE 21ST
65 percent of males aged 16 to 25—the ARMY GROUP, 1944–45
very men who would be drafted. Thus
• Born: November 17, 1887, London,
encouraged, Roosevelt endorsed the bill, England
as did Republican candidate for presi- • Political party: Conservative
dent Wendell Willkie. This act required • Education: Royal Military College at
considerable courage on Willkie’s part, Sandhurst, 1908; Staff College, 1920
because his chances for victory de- • Military service: British Army—
subaltern, 1908; lieutenant, 1914;
pended to a large extent on winning the brigade-major, 1916; lieutenant
isolationist vote. colonel, 1931; colonel, 1934; major
general, 1938; commander of II
Roosevelt signed the Burke- Corps, 1940; lieutenant general, 1942;
Wadsworth bill into law on September commander of Eighth Army, 1942;
16, 1940. The National Guard and general, 1943; commander of Allied
ground forces, 1944; field marshal,
Organized Reserve were called up at 1944; Commander of the 21st Army
that time as well. In this manner an Group, 1944 –45
army that numbered 270,000 officers • Died: March 24, 1976, Alton,
Hampshire, England
and men in 1940 was five times that size
a year later. There was a close call in the
summer of 1941 when the House
extended the original one-year enlist- Montgomery was the leading British
ment of draftees by only a single vote. field commander in the Mediterranean
Still, Burke-Wadsworth did the job. For and European theaters. Extremely popu-
the next four years, training this new lar with his troops and the British pub-
army, not raising it, would be the fore- lic, Montgomery was despised by most
most problem. U.S. commanders by his headline-grab-
bing boasts at their expense. Even by
SEE ALSO U.S. standards he was unusually cau-
Byrnes, James F.; Financing the war; tious and slow-moving.
Labor; Selective Service System Efficient, hard working, and a metic-
ulous planner, Montgomery first gained
F U RTHER READING
fame as the commander of Britain’s
Flynn, George Q. The Mess in Washing- Eighth Army in North Africa. His May
ton: Manpower Mobilization in World
War II. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 4, 1942, defeat of General Erwin Rom-
1979. mel, who had so often defeated British
Janeway, Eliot. The Struggle for Survival: commanders in the past, made Mont-
A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in
World War II. New Haven: Yale Univer- gomery a world figure. His victory at El
sity Press, 1951. Alamein in the western desert of Egypt
233
• M O N T G O M E R Y, B E R N A R D L A W •

Field Marshal ton’s Third Army, was so sudden, and


Montgomery Patton moved so quickly, that most of
(left) greets the German forces in northern France
Prime Minister were caught in what was called the
Mackenzie “Falaise pocket.” They might have
King of Canada
remained trapped there, but again
in May 1944.
Montgomery’s divisions moved too
Montgomery
slowly, and by the time they arrived,
was much bet- Image Not Available
ter at internal most of the Germans had escaped.
diplomacy than In the hot pursuit that followed, the
many of his 21st Army Group captured Antwerp,
peers, especially Belgium, on September 4, giving the
Patton. Allies an undamaged port, which they
desperately needed. Then Montgomery
ordered his forces to halt for refueling.
During the two days that elapsed, the
was the first major success on land of the Germans fortified the 60-mile-long
British Army in World War II. Scheldt estuary that linked Antwerp to
Montgomery won El Alamein by the sea. It would take months of hard
battering away at the German lines with fighting for the Canadians to clear its
overwhelming force until they finally banks, during which time the Allied
broke. This was typical of his methods, campaign bogged down for want of
as was the fact that he had no plans to supplies and fuel.
exploit his victory and allowed Rommel Montgomery was bitterly disap-
to get away. It would take almost an- pointed over being relieved on Septem-
other year to seize Rommel’s army. ber 1, 1944, as the commander of Allied
After Montgomery’s victory over ground troops, although this assignment
Rommel, he led the Eighth Army had never been intended as anything
through Sicily in 1943, and then to the more than a temporary job. He was fur-
Italian mainland. Next he took part in ther embittered by Eisenhower’s “broad-
the planning for D-Day, the landing in front strategy.” Instead of having the
Normandy to free France. During this army groups being treated more or less
campaign, called Operation Overlord, equally, Montgomery wanted to receive
he commanded all Allied ground forces most of the available supplies, and at
as well as the 21st Army Group, which least two U.S. armies, for a single thrust
consisted primarily of British and Cana- at Berlin.
dian divisions. It was supposed to break When Eisenhower refused to play
out of the landing area into the open favorites, Montgomery ordered Opera-
country beyond Caen, soon after D-Day tion Market-Garden, in hopes of getting
on June 6, 1944. But his divisions were his way. The plan was to drop a carpet of
too slow and the Germans too quick, so airborne troops along the route to Arn-
Montgomery failed to take Caen. As a heim on the Rhine. Arnheim and its pre-
result, he ended up playing a supporting cious bridges would be seized, too,
role, tying down large numbers of Ger- putting the 21st Army Group on the high
man troops in the north while U.S. road to Berlin. But the plan, which was
forces broke out of southern Normandy. launched on September 17, 1944, was far
The U.S. breakout in early August, too ambitious. Lightly armed paratroop-
led by Lieutenant General George Pat- ers did seize one end of a bridge at Arn-
234
• M O R G E N T H A U, H E N R Y T. , J R. •

heim, but they could not hold it. And Montgomery launched his offensive, the
they could not be relieved, because Mont- 12th Army Group had crossed the
gomery’s XXX Corps, stalled on one-lane Rhine and was well into an offensive
roads, failed to break through as that captured hundreds of thousands of
planned. Even Montgomery admitted German soldiers and large portions of
that he was to blame for this defeat. German territory. So it was that the 21st
Throughout the fall of 1944, Mont- Army Group ended up playing only a
gomery continued to pester Eisenhower supporting role, yet again.
with demands for a single thrust on Berlin,
SEE ALSO
antagonizing every U.S. commander with
Bulge, Battle of; Eisenhower, Dwight D.;
his complaints, demands, and insults. His France, battle of; Germany, battle of
misbehavior finally came to a head during
the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans F U RTHER READING
attacked in the Ardennes Forest on Hamilton, Nigel. Monty: The Battles of
December 17, cutting off General Omar Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery.
Bradley, the U.S. 12th Army Group com- New York: Random House, 1994.
mander, from his First and Ninth armies.
Eisenhower then gave temporary com-
mand of them to Montgomery, which was
a big mistake. Montgomery did little dur-
Morgenthau, Henry
ing the battle except to spoil Eisenhower’s T., Jr.
plan for capturing the German force. SECRETARY OF THE
Eisenhower’s strategy was for Gen- TREASURY
eral Patton’s Third Army to drive north
up the base of the Bulge while Mont- • Born: May 11, 1891, New York, N.Y.
• Political party: Democratic
gomery drove south. But once again
• Education: attended Cornell
Montgomery jumped off too late and University, 0000–00
with too little strength to meet the Third • Military service: none
Army in time. Instead, the Bulge was sim- • Government service: Chairman of
ply flattened by repeated U.S. attacks. New York State Agricultural Advisory
Commission 1928–30; state
In the course of the fighting Mont- conservation commissioner, 1930–32;
gomery made such extreme demands, head of Federal Farm Board, 1933;
Secretary of the Treasury, 1933 –45
and treated Eisenhower with such con-
• Died: February 6, 1967,
tempt, that he nearly lost his job. In no Poughkeepsie, N.Y.,
way humbled by this close call, he fol-
lowed it up by holding a press conference
to explain how he had won the battle.
This was too much even for Prime Minis- Henry Morgenthau’s lack of education
ter Winston Churchill, who at once made (he was a college dropout) and of any
a point of describing the Battle of the business or banking experience led
Bulge as a great U.S. victory. many to claim that he was unfit to head
Eisenhower, generous to a fault, the Treasury Department. However, he
planned to give Montgomery priority in was comfortable with the job and, more
crossing the Rhine, the last barrier to an important, was an old friend and neigh-
Allied victory. But, as usual, Mont- bor of President Roosevelt who trusted
gomery spent so long preparing his him completely. That Morgenthau lived
attack that Bradley’s 12th Army Group up to Roosevelt’s expectations is shown
crossed the Rhine first. By the time by his long tenure in office.
235
• M O R T A R S •

During the war Morgenthau was knowledge, so Morgenthau’s plan ended


generally responsible for the complicated up on the shelf. Morganthau should be
programs that froze wages and prices, remembered for his years of faithful ser-
raised taxes, and sold bonds to cover the vice to the nation, for his humanity, and
annual deficits. Three facts are the mea- for the outstanding job he did managing
sure of his success: Inflation was the finances of the United States during
brought under control; Government rev- World War II.
enues covered a larger share of the war’s
SEE ALSO
costs than in any previous conflict; and
Financing the war; Mobilization
interest rates remained low. Compared
to most other war economies, that of F U RTHER READING
the United States was extremely well Blum, John Morton. Roosevelt and Mor-
managed, for which Morgenthau genthau. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
deserves more credit than anyone else. 1970.
A humane man, Morgenthau ——, ed. From the Morgenthau Diaries. 3
vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
opposed, although he could not pre- 1959–67.
vent, the internment of Japanese Ameri- Morgenthau, Henry. Mostly Morgenthaus:
cans. More than anyone else in the A Family History. New York: Ticknor &
Fields, 1991.
Roosevelt administration he drew atten-
tion to the Holocaust while it was going
on. And Morgenthau was instrumental
in the creation of the War Refugee
Board, which saved hundreds of thou- Mortars
sands of lives.
Morgenthau is perhaps best remem-
bered for a proposal he completed on
September 4, 1944. The Morgenthau A mortar is a weapon that fires only at
Plan, as it was usually called, aimed at angles above 45 degrees to the horizon.
destroying Germany’s ability to make In World War II, these munitions were
war forever. After its defeat, Germany mainly smooth-bore as opposed to rifled-
was to be both demilitarized and dein- barrel weapons used by infantry to pro-
dustrialized. Its surviving armament and vide their own close support. The U.S.
heavy industrial plants would be dis- Army differed from most in that it had a
mantled. Key areas, such as East Prussia, rifled mortar.
the Saar, and Silesia would be given to Mortars around the world were
neighboring states. The Ruhr basin, the much alike, consisting of a steel base-
seat of German industry, would be inter- plate, a barrel, and a supporting bipod or
nationalized. What remained of Ger- tripod. The projectile, usually called a
many would be divided into two agri- bomb, had a shotgun shell in its tail.
cultural states. When the bomb was dropped down the
Although this might have been what barrel, a firing pin set off the shotgun
the Germans deserved, Morgenthau’s shell, which detonated the propellant.
plan would have punished much of Mortars were small as a rule, except
western Europe as well. Without a those in the Red Army. Its mortars were
strong German economy there was little up to 9.4 inches in size, equal to a naval
hope of reviving the economies of Ger- gun. They were cheaper and easier to
many’s former trading partners. In the make than artillery, which is why the
postwar years this became common Soviets liked them.
236
• M O T I O N P I C T U R E S •

Motion pictures

Radio and movies were the most impor-


tant entertainment media during the war
years, although radio was also a pri-
mary news medium. The government
attempted to instruct, or indoctrinate, Image Not Available
Americans with motion pictures, but in
this effort it had little success.
The outstanding propaganda film
was Casablanca, a purely commercial
product of Hollywood’s “dream fac-
tory.” Casablanca succeeded as a movie,
and still works today, because its anti-
Nazi message is understated and woven
skillfully into the plot. Touching at some
points, stirring at others, Casablanca
promoted the war effort by refusing to
club its audience over the head. Typi- eral George C. Marshall overruled them, Germany had
cally, the government could not see this. however, on the grounds that knowing its own propa-
It kept Casablanca from being shown in what awaited them could only lead the ganda film
North Africa for fear of offending men to take their training more seriously. industry. The
French citizens who had collaborated Whether it did or not, the film testifies to German docu-
mentary film-
with the Nazis. what could be accomplished when talent
maker Leni
The federal government did sponsor was given free rein.
Riefenstahl cre-
some good documentaries, such as Most of the 2,500 motion pictures ated breathtak-
William Wyler’s Memphis Belle, a film that Hollywood turned out during World ing worlds of
about the first B-17 to complete a tour of War II were simply for entertainment. Nazi domina-
duty in Europe. Most of the combat doc- Hollywood never stopped making come- tion in her
umentaries were made by the armed dies and musicals, although after Pearl films, yet after
forces themselves, aided by Hollywood Harbor was attacked in December 1941, the war
directors and technical personnel. These the war films increased in number. The claimed to be
include Commander John Ford’s The peak year for war movies was 1943, after only doing her
Battle of Midway; The Fighting Lady, a which they became fewer and better. job. Here she
carrier film that did well at the box Except for Casablanca, most of the shoots footage
for the 1934
office; and To the Shores of Iwo Jima. contemporary war films still worth seeing
classic Triumph
Perhaps the best of these documen- were produced in 1944 and 1945.
of the Will.
taries is The Battle of San Pietro, directed Lifeboat, a political allegory by Alfred
and narrated by John Huston. It graphi- Hitchcock about the survivors of an
cally depicts the fight to take a single Ital- engagement at sea who first rescue, but
ian village, including rare shots of dead then are forced to kill, a U-boat comman-
GIs being wrapped in mattress covers. der, is particularly involving. But the most
Some officers did not want The Battle of realistic and moving film was The Story
San Pietro to be shown to troops in train- of G.I. Joe. Based on a column by Ernie
ing, for fear it would injure morale. Gen- Pyle, a newspaperman who was very
237
• M O T I O N P I C T U R E S •

popular with the troops, it vividly por- factory produced was wel-
trayed the infantryman’s way of life and come overseas. Many men
death. Most of the best films about who worked in the film
World War II, however, were produced industry were drafted or, like
afterward, and long afterward in the case Jimmy Stewart, a real hero,
of Patton, A Bridge Too Far, and Saving volunteered for combat. But
Private Ryan, which are among the few entertainment was never Image Not Available
that seem likely to last. more important than during
Most of the wartime films that people the war, which justified the
still enjoy are not actually about the war. special treatment it got.
They include The Man Who Came to Thus Hollywood was pro-
Dinner; the Preston Sturgis satires Sulli- vided with ample film stock
van’s Travels and The Miracle of Morgan’s even when it was in short
Creek; National Velvet, in which a very supply. The movie star
young and very beautiful Elizabeth Taylor SEE ALSO Betty Hutton
rides her beloved horse Velvet to victory in visits sailors
Music; Radio
the Grand National steeplechase; Bing and Marines in
F U RTHER READING the Marshall
Crosby’s Going My Way; and Yankee
Aldgate, Anthony. Britain Can Take It: Islands in
Doodle Dandy, marked by James The British Cinema in the Second World December
Cagney’s exuberant portrayal of George War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
1944.
M. Cohan, the songwriter who penned the Press, 1994.
Beidler, Philip D. The Good War’s Great-
song after which the picture was named. est Hits: World War II and American
Show business played a very impor- Remembering. Athens: University of
tant role in the war effort, lifting morale Georgia, 1998.
at home and in the theaters of war. After Carnes, Mark, ed. Past Imperfect: History
According to the Movies. New York: H.
popular music, no form of entertainment Holt, 1995.
meant more to the troops than American Koppes, Clayton R., and Gregory D.
films. War films shown in war zones were Black. Hollywood Goes to War: How
Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped
likely to cause outbursts of rude GI World War II Movies. New York: Free
humor. Otherwise, everything the dream Press, 1987.

WORLD WAR II MOVIE CLASSICS


Command Decision. MGM, 1948. The political challenges of an RAF general attempt-
ing to stop the production of Nazi jet planes. Starring Clark Gable and Brian Donlevy.
Das Boot. Columbia Pictures, 1981. The claustrophobic world of a German U-boat.
The Desert Fox. 20th Century Fox, 1950. Biopic following Erwin Rommel’s career from
the Afrika Korps to his part in the assassination attempt on Hitler to his subsequent sui-
cide. Starring James Mason and Jessica Tandy.
Destination Tokyo. Warner Bros., 1944. In order to provide information for the first air
raid over Tokyo, a U.S. submarine sneaks into Tokyo Bay and places a spy team ashore.
Starring Cary Grant.
The Fighting Seabees. Republic Pictures, 1944. Construction workers in the treacherous
Pacific Ocean build Seabees for the U.S. Army. Starring John Wayne.
Mister Roberts. Warner Bros., 1955. Life on a World War II cargo supply ship in the
Pacific. Starring Henry Fonda and James Cagney.
Run Silent, Run Deep. United Artists, 1958. A U.S. sub commander, obsessed with sink-
ing a certain Japanese ship, butts heads with his first officer and crew. Starring Clark
Gable and Burt Lancaster.
Twelve O’Clock High. 20th Century Fox, 1949. Tenacious U.S. general leads daylight
bombing raids over Germany. Starring Gregory Peck.
238
• M U N I C H A G R E E M E N T •

from memory are “Goodbye, Mamma,


Munich agreement I’m Off to Yokohama,” “The Japs
Haven’t Got a Chinaman’s Chance,” and
SEE Appeasement; Germany
“When Those Little Yellow Bellies Meet
the Cohens and the Kelleys.”
The first hit song of the war was
Music “Remember Pearl Harbor,” but Frank
Loesser had a much greater success with
“Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammuni-
tion.” It was based on an incident during
Popular music flourished during the war the attack on Pearl Harbor when a chap-
and did much to raise people’s spirits. For lain (“sky pilot”) supposedly manned an
the men overseas it was the primary, and antiaircraft gun. In reality Captain
sometimes only, form of entertainment. William A. McGuire did not remember
Aboard ship, behind the front, and at speaking these immortal words and had
home, radio and the 78-rpm record been passing ammunition himself rather
player were everywhere, despite a short- than manning a gun. Whatever the case,
age of shellac, from which phonograph the government loved it and even went so
records were made. The banning of far as to ask radio stations not to over-
recorded music (to be substituted with play the song and thereby shorten its life.
public performances) in 1942 by the The most popular war song, “Der
hated James C. Petrillo of the American Führer’s Face,” featuring Donald Duck,
Federation of Musi- was kept off the air for This govern-
cians only made rec- a time because censors ment poster
ords more popular. His were offended by encouraged
was a vain, as well as sounds suggesting Don- people to listen
unpatriotic, effort to ald was passing wind. to music wher-
save live recording stu- The later songs be- ever they may
dio bands from the came more sentimental, be for inspira-
technology that was Image Not Available an example being Irving tion and
replacing them. Berlin’s “I Left My courage.
During the war, Heart at the Stage Door
people had money to Canteen.” The most
spend but little to buy, popular song of the war
which was good for the was Berlin’s 1942
music business. Before “White Christmas,”
the war, a hit song introduced by Bing
might sell 400,000 Crosby in the movie
copies of sheet music, whereas during the Holiday Inn. It was the first song in a
war sales of 600,000 copies became decade to sell more than 1 million copies
usual. In 1944 sheet music sales were up of sheet music and led the Hit Parade—
25 percent from the previous year. music’s equivalent of a Nielsen rating—
Although this was still the golden age nine times, rebounding again during the
of popular music, to which composers Christmases of 1943 and 1944. Songs like
like George Gershwin and Cole Porter this meant much to battle-hardened troops
had made superb contributions, most hits as well as to the folks back home. Over
reflected considerably lower tastes. and over, veterans have testified how much
Among those that have mercifully faded one or another song meant to them.
239
• M U S S O L I N I, B E N I T O •

Apart from fear itself, behavior. His first employment after


nostalgia seems to have receiving his diploma was as a teacher,
been the nation’s strongest but his drinking, womanizing, and bully-
Image Not Available emotion during World War ing behavior made it difficult for him to
II; certainly it was what pro- hold any job for long. In 1909 he became
duced the best music. The an editor of a socialist weekly in Tren-
most popular song of 1944 tino, Austria. He soon returned to Italy,
was the touching “I’ll Be Seeing where he developed a career as a socialist
You,” and in that same year “I’ll Be agitator and editor.
Home for Christmas” (with its melan- In 1914 Mussolini founded his own
Record compa- choly coda, “if only in my dreams”) was paper, Il Popolo, using it to support Ital-
nies like Colum- a hit also. ian entry into World War I, which the
bia boomed Even novelty songs could elicit a socialists opposed. After being released
during the war somber mood. Forty-six years later a from the Italian Army in 1917 because
years because writer recalled that on his first crossing of of a training accident, Mussolini
Americans had
the North Atlantic, in 1943, at the height returned to Il Popolo, which he moved
few other places
of the submarine war, another young from the extreme left to the extreme
to spend their
disposable
sailor played “Juke Box Saturday Night” right politically. It became the organ of
incomes. over and over on his phonograph. his Fascist party, a magnet for violent
Although it is a bouncy number, being at ex-servicemen. Italy’s government was
sea in a dangerous time gave it a “dirge- wildly unpopular as a result of its hav-
like quality” to that listener. This must ing led the country into a war that pro-
have been a common experience. duced ruinous defeats and catastrophic
economic losses. Having no support, it
SEE ALSO
was easily toppled by Mussolini in
Home front; Motion pictures; Radio
1922. He made himself dictator of Italy
in 1925.
Although it is often said that Mus-
Mussolini, Benito solini came to power as a result of his
march on Rome, the mere threat of such
PRIME MINISTER OF ITA LY,
a march was sufficient. After he
1922–43
announced that his fascist “blackshirts”
• Born: July 29, 1983, Predappio, would move on Rome and seize power,
Romagna, Italy Mussolini was named prime minister by
• Political party: Fascist
King Victor Emmanuel III on October
• Education: secondary school diploma,
1901 29, 1922. His blackshirts were then ush-
• Military service: Italian Army: private, ered into Rome, where they committed
1905–6; sergeant, 1915–17 unnecessary acts of violence involving 12
• Government service: parliamentary
deaths. Apparently this was to establish
deputy, 1921–22; Prime minister,
1922–43 the myth that fascism had come to power
• Died: April 28, 1945, Dongo, Italy by force of arms.
Mussolini ruled with a heavy hand,
inflicting violence, torture, and death on
his critics and enemies. The only redeem-
Even as a boy, Mussolini was thuggish ing feature of his regime was that these
and violent. Although his parents had lit- evils took place on a small scale com-
tle money, they sent him to boarding pared to what went on in Nazi Germany.
schools because of his uncontrollable Also, Mussolini was not anti-Semitic, a
240
• M U S S O L I N I, B E N I T O •

result of Italy’s being the least anti-Semitic


of European countries.
Mussolini made peace with the
Catholic Church, signing a concordant
and treaty with the Vatican in 1929. His
was the first Italian government ever to
be officially recognized by the Church.
Pope Pius XII said that Mussolini was “a
man sent by Providence” to deliver Italy
from liberalism.
Mussolini was unable to do much
about Italy’s poverty and backwardness
as an industrial state. Yet, despite its slen-
der resources, the Italy that Mussolini
dreamed of would be a new Roman Image Not Available
empire, and he would be its leader. This
was a fantasy and led to disastrous
adventures. In 1935 the Italian Army
invaded Ethiopia. Although Addis
Ababa, the capital, fell in 1936, fighting
continued for three more years. Musso-
lini spent the equivalent of an entire
year’s national income on the Ethiopian
war, which provided no tangible benefits
to the Italian state. Ethiopia remained a
drain for as long as Italy occupied it.
This episode alienated the Western
democracies and deprived Mussolini of
his major diplomatic asset. Before
Ethiopia he had been able to play off
Britain and France against Hitler’s Ger-
many. By first leaning one way, then Mussolini took Hitler’s side. The result Like Hitler,
another, he had inflated Italian prestige. was that Hitler, who had already seized Mussolini
In the future he would become progres- Austria, gained Czechoslovakia as well. employed ban-
sively more dependent on Hitler. Italy gained nothing. It is true that Italy ners, cere-
The Spanish Civil War of 1936 had seized Albania earlier in the year. But monies, rallies,
and martial
resulted in another mistake. When Gen- this was a meaningless triumph, for it
music to build
eral Francisco Franco led an uprising already controlled Albania’s army and
support for his
against the Spanish Republic in that year, economy. Worse was to follow.
regime.
Mussolini came to his aid with financial In 1940, while Germany was beating
and military support. What followed was France and Britain on the battlefield,
a three-year war that ended with Franco’s Mussolini declared war on the Allies. But
victory but cost Italy a sum equal to half Italy’s invasion of France was easily
a year’s revenue and depleted the coun- stopped, and Italy gained an occupation
try’s foreign currency reserve by half. Fur- zone only because Germany provided
ther, setbacks in battle proved that the one. Undeterred by failure, in the fall of
Italian Army was not very good. 1940 Mussolini ordered his Libyan army
At the Munich conference in 1938, to advance into Egypt. Then, in October,
241
• N A G A S A K I •

he ordered an invasion of Greece. The mistress, and strung both bodies up by


Greeks stopped the Italians cold, then their heels in Milan. So ended the career
began pushing them back into Albania. of one of history’s most inept dictators.
In December a small British force
attacked the Italians in Egypt, routing SEE ALSO
them completely. British-led forces also Germany; Italian campaigns; Italy;
liberated Ethiopia in April 1941. Mediterranean theater; Sicily, battle of
Germany rescued Mussolini in
F U RTHER READING
North Africa by sending over General
Carpi, Daniel. Between Mussolini and
Erwin Rommel with two divisions in Hitler: The Jews and the Italian Authori-
1941. It also bailed out Italy in the Bal- ties in France and Tunisia. Hanover,
kans by seizing Yugoslavia and Greece in N.H.: University Press of New England,
1994.
that same year. This put Italy very much Hartenian, Larry. Benito Mussolini. New
under the German thumb. Thereafter, it York: Chelsea House, 1988.
was committed to a Balkan occupation it Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. Mussolini’s Empire:
The Rise and Fall of the Fascist Vision.
could not afford and a North African
New York: Wiley, 1994.
campaign it could not win, even with Mussolini, Benito. The Fall of Mussolini,
German help. His Own Story. New York: Farrar, Straus
By early 1943, three-fourths of the & Giroux, 1948.
Smith, Dennis Mack. Mussolini. New
Italian merchant fleet had been sunk and York: Knopf, 1982.
Italy was losing six ships for every one it
built. Its economy was collapsing even
before the North African campaign was
lost in May 1943. The Allies then in-
vaded Sicily.
Nagasaki
On July 25, 1943, Mussolini was SEE Atomic bombs
fired by Victor Emmanuel as prime min-
ister and placed under arrest. No fascists
came to his aid, however, because of the
party’s reputation as well as Mussolini’s Napalm
own, which had been ruined by so many
failures.
Mussolini was rescued from prison
on September 12 by German commandos Napalm was developed by Harvard sci-
and put in nominal charge of a puppet entists and introduced by the U.S. Army
state called the Italian Social Republic in in 1943. A napalm bomb was created
northern Italy. But as real power was by filling an aircraft fuel tank with a
now in German hands, Mussolini could mixture of gasoline and naphthalic and
do little beyond executing his former palmitic acids. The result was a “jelled”
advisors. These included Count Galeazzo gasoline incendiary that clung to human
Ciano, who had been his foreign minister flesh upon exploding and was almost
and was still married to Mussolini’s impossible to put out. Napalm was also
daughter. used in flamethrowers, both manually
In 1945, when German power in carried and tank-mounted. On Oki-
Italy collapsed, Mussolini wandered nawa, U.S. troops poured napalm
about aimlessly until he fell into the directly into caves, igniting the fuel with
hands of communist partisans. They exe- hand grenades. Napalm was used only
cuted him on the spot, along with his by U.S. troops.
242
• N A V A J O C O D E T A L K E R S •

About 400 Navajos served in every


Navajo code talkers Marine campaign, beginning with
Guadalcanal in August 1942. Each of
the six Marine divisions employed code
talkers. They worked usually in two-
The first Native American code talkers man teams, using field telephones and
used in warfare were 14 Choctaw Indian radios to call in artillery strikes, direct
members of the U.S. Army’s 36th artillery and troop movements, and per-
Infantry Division in World War I. Near form other important tasks. Their great-
the end of the war they were stationed in est achievement was on Iwo Jima early
company headquarters and translated in 1945, which was the bloodiest battle
radio, telephone, and written field mes- fought by Marines in the Pacific war.
sages into Choctaw. The Germans were The entire operation was directed by
never able to decode these messages, so orders communicated by the Navajo
they were the most secure form of com- code talkers. Working around the clock,
munication employed by the U.S. Army. they sent and received over 800 mes-
In World War II some Choctaws and sages in the first 48 hours alone. Major
Comanches were used as code talkers by Howard Connor, head of signals for the
the U.S. Army in Europe. However, most 5th Marine Division, said afterward
code talkers in World War II were Nava- that without the Navajos Iwo Jima
jos, chiefly from New Mexico, who were could not have been taken.
recruited—and sometimes drafted—by the Japanese intelligence, which often
Marine Corps for service in the Pacific. broke U.S. Army codes, was baffled by
The idea came from Philip Johnson, an the code talkers, even though it had
engineer who had been raised on a Navajo access to a Navajo prisoner named Joe
reservation as the child of missionaries and Lee Kieyoomia, who had served in the
knew the language. Because the Navajo Army and was captured when the Philip-
language was so difficult and almost never pines fell in 1942. Although his Japanese
appeared written, Johnson advised the captors tortured him, Kieyoomia could
Marine Corps that having Navajos com- tell them nothing because the code talkers
municate in their own tongue from the had come up with special terms for mili-
front lines to headquarters and back tary purposes that were meaningless to
would prove much faster and more accu- other Navajos. Code talkers did not sim-
rate than encoding messages. Codes and ply speak to one another in their native
ciphers were difficult to write under com- tongue, but instead used a code that
bat conditions, and there was always the sounded like gibberish to anyone who
risk that they would be broken. had not learned it. The only way to break
Navajo code talkers were the perfect this code was to capture a code talker.
solution to this problem. It was estimated For that reason many believed that it was
at the time that only 30 non-Navajos in Marine Corps policy to have code talkers
the entire world, none of them Japanese, killed if they were in danger of being
understood the language. In a test taken prisoner by the Japanese. In any
arranged by the Marine Corps it was dis- case, no code talker was ever captured
covered that Navajos could encode, send, and the code remained secure.
and decode a three-line message in En- Because code talking was a closely
glish in 20 seconds. Marine coding guarded secret, they were unable to tell
machines required 30 minutes to perform their families where they were and what
this task. No more proof was required. they were doing. Anxiety on the reserva-
243
• N A V Y •

These Navajo
code talkers
were part of
the first assault
wave to land
on Saipan in
June 1944.

Image Not Available

tions owing to lack of information long after the fighting had stopped. Unlike
became so great that Johnson finally sent most other veterans, though, code talkers
a letter to every family with a code talker often turned to using Navajo ceremonies
in the service describing the code-talking called the “Enemy Way,” a ritual designed
operation and urging them to tell no one to help them deal with their memories
else for reasons of security. It was the and the ghosts of dead comrades.
right thing to do morally, but somehow
F U RTHER READING
code talking ended up as a feature story
Aaseng, Nathan. The Navajo Code Talk-
in Arizona Highways. ers. New York: Walker, 1992.
Despite this limited public awareness,
the Marine Corps refused to release
information on code talking until 1968.
Because code talking remained top secret Navy
for all that time, not a single Navajo was SEE Japanese Navy; Royal Navy;
given an award or medal. Except for United States Navy
readers of Arizona Highways, few Ameri-
cans knew of the Navajos’ special contri-
bution until recently. Nowadays, their
story is well known and the Navajo code
Nazis
talkers have received many honors and
tributes. In December 1981, President
Ronald Reagan awarded the Navajo
code talkers a Presidential Certificate of In 1919 Adolf Hitler, then still a soldier
Recognition, and proclaimed April 14, on active duty with the German Army,
1983, Navajo Code Talker Day. was assigned to observe a meeting held
Because many code talkers fought on in Munich by the German Worker’s
the front lines—and in some cases behind party (DAP). This right-wing nationalist
enemy lines—they were often in great group appealed to him at once, and he
danger. Like other combat veterans, mem- became its 55th member. In such a tiny
ories and nightmares based on their band, Hitler’s qualities assured him of a
wartime experience often disturbed them rapid rise to the top.
244
• N E G R O E S •

Hitler began • Military service: U.S. Navy: ensign,


1905; lieutenant, 1910; lieutenant
as the DAP’s pro- commander, 1917; commander, 1921;
paganda chairman, captain, 1928; commander, Augusta,
but in July 1921 1933–35; rear admiral, 1938;
commander, Battleship Division 1,
he became party 1938; admiral, 1941; commander in
Image Not Available leader. Upon tak- chief of Pacific Fleet, 1941–45;
ing charge, he commander in chief of Pacific Ocean
Areas, 1942–45; fleet admiral, 1944
renamed the DAP • Died: February 20, 1966, Berkeley,
the National Calif.
Socialist Worker’s
party (NSDAP), or
Nazi for short.
This Nazi Nazis therefore refers only to members Chester Nimitz was the choice to com-
bookplate was of the NSDAP in its narrowest, original mand the Pacific Fleet. He had held many
created specifi- sense. Nazi-like parties in other coun- command and staff positions and consis-
cally for Hitler. tries were called fascist, which was spe- tently impressed his superiors. As chief of
Many books cific to Mussolini’s National Fascist the Bureau of Navigation (the Navy’s per-
that did not
party, but also became a generic term sonnel branch) from 1939 to 1941, he had
support
for any right-wing, undemocratic politi- frequently met with President Franklin D.
National
cal organization. Roosevelt. In fact, he had been offered the
Socialist ideals,
however, were command of the Pacific Fleet before the
SEE ALSO
banned and war broke out, but Nimitz declined on
Fascism; Germany; Hitler, Adolf
burned. the ground that he was too junior for
such an important post.
This reason was probably not the
Negroes only one. Nimitz had predicted that when
SEE African Americans the United States first went to war in the
Pacific it would suffer defeats, and those
responsible would lose their jobs. This is
precisely what happened. Admiral Hus-
New Guinea band Kimmel, who became commander
SEE Southwest Pacific Area in chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) in
Nimitz’s place, bore the responsibility for
Pearl Harbor’s lack of readiness and was
9th Army promptly fired. Thus it was Nimitz who
replaced Kimmel, instead of the other way
SEE France, battle of; Germany, sur- around, as could easily have happened.
render of It was Nimitz’s view that the Pearl
Harbor defeat could have happened to
anyone. But it is hard to believe that the
Nimitz, Chester W. fleet would have been caught so com-
pletely by surprise had he been CINCPAC
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF
on December 7, 1941, the date of the
THE PACIFIC FLEET, 1941–45
attack. In any event, Nimitz proved to be
• Born: February 24, 1885, an inspired choice, for his modesty and
Fredericksburg, Texas
folksiness concealed a first-class brain.
• Political party: none
• Education: U.S. Naval Academy,
Admiral Raymond Spruance, regarded by
1905; Naval War College, 1923 Admiral Ernest King as the smartest man
245
• N I M I T Z, C H E S T E R W. •

in the Navy second only to himself, was Sitting on the


one of those who underrated Nimitz at bridge of a
first. However, Spruance later admitted destroyer,
that the better he knew Nimitz the more Admiral
he admired his intelligence, his openness Nimitz reviews
the inspection
to new ideas, and his courage.
of a newly
It was these qualities that lay behind
acquired base
the great U.S. victory at Midway Island in Image Not Available in the Marshall
June 1942. As CINCPAC, Nimitz found Islands.
himself in charge of a battered fleet that
was inferior to the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN) in almost every respect. Yet,
when code breakers learned that the IJN
was planning to seize Midway in order to
lure the Pacific Fleet to certain destruc-
tion, Nimitz did not hesitate. Heavily out-
numbered though his fleet was, Nimitz An important decision for which
sent all three of his carriers and everything Nimitz is remembered was to place Vice
else he could spare to Midway—risking Admiral William F. Halsey in command
everything. Yet it was a calculated risk, for of the South Pacific Area. Late in 1942
knowing the enemy’s plans, Nimitz and the U.S. Navy had gone on the offensive
his staff had devised a counterplan that for the first time by attacking the Japan-
might turn the war around. ese-held island of Guadalcanal in the
Luckily for Nimitz, his plan was a Solomons. “Operation Shoestring,” as the
success. Thanks to luck, courage, and men called it, went badly from the start.
inspired leadership, the U.S. Navy won a First a Japanese force drove off the U.S.
tremendous victory at Midway, despite all invasion fleet, leaving the Marines
the odds against it. There was plenty of stranded. Then it sank an Allied cruiser
credit to go around, but it must go first to force at the Battle of Savo Island (August
Nimitz, who took the risk and would 8, 1942), the Navy’s worst World War II
have been held responsible if the Pacific defeat at sea. A seesaw campaign fol-
Fleet had been beaten. Hawaii would then lowed, marked by frequent Japanese rein-
have been in deadly danger and Nimitz, forcements of Guadalcanal and numerous
almost certainly, would have been finished fights at sea.
as CINCPAC. At the end of September 1942,
Nimitz never again took such a dra- Nimitz went to the South Pacific for a
matic risk, but throughout the rest of the personal look. He discovered that theater
Pacific war he provided his vast theater commander Vice Admiral Robert Ghorm-
with the best possible leadership. Shortly ley was exhausted and defeatist, like
before the battle at Midway, Nimitz had many of his officers. On Guadalcanal,
been given a second hat as well. In addi- however, Marine commanders were cer-
tion to CINCPAC, he became comman- tain they could win, given decent support.
der in chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas Reluctantly, for Ghormley was an old
(South, Central, and North). In this role friend, Nimitz sacked him and put Halsey
he was responsible for the entire Pacific in charge. Halsey, though impulsive,
Ocean, except for the Southwest Pacific proved to be a wildly popular comman-
Area, which was commanded by General der and soon had put the South Pacific
Douglas MacArthur. Area on track. Turning defeat, or at least
246
• N I M I T Z, C H E S T E R W. •

defeatism, into victory in the Solomons Jima caused an uproar at home, but had
would be Halsey’s biggest achievement of little effect on Nimitz’s strategy.
the war. Nimitz was successful in changing
Nimitz went on to drive the Japanese King’s mind on one important issue, how-
out of the Aleutian Islands off Alaska and ever. King had originally planned for the
organize the central Pacific drive that was central Pacific drive to end on the coast of
the U.S. Navy’s main effort in World War China, from where a buildup would take
II. However, unlike Admiral King, Nimitz place to invade Japan. By late 1944, how-
was never entirely sold on the idea of a ever, the Japanese had overrun much of
main drive in the central Pacific. The area China’s coastal area, leading King to
was so far from MacArthur’s command argue for Formosa instead. MacArthur
that the two theaters competed with each preferred Luzon in the Philippines, partly
other instead of being mutually support- because he wanted to liberate the Philip-
ive. MacArthur wanted the Navy to oper- pines more than anything else. But he also
ate parallel to him in the Southwest Pacif- argued that having air bases in Luzon
ic, so that the fast carriers and scarce would let the United States command the
landing ships tank (LSTs) could shuttle South China Sea and would finish the job
between the two lines of advance as need- of cutting off Japan from its supply
ed. After the bloody fight at Tarawa in the sources in Southeast Asia. He also pointed
Gilberts (November 20–22, 1943), out to King that there would be native
Nimitz began to think MacArthur was labor in Luzon to make up for the lack of
right. After meeting with members of men in the Army Service Forces. If For-
MacArthur’s staff, Nimitz tentatively mosa were chosen as the launch site, it
agreed to MacArthur’s proposal. had to be assumed that native laborers
Admiral King shot the idea down at would be unfriendly. King finally gave up
once. Nimitz, who was relieved by the the idea of taking Formosa, and the inva-
fact that only small losses resulted from sion and subsequent operations in the
seizing the Marshall Islands early in 1944, Philippines were highly successful.
accepted King’s decision and led the Cen- Like most naval and air commanders,
tral Pacific drive as best he could. Casual- Chester Nimitz was convinced that Japan
ties remained staggeringly high, however. could be defeated through strategic bomb-
The Fifth Fleet’s landing at Saipan in the ing and blockades. But the Joint Chiefs
Marianas turned into another bloody believed that Japan had to be invaded,
engagement—a much bigger one than and Nimitz was making plans for such an
Tarawa. Seizing Betio, the principle island operation when he learned of the atomic
in Tarawa’s atoll, had cost the Marines bomb. Nimitz was appalled by the
3,000 casualties in 72 hours. On Saipan, bomb’s destructiveness, but he conceded
Marine and army units would sustain the need for it. Japan had been losing the
14,000 casualties during nearly a month war for years, yet nothing, including the
of fighting, which ended on July 9, 1944. burning of most of its urban areas, had
After the Saipan campaign, the U.S. made it decide to surrender. Nimitz
command understood and accepted the thought that atomic warfare would make
high rate of casualties that resulted from the difference, which of course it did.
the inability of land forces to maneuver Though he had no voice in the decision to
on the small, scattered islands of the cen- drop the atomic bombs, he supported the
tral Pacific. Thus, Saipan was followed action personally.
early in 1945 by the invasion of Iwo Jima, Saddled with a dubious strategy that
which resulted in even heavier losses. Iwo he did not always agree with, Nimitz was
247
• N O R T H A F R I C A N C A M P A I G N •

one of the outstanding U.S. commanders intelligence was decoding Japanese radio
of the war. As commander of the Pacific messages, Nimitz knew that Midway
Ocean areas, he ran his huge theater with Island was where the IJN intended to
outstanding skill. He appointed outstand- mass its forces. Nimitz therefore sent only
ing officers to lead his mighty fleet and a small fleet to the Aleutians. Japan occu-
gave them his full support. He richly pied Attu on June 5, 1942, and Kiska
deserved the five stars that came with his two days later, with sufficient strength to
final promotion to fleet admiral. He was rule out an early liberation by the United
also a model officer: modest, considerate, States’s weakened forces in the Pacific.
and a gentleman through and through. For the next nine months, U.S.
Army and Navy aircraft bombed these
SEE ALSO
two Japanese-held islands, but to little
Central Pacific Area; Midway Island, bat-
tle of; North Pacific Area; South Pacific effect. On March 26, 1943, an attempt
Area by the IJN to reinforce Attu was turned
back by a U.S. surface fleet. Attu was
F U RTHER READING
then assaulted by 11,000 men of the 7th
Brink, Randall. Nimitz: The Man and His
Wars. New York: Penguin, 1999. Infantry Division on May 11. Although
Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. How They Won the the Japanese garrison numbered only
War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His about 2,400 men, they put up stiff resis-
Admirals. New York: Weybright and Tal-
ley, 1970. tance against hopeless odds. Rather than
Larrabee, Eric. Commander in Chief. New wait to be hunted down, the Japanese
York: Harper & Row, 1987. staged one of the biggest banzai (suicide)
Potter, E. B. Nimitz. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1976.
charges of the war on the morning of
May 29. After a day of hard fighting,
the Japanese made a final, futile assault
the following day, with the survivors
North African committing suicide. Only 28 Japanese
campaign prisoners were taken. U.S. casualties
came to 600 dead and 1,200 wounded.
SEE Mediterranean Theater Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald,
commander of the North Pacific Area,
now turned from Attu to the other
Japanese-occupied island, Kiska, and
North Pacific Area invaded it with 34,000 U.S. and Cana-
dian troops on August 15, 1945. They
met no resistance, however, because the
As part of its effort to destroy the U.S. entire Japanese garrison of more than
Pacific Fleet in the summer of 1942, 5,000 men had been secretly evacuated
Japan seized the islands of Kiska and on the nights of July 28 and 29. This
Attu in the Aleutians off the coast of retreat was a rare event in the Pacific
Alaska. The idea was to force Admiral war. For the Japanese, last-ditch stands
Chester Nimitz to send warships to like the one at Attu were the rule, clever
Alaska, weakening the Pacific Fleet escapes the exception.
before its showdown with the Imperial
F U RTHER READING
Japanese Navy (IJN).
The Aleutians were in the North Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United
States Naval Operations in World War
Pacific Area, one of three theaters in II. Vol. 7. Aleutians, Gilberts, and Mar-
Nimitz’s Pacific Ocean Area. Because U.S. shalls. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951.
248
• N U R S E S •

Nurses

Army and Navy nurses, almost all of


them female, were commissioned officers.
In peacetime this made for a life of rela-
Image Not Available
tive ease marked by eight-hour days,
comfortable quarters, travel, and ample
relaxation. In wartime everything
changed.
Nurses stationed in the Philippines
were the first to make the transition from
peacetime to wartime nursing. When U.S.
troops retreated to the Bataan Peninsula
of Luzon to make a last stand in Decem- Most military nurses did not suffer Phyllis Hock-
ber 1941, the Army Nurse Corps (ANC) like those in the Philippines, but the war ing adjusts a
went with them. Nurses found them- was difficult all the same. After what glucose intra-
selves working in a jungle “hospital” that happened to the nurses in Bataan, the venous appara-
was miles long and lacked just about Army’s leaders decided that nurses had to tus for a GI
patient during
everything except patients. Accustomed be trained for field operations. A four-
a Christmas
to a ratio of 1 nurse to 10 patients, these week training program was devised
Eve service in
women now found themselves responsi- involving 20-mile marches with 30- the Church of
ble for up to 300 patients apiece. Desper- pound packs. The nurses learned how to the Transfigu-
ately overworked, they also shared the pitch tents, purify water, and identify poi- ration, Palo,
hardships of the men: hunger, fear, ma- son gas. Like the male trainees, they Leyte, Philip-
laria, and dysentery. They dug their own crawled through a 75-yard infiltration pine Islands.
foxholes and hid in them during Japanese course with live ammunition firing over The church
air attacks. Their hospital was bombed their heads at the end of the program. had become
twice. By January of 1942, a full day’s At the Desert Training Center in Cal- the 36th Evac.
rations consisted of a few slivers of mule ifornia, nurses set up field hospitals in Hospital.
meat in half a cup of soup. 130-degree heat and coped with scorpi-
On the night of April 9, 1942, with ons and sandstorms. They practiced set-
the Japanese only yards away, the nurses ting up a 500-bed field hospital and then,
were ordered to retreat to Corregidor in a day or two, took the whole thing
(“the rock”), an island fortress that held down again to keep up with fast-moving
out for another month. Of the 87 nurses troops. This became valuable experience,
on Corregidor, 21 were evacuated to for the ANC accompanied U.S. troops
Australia, but 66 fell into Japanese hands. when they fought in North Africa.
Though they were not abused or mur- Considering how many served in
dered like the male prisoners of war, the combat zones, the army nurses received
nurses were separated from their patients surprisingly little publicity during the war
and spent the rest of the war in an intern- apart from the heroines of Bataan. In
ment camp. On February 3, 1945, the North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, and
half-starved nurses were liberated. Their Germany they moved just behind the
survival was a tribute to the courage and troops, risking—and sometimes losing—
discipline of the ANC. their lives.
249
• N U R S E S •

Army flight nurses risked their lives exact. Such a bill was actually passed by
as well, flying on unarmed transport the House and would have passed in the
planes without even a red cross to protect Senate too had Germany not surrendered
them. Usually, nurses flew alone and had before it came to a vote.
to do a doctor’s work when emergencies The sad fact is that there was no
took place. Obviously, they did it well: need after all to draft nurses. It was prej-
during 13 months in the South Pacific, udice as much as anything else that
army nurses moved 37,000 patients and accounted for the nursing shortage. The
lost only one. military was uninterested in male nurses
Navy nurses were less at risk because and rarely gave them commissions. The
they were not allowed on combat vessels. services did not favor African-American
Those in the theaters of war were sta- nurses either, accepting only a handful.
tioned on hospital ships. Emergency care They refused to take women older than
on warships was given by men who had 45, and there was an unofficial tendency
been trained by nurses. Like army nurses, to reject women older than 30.
members of the Naval Nurse Corps Although by the end of 1942 the
(NNC) were also teachers and adminis- Army was allowing nurses to marry, the
trators. Navy never accepted already married
The demands of war soon created a nurses. And it did not allow single
nursing shortage. In 1940 the entire ANC women in the NNC to marry until 1944.
consisted of just 700 women. A year The services also refused to accept
later, the corps was recruiting that same women doctors. Fewer than 100 female
number each month. By 1944 the mili- physicians were commissioned in the
tary needed 66,000 nurses, but civilian Army Medical Corps, and then only after
hospitals needed 300,000 more. The overcoming numerous obstacles.
result was a shortage of 100,000 nurses. Despite all these stipulations, 60,000
Additional trained nurses did in fact women joined the ANC and 14,000 the
exist. Civilian nurses could have been NNC. The fact that shortages occurred
called to action, but most had been paid was the military’s own fault for shutting
so poorly that they left the profession to out men and women who wished to
take defense jobs. The statistics tell the serve simply because of their age, color,
story: after graduation from nursing or sex.
school and three years of unpaid hospital
SEE ALSO
work, a registered nurse earned less than
Medicine
a welder in training.
Military nurses did earn more than F U RTHER READING
civilians, but they still had to qualify as Camp, LaVonne Telshaw. Lingering Fever:
registered nurses (RNs) at their own A World War II Nurse’s Memoir. Jeffer-
expense before they could be commis- son, N.C.: McFarland, 1997.
Fessler, Diane Burke. No Time for Fear:
sioned. In May 1943 Congress passed Voices of American Military Nurses in
Representative Frances Bolton’s bill pro- World War II. East Lansing: Michigan
viding support for nursing education, but State University Press, 1996.
Poulos, Paula Nassen, ed. A Woman’s War
it came too late in the war to make much Too: U.S. Women in the Military in
of a difference. Thus, in January 1945 World War II. Washington, D.C.:
President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked National Archives and Records Adminis-
that the Selective Service Act be amended tration, 1996.
Weatherford, Doris. American Women and
so that nurses could be drafted into the World War II. New York: Facts on File,
armed forces—20,000 of them, to be 1990.
250
• O F F I C E O F P R I C E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N •

cessor, Chester Bowles, an advertising


Office of Price man, did as much as was humanly pos-
Administration sible to make the OPA effective.

