G.R. No.
159941 August 17, 2011 On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to
HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA,
namely: EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and
AVELINA M. RETERTA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title
and reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of
such a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis
being friar land under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Management
Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion that can be
corrected through certiorari.
The petitioners, whose complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance the
RTC had dismissed, had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari,
but the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on the ground that
certiorari was not a substitute for an appeal, the proper recourse against
the dismissal. They now appeal that ruling of the CA promulgated on April
25, 2003.1
Antecedents
On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title
and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-
983),2 averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land
(the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of
47,708 square meters, having inherited the land from their father who had
died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the grantee of the land
by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his
predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had
discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had
purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and
participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No.
V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.
dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and that the
petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983.
On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding:3
Considering that plaintiffs in this case sought the review of the propriety of
the grant of lot 2938 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Friar Lands Estate by the
Lands Management Bureau of the defendant Lorenzo Mores through the
use of the forged Affidavit and Sales Certificate No. V-769 which eventually
led to the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-64071 to defendant Lorenzo Mores and
wife Virginia Mores, and considering further that the land subject of this
case is a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently Act No.
1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands
the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the
determination whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement
of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands.
Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature
of this action. On the second ground relied upon by the defendants in their
Motion To Dismiss, suffice it to state that the Court deemed not to discuss
the same.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let this instant case be dismissed as it is
hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied their motion for reconsideration on February 21, 2002.4
On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via
petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on April 25, 2003,
holding: 5
Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In the case at bench, when the court rendered the assailed decision, the
remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But
petitioners did not. Instead they filed the present special civil action for
certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the decision of the court a quo has become
final.
The Order dismissing the case was issued by the court a quo on 29
October 2001, which Order was received by the petitioners on November
16, 2001. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 26,
2001 but the same was denied by the court a quo on 21 February 2002.
The Order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the
petitioners on 20 March 2002.
Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari on May 15, 2002. Certiorari,
however cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423, the Supreme Court had
the following to say:
"We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no
appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a
judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a
substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.6
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioners submit that:
I.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
TO DISREGARD THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1, RULE 41, SECOND
PARAGRAPH, SUBPARAGRAPH (a), AND SECTION 9, RULE 37, 1997
RULES OF COURT;
II.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS TO APPLY THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ROSETE vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 339 SCRA 193, 199, NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ALREADY TOOK
EFFECT ON JULY 1, 1997.
III.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE NATURE OF THE
ACTION, AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME.7
Briefly stated, the issue is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
1.
Propriety of certiorari as remedy
against dismissal of the action
The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari,
considering that the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss was
a final, as distinguished from an interlocutory, order against which the
proper remedy was an appeal in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary
remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when
there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.8
Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari
was their proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain
rules of procedure, specifically pointing out that the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court ("An order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal
from the judgment or final order") prohibited an appeal of a denial of the
motion for reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ( "No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration") expressly declared that
an order denying a motion for reconsideration was not appealable. They
remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided
that in the instances "where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65."
The petitioners’ position has no basis.
For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from
was the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss, not the denial
of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion
to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case,
leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an
appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.
The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one
hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in
Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,9 viz:
The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which has
‘become final’ (or ‘executory’ as of right [final and executory]), is definite
and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at
the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an
action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once
rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy
or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing
more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course,
to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to use
the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.’
xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does
not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is ‘interlocutory,’
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or
granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing
amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement,
or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a ‘final’
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
‘interlocutory’ order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part
of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered
in the case.
Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the
petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order
dismissing the action upon the respondents’ motion to dismiss. The said
rule explicitly states thusly:
Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. – An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order.
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration
independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A
motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting
new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a
reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues,
contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are
excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final
order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.10 By denying a
motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial
court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final
order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the
denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or
final order itself.
The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997
version of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court – the version in force at
the time when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 –
included an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
 (b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion
seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or
duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-
party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court
allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65. (n)
It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27,
2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order
denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the
enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such a revision of a
procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA
on that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA
correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its
assailed final order.
2.
RTC or MTC has jurisdiction over the action
The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order
when appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA
should have given due course to and granted the petition for certiorari for
two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice
demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved
grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the
order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy
despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of
law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court has
declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of
exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable
damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a
failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and
insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public
interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy
does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from
making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally
beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all
other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ,
that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.12 A remedy is plain,
speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency.13 It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by
resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order
annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to
comply with the Rules of Court.14
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being
available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better
on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the
ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void
order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and
justice.15 Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be
defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and
usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that
certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and
that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior
court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as
the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be granted whenever
necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.16
The petitioners’ complaint – self-styled as being for the "quieting of title and
reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate,
reconveyance and damages" – would challenge the efficacy of the
respondents’ certificate of title under the theory that there had been no valid
transfer or assignment from the petitioners’ predecessor in interest to the
respondents of the rights or interests in the land due to the affidavit
assigning such rights and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud.
The petitioners’ cause of action for reconveyance has support in
jurisprudence bearing upon the manner by which to establish a right in a
piece of friar land. According to Arayata v. Joya,17 in order that a transfer of
the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally
effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up
and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval
and registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights
of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words, where a
person considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights
thereon, such transfer must conform to certain requirements of the law.