The Office of Price Administration


Office of Strategic
(OPA) began in April 1941 as the Services
Office of Price Administration and Civil-
ian Supply. The OPA’s primary job was
to control inflation, because defense
orders were pushing prices up. Its first In 1940, British intelligence asked Presi-
head was Leon Henderson, a New Deal dent Franklin D. Roosevelt to send
economist who at that time was Presi- someone over to be briefed on its opera-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt’s budget tions. Roosevelt asked an old friend,
chief. William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, a
A few months later Roosevelt split prominent attorney and in World War I
the two functions, with the OPA a highly decorated officer, to make the
remaining independent and the Civilian trip. At the time, the United States had
Supply role being folded into another no intelligence director or central
agency. This change did not solve the agency. Instead, the various services and
problem, however, which was that the government departments maintained
OPA lacked enforcement powers and their own intelligence units. The success Allied spies
could only nag businessmen about price of Donovan’s mission, and his report on were furnished
controls. what the British were doing, convinced with false iden-
tification
After Pearl Harbor was attacked in Roosevelt that he needed a centralized
papers like
December 1941, the OPA gained more intelligence operation.
these by artists
authority and was assigned the unpopu- In July 1941 Roosevelt named and forgers in
lar duty of rationing consumer goods. Donovan as Coordinator of Information the OSS
Its efforts, not always successful, to con- (COI). The COI organization grew Research and
trol prices turned business and Congress rapidly, in all directions, and included Development
against the OPA. As an example, just propaganda as well as intelligence func- Branch in
one of its functions was to apply General tions. Its structure became unwieldy, and Rome.
Maximum Price Regulations—known as
“General Max”—to 1.7 million retailers.
On the other hand, while the public
believed in price control, it hated
rationing and complained incessantly.
Unable to please anyone and pres-
sured from all sides, Henderson resigned
Image Not Available
as OPA head at the end of 1942. Roo-
sevelt then made a former senator, Pren-
tiss M. Brown, the new chief of the OPA
in hopes that he could improve relations
with Congress. He could not—nor could
anyone else, man or woman, under the
circumstances. However, Brown’s suc-
251
• O K I N A W A, B A T T L E O F •

as a propaganda agency it aroused envy dissolved the OSS immediately after the
and suspicion. Accordingly, on June 13, war, it was soon replaced by the Central
1942, the COI’s propaganda activities Intelligence Agency. This suggests that
were spun off to become the indepen- the OSS had done a good enough job in
dent Office of War Information. The the war to make national security offi-
rest remained under Donovan’s com- cials feel that they could not get along
mand as chief of the Office of Strategic without it in some form or another.
Services (OSS), which was put under the
SEE ALSO
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Intelligence, military
In its final form, the OSS had four
intelligence branches, which did every- F U RTHER READING
thing from running spies to interviewing Chalou, George C., ed. The Secrets War:
refugees. The largest of these was the The Office of Strategic Services in World
Research and Analysis Branch (R&A). War II. Washington, D.C.: National
Headed by William L. Langer, a distin- Archives and Records Administration,
1992.
guished historian, R&A employed a Corvo, Max. The O.S.S. in Italy, 1942 –
broad range of specialists and academic 1945: A Personal Memoir. New York:
experts. Its reports came to be widely Praeger, 1990.
McIntosh, Elizabeth P. Sisterhood of Spies:
admired for their intelligence and fairness. The Women of the OSS. Annapolis, Md.:
The OSS’s operational branches Naval Institute Press, 1998.
engaged in sabotage, espionage, and all Morgan, William James. The O.S.S. and I.
New York: Norton, 1957.
sorts of covert activities. They supported Smith, Richard Harris. OSS: The Secret
resistance groups in occupied countries, History of America’s First Intelligence
conducted raids of their own, and Agency. Berkeley: University of Califor-
planted false information. They were sup- nia Press, 1972.
ported in this work by highly skilled tech-
nical services, which provided OSS agents
with custom-made radios and cameras,
as well as other kinds of equipment. Okinawa, battle of
Although it operated in all the the-
aters of war during World War II, the
OSS was most effective in North Africa
and Europe, where it had a freer hand. Okinawa was the last, and one of the
General Douglas MacArthur disliked it bloodiest, battles of the Pacific war. A
intensely, however, and kept it from 60-mile-long island in the Ryukyu chain,
operating in the Southwest Pacific Area, Okinawa was worth having—at least in
to the degree that he was able. Admiral part. Located only about 350 miles
Chester Nimitz, too, was far from being southwest of the Japanese home island
an OSS fan. of Kyushu and 1,000 miles from Tokyo,
As always with intelligence, the con- Okinawa was within easy fighter
tribution made to victory by the OSS is bomber range of many targets in Japan.
hard to evaluate. It operated on a very To take it, Admiral Chester Nimitz
large scale, conducted numerous opera- assembled a great armada: more than
tions, and produced countless reports. 180,000 troops and 1,200 vessels,
Because it was not allowed to play a pol- including 40 carriers of all sizes and 18
icy-making role, the OSS could offer, in battleships.
theory at least, unbiased advice. At any To defend the island, Lieutenant
rate, although President Harry Truman General Tomohiko Ushijima had some
252
• O K I N A W A , B A T T L E O F •

110,000 troops, centered around the ers, and 15 destroyers—proved invalu-


ancient castle town of Shuri in south able. Best of all, the British carriers had
central Okinawa. In the surrounding strongly armored flight and hangar
mountains the Japanese had built a net- decks that could withstand kamikaze
work of underground strongpoints, the attacks much better than their thin-
Shuri Line, which bristled with guns and skinned U.S. sisters. British armor was
mortars. Ushijima did not intend to carried at a price, slowing the carriers
resist the landings themselves, a tactic and reducing the size of their air groups.
that experience had shown led only to But when a kamikaze struck a U.S.
early defeat, but rather to hold the south flight deck it was taken out of action,
end of the island with its airfields and while a British flattop would simply be
harbor. dented.
After uncontested landings on April While the Royal and U.S. navies
1, 1945, the fight for Okinawa turned were busy fighting off kamikaze attacks,
into a battle of the soldiers and Marines ashore were
attrition. There engaged in violent combat. Okinawa
were 10 mass may have been the most mismanaged
kamikaze (suicide battle of the Pacific war. There was no
aircraft) attacks excuse for this, given the great power and
against the Allied expertise that was available by 1945. The
Image Not Available fleet between April Tenth Army’s commander, Lieutenant
6 and June 22. General Simon Bolivar Buckner, presided
Hardest hit were over a series of grinding frontal attacks,
the outlying early- resisting suggestions that he take advan-
warning destroy- tage of his amphibious capability to land
ers, but the big in the enemy’s rear. Buckner ought to
ships took a have been relieved of duty for this. He
pounding also. was killed by the enemy, as it happened,
A Marine Here the British played an important but too late to make a difference.
dashes through role for the only time in the Pacific. Americans were now far and away
Japanese Although Royal Australian and the world leaders in regard to all arms
machine-gun Royal New Zealand Navy ships had and interservice cooperation, capable of
fire while fought side by side with the U.S. Navy uniting land, sea, and air power into a
crossing a
for years, Admiral Ernest J. King, who smoothly running, irresistible force. Buck-
valley on
hated the British, had not wanted ner took this marvelously flexible weapon
Okinawa.
Britain to interfere at all in “his” war and used it as a blunt instrument.
and did everything to prevent it. King The Battle of Okinawa, which
was forced by President Franklin D. began April 1, did not end until June 21,
Roosevelt to accept the Royal Navy’s by which time 7,000 Americans had
contribution, which included not only been killed on land and 4,900 at sea.
fighting ships but a supply train that Twenty-nine ships were put out of
made them self-sufficient. action—a greater loss than in any previ-
As it turned out, Admiral Raymond ous U.S. naval operation. In addition,
A. Spruance, the naval commander, had 32,000 men were wounded on land,
fewer fleet carriers than at the earlier 4,800 sailors at sea. A total of 20 per-
Battle of the Philippine Sea, so the Royal cent of all casualties sustained by the
Navy’s Task Force 57—comprised of 5 U.S. Navy in World War II were taken
fast carriers, 2 fast battleships, 5 cruis- off Okinawa. A campaign that was sup-
253
• O K I N A W A , B A T T L E O F •

Instead, men were thrown against


nearly untakeable Japanese defenses. It
was World War I all over again, with
heavy artillery barrages followed by
head-on attacks, sometimes across open
ground. The casualty rate, 35 percent of
all troops involved, was a result of these
ruinous tactics.
Nonbattle casualties, mostly neu-
ropsychiatric (combat fatigue, called NP
by the military), were extremely high as
well, amounting perhaps to 10 percent
of all those who fought. At Sugar Loaf,
the key to the Shuri Line, one-third of
Image Not Available the Marine casualties were NPs. Of all
Marines killed in the war, 14 percent
died on Okinawa; and 1 percent of total
U.S. casualties in World War II were sus-
tained taking an island of 875 square
miles, about 0.6 percent of Japan’s total
area. There was no excuse for this, but
these terrible results had far-reaching
consequences.
The casualties on Iwo Jima and
Okinawa figured importantly in the
decision to make nuclear war on Japan.
The Joint Chiefs were planning to
invade the home islands on or about
November 1, 1945. Given recent experi-
ence, this was sure to be costly. Once the
posed to last 45 days took closer to 80, atomic bomb became available, how-
despite the expenditure of 7.5 million ever, it offered a way of winning the war
howitzer rounds, 60,000 5- to 6-inch without repeating the Okinawa experi-
naval shells, 20,000 rockets, almost ence many times over. Accordingly,
400,000 grenades, and 30 million small- there was no way the bomb could not
arm and automatic weapon rounds. be used.
The Japanese sacrificed 1,465
SEE ALSO
kamikazes, 150,000 Okinawan civilians
Atomic bombs; Iwo Jima, Battle of; Japan,
(about one-third of the total popula- surrender of
tion), and most of the Japanese garri-
son—though 11,000 were taken pris- F U RTHER READING
oner, by far the largest total of the war, Feifer, George. Tennozan: The Battle of
and yet not nearly large enough. Gen- Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb. New
York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992.
eral MacArthur severely criticized the Foster, Simon. Okinawa, 1945: Final Assu-
land engagement, arguing that after alt on the Empire. New York: Sterling,
northern Okinawa had been taken, U.S. 1994.
Gow, I. T. M. Okinawa, 1945: Gateway to
troops should have dug in and let the Japan. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
enemy come to them. 1985.
254
• O P E R A T I O N O V E R L O R D •

submarines obsolete. In contrast, the


Operation Overlord IJN possessed 10 battleships, 10 fast
carriers, 18 heavy cruisers, 17 light
SEE D-Day
cruisers, 111 destroyers, and 64 sub-
marines. The IJN had qualitative superi-
ority too, many of its ships being newer,
Pacific Fleet bigger, and better than those of the
Pacific Fleet. Their night-fighting abili-
ties, events would prove, were far supe-
rior to those of the U.S. Navy, and
Since 1922 it had been U.S. Navy policy Japanese carrier pilots were much more
to keep the largest part of the U.S. Fleet skilled than the inexperienced U.S. avia-
in Pacific waters. The entire fleet consist- tors. These great differences in strength,
ed of two main groups. One was the together with U.S. overconfidence and
Battle Force, which included the newer Japanese daring, go a long way toward
battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, explaining Japan’s early victories.
destroyers, submarines, and a variety of Ten days after the Pacific Fleet was
smaller vessels. The second group severely attacked at Pearl Harbor on
included the Scouting Force, which was December 7, 1941, Admiral Chester W.
made up of cruisers and destroyers; a Nimitz was named Pacific Fleet com-
Training Squadron in the Caribbean; the mander. This was the first step on the
Submarine Force, which was divided road to recovery from the attack. With
between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans; his three carriers and supporting ships,
and the Base Force, or Train, divided the he ordered raids against Japanese pos-
same way. In addition, there was a small sessions. On April 18, 1942, army
Asiatic fleet that operated largely in Chi- planes launched from the Enterprise and
nese waters. Most of the U.S. Fleet’s Hornet bombed Tokyo, doing little
ships in the Pacific were based in West damage but raising U.S. morale.
Coast ports. In May 1942 a carrier task force of
In May 1940, as tensions with the Pacific Fleet operating in the Coral
Japan increased, President Franklin D. Sea stopped Japan’s advance toward
Roosevelt ordered the bulk of the U.S. Australia. That set the stage for the
Fleet to be moved to Pearl Harbor in great U.S. victory at Midway Island in
Hawaii as a warning. On February 1, June, where the IJN lost four carriers,
1941, this force was renamed the Pacific the Pacific Fleet only one. Only months
Fleet. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel after Pearl Harbor, the balance of power
became the first commander in chief of now began to tilt in favor of the United
the Pacific Fleet. Early in 1941 President States.
Roosevelt transferred about 20 percent Until 1943 Admiral Nimitz directly
of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic for commanded the Pacific Fleet, while as
possible use against German U-boats. commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean
This left the Pacific Fleet weaker than Areas, he was also theater commander
the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in of all military operations for the whole
every respect. As of May 1941, the of the Pacific except the Southwest
Pacific Fleet had 9 battleships, 3 carriers, Pacific Area, which was commanded by
12 heavy cruisers, 9 light cruisers, 67 Army General Douglas MacArthur. The
destroyers, and 27 submarines. The bat- War Department feared that Nimitz
tleships were old and slow, many of the could not effectively direct both the fleet
255
• P A C I F I C F L E E T •

Landing Ships
Tank pour
army equip-
ment ashore on
Leyte Island in
the Philippines,
1944.

Image Not Available

and the theater, which included a grow- These arrangements were generally
ing number of army and army air units, satisfactory to all involved. The great
and requested that he appoint an admi- problem still was that General Douglas
ral to command the fleet. Doing so MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area
would allow him to concentrate on his (SWPA) and Nimitz’s Pacific Ocean
duties as commander of the Pacific Areas were entirely separate commands.
Ocean Areas. Admiral Ernest J. King, But except for MacArthur’s SWPA,
chief of naval operations, would not there was now an effective command
hear of this initially, but a compromise and staff structure that would last for
was eventually arrived at. the rest of the war.
While Nimitz remained comman- SEE ALSO
der of the Pacific Fleet, the Central Central Pacific Area; Coral Sea, Battle of
Pacific Force, which contained most of the; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester
the fighting ships in the Navy’s Pacific W.; Pearl Harbor, attack on
Fleet, was renamed the Fifth Fleet in F U RTHER READING
March 1943. It would be named the Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. MacArthur’s Navy:
Fifth Fleet when led by Admiral Ray- The Seventh Fleet and the Battle for the
Philippines. New York: Orion, 1989.
mond A. Spruance and the Third Fleet Lundstrom, John B. The First South Pa-
when under Admiral William F. Halsey, cific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy,
with the two taking turns as comman- December 1941–June 1942. Annapolis,
der. Subject to Nimitz’s policies, opera- Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun:
tional control was now in these two The American War with Japan. New
admirals’ hands. In addition, a Pacific York: Free Press, 1985.
Fleet joint staff was established in Sep- Winslow, Walter G. The Fleet the Gods
Forgot: the U.S. Asiatic Fleet in World
tember 1943 with four sections, two War II. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
headed by army officers. Press, 1982.
256
• P A C I F I C O C E A N A R E A •

MacArthur. In one stroke the Army


Pacific Ocean Area took over King’s strategy, while also
reaching for the means to make it work.
After heavy negotiations, a deal was
struck on March 30, 1942. King agreed
General Douglas MacArthur’s arrival in that MacArthur should have his theater,
Australia after his escape from the to consist initially of Australia, the
Philippines in March 1942 forced all the Netherlands East Indies, and New
services to arrive at a unified Pacific Guinea. The Navy got everything else: a
strategy. Japan’s success had cancelled vast region designated as the Pacific
the prewar plans of the United States, Ocean Area, which it subdivided into
yet the speed of events left little time for the South, Central, and North Pacific
thought. Now, as MacArthur demanded areas. By forcing the issue, Marshall had
men and munitions, and with the nation gained the Army a theater of its own
expecting action in the Pacific, the ser- while also taking over King’s strategy,
vice chiefs could no longer avoid laying for Australia was the key to any
plans for the middle distance. advance up the South Sea island chains
The chiefs had assumed that a Pacific that led to mainland Asia. King’s
war would be fought by the Navy. How- response would be to devise a new strat-
ever, Japan’s vast territorial conquests egy using the central Pacific that would
meant that the Army would be involved compete with his original scheme as exe-
as well. A new strategy was required, and cuted by MacArthur.
the question of supreme command was Installing two separate commands
closely linked to it. The need to resolve in one region was among the worst U.S.
this thorny issue complicated everything, decisions of the entire war. It led to
for the Navy would not allow the Pacific major strategic errors, the most impor-
Fleet to be commanded by a general, and tant of these was the Navy’s decision to
the Army would not allow MacArthur to make costly attacks on small islands of
take orders from an admiral. little value. It also meant that for much
The different services’ pride and of the war, MacArthur would be denied
rivalries dictated the outcome of the the men and supplies he needed for his
problem, which was to reshape strategy much larger campaigns.
in such a way as to avoid having a
SEE ALSO
supreme commander. Admiral King pro-
Central Pacific Area; Pacific War; South-
posed setting up strongpoints in prepa- west Pacific Area
ration for an advance through the New
Hebrides Islands, the Solomons, and the
Bismarck Archipelago. Such a move-
ment would secure Australia and pave
the way for a return to the Philippines. Pacific war
The land forces required for this offen-
sive would be directed by Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz, King’s newly
appointed Pacific Fleet commander. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN)
Army General George C. Marshall attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7,
and his planners countered with a plan 1941, was less of a victory than it
of their own. They wanted a Southwest appeared. Tactical gains had been won,
Pacific Area to be commanded by but Japan failed to grasp the strategic
257
• P A C I F I C W A R •

Image Not Available

advantage. The United States lost many Despite these silver linings, the
aircraft, ships, and men, but because its clouds of war hung heavily over the
aircraft carriers were at sea at the time United States in the aftermath of Pearl
of the attack, the Pacific Fleet retained Harbor. While its enemies were fully
its offensive punch. This advantage armed, the United States was almost
doomed Japan’s hope for a quick end to unprotected. The Army still did not
the war, and made the attack on Hawaii have a single combat-ready division. The
a poor long-term decision. U.S. Army Air Forces had lost most of
To make matters worse for the its front line planes. The Pacific Fleet
Japanese, Vice Admiral Chuichi Na- was heavily outnumbered in every type
gumo denied his air commander permis- of ship. To avoid antagonizing Japan,
sion to launch a second strike against the United States had failed to develop a
Hawaii, thus sparing the shipyards, dry- naval base on Guam, which meant that
docks, machine shops, and especially the for want of a supply train the fleet was
fuel storage tanks, on which the whole tied to Hawaii. The IJN, in contrast,
military effort depended. Had these been had built a string of island bases and
wiped out, the Pacific Fleet would have could go wherever it pleased.
withdrawn to its mainland bases and Japanese planners had devised a
there would have been no triumph at complex and far-reaching network of
Midway Island to redeem Pearl Harbor. operations designed to win the Pacific
Even the battle damage at Pearl Harbor war in short order. The raid on Hawaii
was less serious than it looked: except was accompanied by landings in southern
for the Arizona and the Oklahoma, the Siam and northern Malaya. These were
battleships would be repaired, modern- followed by other attacks that quickly
ized, and put to useful service. reduced most of Southeast Asia. Air
258
• P A C I F I C W A R •

strikes against the Philippines were sup- trained Philippine Scouts, about 30,000
posed to coincide with those against Pearl regulars in all. The Japanese not only
Harbor. They did not, however, because outnumbered MacArthur’s combat-ready
pilots of Japan’s Eleventh Imperial Air force but had total air and naval mastery.
Fleet based on Formosa were grounded On that basis, their plan realistically
by a heavy fog. Having lost the element allowed 50 days for seizing the islands.
of surprise, Japanese airmen were pre- MacArthur waited too long before
pared for heavy casualties. Yet when they deciding to concentrate his troops in
arrived over Clark Field, the main U.S. Bataan, a 30-mile-long peninsula that,
bomber base in the Philippines, they met together with the island of Corregidor,
little resistance. A hundred aircraft were controlled Manila Bay. Bataan was cov-
destroyed at Clark and its neighboring ered with mountains and jungles, making
fighter base—including 18 Flying it highly suitable for a stand. But it had
Fortresses, half the strategic bomber force not been fortified or provisioned either
that was supposed to make the Philip- beforehand or during the several weeks
pines defensible. At a single blow the between the first air strikes and Japan’s
Japanese had reduced U.S. air power in invasion. This oversight occurred because
the Philippines by more than 50 percent. MacArthur planned to attack the Japan-
In the weeks that followed, Japan ese at their landing points and in his arro-
attacked other U.S. possessions in the gance regarded preparations to hold
Pacific. Guam in the Mariana Islands, a Bataan as defeatist. When he finally did
refueling stop for Pan American flying give the order to retreat on December 23,
boats, was the first to fall. Its tiny garri- it was too late to stock Bataan with even
son was overrun on December 10, 1941, the barest essentials.
by 5,400 Japanese soldiers. At Wake Japanese forces occupied Manila on
Island, 2,300 miles west of Hawaii, a January 2, 1942, and the evacuation to
small force of Marines actually sank two Bataan, superbly directed by Major Gen-
destroyers of an invasion fleet on Decem- eral Jonathan Wainwright, was largely
ber 7, forcing the Japanese to retreat. To complete by the 6th. The garrison on
avenge their loss of face, they returned in Bataan consisted of about 15,000 U.S.
greater strength on December 23 and 65,000 Filipino troops, who were
(December 22 Hawaiian time) and short of ammunition, medical supplies,
overran the U.S. garrison. and especially food. Bataan, with its
To make December 22 an even dark- swamps and jungles, was a hotbed of
er day, 43,000 Japanese troops came malaria, and so thousands of soldiers
ashore at Lingayen Gulf at dawn with were soon racked by chills and fever.
orders to take Luzon and then the other Even so, against all odds, the garri-
Philippine Islands. To defend them, Gen- son fought a tremendous delaying battle.
eral MacArthur commanded a force three When its first line of defense was out-
times as large, but his army consisted flanked, it fell back to a second line
mainly of some 100,000 Philippine halfway down the peninsula, stopping
reservists, who were ill trained, poorly Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma’s
armed, and usually fell apart under fire. Fourteenth Army in its tracks. When the
One U.S. general described them simply 50 days he had allowed for the campaign
as a “mob.” were up, Homma had taken 7,000 casu-
MacArthur’s effective forces con- alties, lost an additional 10,000 to
sisted of miscellaneous army units, the 12,000 men to malaria and other dis-
4th Marine Regiment, and 12,000 well- eases, and could not launch another
259
• P A C I F I C W A R •

assault. He was therefore obliged to pull


back and seek reinforcements.
Not counting the minor action at
Wake Island, this was the first setback
Japan experienced in its spectacular
round of conquests, giving the Americans
and Filipinos in Bataan almost two more
months of freedom. Since Japan con-
trolled the western Pacific, U.S troops
could not be reinforced or resupplied. Image Not Available
Thus they were steadily worn down by
starvation, disease, air attacks, and
Japanese raiding parties. On February 23
President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to
lift their morale with a radio broadcast.
Unhappily, in doing so he disclosed that
no help was to be expected.
On March 11, 1942, MacArthur, his
wife, his son Arthur, and Arthur’s Chi-
nese nurse boarded PT-41 for a rough
and dangerous 500-mile passage to Min- Yet at the very peak of Japan’s suc- A tired mem-
danao, in the southern Philippines, fol- cess, two battles managed to turn the tide ber of VF-17
lowed by a long flight to Australia. Upon of the war. The first of these, the Battle of pauses under a
arrival he gave a press conference and a the Coral Sea, put an end to Japanese squadron
promise, saying: “I came through, and I expansion. The following battle at Mid- scoreboard at
Bougainville.
shall return.” way Island shattered its main attack
Each Japanese
Meanwhile, the Bataan front crum- force. These defeats resulted in part from
flag represents
bled under renewed Japanese attacks. On “victory disease,” the overconfidence and a downed
April 9 some 76,000 men, most too weak carelessness of Japanese commanders. enemy plane.
to fight, laid down their arms. The great Intoxicated by success, they proceeded at
fortress of Corregidor, just off Bataan and once with further offensive actions rather
the key to Manila Bay, held out under than consolidating their gains.
continuous bombardment until May 6, The first expansion effort of the
when Japanese landings forced Wain- Japanese was to occupy Tulagi in the
wright to surrender all the Philippine and Solomon Islands and other points in the
U.S. forces throughout the islands. region, notably Port Moresby, New
The valiant U.S. defense of Bataan Guinea, so as to gain control of the Coral
held up Japan for only a few months, Sea and threaten Australia. As usual the
but this delay was just enough for Aus- enemy plan was too complex, not only
tralia to organize a successful defense. requiring that the IJN employ great skill
Other than Bataan, the Japanese swept but also that the U.S. Navy act exactly as
all before them, seizing Burma, Malaya, the Japanese expected. Moreover, the
the Netherlands East Indies, the Philip- Japanese paid little attention to security, a
pines, and islands without number. In dangerous failure because the U.S. Navy
the six months following Pearl Harbor, had an overwhelming intelligence edge.
Japan made itself master of Southeast Thanks to information supplied by
Asia, an area comprising 1 million code breakers, Admiral Nimitz was able
square miles and 150 million people. to send a task force to intercept the
260
• P A R A T R O O P S •

Japanese invasion fleet steaming for Port


Moresby. They met in the Coral Sea on Patton, George S., Jr.
May 7, 1942, where the first naval COMMANDER OF THE THIRD
engagement fought entirely by aircraft ARMY, 1944–45
took place. When it was over the U.S.
Navy had suffered a tactical defeat, losing • Born: November 11, 1885, Pasadena,
Calif.
the vitally needed fleet carrier Lexington. • Political party: none
Japan lost only a light carrier, while its • Education: U.S. Military Academy,
two participating fleet carriers were dam- B.S., 1908; U.S. Army Cavalry School,
aged but not sunk. 1923; U.S. Army Command and
General Staff School, 1924; Army War
Strategically, however, the Battle of College, 1932
the Coral Sea was a win for the United • Military service: U.S. Army: second
States because a line was drawn there lieutenant, 1909; captain, 1917; major,
1920; lieutenant colonel, 1934;
that Japan would never cross. Further- colonel, 1938; brigadier general, 1940;
more, the damage done to the two major general, 1941; commander, 1st
Japanese carriers was so serious that Armored Corps, 1942; commander, II
Corps, 1943; lieutenant general, 1943;
they were unavailable on June 4 when commander, Seventh Army, 1943;
the Pacific Fleet won its most important Commander of the 3rd Army,
1944–45; four-star general, 1945
victory in the waters off Midway Island.
• Died: December 21, 1945, Heidelberg,
Had they been present, the battle might Germany
well have been lost.
After Midway, the United States
went on the offensive. Their progress
can be measured by referring to the dis- George S. Patton, Jr., was born to a
cussions under each separate theater of wealthy California family and married
war, and also to the major battles. into a richer one. Even as a child he
dreamed of becoming a soldier. In 1909
SEE ALSO
he graduated from West Point and dur-
Central Pacific Area; Coral Sea, battle of
the; MacArthur, Douglas; Midway Island, ing World War I trained and command-
battle of; Nimitz, Chester W.; North Pacif- ed the first brigade of U.S. armor to
ic Area; South Pacific Area; Southwest fight in France. Although tanks were
Pacific Area
still primitive and unreliable, Colonel
F U RTHER READING Patton quickly grasped the importance
Bischof, Günter, and Robert L. Dupont. of this new weapon.
The Pacific War Revisited. Baton Rouge: Patton became, along with Major
Louisiana State University Press, 1997. Dwight D. Eisenhower, an early sup-
Fahey, James J. Pacific War Diary. Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1993. porter of armored warfare. Both were
Mason, John T., ed. The Pacific War silenced by the army brass, however,
Remembered: An Oral History Collec- which favored horses, and Patton spent
tion. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1986.
the next 20 years serving in cavalry
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: units. The time was not wasted, though,
The American War with Japan. New for Patton was a scholarly and intelli-
York: Free Press, 1985. gent officer, an expert on military his-
tory and tactics, and a superbly qualified
soldier who graduated with distinction
from three service schools and colleges.
Paratroops Patton had dyslexia, a learning disability
SEE Airborne warfare that impairs the ability to read, which
261
• P A T T O N , G E O R G E S . , J R . •

eral and the Allied supreme commander,


sent Patton to turn the situation around,
which he did in 40 days, leading the II
Corps to victory and restoring its self-
confidence. Patton distinguished himself
again in Sicily, as commander of the Sev-
enth Army. The only bright spot in a
poorly planned campaign was Patton’s
Image Not Available boldness and drive and his imaginative
use of amphibious landings behind the
German lines.
Sicily, however, was almost the
graveyard of Patton’s ambitions. He was
eccentric, perhaps slightly mad, and very
emotional. Although some of his out-
rages were staged performances, Patton
had poor self-control and at times lost
his head. Contrary to all the medical evi-
dence, he did not believe that combat
Patton (left) nearly kept him out of West Point, but fatigue was a mental disturbance,
discusses mili- in later years it ceased being a handicap. regarding it as cowardice instead. Twice
tary strategy His professional experience was in Sicily, after visiting field hospitals,
with Lyle immensely broad. By 1944 Patton had Patton slapped enlisted men who were
Bernard, a
served at every level of command from being treated for combat fatigue. When
prominent fig-
platoon to field army and had also been news of this got out, it was all Eisen-
ure in the dar-
a divisional, corps, and War Department hower could do to keep Patton from
ing amphibious
landing behind staff officer. being removed from command.
enemy lines on Patton rose rapidly once the Army Eisenhower helped Patton survive
Sicily’s north committed itself to tank warfare, and many inappropriate incidents, including
coast in 1943. soon became commander of the newly one in Britain in which he allegedly
formed 2nd Armored Division. In peace- insulted Russia during a speech to a
time maneuvers during 1941, the 2nd ladies’ group. Although Patton caused
Armored established Patton as the Eisenhower more trouble than all his
Army’s leading tanker. He was soon other commanders combined, he was the
given a corps and also asked to create best of them, and Eisenhower knew it.
the Desert Training Center in California. The Germans knew it too, which
Patton was one of the ablest trainers enabled Eisenhower to use Patton to
of troops in the U.S. Army, and training deceive them. The Germans realized that
was the solid foundation on which his the invasion of France was coming, but
battlefield achievements rested. As part did not know when or where. The Allies
of Operation Torch, the invasion of wanted Hitler to think the attack would
North Africa in 1942, Patton com- be at the Pas de Calais, the narrowest
manded the Western Task Force that point of the English Channel, although
landed in Morocco. the real target was Normandy. Thus,
While he was training troops in Eisenhower made Patton commander of
Morocco, the II Corps was taking beat- a fictitious 1st U.S. Army Group
ings at Sidi-Bou-Sid and the Kasserine (FUSAG) across from the Pas de Calais.
Pass in Tunisia. Eisenhower, now a gen- Because the Germans could not believe
262
• P A T T O N , G E O R G E S . , J R . •

that Eisenhower would keep his best communication—a seemingly impossible


commander out of the invasion, Patton task. An operation so complex would
gave FUSAG great credibility. As a take days to plan and even more days to
result, Hitler was completely deceived, accomplish. But because Patton had
while Patton, once taken off the bench, already formulated his plans, his divi-
performed up to his usual standards. sions were smashing into the German
In his breakout from Normandy flank within the promised time. Even
and his drive to the West Wall, Ger- General Omar Bradley, commander of
many’s frontier defenses, Patton would the U.S. 12th Army Group and not a
perform feats that his colleagues could fan of Patton’s, called the action “mag-
only dream of. No other commander nificent” and “one of the most brilliant
could have made the breakout from performances by any commander on
Normandy such a success because it either side in World War II.”
required him to do the impossible. The As the Allies neared the Rhine
task in August 1944 was to push an River, Germany’s last defense, they made
entire army through the Avranches bot- elaborate plans for Britain’s 21st Army
tleneck at the base of the Cotentin Group to cross it with enormous air and
Peninsula in Normandy. With only a artillery support. The U.S. armies were
single road open to him, Patton drove under orders to assist the British com-
200,000 men and 40,000 vehicles over mander Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law
it in a matter of days—at one point per- Montgomery by distracting the Ger-
sonally directing traffic. Fed into the mans’ attention. Two events made this
road piecemeal, Patton’s divisions came plan obsolete. The first was that when
out at the other end fully intact and the Germans blew up the bridges across
ready for battle. the Rhine, their explosives failed to
Patton performed what seemed to destroy the railroad bridge at Remagen,
be another miracle at the Battle of the which was crossed by elements of the
Bulge, which began when the Germans U.S. Ninth Army. The second resulted
attacked in the Ardennes Forest of Bel- from Patton’s leadership. Believing that
gium on December 16, 1944. Most of the German-held riverbank facing the
the commanders had been caught off Third Army was held weakly, he slipped
guard because the Germans were sup- a division over the Rhine at night on
posed to be too weak by this time to March 22, 1945, without benefit of air,
launch a major offensive. But Patton artillery, or any other form of support.
had been worried that the First Army’s When the massive British assault began,
VIII Corps, immediately to his left, was the Third Army was already on the
sluggish and wide open to a surprise other side. Because of his initiative, the
attack. Therefore, he had plans drawn Americans led the final drive into Ger-
up in case the Third Army had to come many, with the British playing a sup-
to its rescue. On the 18th Eisenhower porting role. This brought the war to a
met with his senior officers and asked quicker conclusion and gave Patton,
Patton what he could do to help stem who was very competitive, great satis-
the German tide. Patton replied that he faction as well as added glory.
could attack with three divisions in 72 Patton was the best U.S. field gen-
hours. This involved pulling three divi- eral because he was a superb profession-
sions out of combat and turning them at al and a master at combining all avail-
a 90-degree angle to move directly able arms to achieve maximum force,
across Third Army’s lines of supply and not because of his swaggering and
263
• P A T T O N , G E O R G E S . , J R . •

Image Not Available

showmanship, his immaculate uniforms liance. Patton was crushed when Eisen-
and ivory-handled pistols, or his profane hower passed him over, but he under-
speeches to the troops. Among the stood the reason why and was grateful
Allied commanders in Europe, Patton for being allowed to keep the Third
was the only one who understood Army. Bradley could be counted on not
strategic maneuver, a system used to to embarrass Eisenhower nor antagonize
outflank an army and totally destroy it. the British, whereas Patton was likely to
Most of the other Allied commanders do both.
were concerned primarily with limiting In this sense Patton’s career demon-
their risks, which also meant restricting strates the wisdom of holding one’s
their gains. tongue, but this is not why he is remem-
Patton, who was quick to see possi- bered. Patton remains one of the most
bilities and was a master of exploiting admired commanders of World War II
breakthroughs, was the reverse of a because he had a genius for war.
cautious general like Montgomery. He
SEE ALSO
was unorthodox and daring—but sel-
Bulge, Battle of the; France, Battle of; Ger-
dom rash, having calculated the odds. many, surrender of; Mediterranean theater;
No Allied commander understood Sicily, Battle of
armored warfare as well as Patton did,
F U RTHER READING
and none had his ability to “read” a
Blumenson, Martin. Patton, the Man
battle. Amid the fog of war, he had a Behind the Legend, 1885 –1945. New
unique gift for judging accurately what York: Morrow, 1985.
was going on and what the enemy was ———, ed. The Patton Papers. 2 vols.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972, 1985.
likely to do next.
D’Este, Carlo. Patton: A Genius for War.
Had it not been for the slapping New York: HarperCollins, 1995.
incidents, Patton might have become Patton, George S. War As I Knew It.
commander of the 12th Army Group Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947.
Province, Charles M. Patton’s Third Army:
instead of Omar Bradley, who was A Daily Combat Diary. New York: Hip-
junior to him and lacked Patton’s bril- pocrene, 1992.
264
• P E A R L H A R B O R , A T T A C K O N •

and executed. A harbor in Japan similar


Pearl Harbor, attack on to Pearl became a training ground that
paid big dividends during the actual
attack. To allow for the shallow waters
of Pearl—which U.S. Navy leaders
In 1941 the Japanese high command thought protected the fleet from torpedo
decided to expand into Southeast Asia, a attack—Japan modified its torpedoes so
decision it knew meant war with the that they would stay near the surface.
United States. Since the United States’s The attack fleet of six carriers slipped
war-making potential was far greater out of Japan unnoticed and kept radio
than Japan’s, the plan was to destroy the silence while at sea. Thus the U.S. radio
U.S. Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Har- network that located Japanese ships by
bor at the outset. Then the Philippines their transmissions had no idea where
and the U.S. possessions in the western the carriers were.
Pacific could be easily taken. These On the morning of December 7,
actions, the Japanese naively hoped, 1941, the Japanese carriers launched a
would create a mood of defeatism in the first wave of 180 aircraft in 15 minutes
United States and with it a willingness to against Pearl Harbor. A second and
let Japan have its way. equally powerful wave followed an hour
Strategically this plan could not behind it. All Japan’s aircraft were in the
have been more wrong-headed. Anyone air within 90 minutes, a feat no other
with the slightest knowledge of the Unit- navy could match at that time. United
ed States and its history could have pre- States Navy personnel first received news
dicted that the nation, far from caving that Hawaii was under attack when
in, would demand revenge. In taking Japanese bombs and torpedoes started
such a foolish step, Japan’s leaders had exploding at 7:55 a.m. In a matter of
doomed their empire. minutes battleship row was in chaos.
Tactically, however, the attack on Two hours later, when the attack
Pearl Harbor was brilliantly planned ended, the United States had lost 188
planes, with 159 others damaged. A
On December total of 18 warships were sunk or dis-
8, 1941, one
abled, including seven battleships. A
day after the
total of 2,403 Americans lost their lives,
attack on Pearl
Harbor, Con-
while 1,178 were wounded. Japan lost
gress issued 29 planes and pilots, five midget sub-
this joint reso- marines, and one fleet sub, plus their
lution declaring crews. In the history of war, few victo-
war on Japan. ries have been more lopsided.
Image Not Available This sudden and sweeping defeat
led to charges that President Franklin D.
Roosevelt or his commanders must have
orchestrated this battle to lead the Unit-
ed States into World War II. No evi-
dence to support this theory has ever
been discovered. Instead, what two con-
gressional investigations and a library of
books have uncovered was a mountain
of complacency and incompetence.
265
• P E A R L H A R B O R , A T T A C K O N •

Pearl Harbor
was taken com-
pletely by sur-
prise when the
Japanese
arrived in the
early morning
of December 7.
A total of 247 Image Not Available
planes were
either destroyed
or damaged
during the two-
hour attack.

Although the fleet trained hard on leadership failures is so obvious.


weekdays, it still took weekends off. The Humiliating and costly as the
ships at Pearl Harbor were sitting ducks, Hawaiian defeat was, things were not as
with no steam in their boilers, no gunners bad as they seemed. The three carriers
on watch, ammunition for the guns stationed at Pearl Harbor were away
locked up, and many of the men ashore delivering airplanes when the base was
on leave. The battleships were not pro- attacked, so they returned untouched.
tected by torpedo nets. No long-range air Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who
patrols were being conducted, yet the commanded the attacking force, refused
Army’s fighter planes required four the request from his air commander for
hours’ notice to take to the air. Further- a second strike. Thus, the shipyards,
more, as the Army was worried abut sab- drydocks, machine shops, and especially
otage, the aircraft were clustered together, the fuel storage tanks, which were essen-
which made them easy targets for the tial for servicing the fleet, were largely
Japanese. Radar was available, but not in intact. Without them the fleet would
use—except for training purposes. have been forced to return to the West
No precautions had been made Coast and the Pacific war would have
against an attack because no one taken a different course.
thought it likely, despite the war warn- Even the damage itself was not as
ings sent to Hawaii. As a result of the bad as it looked. Except for Arizona and
attack, the army and navy commanders Oklahoma, all the battleships would be
in Hawaii were fired. Hawaii had been raised, modernized, and restored to use-
given enough fighter planes and antiair- ful service. The Pacific Fleet was in busi-
craft guns to defend itself if given suffi- ness still, and would soon put a stop to
cient warning. It had long-range patrol the Japanese advance.
planes too, which, if they had been in
the air could have provided that warn- SEE ALSO
ing. There is no need to look for elabo- Coral Sea, Battle of; Japan; Midway, Battle
rate conspiracies when the evidence of of; Pacific Fleet; Pacific war
266
• P E R K I N S , F R A N C E S •

F U RTHER READING 1929 until his death in 1945. When she


Black, Wallace B. Pearl Harbor! New became secretary of labor in 1933, she
York: Maxwell Macmillan, 1991. became the first woman ever to serve as a
Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept:
The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New member of a President’s cabinet.
York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Energetic and forceful, Perkins was
Raymer, Edward. Descent into Darkness: a highly visible secretary who involved
Pearl Harbor, 1941: A Navy Diver’s Mem-
oir. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1996. herself in many pieces of New Deal legis-
Toland, John. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and lation that affected labor. During the war
Its Aftermath. Garden City, N.Y.: Dou- she was less prominent than in the New
bleday, 1982.
Deal years, because reform took a back-
Willmott, H. P. Pearl Harbor. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983. seat for the duration of the war. She
became a controversial cabinet member
because of her strong defense of labor’s
rights, and Roosevelt preferred that she
Perkins, Frances maintain a low profile. Although she
SECRETARY OF LABOR, offered to resign on several occasions,
Image Not Available
1933–45 Roosevelt trusted her and refused to dis-
• Born: April 10, 1889, Boston, Mass. pense with her services. Her most impor-
• Political party: Democratic tant contribution to the war effort came
• Government service: Member, in 1942 when she helped create the
Industrial Commission of the State of
New York, 1919–26; chairperson,
National War Labor Board, an agency
Industrial Board of the State of New that mediated disputes between labor and
York, 1926–29; Industrial management and did much to keep the
commissioner of the State of New
York, 1926–33; secretary of labor, production lines running smoothly
1933–44 throughout the war.
• Died: May 14, 1965, New York City
SEE ALSO
Labor

Although her given name was Fannie F U RTHER READING


Coralie Perkins, throughout her career Martin, George. Madam Secretary: Frances
Perkins. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976.
she preferred to be called Frances. She Perkins, Frances. The Roosevelt I Knew.
devoted her life to public service, first as New York: Viking, 1946.
a teacher, then as a settlement house
worker and reformer. Beginning in 1919,
she served the Industrial Commission of
New York State as a commission mem-
Philippine Islands
ber, chairperson of the commission, and SEE Pacific war, Southwest Pacific
finally as the commissioner. This commis- Area
sion served as the judicial and legislative
branch of the state Department of Labor,
and labor issues were her chief concern Philippine Sea, battle
throughout her working life.
Although Perkins entered govern-
of the
ment service with the support of New
York state governor Al Smith, she was
closely associated with the administration On June 15, 1944, U.S. troops went
of Franklin D. Roosevelt from the time ashore on Saipan in the Mariana
he became governor of New York in Islands. By nightfall 20,000 troops had
267
• P O L A N D •

landed, despite the usual fierce resis- and one badly damaged. The Americans
tance. Within hours Admiral Raymond lost only 29 aircraft in what they came
Spruance had learned that the Imperial to call “the Great Marianas Turkey
Japanese Navy (IJN) was going to make Shoot.”
an all-out effort to destroy the Fifth At the time, there was considerable
Fleet, which was there to protect the grumbling that Admiral Spruance had
invasion force. The IJN had assembled a held Task Force 58 back when it could
great armada, including nine new carri- have sunk most or all of the Japanese
ers, in hopes of gaining a decisive victory. carriers. But Spruance believed that
Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa knew guarding the landing force took priority
his force to be weaker than the Fifth over chasing enemy ships. What was not
Fleet, but he counted on two advantages. understood at the time was that by
Because his planes lacked armor and self- destroying most of Ozawa’s planes,
sealing gas tanks that would prevent loss TF58 had put Japanese naval aviation
of fuel and explosions, his planes had out of business anyway. The IJN could
more range than the U.S. fighters, replace its lost aircraft, but not its pilots.
enabling them to attack from 300 miles When the IJN fought its last great battle,
out compared to 200 for the Americans’ at Leyte Gulf in October 1944, they
aircraft. In addition, Ozawa thought he would use their carriers simply as bait,
would have the assistance of some 200 since they could no longer launch effec-
aircraft based on Guam and Tinian in the tive air strikes.
Marianas. What he did not know,
SEE ALSO
because the Japanese commander of
Central Pacific Area; Leyte Gulf, Battle of;
those two islands misled him, was that Spruance, Raymond A.
U.S. carrier planes had wiped out the air-
fields he was depending on for support.
At Midway, Japan’s pilots had been
the best. But this was no longer true— Poland
most of Japan’s veterans had been killed
in action. Along with superior firepower,
the superior skills of its crews gave the
U.S. Navy an ever-growing advantage. Few countries suffered more during
Since Midway, radar had been refined so World War II than Poland. When it was
that it could give 45 minutes’ notice of invaded by Germany on September 1,
an attack, and Carrier Task Force 58 1939, Poland had a population of 36
could launch 300 fighters in less than million. At a minimum, 6 million Poles
half an hour. Since a Hellcat could climb had been killed by the end of the war.
20,000 feet in seven minutes, even the In the 1930s, Poland was governed
last ones off the decks would reach com- by a quasi-dictatorship led by the military.
bat altitude before the first Japanese This leadership aroused much anger in the
fighters arrived. West by taking a chunk of Czechoslova-
Japan’s search planes discovered the kia in 1939 when it was dismembered by
Fifth Fleet late on June 18, 1944, and Hitler. Although it profited briefly from
Ozawa ordered a full attack. The U.S. German aggression, Poland became the
Navy’s response was overwhelming. next to fall. While Britain and France had
Fewer than 100 of 373 Japanese planes promised to come to Poland’s side, and
that flew into battle made it back to did declare war on Germany when it
their carriers, three of which were sunk crossed the Polish border on September 1,
268
• P O L A N D •

1939, they provided little tangible aid. came in late 1942 and early 1943 when
Poland was too far from Britain for the Germany began mass expulsions from the
Royal Air Force to provide support. The Lublin and Zamosc region. Germany’s
French Army was afraid to move beyond plan to resettle the area with German
its Maginot Line, allowing the Germans immigrants was defeated by the Polish
to concentrate their forces in the east, Home Army, which attacked the German
where they deployed 60 divisions. settlers and made resettlement impossible.
There was little Poland could do to The resistance sought to counteract
stem the German advance. It had no German propaganda with its own news-
defensible frontier. Its regular army of papers and leaflets. It gathered intelli-
280,000 was no match for the German gence, which was passed on to Britain.
Wehrmacht (military). It did have a large As German pressure on Polish Jews wors-
reserve, but mobilization problems pre- ened, the resistance established a Com-
vented it from being fully effective. mittee for Aid to Jews. The broad reach
Poland’s small navy and air force were of the resistance made it a shadow state,
quickly destroyed. To make matters with its own courts, schools, universities,
worse, the Soviet Union invaded Poland and cultural life. In the face of terrifying
on September 17, putting the Polish Army dangers, Polish patriots kept the flame of
between two jaws of a nutcracker. War- freedom burning.
saw fell on September 27, and all orga- The best-remembered events in the
nized resistance was over by October 5. history of occupied Poland were the two
Defeat did not end Poland’s role in Warsaw uprisings. The first of these took
the war, however. Some 90,000 Polish place in the Warsaw ghetto, where Jewish
soldiers escaped through neighboring leaders had been stockpiling arms to make
states. Many made their way to the west, a last-ditch stand against what became
to fight again under Allied leadership. In known as the Holocaust. The Allies were
addition, many Poles taken prisoner by still far away. Some 300,000 out of the
the Soviets would be released after Ger- ghetto’s 360,000 inhabitants had been sent
many invaded Russia in 1941. These for- to the Treblinka death camp. This left the
mer prisoners of war also fought again, remainder with only two choices: to die
notably in the Italian campaigns. A passively in gas chambers or with guns in
handful of small vessels became the basis their hands in the ghetto.
of a Polish naval force that eventually On April 19, 1943, about 3,000
numbered 4,000 men, and they fought Germans with armored vehicles and
alongside the Royal Navy. Some of the artillery stormed the ghetto, which was
best squadrons in Britain’s Fighter Com- defended by 1,000 Jews, who fought
mand were Polish as well. A Polish gov- back with small arms and other hand
ernment in exile was headquartered in weapons. Though heavily outnumbered
London throughout the war. and outgunned, they managed to hold
In addition, Poland developed the out until May 16, when they were over-
biggest resistance movement of any con- run. Elements of the Home Army, and
quered state. The main Polish under- the Communist People’s Guard, at-
ground army was organized to help liber- tempted to break into the ghetto and
ate Poland when Allied forces arrived on open an escape line, but could not get
the scene. As a rule it avoided making through. Thus, nearly all the survivors
attacks on German positions for fear that were sent to the Treblinka and Maj-
reprisals would be made against the civil- danek death camps. Although the ghetto
ian population. An exception to this rule rising failed, the heroic defenders
269
• P O L A N D •

Polish soldiers
march out of
Warsaw to a
prison camp
after surrender-
ing the partly
demolished
capital in
1939. Image Not Available

inspired other uprisings, notably in the The Home Army surrendered on


Treblinka and Sobibor death camps. October 1. During the months of savage
The second Warsaw uprising took fighting, 83 percent of Warsaw was
place on a much greater scale. When it destroyed and perhaps 250,000 civilians
broke out on August 1, 1944, the Red (out of a total of 1 million) were killed in
Army was nearing Warsaw. The Home addition to 15,000 Home Army irregulars.
Army had long prepared for this day, for Stalin was the real winner of the sec-
which it had political as well as military ond Warsaw uprising. By the time the
goals. It hoped to hand the Germans a Red Army reached Warsaw the Home
defeat. More important, it meant to take Army had been fatally weakened. Polish
control of Warsaw before the commu- confidence in the government in exile,
nists got there and installed their own which had not been able to organize suf-
government. To that end, the Home ficient help, was seriously eroded. All this
Army mustered 37,600 fighters, of whom made it that much easier to turn Poland
only 14 percent had weapons. The rest into a Soviet satellite after the war.
were to arm themselves with weapons Germany divided its share of
parachuted in by the Allies or taken from Poland into two parts. The western half,
German corpses. which the Nazis called Wartheland, was
The Home Army’s leaders expected ruthlessly Germanized. Most Poles were
the fight to last 10 days, but it actually expelled from it, and all traces of Polish
took the Germans several months to culture erased. The eastern half, called
retake the city. During that time the Soviet the General Government, became a kind
offensive came to a halt—because of Ger- of reservation for the Polish people. But
man pressure, or so the Soviets claimed. here too extreme anti-Polish measures
Small quantities of arms were dropped on were employed. Millions of Polish men
Warsaw by Allied, and even Soviet, air- and women were sent to Germany as
craft. But aircraft losses were high and the slave laborers. Many of those who
quantity of supplies dwindled. Except remained became forced laborers in Ger-
once, Stalin would not let Allied planes man camps. Although all Jews were
land on Soviet fields, which made supply- already scheduled to be exterminated,
ing Warsaw by air all but impossible. the German hope was to eliminate the
270
• P O T S D A M C O N F E R E N C E •

Slavic population too. By 1941 the food Gross, Jan Tomasz. Polish Society Under
ration for Warsaw’s Poles was 669 calo- German Occupation. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1979.
ries a day, which ensured that malnutri- Lukas, Richard C. The Forgotten Holo-
tion and disease would take many lives. caust: The Poles Under German Occupa-
Soviet-occupied Poland fared little tion, 1939–1944. Lexington: University
of Kentucky Press, 1986.
better. It was absorbed into the Soviet Sagajllo, Witold. Man in the Middle: A
Union from September 1939 to June Story of the Polish Resistance, 1940–45.
1941 and was ruled by terror, every London: Leo Cooper, 1984.
effort being made to abolish Polish cul-
ture and murder Polish leaders and
resisters. All private property was seized,
and all important government offices Potsdam conference
filled with Soviet citizens. Polish publica-
tions were suppressed. Ukrainian and
Byelorussian became the official lan-
guages, with Russian also compulsory in Code named Terminal, this was the last
schools and universities. One and a half wartime conference of the Grand
million Poles were deported to beyond Alliance, which consisted of Britain, the
the Ural Mountains. Perhaps 30 percent Soviet Union, and the United States. It
of them died in the Soviet Union before met in Potsdam, Germany, from July 17
being released in the fall of 1941. to August 2, 1945. The United States
After Germany invaded Russia in was represented at the conference for
June 1941, the former Soviet zone of the first time by President Harry S Tru-
Poland was divided between the Gov- man, who had succeeded to office in
ernment General and the Baltic states of April following Franklin Roosevelt’s
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. If Ger- death. The conference began with Prime
many had won the war, Hitler’s plan Minister Winston Churchill heading the
was to turn the Government General British delegation, but his party was
area into German soil and eliminate the defeated in the British general election
Polish people. Even though he ultimate- and Clement Attlee came to Potsdam on
ly lost the war, he still eliminated mil- July 28 as the new Prime Minister.
lions of Poles. The accepted estimate is The terms on which Japan was to
that 6 million Polish people died, fewer surrender were discussed at Potsdam, as
than half being Jewish victims of the were the peace terms for Europe. A great
Holocaust. deal of time was spent on the thorny
Some non-Jewish Poles were mur- question of Poland’s future, as well as on
dered by the Soviets, but most fell prey drawing the boundaries between many of
to Nazism. For its suffering Poland the states of Eastern Europe. Because no
deserved a better fate in the postwar agreement could be reached on these
period than it actually received. issues, they were never resolved.
The Japanese surrender terms were
SEE ALSO the easiest to agree on, and issuing them
Germany; Eastern front became the conference’s main achieve-
ment. Japan’s unconditional surrender
F U RTHER READING
remained the basic demand, but the
Engel, David. Facing a Holocaust: The details had to be spelled out. Japan’s
Polish Government-In-Exile and the
Jews, 1943 –1945. Chapel Hill: Universi- armed forces were to surrender without
ty of North Carolina Press, 1993. conditions and be disarmed. Japan was
271
• P R I S O N E R S O F W A R •

to be occupied by the United States.