Under Director of Lands v. Rizal,18 the purchaser in the sale of friar lands
under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law as the actual owner of the lot
purchased even before the payment of the full payment price and before
the execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the obligation to
pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government
becoming that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.19
Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120,20 had grantee Teofilo Reterta
perfected his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him
and taken title from him upon his death. By law, therefore, should the
execution of the deed in favor of the respondents be held invalid, the
interests of Teofilo Reterta should descend to the petitioners and the deed
should issue in their favor. Adding significance to the petitioners’ claim was
their allegation in the complaint that they were in possession of the land.
Moreover, as alleged in the petitioners’ opposition to the motion to dismiss
of the respondents, Teofilo Reterta had partially paid the price of the land.21
Given the foregoing, the petitioners’ complaint made out a good case for
reconveyance or reversion, and its allegations, if duly established, might
well warrant the reconveyance of the land from the respondents to the
petitioners. It did not matter that the respondents already held a certificate
of title in their names. In essence, an action for reconveyance respects the
incontrovertibility of the decree of registration but seeks the transfer of the
property to its rightful and legal owner on the ground of its having been
fraudulently or mistakenly registered in another person’s name. There is no
special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the
aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim
of the registered owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.22 On this score, it is also worthy
to stress that the title of a piece of a friar land obtained by a grantee from
the Government without conforming with the requirements set by the law
may be assailed and nullified.
Was the petitioners’ action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the
regular court?
We answer the query in the affirmative.
The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129,23 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,24 which provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
xxx
Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to
remove a cloud on one’s title involves the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such
action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did
not exceed ₱20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial
jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of
which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the
complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief
thereby sought.25
The respondents’ reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to
sustain their position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead
had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. The provisions read:
Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said
settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the
Government has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of
land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at
the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands xxx and that upon the
payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the
Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held
by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and
become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and
twenty-two of the Land Registration Act xxx.
Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the
Secretary of the Interior.
1aw phi 1
As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being
limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include
the petitioners’ action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction
once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private person and title duly
issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the petitioners’ showing of its plain
error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the
allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.
Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion
connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.26 The abuse must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.27
The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the
petitioners bereft of any remedy to protect their substantial rights or
interests in the land. As such, they would suffer grave injustice and
irreparable damage. In that situation, the RTC’s dismissal should be
annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to do justice to
the unjustly aggrieved.28
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for certiorari; sets aside the
decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 25, 2003; and directs
Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court in Trece Martires City to resume the
proceedings in Civil Case No. TM-983 with dispatch.
The respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Pua v. Deyto
G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
JOSE LAM, petitioner,
vs.
ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 dated June 11, 1997 and the Resolution dated October 27, 1997
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, entitled, "Adriana Chua,
Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jose Lam, Respondent-Appellant."
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the
petition that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said
marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such
psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration
of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in
womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the
conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal
properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future
properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had
long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody
of their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana
prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void
but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite the
lapse of fifteen days after service of summons, no responsive pleading was
filed by him. Hence, the trial court issued an Order dated April 13, 1994,
directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an
investigation for determination whether or not there was collusion between
the parties and to submit his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City
Prosecutor Barrera filed his Report stating that "there seems to be no
collusion between the parties".2
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana
herself. She testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her
parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her married life was abnormal
because Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and
instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was
also the one spending for all the expenses of their only child, John
Paul.3 After her testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the
documentary evidence. No evidence was presented regarding the amount
of support needed by John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open4 on the
ground that she was able to secure additional new evidence which were
significant, material and indispensable. On July 6, 1994, the trial court
granted the motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the reception
of additional evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the
Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia
Santiago, and another Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose
and one Evan Lock,5 showing that Jose had been married twice before he
married Adriana in 1984.
On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision6 the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the
marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null
and void for being bigamous by nature. The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Office of the Civil Registrar General are hereby ordered to
cancel the marriage between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam celebrated on
January 13, 1984 by Hon. Guillermo L. Loja of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Quezon City.
Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support
to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of ₱20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.7
On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 thereof but
only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the
amount of ₱20,000.00. He argued that there was already a provision for
support of the child as embodied in the decision9 dated February 28, 1994
of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute
₱250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child, to wit:
8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties
with respect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party
shall retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party
to be exercised through mutual arrangements.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First
Party and the Second Party shall initially contribute ₱250,000.00 each to a
common fund, to be increased as required, to be used solely and
exclusively for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed
and administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until
the son reaches majority age.10
Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund
had even amounted to ₱500,000.00.
On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lam’s
motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered
into by the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage
was declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment
and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court.
Jose then appealed the Pasay RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals,
assigning only a single error of the trial court:
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT
TO GIVE A MONTHLY SUPPORT OF ₱20,000.00 TO HIS SON BECAUSE
THIS WOULD, IN EFFECT, REQUIRE APPELLANT TO PAY TWICE THE
MONTHLY SUPPORT FOR HIS CHILD. BESIDES, THE LOWER COURT
HAS DULY ADMITTED THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A DECISION
ISSUED BY ANOTHER COURT REQUIRING APPELLANT TO
CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF ₱250,000.00 AS THE LATTER’S
SHARE IN THE COMMON FUND FOR SUPPORT OF THE CHILD,
SUBJECT TO PERIODIC ACCOUNTING AND TO BE MANAGED BY
APPELLEE.11
On June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming
the Pasay RTC’s decision in all respects. Jose filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Decision but in a Resolution dated October 27, 1997,
the Court of Appeals denied the same.