Japanese sovereignty would be confined
to the four home islands. Its war crimi-
nals would be punished. The citizens of
Japan were to receive the blessings of
democracy, including freedom of speech,
thought, and respect for individual rights.
Image Not Available

Prisoners of war

The Geneva convention of 1929 spelled


out the conditions under which prison- out to be a serious blunder on Ger- The American
ers of war (POWs) were to be held. many’s part, for it had acute labor short- Red Cross pro-
POWs were to be promptly removed ages throughout the war that Soviet vided standard
from the battle area, if wounded they POWs could have eased. care packages
were to receive medical attention, and The Soviet Union replied in kind, such as this
one to Ameri-
they were to be fed and housed in the working to death a large proportion of
can prisoners
same way as troops of the capturing the German prisoners it took. This was
of war.
power. They were not required to dis- the policy of Japan too. The Japanese
close any information except for their regarded surrender as dishonorable and
name, rank, and identification numbers. treated POWs as criminals or worse. All
They had the right to correspond with the POWs in Japanese hands were sub-
families and friends. If they escaped and ject to torture and murder at the whim
were recaptured their punishment could of camp commanders, as well as being
not exceed a month’s solitary confine- underfed and overworked. U.S. POWs,
ment. The International Red Cross had most of them taken in the Philippines
the right to inspect the camps in which during the war’s early months, had little
they were held. more than a 50-50 chance of going
All the warring powers in World home alive. Had the war lasted much
War II had signed this convention, longer, all would have died.
except Japan and the Soviet Union. In The luckiest POWs, mostly Ger-
actual practice, the degree to which the man, were those imprisoned in the
convention was observed varied enor- United States. They performed healthful
mously. The United States and Britain agricultural duties for the most part and
upheld it faithfully in most respects. were well treated and fed. The farm
Germany, too, generally observed the areas in which they worked tended to
convention where Western POWs were greet them warmly and were glad for
concerned. However, it treated captured their help. When they traveled in the
Soviet troops with extreme brutality. Of South, German POWs rode and ate in
some 5 million Soviet POWs taken by superior whites-only facilities, to which
Germany, only one-sixth are believed to black Americans were denied entry. This
have survived the war. On the eastern complicated the job of teaching POWs
front, the Waffen SS took no prisoners democratic values, which was a vain
at all. This monstrous crime also turned effort in most cases anyway.
272
• P T B O A T S •

PT boats Race riots


SEE African Americans

The United States had only 12 Patrol Tor-


pedo (PT) boats when World War II
Radio
broke out, although large numbers of
them were constructed after Pearl Harbor
was attacked in December 1941. The PT World War II brought record levels of
boat was 77 feet to 81 feet long and pow- income to radio stations and networks
ered by three Packard V-12 gasoline because they wanted to spend more on
engines. These engines, along with its ply- advertising, which they could deduct
wood hull, gave the PT a top speed of 45 from their high wartime taxes. Further,
knots, making it faster than any destroyer. paper shortages established limits to the
In theory the PT boat’s two to four amount of print advertising that could
torpedoes made it a ship killer. But in be purchased. Magazines, for example,
practice, with its gasoline tanks, wooden were given paper quotas equal to 75
hull, and lack of armor plate, the PT was percent of what they had consumed in
a floating coffin. Nor, in practice, was it peacetime. As a result, in 1944 the
as fast as advertised. Its engines were nation’s 836 full- and part-time radio
balky, and the boat seldom achieved any- stations earned $68.9 million, a 125 per-
thing near its maximum speed. cent increase over 1942.
PT boats became famous early in the The greatest growth of sponsored
war because the half-dozen stationed in programs during the war was in detec-
the Philippines did heroic work. They also tive-mystery dramas, comedy-variety
carried General Douglas MacArthur and shows, and news. The so-called dra-
his party to safety when he was ordered matic shows included such light fare as
to leave Corregidor and escape to Aus- “The Man from G-2,” “The Whistler,”
tralia. After the war, PT boats became “The Man Called X,” “David Hard-
famous again because, as a young officer, ing—Counter-Spy,” and “The FBI in
John F. Kennedy had commanded PT-109 Peace and War,” which was supposedly
and performed bravely when it was sunk based on real cases.
by a Japanese destroyer. As in peacetime, the majority of
Although movies showed PT boats money was spent on comedy-variety
attacking enemy warships, in reality they shows. Most of these continued to use
were mostly used against barges and other the formulas that had worked so well in
small craft, serving in effect as gunboats. the 1930s—Jack Benny’s alleged stingi-
For these duties deck guns, not torpedoes, ness, for instance. “Fibber McGee and
were needed, and PT boat skippers made Molly” was unique in that its writer, Don
every effort to add to their firepower. Quinn, built whole shows around war
Young Kennedy obtained a 37-mm anti- themes ranging from black marketeering
tank gun from the Army and mounted it to the recruitment of nurses’ aides. This
on his bow, a common solution. The show had consistently high ratings, which
Navy would have been better off to copy suggests that others could have been topi-
Germany’s E-boat, which, with its diesel cal too, with no loss of popularity.
engine and steel hull, was reliable, hard to Bob Hope, who had been just an-
sink, and powerful for its size. other comedian before the war, became a
273
• R A T I O N I N G •

national institution during the early Serious documentaries were expensive to


1940s by traveling around the world to produce and usually received poor rat-
military camps and bases. Virtually all the ings. Airing them was a public service,
broadcasts of his weekly show were per- but bad business—even in a time of
formed live before audiences of service- soaring profits.
men. It may have been exhausting, but Local stations took a similar view.
the formula proved to be good business. Writing was the key to good radio, yet in
His show set an all-time high in ratings 1944 the 747 full-time stations in the
for a continuing series, and his face United States employed fewer than 600
appeared on the cover of Life magazine, writers. Their average pay was $40 a
a rare distinction for a comic. week, about half what was paid to the
As an entertainment medium, radio stations’ salesmen. Quality suffered as a Different home
was highly successful. But as an educa- result. front activities
tional medium it fell short. In war, as in provided for
SEE ALSO
peace, the more serious and ambitious different rations
Home front of gasoline. A
shows were often dropped or were aired
“C” card,
at unpopular hours. Of the sponsored issued for one
shows, only “Town Meeting of the Air” of the reasons
had a large audience. listed at the bot-
As a news medium, on the other Rationing tom, granted a
car owner more
hand, radio did an outstanding job. CBS
than the stan-
reported after the war that war-news dard four gal-
programs made up 38.7 percent of the lons of gas per
total network air time from Pearl Har- Rationing (limiting the quantity of prod- month.
bor to V-E Day. Thanks to Edward R. ucts a family could buy in a
Murrow and his brilliant team of given period) was essential to
reporters, CBS’s news was the best, but the war effort but a terrifying
the other networks stepped up their prospect for public officials.
news coverage as well. They feared that voters
All the radio news organizations would not tolerate sharp
refused to allow recorded material to be restrictions on what had in
broadcast, requiring everything to be peacetime been regarded as
aired live. Although the recording tech- essential goods. As it turned
nology of the day was clumsy and not out, politicians misjudged the
easily portable, it did exist. This mobili- public’s reaction. Image Not Available
ty enabled the British Broadcasting Gasoline rationing is a
Company, which employed recordings, case in point. No one had
to bring the sounds of war to its listen- expected that war with
ers, sounds that Americans would have Japan would mean the loss
rarely heard otherwise. of most of the world’s natur-
Everyone appreciated the tremen- al rubber supplies. The
dous efforts made by CBS and other United States had failed to
news organizations to keep the public stockpile natural rubber
abreast of current events. But critics jus- when it had the chance, and
tifiably complained of radio’s failure to now it would have to do
deal with issues in depth. These com- without it. Synthetic rubber
plaints were much the same as those would meet the military’s
made about network television today. needs, but because rubber
274
• R E D A R M Y •

would always be in short supply, it a weekly, or even daily, basis. Con-


would have to be rationed. sumers were issued coupon books and
The easiest way paid for their pur-
All countries
to do this was to chases of rationed
involved in the
war needed to ration gasoline, goods with
ration in order which was not coupons as well as
to conserve scarce (except in the cash. This proce-
supplies. Northeast). By dure made shop-
Ration books, restricting gasoline ping, which was a
such as this use, rubber would Image Not Available nightmare in
one issued to automatically be wartime anyway,
Winston conserved, simply even more difficult.
Churchill, were because fewer miles A certain amount
used to “safe- would be driven. of black marketeer-
guard your
President ing was inevitable
food supply.”
Franklin D. Roo- under these circum-
sevelt hesitated to stances. Most
act, but Congress Americans, no mat-
forced his hand in ter how angry or
1942 by establishing a Rubber Supply frustrated they might get, abided by the
Agency to make rubber out of alcohol. complex rules as best they could. In
FDR vetoed the bill but then got to short, rationing worked. United States
work on the problem. The result was a fighting men and women never lacked
combination of gasoline rationing and a for essentials because of shirking or
national speed limit of 35 miles an hour cheating on the home front.
that saved enough natural rubber to
SEE ALSO
meet essential needs. Once the public
Home front; Mobilization
became aware of what was at stake, it
accepted these restrictions.
Many other items had to be
rationed as well, leading to endless com-
plications. Irritation over rationing was
continuous and so heated that in 1943
Red Army
Leon Henderson, one of the most bril- SEE Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.)
liant New Deal politicians, had to resign
as head of the Office of Price Adminis-
tration even though he was one of the
“unsung heroes of World War II” and a
greater organizer than Albert Speer, the Refugees
German production genius.
Urban Americans eventually grew
used to standing in lines. Not only were
many types of food and clothing Few aspects of World War II were sad-
rationed, but the number of ration der than the refugee crisis. At the out-
“points” (the units used to determine break of war in Europe, Poles fled from
what could be purchased) required for the advancing Germans, only to find
specific items fluctuated, obliging every themselves trapped by Soviet forces
housewife to update her calculations on approaching from the rear. In France
275
• R E L O C A T I O N C A M P S •

and Belgium, masses of people took to


the roads in May 1940 when the Ger- Relocation camps
man blitzkrieg (lightning war) struck.
With civilian and military traffic mixed
together many civilians died in strafing
attacks. The so-called relocation camps were
In 1944, with Allied armies closing actually concentration camps in which
in on all sides, millions of Germans the entire Japanese-American population
became refugees themselves. As death of the West Coast was confined. Almost
camps and concentration camps were 120,000 people were interned, or
liberated, and slave laborers were forcibly held, in these camps between
released from bondage, millions more 1942 and 1946.
took to their feet. By war’s end more Most relocation camps were placed
than 30 million people had become on barren sites in six western states,
refugees, a tide of human misery so although two particularly unpleasant
vast as to be almost beyond belief. camps were built in Arkansas. While the
The United Nations Relief and inmates were not maltreated physically as
Rehabilitation Administration a rule, they lived harsh lives in their bleak
(UNRRA) was established in 1943 to camps, which were cold in winter and
deal with this catastrophe. Refugees, hot in summer. In the worst camps, entire
now labeled “displaced persons” (DPs, families constructed dugouts beneath
for short) were housed in makeshift their barracks to obtain some relief from
camps all over western and central the searing heat. A special trial for female
Europe. Volunteers provided much of inmates was the absolute lack of privacy.
the effort needed to operate these The camps were surrounded by
camps, while the United States provid- barbed wire and armed guards and were
ed the funds. Under such extreme cir- administered by the newly created War
cumstances, the program did as much Relocation Authority. This mass intern-
good as it could. The UNRRA distrib- ment was popular with Americans at the
uted 25 million tons of food in 17 time, but it became a source of shame
countries between 1945 and 1947. shortly thereafter.
Most survivors eventually found
SEE ALSO
their way home or were resettled in
Japanese Americans
new homelands. This was a slow and
difficult process, because most Euro- F U RTHER READING
pean countries were having trouble
Gesensway, Deborah. Beyond Words:
meeting the needs of their own people, Images from America’s Concentration
let alone those of refugees. A lucky few Camps. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
made it to the United States or, in the Press, 1987.
Okihiro, Gary Y. Whispered Silences:
case of Jewish displaced persons, to Japanese Americans and World War II.
Palestine. But others remained in camps Seattle: University of Washington Press,
for years, living a kind of half-life until 1996.
Smith, Page. Democracy on Trial: The
death or emigration solved their
Japanese-American Evacuation and Relo-
problem. cation in World War II. New York:
Of the millions of Chinese Simon & Schuster, 1995.
refugees, whose displacement went Tateishi, John, ed. And Justice for All: An
Oral History of the Japanese American
back to when Japan invaded China in Detention Camps. New York: Random
1937, little is known. House, 1984.
276
• R E S I S T A N C E M O V E M E N T S •

Resistance
movements

Every country occupied by the Axis Image Not Available


powers had some type of resistance
movement. Patriotic undergrounds
(groups of citizens secretly acting against
their occupiers) gathered information for
the Allies, hid wanted individuals, Jews,
and downed Allied airmen, and per-
formed acts of sabotage.
A nation’s courage bore no relation In Norway, civil resistance was so French resis-
to its size. The resistance movement of widespread that the Nazi leader Vidkum tance fighters
Luxembourg (population 300,000) Quisling (whose name became a syn- march on
helped some 4,000 Allied military per- onym for Nazi collaboration) was unable patrol in the
sonnel escape from the Nazis. In some to form a puppet national legislature. Eire and Loire
region in
countries, resisters formed paramilitary One of the most justly celebrated resis-
France.
units, such as the French Maquis and tance coups took place in Denmark. In
the Polish Home Army. October 1943, learning that the Nazis
Women played a prominent role in were planning to seize Denmark’s Jews
the resistance, even in partisan bands and send them to death camps, the resis-
(illegal military units). In World War II tance ferried almost the entire Jewish
women typically did not serve in combat, population to Sweden and safety. Out of
but partisan bands had trouble recruiting some 8,000 Jews, fewer than 500
and could not afford to discriminate remained behind.
against women. As a result, many Another striking example took place
women took part in the dangerous fight in Bulgaria. When its fascist government
for victory and even rose to positions of attempted to send Bulgaria’s Jews to the
leadership. Nancy Wake, an Australian death camps, massive popular opposition
married to a Frenchman, became chef du forced the move’s cancellation. Holland
parachutage—the organizer of arms and was too small for armed resisters to
equipment supplied by Britain—for 7,000 operate safely. But the Dutch staged
resistance fighters in central France. three massive strikes against their occu-
Resistance tactics also included piers. The first was in February 1941 to
industrial strikes and slowdowns, being protest the arrests of Jews. The second,
as uncooperative or inefficient as possi- in the spring of 1943, was a response to
ble, and other forms of civil resistance. the call-up of former prisoners of war for
Underground presses turned out anti- forced labor in Germany. The third was
Nazi posters, pamphlets, newspapers, a rail strike in September 1944 to sup-
and even books. At its simplest, resistance port Operation Market Garden, a
was expressed—frequently—by scrawling doomed Allied effort to seize bridge-
or scratching Churchill’s V-for-victory heads on the Rhine. Savage reprisals fol-
sign (or, in France, de Gaulle’s Cross of lowed each of these actions but did not
Lorraine) on German posters, as well as break the Dutch spirit. Some 15,000
other forms of patriotic graffiti. Dutch Jews survived the war because
277
• R I O T S •

their fellow countrymen concealed them Mastny, Vojtech. The Czechs Under Nazi
throughout the occupation. Rule: the Failure of National Resistance,
1939 –1942. New York: Columbia Uni-
The French underground was excep- versity Press, 1995.
tionally large and well organized. It Michel, Henri. The Shadow War: Euro-
reached its peak of effectiveness after D- pean Resistance, 1939 –1945. New York:
Harper & Row, 1972.
Day (June 6, 1944), when rail workers
and the Maquis combined to sabotage
the railways and prevent the German
Army from sending reinforcements to
Normandy. Their efforts were so effec- Riots
tive that it required two weeks to move a SEE African Americans; Zoot-suit
single German armored division from riots
southern France to the Normandy battle-
fields. As the Allies neared Paris, the
Maquis went into the streets and battled
with the occupiers. Rommel, Erwin
The Polish Home Army was less for- GERMAN FIELD MARSHAL;
tunate. In 1944, as the Red Army “THE DESERT FOX”
approached Warsaw, the underground
• Born: November 15, 1891;
attempted to seize the city. But German Heidenheim, Germany
forces crushed the uprising as the Red • Political party: National Socialist
Army ground to a halt. The Soviets did (Nazi)
• Education: Royal Officer Cadet
not resume their offensive until Warsaw
School, Danzig, 1911
had been flattened and the resistance • Military service: German Army—
wiped out. second lieutenant, 1912; first
Except in Yugoslavia, where parti- lieutenant, 1916; captain, 1918; major,
1933; lieutenant colonel, 1935;
sans led by Joseph Tito ultimately beat colonel, 1937; brigadier general, 1939;
the Germans, no resistance movement commander of 7th Panzer Division,
was strong enough to liberate its own 1940; commander of Afrika Korps,
1941; major general, 1941; lieutenant
country. But resistance movements in general, 1941; commander of
many cases provided the Allies with sig- German-Italian Panzerarmee, 1942;
general, 1942; field marshal, 1942;
nificant help. Their mere existence sus- commander of Army Group Afrika;
tained national pride both during and commander of Army Group B, 1943
after the war. • Died: October 14, 1944, Germany

SEE ALSO
France; Poland
Although he is not particularly esteemed
F U RTHER READING
by German historians today, Rommel was
Camus, Albert. Between Hell and Reason:
Essays from the Resistance Newspaper extremely popular in Germany during the
Combat, 1944 –1947. Hanover, N.H.: war. He was also admired by the Western
University Press of New England, 1991. Allies, who called him the Desert Fox.
Chevrillon, Claire. Code name Christiane
As an infantry commander in World
Clouet: A Woman in the French Resis-
tance. College Station: Texas A & M War I, Rommel won Germany’s highest
University Press, 1995. decoration, the Pour le Mérite. One of
Foot, M. R. D. Resistance: An Analysis the few professional soldiers to be kept
of European Resistance to Nazism,
1940–1945. New York: McGraw-Hill, on in Germany’s tiny postwar army,
1977. Rommel came to Hitler’s attention as a
278
• R O M M E L , E R W I N •

British back into Egypt. Rommel won his


victories despite continual shortages of
men, tanks, and fuel. But there was a limit
to how much could be achieved by clever-
ness in the face of his enemy’s ever-grow-
ing superiority in men and materials.
That limit was reached at El Alamein
in the western desert of Egypt, where
Rommel was badly defeated by Britain’s
Image Not Available Eighth Army under the command of Gen-
eral Bernard Law Montgomery in Novem-
ber 1942. Rommel saved his force with a
masterful fighting retreat, but was forced
to withdraw all the way back to Tunisia.
Thanks to Operation Torch, the
Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria,
the Allies were now closing in on Tunisia
from the west as well as the east. Rom-
mel’s advice to Hitler was to pull out, but
Erwin Rommel result of his highly successful book The Hitler ignored his advice and poured men
pauses for a Infantry Attacks (1937). into Tunisia for a last stand. A fraction of
photograph in In 1939 Hitler put Rommel in the force assembled there, if given to
Libya with the charge of security at his headquarters. Rommel in 1941, would have enabled
15th Panzer The following year Rommel was given a him to seize Egypt and the Suez Canal.
Division, one
panzer division. During the armored bat- Now all it could do was buy time. Rom-
of the two
tles that defeated France in May and June mel won one last victory, against U.S.
founding divi-
sions of his
1940, Rommel led his division with great forces at the Kasserine Pass, but his final
Afrika Korps. dash and ingenuity, and became a nation- efforts were futile. He left Africa on
al hero. extended sick leave in March 1943, two
In 1941 Hitler sent Rommel and two months before the Axis surrender.
divisions to North Africa, where his Ital- Like those of the Third Reich itself,
ian allies were being flattened by the Rommel’s glory days were now behind
British. Ordered to remain on the defen- him. When his health improved, Rommel
sive, Rommel attacked instead, driving was sent by Hitler to Italy and then to
the British almost out of what is now France. He was assigned to defend the
Libya. The rest of the year he devoted to English Channel coast. Although he
weathering three separate British offen- strengthened Germany’s defenses, when
sives, but in January 1942 Rommel D-Day arrived, they proved to be inade-
attacked again. It was during this offen- quate. Rommel was not even there on D-
sive that Prime Minister Winston Day, having gone home for a visit. He
Churchill, speaking in the House of returned to France, only to be badly
Commons, said of Rommel: “We have a wounded in an air attack on July 17.
very daring and skillful opponent against Although he had had almost nothing
us, and, may I say across the havoc of to do with it, Rommel was accused of
war, a great general.” joining in the plot to kill Hitler. Faced with
In June, Rommel captured Fortress a choice between taking poison or being
Tobruk, which had withstood his offen- tried for treason, he took his own life.
sive the previous year, and drove the Rommel was noted for his gallantry
279
• R O O S E V E L T , A N N A E L E A N O R •

and courteous treatment of prisoners of Her mother, Anna Hall Roosevelt,


war. His war in the western desert was a died of diphtheria in 1892 when
“clean” one in that few civilians were Eleanor was not quite eight. Her
killed and both sides observed the rules brother Elliott died of the same disease
of war. Relatively small forces contended in 1893, and her father, Teddy Roo-
over vast stretches of desert there, making sevelt’s brother, died of alcoholism in
it ideal country for an inventive tactician 1894, all three passing away within a
like Rommel. Whether he would have period of 21 months. Other than
done as well had he commanded a great Eleanor, only her brother Hall survived,
army on the European Continent will and he eventually become an alcoholic
never be known, since he was never given like his father. Until she was 15, Eleanor
that chance. But on his own in the desert, was raised by her Grandmother Hall,
commanding what was essentially an whose stern regimen deprived her of
army corps, Rommel was unmatched. much-needed affection.
In 1899 Eleanor was sent to
SEE ALSO
Allenswood, a boarding school in En-
Afrika Korps; D-Day; Mediterranean
theater gland, where she spent the happiest part
of her youth. In New York society
F U RTHER READING
Eleanor, who had no money of her own
Irving, David. The Trail of the Fox. New and believed (wrongly) that she was unat-
York: Dutton, 1977.
Mitcham, Samuel W. The Desert Fox in tractive, had felt inadequate. But at
Normandy: Rommel’s Defense of Allenswood, an outstanding institution
Fortress Europe. Westport, Conn.: where a girl was judged by her character,
Praeger, 1997.
Rommel, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. she came into her own, enjoying both
B. H. Liddell-Hart, ed. 1948. Reprint, academic achievement and popularity.
New York: Da Capo, 1982. This first experience with success planted
Rutherford, Ward. The Biography of Field
Marshal Erwin Rommel. Oregon, Ill.: seeds that would one day flower beyond
Quality Books, 1981. anyone’s expectations. Yet she remained
sensitive and needy in ways her husband
Franklin could not meet. It was a mixed
blessing for both of them that they fell in
Roosevelt, Anna love and were married.
Eleanor In short order, Eleanor had five chil-
dren. Franklin studied law at Columbia
FIRST LADY, 1933–45
University, was admitted to the bar in
• Born: October 11, 1884, New York, N.Y. 1907, elected to the New York State Sen-
• Political party: Democratic ate in 1910, and appointed assistant sec-
• Died: November 7, 1962, New York,
N.Y. retary of the navy by Woodrow Wilson
in 1913, a post he held until nominated
for Vice President by the Democrats in
1920.
Eleanor Roosevelt was the fifth cousin The marriage of Franklin and
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to whom Eleanor did not follow this same upward
she was married on March 17, 1905, course. Too many babies, too much inter-
during the presidency of her uncle ference—however well meant—by her
Theodore. Unlike Franklin, who was an mother-in-law Sara, and too-frequent
adored only child, Eleanor had a diffi- absences by Franklin made marriage
cult early life. something less than the joyful state
280
• R O O S E V E L T , A N N A E L E A N O R •

Eleanor Roo-
sevelt (center)
and Mary
McLeod
Bethune (sec-
ond from left)
greet guests at
the opening of
Midway Hall,
one of two res-
idence halls
built by the
Public Build- Image Not Available
ings Adminis-
tration in
1943 for black
women in
government
service.

Eleanor had pictured. In 1918 she Already well informed on social issues
learned that Franklin was having an because of her close association with
affair with her own secretary and friend, social workers and reformers, she
Lucy Mercer. The marriage survived, but became a skillful politician too. Always
only because divorce would have ruined more liberal than Franklin, she served
Franklin’s political career. Eleanor never as his conscience—especially on issues
forgave him for this betrayal, even relating to women, children, and
though she herself was unable to provide African Americans. During World War
Franklin with the same adoration as Lucy II she served briefly in the Office of
Mercer had. Civilian Defense (OCD), the only gov-
If no longer a love match, the Roo- ernment job she held during Franklin’s
sevelts’ marriage was more than one of lifetime. This proved to be a mistake,
convenience. This became clear when for Eleanor’s liberalism had made her
Franklin was struck down by many enemies, who now extended their
poliomyelitis in 1921. He almost died often-vicious attacks to include the
and was left a paraplegic. With his legs OCD.
heavily braced, he could only move hor- After Pearl Harbor was attacked on
izontally for short distances. From this December 7, 1941, Eleanor’s real war
point on, Eleanor performed not only work was as the President’s representa-
the duties of a politician’s wife but tive on both the home and fighting
served as Franklin’s eyes and ears—and fronts. Her tours often took her to hos-
sometimes his voice as well—in all the pitals and military bases at home and
places he would have liked to go. abroad, most notably to the South
Eleanor helped Franklin resist the Pacific in 1943. Admiral William
temptation to retire from active life and Halsey, commander of the South Pacific
threw herself into furthering his career. Area, like most who did not know
281
• R O O S E V E L T , A N N A E L E A N O R •

Eleanor, dreaded her arrival. He was walked down the long line saying good-
too busy to shower attention on visiting bye and good luck to every truck.
VIPs, and her reputation as a reformer In the course of this one trip, she
and general “do-gooder” did not rec- visited 17 islands plus Australia and
ommend Eleanor to conservative mili- New Zealand, and was seen by an esti-
tary leaders. mated 400,000 servicemen. Among the
By the time she left the area under islands she went to was Guadalcanal,
his command, however, Halsey had which was bombed the night before she
become one of Eleanor’s warmest arrived and the night after she left.
admirers. He later wrote that in a single Admiral Halsey said that in his entire
day she inspected two navy hospitals, time as South Pacific Area commander,
had lunch at an officers’ rest home, Eleanor did more good than any one
reviewed the 2nd Marine Raiders Bat- person or group of civilians who visited
talion, made a speech at a service club, his theater.
attended a reception, and was guest of In other tours she visited Britain
honor at a formal dinner. Although and numerous places in the Caribbean
Halsey did not know it, that night she and South America. During the 1944
wrote her daily newspaper column— Presidential campaign, when FDR was
pecking it out herself on a portable too tired and busy to go on the stump,
typewriter. Eleanor filled in for him on many occa-
Halsey’s own description of sions. She also pushed him to hit the
Eleanor’s methods cannot be bettered. campaign trail himself, which he did
“When I say that she inspected those late in the season, with great success.
hospitals,” he wrote, “I don’t mean that As before the war, Eleanor contin-
she shook hands with the chief medical ued to represent her husband at numer-
officer, glanced into a sun parlor, and ous functions, to serve as a link
left. I mean that she went into every between the President and numerous
ward, stopped at every bed, and spoke other people, and to write a great deal,
to every patient: What was his name? not only her regular column but maga-
How did he feel? Was there anything he zine articles as well. For some time she
needed? Could she take a message also had a weekly radio broadcast.
home? I marveled at her hardihood, Although liberalism and reform took a
both physical and mental; she walked backseat during the war, she continued
for miles, and she saw patients who to speak for the young, the poor, the
were grievously and gruesomely disadvantaged, and African Americans.
wounded. But I marveled at their
SEE ALSO
expressions as she leaned over them. It
was a sight I will never forget.” Roosevelt, Franklin Delano
Eleanor made good on her promises F U RTHER READING
too, carefully writing down the men’s Freedman, Russell. Eleanor Roosevelt: A
names and messages and religiously deliv- Life of Discovery. New York: Clarion,
ering them when she got back home. 1993.
This was a practice that she continued Goodwin, Doris Kearns. No Ordinary
Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt:
throughout the war. At other times she The Home Front in World War II. New
inspected kitchens, stood in chow lines York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
with the men, and rode with them in Lash, Joseph P. Eleanor and Franklin. New
York: Norton, 1971.
jeeps. Once she came across a convoy of Vercelli, Jane. Eleanor Roosevelt. New
armed troops heading for the front and York: Chelsea House, 1994.
282
• R O O S E V E L T , F R A N K L I N D E L A N O •

blame was attached to him for the ticket’s


Roosevelt, Franklin defeat in that election. Indeed, he bene-
Delano fited from the exposure and from the
opportunity to campaign all over the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
country and establish ties with prominent
STATES, 1933–45
Democrats.
• Born: January 30, 1882, Hyde Park, Franklin was struck down by
N.Y. poliomyelitis (polio) in 1921. He almost
• Political party: Democratic
died at first, and suffered great pain for a
• Education: Harvard College, A.B.,
1903; Columbia University Law long time, eventually being crippled by it.
School, 1904–07 The supreme crisis of his life, it was also
• Military service: none his making as a leader. He showed
• Government service: New York immense courage from the start, not only
Senate, 1911–13; assistant secretary of
the navy, 1913–20; governor of New in fighting for survival but having an atti-
York, 1929–33; President of the tude so positive as to seem scarcely
United States, 1933–45
believable. Far from merely brushing off
• Died: April 12, 1945, Warm Springs,
Ga. sympathy or sorrow, he made his bedside
a place of good cheer and high spirits.
Nothing in his life better became him
than the manner in which he almost left
it, and he would be brave and gallant
As the son of James Roosevelt, a wealthy about his disability ever after.
gentleman farmer in New York, and A lesser man would have been driven
Sara Delano, whose family was even from public life by so great a misfortune.
richer, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was But Franklin, aided immensely by
born into wealth and privilege. Although Eleanor, was able to conceal the full
his mother was very possessive, Roo- extent of his disability and remain ac-
sevelt managed, with difficulty, to have tively involved in Democratic party
himself sent to one of the top prep affairs. In 1928 he gave a powerful nomi-
schools, Groton, and then to Harvard nating speech for Governor Al Smith of
College. He failed to distinguish himself New York. When offered the gubernator-
at Groton but did better at Harvard, ial nomination by Smith, he accepted. He
where he became editor of the student would have preferred to wait, for people
newspaper. He did not excel in law assumed that the Republican nominee,
school, but it was as a law student that Herbert Hoover, would serve two terms.
he married a fifth cousin, Anna Eleanor That would make 1932 the year for Roo-
Roosevelt, on March 17, 1905. sevelt to run for governor and 1936 his
Franklin was admitted to the bar in year to be elected President.
1907, but politics was his first love, and Nonetheless, Roosevelt ran for gov-
he won election to the New York State ernor in 1928 and, in the face of a
Senate in 1910. His name, and the fact Republican landslide, managed—by a
that he had won election in a solidly tiny margin—to win. Two successful
Republican district, marked him as a ris- terms, during which he coped as best a
ing figure in the Democratic party. As a governor could with the Great Depres-
result Woodrow Wilson appointed him sion, earned Roosevelt the Democratic
assistant secretary of the navy in 1913, a Presidential nomination in 1932 from
post he held until nominated for the Vice which he ascended to the Presidency.
Presidency by the Democrats in 1920. No During his first two Presidential terms
283
• R O O S E V E L T , F R A N K L I N D E L A N O •

President Roo-
sevelt addresses
a joint session
of Congress on
May 16, 1940.

Image Not Available

Roosevelt established what became By the late 1930s the worsening


known as the New Deal. world situation forced Roosevelt to
Although it failed to bring economic concentrate more on foreign affairs. In
recovery (World War II did that), the New this area, however, he was greatly hand-
Deal was highly successful in other icapped by the overwhelming reluctance
respects. Legislation, such as the Social of Americans to be drawn into another
Security Bill, laid the basis for what would war. This mood, usually called isola-
become a reasonably effective social safety tionism, became more and more of an
net for poor Americans. Other acts cre- obstacle after war broke out in Europe
ated the Tennessee Valley Authority in September 1939. FDR had once been
(which brought cheap power through an isolationist himself, but after the fall
public construction projects to many of France in June 1940, it was clear to
states and raised their standard of living), him that the United States’s interests,
the Securities Exchange Commission, the and perhaps national security itself, was
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, threatened by the advance of Nazism
the Home Owners Loan Corporation, the and, to a lesser extent, of Japanese
Works Progress Administration (which imperialism.
hired unemployed men to do many kinds Until he won reelection to an
of work), and numerous other programs unprecedented third Presidential term in
and agencies. Together they put millions 1940, Roosevelt hesitated to act. He
to work, enhanced the safety and well- was more decisive after the election,
being of millions more, and greatly although he remained handicapped by
improved the nation’s infrastructure. The the popular view that the United States
number and importance of the bills Roo- should not enter the war unless it was
sevelt pushed through Congress has never actually attacked. But in 1941 he did
been equaled. secure passage of the Lend-Lease pro-
284
• R O O S E V E L T , F R A N K L I N D E L A N O •

gram, which provided essential aid to Soviets, who were battling Germany in
Britain and the Soviet Union. the east, and open the way to seizing
In that summer Roosevelt met with Germany’s industrial bases, without
Prime Minister Winston Churchill of which Hitler could not wage war.
Britain and issued the Atlantic Charter Although this was the best strategy,
with him. This document was a state- it could not be activated until May 1943
ment of democratic principles that would at the earliest. By that time the pressure
govern the Allied war effort, although the to concentrate on the war with Japan
United States was still at peace and as yet might have become irresistible. Perhaps
had no formal allies. He also expanded North Africa was not the right place,
naval operations to the point where the but November 1942 was the right time
U.S. Navy was actually engaged in com- to launch a campaign that would put
bat with German U-boats. At the same U.S. troops into battle against the Ger-
time, he took a hard line against Japan, mans before Americans lost interest in
cutting off its oil supplies until the Japa- them. Just as Marshall had feared, fight-
nese agreed to withdrawal from China (a ing in the Mediterranean forced the
proposition that was out of the question postponement of D-Day to 1944, but it
for Japan’s military rulers). may very well have saved the European
Roosevelt seems to have hoped that priority, on which everything depended.
Germany would declare war as a result of Marshall did get his cross-channel inva-
the fighting in the North Atlantic. Instead, sion of France in 1944, later than he
it was Japan that broke the stalemate by wanted but not too late for the Allies to
attacking Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on help defeat Hitler and liberate Western
December 7, 1941, and seizing U.S., Europe. Thus, Roosevelt seems to have
British, and Dutch possessions in the Pa- done the right thing by forcing Marshall
cific and Asia. Hitler declared war shortly to fight in the Mediterranean first.
after, and the United States finally became From mid-1943 on, with victory
an active player in the world conflict. over Hitler becoming ever more certain,
In the early war years, Roosevelt FDR concerned himself mainly with the
kept a close eye on military affairs, and shape of the postwar world. At major
his foreign relations centered on reach- conferences with Soviet leader Joseph
ing agreements about strategy with the Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, he
British. He successfully clung to Europe struggled to design a new world order
as the first priority for U.S. arms, despite that would be fair, democratic, and
an enormous popular demand for peaceful. Although European colonialism
revenge against Japan. Even so, the did not fit into this vision, the main
Pacific war was expanded far beyond obstacle to a just peace was the Soviet
what General George Marshall and Union.
other planners had wanted. In later years Roosevelt would be
The war in the Pacific would likely criticized for “giving away” Eastern
have grown even larger if Roosevelt had Europe and other areas to the Soviet
not ordered that North Africa be in- Union. But to treat the Soviets as a new
vaded in 1942. War strategists believed enemy after having jointly defeated Hitler
this was the wrong place to fight Hitler, not only seemed unfair but could create a
wishing instead to invade France as self-fulfilling prophesy. In an attempt to
soon as possible in order to establish a avert what would someday become
second front in Western Europe. It known as the “Cold War,” Roosevelt
would take much of the pressure off the made every effort to assure the Soviets of
285
• R O O S E V E L T , F R A N K L I N D E L A N O •

U.S. goodwill and holding out on him. Roosevelt offered


to meet the Soviet both a carrot (potential aid) and a stick
Union’s legitimate (the threat of the atomic bomb). It was
security requirements. up to the Soviets to choose.
At the Teheran confer- Events later proved that Stalin was
Image Not Available ence in 1943, and again prepared to pay almost any price to keep
at Yalta in 1945, the Big Eastern Europe firmly under his thumb—
Three (Britain, the Soviet but there was no way for Roosevelt to
Union, and the United know that in advance. The lands that the
States) agreed on occupa- Soviets gained from the war were mostly
tion zones in Germany, territory the Soviets had fought for and
on the future of Europe, that could not have been taken from
A 1940 cam- and on certain territories that the Soviets them. The only way that Stalin might
paign banner would be allowed to keep in Europe and have been kept out of Poland would have
supports an Asia. At Roosevelt’s urging, the Soviets been for the United States to enter the
unprecedented signed a “Declaration on Liberated war much earlier than it did. Given the
third term for Europe” in which all three parties United States’s late start, Roosevelt did
Franklin Roo-
promised that free elections would be everything he could for the people who
sevelt.
held to determine each country’s future. fell under Stalin’s rule.
Roosevelt has been accused of being Unfortunately, it was not good
too trusting, or worse, in supposing that enough. When Stalin chose to ignore the
Stalin would live up to such an agree- Declaration on Liberated Europe, only
ment. But doing so would have been in war, or perhaps the threat of it, could
the Soviets’ best interests, which gave have changed his mind, and that was out
some reason for hope. If the United States of the question.
and the U.S.S.R. worked together, they Roosevelt made mistakes, as even the
could ensure peace and prosperity for greatest do, but he provided the United
both in the postwar era. If, on the other States with the best possible leadership.
hand, the nations of Eastern Europe, One has only to think of the Presidential
which the Red Army largely controlled at candidates of his era to appreciate the dif-
the time of Yalta, were denied the right of ference. Wendell Willkie and Thomas E.
self-determination, the results would be Dewey, the Republican nominees in 1940
very costly. The Soviets would have to and 1944, were good enough men, to be
occupy these states for years to come, sure, but utterly lacked knowledge of the
maintain large armed forces for the pur- world. Henry Wallace, who would have
pose, and also, because of the United become President if Roosevelt had died a
States’s certain anger, would be denied year earlier, believed in appeasing the
the postwar U.S. loans and aid they des- Soviets. Senator Robert Taft, who under-
perately needed. stood neither foreign affairs nor grand
To make the latter point very clear, strategy, had been an isolationist before
Roosevelt refused to discuss postwar aid Pearl Harbor and was therefore hope-
with Stalin during the war. He also did lessly wrong about the greatest issue of
not share the United States’s nuclear the century. Roosevelt towered above
secrets, or even tell Stalin that the United them all, and it was the country’s good
States was building an atomic weapon. fortune to have him at its head before
Thanks to his spies, Stalin knew about and during the war.
the plans to build such a bomb, which When Roosevelt died, on April 12,
meant he also knew that Roosevelt was 1945, the war in Europe was virtually
286
• R O Y A L A I R F O R C E •

over, the Pacific war already won— At the time World War II broke out,
although the Japanese refused to admit it. the RAF was divided into separate branch-
The United States was safe and rich. It es, with Fighter, Bomber, and Coastal
would soon have the atomic bomb. U.S. Commands being the combat arms. For
casualty rates were lower than those of most of the war, the Coastal Command
any other great nation. In the real world, was controlled by the Royal Navy, an
where people make mistakes and things arrangement that made the British antisub-
go wrong, leadership does not get much marine campaign better coordinated than
better than this. that of the United States.
Overseas the RAF was organized ver-
SEE ALSO
tically, with all types of aircraft operating
Atlantic, Battle of the; Atlantic Charter; under a single command. The most impor-
Casablanca conference; Home front; tant of these were the Middle East Com-
Mediterranean theater; Mobilization; Roo-
sevelt, Anna Eleanor; Teheran conference; mand and Air Command Southeast Asia.
Truman, Harry S.; Unconditional surren- Beginning in 1943, RAF units in the Medi-
der; United Nations; Yalta conference terranean served with U.S. aircraft under
the combined Mediterranean Air Com-
F U RTHER READING
mand. In 1943 the RAF formed its Second
Ben-Zvi, Abraham. The Illusion of Deter- Tactical Air Force to support British
rence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the
Origins of the Pacific War. Boulder, ground troops on the European continent
Colo.: Westview, 1987. during and after D-Day, June 6, 1944.
Burns, James MacGregor. Roosevelt: The Dominion air forces—Australian,
Soldier of Freedom, 1940–1945. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Canadian, New Zealand, South
1970. African—served as part of the RAF, as
Cashman, Sean Dennis. America, Roo- did units made of refugees from occupied
sevelt, and World War II. New York:
New York University Press, 1989.
Europe. Some, notably the Czechs, had
Dallek, Robert. Franklin Roosevelt and their own separate national squadrons.
American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945. RAF squadrons were much larger than
New York: Oxford University Press, those of the U.S. Army Air Forces
1979.
Kimball, Warren F. The Juggler: Franklin (USAAF), being comparable in size to a
Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman. Princeton, U.S. air group. They were supported by
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. Princess Mary’s RAF Nursing Service and
Newton, Verne W., ed. FDR and the Holo-
caust. New York: St. Martin’s Press, the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
1996. (WAAF), who were put at greater risk
than U.S. servicewomen. Most notably
during the Battle of Britain, WAAFs
served in heavily bombed installations.
Although ground personnel were often
Royal Air Force draftees, as in the United States, all RAF air-
men were volunteers. Many were trained
overseas in Canada. Unlike the USAAF,
whose pilots, bombardiers, and navigators
Unlike the United States Army Air were always commissioned officers, RAF
Forces, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was airmen were often sergeants. And while the
an independent service with its own cabi- pilot was always the aircrew commander in
net minister (secretary of state for air), U.S. planes, in the RAF command rested
who presided over the policy-making Air with the man who had the highest rank,
Council. whether he was the pilot or not.
287
• R O Y A L N A V Y •

Like the USAAF, the Royal Air Force SEE ALSO


had committed itself before the war to Britain; Britain, Battle of; Strategic bombing
strategic bombing. This doctrine held that
F U RTHER READING
an enemy could be defeated by destroy-
ing its war plants and infrastructure from Hastings, Max. Bomber Command. New
York: Dial Press, 1979.
the air, making ground warfare obsolete. Richards, Denis. Royal Air Force,
In practice the RAF quickly discovered 1939 –1945. London: H.M.S.O., 1974.
that bombing Germany by day was too
costly, because its small undergunned air-
craft were no match for the Luftwaffe
(Germany’s air force). Accordingly, Royal Navy
Bomber Command shifted over to night
operations and area attacks.
Since precision bombing was impos-
sible when attacking at night, the RAF Called the “senior service” in Britain, the
abandoned strategic bombing for terror Royal Navy (RN) was founded in the
attacks that were supposed to break the reign of Henry VIII. Its civilian minister
Germans’ morale. They never did man- was the First Lord of the Admiralty,
age to break the German spirit, although while operations were directed by the
Bomber Command lost 56,000 crewmen First Sea Lord in his role as chief of naval
and thousands of planes in a vain effort staff. The Royal Navy was divided into
to bring about a civilian collapse. Bomb- regional commands which, since the
ing Germany consumed more than a British Empire was still intact, operated in
quarter of the British war effort but all the world’s oceans. Commonwealth
achieved only modest practical results. It navies and—from 1940 on, those of the
was, therefore, a blunder as well as a various governments in exile—served as
crime, given that most people killed or units of the RN. The main exceptions
wounded on the ground were civilians. were warships of Australia and New
On the other hand, Fighter Com- Zealand, which, after 1941, came under
mand won the all-important Battle of U.S. command in the Pacific.
Britain in 1940, which made ultimate vic- The RN’s offensive power was lo-
tory possible. The fighter-bombers and cated in its battle fleets. At the outbreak The British
medium bombers of the Second Tactical of World War II there were two main destroyer HMS
Air Force gave tremendous support to fleets: the Home Fleet, which protected Oakley heads
Allied ground forces after they invaded Britain; and the Mediterranean Fleet, out to sea.
the Continent. In time, Bomber Com-
mand acquired the skill and equipment to
bomb accurately, making genuine strate-
gic bombing possible. However, its com-
mander, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris,
believed passionately in terror raids and
seldom allowed Bomber Command to Image Not Available
make precision attacks. British historians
have been the most severe critics of
Bomber Command, often comparing it
unfavorably to the USAAF, which
remained committed to strategic bombing
and was sometimes successful at it.
288
• R U S S I A •

based in Egypt. In 1941 an Eastern Fleet commanders of small escort vessels. The
was created, with its headquarters in Singa- high ranks and prestige, however, went to
pore. Much of it was destroyed in the early those who commanded battleships and
days of the Pacific war, with the survivors carriers. But everything would have been
withdrawing to Mombasa in British East lost if the RNVR-officered corvettes,
Africa. These survivors eventually grew frigates, destroyers, and aircraft had not
into the British Pacific Fleet, the largest defeated the U-boats.
British Fleet of the war, which fought with Because Germany did not have an
distinction in the Okinawa campaign. important surface fleet and the Italian
The officers and men of the Royal Navy avoided battle, the RN did not fight
Navy fell into three categories: the stand- any great naval actions in the Atlantic or
ing regular navy (RN); the Royal Naval Mediterranean. There were some spectac-
Reserve (RNR), consisting of officers and ular incidents, such as the pursuit and
men with previous RN service as well as sinking of the Bismarck in 1941, but the
former officers of the merchant fleet; and RN’s main job in the war was the
the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve unglamorous but absolutely essential task
(RNVR), consisting of officers who had of keeping the sea-lanes open.
volunteered and draftees who had been Although it was small at first, the
promoted to commissioned rank. The Fleet Air Arm came to play a vital role in
RNVR was called the Wavy Navy, both oceans and the Mediterranean.
because RNVR officers had waved rings When war broke out, the RN had 232
on their cuffs to distinguish them from obsolete aircraft and only five carriers.
RN and RNR officers. Even so, the Fleet Air Arm won a
Enlisted draftees had no service remarkable victory against the Italian
insignias at all. Although there were his- Navy. On November 11, 1940, 21
torical reasons behind these distinctions, Swordfish-class biplanes launched from
to Americans they seemed artificial and the carrier Illustrious torpedoed three
snobbish. In the U.S. Navy all enlisted battleships and a cruiser at anchor in
men dressed alike, and although the U.S. Taranto, Italy. In one stroke the naval
Navy differentiated between regular and balance of power in the Mediterranean
reserve officers, both categories wore shifted in Britain’s favor.
identical uniforms and markings. Taranto also marked the end of the
Because British forces made few battleship era, although this was not fully
amphibious assaults compared with those apparent until the much bigger Japanese
of the United States, the Royal Marines victory at Pearl Harbor a year later. By
had only one division. It was formed in war’s end, the Royal Navy had more
1940 but was later broken up into than 50 carriers of various sizes and
smaller, specialized units. On the other 1,336 front line aircraft, half of which
hand, the Women’s Royal Naval Service were built in the United States.
(whose members were called Wrens) was
SEE ALSO
relatively larger than its U.S. counterpart,
known as the WAVES. In addition to Atlantic, battle of the; Central Pacific
Area; Britain
shore duties, a few Wrens served on motor
torpedo boats. Of the 73,642 RN person-
nel who died in the war, 124 were Wrens.
The RNVR’s officers made up three-
fourths of the officer corps, and they bore Russia
the brunt of the antisubmarine war as SEE Soviet Union
289
• S A I P A N , B A T T L E O F •

1944 Marshall Islands campaign, in


Saipan, battle of which U.S. casualties were light, Nimitz
raised no further objections.
But the Marianas, unlike the tiny
Gilbert and Marshall atolls, were sub-
Saipan, in the Mariana Islands, was stantial islands, and on Saipan there were
assaulted by the U.S. Fifth Amphibious more than 30,000 Japanese troops, about
Corps on June 15, 1944. This attack was twice the number expected. Some 20,000
a continuation of the Navy’s drive across U.S. troops went ashore on Saipan the
the central Pacific that had begun with first day and met the usual fierce resis-
the seizure of the Tarawa atoll the previ- tance. The result was, as Nimitz had
ous year. The chief strategic value of the feared, another bloody battle. When it
Marianas was as a site for the Army’s ended, on July 9, there were 14,000 U.S.
heavy B-29 bombers. casualties and 30,000 Japanese dead.
Admiral Chester Nimitz, who com- The Japanese had abandoned their
manded the Pacific Ocean Area, initially original technique of trying to defend
had been opposed to the Saipan opera- beaches, and much of the fighting con-
tion. He and his staff feared another sisted of rooting out or destroying clus-
bloody engagement like Tarawa and did ters of Japanese in underground bunkers
not think bomber bases were worth and tunnels. At Stalingrad in 1942 and
their probable cost. But Nimitz’s supe- 1943, Germans had called their under-
rior, Admiral Ernest King, the chief of ground battle a Rattenkrieg, or war of
naval operations, was dedicated to the the rats, which described Saipan perfectly.
central Pacific strategy and insisted on The rest of the Marianas, however,
taking the Marianas. After the January proved much easier to seize.
American
troops mourn
the death of
their fellow sol-
diers during
the burial ser-
vices after the
battle of
Saipan.

Image Not Available


290
• S C H W E I N F U R T , B O M B I N G O F •

Apart from the high cost of taking it, 1943, when enough heavy bombers were
Saipan was notable for being the first available for the U.S. Eighth Air Force to
conquered island with a large Japanese attack strategic targets in Germany with
civilian population. Of its 12,000 non- daylight precision bombing. Schweinfurt
combatants, most of them women and was considered an important target at the
children, about two-thirds committed sui- time, because so much of Germany’s ball-
cide, because they thought honor bearing industry was located in the area.
demanded it or because they had been led It was believed that if the five ball-bearing
to believe that their captors would treat plants in the Schweinfurt region could be
them atrociously. It sickened GIs to see destroyed Germany would run out of ball
whole families jump off cliffs or blow bearings and therefore lose the war.
themselves up with grenades. This was a The first attack was made on
chilling foretaste of what the expected August 17, 1943, by two separate air
invasion of Japan would bring. divisions, which struck Schweinfurt and
Whether the Saipan campaign was the city of Regensburg. Of the 315
worth the cost depends on how much heavy bombers that reached their targets
value is attached to the firebomb raids 60 were destroyed by German fighters
against Japan that were staged from the and flak guns. This rate of loss cast
island. Many argue that these raids con- doubt on the theory that heavily armed
tributed materially to the defeat of Japan, and armored B-17s and B-24s, unac-
but some historians believe they had little companied by fighter escorts, could fight
effect, because Japanese industry had their way to targets deep within Ger-
already been brought to its knees by the many and make it home again without
U.S. naval blockade. suffering heavy casualties.
Because so much had been invested
SEE ALSO
in this form of strategic bombing, air
Central Pacific Area; Philippine Sea, Battle
of the force leaders were reluctant to admit
defeat. On October 14, 1943, the Eighth
F U RTHER READING
Air Force launched another attack, with
Crowl, Philip A. Campaign in the Mari-
anas. Washington, D.C.: Center of Mili- Schweinfurt as the only target. Of 291
tary History, United States Army, 1993. heavy bombers that took off for this
Gailey, Harry A. Howlin’ Mad vs the attack 60 were again lost, leaving the
Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan, concept of the self-defending bomber
1945. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986.
force in ruins. The second Schweinfurt
attack was the fourth on German indus-
trial areas that had been staged in a sin-
gle week, during which 148 bombers
Schweinfurt, bombing were lost. After “Black Week,” as it was
of called, the Eighth Air Force in effect
admitted defeat. There were no more
deep penetration raids into Germany for
the rest of the year. They did not resume
There were two separate bombing on a regular basis until February 1944,
attacks on Schweinfurt, Germany, in when long-range fighter escorts at last
1943 that resulted in very heavy U.S. became available.
losses and put an end, temporarily, to the
SEE ALSO
daylight air war against Germany.
The campaign began on June 10, Spaatz, Carl; Strategic bombing
291
• S E A B E E S •

Kimmel, Jay. U.S. Navy Seabees: Since


Seabees Pearl Harbor. Portland, Ore.:
Cory/Stevens, 1995.

Seabees was the nickname given to the


Second front
men of the U.S. Navy’s construction
battalions. Unlike other sailors, the
Seabees were all volunteers drawn from This term came into use after Germany
civilian life because of their skills as invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941.
construction workers or their qualifica- The Soviets demanded that a “second
tions as engineers. front” be opened in the west to relieve the
Established on December 8, 1941, pressure Germany was exerting against
the Seabees reached a peak strength of them in the east. Specifically, the Soviets
8,000 officers and 250,000 men in and their sympathizers wanted the Allies
1945. They worked all over the Pacific, to launch a major invasion of France.
building roads, air bases, and whatever When the United States entered the
else the Navy needed. Although they European war on December 11, 1941,
were neither soldiers nor sailors, the such a front became possible in theory,
Seabees operated close to the action and but in fact it was not until D-Day on
sometimes came under fire. As semicivil- June 6, 1944, that the second front
ians they were better paid than sailors, became a reality. The problem was not
the basic wage being that of a noncom- America’s lack of desire for a second
missioned officer. Their insignia was a front. From the start, leaders such as
bee in flight, wearing a sailor’s cap and General George Marshall, the Army’s
carrying a submachine gun, a wrench, chief of staff, wanted a new western front
and a hammer. in Europe at the earliest possible date.
F U RTHER READING Two things prevented the second
Huie, William Bradford. Can Do!: The front from happening earlier. One was
Story of the Seabees. Annapolis: United that Britain and the United States did not
States Naval Institute, 1997. have the means to invade Europe in
The promo- 1942. The other was that, for different
tional material reasons, Prime Minister Winston
on this Seabees Churchill and President Franklin D. Roo-
songbook sevelt wanted to begin the ground war
reads, “Here is against Hitler in the Mediterranean.
a real OPPOR-
Thus, the opening of that war took
TUNITY for
place in North Africa in November 1942
two-fisted, red-
blooded Ameri-
and proceeded from Africa to an invasion
cans to serve Image Not Available of Sicily and Italy in 1943. These opera-
shoulder-to- tions made it impossible to stage Opera-
shoulder with tion Overlord, the invasion of Nor-
the combatant mandy, until 1944, although Roosevelt
forces in the had unwisely promised Stalin a second
‘SEABEES,’ front in 1942.
the newest arm Churchill and Roosevelt tried to rep-
of Uncle Sam’s resent the North African campaign as
Navy.” the equivalent of a second front.
292
• S E L E C T I V E S E R V I C E S Y S T E M •

Churchill also tried to argue that the cast their nets more broadly and stop giv-
Allied air war against Germany was a ing exemptions for fatherhood. Selective
kind of second front. Neither of these Service was generally regarded as fair, in
substitutes met Soviet Russia’s basic part because conscription was not as rig-
need, but as Stalin could not direct Allied orously applied in the United States as in
operations himself, he had no choice but most other belligerent nations.
to wait for the real thing. In January 1944 President Franklin
D. Roosevelt asked Congress for a
SEE ALSO
National Service Bill. It would have sub-
Mediterranean theater
jected civilian men and women to
mandatory work assignments, as well as
making the military draft more produc-
tive. Similar legislation had been highly
Selective Service effective in Britain, and polls showed
System considerable support for it in the United
States. But Congress feared that in prac-
tice National Service would be unpopu-
lar and therefore refused to enact it.
Otherwise known as the draft, the Selec-
tive Service System was established by
an act of Congress in September 1940.
Initially, conscription (the act of draft- Sicily, battle of
ing) applied only to men aged 21 to 36
and the term of enlistment was limited
to one year. In 1941, by a margin of
only one vote in the House of Represen- As Tunisia fell to the Allies in May 1943,
tatives, the term of service was ex- an Allied conference was convening in
tended. The next year the age limit of Washington. Known as Trident, the con-
those eligible for the draft was widened ference’s discussions were often stormy,
to include men 18 to 46 years of age. because U.S. Army chief of staff General
Student exemptions, which were part of George Marshall had begun to tire of let-
the original Selective Service Act, were ting Britain direct the war effort. The
also dropped. In all, some 10 million British had been able to force Marshall to
men were drafted, a majority into the accept Torch, the invasion of North
Army. Women were not drafted at all. Africa, but they could not make him like
Enlisted draftees served an average of 33 it. And now that more time was being
months, officers about 6 months longer. lost while the British continued to come
Draftees were called up as the result up with proposals for landing in various
of decisions made by thousands of local places on the margins of Europe, the
draft boards that reflected local as well as Americans were becoming irritated. Gen-
national prejudices. Most boards pre- eral Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial
ferred to draft single men, which meant General Staff, would not admit that the
that in the early war years, young fathers Americans would never share Britain’s
were being exempted while single men view of the Mediterranean, and he
younger than 40 were called to active ser- always seemed taken aback that putting
vice. By 1944 a military manpower short- off the invasion of France led the United
age developed that required boards to States to divert resources to the Pacific.
293
• S I C I L Y , B A T T L E O F •

This aerial
photograph
captures the
view from a
B-17 Flying
Fortress intent
on destroying
shipping and
harbor installa-
tions at Paler-
mo, Sicily. The
explosions
Image Not Available
below, and the
bomb on its
way, indicate a
successful mis-
sion.

The Trident conference began with code named, had been set into motion.
Churchill arguing for an Italian campaign On July 10, 1943, the greatest fleet
to follow the conquest of Sicily, while ever assembled to that date—an armada
Roosevelt worried that it might delay the of 3,200 ships—arrived off the coast of
cross-channel attack into France he Sicily. In three days 150,000 troops hit
planned for the coming year. After days of the beaches, soon followed by 300,000
tough bargaining, during which each side more. Sicily was defended (on paper) by
promoted its own sideshows in the Medi- 350,000 Axis troops; however, most
terranean and the Pacific, a compromise were Italians who wished only to sur-
was hammered out. After taking Sicily, render. The real opposition was a Ger-
the Allies would eliminate Italy from the man Army corps that never exceeded
war by means of unspecified actions. 60,000 men. The Allies ought to have
These actions would come to an end on brushed it aside, but instead the cam-
November 1, 1943, after which troops paign lasted for 38 days and ended with
would be concentrated in England for a the entire German force escaping to Italy
cross-channel assault on May 1, 1944. after suffering fewer battle deaths than
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin responded the Allies.
angrily to these decisions because the Given the lack of enemy strength,
Germans were gearing up for a great the Sicilian campaign was poorly execut-
offensive at Kursk, in the Soviet Union ed. The British War Office went so far
(which did happen in July 1943), and as to called it “a strategic and tactical
needed to be diverted. Although Stalin failure.” It took too long to execute and
committed a series of unfriendly acts— only gained air bases that could have
including recalling his ambassadors from been obtained more easily by taking
Washington and London—Operation Corsica and Sardinia, which would have
Husky, as the invasion of Sicily had been had the additional effect of neutralizing
294
• S I E G F R I E D L I N E •

Italy by air and thus avoiding the need


to invade it. Siegfried Line
Operation Husky was poorly exe- SEE Germany, surrender of
cuted because it was poorly planned.
Eisenhower unwisely left the Sicilian
campaign in the hands of General Sir
Harold Alexander, who, although well- Small arms
liked by Americans, had been promoted
above his merits. The planning for
Husky was sloppy and late, with little
effort being made to exploit the Allies’ This category of weapons includes pis-
superiority in air and naval power. tols, rifles, submachine guns, machine
There was no planning beyond tak- guns, and antitank rifles. Pistols as a
ing the beachheads, so the Allies fol- battlefield weapon had long since
lowed up their landings with too many become obsolete by 1939. United States
unimaginative frontal attacks and a combat officers seldom used them, pre-
campaign of attrition. The air comman- ferring the light M-1 carbine instead.
ders went their own way, failing to pro- Antitank rifles were not very useful
vide adequate ground support or antici- either, and heavily armored tanks soon
pate that the Germans would withdraw made them obsolete as well.
across the Strait of Messina (although it The rifle, the basic infantry weapon,
was the only escape route). As Husky had changed little since World War I. It
was a combined operation, both Britain required a soldier to unlock a bolt, move
and the United States shared the blame it back and forth, and relock it every
for it. other shot. The exception to this rule was
Politically and strategically the the U.S. Army’s superb Garand, or M-1,
results were even grimmer. On July 17, rifle. It was an accurate semiautomatic
General Eisenhower decided to invade weapon that held an eight-bullet clip,
Italy as soon as the Sicilian campaign which could be emptied as rapidly as a
was over. This step was almost soldier could squeeze the trigger.
inevitable once the Army abandoned the Another exception, although it was
idea of invading France in 1943. For the not issued until 1943 and did not, in
leisurely Sicilian campaign had ended most cases, replace the obsolete Mauser,
too late in the year to organize an inva- was the German assault rifle. In order to
sion of France and left substantial mili- achieve a greater rate and volume of fire,
tary resources assembled in the Mediter- the assault rifle was lightweight, compact,
ranean. Thus the misbegotten, and and fired a light bullet with a short case.
strategically unnecessary, Italian cam- It was fully automatic, and its long maga-
paigns were born. zine carried a much larger number of
rounds than the Mauser. Called the
SEE ALSO Machine Pistol 43, it was later renamed
Italian campaigns; Mediterranean theater the Assault Rifle 44 and was the model
for the next generation of military rifles
F U RTHER READING developed after the war.
D’Este, Carlo. Bitter Victory: The Battle The submachine gun was a light,
for Sicily, 1943. New York: Dutton,
1988.
fully automatic weapon that fired pistol
Mitcham, Samuel W. Battle of Sicily. New ammunition. Developed by the Germans
York: Orion, 1991. in World War I, they used it widely in
295
• S O L O M O N I S L A N D S •

Browning automatic rifle (BAR) to every


rifle squad. An air-cooled gun with a
bipod near its muzzle, the BAR was
heavy but provided a considerable
increase in firepower.
The Germans developed an all-pur-
pose machine gun that could be altered
as needed. With a shoulder stock and
bipod, it served as a light machine gun.
When heavy fire was required, the gun
Image Not Available received a tripod and long-range sights.
This concept was widely implemented by
other armies after the war, because hav-
ing one type of machine gun instead of
two greatly simplified the problems of
supply and repair.

Solomon Islands
SEE Guadalcanal, Battle of; South
A sailor checks World War II. The British equivalent was Pacific Area
over the small called the Sten gun, while America had
arms in a the Thompson submachine gun. Popular
guard room in with gangsters before the war in its
England in
anticipation of
drum-magazine version, the Thompson, South Pacific Area
now fitted with a 20- or 30-round box
the Battle of
magazine, was in great demand by Allied
France, 1944.
ground troops throughout the war.
Apart from being a bit heavy and In April 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
expensive, the Thompson was a splendid agreed that the Southwest Pacific Area
weapon, sturdy and absolutely reliable. In was to be a separate Army theater of war.
addition, its .45-caliber rounds gave it The rest of the Pacific became the Pacific
plenty of stopping power. Although 2 Ocean Area, directed by navy Admiral
million Thompson guns were made, the Chester Nimitz, whose vast command
troops would have liked millions more. was subdivided into three areas: South,
The Soviet Army used more machine Central, and North. Once the spheres of
guns than any other. They developed a control had been defined, everyone
cheap model made from stamped out, understood that the first thing to be done
rather than machined, parts that suited was to save Australia from the Japanese
their method of close-in fighting extreme- threat.
ly well. Japan was overextended and proba-
The Allies employed both heavy and bly lacked the means to invade Australia,
light machine guns. The heavy gun—belt- but the Allies could not be sure of this,
fed, water-cooled, and mounted on a tri- and Australia’s strategic importance
pod—was similar to World War I mod- meant that it had to be protected. The
els. Light machine guns were generally question was by which armed service.
newer designs. The U.S. Army issued a Most Japanese bases fell within General
296
• S O U T H P A C I F I C A R E A •

Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific meeting little opposition. Then Rear Admi-
Area. However, to seize or neutralize the ral Frank Jack Fletcher sailed away, only
bases would require naval support, and 36 hours after the marines had landed and
Admiral Ernest King, the Navy’s head, before they were half unloaded. Fearing a
would not allow the Army to control his Japanese attack, he wanted to save his fast
fast carriers. carriers. He left only cruisers and destroy-
After a serious struggle, the Joint ers to defend the invasion force.
Chiefs arrived at a compromise. The But even as he fled, Japanese heavy
effort to protect Australia was divided cruisers were moving down the “slot”
into three parts, or “tasks.” Task One formed by the Solomon Islands. At 1:30
was to establish a position in the south- a.m. on August 9, they took the Allied
ern Solomon Islands. Because this would cruisers by surprise, destroying four of
require an amphibious landing that only them: three American and one Aus-
the Navy could mount, its South Pacific tralian. This encounter, dubbed the Battle
Area was moved one degree west so as to of Savo, was the U.S. Navy’s worst defeat
include these islands. Task Two would be at sea and did much to prolong the
an army advance along the northeast Guadalcanal campaign. Since Rear Admi-
coast of New Guinea together with a ral Richmond Kelly Turner, who com-
naval drive up the Solomons. Task Three manded Amphibious Force South Pacific,
was to be an assault on Rabaul, a great now had no air cover, he sailed away at
Japanese air and naval base on New noon, leaving the Marines stranded.
Britain, from which it controlled the By a narrow margin, the expedi-
Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago. tionary force on Guadalcanal was saved,
Tasks Two and Three would be under and the island finally taken after a costly
MacArthur’s command, with the Joint campaign lasting six months. Watch-
Chiefs determining the forces’ composi- tower was a mistake all the same, for if
tion and timing. King believed that by forcing the opera-
Turf having been staked out and tion on Marshall he had a guarantee of
honor preserved, King was eager to seize boundless support he was seriously mis-
Guadalcanal (code named Cactus) in the taken. Watchtower had to compete not
Solomons, where a Japanese airfield was only with MacArthur’s theater but with
under construction. MacArthur favored the North African campaign as well.
doing so as well, for operations in the Guadalcanal might have been lost if
Navy’s South Pacific Area supported his Japan had made a maximum effort.
own, unlike the subsequent central Instead, the Japanese sent reinforcements
Pacific campaigns, which were too far in small numbers and never assembled a
away to help him. large enough force to win the battle. Even
The War Department reluctantly so, the Navy was reduced at one point to
went along, despite well-grounded fears a single carrier in the Pacific as a direct
that the Navy was too weak to mount result of Watchtower.
such an offensive and would soon be call- The U.S. Army was dismayed
ing for assistance. The Joint Chiefs because Admiral King was soon
ordered Operation Watchtower—assaults demanding more and more support
on Tulagi and Guadalcanal—to com- from it. He had forced the operation on
mence in early August 1942. Just as the Marshall by threatening to seize Tulagi,
Army feared, King was barely able to which was at first considered more
patch together an expeditionary force. important than Guadalcanal, with naval
The marines went ashore on August 7, power alone if the Army did not assist
297
• S O U T H P A C I F I C A R E A •

In the early
morning light
on Bougain-
ville, a tank
and infantry-
men scout out
Japanese sol-
diers who may
have infiltrated Image Not Available
American lines
the night
before.

him. However, when the fighting started ered blockading and neutralizing it from
he immediately began calling for land- the air, which would free up resources
based air support. King later said that for other operations.
the Battle of Savo Island was the black- As the climax of Operation Cart-
est day of the war for him. After Savo, wheel, Halsey’s forces invaded
which showed that the Navy had over- Bougainville in the Solomons on Novem-
reached itself, King’s demands became ber 1, 1943. The Japanese first sought to
relentless. To hold Guadalcanal would prevent the landings by attacking the
cost America 24 ships and make the invasion fleet with four cruisers and six
waters between the Guadalcanal, Savo, destroyers. They were driven off by a U.S.
and Florida islands—Ironbottom Sound task force composed of four new light
to Allied sailors—the largest naval cruisers and eight destroyers. The Japa-
graveyard of the war. nese then sent down a large force from its
The South Pacific Area’s first theater main fleet anchorage in Truk. But code
commander was Vice Admiral Robert breakers in Hawaii decrypted the order
Ghormley. He did not function well in a and warned Halsey that seven heavy and
job that entailed trying to do too much one light cruiser plus four destroyers were
with too few resources. In September making for Rabaul, which would put
1942 he was replaced by Vice Admiral them within easy striking distance of his
William Halsey, the Navy’s most aggres- landing site in Bougainville.
sive commander. Halsey restored morale Halsey had no battleships or heavy
and, after being given more men and cruisers with which to protect his inva-
munitions, launched Operation Cart- sion force, because every available large
wheel in June 1943. warship had been assigned to the Cen-
Cartwheel’s job was to implement tral Pacific Area. What he did have on
Task Two by taking a series of steps up temporary loan were the fast carriers
the Solomons and toward the Bismar- Saratoga and Princeton. Carrier planes
cks, isolating Fortress Rabaul. Task had never attacked a Japanese base as
Three, the plan to storm Rabaul, now strong as Rabaul, which was believed to
began to fade away as planners consid- have 150 aircraft besides the newly
298
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •

arrived cruisers. But the situation was so


desperate that Halsey ordered Rear Southwest Pacific
Admiral Frederick C. Sherman to throw
every plane he had against Rabaul.
Area
Halsey feared that Sherman’s air
groups would be cut to pieces, yet the
potential losses had to be borne if neces- Before Pearl Harbor was attacked in
sary to save the Bougainville beachhead. December 1941, the Navy had assumed
Sherman launched two strikes on Rabaul that in case of war with Japan, it would
that left the Japanese commander with be in complete control of all of the Pacific
only half his carrier planes, which for war effort. But Army General Douglas
their safety he had to send back to Truk MacArthur’s valiant, though hopeless,
along with the cruisers. The threat to defense of the Philippines made him a
Bougainville was over. By May 1, 1944, national hero. Once he escaped from the
except for Japanese fugitives, the island Philippines to Australia he had to be
had been secured. All the other Cart- given a suitable command. After heavy
wheel objectives in the South and South- negotiations between the Army and Navy
west Pacific areas were similarly reached. early in 1942, they arrived at a compro-
With the completion of Cartwheel, mise that would make a command posi-
operations in the South Pacific came to tion for MacArthur possible.
an end. The South Pacific Area command MacArthur was given what the Joint
was dissolved, and Halsey went on to Chiefs of Staff called the Southwest Pa-
command the Third Fleet in the Central cific Area (SPA). This theater consisted of
and Southwest Pacific areas. His best Australia, New Guinea, the Philippines,
work of the war was done in the South the Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Archi-
Pacific, where he turned a dispirited com- pelago, and most of the Netherlands East
mand around, took the Solomons, and Indies. The Navy was given almost all the
helped isolate Rabaul, where 100,000 rest of the Pacific, which it named the
Japanese would spend the rest of the war Pacific Ocean Area. The great defect of
waiting for an invasion that never came. this arrangement was that it meant there
Invading Guadalcanal may have would be no supreme commander in the
been a mistake, but in the end U.S. sol- Pacific and thus no unified effort could
diers and sailors in the South Pacific Area be mounted. Instead, the Army and Navy
fought a successful war of attrition that would, for the most part, fight two sepa-
cost the Japanese dearly. rate wars against Japan.
The first challenge facing the United
SEE ALSO
States within the SPA was to save Aus-
Guadalcanal, Battle of; Halsey, William F.;
Southwest Pacific Area tralia, which was being threatened by
Japan’s huge gains in the Southwest Pa-
F U RTHER READING cific. The Joint Chiefs decided to protect
Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United Australia by launching three separate
States Naval Operations in World War operations called “tasks.”
II: Breaking the Bismarck Barrier, 22 Task One was to invade the southern
July 1942–1 May 1944. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1950. Solomon Islands. As this would require
Morris, Mack. South Pacific Diary, an amphibious landing, the Navy’s South
1942–1943. Lexington: University Press Pacific Area was enlarged to include these
of Kentucky, 1996.
Potter, E. B. Bull Halsey. Annapolis, Md.: islands. Task Two would have the Army
Naval Institute Press, 1985. advance up the northeast coast of New
299
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •

Red Cross earth too, but they stubbornly defended it


workers pre- yard by yard despite appalling hardships.
pare to ship All who fought in New Guinea were
gift boxes to tormented by its horrors. The perils of
servicemen the jungle war were severe, but were out-
fighting on weighed by “jungle rot”—dreadful ulcers
islands in the
that formed all over soldiers’ bodies—
Philippines.
clouds of insects whose bites quickly
Each soldier Image Not Available
was to receive
became festering sores, leeches that
a gift package attached themselves to genitals and rec-
on Christmas tums, and diseases like malaria and
Day. dysentery, which struck down five men
for every one that was wounded in battle.
But the Australians hung on, and their
gallantry and sacrifices paid off. They
occupied Milne Bay at the tip of Papua
Guinea, at the same time as the naval and held it, preventing Japanese flanking
campaigns in the Solomons. Task Three movements. They slowed the Japanese
entailed an attack on Rabaul, Japan’s drive on Port Moresby as well, which
most important naval and air base in the became weaker as it advanced, because
region and the key to victory. Tasks Two the enemy could not bring enough sup-
and Three would be under MacArthur’s plies over the terrible mountains.
command, with the Joint Chiefs deter- Meanwhile, the Australian force had
mining when and on what scale they a shortening support line, and as more
would be undertaken. men and supplies were fed into it they
On July 22, 1942, at the same time as became progressively stronger. The
the Navy was preparing to invade Guadal- enemy was stopped 25 miles from Port
canal, 16,000 Japanese troops landed at Moresby, then gradually driven back on
Buna on the north coast of Papua, New supply lines so slim that by October
Guinea. Their objective was Port Moresby, Japanese soldiers on the Kokoda Trail
an important strategic site for launching had been reduced to cannibalism.
an Australian campaign. If the Papuan MacArthur’s counteroffensive did
Peninsula had been level, Port Moresby not get off to a brilliant start. For the
would have been easy to take, for only a reconquest of Papua, MacArthur had
handful of Australian soldiers stood only two U.S. divisions, both of them
between the Japanese and their target. National Guard outfits that had not gone
What made Port Moresby’s defense through the Army’s new training pro-
possible were the Owen Stanley Moun- gram and were completely unprepared to
tains, which rise to a height of 13,000 fight. Experience would show that, unlike
feet from their roots in a steaming jungle. the Army’s regular divisions, which had
The Kokoda Trail over the mountains officers promoted on merit and no bad
was only a path, adequate for barefoot habits to unlearn, National Guard divi-
natives but not for armed soldiers. The sions required extra training. But they
Japanese troops who landed at Gona and were all that MacArthur had, and he was
Buna on the Solomon Sea were obliged forced to use them. The 32nd Infantry
to march from tropical heat and filth to Division was considered the better of his
freezing mountain passes. For Aus- two guard units. On September 15
tralians, the Kokoda Trail was a hell on MacArthur’s air officer, Major General
300
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •

George Kenney, began flying the 32nd to Yet MacArthur was learning fast,
Papua—the first large-scale airlift ever and the experience would not be wasted.
undertaken by the U.S. Army. After the Papuan campaign he made a
The hardest fighting took place in promise, which he kept, that there would
the Buna-Gona area. It was the scene of be “no more Bunas.” During the next
one of the worst-directed U.S. battles of two years his troops would suffer fewer
the war, largely because MacArthur had than 20,000 deaths in the course of many
little understanding of the Army’s new operations, partly because of tactical
triangular division formation, an lessons he learned in Papua that would
infantry-artillery team which had make his later campaigns more efficient.
tremendous firepower. Unfamiliar with Among other things, he was learning the
the triangular division, MacArthur many uses of aircraft, whose value he
broke up the 32nd and sent it to Papua had previously sneered at.
without heavy artillery or tank support. MacArthur’s understanding of sea
Its luckless commander, Major General power was expanding too. His need for
Edwin Forrest Harding, was obliged to troop transports was glaringly exposed at
separate the division into undergunned Buna, because he had almost no ships
task forces and throw them against and thus could not stage landings to out-
defenses that were nearly impossible flank or isolate enemy fortifications. His
to take. complaints led the Navy to assign him a
In the Buna-Gona area, MacArthur specialist, Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey,
repeatedly ordered costly frontal attacks whose VII Amphibious Force would
that had no chance of success. His chief of stage 56 operations in the Southwest
staff, the much hated Major General Pacific Area. MacArthur also learned
Richard K. Sutherland, inspected the battle how to exploit the decrypted enemy
area and reported back that guns, not lead- radio messages provided by army and
ership, were needed. MacArthur then navy intelligence. They would play a key
relieved Harding and put Lieutenant Gen- part in future operations by helping
eral Robert L. Eichelberger in command, determine which enemy strongholds
saying: “I want you to take Buna, or not to could be bypassed.
come back alive.” MacArthur still did not have enough
Buna fell on January 22, 1943, the of anything—during the first year of cam-
first time Japan had sustained a perma- paigning in Italy the United States shipped
nent defeat on land. But a very heavy 2.3 million tons of provisions to the Italian
price was paid for victory in Papua, people alone, which was roughly equal to
which MacArthur refused to admit, say- the volume of supplies provided to
ing instead that no campaign in history MacArthur’s entire theater. The Aus-
had gained so much at so little cost. This tralians made up some of the difference,
was an absurd boast that the facts proved but his command would never be supplied
to be hollow. as well as U.S. troops in Europe. Nor
In Papua some 40,000 Allied troops would he ever have enough warships.
were committed, and the Army suffered Even so, MacArthur worked wonders.
8,546 casualties, including 3,095 killed—a In 1943 the Southwest Pacific Area
death rate more than triple that of Guadal- campaign concentrated on the advance
canal. The 126th Infantry Regiment was to Rabaul. MacArthur was disappointed
completely wiped out, and whole battal- when the Joint Chiefs canceled his
ions were reduced by disease and casual- assault on that fortress. However, in a
ties to a tenth of their normal strength. series of amphibious and air attacks
301
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •

American
troops wade
ashore the
heavily mined
beaches during
the invasion of
Cebu Island in
the Philippines.

Image Not Available

MacArthur isolated it and laid the basis control over a vast region, which the
for his brilliant bypassing strategy. Oper- Japanese vainly contested until their air
ation Cartwheel required him to attack strength was wiped out.
west along the coast of New Guinea, The key to MacArthur’s success was
north to the Admiralty Islands, and east his use of tactical air, which was more
into New Britain while Admiral William important in the Southwest Pacific Area
Halsey’s South Pacific Area forces were than perhaps any other theater. The
working their way up the Solomons. Southwest Pacific is thick with islands
Some at home were discouraged by capable of providing numerous sites for
the campaign’s slow progress. In August airfields. But unlike in Europe, the
1943 Life magazine noted sourly that it enemy’s air defenses were weak,
had taken a year of fighting to advance enabling even heavy bombers to make
from Guadalcanal to the tip of New precise low-level attacks.
Georgia, a distance of 200 miles. At that MacArthur also had an outstanding
rate the United States would invade air commander in General George C.
Japan sometime in 1957. Kenney. Kenney taught MacArthur
But these early efforts were about what planes could do, starting with the
finding solid footing. As U.S. power airlift to Buna that had encountered so
built up, the pace quickened. In Febru- much skepticism. Gradually, Kenney’s
ary 1944 a daring surprise attack put team worked out a strategy of blockad-
MacArthur in the Admiralty Islands (lit- ing enemy strongpoints from the air,
erally, because on this occasion he covering and assisting Allied ground
accompanied the troops, which was a troops while, by advancing their for-
rare event), and he secured them a ward bases, bringing more and more
month later. This completed the encir- Japanese targets within bombing range,
clement of Rabaul and ensured Japan’s or inside what was commonly called the
defeat. The United States now had air bomb line.
302
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •

By 1944 MacArthur had the means cost of 159 U.S. dead. Of 7,000 Japanese
for his most daring effort yet, a long who escaped into the jungle barely 1,000
leap up the New Guinea coast that survived.
would carry his forces 580 miles beyond Flushed with success, MacArthur’s
the enemy’s lines and into their rear. forces then moved quickly forward, seiz-
This campaign would become widely ing one island or coastal base after anoth-
admired as one of the most beautifully er. Only on Biak, where the Japanese
planned and executed of the war. were strongly entrenched and did not
The conventional wisdom in April charge the beaches and expose themselves
1944, in both Japan and the United to naval gunfire, were there problems. All
States, was that Wewak or Hansa Bay in the same, on August 20, at a cost of 600
northeast New Guinea had to be the next U.S. casualties, Biak was secured. In less
target. They were inside the bomb line than two years MacArthur had advanced
and the Japanese occupation force of almost 2,000 miles, and 1,100 were cov-
55,000 men had to be destroyed, accord- ered in the last two months.
ing to orthodox doctrine, before U.S. There was only one drawback to
forces could move farther along the coast. this splendid achievement—many
The idea of bypassing Wewak bypassed Japanese garrisons still had to
developed after bombing attacks on air- be taken. Thus, while U.S. forces went
fields in and around Hollandia on to bigger things, the Australian Army
destroyed the Japanese air cover. Intelli- spent the rest of the war mopping up
gence reported that unlike Wewak, Hol- the Japanese in New Guinea—an
landia was lightly defended. When one unglamorous task that cost it many
of MacArthur’s planners brought this to casualties. Typically, MacArthur gave
his attention, MacArthur decided to the Australians no credit for this effort.
cancel the planned attack on Hansa Bay MacArthur had wanted to liberate
and leap over it to Hollandia. the Philippines ever since he had been
All went according to plan. The forced to abandon them in March 1942.
Fifth Air Force performed so well that Sentiment, politics, and personal vanity
the Japanese were left with only 25 all played a part in this, but there was a
planes in the whole of New Guinea. sound military reason, too, for retaking
Admiral Barbey’s amphibious force, the at least the northernmost island of
largest yet seen in the southwest Pacific, Luzon. Its Manila Bay was a great har-
consisted of 217 vessels carrying 80,000 bor, and aircraft based in Luzon would
troops, which had been brought to- command the South China Sea and finish
gether from three different staging areas the job of cutting off Japan from its
located up to 1,000 miles away. Southeast Asian empire.
The plan unfolded as air and naval Admiral King thought otherwise,
attacks on Wewak and Hansa Bay con- however. He wanted the Navy’s central
vinced the enemy that they were Pacific drive to end with the seizure of
MacArthur’s targets, so that when on Formosa, which did not have as good a
April 22 his fleet changed course the ele- harbor as Manila Bay but otherwise
ment of surprise was total. This opera- would serve the same purpose as Luzon.
tion hastened the liberation of New A final decision was deferred, but an
Guinea by several months and provided agreement was reached that MacArthur’s
the Allies with a magnificent harbor that next move should be to take the southern
became one of their most important Philippine island of Mindanao.
bases. All this was gained at an initial Accordingly, in September 1944
303
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •

Image Not Available

Admiral Halsey, now commanding the because Nimitz would require up to


Fifth Fleet, raided the Philippines and 200,000 army service troops for the oper-
encountered little resistance. He therefore ation and they did not exist.
advised Admiral Nimitz to bypass Min- But there were enough troops for
danao and invade the central Philippines. operations in the Philippines, whose
The Joint Chiefs, then in Quebec for a friendly inhabitants would provide much
conference, promptly directed that opera- of the needed labor, and for Okinawa
tions planned for the Talauds, Mindanao, also. Meanwhile, in China the advancing
and Yap be canceled and everything Japanese were seizing more and more
thrown at Leyte—except for a small force U.S. air bases. This ruled out the possibil-
that was to take the Palau Islands. (When ity of land-based air support from China
assaulted, the main island of Peleliu in for an assault on Formosa. It also elimi-
Palau would cost U.S. forces some nated the value of Formosa as a staging
10,000 casualties, to no real purpose). area for landings on the China coast, as
Leyte was about to be assaulted by the these were now out of the question. In
greatest naval strength ever assembled, the end, almost no one except King liked
for the Seventh and Third fleets together Formosa as an objective, and on October
deployed some 17 fast and 18 escort car- 3 he finally gave in. The Joint Chiefs then
riers, 12 battleships, 28 cruisers, 150 directed MacArthur to assault Luzon in
destroyers, and hundreds of other vessels. December.
Once the United States was commit- Although the initial landings in Leyte
ted to Leyte, opinion soon turned in on October 20, 1944, were easy, the
favor of Luzon over Formosa. invasion fleet was almost sunk by a
MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs strong Japanese surface force which, after
that seizing Leyte would enable him to Admiral Halsey and his Third Fleet were
invade Luzon two months ahead of lured away by decoy ships, nearly broke
schedule. Formosa could not be attacked through the U.S. escort carrier screen. In
that soon, and before long, planners the end, however, what became known as
decided that Formosa could not be invad- the Battle of Leyte Gulf ended with such
ed at all until after victory in Europe, a decisive Allied victory that the Imperial
304
• S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C A R E A •

Japanese Navy was, for all practical pur- business district were destroyed and
poses, destroyed. 100,000 civilians died. Among the other
Leyte proved a much tougher nut to world cities involved in the war, only
crack than expected because of weather Warsaw is believed to have sustained
conditions that deprived the invading more damage.
troops of land-based air cover and allowed During this time MacArthur sent
the Japanese to reinforce their garrison. Lieutenant General Eichelberger to liber-
This forced a delay in attacking Luzon, ate the rest of the archipelago in a cam-
but on January 9 when MacArthur’s paign that made little military sense and
troops went ashore at Lingayen Gulf they that the Joint Chiefs did not want, but
were as strong as they had ever been, that delivered many Filipinos from
amounting to 10 divisions, 5 regimental enemy hands and was a masterpiece of
combat teams (enlarged regiments compa- dash and daring. Eichelberger’s Eighth
rable to brigades), and various other Army, Barbey’s VII Amphibious Force,
units—more U.S. troops than would fight and Lieutenant General Paul B. Wurt-
together anywhere else in the war except smith’s Thirteenth Air Force came
on the western front in Europe. together to pull off 14 major and 24
So many Japanese troops and minor amphibious landings in 44 days,
weapons had been lost defending Leyte freeing most of the Philippine islands.
that General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Operations did not go so well in
famed as the conqueror of Malaya, had northern Luzon, however, where
decided not to defend Lingayen. Thus, Yamashita’s troops had withdrawn to the
the landings were no problem. Simply mountains. The fighting there was bitter
getting there was the hard part, for some and went on for the rest of the war, with
200 Japanese suicide planes took a heavy some 50,000 Japanese holding out until
toll on the invasion fleet, sinking 24 V-J Day, August 15, 1945. Some have
ships, seriously damaging 27 more, and criticized MacArthur for not beefing up
inflicting more than 2,100 casualties, of the 6th Army and crushing Yamashita.
whom 738 were killed. The Seventh Yet the slower approach saved many lives
Fleet’s little escort carriers did not have in a situation where haste was unneces-
the fighter strength to break up these sary. Even on its reduced scale, Luzon
kamikaze attacks, and the fleet carriers was the biggest campaign in the South-
of Task Force 38 were not there to do it west Pacific Area, with 8,300 Americans,
for them. Once again, having a divided 1,100 Filipino guerrillas, and 205,000
command resulted in extra losses. The Japanese dying during its course. Liberat-
good news was that after 200 Japanese ing the entire archipelago cost the United
suicide planes had gone down, there States some 48,000 casualties and 14,000
were no more kamikaze attacks. deaths, the great majority sustained on
On February 3, advance units of the Leyte and Luzon.
1st Cavalry Division were in Manila’s Considering the scale of the fighting,
northern suburbs, liberating Santo the number of casualties was actually
Tomas University and nearly 4,000 moderate. The enemy lost 350,000
Allied internees. But because the Japa- troops in the archipelago, making it far
nese commander put up a ferocious and away the most crushing defeat Japan
defense, it took a month to secure Ma- would sustain in the Pacific. On Oki-
nila, during which time 70 percent of the nawa, by comparison, 7,000 U.S. troops
city’s factories, 80 percent of its southern would be killed fighting an enemy force
residential area, and 100 percent of its less than a third the size of Japan’s
305
• S O V I E T U N I O N •

Philippine garrison. Had MacArthur nia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Bessarabia,


assaulted Yamashita in the headlong cen- and, after a short but bitter war, the
tral Pacific style his losses might well Karelian Isthmus of Finland. It also
have been similar. required the Soviets to supply Germany
Except for Yamashita’s last stand, with large quantities of raw materials,
and clean-up operations in New Guinea, which they did right up to the day they
the liberation of the Philippines complet- were invaded.
ed the work of Allied forces in the Although Americans have commonly
Southwest Pacific Area. After a shaky referred to the U.S.S.R. as Russia, the
start, the Southwest Pacific Area’s strate- Russian Federation, which was the
gic planning, tactical inventiveness, and largest of 11 republics that were indepen-
skillful execution set a standard of excel- dent in name only, actually made up only
lence rarely matched in any other theater 64 percent of the Soviet population. But
of war. because many of the U.S.S.R.’s inhabi-
tants were not of Russian descent, the
SEE ALSO Russian population of the U.S.S.R. as a
Leyte Gulf, Battle of; MacArthur, Douglas; whole amounted to 58.4 percent. The
South Pacific Area Ukrainian Republic was the next largest,
F U RTHER READING with about 16.6 percent of the entire
Bergerud, Eric. Touched with Fire: The population. The rest of the Soviet Union
Land War in the South Pacific. New was home to a dizzying variety of peo-
York: Viking, 1996. ples, including Byelorussians, Uzbeks,
Cannon, M. Hamlin. Leyte: The Return to
the Philippines. Washington: Office of Tatars, Kazakhs, Armenians, Georgians,
the Chief of Military History, Depart- and on and on, speaking more than 80
ment of the Army, 1954. different languages and numerous
James, D. Clayton. The Years of
dialects.
MacArthur. Vol. 2. 1941–1945.
Smith, Robert Ross. Triumph in the Philip- In 1941 Soviet citizens were still
pines. Washington, D.C.: Department of recovering from years of bloodshed
the Army, 1963. inflicted on them by the savage regime of
Joseph Stalin. From the late 1920s
through the early 1930s, millions of peas-
ants were shot, died of starvation (mostly
Soviet Union as a result of government policies
(U.S.S.R.) designed to achieve that end), or died in
forced labor camps. Millions more fled to
the cities or were deported to Siberia.
Additional millions of people, including
When it was invaded by Germany on most leaders of the original Bolshevik
June 22, 1941, the Union of Soviet Revolution and almost the entire senior
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) had a popu- officer corps of the Red Army, were killed
lation of about 170 million. This figure during the Great Terror of 1935–39.
does not include those living in the east- The exact number of deaths by exe-
ern area of Poland, which the U.S.S.R. cution, starvation, and being overworked
had acquired in 1939 as a result of the and underfed in the vast chain of forced
Stalin-Hitler Pact. That agreement, which labor camps known today as the Gulag
opened the way for Germany’s invasion Archipelago is unknown. But a common
of Poland, allowed the Soviets to take figure is that 20 million Soviets perished
much of Poland, the Baltic states (Esto- as a result of Stalin’s orders. All this
306
• S O V I E T U N I O N •

occurred before a single Soviet citizen half of 1941. In 1942, and for every year
was killed by the invading Germans. thereafter, Soviet production of aircraft,
Understandably, many Soviet citi- tanks, and other important weapons
zens, especially those in the Ukraine, exceeded Germany’s output. This was
which had been hardest hit by the accomplished even though Germany’s
famines, initially welcomed the German steel and coal production was much
soldiers as liberators. Wholesale confisca- greater than that of the Soviets through
tions and massacres soon made it clear, 1944. The Soviets also received substan-
however, that—impossible as it seemed— tial Lend-Lease aid from the United
Hitler’s rule would be even worse than States, although this program’s assistance
Stalin’s. This realization united the Soviets did not become important until 1943,
as Stalin could never have done and when the tide of battle had already
made possible an almost miraculous turned in the U.S.S.R.’s favor.
national recovery. Stalin exploited this The miracle of Soviet military pro-
national will to survive by naming the duction was achieved by sacrificing civil-
Soviet struggle the Great Patriotic War. ian goods production almost completely.
Only a united and determined peo- Agricultural production was hard hit
ple could have survived the terrible losses too, not only from the loss of farmlands
of 1941. Many millions of Soviet soldiers but because the agricultural workforce
were killed or captured. Germany occu- fell by a third (compared to a 12.5 per-
pied Soviet territories that included 40 cent decline in the industrial workforce).
percent of the country’s population, 60 Because few able-bodied men of military
percent of its armaments industries, 63 age remained on the farms, most work
percent of its coal, 58 percent of its steel was done by women, minors, and the
production, and similar large shares of aged. The loss of horses, oxen, and trac-
its industrial and agricultural output. tors meant that women had to serve as
The key to Soviet survival in the face draft animals to an astonishing degree.
of these staggering losses was relocation. Women made up a large part of the
Even as the fighting raged, not only did industrial work force as well, and
millions of people flee the invaded 800,000 served in the military, some in
regions, but they removed much of their combat jobs.
industry as well. A total of 2,593 plants Under these conditions, Soviet agri-
relocated to new sites in the Volga cultural output fell drastically. Because of
region, beyond the Ural Mountains, and German advances the total population—
elsewhere. Some 40 percent of the work- including Poles—fell from 194 million to
ers and technicians relocated as well. A 130 million. But while the population of
second, though smaller, relocation was the native Soviets alone fell to 67 percent
made necessary in 1942 as a new Ger- of its prewar size, potato production fell
man offensive threatened the Volga and to 31.3 of what it had been, grain to
Caucasus regions. 27.9 percent, and meat and fats to 38.3
Meanwhile, military production in percent. This meant that most Soviet citi-
unaffected areas increased at such a rate zens went through the war in a state of
that even while the relocation was going malnutrition, a condition worsened by
on, target levels set before the war were the fact that most of them, including
actually exceeded. Production still did children and the aged, were working
not meet requirements, but Soviet indus- harder and for longer hours than before.
try manufactured about as many Calorie allowances for dependents were
weapons as Germany did in the second set at 780 a day and for nonindustrial
307
• S O V I E T U N I O N •

employees at 1,074 to 1,176. To encour-


age people to work in factories, indus-
trial workers had a ration that provided
up to 4,418 calories a day, though this
quota was seldom met.
The conditions in Soviet factories Image Not Available
were extremely harsh. This was particu-
larly so in the relocated plants, which
often lacked roofs and whose workers
slept in the open at first. New housing,
when it was available, consisted mainly
of hovels. This held true for relocated without reason—to be his enemies, most Three Soviet
plants and the nation as whole. commanders had been promoted above women with
As might be expected, civilian mortal- their experience and ability. Soviet mili- guns plan
ity rates under these conditions were very tary doctrine emphasized infantry tactics guerilla fight-
high. It is estimated that the total popula- to the neglect of armor and air power. It ing strategies.
The sheer num-
tion decrease, including indirect losses also concentrated on offense and did little
ber and deter-
resulting from premature births, desertion, to prepare the Red Army for the defen-
mination of the
and emigration, may have been as high as sive battles it would be called on to fight.
Russian people,
48 million. Many deaths resulted from Although it had a great many tanks, most as well as
Stalin’s policy of removing entire peoples were obsolete and few had radios. Soviet severe winter
to Siberia whose loyalty was suspect. aircraft were not much better. weather,
These groups included the Volga Ger- What seemed at first to be another proved to be
mans, who had been there for centuries, obsolete feature of the Soviet war engine too much for
the Tatars of Crimea, and others. was the large number of cavalry units the Germans.
Many deaths also resulted from Sta- attached to the Red Army. In fact,
lin’s order of August 16, 1941, which because the Soviet Union had few good
defined surrender as treason. Any soldiers roads, the horses were invaluable and
who surrendered and later fell into Soviet gave the Soviets scouting and raiding
hands were to be shot on the spot. The capabilities that the Germans greatly
families of those who surrendered were envied.
to be arrested or deprived of all state At the time of the German invasion,
allowances and assistance, which was fre- the Red Army had 5.37 million men
quently a sentence of death. Because mil- under arms, and another 5 million were
lions of soldiers became prisoners of war, mobilized within 10 days. On paper they
millions of families suffered accordingly. should have been more than a match for
The Red Army had been profession- the 3 million German and other soldiers
alized during the 1930s and equipped in the invasion force. But the Soviets were
with a substantial number of weapons. short of transport, their communications
The share of the national budget going to soon broke down for lack of radios, and
the military rose from 9.1 percent in their prewar training and tactics proved
1927–28 to 43.4 percent in 1938. But to be out of date. As if this were not
although it was better trained and enough, incompetent leadership resulting
equipped as a result of these expendi- from the purges ensured disaster.
tures, the army suffered from numerous Throughout the war, Stavka, the
defects. Because the senior officer corps Soviet high command that worked direct-
had been slaughtered in Stalin’s earlier ly under Stalin, introduced numerous
purges of people he suspected—often changes. What was an army group in the
308
• S O V I E T U N I O N •

West was known as a “front” to the produced the much more advanced Ger-
Soviets and was named after the military man economy in almost every important
district to which it was assigned. Each category of weapons. Although accurate
front had a varying number of armies of figures are hard to come by (which is true
varying sizes, depending on its mission. In throughout Soviet history), a few facts
1942 the first tank corps were formed, are suggestive. In December 1941, the
and then the first tank armies, which low point of the Soviet war effort, the
were designed as offensive units. In the Soviet and German forces each had about
same year, entire artillery divisions were 2,500 combat aircraft. By January 1945,
created to provide massive concentrations when both countries were close to their
of firepower, above and beyond the guns peak production levels, the Soviets had at
provided to each rifle (infantry) division. least 14,500 aircraft, the Germans not
In 1943 artillery corps were formed with quite 2,000.
700 guns apiece. At war’s end there were For tanks and self-propelled guns,
10 of these corps. the 1941 figures were 1,700 Soviet and
Stalin never accepted the concept of 1,500 German. The 1945 figures in this
the strategic retreat. And he insisted on category were 11,000 and 4,000, respec-
massing troops so that defeats became tively. Most Soviet tanks were compara-
catastrophes. However, once the Red ble to the best German tanks, something
Army went over to the offensive in 1943 that was never true on the western front.
these mistaken ideas no longer mattered. No other state—not even Germany
Although the Red Army’s perfor- and Japan—suffered losses on the
mance improved enormously during the immense scale that the Soviets did. And
course of the war, some of its problems no other nation made as great a contribu-
were never solved. German optics and elec- tion to the defeat of Germany. A few sim-
tronics were always better, as was German ple statistics make this clear. Germany’s
leadership, especially on the middle and armed force suffered more than 13 mil-
lower levels. Stalin squandered men by lion casualties—killed, wounded, cap-
insisting, for example, that the infantry tured, and missing in action—in the entire
attack without tank support, with Soviet war. Of these, 10 million were sustained
armor being kept in reserve to exploit fighting the Soviets on the eastern front.
breakthroughs. It appears also that on at
least some occasions minefields were SEE ALSO

cleared by having low-grade troops or pun- Eastern front; Finland; Germany; Japan,
ishment battalions march through them. surrender of; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad,
Battle of
These unfortunate tactics led to huge
and avoidable losses. By one estimate the
F U RTHER READING
Red Army lost more men taking Berlin
alone than the U.S. Army lost in action in Dunn, Walter S. Hitler’s Nemesis: The Red
Army, 1930–1945. Westport, Conn.:
the entire European theater. In all, it Praeger, 1994.
appears that some 11 million Soviet ser- Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. Boul-
vicemen and women were killed in action der, Colo.: Westview, 1983.
Salisbury, Harrison. The Siege of
or died of their wounds. This figure com-
Leningrad. New York: Avon, 1969.
pares with fewer than 300,000 U.S. battle Temkin, Gabriel. My Just War: The Mem-
deaths for the entire war. oir of a Jewish Red Army Soldier in
Despite these horrendous losses, World War II. Novato, Calif.: Presidio,
1998.
which led to severe manpower shortages Werth, Alexander. Russia at War,
in Soviet defense plants, the Soviets out- 1941–1945. New York: Avon, 1970.
309
• S P A A T Z , C A R L A . •

Accordingly, the RAF’s Bomber Com-


Spaatz, Carl A. mand was forced to attack at night.
COMMANDER OF THE Because for years the smallest target that
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC could be found at night was a large city,
AIR FORCES EUROPE, 1944–45 strategic bombing had to be abandoned.
Instead, Bomber Command made what
• Born: June 28, 1891, Boyertown, Pa.
were called area attacks, on the theory
• Political party: none
that by killing civilians and burning
• Education: U.S. Military Academy,
B.S., 1914; Air Service Tactical School, their homes German morale would be
1924–25; Command and General destroyed.
Staff School, 1934–35
In 1943 the first U.S. heavy bomber
• Military service: U.S. Army—second
lieutenant, 1914; major, 1917; groups began attacking German targets.
commander, 13th Aero Squadron, 1918; Initially, United States air commanders
commander, 7th Bombardment Group, were not deterred by the RAF’s dismal
1928–31; lieutenant colonel, 1935;
colonel, 1939; brigadier general, 1940; experience, because they believed that General Carl
chief of the Air Staff, U.S. Army Air their heavy bombers were armed and
Forces, 1941; commander, Eighth Air Spaatz (right)
Force, 1942; major general, 1942; air
armored strongly enough to fight their presents a gold
commander, N.W. Africa, 1943; way through the German fighter screen. loving cup he
lieutenant general, 1943; commander of America’s four-engine bombers, the B-17 received in
the United States Strategic Air Forces
Europe, 1944–45; general, 1945 Flying Fortress and the B-24 Liberator, London to
• Died: July 14, 1974, Washington, D.C. carried many heavy machine guns and General H. H.
plenty of armor plate. Even so, the Arnold (left)
Eighth Air Force discovered that it could while the
not fight its way through German fight- British ambas-
sador looks on.
The model “Bomber Baron,” General ers without taking unacceptable losses.
The cup is
Carl Spaatz was one of those airmen In the fall of 1943, therefore, strategic
symbolic of
who embraced the doctrine of strategic attacks on Germany came to a halt. friendship
bombing after World War I. As outlined Having invested so much in strategic between the
by General William “Billy” Mitchell and bombing, the U.S. Army Air Forces were Royal Air
others in the 1920s and 1930s, this the- unwilling to give up on it. Major Gen- Force and the
ory held that in the future it would be eral Ira Eaker, who commanded the U.S. Army Air
possible to defeat an enemy nation Eighth Air Force, based in Britain, was Forces.
solely through air power. By destroying
its defense plants and infrastructure, the
argument went, an enemy would be
deprived of the means to wage war and
would have to surrender without ever
being invaded.
Leaders of Britain’s Royal Air Force
believed in strategic bombing too, but Image Not Available
found themselves unable to put theory
into practice. Because bombardiers had
to see their targets, German objectives
had to be attacked in daylight to be
accurately hit. This tactic proved to be
impossible to carry out, however,
because bombers operating by day were
sitting ducks for German fighters.
310
• S P A A T Z , C A R L A . •

relieved of his job and made the senior air what was called the Transportation Plan.
officer in the Mediterranean theater. Gen- The idea behind it was to disrupt the
eral Spaatz, who had been commanding French rail and road systems so that
in the Mediterranean, was sent to Britain Germany could not reinforce and resup-
as commander of a newly formed entity, ply its forces in Normandy.
the United States Strategic Air Forces Although Eisenhower’s desire to see
Europe (USSTAF). His command includ- some visible support from the heavy
ed the Eighth Air Force and a newly bomb groups was understandable, in
formed Fifteenth Air Force based in the this instance Spaatz was right. There
Mediterranean. In addition, Spaatz was was in fact no need for USSTAF to
put in charge of all other U.S. air units in attack transportation targets in France,
the European Theater of Operations. because Bomber Command, which by
Since Eaker tended to defer to Spaatz, mid-1944 had achieved a high degree of
Spaatz became, in effect, the director of all accuracy, could attack rail yards as well
U.S. air operations in both theaters. or better. Also, the Allies had big tactical
In practice, however, Spaatz was air formations that were extremely effec-
primarily concerned with strategic tive against transportation targets.
bombing. In February 1944 the USSTAF Spaatz persisted, however, bootleg-
resumed its attacks on Germany, this ging oil attacks as often as the Trans-
time with the support of long-range portation Plan allowed. By the fall of
fighter escorts that previously had not 1944 he was finally free to concentrate
been available. This cover enabled on oil targets. Eventually the Oil Plan
USSTAF to gain control of the daylight would succeed, but the problem was
skies over Germany and reduce the Ger- that oil plants had to be bombed visu-
man fighter force, for the most part, to ally, and clear days came only about
night operations. That was the major once a month. Thus, in practice USSTAF
contribution made by heavy bombers to was forced to bomb blind most of the
the success of Overlord, the Allied inva- time, using H2X radar sets that could
sion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. not find a target smaller than a city.
During the preinvasion period, and Because visibility was too poor for
for a time afterward, Spaatz fought hard precision bombing, the attacking aircraft
to keep his bombing attacks confined to would bomb cities as their secondary
strategic targets. The ones he most targets. These bombings were area
wished to destroy were oil plants, attacks, and therefore in their effects lit-
refineries, and factories that turned coal tle different from the terror raids made
into synthetic gasoline. This campaign by the RAF.
was known as the Oil Plan. But General The USSTAF terror raids became a
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied public issue after the bombing of Dres-
supreme commander in Europe, who den in 1945. Bomber Command
had gained direct control of USSTAF and attacked this previously unbombed city
the RAF’s Bomber Command during the on the night of February 13–14, creating
invasion period, disagreed. He and other a firestorm that virtually leveled it. On
Allied commanders had too often seen the 14th, USSTAF made two separate
heavy bomber commanders make claims attacks on Dresden, aiming, as usual, at
for strategic bombing that were not its marshaling yards, not knowing that
borne out in practice. Thus he insisted they had already been destroyed. Unlike
that the heavy bomber forces attack rail most such attacks, the bombing of Dres-
marshaling targets in France as part of den became an issue in the United States.
311
• S P R U A N C E , R A Y M O N D A M E S •