Hence, Jose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, likewise raising a single error of the appellate court,
to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING LEGAL
QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT WHERE THEY BOUND THEMSELVES TO
CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱250,000.00) TO A COMMON FUND FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THEIR CHILD DOES NOT BAR THE TRIAL COURT IN ANNULMENT
CASE TO AGAIN AWARD SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF THE CHILD.
The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they
ruled that the amount of support is by no means permanent. In Advincula
vs. Advincula,12 we held that another action for support could be filed again
by the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for
support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. We further held
in said case that:
. . . Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of
such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire
period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be
modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.13
Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement
between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied
in its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution
of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in
favor of their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the
benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement
between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC,
cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support
is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child
and the capabilities of the parents to give support.
Having settled the issue on the authority of the trial court to award support
for the child in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of the child’s
parents, this Court will now discuss the propriety of the proceedings
conducted by the Pasay RTC and the decision it rendered, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the
proceedings and the decision rendered by the trial court.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the psychological
incapacity of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child. Adriana
presented, formally offered her evidence in support of the petition and
submitted the case for decision as of May 12, 1994.14 But on a motion to
re-open filed by her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for
reception of evidence on July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana
to present evidence of two previous marriages contracted by Jose with
other women to prove that the marriage between Adriana and Jose was
null and void for being bigamous. It is only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that
respondent Adriana first claimed support for John Paul when she testified
in open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the
admission of the additional evidence. The ground relied on for nullity of the
marriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose to that of
existence of previous marriages of Jose with two different women with an
additional claim for support of the child. Such substantial changes were not
reflected in the petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment
was ever made by Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase
"And for respondent to support the child of petitioner in an amount this
Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable"15 found at the ultimate
paragraph of the petition, as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is nothing
on record to show that petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial
changes in the petition of Adriana.
Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present on
July 6, 1994 for the presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the
same. Although copy of the motion filed on June 23, 1994 with a notice of
hearing on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose, the record does not show that
he received the notice in due time; neither does the record show that he
was notified of the subsequent hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana
presented the marriage certificates and claimed for the support of their child
sans the presence of Jose.
Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the Order
dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-
Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith allowed her to present her
evidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous marriages with
different women.
Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent regarding her claim for
support for John Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot be made a valid
basis upon which the Pasay RTC could have determined the monthly
amount of ₱20,000.00 for the support to be given to John Paul by petitioner
Jose.
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of
substantially amended or supplemental pleadings.16 Considering that in
cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage, there
can be no default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of
Court17 in relation to Article 48 of the Family Code,18 it is with more reason
that petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings.
Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of the ruling of the Court
in Asian Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates,19 to wit:
It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion,
nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in
their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram non-judice
and void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief
beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the
excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of
jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack.
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject
within its general jurisdiction, but which is not brought before it by any
statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for
its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to
have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was
beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect the
new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as to
authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and
Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should
have been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court
rendered judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the
petition served upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and deprived petitioner Lam of due process.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and
Jose for being bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the Pasay
RTC could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond its
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for
reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed
in the Court of Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render judgment on
his previous marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the
petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court
will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of
Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule
that while a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however,
admits of an exception where estoppel has supervened.20
Consequently, the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised by Jose in
the present petition for review on certiorari which is the award of support
for his child, John Paul.
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount
of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient,
pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to
and from place of work.
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles
19521 and 196,22 shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be
reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of
the person obliged to furnish the same.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the
evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or
resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children
as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly
expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and embodied
attendance, education and transportation of the child. in the decision of the Makati RTC, portions of which read as follows:

In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana regarding
her claim for support of the child is her testimony, which is quoted below in
verbatim:
Atty. Lorbes:
Q - After discovering that your husband had contracted two valid
marriages prior to your marriage, how do you feel about it?
A - I felt it is unfair to my life.
Q - Considering the bigamous marriage contract by your husband
with you, what do you want to request to the Honorable Court?
A - I want to request the Court that the respondent be ordered to
support my little boy.
Court:
Q - How much support do you want?
8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties
with respect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party
shall retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party
to be exercised through mutual arrangements.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First
Party and the Second Party shall initially contribute ₱250,000.00 each to a
common fund, to be increased as required, to be used solely and
exclusively for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed
and administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until
the son reaches majority age.
WHEREFORE, finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order, and not
being contrary to law, morals or public policy, the same is hereby
APPROVED. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing
between the said spouses is dissolved and a decree of complete separation
is established in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. The parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully comply
with the conditions of their Agreement as embodied in this petition and the
same shall, as between the parties, be deemed to be a decision and/or
award in the matters treated in the aforesaid settlement.

A - ₱20,000.00 to ₱25,000.00 Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be recorded in
the proper local civil registries and registries of property at the expense of
Q - Is there a prayer for support? the herein petitioners pursuant to Article 139 of the Family Code.

Atty. Lorbes: SO ORDERED.