Its apparent brutality and pointlessness July 1903–08; ensign, 1908; lieutenant,
sparked reports that the Allies were now j.g., 1911; lieutenant, 1913; lieutenant
commander, 1917; commander, 1918;
committed to terror attacks. Spaatz captain, 1932; rear admiral, 1940;
strongly defended USSTAF’s policies, commander of carrier task force at
Battle of Midway, June 4–6, 1942; vice
arguing that precision bombing was admiral, 1943; commander Fifth Fleet,
still the goal, with the area attacks 1943; admiral, 1944.
being made only out of necessity. Most • Died: December 13, 1969, Pebble
Americans seemed to have accepted Beach, Calif.
this position.
It became apparent that the
USSTAF’s strategy was successful at the
time of Germany’s surrender. By then its Raymond A. Spruance was the best
rail system had been put out of commis- American seagoing admiral of World War
sion by attacks on the rail yards. Its oil II, and perhaps in the entire history of the
industry was defunct as well. Still, the United States. In his time he was less
fact remains that Germany surrendered famous than his outspoken partner,
not for these reasons but because it had William Halsey, who became a five-star
been overrun by Allied and Soviet forces. fleet admiral, while Spruance retired with
Spaatz’s legacy was, therefore, ambigu- only four stars. But Spruance was a better
ous, both morally and with respect to seaman than Halsey, and made better
the value of strategic bombing. decisions in the heat of battle. He was
also a quiet man, highly intelligent, cour-
SEE ALSO
teous, and publicity-shy.
Arnold, Henry H.; Berlin, bombing of;
Royal Air Force; Schweinfurt, bombing of; Spruance worked his way up the lad-
Strategic bombing der of promotion as a commander of sur-
face ships. When the Pacific war broke
F U RTHER READING out on December 7, 1941, he was in
Davis, Richard G. Carl A. Spaatz and the charge of Cruiser Division 5, part of
Air War in Europe. Washington, D.C.: Halsey’s carrier task force. In May 1942
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.
Mets, David R. Master of Airpower: Gen- naval intelligence learned that the Japa-
eral Carl A. Spaatz. Novato, Calif.: Pre- nese main fleet was going to attack Mid-
sidio, 1988. way Island, the westernmost one of the
Hawaiian chain. Its purpose was to lure
the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s carriers into a trap
Spruance, Raymond and destroy them.
Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander
Ames in chief of the Pacific Fleet, decided to
AMERICAN ADMIRAL, meet the Japanese force because even
VICTOR OF THE BATTLES OF though the Americans would be outnum-
MIDWAY AND THE bered and outgunned in every type of ship
PHILIPPINE SEA and weapon, they would have the advan-
tage of surprise. Halsey should have been
• Born: July 3, 1986, Baltimore, Md.
• Political party: none
in command of this battle, but he was
• Education: U.S. Military Academy, hospitalized with a skin condition. When
B.S., 1914; Air Service Tactical School, Nimitz asked Halsey who should take
1924–25; Command and General over his command, he picked Spruance.
Staff School, 1934–35
• Military service: U.S. Navy:
This was unheard of because the Navy
midshipman in U.S. Naval Academy, believed that only aviators could com-
312
• S P R U A N C E , R A Y M O N D A M E S •

mand aircraft carriers and task forces, and more days. Yorktown, already damaged
Spruance was not a pilot. But except for by Japanese planes, finally was sunk by
Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who an enemy submarine. Spruance’s aircraft
would command the fleet at sea, there sank a Japanese cruiser. Finally, low on
were no other carrier admirals available. fuel and planes, Spruance, who now had
Nimitz therefore put his faith in Spruance, operational command of the fleet, turned
and would be richly rewarded. its ships toward home.
Spruance and Fletcher commanded Until Midway the Japanese had
separate task forces. Spruance had two enjoyed seven months of unbroken suc-
carriers, Enterprise and Hornet, while cess. But the defeat suffered by the Imperi-
Fletcher had only one, Yorktown. When al Japanese Navy (IJN) on June 4 was a
the enemy fleet was sighted on June 4 blow from which it never recovered. After
by a Midway search plane, Spruance, Midway Japan was forced to assume a
who had been given a free hand by defensive position and would never have
Fletcher, made one of the most impor- anything in the future but local successes
tant decisions of the war at sea. He that changed nothing. Midway, the most
attacked the Japanese immediately with strategically important battle of the Pacific
all his strength at the maximum range of war, was won by U.S. courage and luck,
his torpedo bombers. Fletcher attacked but also to a large extent because of Spru-
an hour later. ance’s good judgment and willingness to
The battle did not go as expected. take calculated risks.
All the air groups had trouble locating After serving as chief of staff to
the Japanese force, which consisted of Nimitz from August 1943 to November
four carriers and a number of support- 1945, Spruance was made co-comman-
ing ships. The torpedo plane squadrons der of a fleet of ships that had previously
found the carriers first and, attacking been known as the Pacific Fleet. Com-
with little or no fighter protection, were mand of the fleet alternated between
nearly wiped out without scoring a sin- Halsey and Spruance; while one man
gle hit. Land-based aircraft from Mid- took it out to sea, the other planned its
way also failed to damage the Japanese. next operation. It was called the Third
Although the dive bombers from Hornet Fleet under Halsey and the Fifth Fleet
never did find the enemy and had to under Spruance. The Fifth Fleet, and its
land on Midway for lack of gas, the companion, the amphibious Central
other two dive bomber squadrons found Pacific Force, successfully assaulted the
all four enemy carriers, their decks Gilbert Islands (November 1943), the
crammed with aircraft, and their defen- Marshalls (January 1944), the Marianas
sive fighter patrol, which had been (June 1944), Iwo Jima (January 1945),
shooting down torpedo planes, flying at and Okinawa (April 1945).
low altitudes. At once the Americans The most important of these was
began their bombing runs and within the attack on the Marianas—Spruance’s
minutes three Japanese carriers were second most important victory against
aflame and sinking. the IJN. When the Fifth Fleet began its
Later that day Spruance sent a mixed air attacks on the Marianas on June 11,
force, including planes from Yorktown, 1944, Japanese naval leaders intent on
which had been attacked and could not achieving a decisive victory sent the
recover its aircraft, against the remaining largest fleet they could assemble from
Japanese carrier, which was then de- bases in the Philippines. Spruance
stroyed. The battle continued for several learned of its approach on the 15th and
313
• S S ( S C H U T Z S S T A F F E L N ) •

made plans to receive it. His first con- force. If Mitscher had been given a free
cern was for the invasion force of trans- rein, all nine Japanese carriers would
ports and support ships, which he probably have been sunk. Strategically,
assumed the Japanese planned to attack. though, this would have made little dif-
Therefore he placed Task Force 58, ference because without air crews the
which had all his fast carriers, and his remaining carriers were nearly useless.
fast battleships and cruisers in front of Although his victory could have been
the enemy fleet, but limited them to the even greater, Spruance won a crucial bat-
waters near Saipan. tle with little risk to his own men. Faced
The Japanese, however, did not with a similar decision at the Battle of
attack the invasion force on June 19. Leyte Gulf in October 1944, Halsey went
Instead, they assaulted Task Force 58 on the attack at once and nearly lost an
with both land-based and carrier air- entire U.S. landing force.
craft. Unlike the battle at Midway, U.S.
SEE ALSO
planes and pilots were now superior,
Central Pacific Area; Halsey, William F.;
and the result was a slaughter. The Midway, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of
Japanese lost about 375 planes while
Task Force 58, commanded by Vice F U RTHER READING
Admiral Mark A. Mitscher, lost only 25. Buell, Thomas B. The Quiet Warrior: A
This fight was informally named “The Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spru-
Marianas Turkey Shoot.” ance. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1987.
The enemy fleet, now in retreat,
was not located until late the following
day. Mitscher then launched his air
groups at maximum range, and with the
light fading they managed to sink one SS (Schutzsstaffeln)
more Japanese carrier in addition to two
that were destroyed by U.S. submarines
on the 19th. Many planes ran out of gas
on the long flight back to Task Force The SS (Schutzsstaffeln, literally “protec-
58, but most of their crews were later tion squads”) began as Hitler’s squad of
rescued. In this two-day engagement, personal bodyguards in 1923. In 1929
known as the Battle of the Philippine command of it was given to Heinrich
Sea, the Japanese lost 476 planes and Himmler, who expanded it from a few
445 aviators, Spruance, 130 planes and hundred men to over 200,000 by 1933.
43 men. Even though most of the Japa- Known as the “black order” because of
nese carriers got away, the Japanese the color of its uniforms, the SS became
Fleet Air Arm was destroyed because of Hitler’s elite organization with its own
the loss of so many aviators who could political police, the dreaded Gestapo. It
not be replaced, although the Allies did ran the concentration and death camps,
not realize this at the time. owned its own businesses, and was a
Spruance was much criticized, both great empire that penetrated many areas
at the time and later, for not sending Task of German life.
Force 58 and his fast battleships to meet The largest department of the SS
the enemy as soon as it was sighted. In was its field army, the fierce and feared
hindsight, however, this was clearly the Waffen-SS, which, by the end of the war
right course because the Japanese were consisted of 800,000 men organized
after Mitscher’s carriers, not the invasion into 38 divisions. The first 3 divisions
314
• S T A L I N , J O S E P H •

Although its best divisions were


excellent fighting units, the fanaticism of
the SS led it to commit many atrocities.
These took place not only in the east,
where vicious acts were common, but
also on the western front, where the reg-
ular army generally observed the rules of
Image Not Available
war. Thus, efforts to make moral dis-
tinctions between the “bad” SS of the
death camps and the “good” SS that
only fought for its country must be
viewed with suspicion.
SEE ALSO

were formed in 1939, against the will of Bulge, Battle of the, Eastern front, German
Gestapo offi-
Army
cials record the German Army, which saw the Waf-
data on incom- fen-SS as a rival for men and resources. F U RTHER READING
ing prisoners at In time the Waffen-SS was fully inte- Lumsden, Robin. The Waffen-SS. London:
a German con- grated into the Army on the command Allan, 1994.
centration level, while remaining under Himmler’s Stein, George. The Waffen-SS: Hitler’s
camp. Those Elite Guards at War. Ithaca, N.Y/: Cor-
authority in other areas, such as person-
waiting to be nell University Press, 1966.
nel and replacement training. Competi-
questioned are
seated on the
tion was further reduced by severe
ground (left) restrictions on the Waffen-SS’s ability to
under guard. recruit inside Germany. Although fric-
tion never died out, army commanders
Stalin, Joseph
came to appreciate the Waffen-SS for its ABSOLUTE RULER OF THE
dedication, drive, and willingness to take SOVIET UNION
high casualties. • Born: December 9, 1879, Gori,
Because of the limits placed on it, Georgia
the Waffen-SS depended heavily on • Political party: Communist
• Military service: Red Army: political
recruits. It often forcibly enrolled men commissar, 1918–20; marshal of the
from ethnic German communities out- Red Army, 1943; generalissimo, 1945
side the Third Reich. In addition, volun- • Government service: Commissar of
teers were obtained from other Nordic nationalities, 1918; member, Central
Committee of Communist party;
countries such as Norway and Holland. member, Political Bureau of the
Manpower needs were so great, how- Communist party (Politburo),
Organizational Bureau of the
ever, that by 1943 the SS also included Communist party (Ogburo) and
men from all over Eastern Europe and commissar of state control, 1919;
the Balkans. These non-Germans fre- general secretary of the Central
Committee, 1922–1952
quently volunteered because of threats
• Died: March 5, 1953, Moscow,
or false promises, and therefore they Russia, U.S.S.R.
lacked motivation. As a result, the Waf-
fen-SS lost much of its elite character.
Only about a dozen Waffen-SS divisions
were really effective. They were used as Despite his two years as a political com-
troubleshooters, moving from front to missar with the Red Army and his lofty
front wherever the need was greatest. titles, Iosif Vissarionovich Djugashvili,
315
• S T A L I N , J O S E P H •

who named himself Stalin in 1912, was Stalin (center in


never a serving soldier. He regarded white jacket)
himself as a military genius, however, arrives at the
and all important military decisions and Potsdam resi-
plans had to have his approval. dence of for-
mer British
Stalin spent virtually his entire adult
prime minister
life as a politician, first as a Bolshevik
Image Not Available Winston
revolutionary, then as a leader of the Churchill, who
Communist party of the Soviet Union. was hosting a
He held many titles and offices, but it state dinner for
was as general secretary of the party that the “Big Three”
he managed to defeat his rivals to leaders.
become leader of the U.S.S.R. after
Lenin’s death in 1924. By 1927 he had
acquired dictatorial powers, which he
used to launch a series of famines and
purges that made his rule the bloodiest in the Soviet Union in June 1941.
world history. That the Soviets survived their dev-
A conservative estimate is that Sta- astating defeats that year was partly
lin had put 20 million people to death because Hitler made mistakes but also
by the time World War II broke out. because Stalin had done some things
Among those he had killed in the course right in the prewar era. Hitler’s most
of preparing the Soviet Union for war important mistake was to launch a reign
included most of the senior officer corps of terror in the occupied regions of the
of its armed forces. Not only was this a U.S.S.R., alienating the anticommunist
terrible crime, it was also a serious mis- inhabitants there and uniting the entire
take that contributed to the many Soviet nation behind Stalin in a struggle for sur-
defeats in 1941 and 1942. vival. Stalin’s biggest contribution to vic-
Stalin made another mistake when tory was that he had, through brute
he signed a pact with Hitler in 1939. force, created an arms industry that
Under the terms of this agreement, the would prove to be superior to that of the
Soviet Union acquired about half of Germans, although Soviet industry as a
Poland, all of the Baltic states (Estonia, whole was much behind Germany’s.
Latvia, Lithuania), and parts of Finland Nonetheless, Stalin contributed to
and Romania. In return Stalin pledged the Soviet losses by insisting on carrying
to remain neutral in the coming war and out offensives before the Red Army was
provide Germany with foodstuffs and strong enough to defeat Germany on the
raw materials. Apparently Stalin made battlefield. He survived numerous deba-
this deal because he anticipated that cles by ruling with an iron hand while at
Germany’s war in the west would be the same time wrapping himself in the
long and difficult, as it had in World mantle of patriotism.
War I. But Hitler’s stunning victory in During the war Stalin also eased
1940, which drove Britain from the some forms of repression, such as allow-
Continent, proved Stalin’s calculations ing the Orthodox Church to operate
wrong. Because Hitler no longer faced more freely. But these freedoms were off-
much of a threat in the west, he was set by Stalin’s infamous order of August
able to draw on practically all of the 16, 1941, that Soviet military personnel
resources of Europe when he invaded taken prisoner by the Germans were to
316
• S T A L I N , J O S E P H •

be regarded as traitors. When Lieutenant At the Teheran and Yalta confer-


General Andrey Vlasov was captured in ences in 1943 and 1945, it was agreed
1942—as a result of Stalin’s refusal to that the Soviets would have a sphere of
allow him to retreat from a hopeless posi- influence in Eastern Europe. The Allied
tion—he offered to lead Soviet prisoners hope was that Stalin would allow inter-
of war in battle as German allies on the nal self-government in the states he liber-
eastern front. ated. But the main reason why Stalin
Hitler foolishly failed to take advan- gained a free hand in the region was not
tage of this opportunity. Vlasov did form because of bad Allied diplomacy. What
a small army of Soviet prisoners of war, Stalin ruled after the war were territories
but they were not sent to the eastern that the Red Army had taken from Ger-
front. Most Soviet prisoners of war were many and its allies. No amount of bril-
simply brutalized and neglected by Nazi liant diplomacy on Roosevelt’s part
Germany, which made little use of them could have prevented this from happen-
either as fighters or workers. ing. The only way to have saved Eastern
As time went on, Stalin’s military Europe from communist rule was for the
leadership improved. He made fewer United States to have entered the war,
mistakes, appointed able men to posi- and thus opened the second front, much
tions of command, and gave them sooner than it actually did.
greater freedom. Just to be on the safe It is also unclear how much Stalin
side, however, Stalin made sure that actually gained by turning his newly
most Soviet leaders had at least one rela- acquired Eastern European territories
tive held hostage in the vast and terrible into communist police states. To keep
prison camp system known as the them in his empire they had to be occu-
Gulag. While generals that lost battles pied by the Red Army on a permanent
were sometimes shot, winners were basis. And to keep their economies from
showered with medals and privileges. collapsing altogether, they had to be sup-
Soon after the German invasion, plied with raw materials, oil and gas
Stalin began demanding aid from Britain, especially, at low prices. With Germany
and from the United States too, once it eliminated as a military power, the Soviet
entered the war. Most of all, he demand- Union was going to dominate the region
ed that the Allies open a second front by in any case and could have done so much
invading France. He continued to make more profitably if it had treated the east-
this demand even after the Soviets gained ern states as it did Finland.
the upper hand over Germany in 1943. The Finns had sided with Germany
After the war anticommunists in the in 1941 to regain their Karelian Isthmus,
United States would charge that President which Stalin had taken from them after
Roosevelt, as a negotiator, had lost to the Winter War of 1939–40. When Fin-
Stalin, but this was untrue. Stalin pos- land surrendered, it was forced to pay an
sessed no special gift for diplomacy and indemnity and trade with the Soviets on
was not particularly farsighted. His con- highly unfavorable terms. The Soviets
stant demand for a second front was also retained a veto over Finland’s foreign
proof of this, since the later the Allies policy. Otherwise, Stalin left Finland
arrived in Europe the more territory Sta- alone. Giving the Finns internal freedom
lin would be able to seize. Certainly after at a high economic price satisfied the
1943 he did not need a second front and security requirements of the Soviet Union
could have taken all of Europe if the while also enriching its coffers.
Western Allies had not invaded France. Stalin’s failure to “Finlandize” East-
317
• S T A L I N G R A D , B A T T L E O F •

ern Europe turned out to be not in the sonally ordered untold millions of Soviet
best interests of the Soviet state. “Staliniz- citizens put to death before, during, and
ing” the east was a disastrous choice. It after World War II. He insisted on mili-
guaranteed that World War II would be tary strategies and tactics that caused mil-
followed by a cold war, which would lions of Soviet soldiers to die who other-
prove to be ruinously expensive for the wise would no doubt have lived. Cruel as
Soviets. Probably Stalin dealt harshly he was to the peoples of Eastern Europe,
with the east for personal reasons rather he was crueler still to his own people. It
than reasons of state. It extended his cannot be denied that without the Sovi-
power, which he loved to exercise. ets, Nazi Germany would not have been
Furthermore, the cold war gave defeated. The Soviet Union’s victory was
Stalin an excuse for maintaining the achieved under Stalin’s leadership; this
Soviet Union as a police state, which in too cannot be contested. But the price of
the absence of enemies would have been victory was terribly high—for the Soviets
harder to do. The United States and most of all.
Britain were eager to have good rela-
SEE ALSO
tions with Stalin after the war. Had he
Eastern front; Finland; Germany;
Finlandized Eastern Europe there would Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Soviet Union
have been no important barriers to (U.S.S.R.); Teheran conference; Yalta
good relations between East and West. conference
This suggests that the Stalinization of
Eastern Europe was designed to pro- F U RTHER READING
voke the West, thereby creating the per- Barros, James. Double Deception: Stalin,
manent enemies that would justify Sta- Hitler, and the Invasion of Russia.
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University
lin’s dictatorship. Press, 1995.
The legend of Stalin as a master of Bialer, Seweryn. Stalin and His Generals:
statecraft is therefore largely false. The col- Soviet Military Memoirs of World War
II. New York: Pegasus, 1969.
lapse of Germany and Japan left the Soviet Ulam, Adam. Stalin: The Man and His
Union and the United States as the only Era. New York: Viking, 1973.
remaining great powers. Stalin then had a
choice between alienating the United States
and maintaining the two countries’
wartime alliance. Had he chosen the latter,
the Soviet Union would have gotten Mar- Stalingrad, Battle of
shall Plan aid and would not have needed
to maintain great armed forces.
Under these circumstances the Soviet
Union might have enjoyed enough eco- Stalingrad is usually regarded as the
nomic success to have survived in some turning point of the European war. In
form or other. While claiming to act in 1942 the Wehrmacht (the German mili-
the name of the Soviet Union and com- tary) was weaker than in 1941 when it
munism, Stalin launched policies that had failed to capture Moscow. Just the
were ultimately destructive to both— same, Hitler ordered another offensive
hardly the mark of a great leader. Like in Russia that was supposed to be deci-
Hitler, Stalin did as he pleased, regardless sive. Known as Operation Blue, it was
of the cost or the consequences. intended to defeat the Soviets by, among
Stalin’s reputation as a blood-soaked other things, cutting them off from their
monster is not legend but fact. He per- oil supplies in the Caucasus.
318
• S T I M S O N, H E N R Y L E W I S •

The mission of General Friedrich mans’ resistance came to an end a few


Paulus, who commanded Germany’s days later.
Sixth Army, was to take the city of Stal- The Germans lost some 250,000
ingrad. This would support the Caucasus men at Stalingrad, the Soviets at least
drive and give Germany control of the that many. Stalingrad marked the end of
lower Volga region. The Sixth Army the German blitzkrieg (lightning war),
reached the outskirts of Stalingrad on which had once swept all that lay before
September 12, 1942. Because of its it. The balance of military power on the
value, and fearing a loss of prestige if the eastern front now tipped in the Soviets’
city named after him fell, Stalin decided favor for good.
to hold it at all costs. Accordingly, he
SEE ALSO
poured reinforcements into Stalingrad
Eastern front
while at the same time planning vast Red
Army movements to encircle the Sixth F U RTHER READING
Army. This was accomplished on Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad.
November 23 after Soviet forces New York: Harper & Row, 1975.
destroyed two Romanian armies. Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. 199 Days: The Battle
When Germany’s relief efforts for Stalingrad. New York: Tor, 1993.
Jukes, Geoffrey. Stalingrad: The Turning
failed, the obvious response was for the Point. New York: Ballantine, 1968.
Sixth Army to break out of its pocket
while the Soviet lines were still weak
enough to make escape possible. But
Hitler once again refused to authorize a Stimson, Henry Lewis
retreat. Instead, the Luftwaffe (Ger-
SECRETARY OF WAR, 1940–45
many’s air force) was to supply the Sixth
Army by air. Germany’s air commander, • Born: September 21, 1867, New York,
Reichsmarshal Hermann Göring, N.Y.
• Political party: Republican
pledged to deliver 300 tons a day of sup-
• Education: Yale, B.A., 1888; Harvard,
plies to the pocket. But the Sixth Army M.A., 1889; Harvard, L.L.B., 1890
required a minimum of 500 tons of sup- • Military service: U.S. Army—colonel,
plies a day, a total that was reached just 1917–19
once. And on most days the Luftwaffe, • Government service: U.S. attorney,
1906–08; secretary of war, 1911–13;
despite heavy losses, delivered far less (an governor general of the Philippines,
average of 90 tons). Starving and run- 1927–29; secretary of state, 1929–33;
ning low on all supplies, the Sixth Army secretary of war, 1940 –45
• Died: October 20, 1950, Huntington,
fought in the cellars and ruins of Stalin- N.Y.
grad. The German soldiers called this a
Rattenkrieg, or war of the rats, and they
steadily lost ground.
There could be only one end to Henry Stimson was the oldest and most
what had become such a lopsided battle. distinguished of President Franklin
On January 30, 1943, as the end Delano Roosevelt’s civilian war leaders.
neared, Hitler promoted Paulus to field Well before he entered the cabinet in
marshal. Presumably this was so that he 1940 he had helped set in motion the
would kill himself, because no German chain of events that led to the December
marshal had ever before been taken pris- 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. As Presi-
oner. Paulus, however, became the first, dent Hoover’s secretary of state, he was
surrendering on January 31. The Ger- responsible for the policy of not recogniz-
319
• S T I M S O N , H E N R Y L E W I S •

ing Manchukuo, Americans in so-called “relocation,” or


the puppet state internment, camps. He agreed with the
Japan had set up policy of not diverting U.S. air power to
after seizing bomb Hitler’s death camps. Because of
Manchuria in this policy, many died in the Holocaust
1931. This was who might otherwise have been saved.
the beginning of a (Though some prisoners in the camps
Image Not Available steady decline in would have been killed in the raids, the
American-Japa- bombs might well have destroyed the
nese relations that Germans’ efficient machinery of death—
resulted in the the crematoriums and gas chambers—
Pacific war. without which the mass murders could
Although a not continue.) He also opposed admit-
lifelong Republi- ting refugee Jews to the United States
can, Stimson was above the existing quotas.
asked by Roo- Stimson was an excellent adminis-
Secretary of sevelt to serve in his cabinet because he trator and, for a man of the 19th cen-
War Stimson was an outspoken enemy of isolationism tury, remarkably aware of the value of
draws the first and could be counted on for support if science. One of his major contributions
number in the Roosevelt ever wished to enter the Euro- was to urge the traditionally conserva-
Selective Ser- pean war. That he was a Republican tive military leadership to take advan-
vice Lottery
mattered too, for Stimson would give tage of what scientists had to offer. He
held in the
Roosevelt’s policies a bipartisan flavor. ardently supported the atomic bomb
departmental
auditorium on
Finally, he was highly qualified for the project and was the principal civilian
October 15, job by virtue of his previous government advisor to both Roosevelt and Truman
1940. service and because he was well on nuclear issues.
informed on military matters. Stimson regretted the need to drop
A man of outstanding good judg- atomic bombs on Japan, and he succeed-
ment and integrity, Stimson supported ed in having Kyoto, a religious and cul-
aid to Britain and was urging Roosevelt tural center, removed from the target list.
to use the Navy to escort Lend-Lease He also had reservations about the con-
convoys well before the President de- ventional bombing of cities, especially the
cided to do so. He was one of very few Japanese fire bomb raids, which were
Presidential advisors who agreed with undisguised terror attacks. In fact, Stim-
Roosevelt’s decision to provide the Soviet son was the only civilian war leader to
Union with Lend-Lease aid when it have serious doubts about the morality of
entered the war. making war against civilians.
Stimson continued to favor taking a
SEE ALSO
hard line against Japan even if it meant
war, but when war came he supported Atomic bombs; Japan; Japanese Ameri-
cans; Mediterranean theater; Strategic
the decision to concentrate on Europe bombing
first. To that end he, like General
George C. Marshall, was opposed to the F U RTHER READING
Mediterranean campaigns that delayed Hodgson, Godfrey. The Colonel: The Life
the invasion of France. and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867–50.
On other issues Stimson was less New York: Knopf, 1990.
Stimson, Henry Lewis. On Active Service
wise. He went along, however reluctantly, in Peace and War. New York: Octagon
with the imprisonment of Japanese Books, 1948.
320
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •

of almost 19 percent was intolerable.


Strategic bombing Thus, when the RAF began subjecting
Germany to strategic bombardment it
had to do so by night, when the enemy’s
fighter force was less effective.
The Allied air forces arrived at their From May 1940 until the end of
common destiny by different means and 1941, Britain attacked strategic targets
from different starting points. Unlike the in Germany with feeble results. The War
British Royal Air Force, which had been Cabinet ordered a study that found that
independent since 1918, the U.S. Air only one in four air crews who claimed
Force remained a branch of the Army to have hit their target had actually
throughout World War II. But it yearned dropped their bombs within five miles
to be a separate service and as early as of it. The RAF’s own casualties were
1935 had embraced an idea designed to higher than those it inflicted on enemy
bring that about—the doctrine of strate- civilians.
gic bombardment. Britain might have called off its air
According to this theory, an enemy war against Germany at this point and
could be bombed into submission by been little the worse for doing so.
attacks on its industrial base. Victory Instead, it decided to continue bombing
through air power was advanced by Germany under different principles. In
Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, founder February 1942, under a new comman-
of the RAF, by the Italian general der, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris,
Giulio Douhet, and was promoted known to his men as “Butch,” for
ardently by Brigadier General William butcher, Bomber Command began to
“Billy” Mitchell of the United States— attack German cities. Its purpose was
who resigned his commission after what Lord Cherwell, the prime minis-
being court-martialed in 1925 for going ter’s science advisor, called “de-housing
outside official channels to promote his the workers,” a policy that aimed to
cause. Despite Mitchell’s punishment, destroy German morale by destroying
air officers continued to keep the faith, that country’s civilians. This strategy
although with greater discretion. was forced on the RAF; a city was the
When war came, both the U.S. smallest target that could be located at
Army Air Forces (USAAF) and the RAF night by bombers.
were committed to strategic bombing The United States joins the air war
as their primary mission. The USAAF In 1942, when the U.S. Eighth Air Force
had acquired the first real heavy dropped its first bombs on Europe, sever-
bomber in history for this purpose, the al facts were alarmingly clear. Germany’s
four-engine Boeing B-17 Flying air attacks on Britain in 1940 and 1941
Fortress. Britain lagged behind, with its had failed. And the RAF’s attempts to
first strategic bombers being two- destroy strategic targets in Germany had
engine aircraft incapable of accomplish- failed also. Britain was now engaged in a
ing their mission. program of area bombing that was
Not surprisingly, the first RAF extremely expensive in men and
attempts at daylight precision bombing machines and yet seemed to have little
under combat conditions were miserable effect on German war production. Not
failures. In September and December even the introduction of RAF four-engine
1939, it attacked German naval targets heavy bombers with big bomb loads had
with 159 bombers, losing 29. A loss rate changed this equation.
321
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •

made them unsuitable for area bombing.


As bombers, the 17s and 24s could be
effectively used only for daylight preci-
sion attacks.
But the U.S. generals were wrong. It
was not until June 10, 1943, that the
order was given to attack German tar-
gets, with the U.S. Eighth Air Force con-
centrating especially on the Luftwaffe
(Germany’s air force) and its supporting
Image Not Available aircraft industry. Despite efforts to pro-
vide fighter planes with extra fuel capa-
city, on their deep penetration raids the
bombers still had to go it alone, resulting
in terrible casualties. A climax was
reached on August 17 when two separate
air divisions attacked Regensburg and
Schweinfurt. Of the 315 heavies that
reached their targets, 60 went down,
resulting in a loss rate of 19 percent.
Too much had been invested in
The aerial view U.S. generals argued that the experi- strategic bombing at this point to admit
of fields and ence of other air forces was not relevant, defeat. On October 14, Eighth Air Force
roads creates because only B-17s, and the newer B-24 bombed Schweinfurt again and lost
an abstract pat- Liberators, had been designed for day- another 60 aircraft out of 291 that were
tern in this light precision bombing. Both types were launched. Including Schweinfurt, a total
photograph
heavily armed and armored, payload of 148 bombers had been lost in four
taken above
being sacrificed to defensive capability. attacks mounted during a six-day period.
Czechoslova-
Thus, while Bomber Command’s splen- “Black Week,” as the airmen called
kia. The clouds
over the indus- did Avro Lancaster carried immense 10- it, stopped the Eighth Air Force in its
trial facility in ton “blockbusters,” the U.S. heavies tracks. German fighters had destroyed
the center are could drop only 2 or 3 tons of bombs on the theory of the “self-defending bomber
bombs that distant targets. force.” Without admitting defeat, the
have hit their Lancasters had but five puny .303- Eighth staged only one more bombing
target. caliber machine guns, while the B-17Es attack between the second Schweinfurt
that attacked Rouen were armed with a attack and February 1944.
dozen .50-caliber guns. Three pairs of The Allied aircrews’ extraordinary
these were mounted in power turrets losses also destroyed the theory that air
(rotating gun chambers), and the later G forces would limit casualties on the
model added another power turret with ground by substituting aircraft for men, a
two more guns under the nose. By flying key rationale for air power in the first
in close formations that provided over- place. The USAAF, with about one-fourth
lapping fields of fire, the U.S. heavies of the Army’s manpower, took only one-
were supposed to be capable of fighting ninth of its battle casualties. However, the
their way across Germany and back comparison is misleading, because it
again. In any case, there was no point in includes wounded men, of which the
adding U.S. bombers to the RAF’s night Army’s ground forces had many and the
attacks, because their small payloads air forces relatively few. When a U.S.
322
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •

bomber went down, half its crew usually propeller-driven fighter. It was originally
perished. built by North American Aviation for ser-
Out of 291,557 U.S. battle deaths in vice with the RAF, which on delivery
World War II, 52,173 were army airmen. found it to be underpowered. The British
This is an enormous number considering then fitted it with their own superb air-
that bomber crews made up a small part craft engine, the legendary Merlin. Thus
of the military as a whole. Their non- equipped, it could outperform any pro-
combat death rate was higher as well, peller-driven fighter, but it still lacked the
because of the hazardous nature of air range to accompany deep attacks. The
operations. A total of 35,946 airmen solution to this problem came from an
were killed accidentally, 43 percent of all intervention by Robert A. Lovett, the
such deaths in the Army. During the U.S. assistant secretary of war for air.
worst months of the air war in Europe, a Unlike Arnold, whose “hands were
study tracked 2,051 airmen through tied by his mouth,” Lovett said later, he
their duty tour of 25 missions, and only was not limited by having previously
559, or 26.8 percent, completed it, with championed the idea of a self-defending
1,195 being killed or missing in action. bomber. He demanded results from
The odds improved somewhat for Arnold, who dropped the problem on his
U.S. airmen once the Luftwaffe was new chief of staff, Major General Barney
beaten as a daytime force (though not M. Giles. The decisive Giles had North
for Bomber Command, because German American Aviation take out a big radio
night fighters remained active to the from behind the pilot’s seat and replace it
end). Still, bombing Germany was never with a 100-gallon fuel tank, while also
safe, and overall a high price was paid installing bulletproof tanks in the wings.
by American youth in support of the Fears that 300 additional gallons of fuel
USAAF’s faith in daylight precision bom- would be more than the wings and land-
bardment. ing gear could support were proven wrong
Victory in the air The USAAF when a test showed that the rugged little
responded to its defeat with very little Mustang could take it. Thanks to Lovett
delay. In December 1943, General Henry and Giles, bomber crews would now have
“Hap” Arnold—whose nickname belied a good chance of survival.
his impatience, hot temper, and ruthless- In February 1944 the strategic air
ness—replaced the Eighth’s commander, forces—reorganized, reinforced, and
Major General Ira Eaker, with Major defended by a large number of fighter
General James H. Doolittle, hero of the groups—were ready to take on the Luft-
first bombing raid on Tokyo in 1942. waffe once again, this time in Operation
This change was part of a general reorga- Pointblank. On February 20, when bad
nization that merged the Eighth Air Force weather over Germany finally lifted,
with the Fifteenth Air Force (a new com- “Big Week” began. The Eighth Air
mand operating from Mediterranean Force committed 16 combat wings (a
bases) to create the U.S. Strategic Air battle formation consisting of 63 heavy
Forces in Europe (USSTAF). Lieutenant bombers) and 17 fighter groups, most
General Carl Spaatz was made chief of being equipped with P-47 Thunder-
USSTAF, with Eaker taking over all bolts and P-38 Lightnings, whose ranges
Allied air forces in the Mediterranean. had been extended with belly and
A more important development was wing tanks.
the arrival of the desperately needed long- These aircraft had varying combat
range P-51 Mustang, the last and greatest ranges, but two groups consisting of
323
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •

Mustangs and could go most, and soon


all, of the distance to the target. In addi-
tion, the RAF’s fighter command threw in
16 squadrons of Spitfires and Mustangs.
The targets of this immense force were
aircraft and ball-bearing factories in the
Reich, most of which were struck, at a
cost of only 25 U.S. bombers and 4 fight-
ers. The bomber loss rate was just 2.5
percent—a far cry from the attacks on Image Not Available
Schweinfurt. Fighter-bomber attacks on
German airfields were equally effective.
When Big Week was over, the Eighth
Air Force had made 3,300 bomber runs
and the Fifteenth more than 500. To-
gether they dropped 10,000 tons of
bombs, more than the Eighth had deliv-
ered in its first full year of combat opera-
tions. Together the VIII and XV fighter
commands and the Ninth Tactical Air preferred the Oil Plan, according to A formation of
Force made 3,773 runs. The cost was which USSTAF would concentrate on B-29s releases
heavy—2,600 airmen were killed, wound- eliminating Germany’s supply of liquid incendiary
ed, or missing—but for the first time fuel. But Supreme Headquarters Allied bombs over
something important was gained. Within a Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) had lost Japan in June
1945. On
few months, the German daylight fighter confidence in the air marshals and gener-
August 1, a
force was broken. The Luftwaffe remained als whose promises had seldom been
fleet of these
active at night, but the United States ruled kept, and insisted that the British and planes dropped
the skies over Germany by day. U.S. heavy bombers concentrate on trans- 6,871 tons of
The Transportation Plan On April 1, portation targets. explosives on
1944, Operation Pointblank came to an Even so, Spaatz secretly kept the Japanese strate-
end, and the Allied strategic air forces Oil Plan going throughout this period, gic targets, the
came under General Eisenhower’s control making attacks supposedly in support of largest air raid
for the first time. He used his authority to the Transportation Plan that actually of the war.
order attacks on rail marshaling yards and struck petroleum targets. USSTAF had
related targets specified by the Transporta- estimated that 90 percent of Germany’s
tion Plan, which proposed to isolate Nor- liquid fuel and lubricants was produced
mandy from the rest of Europe so that by 54 oil refineries and synthetic petrole-
during the invasion of France, Germany um plants, of which 27 were especially
would not be able to reinforce and resup- important.
ply its troops in the combat zone. In order The Oil Plan On June 10, 1944,
to conceal the landing site, it was neces- when he regained his independence,
sary for air attacks to be made all along Spaatz announced that oil targets would
the Channel coast, not just in Normandy. have first priority in strategic bomb-
General Spaatz argued that this was ing efforts. USSTAF then began attack-
a misuse of his bombers, because Trans- ing targets in the Ruhr Valley and
portation Plan targets could be destroyed around Ploesti in Rumania. They were
by tactical air strikes and did not require fiercely defended and had the virtue of
his heavy bombers to take them out. He putting more pressure on the German
324
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •

fighter force, which was now desperately ably, for sheer mindless violence Britain’s
short of pilots. Bomber Command took first place. It
These attacks were costly, especially began to carry out terror bombing
for the 15th Air Force, since Ploesti was because it could not attack Germany in
the third-best-defended target in Europe any other way. But under Air Marshal
(the first was the Ruhr). The Fifteenth Harris, it went on raiding German cities
also attacked Vienna, which had the sec- long after it was capable of accurately
ond-best air defense. Accordingly, Fif- bombing real strategic targets.
teenth’s losses were higher than those of Bomber Command committed the
Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command, two worst crimes of the European air
amounting to a loss of 318 heavy war: the bombings of Hamburg in 1943
bombers in July, Fifteenth’s worst month. and Dresden in 1945. Both attacks, the
During August it actually lost more men second deliberately, created huge
than the Allied armies in Italy. But when firestorms that consumed oxygen faster
the Red Army reached Ploesti a month than it could be replaced, killing thou-
later it found that oil was no longer being sands of people by carbon monoxide poi-
produced there—an exploit that had cost soning who were untouched by flame or
the Fifteenth Air Force 350 bombers. blast. Furthermore, Dresden had limited
By September 1944 Germany’s petro- strategic value and the war was nearly
leum output was reduced to 23 percent of over. The USAAF, in contrast, made seri-
the pre–Oil Plan levels, ending German ous efforts to bomb precisely and killed
tank training altogether and drastically far fewer German civilians.
reducing the training time of Luftwaffe But the differences between the two
pilots. At the end of 1944 Germany had air forces were greater in theory than in
only four crude oil refineries in operation practice. More than half of all U.S.
and five or six synthetic plants running. attacks ended up with the bombs being
By February 1945 air attacks had brought dropped through “undercast” (clouds
industry to a halt completely. and fog seen from above in a plane),
On April 7 the RAF discontinued which was in fact area bombing, what-
area bombing, and on the 16th Spaatz ever the military called it. In time Ameri-
informed his commanders that the cans employed terror bombing intention-
bomber offensive was over. Except for ally. One series of such attacks, on
tactical targets there was nothing left to February 22 and 23, 1945, code-named
attack. By this time Germany’s trans- Clarion, was aimed at small cities and
portation system had been destroyed as towns that had little or no military
well, since it was the habit of USSTAF to importance. The “Thunderclap” bomb-
have its bombers attack cities when the ing of Berlin on February 3, which was
weather did not permit raids on Oil Plan purely a terror raid, killed up to 25,000
targets—which was most of the time. As civilians. Four other attacks on Berlin
a result of frequent area attacks by U.S. were similar in character.
and British bombers, all of Germany’s USSTAF also supported Britain’s
cities were eventually burned out, includ- attack on Dresden in February and, when
ing their precious rail yards. criticism of area bombing developed,
Analysis of the bombing of Germany issued a statement saying that there had
British air historians, embarrassed by the been no change in policy, an obvious
record of Bomber Command, tend to falsehood, since it was policy to area
hold up the USAAF as the model that bomb whenever precision bombing was
ought to have been copied. And, undeni- impossible. Ultimately, U.S. air strikes
325
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •

killed fewer Germans than those of the than that of Germany. It began in 1944
British, mainly because they dropped when the new Boeing B-29 Superfortress
smaller bomb loads. The touch of moral was based in China for long-range
superiority over the RAF that may attacks on the Japanese home islands.
remain after noting these exceptions This campaign failed because all the sup-
leaves little to celebrate. plies for the bombing effort had to be
Not just a crime, the air war was also flown in from India over the “Hump,” a
a blunder. Even the official historians of the series of mountain ranges. This expensive
USAAF admit that daylight attacks on Ger- and dangerous enterprise cost many
many should not have been undertaken planes yet never managed to deliver
before February 1944, when long-range enough fuel and munitions to make air
fighter escorts became available. Although raids from China effective. So the effort
they did not admit this, the constantly shift- was canceled and the planes sent to bases
ing rationales of the bomber barons gave in the Mariana Islands.
their game away. Strategic bombing was Few senior officers outside the air
supposed to defeat the German nation, but force were enthusiastic about strategic
in actual practice the bomber campaign bombing by this time, and there was con-
became a war of attrition between the stant pressure to use heavy bombers in
Allied air forces and the Luftwaffe. direct support of troops. This was why
Control of the skies was supposed to General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold had
be won by destroying Germany’s aircraft persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
industry. Because this proved impossible, make B-29s independent of theater com-
control was won by raids whose principal manders in the Pacific. He would person-
function was to attract German fighters, ally direct the Twentieth Air Force, to
with the supposedly war-winning Allied which all Superfortresses were assigned,
heavy bombers serving simply as bait. with operations to be run by the heads of
The air war succeeded in the sense its bomber commands.
that virtually all the strategic targets in Given the vast resources that had
Germany were destroyed by war’s end. been committed to the B-29, and consid-
But this achievement came so near to the ering the Navy’s skepticism in particular
end of the ground war that it actually about it, the USAAF had much at stake
made little difference. Bombing Germany in its bombardment of Japan. Although
had other uses as well, mainly the diver- the Marianas were far superior to China
sion of German resources to air defense. as a base of operations and Tokyo was
Yet victory could have been achieved as only 1,200 miles from Saipan, the XXI
quickly, and perhaps even sooner, had the Bomber Command (the principal striking
huge Allied investment in strategic bomb- force) accomplished very little.
ing been put into the ground war instead. The B-29 still suffered from technical
None of this criticism applies to the difficulties, its maintenance was poor to
fighters and medium bombers (known as begin with, and the long flights to Japan
tactical air) directly supporting the consumed more fuel than expected, leav-
ground troops, which were an outstand- ing little margin for error. The USAAF
ing success. This support enabled Allied had not been prepared for the tremendous
armies that would otherwise have been winds and heavy cloud cover frequently
too small for the job to prevail over the found over Japan. Its very first attack,
German Army. launched from the Marianas on Novem-
Japan The strategic bombing of ber 24, 1944, was made by 111 aircraft.
Japan was even more futile and mindless Of these 17 aborted and returned to base,
326
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •

Miniatures of
Japanese tar-
gets, such as
this model of
Tokyo Bay in
the back-
ground, were
constructed on
sound stages
and used to
brief crews
preparing to Image Not Available
bomb Japanese
targets.

6 could not bomb because of mechanical the Eighth Air Force, understood that he
failures, and those that made it to Tokyo was supposed to terrorize Japan.
could not see the target because of under- Firebomb raids Once accuracy
cast and were swept along by 120-knot became unimportant, a battery of new
winds that made even radar useless. A methods could be used to burn out
mere 48 bombs fell on the primary target. Japanese cities, which were especially vul-
Although only one Superfortress was lost nerable because of their flimsy construc-
to enemy air defenses, 29 ran out of gas tion. Area bombing could take place after
and had to ditch in the ocean. This futile dark, because Japan had few night fight-
attack was followed by others. As a result ers, and could be carried out at low alti-
of poor visibility and winds as high as tudes, where the B-29 consumed less fuel
200 knots an hour, accuracy was nearly and could carry heavier bomb loads.
impossible. The skies over Japan were more
Arnold solved the problem by firing often clear at night than during the day,
Major General H. S. Hansell, the chief of the winds at low altitudes were not as
the XXI Bomber Command and a be- great as at higher ones, and loran, a radio
liever in precision bombing. His offense navigation system, also worked better at
seems to have been failing to launch fire- night. This was an important point,
bomb raids against Japanese cities. because at night bombers could not fly in
Hansell did not understand that the formation and every plane had to find its
USAAF was now committed to area own target by itself.
bombing, its prewar theory of strategic The first firebomb raid on Japan
bombardment having been proven took place on the night of March 9–10,
wrong. His replacement, Major General 1945, when 334 Superfortresses carrying
Curtis E. LeMay, the tactical wizard of six-ton bomb loads attacked Tokyo. The
327
• S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G •

resulting devastation consumed almost but after January 1945 by the surface
16 square miles of the city and one- navy and tactical air units.
fourth of its buildings. One million peo- Minelaying The blockade of Japan
ple were made homeless and at least was completed by the Army Air Forces.
100,000 killed. It was the single most There was considerable irony in this,
destructive air attack of the war—includ- because the XXI Bomber Command’s
ing the atomic bombings—and was fol- greatest success was forced on it by the
lowed by many others. Navy. By 1945 Japan’s open-ocean con-
When Japan surrendered, 40 percent voy routes had been closed by a mix of
of its 66 major cities had been destroyed, naval and tactical air power. Much of
perhaps 400,000 people killed, some 9 what traffic remained went through Shi-
million forced to move to the country, monoseki Strait, and experience had
and 13 million made homeless. The XXI shown the Navy that heavy bombers
Bomber Command had practiced terror could do this best.
bombing on an entirely new scale, far The USAAF agreed to do so, and
surpassing the RAF’s attacks on German General Arnold ordered a mining cam-
cities. Little effort was made to determine paign to begin on April 1, 1945. Mining
the usefulness of firebombing, the policy the Tsushima and Shimonoseki straits
being simply to smash and burn until and the ports of Kobe and Osaka proved
Japan gave up. in fact to be sensationally effective. The
As with Germany, the bombardment tonnage of shipping received in Kobe
of Japan was both morally wrong and declined from 320,000 tons in March to
a waste of U.S. resources. It is true that 44,000 in July. Once Major General Cur-
legitimate targets were sometimes de- tis LeMay realized this, he stepped up the
stroyed, but most were marginal. Even effort, overwhelming Japan’s minesweep-
the official USAAF history is candid ing force. By this time Japan had given
about this, admitting that it was the up trying to import anything but food-
blockade rather than the bombing that stuffs and was failing even at that.
destroyed Japan’s defense effort. By In the last four and a half months of
April 1945 the flow of oil into Japan had the war, mines accounted for half of all
been cut off completely. It was only a Japanese shipping losses. The Army Air
matter of time, and not much of it at Force’s mining operations played an
that, before the wheels of Japanese indus- important role in completing the block-
try stopped turning. ade and did more to secure victory than
On June 26, the XXI Bomber Com- the celebrated firebomb raids. They were
mand launched an “oil plan” of its own, also more humane. Only 16 aircraft were
similar to the one employed with such lost out of 1,528 sent out to plant mines.
success against Germany. But after the While it is not known how many Japan-
war it was found that the Japanese ese seamen were killed, the number had
refineries were operating at only 4 per- to be small, because mining was done in
cent of their capacity when the campaign shallow waters close to land, giving crews
against them started. Thus, though it was a good chance of survival.
hugely destructive, firebombing con- Had the atomic bomb not become
tributed little to the defeat of Japan and available, the combined blockade and
alone would never have produced a sur- bombardment of Japan would have
render. The most effective Allied military forced a surrender in time, although it is
campaign against Japan was the block- impossible to know how much time
ade, originally conducted by submarines, would have been required.
328
• S U B M A R I N E S I N T H E P A C I F I C •

SEE ALSO tive as well, assigning the boats to patrol


Aircraft; Dresden, bombing of; Germany, huge areas instead of the Luzon Strait
surrender of; Hamburg, bombing of; and other places where enemy shipping
Japan, surrender of; Royal Air Force; was concentrated. They hunted singly
Schweinfurt, bombing of; United States
Army Air Forces; United States Strategic rather than in groups, despite the suc-
Bombing Survey cess Germany was enjoying with its
“wolf packs.”
F U RTHER READING
The U.S. Navy acted in the Pacific
Craven, Wesley F., and James L. Cate. The as if U-boats did not exist, neglecting the
Army Air Forces in World War II. 7 vols.
rich store of knowledge about subma-
Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1948–58. rine tactics that had been accumulated
Levine, Alan J. The Strategic Bombing of while fighting them in the Atlantic. U.S.
Germany, 1940–1945. Westport, Conn.: skippers were too old and cautious, hav-
Praeger, 1992.
MacIsaac, David. Strategic Bombing in ing acquired their commands through
World War Two: The Story of the United seniority at a time when conserving tor-
States Strategic Bombing Survey. New pedoes was an important leadership
York: Garland, 1976.
Messenger, Charles. “Bomber” Harris & the requirement. Finally, the submarine fleet
Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–1945. was divided into three commands, two
New York: St. Martin’s, 1984. based in Australia and the largest in
Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgment:
Pearl Harbor, an arrangement that
American Bombing in World War II. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1985. encouraged them to compete with each
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American other instead of cooperating.
Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. Early on it became clear that the
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1987. Mark XIV was ineffective, but the
Naval Bureau of Ordnance, known as
the Gun Club, refused to admit error,
insisting month after month that it was
the skippers who were at fault and not
Submarines in the their torpedoes. After many months of
Pacific unsuccessful torpedo attacks, tests in the
field proved conclusively that the Mark
XIV was in fact no good. Its magnetic
detonator did not work, it ran too deep,
Japan owed its desperate state in 1945 and even when a torpedo made a perfect
chiefly to U.S. submariners. Few ex- hit at a 90-degree angle the firing pin
pected such success, given the service’s crumpled instead of triggering the deto-
depressing record of failure against nator. Machinists built sturdier pins, and
Japanese ships in 1942. There were at last, after 21 months of war, the sub-
many reasons for this poor start. As part marine fleet had a reliable weapon. The
of its obsession with big ships, the Navy Gun Club finally went down to defeat.
had neglected submarines, so the force Together the three submarine com-
consisted mostly of small, obsolete mands mounted 520 war patrols in
boats, including many with defective 1944 and sank 603 enemy vessels total-
engines. ing 5.1 million tons. This was a level of
Worse still, the Navy’s Mark XIV damage that Japan could not hope to
torpedo, which had never been tested at sustain and still survive. In the previous
sea, turned out to be riddled with year Japan had imported 16.4 million
defects. The Navy’s tactics were defec- tons of bulk commodities, but in 1944
329
• S U B M A R I N E S I N T H E P A C I F I C •

Sailors run
drills in this
submarine off
the coast of
North Carolina
in preparation
for combat in
the Pacific.

Image Not Available

that was reduced to 10 million tons. In a mariners had destroyed 1,314 enemy
single year the Japanese merchant fleet, vessels, including one battleship, eight
excluding tankers, was cut in half, carriers, and eleven cruisers. A force of
bringing it down to 2 million tons. 16,000 men accounted for 55 percent of
Tanker capacity remained constant at all enemy ship losses, driving its mer-
860,000 tons, but only because Japan chant fleet from the high seas and
built 204 additional ships. Without putting Japanese industry out of busi-
them the tanker tonnage would have ness for lack of oil.
fallen by about two thirds. Even so, at In doing so, 3,500 U.S. submariners
the end of the year oil imports were perished, the highest loss rate of any
down to 200,000 tons a month from U.S. combat arm, and yet a very low fig-
700,000 in September. At that rate there ure compared with the number of
would be none at all very soon. Americans being killed on land. Despite
To all intents and purposes the sub- almost two years of bungling, the sub-
marine war came to an end in December marine was far and away America’s
1944, when Japanese merchant ships most effective Pacific weapon.
abandoned the open ocean. From then
on, they kept to the narrow waters of F U RTHER READING
the Sea of Japan or the Yellow Sea, sail- Blair, Clay, Jr. Silent Victory: The Ameri-
ing close to shore and anchoring in har- can Submarine War Against Japan. New
bors at night. York: Bantam, 1976.
Calvert, James F. Silent Running: My Years
While this protected Japanese ships on a World War II Attack Submarine.
against torpedo attacks, it also drasti- New York: Wiley, 1995.
cally limited their usefulness. During the Galantin, I. J. Take her Deep! A Subma-
Okinawan campaign not a single Japa- rine Against Japan in World War II.
Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin, 1987.
nese supply ship reached the island. After Mendenhall, Corwin. Submarine Diary.
the war it was calculated that U.S. sub- Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin, 1991.
330
•SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED E X P E D I T I O N A RY FORCE•

hower himself, who bent over back-


Supreme Headquarters wards to give the British equal treatment
Allied Expeditionary even though they weren’t making an
equal contribution to the fight against
Force (SHAEF) Hitler. Some U.S. commanders were
annoyed at this, but it was crucial to the
success of SHAEF.

Formed in February 1944, several


months after General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower had been named supreme com-
mander, Supreme Headquarters Allied Tarawa, battle of
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was locat-
ed in Bushy Park, just outside London.
SHAEF’s naval commander in chief was
Admiral Bertram H. Ramsey, of the Tarawa was the site of the first battle in
Royal Navy, its air commander another the U.S. Navy’s Central Pacific cam-
British officer, Air Chief Marshal Arthur paign. Although savage fighting was
W. Tedder, who also served as deputy taking place in the South and Southwest
supreme commander. A key figure who Pacific Areas, instead of supporting
accounted for much of SHAEF’s effi- these campaigns, the largest fleet in the
ciency was U.S. Lieutenant General Wal- world was poised to strike at Tarawa
ter B. Smith. He did much of Eisenhow- and Makin atolls in the Gilbert Islands.
er’s administrative work and protected On November 21, 1943, after a
him from seeing unwanted visitors. brief bombardment, Marines assaulted
In May 1944 a command post Tarawa’s Betio Island. What followed
nearer to the action was established with was a bloody and difficult engagement.
a small staff at Portsmouth, known as In three days of fighting on Betio, where
SHAEF Forward. As the Allies the Japanese had dug in, the Marines
advanced, so did Eisenhower’s head- suffered 3,000 casualties (40 percent of
quarters. On August 7 he established the assault force), including 1,000 dead,
himself at Tournieres, near Bayeux in while Japan lost 4,500 men—all on an
Normandy. At the end of August, island of less than 3 square miles.
SHAEF Forward moved to Jullouville, Although many Marines died on
and on September 19 it relocated to Betio because the Navy was in a rush,
Gueux near Reims. It was at Reims that many sailors died off Makin because the
the Germans surrendered uncondition- Army wasn’t. Since Makin was lightly
ally on May 7, 1945. By this time the defended, the U.S. assault force of 6,500
entire headquarters, including SHAEF men consisted mostly of soldiers who
Main, to which the bulk of Eisenhower’s were opposed, it turned out, by only
staff was assigned, numbered some some 800 Japanese and conscripted
16,000 persons, of whom about 6,000 Korean laborers. Although the Ameri-
were British. cans prevailed in the end by sheer force
SHAEF is generally considered to of numbers, it took them four days to
have been the most effective joint com- secure Makin. On the fourth day, the
mand ever assembled for any war. The escort carrier Liscomb Bay was sunk by
Axis powers had nothing like it. A great a Japanese submarine at a cost of more
deal of credit for this goes to Eisen- than 600 lives.
331
• T A X A T I O N •

Teheran conference

In September 1943 Soviet leader Joseph


Stalin, who previously had found ways
around meeting with Roosevelt and
Image Not Available Churchill, finally agreed to a conference.
More than likely this was because of
Russia’s victory at Kursk in July 1943,
where the last German offensive on the
eastern front was crushed. Stalin had
breathing room now and could not be
forced into making unwanted concessions
in return for Overlord, the impending
invasion of France. To the contrary,
Overlord’s success would depend on hav-
ing the Soviet Union launch a supporting
This serene Naval officers were not slow to offensive to prevent Germany from re-
sunset was point out that had Marines been sent to inforcing France with troops drawn from
captured just Makin they would have taken it by the eastern front.
moments storm and the Liscomb Bay would have Furthermore, by playing hard to get
before the been safely at sea when the Japanese sub Stalin had moved President Franklin D.
Marine attack
arrived. This argument was probably Roosevelt to signal that he might make
on Tarawa.
unfair, since Makin was taken according concessions on the Polish boundary and
to a timetable agreed to by the Navy. recognize Soviet annexation of the Baltic
Lessons learned at Tarawa were states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).
applied to subsequent landings. The fact In short, Stalin was gaining the upper
remained that assaulting fortified strong- hand, and a meeting with the other
points would always be bloody work no Allied leaders would enable him to
matter how well the troops were sup- exploit it. Roosevelt confirmed this
ported. Americans were horrified that belief by agreeing to Stalin’s demand
such heavy casualties had been sustained that the meeting be in Teheran, Iran, a
on Betio in only three days of fighting. site that was highly convenient for the
But because the Navy remained commit- Soviet premier but not for the ailing
ted to its strategy of making frontal President.
assaults on strongly defended islands, Before he arrived in Teheran, Roo-
worse was to come. sevelt held meetings with the British at
Cairo, but instead of using them to pre-
SEE ALSO
pare for hard bargaining with Stalin,
Central Pacific Area
Roosevelt saw to it that most of the time
was spent discussing China. This empha-
sis was partly because he was still trying
Taxation to build up operations there but also
partly, it seems, because he wanted to
SEE Financing the war
avoid discussing Teheran with the British,
intending to handle Stalin by himself.
332
• T E H E R A N C O N F E R E N C E •

At Teheran, each of the Big Three against Japan within months of V-E
nations—the United States, Britain, and Day.
the Soviet Union—had a different In Europe, Russia would gain
agenda. Churchill, to the despair even of Konigsberg, Germany, half of East Prus-
British diplomats, was still trying to stop sia, a third of the Italian fleet, and a free
the Overlord invasion planned for hand with Finland. During a conversa-
France and promote his Mediterranean tion with Stalin, FDR revealed that he
strategy. Stalin was determined to have a would not challenge a possible Soviet
second front opened in France and annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and
would not discuss anything else until its Estonia.
main features had been agreed upon. In East Asia, Darien would be a free
Roosevelt was most interested in the port, while Russia would acquire the
postwar settlement, which he believed southern half of the Sakhalin Islands in
depended on establishing a good rela- addition to the Kuriles. Most of all, Rus-
tionship with Stalin. sia would move its European boundary
As a result of Churchill’s stubborn- west to the so-called Curzon Line, at the
ness, most of the Teheran conference expense of Poland, despite the opposi-
was given over to wrangling about tion of Poland’s government-in-exile in
Overlord. For days the Big Three argued London. Stalin agreed to join a global
about when it should take place, about collective security organization after the
who should be in command if and when war. He gave his blessing to Roosevelt’s
there should be a supporting invasion of plan for partitioning Germany.
southern France, and over prospective Turkey never entered World War II,
operations in the Mediterranean. At var- despite heavy British pressure on it to do
ious times both Churchill and Roosevelt so, and it was lucky for the Turks that
attempted to curry favor with Stalin at they didn’t. If an Allied force had been
the other’s expense. sent to Turkey this would only have
Stalin, for his part, issued the cus- provided Stalin with an excuse to follow
tomary veiled threats to make a separate suit. And once in, the Soviets would
peace if Overlord were canceled. have been difficult to get out. Other-
Churchill gave in finally, agreeing that wise, the understandings arrived at in
Overlord would take place in May 1944 the Teheran conference determined the
and that there would be landings in the postwar settlement. The Yalta confer-
French Riviera associated with it. There ence of February 1945 mainly con-
was never any doubt of this once Stalin firmed what had already been agreed
made it clear, as he did almost immedi- upon.
ately, that he backed the U.S. position.
After rushing through many sub- SEE ALSO
jects, the Big Three ended their talks Yalta conference
with a flurry of pledges and pronounce-
ments. They issued an ambiguous state- F U RTHER READING
ment on the future of Iran. They Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and
American Foreign Policy, 1932–45. New
promised to support the Yugoslav parti- York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
sans in various ways in their fight Eubank, Keith. Summit at Teheran. New
against the Germans. Turkey would be York: Morrow, 1985.
encouraged to enter the war. Stalin was Mayle, Paul D. Eureka Summit: Agree-
ment in Principle and the Big Three at
to launch an offensive in support of the Tehran, 1943. Newark: University of
invasion of France and enter the war Delaware Press, 1987.
333
• T O J O , H I D E K I •

that led to the oil embargo of Japan. He


Tojo, Hideki argued successfully that Japan should
PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN, respond to the embargo by launching the
1941–44 Pacific war.
Image Not Available
• Born: December 30, 1884, Tokyo, Given the style of Japanese decision
Japan making, in which a consensus is sought
• Political party: none for every major decision, Tojo was not
• Education: Military Academy, 1905; an absolute dictator. He had dictatorial
Staff College, 1912–14
powers, but in exercising them he was
• Military service: Imperial Japanese
Army—second lieutenant, 1905; first answerable to the military clique that
lieutenant, 1907; captain, 1915; major, had made him prime minister.
1925; colonel, 1929; brigadier general,
1931; major general, 1933; lieutenant When the war turned against Japan
general, 1936; chief of staff of in 1944, he was forced to resign as prime
Kwantung Army, 1937; vice war minister and retire from the army, even
minister, 1938; minister of war, 1940;
general, 1941 though the policies that were leading the
• Died: December 23, 1948, Tokyo, Japan Japanese Empire to its doom had not
been his alone but those of the ruling
faction. However, a scapegoat was
needed and, loyal to the end, Tojo
always insisted that he personally was
Apart from Emperor Hirohito himself, responsible for everything Japan did dur-
Hideki Tojo was the Japanese leader ing his years in power.
most often attacked by U.S. propagan- After the war, and after a failed sui-
dists. He did not owe this distinction to cide attempt, Tojo was tried as a war
any remarkable traits of character. Tojo criminal and sentenced to death by hang-
was not a Hitler or Stalin, or even a ing. Even though the war crimes trials
Mussolini. Rather, he was a typical had an arbitrary quality in that only a
Japanese general of his time, which is to few individuals were punished for the
say hard-working, brutal, narrow, impe- crimes of many, Tojo’s sentence was not
rialistic, and loyal—to the emperor in unjust. As prime minister, he led Japan
theory, but to the Imperial Japanese into a war that caused millions of deaths.
Army in practice. He was a prominent He also approved of the brutal acts com-
figure in the war party and held the mitted by the Japanese military and had
office of prime minister when Japan personal knowledge of many atrocities.
attacked Pearl Harbor, and for most of He himself gave the order that starving
the war. Therefore, he came to symbolize Allied prisoners of war be put to heavy
everything Americans hated about Japan. work, a policy that killed them by the
Tojo was a leader of the imperialistic thousands and probably would have
“control faction” in the Army. He killed them all if the war had lasted
ardently promoted all the major Army much longer.
initiatives that led Japan to destruction SEE ALSO
and inflicted intense suffering on the peo- Japan; Japanese Army
ples of East and Southeast Asia. Among
the actions he supported were the mili- F U RTHER READING
tary’s, and especially the Army’s, seizure Brown, Courtney. Tojo: The Last Banzai.
New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1967.
of power in Japan during the 1930s, the Palmer, Edwin. Warlord: Tojo Against the
invasion of China in 1937, and the World. Lanham, Md.: Scarborough
seizure of French Indochina in 1940–41 House, 1993.
334
• T O K Y O , B O M B I N G O F •

Tokyo, bombing of
SEE Strategic bombing

Torch, Operation Image Not Available


SEE Mediterranean Theater

Truman, Harry S.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1945–53
• Born: May 8, 1884, Lamar, Mo. which he knew more than most college Franklin Roo-
• Political party: Democrat graduates. A member of the Missouri sevelt (right)
• Education: high school National Guard, he had been elected cap- hosts his new
• Military service: U.S. Army: captain, running mate
1917–19 tain of an artillery unit in World War I,
leading it with distinction. The “boys” of Harry Truman
• Government service: road overseer,
Jackson County, Mo., 1914; at a lunch on
Battery D, mostly Irish Catholics from
postmaster, Grandview, Mo., 1915; the lawn of the
Jackson County judge, 1922–24, and
Kansas City, would be the core supporters
White House.
presiding judge, 1926–34; U.S. Senate, of this small-town Baptist when he entered
1935–45; Vice President, 1945 politics—early evidence of his ability to
• Died: December 26, 1972, Kansas rise above the prejudices of his youth.
City, Mo.
Western Missouri was at the time
dominated by the political machine of
T. J. Pendergast. Truman would not have
had a political career if he had failed to
Like so many leaders of the period, go along with it, yet he remained com-
Harry Truman came from the midwest- pletely honest. He served eight years as
ern heartland of the United States. He presiding judge of Jackson County, an
was born in a small town near Joplin, administrative post similar to that of
Missouri, raised near Independence, and county executive elsewhere, which pro-
was about as typically American as you vided many opportunities for graft in the
could get. Yet, like Eisenhower, his “plain awarding of contracts for roads, bridges,
vanilla” exterior concealed a formidable and other public works. But when the
personality. 50-year-old Truman arrived in Washing-
A poor speaker whose seat in the ton in 1935, he was literally broke. After
Senate was his reward for loyalty to a renting a modest apartment for himself,
political leader, “Boss” Pendergast, Tru- his wife, and daughter, he had to take out
man had previously been best known for a bank loan to pay for the furnishings.
his careful grooming (“dapper” was the People initially thought little of Tru-
word always used) and modest friendli- man when he arrived in Washington, call-
ness. These appearances were deceptive. ing him the “senator from Pendergast.”
While he had no education beyond high But they found, as his fellow Missourians
school, Truman was a serious reader of had, that he was hard-working and hon-
history, biography, and the classics, about est, which, with his other good qualities,
335
• T R U M A N , H A R R Y S . •

made him popular in the Senate. Truman were doing well in their jobs, and Truman
was allowed to form his Special Commit- retained them. He tried as best he could to
tee to Investigate the National Defense follow Roosevelt’s conciliatory policy
Program out of courtesy more than any- toward the Soviet Union. However,
thing else, few sharing his belief that cor- because Truman had a quick temper, this
ruption in defense spending could be was not natural to him and he was soon
dealt with by legislators. responding to tough talk by the Soviets
The skeptics were wrong. Truman’s with sharp language of his own.
committee could not detect every scam, Truman’s best-remembered wartime
but it did a remarkably good and honest decision was to make nuclear war against
job of discovering waste, incompetence, Japan. Actually, he made no decision as
and fraud. This was a direct result of such, but rather he allowed military lead-
Truman’s determination, his efforts to ers to go forward with their plans to
create policy by including Republicans as drop the first two available atomic
well as Democrats, and his experience in bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Missouri, which had taught him where to Characteristically, however, Truman
look for the dirt. Within a year, citizens accepted responsibility for employing
respected his congressional committee atomic bombs and always maintained
more than any other. Newspapers called that the decision to drop them was his
him the “billion-dollar watchdog,” which alone. Technically he was correct in that
proved to be a considerable underestima- he had the power to cancel the drops had
tion of what he would eventually save he chosen to do so.
taxpayers. However, Truman followed General
Truman, unlike Henry A. Wallace, George C. Marshall’s lead in this and
his predecessor as Vice President, was other matters. Like Marshall, Truman
everything party leaders wanted. Well worried most of all about the many Amer-
known and admired, he was acceptable icans who would surely die if Japan had to
to labor and northern liberals because of be invaded. Under the circumstances, he
his pro–New Deal voting record and to felt that no other decision was possible.
southerners because he was, or at least Truman was convinced that he had done
appeared to be, one of them. Few if any the right thing and never regretted it.
delegates to the Democratic National
SEE ALSO
Convention in 1944 seem to have asked
Atomic bombs; Japan, surrender of; Pots-
if he was qualified to run the nation, yet dam conference
in selecting Truman the delegates were
also unwittingly naming the next Presi- F U RTHER READING
dent. All knew that the likelihood of Hamby, Alonzo L. Man of the People: A
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s dying in Life of Harry S. Truman. New York:
office was great. But they chose to ignore Oxford University Press, 1995.
McCullough, David. Truman. New York:
this for the sake of a balanced ticket. Not Simon & Schuster, 1992.
since 1864, when Lincoln’s vice president Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. Garden City,
was chosen, had the Vice Presidential N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955.
decision been so important. Wainstock, Dennis. The Decision to Drop
the Atomic Bomb. Westport, Conn.:
No thanks to the political process, Praeger, 1996.
Truman would prove to be a better than Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt and Utter
average President. He was sworn in quick- Destruction: Truman and the Use of
Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel
ly on April 12, 1945, after FDR’s sudden Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
death. By that time Roosevelt’s appointees 1997.
336
• U - B O A T S •

U-boats

U-boat stood for Unterseeboot, the Ger-


man word for submarine. From 1940
until mid 1943, U-boats were the scourge
Image Not Available
of the Atlantic, as they had been in World
War I.
The basic U-boat was the Type 7c,
which in its final version could cruise on
the surface for 12,600 nautical miles and
dive to a depth of 1,000 feet. Like all
operational subs of the period, U-boats
were diesel-powered surface vessels that Despite the excellent quality of Ger- These three
dived only when they had to. On the sur- many’s U-boats and crews, they were no German sailors
face their top speed was about 17 knots, match for the Allied hunter-killer task were picked up
more than enough to overtake merchant forces introduced in 1943. These units by the Coast
ships, but underwater, running on batter- were built around escort carriers whose Guard after
their U-boat
ies, their best speed was only 7 knots. planes wreaked havoc on the U-boat
was sunk in
Even that rate could not be sustained for “wolf packs.” Together with Allied land-
Atlantic ship-
long, nor could their crews, whose air based, long-range aircraft and improved ping lanes.
supplies were good for only about 24 antisubmarine weapons and tactics, they
hours. U-boats could operate far from won the battle of the Atlantic and virtu-
home, thanks to the big Type XIV ally destroyed Germany’s U-boat force.
“Milch Cow” submarines that resupplied
SEE ALSO
boats operating in the South Atlantic and
Atlantic, Battle of the
Indian oceans.
Near the end of the war, the Germans F U RTHER READING
came close to deploying a true submarine, Von der Porten, Edward P. The German
the “Walter,” which had a turbine propul- Navy in World War II. New York:
Crowell, 1969.
sion system supplied with oxygen and
steam created by the breakdown of hydro-
gen peroxide. It was tested in 1944 but,
fortunately for the Allies, never became ULTRA
operational. Germany did deploy a very
SEE Intelligence, military
long range underwater cruiser, the Type
IXD, which had a top speed of better than
19 knots and a range of 32,000 miles. But
it suffered from the same defect as the
Type 7c in that it was primarily a surface
Unconditional
boat. Both types were equipped with the surrender
Schnorchel pipe beginning in 1944, which
vented exhaust gases and brought in fresh
air. This device enabled a U-boat to cruise
just beneath the surface but did not change The unconditional surrender of the Axis
the nature of undersea warfare. powers was announced by President
337
• U N I O N O F S O V I E T S O C I A L I S T R E P U B L I C S •

Franklin D. Roosevelt at a press confer-


ence during his Casablanca, Morocco, Union of Soviet
meeting with Prime Minister Winston Socialist Republics
Churchill in January 1943. Although the
doctrine of unconditional surrender had SEE Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.)
been implied by earlier statements, as
when FDR said that his goal was “total
victory,” this was his first use of a phrase
that would quickly become routine.
Taken for granted during the war,
United Nations
when most people believed that you
could not negotiate with regimes as evil
as those of Nazi Germany and Imperial
Japan, it later became controversial. In In 1942 the United Nations Declaration
particular, critics would charge that the was signed by 45 Allied states. No for-
doctrine of unconditional surrender pro- mal organization existed, however, until
longed the war by undermining the anti- representatives of 50 states met in San
Nazi movement in Germany. Francisco from April 25 to June 26,
It probably did not. To avoid, or 1945, to draw up the United Nations
delay, having to pay for their crimes, the Charter.
blood- and guilt-drenched leaders of The UN was divided into two parts,
Germany and Japan would have fought a Security Council consisting of five per-
to the bitter end regardless. Italy’s surren- manent members (China, France, the
der was delayed by some weeks while United Kingdom, the United States, and
the regime that succeeded Mussolini’s the U.S.S.R.) and six temporary mem-
tried to negotiate better terms. While it bers, and a General Assembly. At San
dithered, German forces were able to Francisco a Trusteeship Council was also
seize most of the Italian peninsula. But formed to oversee the colonies and man-
most likely the Germans would have dates of the former Axis powers as well
done so anyway, because they were in as other non-self-governing territories.
Italy in strength and the Allies were not. The Trusteeship Council was phased out
Japan was allowed one condition in shortly after the last trust territory, Palau,
the end—that the emperor be treated gained independence in 1994.
with respect. This took only a few days Some hoped that the UN would
to arrange, so the demand for uncondi- evolve into some sort of world govern-
tional surrender would seem to have had ment, or at least be a mechanism for
little effect on the Pacific war. enforcing world peace. These hopes were
not only unrealistic but were rendered
SEE ALSO
impossible by the Security Council, each
Germany, surrender of; Italy, surrender of; of whose permanent members had the
Japan, surrender of
right to veto resolutions. President
F U RTHER READING Franklin D. Roosevelt, who died just
Armstrong, Anne. Unconditional Surren-
before the conference met, had been the
der: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy moving spirit behind the UN and
Upon World War II. New Brunswick, appears to have intended it to be a way
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961. of dividing the world into “spheres of
O’Connor, Raymond Gish. Diplomacy for
Victory: FDR and Unconditional Surren- influence.”
der. New York: Norton, 1971. It had been Roosevelt’s intention
338
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y •

that peace would be maintained in the groundwork that would turn it into a
future by what he called the “Four mighty force had been laid before war
Policemen” (China, the United King- broke out. When General George C.
dom, the United States, and the Marshall became chief of staff in 1939,
U.S.S.R.), or at least the “Three Police- he brought to his job a vision of a new
men” (the previous four minus China). army based on his experience as a
Before long, however, it became clear trainer and leader of troops. The old
that the postwar world would have only “square” division consisting of four regi-
two policemen, who would be rivals in ments and some 20,000 men was
the cold war rather than partners. Thus, replaced by a “triangular” division con-
the UN evolved in ways unanticipated sisting of three regiments and about
by any of its planners. 15,000 men. Leaner and more flexible
than the square division, it also possessed
F U RTHER READING
greater firepower, because of its artillery
Hilderbrand, Robert. Dumbarton Oaks:
The Origins of the United Nations and
battalions. In time, the typical infantry
the Search for Postwar Security. Chapel division would also have a tank battalion
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, attached to it. Because of their many
1990. vehicles, most infantry divisions were
Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley.
FDR and the Creation of the UN. New actually motorized. In addition to high
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. mobility, self-propelled guns enabled U.S.
Patterson, Charles. The Oxford 50th divisions to start fighting immediately
Anniversary Book of the United Nations.
New York: Oxford University Press, upon arriving at the battlefield.
1995. The three regiments of an infantry
Roberts, Adam. Presiding Over a division consisted of three battalions of
Divided World: Changing UN Roles,
1945–1993. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner,
about 850 men each, which were subdi-
1994. vided into three rifle companies and one
heavy weapons (mortars and machine
guns) company, a headquarters company
with six 105-mm howitzers, a service
United States Army company, and an antitank company.
It was not accidental that a division
came to have three regiments and the
regiments three battalions. Marshall
In September 1939 the U.S. Army con- believed in the holding attack, according
sisted of only 190,000 officers and men. to which one unit would fix the enemy
Behind this minuscule force was a in place, a second would seek to flank,
National Guard of 200,000 civilian vol- or go around, the enemy, and a third
unteers who trained on weekends and would be held in reserve ready to sup-
for two weeks in the summer. The guard port the other two or take advantage of
was mobilized in 1940 at the same time opportunities as they arose.
as the Selective Service System was cre- The first armored divisions, of
ated to supply soldiers through a limited which there would ultimately be 16,
military draft of civilians. In practice, consisted of two regiments of tanks and
National Guardsmen proved to be one of armored infantry, supported by
poorly trained and required extensive three artillery battalions. However, in
training to perform well in combat. practice U.S. armor rarely made massive
Although the regular army was “blitzkrieg-style” assaults, and in 1943
underequipped and far too small, the the armored divisions were reorganized
339
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y •

This mammoth
274 mm
railroad gun
captured during
the U.S.
Seventh Army
advance near
Rentwertshausen
easily holds
the 22 men lined
up on the barrel. Image Not Available

to achieve greater flexibility. The regi- never had enough manpower, what the
ments were replaced by three battalions U.S. Army did have instead was superb
each of infantry, tanks, and artillery. air and artillery support. Although pre-
These units were assigned as needed by war artillery officers often had to train
divisional headquarters to two smaller without guns, the plans they made
field headquarters known as combat proved to be tremendously effective when
commands. war came. Eventually there would be 326
In 1943 Marshall decided to cap the artillery battalions armed with highly
Army’s size at 90 divisions. In all, the effective 105-mm and 155-mm guns.
Army would deploy 11 field armies. The services’ radio communications
Each army consisted of two or more were first rate, and the introduction of
corps, which typically were made up of small planes made artillery spotting
two infantry divisions and one armored highly effective as well. Army gunners
division, plus supporting units. By the specialized in the technique of time-on-
war’s end, 26 corps would be deployed, target (TOT) method of bombardment,
with a total of 68 divisions going to according to which all guns fired their
Europe and 22 to the Pacific. first rounds at intervals timed to bring
Marshall’s decision to limit the every round on target at the same
Army to 90 divisions turned out to be a moment. The resulting storm of fire that
mistake because it meant, particularly in broke without warning was the U.S. tac-
Europe, that there would never be a tic the Germans feared the most.
strategic reserve and divisions could not Of the approximately 16 million
be rotated out of combat on a regular Americans who served in World War II,
basis. This put a great burden on the some 10 million were in the Army
U.S. combat soldier, who spent more Ground Forces. Unlike sailors and air-
time in battle than his British, and even men, most soldiers were draftees, and
German, counterparts. the Army’s makeup was heavily influ-
Although Eisenhower in particular enced by Selective Service priorities.
340
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y •

Americans did not think fathers should devote more of its resources to trans-
be drafted, as a result of which the aver- portation and logistics. But because so
age age of soldiers in 1944 was 26, many men were working to provide
while it was 23 for sailors and 22 for goods and services to the troops, U.S.
Marines. soldiers enjoyed a higher standard of liv-
The Army found itself drafting sin- ing than those of other nations.
gle men in their forties but sparing mar- The Army sustained 949,000 casu-
ried men half their age. This practice alties, of which 175,000 were killed in
had to change as casualties mounted. action. Thus the chance of being hit was
Thus, although fathers made up only 6 less than 1 in 10, and of being killed less
percent of those drafted in October than 1 in 50. But in a combat unit, the
1943, by the following April more than odds underwent a radical shift, with the
half the draftees were fathers. infantry suffering 264 casualties per
Another change as the war devel- 1,000 men per year and the armored
oped was the process of “skimming,” units 228. Combat engineers, field
whereby the Army Service Forces (the medics, and tank destroyer groups had
noncombat support branch of the similar casualty rates.
Army) got most of the men with techni- Even this summary understates the
cal skills and the Army Air Forces (AAF) risk, because casualties were not spread
received the pick of those who scored throughout an infantry division but
highest in qualification tests. As a result, were concentrated in its rifle companies.
Wool field combat soldiers were less educated than Additionally, these figures are for the
jackets (this other military personnel (having a year entire war, while the heaviest ground
one with a dis- of high school on average), and were fighting took place between June 1944
charge emblem also shorter and lighter. and June 1945. For the last six months
on its lapel) In 1943 the AAF lost its skimming of 1944, between 12,000 and 18,000
worn by Army
privileges. In 1944 General Marshall GIs were killed each month and 40,000
personnel were
closed down the Army’s specialist acade- to 60,000 wounded. In a typical rifle
nicknamed
“Ike” jackets
mic programs and the training of air company, combat losses would normally
because Eisen- cadets as well. The transfer of person- equal the number of men originally
hower was nel—some 30,000 air cadets alone—to assigned to it. Few riflemen escaped
rarely seen the infantry was one reason, in addition unharmed.
without one. to experience, why U.S. divisions Even though the greatest number of
improved with time, whereas casualties was sustained in Europe, men
almost everyone else’s preferred it to the Pacific. Overall casualty
were worn down. rates were lower in the Pacific, chiefly
Most U.S. sol- because 60 percent of all casualties were
diers saw little or caused by shells and the Japanese had
no combat, inferior ammunition. There were actual
because they cases of Japanese who attempted to com-
Image Not Available played supporting mit suicide with hand grenades and only
roles to the men bruised themselves. In Europe the “lethali-
who actually ty” rate for shrapnel wounds was 25 per-
fought. The U.S. cent but in the Pacific only 16 percent.
Army fought at However, the Pacific was a much
such a distance less healthy place to fight in than
from its bases at Europe, which resembled home to some
home, it had to extent and had towns and liquor and
341
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y A I R F O R C E S •

women. Except for beer and illegally World War II. Novato, Calif.: Presidio,
distilled spirits, the Pacific had little to 1998.
Perret, Geoffrey. There’s a War to Be Won:
offer. Most fighting took place in jungles The United States Army in World War
where heat and humidity were high and II. New York: Random House, 1991.
the disease rate enormous. Malaria was Province, Charles M. Patton’s Third Army:
A Daily Combat Diary. New York: Hip-
everywhere, as were dengue fever, para- pocrene, 1992.
sites, scrub typhus, diarrhea, swimmers’
itch, tree sap dermatitis, and every other
skin ailment known to man, plus a mys-
terious disease called “blue nail,” which
the doctors never did figure out.
United States Army
When first sent into battle, U.S. Air Forces (USAAF)
divisions composed of draftees and
National Guardsmen were not very
impressive, the inevitable result of mobi-
lizing too little and too late. But with In June 1941 the U.S. Army Air Corps
experience, more realistic training, more became the U.S. Army Air Forces
and better weaponry, and the abandon- (USAAF). However, most people called it
ment of the practice of skimming, U.S. the Air Force, as if it were a separate ser-
soldiers became as good as, if not better, vice equal to the Army and Navy. After
than those of any other nation. the war it would become a separate
As evidence one may offer the expe- branch of the military, but even during
rience of the 99th Infantry Division. It the war it maintained a great deal of
was a green division that went on the independence from the army command,
line in Belgium only weeks before the because General George C. Marshall, the
Battle of the Bulge began in December Army’s chief of staff, usually went along
1944. Yet, despite its absolute lack of with the USAAF’s commander, General
experience, and though heavily outnum- Henry Arnold, on air matters. Further-
bered and outgunned, the 99th stopped more, Arnold had a seat along with
the Sixth SS Panzer Army dead in its Marshall on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
tracks. It destroyed the German plan of Although all the services grew enor-
attack and won the precious time mously during the war, none equaled the
needed for Eisenhower to redeploy his USAAF in percentage terms. In 1939 the
forces and turn defeat into victory. Air Corps had 20,000 men. In 1945, 1.9
Many such stories could be told, all million men and women served in the
demonstrating the point that the U.S. USAAF. By then it had risen from 11
Army prevailed on the battlefield not percent of the Army’s total strength to
because it heavily outnumbered the more than 22 percent. In 1939 the air
enemy, which it seldom did, but because corps possessed 2,470 aircraft, nearly all
of its men and its methods. of which were obsolete. In 1944, when it
reached its peak, the USAAF had 80,000
SEE ALSO aircraft in service, most of which had
France, Battle of; Germany, surrender of; been built after Pearl Harbor was
Marshall, George C.; Southwest Pacific
Area
attacked in December 1941.
In addition, the USAAF employed
F U RTHER READING 422,000 civilians, including female ferry
McManus, John C. The Deadly Brother- pilots, who were known as WASPS, and
hood: The American Combat Soldier in the Civil Air Patrol, which performed a
342
• U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y A I R F O R C E S •

variety of duties, including searches for of February 1945 the air force had a total
German U-boats. Some 1.5 million men of 26 very heavy bombardment groups
and women are estimated to have served and 72.5 heavy bombardment groups.
in the Ground Observer Corps, which Each very heavy group had 45 aircraft
turned out not to be needed because the and 2,000 men, while heavy groups fly-
enemy aircraft they were supposed to ing B-17s and B-24s had 72 aircraft and
spot never arrived. 2,300 men. By comparison, there were
The USAAF included a great number 71 single-engine fighter groups, each with
of services and commands, which existed fewer than 1,000 men, 28.5 medium
to support the 16 separate air forces bombardment groups with 1,800 men
raised during the war. They were num- apiece, and 32 combat cargo groups,
bered according to the order in which each with fewer than 900 men. In addi-
they were formed. The First, Second, tion, there were miscellaneous squadrons
Third, and Fourth Air Forces remained in of light bombers, twin-engine fighters,
the continental United States for training troop carriers, and such specialized units
and defense purposes. The Sixth Air as mapping and photo-reconnaissance
Force protected the Panama Canal, while squadrons. Even so, the imbalance is
the Eleventh was based in Alaska. All the clear; strategic bombing got much more
rest were deployed overseas. than its share of resources.
The Twentieth Air Force, to which all Heavy and very heavy bombers
the USAAF’s B-29 very heavy bombers were often useful, especially in the
belonged, was unique also. It was com- Mediterranean Theater and the South-
manded by General Arnold himself. This west Pacific Area, where targets were
was a maneuver designed to prevent B- plentiful and lightly defended as a rule.
29s from being diverted to duties other But the majority of the heavy bombers,
than bombing Japan. In practice, the and all the very heavy ones, were de-
Twentieth’s operations were directed by voted to bombing Europe and Japan,
Arnold’s representative in the field. with results that did not justify the cost
The USAAF’s greatest achievements in planes and men—especially in
in the war were providing air support Europe. The USAAF was, therefore,
for ground troops and transporting men both lopsided and excessively large.
and materials all over the world. But Although strategic bombing was sup-
Arnold and the air generals were dedi- posed to save lives, as compared to the
cated above all to the theory of strategic heavy costs of ground warfare, it did not.
bombardment, according to which Ger- Some 40,000 airmen were killed in the
many and Japan would be defeated by war, plus an additional 35,000 who died
daylight precision bombing of essential in training or other noncombat missions.
military and industrial targets. Although Considering that the great majority of men
USAAF bombers destroyed large parts and women in the USAAF were ground
of Germany and Japan and killed many personnel, this was a very high total.
civilians, ultimately strategic bombing
SEE ALSO
failed to persuade either country to sur-
Arnold, Henry H.; Spaatz, Carl A.; Strate-
render. Nonetheless, it consumed the gic bombing
largest part of the USAAF’s resources.
F U RTHER READING
The basic air unit was the squadron,
which ranged in size from 7 B-29s to 25 Craven, Wesley F., and James L. Cate. The
Army Air Forces in World War II. 7 vols.
single-engine fighters. The typical group Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
consisted of three or four squadrons. As 1948–58.
343
• U N I T E D S T A T E S M A R I N E C O R P S •

McLachlan, Ian. U.S.A.A.F. Fighter Sto- pilots and 13 squadrons in 1941 to


ries. Osceola, Wis.: Motorbooks, 1997. more than 10,000 pilots and 128
Perret, Geoffrey. Winged Victory: The
Army Air Forces in World War II. New squadrons by war’s end.
York: Random House, 1997. Because the Navy’s Central Pacific
Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgment: strategy required the marines to storm
American Bombing in World War II.
small but heavily defended islands with
New York: Oxford University Press,
1985. little room for maneuver or finesse, their
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American losses were very high. Marine casualties,
Air Power: The Creation of Armaged- nearly all sustained by its six infantry
don. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1987. divisions, totaled 92,000, including
Watry, Charles A., and Duane L. Hall. 24,500 dead. Although the corps was
Aerial Gunners: The Unknown Aces of 500,000 strong at its peak, a majority of
World War II. Carlesbad, Calif.: Califor-
nia Aero Press, 1986. Marines occupied noncombat positions.
A better sense of what combat cost
the Marines may be gained by looking at
a few figures. Like the U.S. Army, a
Marine division was comprised of three
United States Marine regiments, plus attached and supporting
Corps (USMC) units. Because divisional strengths varied
considerably, the Regimental Combat
Team (RCT)—an overstrength regi- Skillful and
ment—is the best unit for comparison experienced
A separate service within the Navy with the Army. An RCT had an average jungle fighters,
Department, the U.S. Marine Corps had strength of about 7,500 officers and men, these Marines
the distinction, and the advantage, of many of whom had jobs that entailed lit- gather in front
of a Japanese
being the only Marine force in the world tle risk. On Peleliu the 1st Marine RCT
dugout they
with its own air arm. Although the had 1,749 casualties. On Iwo Jima the
helped to take
Marines had their own commandant 26th RCT sustained 2,675 casualties. On at Cape Totki-
and headquarters, he was not represent- Okinawa the 29th RCT suffered 2,821. na on Bougain-
ed on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and In Europe it was almost impossible ville, Solomon
marine operations served the Navy’s for a combat soldier to serve throughout Islands, in
needs and required naval approval. the 11 months of fighting that began on 1944.
The USMC was the first service to
recognize the need for amphibious opera-
tions and established the Fleet Marine
Force (FMF) in 1933 for that purpose. It
consisted of two brigades and a Marine
aviation group. Although numbering
only 20,000 men, and with little support
from the Navy, the Marines worked to Image Not Available
obtain specialized landing craft that
would make beach assaults easier.
In 1941 the two FMF brigades
became the 1st and 2nd Marine Divi-
sions, which later were joined by four
more. They were organized into two
amphibious corps. Marine aviation
expanded similarly, growing from 641
344
• U N I T E D S T A T E S N A V Y •

D-Day without becoming a casualty. In After the Pearl Harbor disaster in


the Pacific, by 1945 it was unusual for December 1941, President Roosevelt
the average Marine rifleman to go cleaned house. He replaced the comman-
through a single operation unscathed. der in chief of the Pacific Fleet with
Admiral Chester Nimitz, a brilliant
SEE ALSO
choice. The old position of commander
Central Pacific Area; Guadalcanal, Battle
of; Iwo Jima, Battle of; Okinawa, Battle in chief of the U.S. Fleet was revived, and
of; Saipan, Battle of; South Pacific Area; King was appointed to it. In a few
Tarawa, Battle of months he was named chief of naval
F U RTHER READING operations as well, becoming the only
Berry, Henry. Semper Fi, Mac: Living man then or since to hold the Navy’s
Memories of the U.S. Marines in World two highest positions simultaneously.
War II. New York: Morrow, 1996.
Hough, Frank, Verle Ludwig, and Henry The U.S. Navy experienced the same
Shaw. History of U.S. Marine Corps explosive growth as the Army, rising
Operations in World War II. 5 vols. from a prewar strength of 161,000 offi-
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps,
1958–71.
cers and men to 3.4 million men and
women in 1945. Some 75,000 aircraft
were delivered to the Navy between mid-
1940 and August 1945, while aviation
United States Navy personnel increased during the same
(USN) period from 11,000 to about 440,000
persons. In June 1940 the Navy pos-
sessed 1,099 ships of all types. In August
1945 it had a strength of 67,952 vessels.
Like the U.S. Army, when war broke out The Navy completed or acquired 10 bat-
in 1939 the U.S. Navy was poorly tleships in this period, plus 27 fast carri-
equipped for the task that lay ahead. It ers (fleet and light), 111 escort or “jeep”
had 15 battleships but only 5 aircraft carriers, and 217 submarines. By far the
carriers, which, although naval leaders greatest part of the fleet, from the stand-
did not know this yet, was a ratio that point of numbers, was its landing ships
should have been reversed. All the battle- and craft, of which it acquired no fewer
ships were too slow to keep up with the than 66,055.
fast carriers that would soon become the This was not the type of force that
basis of naval power. naval leaders had planned on having
Otherwise, the Navy had 18 heavy when the war first broke out. Most
and 19 light cruisers, 61 submarines— believed that the battleship was still the
most of them obsolete—and a variety of principal weapon of naval warfare. They
destroyers, gunboats, and the like, all of expected that its function in the event of
which were too few and mostly too old. war with Japan would be to win a deci-
A large majority of the Navy’s big ships sive battle at sea. In reality, nothing went
were in the Pacific Fleet, the rest in a as planned. Pearl Harbor established that
small Asiatic Fleet and an Atlantic carriers were not auxiliary vessels but the
Squadron. In 1941, although it had backbone of the fleet. Battleships, if they
grown only a little, the basis for a two- were slow, were relegated to bombarding
ocean navy was created by upgrading the enemy-held islands and, if fast, providing
Atlantic force to fleet status, with Vice antiaircraft support for carriers.
Admiral Ernest King becoming comman- Submarines, previously all but
der in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. ignored, played a critical role in the war
345
• U N I T E D S T A T E S N A V Y •

by destroying most of Japan’s merchant


marine. Antisubmarine warfare, complete-
ly ignored in peacetime, became one of
the Navy’s most critical missions and its
chief contribution to the defeat of Hitler.
Amphibious operations, also ignored by
the prewar navy, started every major land
campaign in Europe and North Africa as Image Not Available
well as in most of the Pacific.
There never was a decisive naval
engagement. After the Solomon Islands
campaign, the Navy won every battle at
sea. But even when their fleet was gone
the Japanese continued to fight on.
In a sense, therefore, the Navy’s
achievement was greater than that of the
Army, because it had to unlearn so much. named the Third or the Fifth Fleet, Recruitment
Army leaders made mistakes and failed depending on who was commanding it, posters with
to forsee the unknowable. But the war became a well-oiled machine that utterly slogans such as
against Germany went much as the Army crushed the Imperial Japanese Navy. “Fighting Fish
had expected it to after the fall of France Planning, however, remained the and Fighting
in 1940 (except for politically motivated Navy’s weakness. In part this resulted Men” con-
tributed to the
diversions in North Africa and the from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
explosive
Mediterranean), while almost nothing in failure to name a supreme commander for
growth of the
the Pacific war conformed to the Navy’s the Pacific, thereby allowing the services Navy during
expectations. to fight two separate wars. When General the war.
The Navy got better and better tech- Douglas MacArthur was given command
nically as the war went on. It filled its rou- of the Southwest Pacific Area, the Navy
tine but all-important role as the carrier of had to invent a new mission for itself. The
men and materials to remote theaters of result was the Central Pacific drive, which
war. And it learned to do a great many kept the fleet from aiding MacArthur’s
things skillfully that it started out doing Southwest Pacific Area most of the time,
badly. The submarine war in the Pacific although that was where most Japanese
was almost a joke to begin with, handi- forces in the Pacific were located.
capped by poor commanders, bad tactics, Instead, the Navy launched a series
and defective torpedoes. But in the end, a of usually brief but, for the Mmarines,
force that never exceeded 50,000 men extremely bloody island campaigns. Not
swept Japan’s merchant fleet from the seas only was the strategy wrong, but the
and sank a great many warships. planning of the land battles was poor as
The war against the U-boats, pa- well. At Tarawa Atoll in 1943, the intel-
thetic at first, ended with the Navy’s ligence was so bad that many landing
putting together a huge and complicated craft became hung up on reefs, forcing
antisubmarine campaign that, with much the Marines to wade long distances in
help from the British and other allies, the face of heavy fire. In 1945 Iwo Jima,
ended in complete victory. In the Pacific although it ended in victory, began with
the U.S. Navy assembled the greatest an overoptimistic plan, followed by a too
fleet the world had ever seen or will like- brief bombardment. When it was fin-
ly ever see. This mighty force, alternately ished, three Marine divisions had been
346
• U N I T E D S TAT E S S T R AT E G I C B O M B I N G S U RV E Y •

destroyed (half of the corps) to acquire commander of the American Legion and
emergency landing strips for the Army an insurance executive. For some reason,
Air Force. lawyers played important roles in the sur-
While the Navy did many things vey, which also included young men such
supremely well, it committed itself to a as George Ball, Paul Nitze, John Kenneth
costly and unwise strategy. After the Galbraith—and even the poet W. H.
bloody battle at Betio Island in Tarawa Auden, who had not yet become famous.
Atoll, naval planners came up with bet- After Germany’s defeat, the USSBS
ter tactics while clinging to the strategy made a quick study of bombing results
that would produce additional, unneces- and in mid-June returned home. Survey
sarily bloody battles at Saipan, Peleliu, experts recommended to the U.S. Army
Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Air Force, on the basis of what they had
seen in Germany, that the system of target-
SEE ALSO
ing Japan be changed. At the time Major
Atlantic, Battle of the; Central Pacific
Area; King, Ernest J.; South Pacific Area; General Curtis LeMay was firebombing
Submarines in the Pacific Japanese cities in a terror campaign that
was forcing Japanese civilians to move
F U RTHER READING
into the countryside but which had not yet
Davidson, Joel R. The Unsinkable Fleet:
The Politics of the U.S. Navy Expansion persuaded Tokyo to surrender.
in World War II. Annapolis, Md.: Instead of this approach, called area
Naval Institute Press, 1996. bombing, the USSBS recommended that
Gunter, Helen Clifford. Navy WAVE:
Memories of World War II. Fort Bragg, LeMay concentrate on railways and
Calif.: Cypress House, 1992. coastal shipping or what was left of it,
Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. Now Hear This: The as well as oil, chemical, and electrical
Story of American Sailors in World War
I I. New York: Marlowe, 1994. power plants. Their advice was ignored,
Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United however, because the Air Force had
States Naval Operations in World War attempted daytime precision bombing in
II. 15 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, late 1944 and early 1945 and failed.
1947–62.
———. The Two-Ocean War: A Short The strong winds that prevailed over
History of the United States Navy in the Japan made accuracy impossible, hence
Second World War. Boston: Little, the terror attacks.
Brown, 1989.
Spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun: Little controversy surrounds the
The American War with Japan. New USSBS report on bombing results in
York: Free Press, 1985. Germany, but its report on Japan is still
debated. That is because, after an exam-
ination lasting not quite two months,
the USSBS announced that Japan would
United States have surrendered by November 1, 1945,
Strategic Bombing or December 31 at the latest, even if the
atomic bomb had not been used and
Survey (USSBS) there had been no Allied invasion. This
report has played a key role in the con-
tinuing historical argument over
whether the United States was justified
The United States Strategic Bombing Sur- in waging nuclear warfare against
vey was launched in late 1944 to evaluate Japan.
the air wars against Germany and Japan. But the USSBS report was seriously
It was led by Franklin D’Olier, a former flawed. Although some 1,000 USSBS
347
• V - 1 F L Y I N G B O M B •

staff members participated, none of The most important difference between


them were experts on Japanese culture them is that the Tomahawk is highly
and history, and no such experts advised accurate because of its computer guid-
them. Furthermore, the survey relied ance system and on-board radar.
heavily on interviews with 14 leaders of The V-1 was developed by Germany
wartime Japan who, it claimed, agreed for use against Britain as a response to
that Japan was on the verge of surrender Allied bombing attacks. But because it
when the atomic bombs were dropped. lacked a real guidance system, the V-1
But transcripts of these interviews do was mainly a terror weapon of little mil-
not bear out this claim—in fact, 13 of itary value.
those interviewed actually said that Germany began launching V-1s
Japan intended to fight on to the end. against London in June 1944. By the
The differences between the inter- end of the war about 10,000 V-1s had
views and how they were reported been fired at England. Most of these
appear to be the work of General Henry were shot down before reaching their
H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces. targets, but 2,419 fell on London, 30 on
In the immediate postwar period, air Portsmouth and Southampton, and one
officers feared that nuclear weapons on Manchester. They killed 6,184 peo-
would doom their plans for a large and ple and wounded another 17,981. V-1s
independent air force. Thus it was were also launched against the vital port
important to establish the value of con- of Antwerp and did some damage to it.
ventional bombing even in a nuclear Because V-1s were so inaccurate
age. Their fears were groundless. Atomic their chief effect was political. London-
weapons have never been employed ers in particular were upset by these
since World War II, and the Air Force “buzz bombs,” and many Allied aircraft
has never lacked bombers. Accordingly, were diverted to make wasteful and
the USSBS could have told the truth almost always unsuccessful attacks on
about Japan without endangering the V-1 launching sites, which were small
Air Force’s future. and hard to hit. Otherwise, though, the
V-1 was a waste of scarce German
SEE ALSO
resources.
Atomic bombs; Japan, surrender of; Strate-
gic bombing

V-1 flying bomb V-2 rocket

The first true ballistic missile, the V-2


The V-1 flying bomb was a small, was an astonishing technical achieve-
unmanned aircraft carrying an explosive ment. It was first launched against
warhead and powered by a jet engine. It Britain in September 1944 and ultimate-
was the first example of what are today ly 1,054 V-2s fell on English soil, about
called cruise missiles. The current U.S. half of them on London. Another 900
Tomahawk, for example, is a jet-pow- were fired at the port of Antwerp, Bel-
ered missile like the V-1, but it has gium.
greater range and more explosive power. Against this liquid-fueled rocket,
348
• V I C H Y F R A N C E •

which reached speeds of 2,500 miles per tion. A sizable strip along France’s Ital-
hour, there was no defense. Since this ian border, including the major port of
rate far exceeded the speed of sound, the Marseilles, was occupied by Italy. The
V-2 gave no warning. The first indica- most industrialized and populous area,
tion of danger was the explosion that which included Paris and the English
blew you up. However, like the V-1 fly- Channel and
ing bomb, the V-2 could not be targeted Atlantic coasts of
against anything smaller than a city and France, was occu-
so had little military value. Furthermore, pied by Germany.
the V-2 was far more complicated and What remained, a
expensive to build than the V-1 and largely rural area
strained Germany’s technical resources including most of
to the limit. Had Hitler not been so southern France Image Not Available
committed to these frightening but and part of the
largely useless weapons, the Germans Mediterranean
might well have developed an atomic coast, had a limit-
bomb. At the very least, the highly ed amount of self-
advanced conventional weapons the rule. Marshal
Germans were introducing—a subma- Henri Petain, a
rine that could stay underwater for hero of World
weeks at a time, a wire-guided antitank War I who came
missile, the first ground-to-air missile, out of retirement to preside over Henri Philippe
among others—could have been made France’s surrender to Germany, estab- Pétain headed
operational in time to affect the course lished his seat of government in the France’s Vichy
of the war. resort town of Vichy in central France. government.
The V-2 put Londoners on the front From Vichy, Petain’s government A military hero
from World
line again, as during the blitz of exercised direct control over what was
War I, Pétain
1940–41. But the development of the V- called the zone libre, or “free zone,”
was convicted
2 greatly reduced Germany’s ability to while it administered occupied France of treason after
defend itself. About 2,700 Londoners under German control. The Vichy World War II
were randomly killed by the V-2, but a regime broke sharply with France’s for his collabo-
far larger number of Allied soldiers sur- republican past and attempted to stage ration with
vived the war who would otherwise what it called a national revolution Nazi Germany.
have been killed had Germany’s based on traditional and authoritarian
resources been more intelligently values. It replaced all elected officials
employed. with appointees loyal to itself and perse-
cuted Jews, communists, and its real, or
potential, political enemies.
On November 11, 1942, following
Vichy France the Allied invasion of French North
Africa, Germany occupied the zone
libre. But it did not acquire the sizable
fleet, moored in Toulon since the
After its defeat in June 1940, France Armistice of June 1940, which was scut-
was divided up and greatly reduced in tled by the French Navy. Now directly
size. Large sectors on the German fron- under German control, Vichy retained
tier were either directly annexed by Ger- its administrative functions and, as resis-
many or reserved for future coloniza- tance to it mounted, conducted ever
349
• V I C T O R Y G A R D E N S •

more savage campaigns against the Jews


and its armed opposition, known as the
Maquis.
After the liberation of France, the
Vichy leaders were removed to German-
held territory. After the war, some went
into exile, but others, like Petain himself,
returned to France, where they stood
Image Not Available
trial for treason. Vichy’s active collabo-
ration with the Nazis, and its brutal acts
of repression, left a legacy of shame that
troubles France even today.
SEE ALSO
France; France, Battle of; France, fall of
In cities with populations above A London cou-
F U RTHER READING
100,000, Victory gardens averaged 500 ple plants a
square feet in size, or about 20 by 25 victory garden
Novick, Peter. The Resistance Versus
Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in feet, but they amounted collectively to 7 in this bomb
Liberated France. New York: Columbia million acres—an area the size of Rhode crater. Ameri-
University Press, 1968. Island. cans also kept
Paxton, Robert O. Vichy France. New Victory gar-
York: Knopf, 1972. Victory gardens appeared every-
dens, on both
where, not only on private lots but in
public and pri-
parks, before the San Francisco city vate grounds.
hall, in the yards of schools and pris-
ons, wherever there was arable soil and
Victory gardens hands to do the tilling. The Agriculture
Department reported that the amount
of vegetables grown in Victory gardens
exceeded “the total commercial produc-
Food production and conservation had tion for fresh sale for civilian and non-
been strongly encouraged by U.S. lead- civilian use.” This level of production
ers in World War I, and many families was all the more impressive because
who did not ordinarily grow their own after being grown, much of this pro-
produce established kitchen gardens in duce still had to be canned in family
response. Americans took it for granted kitchens—no small thing, because a
that food would be short this time as mistake could result in glass canisters
well. Accordingly, they began planting exploding—or even in bacterial growths
vegetables in the spring of 1942, despite that could be potentially lethal. A real
receiving no encouragement from the help to the war effort, Victory gardens
Department of Agriculture, which ini- also demonstrated the commitment of
tially dragged its feet. By April at least 6 ordinary people and their willingness to
million gardens were being cultivated, do more than was asked of them.
inspiring Secretary of Agriculture Claude
Wickard to call for 18 million Victory
gardens, a goal that was easily reached.
In 1943 more than 8 million tons of WACs
produce was grown on 20 million indi-
vidual plots, many of them very small. SEE Women’s Army Corps (WAC)
350
• W A G E A N D P R I C E C O N T R O L S •

and was essential in any case to help


Wage and price finance the war. It cost $304 billion to
controls wage World War II, of which 45 percent
was paid for out of current revenues, or
in other words taxes. This ratio, which
was a much higher one than in any pre-
With mobilization came inflation, the vious war, was accomplished by raising
obvious solution to which was price con- the percentage of national income that
trols, a policy few objected to in princi- went to pay federal taxes from 7.1 per-
ple, although every seller believed the cent in 1940 to an impressive 24.2 per-
prices set for goods he sold were never cent in 1945. To avoid inflation altogeth-
high enough. Beginning in 1942, the War er, this tax rate should have been higher
Labor Board’s (WLB) biggest headache still, but Congress ruled that out. Con-
was pay. Since price controls did not gress also ruled out making purchases of
become effective until 1943, and then war bonds compulsory, which would
were fixed for as long as the war lasted, also have curbed inflation.
union leaders soon found themselves Given these limitations, the adminis-
under pressure from the rank and file to tration had no choice except to hold
negotiate higher wages. But if wages down both wages and prices. Some,
rose, prices would too. In a war econo- including Leon Henderson, who headed
my, if the population’s income exceeds the Office of Price Administration, want-
the supply of civilian goods, inflation ed higher taxes and compulsory savings
results. Ideally, government could have too. Roosevelt took everyone’s advice in
raised taxes or in other ways locked up his stabilization address of April 27,
all surplus income, thus keeping the sup- 1942, which called for a seven-point pro-
plies of money and goods in balance. gram involving higher taxes, price con-
Doing so would not only have prevented trols, and a wage freeze to be worked
inflation but distributed the sacrifices of out by the War Labor Board.
war more fairly—among civilians but The board finally decided that
also between them and the armed forces. wages should be pegged at the level
However, to do so would have existing on January 1, 1941, plus 15 per-
angered the typical voter, who, govern- cent. This decision resulted in the aver-
ment believed, preferred to have any age hourly industrial wage rising by
financial sacrifices borne by someone more than 25 percent, from 66 cents at
else. Consequently, President Franklin D. the beginning of 1941 to 85 cents as of
Roosevelt’s administration felt that it had January 1, 1943, while consumer prices
to erect a complicated structure of taxes increased by 16.4 percent. In July 1942,
and controls that gave the impression of the board confirmed its policy in a deci-
being, or at least could be defended as, sion affecting the smaller steel producers.
both fair and effective, while at the same What became known as the “Little Steel
time making the fewest possible formula” would determine wage policy
demands on civilians. for the balance of the war.
Wages, prices, and taxes could not The wage freeze, as it was called
be controlled except in relation to each despite being less drastic than the term
other. In the early war years there were implied, reduced inflation at the expense
heated debates within the administration of the industrial unions. After the
about how to balance wages, prices, and December 6, 1941, attack on Pearl Har-
taxes. Raising taxes did limit inflation bor, acting on the assumption that
351
• W A L L E N B E R G , R A O U L •

Vatter, Harold G. The U.S. Economy in


World War II. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1985.