A - None, Your Honor. GIVEN this 28th day of February, 1994 at Makati, Metro Manila.24

Court:
Get the original copy of the complaint, add and sign it for the
support of the boy.
A - Yes, Your Honor.23
Evidently, such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the
child nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give.
The matter of support is a question that may be raised and threshed out
before the Makati RTC as it was the court that approved the Compromise
Agreement, or before the Pasay RTC where the petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is filed. In the interest of orderly
administration of justice, the Court deems it proper that the issue on support
should be resolved by the Pasay RTC where the claim for support of the
child was initiated by Adriana.
The trial court’s action of merely ordering in open court during the July 6,
1994 hearing that a prayer for support be written and inserted in the petition
filed by respondent Adriana does not constitute proper amendment and
notice upon petitioner Jose. Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was
deprived of due process when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on
a motion to re-open and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite
notice and the opportunity to refute the new claim against him.
Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of support
awarded to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis.
Such being the case, the Court has no other recourse but to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar as the award of
support is concerned and order the remand of the case to Pasay RTC for
further proceedings as to the issue regarding support.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107,
dated June 11, 1997 and October 27, 1997, dismissing the appeal
and denyingthe motion for reconsideration, respectively, are hereby SET
ASIDE but only insofar as the award of support in favor of John Paul Chua
Lam is concerned. The Decision dated August 4, 1994 and the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109), dated August 22, 1995,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being null and void, likewise only
insofar as the matter on support is concerned.
Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-0331 be remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109) which is DIRECTED to reopen the
trial of Civil Case No. 94-0331 with respect to the claim of Adriana Chua
against Jose Lam for the support of John Paul Chua Lam and conduct
hearings for further reception of evidence for the proper determination of
the proper amount of support to be awarded to the child John Paul Chua
Lam.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182065 October 27, 2009
EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, both in his private and official capacity
as Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 28 November 2006, rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated 15 July 2003, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
39, of Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 25843, dismissing the special civil action
for Mandamus/Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, filed by petitioners
Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya against respondent Mayor Mariano
Malones of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo.
Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market, which had just
been newly renovated. In a letter3 dated 6 August 1998, the Office of the
Municipal Mayor informed petitioners of a meeting scheduled on 11 August
1998 concerning the municipal public market. Revenue measures were
discussed during the said meeting, including the increase in the rentals for
the market stalls and the imposition of "goodwill fees" in the amount of
₱20,000.00,4payable every month.
On 17 August 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The Municipal Revised Revenue
Code." The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls
and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00 and
₱15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second floors of the municipal
public market, respectively. The same Code authorized respondent to enter
into lease contracts over the said market stalls,5 and incorporated a
standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public
market.
Only a month later, on 18 September 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998,6 moving to have the
meeting dated 11 August 1998 declared inoperative as a public hearing,
because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill
fee failed to agree to the said measure. However, Resolution No. 68, series
of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin was vetoed by respondent
on 30 September 1998.7
After Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was approved on 17 August 1998,
another purported public hearing was held on 22 January 1999.8
On 9 June 1999, respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them
that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public
market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls
were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants.9
This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall
holders at the municipal public market,10 to file before the RTC on 25 June
1999 a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,11 against respondent. The Petition was docketed as Civil Case
No. 25843.
Petitioners alleged that they were bona fide occupants of the stalls at the
municipal public market, who had been religiously paying the monthly
rentals for the stalls they occupied.
Petitioners argued that public hearing was mandatory in the imposition of
goodwill fees. Section 186 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides
that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges shall not be enacted
without any prior hearing conducted for the purpose. Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01, imposing goodwill fees, is invalid on the ground that the
conferences held on 11 August 1998 and 22 January 1999 could not be
considered public hearings. According to Article 277(b)(3) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code:
(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the
public hearing or hearings. The initial public hearing shall be held not earlier
than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or notices, or the last
day of publication, or date of posting thereof, whichever is later. (Emphasis
ours.)
The letter from the Office of the Municipal Mayor was sent to stall holders
on 6 August 1998, informing the latter of the meeting to be held, as was in
fact held, on 11 August 1998, only five days after notice.12
Hence, petitioners prayed that respondent be enjoined from imposing the
goodwill fees pending the determination of the reasonableness thereof, and
from barring petitioners from occupying the stalls at the municipal public
market and continuing with the operation of their businesses.
Respondent, in answer, maintained that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is
valid. He reasoned that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposed goodwill
fees to raise income to pay for the loan obtained by the Municipality of
Maasin for the renovation of its public market. Said ordinance is not per se
a tax or revenue measure, but involves the operation and management of
an economic enterprise of the Municipality of Maasin as a local government
unit; thus, there was no mandatory requirement to hold a public hearing for
the enactment thereof. And, even granting that a public hearing was
required, respondent insisted that public hearings take place on 11 August
1998 and 22 January 1999.
Respondent further averred that petitioners were illegally occupying the
market stalls, and the only way petitioners could legitimize their occupancy
of said market stalls would be to execute lease contracts with the
Municipality of Maasin. While respondent admitted that petitioners had
been paying rentals for their market stalls in the amount of ₱45.00 per
month prior to the renovation of the municipal public market, respondent
asserted that no rentals were paid or collected from petitioners ever since
the renovation began.
Respondent sought from the RTC an award for moral damages in the
amount of not less than ₱500,000.00, for the social humiliation and hurt
feelings he suffered by reason of the unjustified filing by petitioners of Civil
Case No. 25843; and an order for petitioners to vacate the renovated
market stalls and pay reasonable rentals from the date they began to
occupy said stalls until they vacate the same. 13
The RTC subsequently rendered a Decision14 on 15 July 2003 dismissing
the Petition in Civil Case No. 25843.
The RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy
of mandamus or prohibition. It reasoned that mandamus would not lie in
this case where petitioners failed to show a clear legal right to the use of
the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees imposed by the municipal
government. Prohibition likewise would not apply to the present case where
respondent’s acts, sought to be enjoined, did not involve the exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The RTC also dismissed the Petition in Civil Case No. 25843 on the ground
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioners’ failure to
question the legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Secretary
of Justice, as provided under Section 187 of the Local Government
Code,15 rendered the Petition raising the very same issue before the RTC
premature.
The dispositive part of the RTC Decision dated 15 July 2003 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding the petition without
merit, the same is, as it is hereby ordered, dismissed. 16
On 12 August 2003, petitioners and their co-plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.17 The RTC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
in a Resolution dated 18 June 2004.18
While Civil Case No. 25843 was pending, respondent filed before the 12th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan-Maasin, Iloilo City a case
in behalf of the Municipality of Maasin against petitioner Evelyn Ongsuco,
entitled Municipality of Maasin v. Ongsuco, a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer with Damages, docketed as MCTC Civil Case No. 257. On 18
June 2002, the MCTC decided in favor of the Municipality of Maasin and
ordered petitioner Ongsuco to vacate the market stalls she occupied, Stall
No. 1-03 and Stall No. 1-04, and to pay monthly rentals in the amount of
₱350.00 for each stall from October 2001 until she vacates the said market
stalls.19 On appeal, Branch 36 of the RTC of Maasin, Iloilo City,
promulgated a Decision, dated 29 April 2003, in a case docketed as Civil
Case No. 02-27229 affirming the decision of the MCTC. A Writ of Execution
was issued by the MCTC on 8 December 2003.20
Petitioners, in their appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 86182, challenged the dismissal of their Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 25843 by the RTC.
Petitioners explained that they did appeal the enactment of Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Department of Justice, but their appeal
was not acted upon because of their failure to attach a copy of said
municipal ordinance. Petitioners claimed that one of their fellow stall
holders, Ritchelle Mondejar, wrote a letter to the Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
Municipal Treasurer of Maasin, requesting a copy of Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01, but received no reply.21
In its Decision dated 28 November 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, the
Court of Appeals again ruled in respondent’s favor.
The Court of Appeals declared that the "goodwill fee" was a form of revenue
measure, which the Municipality of Maasin was empowered to impose
under Section 186 of the Local Government Code. Petitioners failed to
establish any grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent in
enforcing goodwill fees.
The Court of Appeals additionally held that even if respondent acted in
grave abuse of discretion, petitioners’ resort to a petition for prohibition was
improper, since respondent’s acts in question herein did not involve the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as required
under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners
of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC was premature,
as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto. The
appellate court did not give any weight to petitioners’ assertion that they
filed an appeal challenging the legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01
before the Secretary of Justice, as no proof was presented to support the
same.
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the instant appeal
bereft of merit. The assailed decision dated July 15, 2003 as well as the
subsequent resolution dated 18 June 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED and the
instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. 22
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 of the foregoing Decision,
but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution24 dated 8 February
2008.
Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE EXHAUSTED
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE FILING THE INSTANT
CASE IN COURT;
II
WHETHER OR NOT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE; AND
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE MARIANO MALONES WHO
WAS THEN THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF MAASIN, ILOILO HAS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.25
After a close scrutiny of the circumstances that gave rise to this case, the
Court determines that there is no need for petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.
The findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that petitioners’
Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus in Civil Case No. 25843 was premature
is anchored on Section 187 of the Local Government Code, which reads:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings.—The procedure for
approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings
shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30)
days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render
a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal:
Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of
the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30)
days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without
the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may
file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself
of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if
resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should
be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause
of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based
on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case. However, there are several exceptions to this rule. 26
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to
preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the
jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly
constitute an exception.27 Resolving questions of law, which involve the
interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of
judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such
lower courts the Legislature may establish. 28
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they
still need to present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the
RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01
was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a
public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly
a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC
to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly
establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes
the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Emphases ours.)
In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,29 Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,30 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos,31 the
Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of
constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances)
in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative
policy.
Although not raised in the Petition at bar, the Court is compelled to discuss
another procedural issue, specifically, the declaration by the RTC, and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that petitioners availed themselves of the
wrong remedy in filing a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the
RTC.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of the Rules of Court lay down under
what circumstances petitions for prohibition and mandamus may be filed,
to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court,
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the respondent. (Emphases ours.)
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person -- whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions
-- who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter
specified in the petition.32 On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus
lies to compelperformance of a ministerial duty.33 The petitioner for such a
writ should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
performance of the act, and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
respondent to do the act required to be done.34
In this case, petitioners’ primary intention is to prevent respondent from
implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the
goodwill fees from petitioners and barring them from occupying the stalls
at the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is more
in the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than
mandamus (compelling performance).