Wallenberg, Raoul
RESCUER OF JEWS Image Not Available
Image Not Available
• Born: August 4, 1912, Stockholm,
Sweden
• Education: University of Michigan
School of Architecture, 1935
• Military service: Swedish Army,
1930–31
• Government service: Secretary to
Swedish legation in Hungary, 1944–45
• Died: Time and place of death
unknown
The cost of unionized workers would be rewarded
living in the for their restraint, most labor leaders had
United States pledged not to strike while the war
rose during the lasted. But by freezing wages, govern- Raoul Wallenberg was one of the great-
war until mea- ment had eliminated the main reason for est heroes of World War II and the fore-
sures by the
joining a union, and in 1942 their mem- most savior of Jews. Little in his early
government
bership declined—sharply in some cases. life suggested he would play such a role.
to keep it in
check became
To save organized labor, the WLB His family was one of the richest and
effective. agreed to help the unions hold and recruit most influential in Sweden but was also
members. In return for a no-strike pledge devoted to public service. After his grad-
and assurances of union cooperation with uation from the University of Michigan,
government, the WLB insisted that union- Wallenberg traveled widely, holding var-
ized employers include in their labor con- ious jobs in Europe and elsewhere. He
tracts what was called a “maintenance of returned to the safety of neutral Sweden
membership” clause. As defined in June after the war in Europe broke out.
1942, it stipulated that workers in orga- A few things about Wallenberg
nized plants automatically became union seem important in retrospect. He was an
members unless they refused to do so early critic of Adolf Hitler. His great-
within 15 days of being hired. Thanks to great-grandfather was Jewish. He had
this device, the fall in membership was worked for six months in Haifa, Pales-
halted and organized labor grew from a tine, which was largely Jewish. These
total membership of 8.7 million in 1940 few personal details do not go very far,
to 14.3 million five years later. Workers however, toward explaining the fantastic
continued to resent the wage freeze, but courage and zeal he would bring to the
on the whole it worked well and did not task of saving Hungarian Jews.
cause undue hardship. Many currents met to bring Wallen-
SEE ALSO berg to Budapest, Hungary, on July 9,
Financing the war; Labor; Mobilization; 1944. The Allied and neutral states had
Office of Price Administration done little about the Holocaust previous-
ly, but in 1944 the American War
F U RTHER READING
Refugees Board was formed and charged
Lichtenstein, Nelson. Labor’s War at
Home: The CIO in World War II. New with, among other things, saving Jews if
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. it could. Sweden, which cooperated with
352
• W A L L E N B E R G , R A O U L •

Hitler in many ways in order to maintain ”safe houses,” where Jews could stay
its neutrality, was growing bolder, until they could be taken out of the coun-
because numerous German defeats were try, and much more. These methods
making it clear that the Axis powers were worked in part because Horthy, who was
losing the war. Thus, when the plight of still regent of Hungary and retained some
Hungary’s Jews became known, Sweden authority, let them go ahead.
and the United States were willing to take However, on October 15, 1944,
action on their behalf. Horthy announced over the radio that
Although Hungary was a member Hungary was prepared to surrender to
of the Axis, its ruler, Admiral Miklos the Soviets. The Germans immediately
Horthy, did not support the Holocaust. put a puppet in his place, the leader of
Because of Horthy’s protection, in the the Hungarian fascist movement called
beginning of 1944 most Hungarian Jews the Arrow Cross. Wallenberg and his
were still alive. But Hungary’s role as a colleagues now redoubled their efforts,
safe haven ended on March 19, 1944, Wallenberg personally pulling Jews off
when Germany occupied Hungary to death trains and demanding that their
prevent it from surrendering to the So- documents, usually provided by his
viet Union. The roundup of Jews began organization, be respected. He risked his
the next day, under the supervision of liberty, and perhaps his life, time and
Adolf Eichmann, a leading exterminator. again in daring trips into the very heart
By July 7 the provinces had been cleared of the Nazi death machine. Arguing that
of Jews, hundreds of thousands having Germany had lost the war and continu-
been shipped to death camps in Poland. ing with the killing of Jews would only
Several hundred thousand Jews make it worse for the losers after the
were still alive in Budapest, and the U.S. war, Wallenberg tried to persuade Eich-
War Refugees Board, the Swedish Red mann to call off the slaughter. But Eich-
Cross, and the Swedish government mann and his fellow butchers were
resolved to save them. Since Sweden was already so drenched with innocent
to front the operation, because of its blood that they had nothing to lose.
neutral status, the rescue supervisor had Eichmann left Budapest on Decem-
to be Swedish. In the small world of ber 23, 1944, when the Red Army was
Sweden’s elite, Wallenberg stood out at knocking on its gates. He left orders that
once. He was young, single, his family the central ghetto was to be cleared of
name was famous and would afford him Jews. But Wallenberg prevented that,
some protection, and he was available pointing out to the SS officer in charge
and willing to go. that when he went to trial for crimes
Wallenberg’s job as secretary of the against humanity after the war, sparing
Swedish legation enabled him to issue the ghetto would count in his favor. No
protective passes and other documents one knows how many Jews were saved
to Jews that in theory should, and in by Wallenberg and his operation, but it
practice often did, save them from the cannot have been less than 100,000.
Holocaust. Wallenberg counted on the Wallenberg was eager to make con-
German respect for paperwork and pro- tact with Soviet authorities to arrange for
cedure, and it did not fail him. the completion of his rescue work. He
Under Wallenberg’s leadership an left Budapest on January 17, 1945, with
extensive network of rescuers was devel- two Soviet officers, and was never seen
oped that included Jewish youth, friendly again. After years of international agita-
legations (notably that of the papacy), tion on Wallenberg’s behalf, during which
353
• W A R B O N D S •

the Soviets denied any knowledge of him, SEE ALSO


Soviet authorities announced in 1957 Holocaust
that he had died of “natural” causes a
F U RTHER READING
decade earlier. That seems unlikely.
Adachi, Agnes. Child of the Winds: My
He was probably executed, for a Mission with Raoul Wallenberg. Chica-
host of reasons. The Soviets distrusted go: Adams Press, 1989.
Sweden and thought the Swedish lega- Marton, Kati. Wallenberg. New York:
Random House, 1982.
tion in Budapest to be a nest of Nazi Rosenfeld, Harvey. Raoul Wallenberg.
spies. It would have been easy for them New York: Holmes & Meier, 1995.
to see Wallenberg as the spymaster of
this imaginary espionage ring. Then, too,
after the war he was going to be hailed
throughout the world for his heroic acts War bonds
on behalf of humanity and would, by his
very existence, be a symbol of freedom
and an embarassment to the Soviets, Of all the methods used to raise funds
who intended to replace Hitler’s tyranny for the war effort, Secretary of the Trea-
in the East with another of their own. sury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., favored
Maybe they had hoped to turn Wallen- bonds especially. He wanted bonds sold
berg into a spy for them, and finding widely and in such a way as to make
themselves unable to do so shot him out Americans “war minded.” He believed
of frustration. Whatever their reasons, that this was even more important than
the act was criminal. But, in killing Wal- helping finance defense purchases. To
lenberg, the Soviets only made him a sell bonds was to sell the war, so bond
martyr to the cause of freedom as well as drives were aimed at the average Ameri-
even more of an international hero. can rather than wealthy investors, which
A young
woman sells
war bonds and
stamps and dis-
tributes War
Production
Drive litera-
ture.

Image Not Available


354
• W A V E S •

meant, in turn, drawing heavily on the bat zone in which the Western Allies
popular culture. and Germany fought. In World War I,
The war-bond drives, of which the front was a continuous line of
there were seven, entertained Americans trenches running from Switzerland to
as well as raised money. Movie stars the English Channel. In World War II
played important parts, with Hollywood there was no single fortified line, but the
organizing seven tours that played in invasion of Normandy by Allied forces
some 300 communities. Dorothy La- on June 6, 1944, established a new
mour, the star of many movies, was western front. To the U.S. Army there
credited with selling $350 million worth was no western front in World War II,
of bonds. Carole Lombard, another but rather a European theater of opera-
popular movie actress, gave her life to tions. “Western front” was, therefore,
the cause, dying in a plane crash on her an unofficial term.
way home from a bond tour. In addition
SEE ALSO
to bonds, war stamps costing only pen-
France, Battle of; Germany, surrender of
nies were sold—mainly to children.
Every form of salesmanship was
employed in this cause, and few Ameri-
cans managed to escape it. Willkie, Lewis
War-bond purchases were volun-
tary, although some thought that apart Wendell
from the “educational” value of war- REPUBLICAN NOMINEE FOR
bond drives it would be more effective PRESIDENT, 1940
to make them mandatory. Morgenthau
• Born: February 18, 1892, Elwood,
shrank from this, however, believing (no Ind.
doubt correctly) that Congress would • Political party: Republican
simply reduce the income tax to offset • Education: Indiana University, B.A.,
1913, LLB, 1915
the added burden. Even so, war-bond
• Military service: U.S. Army, 1917–19;
sales to individuals amounted to $49 bil- captain, 1919
lion, one-sixth of the war’s total cost. • Government service: none
• Died: October 8, 1944, New York, N.Y.
SEE ALSO
Financing the war; Office of Price Admin-
istration; Wage and price controls

Wendell Willkie was a power company


executive. He had never previously run
WAVES for office and, until 1939, he had been a
SEEWomen Accepted for Voluntary Democrat. Any one of these factors
should have prevented him from getting
Emergency Service (WAVES)
the GOP nomination in 1940. Although
they were beloved by many Republicans,
big businessmen were not greatly
Western front admired during the years of the Great
Depression. In addition, changing parties
was rare and tended to be looked down
on. In any case, Presidential nominees
Western front was a term carried over were usually selected at conventions run
from World War II to describe the com- by political bosses.
355
• W I L L K I E , L E W I S W E N D E L L •

Wendell bergh feared that having arms would


Willkie (left) inspire the President to use them.
delivers a per- At first Willkie’s position on most
sonal message issues was not much different from that
to Winston of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Like
Churchill from FDR, he wanted Britain to survive and
President Roo-
believed that the United States should be
sevelt while
able to defend itself. As Willkie was not
inspecting con-
ditions in war- Image Not Available giving people much reason to prefer him
torn Britain. over Roosevelt, he trailed in the polls. In
October, reason having failed, Willkie
made a last-ditch effort to win by smear-
ing FDR as a warmonger. This almost
worked, because the polls showed that
the more mud Willkie threw the more
popular he became. In self-defense FDR
Willkie won the Republican nomina- was obliged to make promises that he
tion all the same, because the GOP had knew he might not be able to keep. One
not recovered from its two huge defeats of these affirmations was that “our
by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 and boys” would never fight overseas. FDR
1936 and was desperate. Unknown won his third term, but the election itself
before the New Deal launched the Ten- was a disgrace, with both candidates
nessee Valley Authority project in 1933, lying about their true positions.
Willkie led his industry’s attack against That Willkie is still respected results
publicly owned electrical power, a central not from the dirty finale of his campaign
feature of TVA. But he did so in such a but from the support he gave to the
refreshingly down-home way that the right side of several important issues.
Republican rank and file warmed to him Before the election, FDR worked out a
immediately and forced him on the party deal with Britain in which some 50
bosses, who would have preferred a pro- overaged U.S. destroyers would be
fessional but wanted to win above all else. exchanged for long leases on British
Although most Americans wished bases in the New World. Isolationists
the United States to stay out of the Euro- were furious about this step away from
pean war, neutrality was becoming hard- neutrality. But Willkie, who had agreed
er and harder to maintain; therefore, not to criticize the arrangement, kept his
1940 was a crucial election year. After word, arguing instead against the way
the fall of France in June 1940, many the decision was made.
prominent Americans called for aid to Willkie also ended up supporting
Britain. Doing so would compromise U.S. the Burke-Wadsworth Act, which estab-
neutrality, however, and might well end lished the first peacetime civilian draft in
by bringing the country into the war. American history, which isolationists
In addition to foreign policy, rearma- also hated. Perhaps he would have lost
ment was a key issue in the 1940 election. the election anyway, but Willkie did not
Interventionists such as Henry Stimson, do himself any good by antagonizing his
Roosevelt’s secretary of war, held that most important supporters.
being able to defend the United States was After the election Willkie gave up his
simple self-preservation. Isolationists like chance at another nomination by show-
aviator and popular hero Charles A. Lind- ing his true colors, supporting Lend-
356
• W O M E N •

Lease, rearmament, a bipartisan defense


effort, and other policies loathsome to
isolationists. Then, after Pearl Harbor
was attacked on December 7, 1941, he
generally supported FDR’s war policies
and championed what would become the
United Nations. He did so knowing the
political risks but hoping to overcome
them. However, he had angered too Image Not Available
many conservative Republicans and party
bosses to be nominated again, so he with-
drew from the race in 1944 when that
became clear. He died suddenly a few
months later, having sacrificed his politi-
cal career for the sake of his country.
SEE ALSO
At the time, there were only seven Women slide
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Selective Ser-
vice System women in the entire federal government markers onto a
at the policy-making level. Women were grid map to
F U RTHER READING track airplane
excluded from serving in Civil Aeronau-
Ellsworth, Barnard. Wendell Willkie: tics Authority programs for training stu- movements at
Fighter for Freedom. Marquette: an intelligence
Northern Michigan University Press, dent pilots. The female assistant national
center in Vir-
1966. civilian defense director had just resigned,
Johnson, Donald Bruce. The Republican ginia. These
because Director Fiorello La Guardia dis-
Party and Wendell Willkie. Westport, volunteers
Conn.: Greenwood, 1960. approved of her efforts to have the worked four-
Moscow, Warren. Roosevelt and Willkie. Works Progress Administration survey to five-hour
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968. and catalog volunteer associations shifts, some-
Neal, Steve. Dark Horse: A Biography of
Wendell Willkie. Garden City, N.Y.: around the country, many of them times after get-
Doubleday, 1984. women’s groups, as possible contributors ting off their
to civil defense. regular jobs.
Women were joining the Red Cross
Women and other emergency-related bodies in
large numbers, but not because govern-
ment was encouraging them to or
promising that if war came it would use
Among the most conspicuous failures of their services. This lack of interest on the
the mobilization process was the federal government’s part would not change very
government’s failure to take advantage of much after Pearl Harbor. In the age of
American women’s eagerness to serve. total war, the United States would make
This was true even before Pearl Harbor only a partial effort at enlisting the aid of
was attacked in December 1941. Thus, in its female population. This prejudice
August 1941 the president of the General against women would seriously weaken
Federation of Women’s Clubs—an old, the war effort.
large, and conservative body—complained It was obvious that vast numbers of
that women were being discriminated men in uniform would be performing
against “intolerably” in the civil defense clerical tasks and other duties that were
program. The Office of Civilian Defense not gender specific. Yet military leaders
did not even have a women’s division. were slow to admit that women could do
357
• W O M E N •

these jobs as well as, if not better than, cooking modeled on that of the Army.
men, thus freeing able-bodied males for Some 25,000 women volunteered for the
combat. Early in 1942, the Army agreed Women’s Ambulance and Defense Corps
to accept 10,000 volunteers for a of America, whose slogan was “The Hell
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps—later We Can’t.” Its more than 50 chapters
renamed the Women’s Army Corps trained women to serve as air-raid war-
(WAC)—only because a bill introduced in dens, security guards, and messengers for
Congress by Representative Edith Nourse the armed forces. However, most who
Rogers (Republican–Mass.) forced its wished to contribute joined the Red
hand. The Navy went on refusing to Cross, which, with 3.5 million female
accept women in any capacity. There were volunteers, was by far the most impor-
plenty of men who were as yet not draft- tant outlet for patriotic women.
ed, the military’s reasoning went, which Some government agencies recog-
was true at the time, but this surplus did nized opportunity when they saw it. The
not last, forcing a later change of heart. Office of Civilian Defense employed a
Washington’s attitude toward number of female volunteers. The Office
women was particularly annoying in light of Price Administration used 50,000
of the popular support for a more serious women in five states to conduct a three-
war effort. In January 1942 a Gallup poll day canvass in July 1942 during which
reported that 68 percent of the public they briefed 450,000 retailers on the new
favored a labor draft for women aged price regulations. For the most part,
21–35—among women the majority in though, except for defense contractors,
favor rose to 73 percent. The women in who gradually warmed to the idea of hir-
the suggested age group were the most ing women workers, volunteer organiza-
enthusiastic of all: fully three-quarters of tions remained the main outlets.
those questioned asked for such a draft. Of these, the most controversial was
In March 1942 another poll dis- the American Women’s Voluntary Services
closed that the support for registering all (AWVS), founded by a group of society
adults and assigning as many as needed women in 1940 to prepare women for
to war work—what later would be called emergency work in the event of a Lon-
national service—was supported by a don-style blitz. It soon enrolled 350,000
ratio of almost two to one. It seems clear members in almost every state. To refute
that a selective labor draft, focusing on mockers who accused them of being
young women but including other social butterflies out on a spree, the
women (and men as well) who met cer- AWVS cast a remarkably broad net for
tain criteria, had all the support it needed. the times, organizing several units in
Magazines regularly predicted the enact- Harlem, at least one Chinese chapter, a
ment of legislation to that effect. But number of Hispanic units, and one affili-
Congress refused to pass such a bill, even ate consisting entirely of Taos Pueblo
in 1944 when President Franklin D. Roo- tribeswomen in New Mexico. Defying
sevelt finally got around to asking for it. local taboos, the New Orleans chapter
Lacking official outlets for war bravely included African-American
work, women formed numerous paramil- women.
itary groups of their own, including the When it became evident that the
Powder Puff Platoon of Joplin, Missouri, United States was not going to be
the Home Guard of Kalamazoo, Michi- attacked by German bombers, the AWVS
gan, and the Women’s Defense School of took on new assignments. In New York
Boston, which taught a course in field its members sold $5 million worth of war
358
• W O M E N •

bonds. In California there were AWVS was the efforts of the millions of wives
“chuck wagons” that delivered food, and mothers who fed and clothed their
including late-night snacks, to Coast families and kept their children in school,
Guard stations and remote military sites. sometimes under extremely difficult con-
In San Francisco, AWVS women taught ditions. Rationing, including that of gas,
Braille to blinded veterans. Others orga- made everyday life much harder than
nized agricultural work camps in Califor- before. Shortages, a complex rationing
nia and Colorado. Some New York sub- system in which the number of “points”
urbs had ambulances staffed entirely by required to buy rationed items was con-
AWVS members. stantly changing, long lines, and an over-
Although it was the biggest such burdened transportation system could
agency, the AWVS was by no means the make shopping and getting children to
only volunteer women’s organization that school and to appointments a nightmare
made a place for itself in the war effort. by prewar standards. Housewifery, never
At least three other women’s groups pro- an easy job, was never harder in modern
vided land and air ambulance services. times than during World War II.
There were also volunteer groups of Working women had to do all those
working women, such as WIRES things plus toil long hours at what were
(Women in Radio and Electric Service), frequently hard and demanding jobs,
WAMS (Women Aircraft Mechanics), especially in defense plants. The govern-
and WOWS (Women Ordnance Work- ment did little to make things easier for
ers), who collectively by 1943 had a them, an astonishing oversight consider-
membership of 33,000 in dozens of ing the seriousness of the manpower
munitions plants. shortage. This was a problem to which
As part of an elaborate recruiting women presented the obvious solution.
campaign, Oldsmobile created WINGS A few figures make this clear. Of the
(also known as the “Keep ’Em Winning 9 million additional persons who entered
Girls”), workers who were given uni- the labor force during World War II,
forms with a torch and wing insignia on some 3.3 million represented a natural
the front pocket. So that housewives increase, with the balance coming from
should not feel excluded, the Ladies’ people who would not otherwise have
Home Journal organized WINS (Women been employed. Boys and girls left school
in National Service), saying that house- early to work in factories, or at least
wives were “the largest army in the replace those who had given up lower-
nation fighting on the home front.” The paying jobs to do so. Old men came out
outpouring of female volunteers in a host of retirement to fill in for youths who
of organizations enabled women to had been drafted. But the most numerous
accomplish much, and suggested how new adult workers were married women,
much more they might have done had despite the prejudice against them.
there been a system in place to take full In 1936 a Gallup poll disclosed that
advantage of their enthusiasm. Even as it 82 percent of the men questioned, and 75
was, in April 1942, when 10,000 women percent of the women, believed that
volunteers marched down Fifth Avenue wives with employed husbands should
in New York, there were so many differ- not work. War did not change these atti-
ent uniforms that no one could identify tudes as much as might be supposed, for
them all. U.S. democracy had not yet reached the
Probably women’s greatest contribu- point where women were seen as having
tion to national well-being in wartime the same rights as men.
359
• W O M E N •

Fortunately for the war effort, mar-


ried women joined the labor force any-
way. Between 1940 and 1944, the num-
ber of employed women rose by half,
reaching a high of 19 million, and for the
first time in American history, married
women outnumbered single ones. This
was a matter not of choice but of need.
When the supply of white male and sin- Image Not Available
gle white female workers was exhausted,
employers had no alternative but to hire
married women and blacks.
However, unlike today, and despite
the fact that the basic allotment for a ser-
viceman’s wife was only $50 a month,
young mothers remained at home. The
number of women workers younger than
35 increased just one-half of 1 percent
more than if there had been no war. The reason was that mothers mistrusted, and These women
Women’s Bureau, part of the U.S. Depart- often rightly so, the quality of these hast- welders were
ment of Labor, found that only 32 per- ily assembled facilities. In other cases the trained for a
cent of the married, widowed, or nursery fees were so high that working typically
divorced women in the work force had women could not afford them. Notable “male” occu-
pation, chal-
any children younger than 14, and in half exceptions were the Kaiser Corporation’s
lenging gender
of these cases only one. Women older shipyard care centers, which were open
conventions of
than 35 years of age accounted for 60 24 hours a day and staffed by child the day.
percent of the increase. development experts. The excellence of
There were several reasons for this. these centers and their success in persuad-
For one, the government did not want ing young mothers to use them was, for
young mothers to work. In 1942 Chair- the most part, an example that persuaded
man Paul McNutt of the War Manpower few employers.
Commission issued a directive saying that Britain, where the labor crunch was
“no women responsible for the care of more severe, showed how much more
young children should be encouraged or could have been done. Britain conscripted
compelled to seek employment which women between the ages of 19 and 30,
deprives their children of essential care offering them a choice between the
until all other sources of supply are armed services and essential war work.
exhausted.” Few efforts were made to Although this program was not rigor-
assist employed mothers of young chil- ously enforced, the country expected
dren. Although some department stores, most women younger than 60 to con-
led by Bloomingdale’s of New York, set tribute in some way to the war effort.
up defense plant branches, most stores Child care support was provided on a
kept the same hours as in peacetime. This much larger scale in Britain than in the
left women coming off the day shift with United States, stores there were required
little or no time to shop. to remain open late, and in other ways
Only 130,000 children were served the nation did a good deal to make
by the Lanham Act, which provided fed- motherhood and employment compati-
eral subsidies for child care. Part of the ble. As a result it was estimated that 8
360
• W O M E N •

married women out of 10 between the For U.S. industry as a whole, female
ages of 18 and 40 were either in the employment patterns varied widely dur-
armed services or industry. ing the war. In Detroit women held 20
Although U.S. support for women percent of the jobs in aircraft factories,
workers was never this good, the work while at Boeing’s facilities in Seattle they
force changed anyway. In 1940 about made up 47 percent of the workforce.
half of the 11 million working women Also in Seattle women held 1.8 percent of
held poorly paid clerical, sales, and ser- the jobs at one shipyard but 21 percent at
vice jobs. The one-fifth engaged in manu- another. Yet, despite regional differences,
facturing were concentrated at the low the total number of women in the war
end, mostly in textile and clothing facto- industries soared, in Detroit alone the fig-
ries. Four years later, the percentage of ure rising from 46,800 to a high of
the female labor force in clerical, sales, 215,000 female industrial workers.
and service jobs had declined to 34 per- Apart from patriotism, the chief rea-
cent—because 3 million women had son why women poured into factories—
taken jobs in industry. Of these, about dirt, noise, and danger notwithstanding—
half had not worked at all before the was money. Even without wage equality,
war, while about a quarter had trans- women earned more as factory workers
ferred to manufacturing from the service than in their previous jobs. By 1945 at
industries. Ford’s Willow Run plant in Michigan,
Officially, the U.S. view was that one-third of the women workers had
married women were only working for experienced pay raises of 100 percent
the duration of the war and would return since the war began, compared to one-
home when it was over. There were many ninth of the men.
exceptions to this rule even in 1940, Although the prejudice against work-
when 15 percent of married women held ing women declined, or was at least sus-
outside jobs. But after that the proportion pended for the war, one thing that did
of married women who joined the labor not change was a refusal to take full
force increased to one in four in 1950, advantage of women’s potential. Black
and then to more than half in 1980. The women were discriminated against in war
proportion who were active mothers rose plants even more than white women, not
as well, so that by 1980 three out of five only by employers but by workers. Dur-
married women with children aged 6 to ing one two-week period in Detroit there
17 were in the work force, and so were were five “hate” strikes caused by the
two out of five with children younger employment of black women. Yet black
than 6. women were even more eager than
By June 1987 more than half of all whites to work.
women, 51 percent to be exact, who had While the participation rate of all
given birth during the previous year were women in the Detroit workforce rose
gainfully employed. Thus, while the from 29.5 in 1940 to 39.7 percent in
prominent role played by married 1944, the rate for nonwhite women went
women in wartime was seen as a tempo- from 31.6 to 48.8 percent. By 1945 the
rary expedient, it marked an historic percentage of employed black women
change from a relatively small female who were in private household service
work force dominated by young singles had declined from 60 to 45. One black
to an immense force comprised for the woman told an investigator that it was
most part of older, married, or formerly Hitler who had gotten them out of white
married women. folks’ kitchens. They would not go back.
361
• W O M E N A C C E P T E D F O R V O L U N TA RY E M E R G E N C Y S E RV I C E •

Even when labor was in shortest Anderson, Karen. Wartime Women: Sex
supply, little was done to relieve women Roles, Family Relations, and the Status
of Women during World War II. West-
of domestic duties that impaired their job port, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981.
effectiveness. In Seattle’s war industries Campbell, D’Ann. Women at War with
during 1943, women workers were more America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
than twice as likely to be absent from Press, 1984.
work as men. The War Manpower Com- May, Elaine Tyler. Pushing the Limits:
mission believed that 100,000 worker American Women, 1940–1961. New
hours were lost per month in Detroit York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Poulos, Paula Nassen, ed. A Woman’s War
alone because women took days off to do Too: U.S. Women in the Military in
their laundry. In Baltimore the quit rate World War II. Washington, D.C.:
for women workers was 6.16 percent, National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration, 1996.
compared to 4.78 for men. If shopping Weatherford, Doris. American Women and
and laundry services, hot take-out meals, World War II. New York: Facts on File,
and more and better nurseries had been 1990.
more widely available, all these losses
could have been cut. It would probably
have made some difference too if women
workers had been promoted and paid Women Accepted for
equally with men, which seems not to
have happened anywhere. This discrimi- Voluntary Emergency
nation helps to account for their much Service (WAVES)
lower wages, $31.21 per week in 1944
compared to $54.65 for men. Even the
high degree of unionization during
wartime had no effect, since union lead- The Navy called its female sailors
ers developed little interest in the special Women Accepted for Voluntary Emer-
problems of women. gency Service, so that they could be
Given the stereotyping and the pre- called WAVES. At first the U.S. Navy
vailing bias against employment of did not want women in the service, but
women, and the mass media’s habit of when Congress began working on a bill
trivializing what they did, what is to that end in 1942, the Navy benefited
remarkable is that so many women did from the Army’s mistakes and insisted
find jobs in defense plants. They were that women be admitted to service on
essential to the war effort, yet, like racial the same terms as men. However,
minorities, they could have contributed WAVES were held to higher standards
even more but for the prejudices against than the army’s Women’s Army Corps
them. Here, as well, American democracy (WAC). They were required to have a
had far to go and much to learn. college degree or two years of college
and at least two years of work experi-
SEE ALSO
ence in areas of use to the Navy. This
Mobilization; Women Accepted for Volun-
tary Emergency Services (WAVES);
made the average WAVE far better edu-
Women’s Army Corps (WAC) cated, and older too, than most enlisted
men.
F U RTHER READING
The Coast Guard, which was con-
American Women in a World at War: Con- trolled by the Navy Department during
temporary Accounts from World War II.
Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, eds. wartime, followed suit. Its female per-
Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1997. sonnel were known as SPARS, from the
362
• W O M E N ’ S A R M Y C O R P S •

women was impossible to overcome.


Polls consistently showed that women of
draft age would have welcomed con-
scription. Being drafted on an equal
footing with men would have meant
that women were in the military for the
same reasons as men, making it more
Image Not Available difficult to slander them. However, Con-
gress would not pass such a bill, which
would have released millions of men in
uniform for active duty and prevented
the military manpower crisis of 1944.
SEE ALSO
Women; Women’s Army Corps (WAC)

WAVES were Guard’s Latin motto, Semper Paratis, F U RTHER READING


required to and its English translation, “always
Weatherford, Doris. American Women and
have at least ready.” SPARS were only required to be World War II. New York: Facts on File,
two years of high school graduates, or to have com- 1990.
college and parable business experience. The Wingo, Josette Dermody. Mother Was a
another two Gunner’s Mate: World War II in the
Marines were last to enroll women, Waves. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
years of work
waiting until January 1943. When it Press, 1994.
experience in
areas of use to
did, the Marine Corps announced that
the Navy. there would be no special designation
for its women reserves, who would sim-
ply be called Marines. Unlike the WAC,
Women’s Army Corps
whose members served in both Europe (WAC)
and the Pacific, SPARS and WAVES
were restricted to service in the United
States. In the last year of the war, they
could be assigned to any base in the The Women’s Army Corp was estab-
Western Hemisphere, which still kept lished to meet a pressing need—the
them far from danger. Army’s manpower shortage—which
Like WACS, WAVES, SPARS, and became acute after the Allies’ invasion
female marines were never very numer- of France in 1944. But the WAC,
ous, and for similar reasons. Members although it did valuable work, never
of the press slandered them repeatedly, lived up to the hopes entertained for it.
claiming they were “loose” women or The War Department was not to
lesbians who had joined the service for blame for this failure. Army chief of staff
sex. Their low pregnancy rate, com- General George C. Marshall and Secre-
pared to the national average for single tary of War Henry L. Stimson were early
women, had little affect on the preju- and enthusiastic backers of the effort to
dices of men, and indeed on women of recruit women. In 1941 when First Lady
traditional beliefs. Every service came to Eleanor Roosevelt and Representative
appreciate its women volunteers, who Edith Nourse Rogers (Republican–Mass.)
on average were abler than men at a urged that women be enlisted, the Army
great many clerical and technical tasks. drew up a bill establishing the Women’s
But the prejudice against uniformed Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC), which
363
• W O M E N ’ S A R M Y C O R P S ( W A C ) •

Mrs. Rogers introduced in Congress.


But opposition to having women in the
military was immediate, and worsened
as time went on. Some thought the
WAAC would be too expensive, others
that it would hurt discipline. As finally
enacted, the bill discriminated against
women soldiers by making their pay
structure lower than that of men.
Image Not Available
A War Department study estab-
lished that fully half of the Army’s jobs
could be performed by women, for
behind the front was a huge weaponless
army of uniformed clerks and laborers
whose work was not gender specific.
The Navy, hostile at first to having
women, finally came to similar conclu-
sions. It then outdid the Army by creat- their girlfriends against joining up, on Major Charity
ing its WAVES, who made twice as the ground that WACs were whores or, Adams and
much money as WAACs and had a alternatively, lesbians, and in either case Captain Abbie
smarter uniform to boot. unfit associates. Women in the other ser- Campbell
In addition to pay inequities, the vices were similarly smeared. inspect the
women of the
WAAC was put into the Army Service The War Department racked its col-
6888th Central
Forces, which made every mistake possi- lective brains to counter this negative
Postal Direc-
ble in recruiting, training, and deploying propaganda, although an early recruit- tory group in
women. In 1943 a new Women’s Army ing campaign with the theme “Release a England, the
Corps came into being, to which most Man for Combat” backfired, because it first black
WAACs transferred. It was placed implied that women who enlisted could Women’s Army
directly under the General Staff, after be condemning their loved ones to Corps mem-
which conditions improved. What could death. Some believe the WAC never bers to be sent
not be improved, however, was the recovered from this recruitment mistake. overseas.
widespread contempt for women in the In any case, the whispering campaign
military, which resulted in endless was so vile and widespread that it could
amounts of bad publicity and slander- easily have been fatal by itself. The
ous whispering campaigns. result was that while Marshall hoped
WACs were said to be promiscu- for a WAC of 500,000 women, it never
ous—indeed, to have volunteered so exceeded 100,000.
that they could have sex. Army and If Congress had been willing, there
civilian newspapers ran many cartoons would have been an easy solution to this
making fun of women in uniform. Sur- problem, for Gallup polls taken through-
veys found that many soldiers were con- out the war showed that a majority of
vinced that 90 percent of WACs were women aged 21 to 35 supported the idea
prostitutes, even though their venereal of a female military draft. Conscription
disease rate was minimal compared to would have put the morality issue to rest,
that of male soldiers, and pregnancies in for while one could defame volunteers, it
the WAC were one-fifth those of single would be difficult to slander conscripted
civilian women in the same age group. women who would, like male soldiers,
Even so, servicemen continued to warn have the same sexual preferences as
364
• Y A L T A C O N F E R E N C E •

civilians. In light of the double standard, SEE ALSO


according to which men who joined up Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency
freely were patriotic but women who did Service (WAVES)
so were sluts, the draft would have been F U RTHER READING
just as important for the WAC as it was Flint, Margaret. Dress Right, Dress: The
in fact for the regular army. Autobiography of a WAC. New York:
Congress’s failure to enact a female Dodd, Mead & Company, 1943.
Green, Blanche. Growing up in the WAC.
draft proved to be a serious blow to the
New York: Vantage, 1987.
war effort. The limited number of women Gruhzit-Hoyt, Olga. They Also Served:
who braved public scorn to volunteer American Women in World War II.
released the equivalent of seven divisions Secaucus: Carol, 1995.
Meyer, Leisa D. Creating GI Jane: Sexual-
of men for active service. But the army ity and Power in the Women’s Army
ground forces did not make the best use Corps During World War II. New York:
of their women. Too many were Columbia University Press, 1996.
Weatherford, Doris. American Women and
employed at clerical tasks that could as World War II. New York: Facts on File,
easily have been done by civilians. But 1990.
some were used as decontamination
experts in the Ordnance Corps, as pho-
tographers and cryptanalysts, and in other
specialized jobs. The Army Air Forces, Yalta conference
which enlisted half of all women,
employed them to the fullest. General
Henry H. Arnold opened every noncom-
bat assignment and school to women, The last meeting of the Big Three—
who performed superbly. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin—was held
Ultimately, 10,000 women served in at Yalta in the Russian Crimea during Feb-
the Europe and 6,000 in the Southwest ruary 1945. It was purely a great power
Pacific, where they quickly proved their summit. Not only were the smaller Allied
worth. Eisenhower could not get as states excluded as usual, but so were
many women assigned to his forces as France and China—despite Roosevelt’s
he wanted. MacArthur called the having at times named the latter as one of
women who served in his forces “my the “policemen” who were supposed to
best soldiers.” Women nurses, who maintain world peace after the war. For
encountered little resistance, served the most part, Yalta confirmed what had
nobly in all theaters, and intrepid civil- earlier been suggested at the Teheran con-
ian women ferried military aircraft ference in late November 1943.
across some of the most dangerous On the public level, agreement was
transoceanic routes. reached at Yalta about the occupation
Thus, long before the Persian Gulf zones in Germany and central Europe, a
War in 1990–91, women had proved that new provisional government in Poland,
they belonged in uniform. If only the War free elections in the other liberated states,
and Navy departments could have over- their representation in the United
come prejudice and congressional opposi- Nations, and a formula for the veto
tion, women soldiers would have solved authority to be exercised by the great
the military manpower problem. Perhaps powers in the UN Security Council.
even more than discrimination, the failure Secretly, Roosevelt and Stalin also
of democracy to recognize women as arranged for the Soviet Union to enter the
equals jeopardized the war effort. war against Japan within two or three
365
• Y A L T A C O N F E R E N C E •

months of V-E Day. In return the Soviets


would gain the Kurile Islands, the south-
ern half of Sakhalin, the restoration of
rights and privileges in Manchuria lost
during the Russo-Japanese War of
1904–05, and the recognition of its pup- Image Not Available
pet state Mongolia.
Most historians agree that the Sovi-
ets were allowed to take only what they
could not have been kept from seizing.
The Asian territories, although often
regarded as a bribe to obtain help against
Japan, were beyond Allied control and In his history Churchill claimed that Roosevelt (cen-
ripe for Soviet picking. Since there was the Declaration meant exactly what it ter) meets with
no way to keep them out of the Soviets’ said. And he believed that if only Stalin British prime
grasp, Roosevelt and Churchill made a had lived up to it there would have been minister Win-
virtue of necessity for the sake of cordial no cold war. Both Churchill and Roo- ston Churchill
(left) and Sovi-
relations. sevelt feared that the Soviets would renege
et premier
In Europe too the settlement was on the promise of free elections, as in due
Joseph Stalin in
determined by Soviet power. The Allies, course they did. But with the war still rag- Yalta to discuss
having waited so long to invade France, ing, the Allies had to behave as if Stalin war strategy.
were in no position to demand that the could be trusted, because there was no
Soviets retreat from positions they had real alternative.
won by hard fighting. It was not sympa- Nonetheless, after the war Roosevelt
thy for communism but the lack of pre- would especially be blamed for “selling
war preparedness, aggravated by bad out” to the Soviets and “giving away”
strategy, that were responsible for the Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe was not
Allies’ weak hand at Yalta. Roosevelt’s to give, but the sentiment was
At Yalta, the United States and politically potent anyway. Thus Yalta
Britain realistically recognized the limits would come to have the same distasteful
of their power. Rather than taking a meaning for the cold war that Munich
hard line, the two countries bent over did for World War II, despite their lack of
backwards to satisfy the Soviet Union. any real similarity.
This was a popular position at first,
with even ardent anticommunists like SEE ALSO
Herbert Hoover and John Foster Dulles Atlantic conference; Foreign policy;
praising the Crimean settlement. Teheran conference
The only mystery about Yalta is
what Roosevelt really understood the F U RTHER READING
Declaration on Liberated Europe, a Clemens, Diane Shaver. Yalta. London:
part of the final agreement, to mean. Oxford University Press, 1970.
The language is plain enough, the Big Fenno, Richard F. The Yalta Conference.
Boston: Heath, 1955.
Three affirming the Atlantic Charter Snell, John L., ed. The Meaning of Yalta:
and calling for provisional governments Big Three Diplomacy and the New Bal-
in Eastern Europe representative of ance of Power. Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1956.
all democratic elements in the pop- Sulzberger, Cyrus Leo. Such a Peace: The
ulation and committed to early, free Roots and Ashes of Yalta. New York:
elections. Continuum, 1982.
366
• Y A M A M O T O , I S O R O K A •

in part to prevent him from being assas-


Yamamoto, Isoroka sinated by radical young officers, which
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF often happened in the Japan of the
THE COMBINED FLEET OF 1930s, that he was appointed comman-
JAPAN, 1939–43 der in chief of the Combined Fleet.
Apart from his being the obvious
• Born: 1884, Nagaoka, Niigata
Prefecture, Japan choice, the job kept him out of Tokyo
• Political party: none and often at sea.
• Education: Japanese Naval Academy, Although Yamamoto opposed wag-
1905; Navy Staff College, 1916 ing war on the West and predicted that
• Military service: Imperial Japanese
Navy—ensign, 1905; lieutenant, 1914;
Japan would be defeated if the conflict
lieutenant commander, 1915; lasted more than a year, he did his duty
commander, 1921; naval attaché at when the decision to fight was made. It
Japanese embassy in Washington, 1926;
commander, cruiser Isuzu, carrier was his idea to begin the Pacific war by
Akagi; captain, 1926; head, Technical attacking U.S. bases in Hawaii, a plan
Division of Aeronautics Department, that met with outstanding success. But
1930; rear admiral, 1930; commander,
First Carrier Division, 1933; vice he knew that the failure of his conserva-
admiral, 1934; head, Aeronautics tive subordinate Vice Admiral Chuichi
Department, 1935; navy vice minister, Nagumo to destroy the port facilities at
1936; admiral, 1940
• Died: April 18, 1943, Bougainville Pearl Harbor with a second strike was a
Island, South Pacific mistake that could cost Japan dearly.
Yamamoto also planned the failed
attack on Midway Island in June 1942.
Part of that blame went to Admiral
Isoroka Yamamoto was the most brilliant Nagumo again, but Yamamoto’s plan
Japanese naval leader of World War II for Midway was too complex and
and the architect of Japan’s victory at involved too much dispersal of his
Pearl Harbor. His talent was recognized forces. Thus, despite its overwhelming
early, hence his rapid promotions. superiority in ships and aircraft, the IJN
Yamamoto was unusually well trav- was defeated by a much smaller U.S.
eled even by the standards of the Imper- force that had the advantage of surprise,
ial Japanese Navy (IJN), whose officers better planning, and superior leadership.
knew the world far better than did the From August 1942 until his death
provincial army leaders. He served two in April 1943, Yamamoto was preoccu-
tours of duty in the United States. The pied with the struggle to prevent Allied
first, from 1919 to 1921, was as a stu- forces from seizing the Solomon Islands
dent and observer, the second as a naval and undermining Japan’s position in the
attaché. He also toured Europe in 1923 South Pacific. This was already a losing
and was a delegate to a London naval battle when Yamamoto’s transport
conference in 1930. Because he knew plane was shot down by a U.S. fighter
the strength of the West, and that of the squadron while he was making an
United States in particular, Yamamoto inspection tour. United States intelli-
belonged to the peace party in the IJN, gence had learned the details of his
which was known as the “treaty” fac- flight plan and prepared an ambush. He
tion. (The officers who favored war was the only high commander in the
were called the “fleet faction.”) As navy war to be assassinated in this way, a
vice minister he so antagonized the fleet tribute of sorts to the regard in which
faction that his life was in danger. It was he was held by his enemies.
367
• Y A M A S H I T A , G E N E R A L T O M O Y U K I •