For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be
that of a "tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions"; and (2) there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."35
The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what
the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate
upon the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial function applies to the
action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies that are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In implementing Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is not called upon to adjudicate the rights
of contending parties or to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial
nature.
A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the
context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard
for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done.36
The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function.
It bears to emphasize that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 enjoys the
presumption of validity, unless declared otherwise. Respondent has the
duty to carry out the provisions of the ordinance under Section 444 of the
Local Government Code:
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. – (a) The Municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the
municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties
and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which
is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs,
projects, services and activities of the municipality x x x.
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and
apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program
objectives sand priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code,
particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial
development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto,
shall:
xxxx
(iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are
collected, and that municipal funds are applied in accordance with law or
ordinance to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the
municipality; x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposes increased rentals and goodwill
fees on stall holders at the renovated municipal public market, leaving
respondent, or the municipal treasurer acting as his alter ego, no discretion
on whether or not to collect the said rentals and fees from the stall holders,
or whether or to collect the same in the amounts fixed by the ordinance.
The Court further notes that respondent already deemed petitioners’ stalls
at the municipal public market vacated. Without such stalls, petitioners
would be unable to conduct their businesses, thus, depriving them of their
means of livelihood. It is imperative on petitioners’ part to have the
implementation of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 by respondent stopped
the soonest. As this Court has established in its previous discussion, there
is no more need for petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies,
considering that the fundamental issue between them and respondent is
one of law, over which the courts have competence and jurisdiction. There
is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners in the
ordinary course of law, except to seek from the courts the issuance of a writ
of prohibition commanding respondent to desist from continuing to
implement what is allegedly an invalid ordinance. 1 a vv p h i 1
This brings the Court to the substantive issue in this Petition on the validity
of Municipal Ordinance N. 98-01.
Respondent maintains that the imposition of goodwill fees upon stall
holders at the municipal public market is not a revenue measure that
requires a prior public hearing. Rentals and other consideration for
occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market are not matters of
taxation.
Respondent’s argument is specious.
Article 219 of the Local Government Code provides that a local government
unit exercising its power to impose taxes, fees and charges should comply
with the requirements set in Rule XXX, entitled "Local Government
Taxation":
Article 219. Power to Create Sources of Revenue.—Consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy, each LGU shall exercise its power to create
its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, or charges, subject to
the provisions of this Rule. Such taxes, fees, or charges shall accrue
exclusively to the LGU. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 221(g) of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines "charges" as:
Article 221. Definition of Terms.
xxxx
(g) Charges refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or
property. (Emphasis ours.)
Evidently, the revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes
alone, but also other fees and charges. And rentals and goodwill fees,
imposed by Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 for the occupancy of the stalls
at the municipal public market, fall under the definition of charges.
For the valid enactment of ordinances imposing charges, certain legal
requisites must be met. Section 186 of the Local Government Code
identifies such requisites as follows:
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges.—Local
government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on
any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed
under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended,
or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees or charges shall not
be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared
national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes,
fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing
conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis ours.)
Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code establishes in detail the procedure for the enactment of
such an ordinance, relevant provisions of which are reproduced below:
Section 277. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures.—x x
x.
xxxx
(b) The conduct of public hearings shall be governed by the following
procedure:
xxxx
(2) In addition to the requirement for publication or posting, the sanggunian
concerned shall cause the sending of written notices of the proposed
ordinance, enclosing a copy thereof, to the interested or affected parties
operating or doing business within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU
concerned.
(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the
public hearing or hearings. The initial public hearing shall be held not earlier
than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or notices, or the last
day of publication, or date of posting thereof, whichever is later;
xxxx
(c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in
the absence of a public hearing duly conducted in the manner provided
under this Article. (Emphases ours.)
It is categorical, therefore, that a public hearing be held prior to the
enactment of an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges; and that such
public hearing be conducted as provided under Section 277 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.
There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall
holders at the municipal public market were sent out on 6 August 1998,
informing them of the supposed "public hearing" to be held on 11 August
1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their notice also on 6 August
1998, the "public hearing" was already scheduled, and actually conducted,
only five days later, on 11 August 1998. This contravenes Article 277(b)(3)
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code
which requires that the public hearing be held no less than ten days from
the time the notices were sent out, posted, or published.
When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural
defect through Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, dated 18 September
1998, respondent vetoed the said resolution. Although the Sangguniang
Bayan may have had the power to override respondent’s veto,37 it no longer
did so.
The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured
when another public hearing was held on 22 January 1999, after the
questioned ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and
approved by respondent on 17 August 1998. Section 186 of the Local
Government Code prescribes that the public hearing be held prior to the
enactment by a local government unit of an ordinance levying taxes, fees,
and charges.
Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void and cannot be given
any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance could not have
conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction to order petitioners’ stalls at the
municipal public market vacant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 86182 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and ineffective, and a writ of prohibition is
ISSUED commanding the Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to
permanently desist from enforcing the said ordinance. Petitioners are also
DECLARED as lawful occupants of the market stalls they occupied at the
time they filed the Petition for Mandamus/Prohibition docketed as Civil
Case No. 25843. In the event that they were deprived of possession of the
said market stalls, petitioners are entitled to recover possession of these
stalls.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180542 April 12, 2010
HUBERT NUÑEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC., through its representative,
CESAR SYLIANTENG Respondent,
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The determination of the jurisdiction of first level courts over ejectment
cases is at the heart of this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant
to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which seeks the
nullification and setting aside of the 31 July 2007 Decision rendered by the
Special Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91771.1
The Facts
The subject matter of the instant suit is a 635.50 square meter parcel of
land situated at Calle Solana, Intramuros, Manila and registered in the
name of respondent SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc. under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87556 of the Manila City Registry of Deeds.
Despite having acquired the same thru the 4 June 1999 Deed of
Assignment executed in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and
Emerenciana Sylianteng,2 it appears that respondent was constrained to
leave the subject parcel idle and unguarded for some time due to important
business concerns. In October 2003, an ocular inspection conducted by
respondent’s representatives revealed that the property was already
occupied by petitioner Hubert Nuñez and 21 other individuals.3 Initially
faulting one Vivencia Fidel with unjustified refusal to heed its verbal
demands to vacate the subject parcel, respondent filed its 5 December
2003 complaint for forcible entry which was docketed as Civil Case No.
177060 before Branch 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.4
Additionally impleading petitioner and the rest of the occupants of the
property, respondent filed its 9 January 2004 amended complaint, alleging,
among other matters, that thru its representatives and predecessors-in-
interest, it had continuously possessed the subject realty, over which it
exercised all attributes of ownership, including payment of real property
taxes and other sundry expenses; that without the benefit of any lease
agreement or possessory right, however, petitioners and his co-defendants
have succeeded in occupying the property by means of strategy and
stealth; and, that according to reliable sources, the latter had been in
occupancy of the same parcel since 1999. Together with the ejectment of
the occupants of the subject premises, respondent prayed for the grant of
its claims for reasonable rentals, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
the costs.5
Specifically denying the material allegations of the foregoing amended
complaint in his 14 February 2004 Answer, petitioner averred that the
property occupied by him is owned by one Maria Ysabel Potenciano Padilla
Sylianteng, with whom he had concluded a subsisting lease agreement
over the same, and that, in addition to respondent’s lack of cause of action
against him, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case for lack of prior
demand to vacate and referral of the controversy to the barangay
authorities for a possible amicable settlement.6 Likewise questioning the
MeTC’s jurisdiction over the case, the rest of the defendants filed a Motion
to Dismiss7 which they adopted as their answer subsequent to its 27
February 2004 denial upon the finding that a sufficient cause of action can
be gleaned from the allegations of the complaint.8
After an ocular inspection conducted on 9 June 2004, it appears that the
MeTC concluded that the crowding of the residential units on the subject
parcel rendered the determination of its exact metes and bounds
impossible.9Unable to present his lessor’s title, petitioner also appears to
have agreed to the use of TCT No. 87556 as basis for determining the exact
measurement of respondent’s property.10 With the parties’ further failure to
abide by their agreement to cause a survey of the property thru an impartial
surveyor from the Office of the City Assessor or City Engineer, the record
shows that respondent submitted a survey plan prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Joseph Padilla who determined that petitioner was, indeed,
occupying a portion of the subject parcel.11 Relying on said report, the
MeTC went on to render a Decision dated 23 November 2004,12 resolving
the complaint in the following wise:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against all the defendants and ordering the latter to:
1. vacate the subject premises located at Lot 11, Block 45, Solana
St., Intramuros, Manila;
2. for each [defendant], to pay Php5,000.00 a month counted from
October 2003 until defendants vacate the subject property;
3. to pay Php15,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
4. to pay the costs of suit.13
On appeal, the foregoing decision was affirmed in toto in the 14 July 2005
Order issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No.
05-112490.14 Dissatisfied with said Order, petitioner elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review filed pursuant to Section
1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Finding that the
allegations in respondent’s amended complaint sufficiently made out a
cause of action for forcible entry against petitioner, the Court of Appeals
rendered the herein assailed decision, dismissing said petition for review
upon the following findings and conclusions:
Parenthetically, although the dispossession took place more than one year
from the illegal entry of petitioner and his co-defendants, knowledge of the
same was only acquired by petitioner in 2003 when the ocular inspection
was made. While ordinarily, the one-year prescriptive period should be
reckoned from the date of the actual entry on the land, the same however,
does not hold true when entry was made through stealth, in which case,
the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
Neither may petitioner seek refuge in the alleged demand letter dated 31
July 1996 sent by respondent’s counsel which sought his ouster from the
subject premises. Not only was the existence of this letter immaterial to the
issue of illegal entry into the subject premises but the same cannot bind
respondent who has no participation therein. Moreover, it also bears
stressing that not once did petitioner refute the lack of knowledge on the
part of respondent of the alleged lease contract and their usurpation of the
disputed property. Verily, granting that a lease contract truly existed,
respondent’s lack of knowledge of the lease contract and the failure to
register the same in the Register of Deeds cannot bind third parties like
respondent and therefore, withhold respondent’s right to institute the action
for ejectment.