SEE ALSO In a series of amphibious landings,


Japan; Japanese Navy; Midway, Battle of; Yamashita worked his way down the
Pearl Harbor, attack on; South Pacific Malayan Peninsula, outflanking or land-
Area
ing behind the British time and again. His
F U RTHER READING troops moved on foot, in commandeered
Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral: trucks, and on bicycles, never giving the
Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. New British a chance to build a strong defen-
York: Kodansha, 1979.
sive position. By January 31 all of Malaya
Davis, Burke. Get Yamamoto. New York:
Random House, 1969. had been taken, and its surviving defend-
Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. Yamamoto: The Man ers were besieged in the fortress of Singa-
Who Planned Pearl Harbor. New York: pore, an island just off the peninsula. On
McGraw-Hill, 1990.
February 8 Yamashita invaded Singapore,
and on the 15th it surrendered.
Yamashita’s victory was based on
the superior experience of his veteran
Yamashita, General troops, his daring tactics and inspired
Tomoyuki leadership, and on Japanese control of
JAPANESE COMMANDER IN the sea and air. But he was lucky, too, in
MALAYA AND THE that half of Britain’s force consisted of
PHILIPPINES poorly trained and motivated Indian
troops who were quick to surrender or
• Born: November 8, 1885, Osugi
even desert. Added to that was the
Mura, Shikoku, Japan
• Political party: none incompetence of Britain’s Lieutenant
• Education: Central Military Academy, General Arthur Percival, who surren-
1908; Staff College, 1914–17 dered Singapore at a time when
• Military service: Imperial Japanese Yamashita was running out of everything
Army—2nd lieutenant, 1908; captain,
1917; assistant military attaché to and might well have been forced to with-
Japanese Embassy in Switzerland, draw if the British had attacked him.
1919–22; major, 1922; attaché to Still, the facts speak for themselves.
embassy in Austria, 1927–30; colonel,
1930; commander, 3rd Regiment, In 54 days, at a cost to himself of fewer
1930; chief of military affairs and than 10,000 casualties, Yamashita’s
major general, 1936; lieutenant
general, 1937; commander, 25th
army killed, wounded, or captured
Army, 1941; commander, 1st Army 138,708 enemy troops. Of these, more
Group, 1942; general, 1943; than 130,000 became prisoners of war.
commander, 14th Army Group, 1944
As a result of his victory Yamashita
• Died: February 23, 1946, Manila,
Philippines became known all over the world as the
“Tiger of Malaya.”
Instead of being honored for this
stunning achievement, Yamashita was
Tomoyuki Yamashita was the ablest quickly exiled to a command in
commander in the Japanese Army. He Manchuria, where he sat out much of
proved this after the Japanese invasion the rest of the war. This was apparently
of the British colony of Malaya on because he belonged to a different army
December 7, 1941. Although his small faction from that of Prime Minister
force of some 60,000 men was heavily Tojo, who mistrusted Yamashita and
outnumbered by the British imperial and may have seen him as a possible rival.
commonwealth garrison, Yamashita When Tojo fell from power in
won a stunning victory. 1944, Yamashita was brought back
368
• Z H U K O V , G E O R G I K . •

from exile to defend the Philippine F U RTHER READING


Islands against General Douglas Barker, A. J. Yamashita. New York: Bal-
MacArthur. By October, when he lantine, 1973.
Reel, A. Frank. The Case of General
reached Manila, the Philippines were no Yamashita. New York: Octagon, 1971.
longer defensible, but even if they had
been Yamashita arrived too late to make
a major difference. Although he believed
Japan had lost the war and ought to be
Zhukov, Georgi K.
suing for peace, he did his best to make MOST HONORED SOVIET
the U.S. seizure of the Philippines as dif- COMMANDER OF WORLD
ficult as possible. But the best he could WAR II
do after a string of defeats was to with- • Born: December 2, 1896, Strelkovka,
draw his main force on Luzon to its Kaluga Province, Russia
• Political party: Communist
northern mountains, where it held out
• Education: primary school, 1915;
until Japan surrendered. On September Cavalry School, 1924–26; Command
2, 1945, he gave up himself and his School, 1928–30
army to the Americans. • Military service: conscripted into
Russian Army, 1915; Red Army
Although many atrocities had been volunteer, 1918; commander, 39th
committed by troops under Yamashita’s Buzuluksk Cavalry Regiment, 1923;
command in Malaya and the Philippines, commander, 2nd Cavalry Brigade,
1930; commander, 4th Cavalry
they had not been done at his orders, or Division, 1933; commander, 3rd
perhaps even with his knowledge. How- Cavalry Corps, 1936; commander, 1st
ever, Yamashita was tried as a war crimi- Army Group, 1939; general of the
army, 1940; chief of the General Staff,
nal on the grounds that he should have 1941; deputy defense commissar,
prevented any illegal acts committed by 1941; varied assignments, 1941–44;
troops under his command. This doubt- marshal of the Soviet Union, 1943;
commander, 1st Byelorussian Front,
ful rule had never before been applied to 1944
a commander. Further, the most egre- • Died: June 18, 1974, Moscow, Russia,
gious crimes were committed by Japan- U.S.S.R.
ese naval infantry defending Manila
under the direct command of an admiral
who disobeyed Yamashita’s order to
abandon the city. His trial, which was A child of poverty, Georgi Zhukov
hasty and in which he was poorly owed everything to the Red Army, hence
defended, has been severely criticized by his loyalty to it and the Communist
historians. It was also criticized at the party. He was a ruthless, hard-driving
time by two justices of the U.S. Supreme commander who abused his subordi-
Court—although a majority of the Court nates and was widely disliked. However,
voted that it had no authority to hear he also got results, and rose rapidly in
Yamashita’s appeal. His conviction and the Red Army (which did not adopt
execution have always been viewed by Western-style ranks until 1940) and his
critics as General Douglas MacArthur’s assignment to the Far East in 1939,
revenge for the defeat Japan had handed where the Soviets and Japan were fight-
him in 1942. ing an undeclared war on the Manchu-
rian border.
SEE ALSO Events did not go well in the Far
Japanese Army; Southwest Pacific Area; East for the Soviet forces initially, and
Tojo, Hideki Zhukov was sent out to turn things
369
• Z O O T - S U I T R I O T S •

around—the Soviet general to be promoted to the


first of many rank of marshal during World War II. In
times when he 1944 Zhukov was given command of
would be called the 1st Byelorussian Front (the equiva-
on to do so. As lent of a U.S. army group). This was the
commander of prize Soviet military appointment of the
what became war, for it meant that Zhukov would
the 1st Army capture Berlin and win the most glory of
Group, he reor- any commander.
Image Not Available ganized the
SEE ALSO
Soviet force and
led it to victory. Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.); Stalingrad, Battle
of
This move had
an effect that F U RTHER READING
went beyond
Chaney, Otto Preston, Jr. Zhukov. Norman:
simply bringing University of Oklahoma Press, 1971.
peace to the Fugate, Bryan I. Thunder on the Dnepr:
Manchuria Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler’s
frontier. Blitzkrieg. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1997.
Le Tissier, Tony. Zhukov at the Oder: The
During the fall Zhukov’s victory helped persuade Decisive Battle for Berlin. Westport,
of Germany, Japanese leaders that it would be easier Conn.: Praeger, 1996.
Georgi Zhukov to expand to the south than to take on Spahr, William J. Zhukov: The Rise and
Fall of a Great Captain. Novato, Calif.:
led the 1st the Soviets again. Thus, in 1941 Japan Presidio, 1993.
Byelorussian and the U.S.S.R. signed a nonaggression Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich. Marshal
Front into treaty that freed Japan to launch the Zhukov’s Greatest Battles. New York:
Berlin, a tri- Harper & Row, 1969.
Pacific war. The treaty, and the war, ———. The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.
umphant
guaranteed that when Germany invaded New York: Delacorte, 1971.
march that sig-
the Soviet Union in June 1941 the Sovi-
naled victory
for the Allies. ets would not have to worry about
being attacked by Japan as well.
At the time of the German invasion
of the Soviet Union that began in June
Zoot-suit riots
1941, Stalin formed a new high com-
mand for the armed forces, known as
the Stavka, of which he and Zhukov
comprised one third of the total mem- Not all race riots were directed against
bership. Thus, Zhukov would be blacks. In California the riot victims
involved throughout the war with strate- were usually Mexican-American youths,
gic planning at the highest level. In addi- known as “zooters” or “zoot-suiters”
tion, he served as Stalin’s troubleshooter. because of their colorful apparel, the
In 1941 he organized the successful zoot suit.
defenses of Leningrad and then of This garment had a very long
Moscow. In 1942 he played a crucial jacket, heavily padded shoulders, and
role in the defense of Stalingrad and the balloon trousers with tight cuffs. In June
annihilation of Germany’s Sixth Army. 1943 mobs of servicemen, egged on by
For these and other valuable ser- civilians, began beating zoot-suiters in
vices Zhukov became the most deco- Los Angeles and San Diego in a series of
rated Soviet officer, as well as the first riots that lasted for several days.
This page intentionally left blank
371
APPENDIX 1

IMPORTANT DATES DURING WORLD WAR II

1939 1942
Sept. 1 Apr. 9
Germany invades Poland Bataan peninsula in the Philippines falls
to the Japanese
Nov. 4
United States Neutrality Act passed May 6
Corregidor Island falls, and the
Philippines surrender to the Japanese
1940
May 4–8
May 10 Battle of the Coral Sea
Germany attacks in the west
June 4–7
June 22 Battle of Midway
France signs armistice with Germany
Aug. 7
American troops land on Guadalcanal
1941 Nov. 8
Allies land in Morocco and Algeria
March 11
(Operation Torch)
U.S. Lend-Lease Bill becomes law
June 22
Germany invades the Soviet Union 1943
Aug. 9 Jan. 14–24
Conference in Newfoundland between Casablanca Conference
Churchill and Roosevelt begins and
Feb. 2
results in Atlantic Charter
Soviets win the Battle of Stalingrad
July 26
May 13
The United States freezes Japanese assets
Axis forces surrender in North Africa
and restricts oil sales to Japan, a restric-
tion that soon becomes an embargo July 10
Anglo-American forces invade Sicily
Dec. 7
Japan attacks American military targets Aug. 17
in Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor Sicily falls to Allies
Dec. 8 Sept. 3
The United States declares war on Japan Allies land in Italy
Dec. 11 Nov. 20–23
Germany and Italy decare war on the Battle of Tarawa
United States
Nov. 28–Dec. 1
Dec. 23
Teheran Conference
Japan invades the Philippines
Dec. 24
Wake Island falls to the Japanese
372
• A P P E N D I X 1 •

Feb. 4–11
1944 Yalta Conference
Jan. 22 Feb. 19–March 26
Americans land at Anzio in Italy Battle of Iwo Jima
Jan. 25 Mar. 9–19
Allies secure Papua Americans initiate first firebomb raids
Feb. 20–25 on Japan
“Big Week,” Allied offensive turns tide April 1–June 21
of the air war over Germany Battle of Okinawa
June 4 April 12
Rome falls to Allies President Franklin D. Roosevelt dies
June 6 April 28
D-Day, the Allied invasion of France Italian partisans shoot Benito Mussolini
(Operation Overlord)
April 30
June 15–July 9 Adolf Hitler commits suicide
Battle of Saipan
May 2
June 19–20 Berlin falls to Allies
Battle of the Philippine Sea (The Great May 2
Marianas Turkey Shoot) German troops in Italy surrender
July 28 May 8
Americans lead the breakout from V-E Day (Germany surrenders)
Normandy
July 16
Aug. 15 American scientists test atomic bomb
Allied landings in southern France at Alamogordo in New Mexico
(Operation Dragoon)
July 17–Aug. 2
Aug. 25 Postdam Conference
Allies liberate Paris
Aug. 6
Sept. 17–25 United States drops the atomic bomb
Operation Market Garden “Little Boy” on Hiroshima
Oct. 20 Aug. 8
Americans land on Leyte in the Soviet Union declares war on Japan
Philippines
Aug. 9
Oct. 24–26 United States drops the atomic bomb
Battle of Leyte Gulf “Fat Man” on Nagasaki

Dec. 16 Aug. 15
Germans launch the Battle of the Bulge V-J Day (Japan surrenders)
Sept. 2
Japanese sign instrument of surrender
1945 aboard USS Missouri
Jan. 28
Battle of the Bulge ends
373
APPENDIX 2

MUSEUMS AND HISTORIC SITES


There are many facilities of various kinds devoted, wholly or in part, to World
War II. The first category listed below consists of institutions devoted solely to
World War II. The second consists of more general military museums or displays
that include other wars as well. Both lists are suggestive rather than inclusive, as the
United States and its possessions contain a host of memorials, exhibits, and pre-
served weapons—including armor, aircraft, and naval vessels—as reminders of the
national effort in World War II. The many internet sites devoted to the war include
digital exhibitions and guides to a host of museums. You can tour the Intrepid Sea-
Air-Space Museum, for example, at its location in New York City or on the internet
at www.intrepid-museum.com.

Saipan Museum
World War II History Sites American Memorial Park
National Park Service
Admiral Nimitz Museum and
P.O. Box 5198-CHRB
Historical Center
Saipan, MP 96950-5198
P.O. Box 777
(670) 234-7207
304 East Main Street
www.nps.gov/amme
Fredricksburg, TX 78624
(830) 997-4379
USS Bowfin Submarine Museum
and Park
Allied Air Force, Inc.
11 Arizona Memorial Drive
1730 Vultee Street
Honolulu, HI 96818-3145
Allentown, PA 18103
(808) 423-1341
(610) 791-5122
www.aloha.net/~bowfin

American Airpower Heritage Museum


United States Holocaust Memorial
of the Confederate Air Force
Museum
P.O. Box 62000
100 Raul Wallenberg Place, SW
Midland International Airport
Washington, DC 20024-2150
9600 Wright Drive
(202) 488-0400
Midland, TX 79711-2000
www.ushmm.org
(915) 563-1000
fax: (915) 567-3047
USS Arizona Memorial
www.avdigest.com/aahm/aahm.html
1 Arizona Memorial Place
Honolulu, HI 96818
National Atomic Museum
(808) 422-0561
P.O. Box 5800
www.nps.gov/usar
Albuquerque, NM 87185-1490
(505) 284-3243
USS Massachusetts Memorial
www.sandia.gov/museum/main.htm
Battleship Cove
Fall River, MA 02721
(508) 678-1100
www.battleshipcove.com
374
• A P P E N D I X 2 •

National Museum of Naval Aviation


USS North Carolina Battleship 1750 Radford Boulevard
Memorial Pensacola, FL
P.O. Box 480 (800) 327-5002
Wilmington, NC 28402 namfmktg@naval-air.org
(910) 251-5797
www.city-info.com/battleship/main.html Patton Museum of Cavalry
and Armor
War in the Pacific National P.O. Box 208
Historical Park 4554 Fayette Avenue
Box FA Fort Knox, KY 40121-0208
Agana, Guam 96910 (502) 624-3812
(011) 671-477-9362
www.nps.gov/wapa United States Air Force Museum
1100 Spaatz Street
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-
7102
Militar y Histor y Sites that (937) 255-3286
include World War II www.wpafb.af.mil/museum

Arlington National Cemetery United States Marine Corps


Arlington, VA 22211 Air-Ground Museum
www.arlingtoncemetery.com Brown Field
Marine Corps Base, Quantico
Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum Quantico, VA 22134
Intrepid Square, 46th Street (703) 784-2606
and 12th Avenue
New York, NY 10036 United States Marine Corps Museum
(212) 245-2533 Washington Navy Yard, Building 58
www.intrepid-museum.com Washington, DC 20560
(202) 433-3840
National Air and Space Museum
Smithsonian Institution Women’s Army Corps Museum
Washington, DC 20560 3rd Street and 5th Avenue
(202) 357-2700 Fort McClellan, AL 36205
www.nasm.edu (205) 848-3512

National Infantry Museum


US Army Infantry Center
Fort Benning, GA 31905
(706) 545-2958
375

DOING RESEARCH ON WORLD WAR II:


FURTHER READING AND WEBSITES
Short History. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle
Further Reading River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999.
Mauldin, Bill. Up Front: The Classic
Ambrose, Stephen A. Citizen Soldiers: Portrait in Text and Drawings of the
The U.S. Army From the Normandy American Combat Soldiers in World
Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender War II. New York: Norton, 1991.
of Germany. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1997. May, Elaine Tyler. Pushing the Limits:
American Women, 1940–1961. New
Ambrose, Stephen A. D-Day, June 6,
York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
1944: The Climactic Battle of World
War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, Morrison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-
1994. Ocean War. Boston: Little, Brown,
1963.
Bergund, Eric. Touched with Fire: The
Land War in the South Pacific. New O’Neill, William L. A Democracy at
York: Viking, 1996. War: America’s Fight at Home and
Abroad in World War II. New York:
Cohen, Stan. V for Vicotry: America’s
Free Press, 1993.
Home Front During World War II.
Missoula, Mont.: Pictoral Histories, Perrett, Geoffrey. There’s a War to be
1991. Won: The United States Army in
Dallek, Robert A. Franklin Roosevelt World War II. New York: Random
and American Policy, 1932–1945. House, 1991.
New York: Oxford University Press, Polmar, Norman. World War II: The
1979. Encyclopedia of the War Years,
Dawidowicz, Lucy. The War Against the 1941–1945. New York: Random
Jews, 1933–1934. New York: Holt, House, 1996.
Rinehart, and Winston, 1975. Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the
Dear, I.C.B. & Foot, M.R.D., eds. The Third Republic. New York: Simon &
Oxford Companion to World War II. Schuster, 1986.
New York: Oxford University Press, Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of
1995. the Third Reich: A History of Nazi
Goodwin, Doris Kearns. No Ordinary Germany. New York: Simon &
Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: Schuster, 1960.
The Home Front in World War II. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. Sun: The American War With Japan.
Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Free Press, 1985.
New York: Penguin, 1991.
Stokesbury, James L. A Short History of
Lewin, Ronald. American Magic: World War II. New York: Morrow,
Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of 1980.
Japan. New York: Farrar, Straus &
Time-Life books, Editors of. World War
Giroux, 1982.
II. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life, 1976-83.
Lewin, Ronald. Ultra Goes to War.
Toland, John. Rising Sun: The Decline
London: Hutchinson, 1978.
and Fall of the Japanese Empire. New
Lyons, Michael J. World War II: A York: Random House, 1970.
376
• F U R T H E R R E A D I N G •

Tuchman, Barbara. Stillwell and the Hir oshima


American Experience in China, www.khm.uni-koeln.de/~akke/
1911–1945. New York: Macmillan, hiroshimaproject
1970. A guided tour, personal accounts, and
analysis
Tuttle, William M. Daddy’s Gone to
War: The Second World War in the
Holocaust Sites
Lives of America’s Children. New
www.lib.muohio.edu/inet/subj/
York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
history/holoc.html
Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s A guide to links.
Lieutenants: The Campaigns of
France and Germany 1944–1945. The Home Front
Bloomington: Indiana University hyperion.advanced.org/1551
Press, 1981. Educational site about life in the
Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at United States during the war.
Arms: A Global History of World
War II. Cambridge: Cambridge Of ficial Gover nment Publications
University Press, 1994. www.smu.edu/~sshort/ww2home.htm
Includes documents, posters, and
Werth, Alexander. Russia at War,
maps issued by the government
1941–1945. New York: Avon, 1970.
during the war.

Oral History Archives


Websites history.rutgers.edu/oralhistory/
orlhom.htm
There are many websites about World A large oral history archive of Rutgers
War II, and a large number of these University alumni who served in
include bibliographies, guides to World War II.
sources, and archives of valuable
information and research. The few Powers of Persuasion
listed below are good examples of the www.nara.gov.exhall/powers/
quality and quantity of information powers.html
available. In addition, Access Indiana Newly expanded government poster
Teaching and Learning Center offers a exhibit from the National Archives.
categorized index of general World
War II websites for educational use at Soviet Ar chives Exhibit
tlc.ai.org/wwii.htm. sunsite.unc.edu/expo/soviet.exhibit/
entrance.html#tour
American Memory The Soviet experience of World War II.
www.loc.gov/amhome.html
Exhibition of photographs, docu- Those Who Served
ments, and sound recordings at the www.nara.gov/exhall/people/
Library of Congress people.html
Exhibition highlighting the contribu-
Ger man Sur render Documents tions of thousands of Americans, both
www.law.ou.edu/hist/germsurr.html military and civilian, who served
From the University of Oklahoma during the war.
Law Center.
377
• A U S T R A L I A •

INDEX

References to illustrations are Arnold, Henry H., 23, 71, 309, 322, Britain, 43–48, 63. See also Britain,
indicated by page numbers in 325, 327, 341, 347, 364 Battle of; British Army; Cham-
italics. References to main article Artillery, 24–25 berlain, Neville; Churchill, Winston;
entries are indicated by page Assault guns, 25 France; Germany; Royal Air Force;
numbers in boldface. Associated Negro Press of Chicago, Royal Navy; specific battles
14 Britain, Battle of, 40, 49
Atlantic, Battle of the, 25–30, 61, 160 British Air Force. See Royal Air Force
Adams, Charity, 363 Atlantic Charter (1941), 30–31, 129 British Army, 50–51
Admiralty Islands, 301 Atomic bombs, 21, 31–33, 144, 180, British Empire Air Training Scheme, 60
African Americans, 10–14, 114, 155, 181–83, 184, 216–17, 246, 327, British Expeditionary Force (BEF),
249, 350 335 121–22, 140
Afrika Korps, 14–15. See also North Attlee, Clement, 270 British Navy. See Royal Navy
Africa; Rommel, Erwin Auden, W. H., 346 Brooke, Alan, 292
Agriculture: Soviet Union, 306; U.S., Auschwitz concentration camp, 150 Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
156. See also Victory gardens Australia, 63, 85, 86, 138, 252, 286, 108
Airborne warfare, 15–16. See also 287, 295, 296, 299, 302 Brown, Prentiss M., 250
Paratroopers; Strategic bombing Austria, 126 Buckner, Simon Bolivar, 252
Air Corps, U.S. See U.S. Army Air Axis, 34. See also Germany; Italy; Bulgaria, 151, 276
Forces Japan Bulge, Battle of the, 51–56, 105, 132,
Aircraft, 16–17. See also 133, 156, 262
Antiaircraft guns; Bombers; Badoglio, Pietro, 164, 171 Burke, Edward R., 232
Strategic bombing Ballistic missiles, 347–48 Burke-Wadsworth Act, 355
Aircraft carriers, 17–19, 35 Banzai (suicide), 247 Burma, 56–57, 76, 77–78, 113–14,
Air Force. See Luftwaffe; Royal Air Barbarossa, Operation, 38 229. See also China-Burma-India
Force; U.S. Army Air Forces Barbey, Daniel E., 211, 300 theater
Air power theory, 207 Baruch, Bernard, 231 Buzz bombs, 347
Albania, 167, 168, 240 Bataan death march, 34 Byrnes, James F., 57–58, 231
Aleutian Islands, 225, 246, 247 Battle of San Pietro, The (film),
Alexander, Sir Harold, 294 236 Caldwell, Erskine, 40
Allied Relief Fund, 49 Battleships, 35–36, 188 California Institute of Technology, 32
Allies, 19. See also Britain; China; Bazookas, 36 Campbell, Abbie, 363
France; Soviet Union Belgium, 42, 118, 120–21, 233. See Canada, 42, 58–61, 63, 286
America First Committee, 19–20, 163 also Bulge, Battle of the Cantrill, Hadley, 107
American Federation of Labor (AFL), Berlin, 36–38, 100, 105, 308. See also Cartwheel, Operation, 297
12, 195, 197 Germany; Strategic bombing Casablanca (film), 236
American Volunteer Group (AVG), Berlin, Irving, 238 Casablanca conference, 61–62
113 Bernard, Lyle, 261 Casualties, 62–63. See also Germany;
American War Refugees Board, 352 Beveridge Report, 48 Holocaust; Medicine; Soviet Union;
American Women’s Voluntary Services Biddle, Nicholas, 186 specific battles
(AWVS), 357–58 Bismarck (battleship), 18, 36, 288 Catholic Church, 240
Antiaircraft guns, 24–25, 87 Blacks. See African Americans Central Pacific Area, 63–67, 193, 246,
Anti-Semitism, 170, 240. See also Blackshirts (Italy), 239 343. See also Iwo Jima, Battle of
Jews Blitzkrieg, 16, 22, 38, 97, 115 Chamberlain, Neville, 21, 67–68, 79,
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 25–26, Blum, Leon, 122 120, 127
28, 29–30 Bolton, Frances, 249 Chennault, Claire, 76, 77, 113–14
Anzio, Battle of, 20–21, 166 Bombers, 17, 23, 39–40. See also Chiang Kai-shek, 68–70, 75, 76–77,
Appeasement, 21, 67, 79. See also Atomic bombs; Strategic bombing 174. See also China
Munich pact Bonesteel, Charles H., 186 Chiang Kai-shek, Madam (Soong Mei-
Arcadia conference (1941), 21, 71 Bormann, Martin, 131 ling), 70
Ardennes campaign. See Bulge, Battle Bourke-White, Margaret, 40 Children: Britain, 45; Germany, 132;
of the Bowles, Chester, 250 U.S., 155, 359
Armor, 22 Bradley, Omar N., 41–43, 55, 104, China, 62, 65, 72–74, 173–75, 188
Army. See British Army; German 104, 118, 119, 133–34, 262 China-Burma-India theater, 74–78
Army; Imperial Japanese Army; Red Braun, Eva, 148 Churchill, Winston, 21, 27, 30, 31,
Army; U.S. Army Brereton, Lewis H., 88 37, 44, 45, 48, 49, 61, 71, 78–82,
Army Medical Corps, 249 Brewster, Kingman, 19 92, 121, 164, 215, 220, 270, 278,
Army Nurse Corps (ANC), 248, 249 Bricker, John, 106, 107 332, 337, 355, 365
378
• I N D E X •

Civil Air Patrol, 26, 341–42 Denmark, 128, 147, 150, 276 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Civil defense, 82–83 “Der Führer’s Face” (song), 238 185
Civilian Air Warning System, 83 Destination Tokyo (film), 237 Fermi, Enrico, 33
Civilians. See Home front; Human Destroyers, 94–95 Field guns, 24
rights; Slave labor; Strategic Dewey, Thomas E., 106, 107–8, 285 Fighting Seabees, The (film), 237
bombing DeWitt, John L., 185 Films, 155, 236–37
Coast Guard, 10–11, 361–62 Dietrich, Josef, 52, 53 Financing, of war, 109–11. See also
Cobra, Operation, 42, 118 Dill, Sir John, 71 Taxation
Codes and code breaking, 159–60, Dive-bombers, 40 Finland, 96, 100, 111–12, 316
176, 225–26. See also Intelligence; Doenitz, Karl, 27, 30, 105, 136 Fire bombing, 22, 95–96, 143,
Navajo Code Talkers D’Olier, Franklin, 346 179–80, 202, 326–27
Collaborators, 92, 116. See also Donovan, William J., 250 Fish, Hamilton, 11
Resistance movements Doolittle, James H., 225, 322 Flak tower, 25
Colonialism, 178 Douhet, Giulio, 320 Flamethrowers, 112–13
Combat fatigue, 219 Draft. See Conscription Fletcher, Frank Jack, 86, 137, 138,
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 71 Dresden, bombing of, 95–96, 226, 227, 296, 312
Combined Munitions Assignment 310–311, 324 Flying Tigers, 75, 113–14
Board, 71 Dunkirk, evacuation from, 44, 80, 91, Forrestal, James V., 114
Command Decision (film), 237 121–22, 140 Foster, Thomas B., 11
Communist party (China), 68, 69–70, France, 115–22. See also D-Day; De
72–73, 75 Eaker, Ira, 309–310, 322 Gaulle, Charles; French Army;
Concentration camps, 83, 151, 314. Eastern Europe, 284–85, 316–17. See Normandy; Resistance movements;
See also Holocaust also Czechoslovakia; Poland Vichy France; specific battles
Congress, U.S., 84. See also Elections Eastern front, 96–101. See also Soviet Franco, Francisco, 240
of 1942 and 1944 Union French Army, 117
Congress of Industrial Organizations East Indies, 176, 179. See also French Canadians, 58–59
(CIO), 12, 195, 197 Indonesia French National Committee, 61,
Connor, Fox, 102 Education, 136, 214 91–92, 94
Connor, Howard, 242 Egypt, 14, 168, 169, 240, 241
Conscription, 84, 149, 153, 232, 292, Eichelberger, Robert L., 300, 304 Gauss, Clarence, 75
339–40, 357, 363–64. See also Eichmann, Adolf, 352–53 General Federation of Women’s Clubs,
Selective Service System Einsatzgruppen, 149 356
Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), 231 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 37–38, 41, Geneva Convention of 1929, 271
Convoys, North Atlantic, 26 43, 52–53, 54–55, 89–90, 101–105, Genocide, 123. See also Holocaust
Coral Sea, Battle of, 85–86, 259–60 118, 119, 133, 134–35, 165, 217, George, David Lloyd, 79
Cowner, Eastine, 190 221, 223, 233, 234, 261–62, 294, German Army, 123–24. See also
Crete, 15 310, 323, 330, 364 Bulge, Battle of the; Eastern front;
Crime, 47, 155 El Alamein, battle of, 223, 232–33, France; SS
Crosby, Bing, 155, 238 278 German Labor Front, 132
Cruise missiles, 347 Elections of 1942 and 1944, 105–8 Germany, 105, 125–36, 324–25. See
Cruisers (warships), 86–87 Elsenborn Ridge (Belgium), 52, 53–54 also Berlin; Dresden; German
Czechoslovakia, 67, 126–27, 146–47, Embargo, of Japan, 176 Army; Hamburg; Hitler, Adolf;
321 England. See Britain Luftwaffe; Nazis; specific battles
ENIGMA code machine, 159, 160 Gerow, Leonard T., 53
Dachau concentration camp, 83 Enola Gay (airplane), 33, 181 Gestapo, 314. See also SS
Darlan, Jean, 93, 222, 223 Enterprise (aircraft carrier), 225, 226, Ghormley, Robert, 245, 297
Das Boot (film), 237 227, 228 G.I. Bill of Rights (1944), 12, 84, 136
Davis, William H., 196 Escort carriers, 18, 30 Gilbert Islands, 63–64
Dear Fatherland, Rest Quietly Ethiopia, 167, 168, 169, 240 Giles, Barney M., 322
(Bourke-White), 40 European Theater of Operations, 108. Giraud, Henri, 61, 93, 223
Declaration on Liberated Europe, See also France; Germany; Italy Göring, Hermann, 163, 207, 318
285, 367 Gort, Lord John, 121
D-Day, 87–90, 104, 215, 233. See Fair Employment Practices Gothic Line (Italy), 166
also Overlord, Operation Commission (FEPC), 12–13, 108–9 Government: Britain, 47–48; Canada,
De Gaulle, Charles, 61, 90–94, 102, Falaise gap (France), 118, 119, 233 60; France, 94; Germany, 125–26;
116–17, 122, 223. See also France Fascism, 109. See also Germany; Italy; Japan, 143–44, 173; U.S., 84,
De Guingand, Freddie, 55 Nazis 105–8, 356. See also Churchill,
379
• I N D E X •

Winston; De Gaulle, Charles; Hopkins, Harry, 200 Johnson, Philip, 242


Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Hornet (aircraft carrier), 39, 225, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21, 28, 71
Harry S. 226, 227
Great Britain. See Britain Horthy, Miklos, 352 Kaiser, Henry J., 18, 190–91, 359
Great Depression, 46, 126, 136, 145, Hoss, Rudolph, 150 Kamikazes, 19, 67, 191
173, 174, 195 Huertgen Forest, Battle of, 52, 54 Kennedy, John F., 272
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Hull, Cordell, 91, 158 Kenney, George C., 211, 301
Sphere, 175 Human rights, 161, 185. See also Kesselring, Albert, 20, 165, 166
Greece, 38, 168, 240 Holocaust; Internment; Prisoners of Kieyoomia, Joe Lee, 242
Grenades, 137 war; Slave labor; Strategic bombing Kimmel, Husband, 244, 254
Ground Observer Corps, 342 Hungary, 351–53 King, Ernest J., 18, 28–29, 63, 64,
Groves, Leslie Richard, 31, 32 Husky, Operation, 61, 103, 224, 65, 71, 114, 137, 192–94,
Guadalcanal, battle of, 137–39, 296 293–94 199–200, 212, 246, 252, 289,
Guam, 64, 258 Hutton, Betty, 237 296–97, 344
Guderian, Heinz, 120–21, 139–40 King, Mackenzie, 58, 59, 233
Gulag Archipelago, 305, 316 Iceland, 129 Kinkaid, Thomas C., 204–5
Gustav Line (Italy), 20, 166 Ickes, Harold, 186 Knox, William Franklin, 114, 194–
Gypsies, 151 Imperial Japanese Army, 160, 187–88, 95
333, 367–68 Korean War, 43
Halsey, William, 64, 141–42, 204–5, 226, Imperial Japanese Navy, 85–86, 159, Kristallnacht (1938), 149
245–46, 280–81, 297–98, 302, 311 188–90, 225, 366 Kurita, Takeo, 204, 205
Hamburg, bombing of, 143, 324 India, 76 Kursk, Battle of, 100
Hanford, Washington, 32, 35 Indochina, 176, 178
Hansell, H. S., 326 Indonesia, 65. See also East Indies Labor, 13, 195–97, 351. See also
Harding, Edwin Forrest, 300 Industry: Britain, 46; Canada, 59; Industry; Mobilization; Slave labor;
Harris, Sir Arthur, 36, 37, 95, 287, Germany, 124, 130–31, 208; Japan, War Labor Board
320 179; Soviet Union, 99, 306; U.S., LaGuardia, Fiorello, 12, 82, 356
Hawaii. See Pearl Harbor 12–13, 153–54, 358–59, 360–61. Lamour, Dorothy, 111, 354
Henderson, Leon, 250, 274, 350 See also Labor; Mobilization Landing ships and craft, 198–99
Hideki, Tojo, 179 Infantry Attacks, The (Rommel), 278 Langer, William L., 251
Higgins, Andrew J., 191, 198 Infantry in Battle (Marshall), 214 Lanham Act, 359
Himmler, Heinrich, 313–14 Inflation. See Wage and price controls Leahy, William D., 66, 71, 199–200
Hindenburg, Paul Von, 126, 145 Intelligence, military, 85, 88–89, Ledo Road (Burma), 56, 57
Hirano, Hisa, 161 158–60, 185, 225–26, 250. See also LeMay, Curtis E., 200–2, 326, 346
Hirohito, Emperor, 143–44, 183 Codes and code breaking Lemkin, Raphael, 123
Hiroshima, Japan, 32, 33, 180, 181, Internment, of Japanese-Americans, Lend-Lease Program, 84, 129, 202–4
183, 184. See also Atomic bombs 161–62, 185–86, 275 Lewis, Fulton, Jr., 163
Hitler, Adolf, 14, 21, 38, 43, 49, Isolationism, 84, 129, 162–64, 355. Lexington (aircraft carrier), 17, 85,
51–52, 53–55, 67, 96, 98–99, 105, See also Lindbergh, Charles A. 86, 260
120, 121, 125–28, 135–36, 139, Italian Social Republic (ISR), 170, 241 Leyte Gulf, Battle of, 18, 36, 141–
145–48, 150, 166, 207, 208, Italy, 63, 151, 164–71, 241. See also 42, 189–90, 204–5, 302–4
243–44, 315 Mussolini, Benito; Sicily; specific Liberty ships, 154, 190. See also
Hobby, Oveta Culp, 148–49 battles Atlantic, Battle of; Kaiser, Henry J.
Hocking, Phyllis, 248 Iwo Jima, Battle of, 66–67, 171–72, Libya, 168, 169
Hodges, Courtney H., 53, 134 242, 246, 345–46 Lifeboat (film), 236
Holocaust, 61, 149–51, 235, 319, Life magazine, 40
351–53. See also Concentration Japan, 114, 173–84, 270–71, 325–27. Lindbergh, Charles A., 20, 162, 163
camps; Genocide; Jews See also Hirohito, Emperor; Liscomb Bay (escort carrier), 63–64
Home front: Britain, 43–48; Germany, Imperial Japanese Army; Imperial Literature, of World War II, 205–6
130–32; Japan, 179–80; U.S., Japanese Navy; Pacific War; Tokyo; Local Defense Councils, 83
152–57. See also Children; specific battles Loesser, Frank, 238
Industry; Morale; Music; Radio; Japanese Americans, 161–62, 185–86, Lombard, Carole, 111, 354
Women 275 London, bombing of, 47, 49
Home Guard, 44, 50 Jet aircraft, 208 Los Alamos Laboratory (New
Homma, Masaharu, 258 Jews, 92, 116, 168, 169, 268, 319, Mexico), 32
Hoover, J. Edgar, 185 351–53. See also Anti-Semitism; Lovett, Robert A., 322
Hope, Bob, 272–73 Holocaust Lucy Ring, 158–59
380
• I N D E X •

Luftwaffe, 49, 99, 122, 207–9. See Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law, 41, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 32–33
also Strategic bombing 51, 55–56, 104, 119, 134, 223, O’Connor, Richard, 169
Luxembourg, 276 232–34 Office of Civilian Defense (OCD),
Morale, 47, 237. See also Home front 82–83, 280, 357
MacArthur, Douglas, 16, 63, 64, 65, Morgenthau, Henry, 109–10, 110–11, Office of Economic Stabilization, 231
66, 102, 149, 177, 192–93, 205,, 234–35, 353 Office of Emergency Management,
209–13, 246, 258, 259, 298–304, Morocco, 222–23 230
345, 364 Mortars, 235 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI),
Machine guns. See Small arms Motion pictures, 155, 236–37 185
MAGIC (code breaking), 159, 176, Mr. Chairman (Hobby), 148 Office of Price Administration, 250,
177, 178 Munich pact (1938), 21, 127, 240. 357
Maginot Line (France), 115, 120, 122 See also Appeasement Office of Production Management
Makin Atoll, 63–64, 330–31 Murrow, Edward R., 273 (OPM), 230
Malaria, 217–18, 341 Musashi (battleship), 36 Office of Strategic Services, 250–51
Malaya, 179, 367 Music, popular, 155–56, 238–39 Office of War Mobilization (OWM),
Malmedy massacre, 213 Mussolini, Benito, 150–51, 166, 167– 231
Manchuria, 173–74. See also China 68, 170, 171, 239–41. See also Italy Okinawa, battle of, 64, 66–67,
Manhattan Project, 31–32 212–13, 251–53
Manila Bay. See Philippines Nagasaki, Japan, 32, 33, 180, 182, Omaha Beach (France), 90
Manteuffel, Hasso von, 54 183, 184. See also Atomic bombs Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 31–32
Mao Zedong, 68, 70, 72 Nagumo, Chuichi, 226–27, 257, 265 Overlord, Operation, 16, 81, 103–4,
Maquis (French underground), 117, Napalm, 110, 241 215, 216. See also D-Day
277 National Association for the Ozawa, Jisaburo, 267
Mariana Islands, 64, 65, 289, 312–13 Advancement of Colored People
Marines. See U.S. Marine Corps (NAACP), 12, 14 Pacific Fleet, 254–55
Market Garden, Operation, 16, 104, National Guard, 232, 338 Pacific Ocean Area, 256. See also
119, 233–34 National Velvet (film), 237 Central Pacific Area; Pacific War;
Marshall, George C., 71, 75, 102, Native Americans, 242–43 Southwest Pacific Area
103, 133, 192, 213–17, 292, 335, Navajo code talkers, 242–43 Pacific War, 256–60, 340–41. See also
338–39, 340, 341, 362 Naval Nurse Corps (NNC), 249 Pacific Ocean Area; U.S. Navy; spe-
McCloy, John, 11 Navy. See Imperial Japanese Navy; cific battles
McClusky, Clarence, 228 Royal Navy; U.S. Navy; U-boats Panzerfaust (tank fist), 36
McNutt, Paul, 359 Nazis (National Socialist German Papua, New Guinea, 210, 300
Medicine, 217–20. See also Workers’ party), 125, 145–46, Paratroopers, 15–16, 90, 207. See also
Casualties; Nurses 243–44. See also Hitler, Adolf Airborne warfare
Mediterranean theater, 220–24. See Nelson, Donald, 230–31 Patton, George S., Jr., 42, 54, 55, 104,
also North Africa Netherlands, 120–21, 176, 276–77 118–19, 134, 217, 222, 260–63
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 126, 145, 146 New Deal, 84, 106, 266, 283 Paulau Islands, 302
Memphis Belle (film), 236 New Guinea, 299–300, 301–2. See Paulus, Friedrich, 99, 318
Mental health, 218–20 also Papua; Port Moresby; Rabaul; Pearl Harbor, attack on, 35, 69, 72,
Merrill, Frank, 57 Southwest Pacific Area 75, 130, 152, 159, 177–78, 244,
Mexican Americans, 369 Newspapers, 14 256–57, 264–65
Michener, James, 139 New Zealand, 252, 286, 287 Penicillin, 218
Mid-Pacific Direction Finding Net, Nimitz, Chester, 63, 64, 66, 85–86, Percival, Arthur, 367
85 193, 212, 227–28, 244–47, 251–53, Perkins, Frances, 266
Midway, Battle of, 35, 189, 224–28, 254–55, 259–60, 289, 311–12, 344 Pétain, Henri Philippe, 91, 116, 222,
245, 259, 312, 366 Nishimura, Shoji, 204 348
Milch, Erhard, 208 Normandy, Battle of, 41–42, 103–4, Petrillo, James C., 238
Mines and minesweeping, 228–29, 262. See also D-Day Philippines, 34, 65–66, 177, 179, 187,
327 North Africa, 27, 93, 102–3, 169, 209, 212, 248, 258–59, 301,
Mister Roberts (film), 237 198, 220, 221–24, 278–79, 291–92 302–4. See also Leyte Gulf, Battle
Mitchell, William, 309, 320 Northern Punitive Expedition (China), of; Pacific War
Mitscher, Mark A., 141, 313 68–69 Philippine Sea, Battle of, 65, 189,
Mobilization: Britain, 45–46; North Pacific Area, 247. See also 266–67, 313
Germany, 131; U.S., 230–33. See Aleutian Islands Pius XII, Pope, 240
also Industry Norway, 67, 123–24, 128, 147, 276 Pointblank, Operation, 61
Monte Casino, Italy, 166 Nurses, 248–49, 286, 364 Poland, 38, 63, 100, 127, 140, 147,
381
• I N D E X •

267–70, 277, 305 60, 143, 286–87, 320, 321, 323. Spruance, Raymond, 141, 226, 227,
Poliomyelitis, 282 See also Britain, battle of 244–45, 252, 267, 311–13
Port Moresby, New Guinea, 85, 86, Royal Canadian Air Force, 59, 60 SS (Schutzsstaffeln), 313–14
299 Royal Canadian Navy, 59 Stagg, J. M., 89–90
Potsdam Declaration (1945), 181, Royal Marines, 288 Stalin, Joseph, 37, 73, 111–12, 127,
182, 270–71 Royal Navy, 121–22, 252, 287–88 128, 285, 293, 314–17, 331–32,
Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr., 13, 14 Ruml, Beardsley, 110 364, 365
“Praise the Lord and Pass the Run Silent, Run Deep (film), 237 Stalin-Hitler pact (1939), 127–28,
Ammunition” (song), 238 Russia, 305. See also Soviet Union 147, 315
Prisoners of war (POWs), 34, 54, 188, Ryan, Cornelius, 87 Stalingrad, Battle of, 99–100, 317–18
213, 248, 268, 271, 316 Stilwell, Joseph W., 57, 73, 75–76,
Psychiatric casualties, 218–20 Saint-Pierre and Miquelon Islands, 91 77
PT boats, 272 Saipan, battle of, 65, 246, 289–90 Stimson, Henry L., 11, 194, 202, 216,
Saratoga (aircraft carrier), 17, 86 318–19, 362
Quebec, 58 Savo Island, Battle of, 138, 296, 297 Story of G.I. Joe, The (film), 236–37
Quinn, Don, 272 Schindler, Oskar, 150 Strategic bombing, 17, 23, 135, 216,
Quisling, Vidkum, 276 Schweinfurt, bombing of, 290 287, 290, 309–310, 320–27, 342,
Seabees, 291 346–47
Rabaul, New Guinea, 65, 297–98 Sea Lion, Operation, 49 Strikes, 195–97. See also Labor
Race riots, 11, 13 Second front, 291–92. See also Stuart, R. Douglas, 19
Radio, 272–73. See also Music Eastern Front Submachine gun, 294–95
Ramsey, Bertram H., 330 Selective Service System, 84, 292. See Submarines, 179, 328–29, 344–45.
Randolph, A. Philip, 12, 108–9 also Conscription See also Antisubmarine warfare; U-
Rationing, 46, 169, 250, 273–74, 358 Sherman, Frederick C., 298 boats
Reagan, Ronald, 243 Sherman tanks, 22 Sudetenland, 126, 146
Red Army, 96–101, 307–8, 368–69. Shingle, Operation, 20 Suez Canal, 220, 221
See also Soviet Union Shipping: Britain, 46; Japan, 327, Superfortress (B-29 bomber), 23, 39
Red Cross, 152, 356, 357 328–29; U.S., 25–30, 129–30, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Refugees, 274–75 190–91. See also Atlantic, Battle of Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), 88,
Regimental Combat Team (RCT), the 103, 323, 330
343 Sicily, 15–16, 164, 224, 261, 292–94 Sutherland, Richard K., 300
Relocation camps, 275 Singapore, 367 Sweden, 351–53
Resistance movements, 117, 268, Slave labor, 131, 269 Syphilis, 218
276–77 Slavs. See Czechoslovakia; Soviet Szilard, Leo, 31
Revenue Act of 1942, 110 Union
Rhineland, 126, 146 Slim, Sir William, 57 Taft, Robert, 185, 285
Ridgway, Matthew B., 16 Small arms, 294–95 Taiwan, 70
Riefenstahl, Leni, 236 Smith, Walter B., 330 Tanks, 22, 24, 36, 99, 100, 124, 131
Rochefort, Joseph J., 226 Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930), 174 Tarawa, battle of, 63–64, 330–31,
Rogers, Edith Nourse, 357, 362–63 Solomon Islands. See Guadalcanal, 345
Romania, 100, 151 battle of; South Pacific Area Taxation, 46–47, 109–10. See also
Rome-Berlin Axis, 34 Somaliland, 168, 169 Financing
Rommel, Erwin, 14–15, 140, 233, Soong, Charles Jones, 70 Taylor, A. J. P., 48
241, 277–79 Sorge, Richard, 158 Tedder, Arthur W., 330
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 82, 280–81 South Africa, 286 Teheran conference (1943), 331–32
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 18, 20–21, 27, Southeast Asia, 176, 178 Thach, James, 227–28
28, 29, 30, 31, 57, 61, 65, 71, 75, South Pacific Area, 141–42, 295–98 Thailand, 177
77, 84, 91, 92–93, 94, 103, 106–8, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 63, Theobald, Robert A., 247
128–30, 158, 176, 177, 178, 185, 65, 193, 210–12, 298–304 Third Reich, 126. See also Hitler,
186, 192, 195–96, 199, 202, 215, Soviet Union, 62–63, 96–101, 268, Adolf; Germany
216, 220, 221, 230–32, 234, 249, 269, 270, 307–8. See also Red Tibbets, Paul, 181
250, 266, 274, 279–81, 282–86, Army; Stalin, Joseph Tito, Joseph, 277
331–32, 334, 337–38, 344, 345, Spaatz, Carl A., 309–11, 322, 323 Todt, Fritz, 131
355, 362, 364, 365 Spanish Civil War (1936), 128, 240 Tojo, Hideki, 333
Rosenthal, Joe, 172 SPARS (Coast Guard), 361–62 Tokyo, bombing of, 175, 178–80, 202
Roundup, Operation, 215, 216 Speer, Albert, 131, 146 Torch, Operation, 84, 215, 221–24,
Royal Air Force (RAF), 44–45, 49, Sprague, Clifton T., 205 278, 334
382
• I N D E X •

TOT (time-on-target concentration), University of California at Berkeley, Welles, Sumner, 158


24, 339 32 Western front, 354. See also European
Treblinka concentration camp, 150 University of Chicago, 33 theater; France; Germany
Trenchard, Hugh, 320 Ushijima, Tomohiko, 251–52 Wheeler, Burton K., 20
Trident conference (1943), 76, 292–93 White, Walter, 12
Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy, Vatican, 240 Whitehead, Ennis C., 211
Japan), 34, 176 Venereal diseases, 218 Wickard, Claude, 349
Truman, Harry S., 57–58, 106–7, Veritable, Operation, 133–34 Wilkie, Wendell L., 232, 285, 354–56
181, 184, 200, 270, 334–35 Versailles, Treaty of (1919), 125, 126 Wingate, Orne, 56–57
Tunisia, 15, 93, 169, 222, 223, 278 Vichy France, 91, 93–94, 116, WINS (Women in National Service),
Turkey, 332 222–23, 348–49 358
Turner, Richmond Kelly, 137–38, 296 Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, Women: Britain, 45–46; Germany,
Twelve O’Clock High (film), 237 171, 239, 241 131; Soviet Union, 306; U.S., 82,
Victory gardens, 46, 153, 156, 349 149, 152–53, 154, 276, 341–42,
U-boats, 18, 25–30, 36, 130, 336, Victory tax of 1942, 109–10 356–61. See also Home front;
345. See also Atlantic, battle of the; Vlasov, Andrey, 316 Nurses; specific military services
Submarines Volunteerism, 152, 358 Women Accepted for Volunteer
Ugaki, Matome, 184 Emergency Service (WAVES), 114,
Ukraine, 305 Wadsworth, James, 232 361–62, 363
ULTRA code machine, 28, 29, 88, Waffen-SS, 313–14 Women’s Air Force Service Pilots
159, 160. See also Intelligence; Wage and price controls, 196, 250, (WASPs), 341–42
Codes and code breaking 350–51 Women’s Ambulance and Defense
Unconditional surrender, 336–37 Wagner Labor Relations Act, 195 Corps, 152, 357
Undertow, Operation, 134 Wainwright, Jonathan, 258 Women’s Army Corps (WAC),
United Nations, 158, 275, 337–38 Wake, Nancy, 276 148–49, 357, 362–64
U.S. Air Transport Command (ATC), Wake Island, 258 Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF),
17, 56 Waldron, J. C., 227 286
United States Army, 10–11, 16, 22, Wallace, Henry A., 106, 285 Women’s Bureau (U.S. Dept. of
24–25, 338–41. See also Wallenberg, Raoul, 150, 151, 351–53 Labor), 359
Eisenhower, Dwight; European the- War bonds, 110–111, 353–54 Women’s Royal Naval Service
ater; Intelligence; North Africa; spe- War criminals, 333, 368 (Wrens), 288
cific battles War Labor Board (WLB), 195–96, Wood, Robert, 19
United States Army Air Forces, 11, 266, 350 Wurtsmith, Paul B., 304
26–27, 37, 143, 309–11, 320–27. War Manpower Commission, 361 Wurzberg, bombing of, 135
See also Strategic bombing War Production Board (WPB), 230–31
United States Marine Corps, 63–64, War Refugee Board, 235 Yalta conference, 364–65
138–39, 171–72, 242, 253, 343–44, War Relocation Authority (WRA), Yamamoto, Isoroka, 189, 225, 366
362. See also Pacific War; specific 185–86 Yamashita, Tomoyuki, 304, 367–68
battles Warsaw uprisings, 268–69 Yankee Doodle Dandy (film), 237
United States Navy, 10, 11, 114, 249, War Shipping Administration (WSA), Yorktown (aircraft carrier), 86, 225,
344–46, 361–62, 363. See also 28 226, 227–28, 312
Intelligence; King, Ernest J.; Nimitz, War stamps, 111, 354 Yugoslavia, 168, 241, 277
Chester; Pacific War; specific battles Watchtower, Operation, 137, 296
United States Strategic Bombing Wedemeyer, Albert C., 77 Zhukov, Georgi K., 100, 368–69
Survey, 346–47 Weimar Republic, 125, 126 Zoot-suit riots, 369
383

PICTURE CREDITS

American Red Cross: 271; Archive Photos: 43, 93, 121, 159; courtesy of The Army
Museum collection: 22, 88, 136, 157, 340; Corbis: 307; Corbis/National Archives:
169, 345; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: 89; Express Newspapers/Archive Photos:
369; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library: 11, 107, 117, 203, 285, 349, 353, 356; Hulton-
Deutsch Collection/Corbis: 59, 175; Imperial War Museum/Archive Photos: 32, 99,
144, 207; Library of Congress: 19, 31, 40, 49, 62, 68, 77, 79, 81, 83, 83, 91, 102,
108, 110, 135, 138, 155, 163, 183, 199, 231, 236, 240, 244, 266, 269, 274, 283,
287, 299, 301, 309, 314, 315, 319, 321, 323, 331, 351, 348, 365; Los Almos
Scientific Library, courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library: 32; National Archives:
cover (top left), cover (top right), cover (bottom), frontispiece, 6, 9, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24,
27, 29, 33, 35, 37, 39, 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 64, 66, 70, 73, 74, 87, 104, 112, 113, 115,
123, 125, 127, 130, 147, 148, 151, 153, 161, 167, 172, 178, 177, 185, 187, 189,
190, 191, 193, 197, 205, 209, 214, 218, 221, 229, 233, 237, 238, 244, 245, 248,
250, 252, 255, 259, 261, 264, 265, 278, 280, 289, 291, 295, 297, 299, 326, 329,
333, 334, 336, 339, 343, 355, 359, 363; National Museum of Naval Aviation: 141,
192, 227, 362; National Park Service, courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library: 57;
Tallandier/Archive France/Archive Photos: 276; Gary Tong: 13, 26, 34, 55, 97, 133,
142, 165, 181, 210, 222, 253, 257, 263, 303; The Raul Wallenberg Committee of the
United States: 351; UPI/Corbis: 13
384

William O’Neill is a professor of history at Rutgers University, New


Brunswick, New Jersey, where he teaches courses on 20th century American
history and the two world wars. Among his books are A Democracy at War:
America’s Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II and American High:
The Years of Confidence, 1945–60. He has written articles and book reviews
for a wide range of scholarly and general publications, including The Boston
Globe, The New York Times, and The Washington Post; has lectured at
numerous colleges and universities, including the National War College in
Washington, D.C.; and has participated in many documentary films and
videos. He is a member of the board of Gender Issues. One of William
O’Neill’s daughters served in the U.S. Army.

William H. Chafe is Alice Mary Baldwin Distinguished Professor of History


and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Duke University. His numer-
ous publications include Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North
Carolina and the Black Struggle for Freedom (winner of the Robert F. Kennedy
Book Award); A History of Our Time: Readings in Postwar America (edited
with Harvard Sitkoff); The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II;
The Paradox of Change: American Women in the Twentieth Century; Never
Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American
Liberalism (winner of the Sidney Hillman Book Award); and The Raod to
Equality: American Women Since 1962. Professor Chafe is courrently the
president of the Organization of American Historians.

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