As to the identity of the premises occupied by petitioner Nuñez, We find
that the RTC committed no reversible error in admitting the evidence of
respondent which consists of the plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Padilla. Suffice it to state that petitioner, during the proceedings below,
agreed to secure an impartial survey from the Assessor’s Office or the
Office of the City Engineer. However, when he took no action after failing
to obtain the survey from said offices, his consequent failure to secure, on
his own, the services of an impartial surveyor to determine and rebut
respondent’s allegation, he did so on his own accord and had no other
person but himself to blame.16
The Issues
Upon receipt of the Court of Appeals’ 4 November 2007 Resolution denying
his motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision,17 petitioner filed
the petition at bench on the following grounds:
I action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry
THE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE INSTANT CASE
CONSIDERING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF FORCIBLE ENTRY ARE NOT
PRESENT AND ADDITIONALLY THERE IS A QUESTION OF
OWNERSHIP.
II
THE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT VACATE THE LEASED PREMISES
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS AN EXISTING LEASE CONTRACT
WITH THE OWNER WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION OF
ARTICLE 1671 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.18
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession
or the right to possession of the property involved,19 there can be no
gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts20 by express provision of Section
33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.21 In addition to being conferred by law,22 however,
a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint23 and the character of the relief
sought,24irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims asserted therein.25 In much the same way that it
cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by
one of the parties,26 jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
reconsideration.27
The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following
requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the
case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of
the property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of possession
either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) the action
must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal
possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the
property.28 As it is not essential that the complaint should expressly employ
the language of the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of the
requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took
place under said conditions.29 The one-year period within which to bring an
on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year
period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.30
Even prescinding from the fact that the parties had admitted the MeTC’s
jurisdiction,31 our perusal of the record shows that respondent’s 9 January
2004 amended complaint was able to make out a cause of action for
forcible entry against petitioner. As the registered owner of the subject
parcel, respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and thru its
predecessors-in-interest, it had been in possession of the subject parcel
and had exercised over the same all attributes of ownership, including the
payment of realty taxes and other expenses; that an ocular inspection
conducted in October 2003 revealed that petitioner and his co-defendants
have succeeded in occupying the property by means of stealth and
strategy; and, that its subsequent demands to vacate had been unheeded
by said interlopers.32 Considering that the test for determining the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer of the plaintiff,33 we find that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the admission in the
complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, respondent’s
claim of prior possession is clearly negated by the fact that he had been in
occupancy thereof since 1999. While prior physical possession is,
admittedly, an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth
of merit in petitioner’s position is, however, evident from the principle that
possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by
the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.34 Because
possession can also be acquired by juridical acts to which the law gives the
force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, execution and
registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information
titles and the like, it has been held that one need not have actual or physical
occupation of every square inch of the property at all times to be considered
in possession.35 1avvphi 1
In this case, the subject parcel was acquired by respondent by virtue of the
4 June 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by the Spouses Ong
Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. Although it did not immediately put the
same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the
property to be registered in its name as of 27 February 200236 and to have
paid the real property taxes due thereon37 alongside the sundry expenses
incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it
consequently did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its
ocular inspection in October 2003, petitioner had already been occupying
the land since 1999. Ordinarily reckoned from the date of actual entry on
the land, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff acquired
knowledge of the dispossession when, as here, the same had been
effected by means of stealth.38
Petitioner had, of course, endeavored to establish that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest had served him a demand to vacate the subject
parcel as early as 31 July 1996.39 Correctly brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals on the ground, among others, that respondent had no participation
in its preparation, we find said demand letter of little or no use to petitioner’s
cause in view of its non-presentation before the MeTC. However, much as
it may now be expedient for petitioner to anchor his cause thereon, said
demand letter was first introduced in the record only as an attachment to
his reply to respondent’s comment to the motion for reconsideration of the
14 July 2005 order issued by the RTC.40 The rule is settled, however, that
points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention
of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing
court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.41 Basic
consideration of due process impels this rule.42
A similar dearth of merit may be said of the exceptions petitioner continues
to take against the MeTC’s reliance on the survey plan prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Joseph Padilla to the effect that that the premises
occupied by petitioner lies within the metes and bounds of respondent’s
property. As mere allegation is not evidence,43 the rule is settled that
plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of
proving the material allegations in his case where he sets up a new
matter.44 Given the parties’ failure to make good on their agreement to
cause a survey of the property thru an impartial surveyor from the Office of
the City Assessor or City Engineer, respondent’s submission of said report
was evidently for the purpose discharging the onus of proving petitioner’s
encroachment on the subject parcel, as alleged in the complaint. As the
party asserting the contrary proposition, petitioner cannot expediently
disparage the admissibility and probative value of said survey plan to
compensate for his failure to prove his own assertions.
Petitioner is, finally, out on a limb in faulting the Court of Appeals with failure
to apply the first paragraph of Article 1676 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines45 in relation to the lease he claims to have concluded with one
Maria Ysabel Potenciano Padilla Sylianteng. In the absence of proof of his
lessor’s title or respondent’s prior knowledge of said contract of lease,
petitioner’s harping over the same provision simply amounts to an implied
admission that the premises occupied by him lie within the metes and
bounds of the subject parcel. Even then, the resolution of said issue is
clearly inappropriate since ejectment cases are summary actions intended
to provide an expeditious manner for protecting possession or right to
possession without involvement of title.46 Moreover, if a defendant’s mere
assertion of ownership in an ejectment case will not oust the MeTC of its
summary jurisdiction,47 we fail to see why it should be any different in this
case where petitioner merely alleged his lessor’s supposed title over the
subject parcel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.