The purpose of this little exercise isn’t to decide whether or not it people should go vote.

The purpose to examine why people with certain preferences will choose to vote or not to
vote in an election between two candidates based on payoffs and internal and external
incentives.

To begin, let’s assume that in voting, you have a utility function dependent on the
following perceptions:

U = α + βλ − ϕ

• α is a function of “patriotism” or “good citizenship,” generally measuring how

much you value voting for the sake of voting. If you believe voting to be your
civil duty, you’re more likely to generate some utility simply by going to the
voting booth and pushing the button.

This is also a function of internal and social pressures; if you obtain some utility
from wearing an “I voted” sticker, then your α is higher to reflect that. You may
also face pressures from external sources that work in the opposite direction:
people around you that cause you disutility if you do not vote (for example, an
angry wife that wishes you weren’t wasting your time on this analysis).

• λ is a measure of the impact of your vote. For simplicity, I will assume that you
care only about the degree that your vote has an impact and has no bearing on
whether the public’s vote is positive or negative with respect to your own vote.

To measure impact, I will use

[outcome if you do vote] − [outcome if you don't vote]

λ=
[outcome if you don't vote]

• β is the rate that you value your impact. If you care highly about your impact,
your β will be high, and if you care almost nothing about your impact, your β will
be close to 0. The coefficient is a function of candidate preference, your
alignment on issues, and how much you expect the candidate to change impact
your life (for the better or otherwise).

• ϕ is simply the cost of voting. It is the value of the time you spend traveling to the
polling place and waiting in line, etc. This can also measure the extra time it costs
and unregistered voter to get registered, assuming they can legally do so
immediately before voting. As we will eventually compare our expected utility in
voting with the expected utility in doing something else, we will not include
opportunity cost in this variable.
For the purposes of evaluating a final decision, I’ll assume that the payoffs to voting and
not voting are as follows:

s0 s1 s2 s3 … sn
Vote v+0 v + s1 v + s2 v + s3 … v + sn
Don’t vote 0 s1 s2 s3 … sn

• v = your vote for your candidate, and

• si = the absolute value of the difference between votes for your candidate and
votes against your candidate, not counting your own vote, beginning with s0 = 0
other voters. This is just a measure of whether the election in question is a
landslide or a nail-biter. Each si has a probability pi = the probability that a certain
number of people will vote and that the difference between their votes is si. Thus,
pisi gives a probability distribution of the likelihood of varying degrees of victory
for each candidate.

For the purposes of this paper (and for the purposes of pretty much everything in non-
behavioral economics), I will assume that people are rational and that they maximize
their expected utility; that is, they’ll do what they expect gives them the most satisfaction.

Then E(U ) = E(α + βλ − ϕ ) = α + β E(λ ) − ϕ .

That is, we know inherently (or subconsciously, at least) our own personal values for α, β
and ϕ. But we must calculate the expected value of our impacts based on our perception
of the probabilities given above. We will have

E(vote) = p0 (v) + p1 (v + s1 ) + p2 (v + s2 ) + K + pi (v + si )
= p0 v + p1v + p1s1 + p2 v + p3 s3 + K + pn v + pn sn
= v( p0 + p1 + K + pn ) + p1s1 + p2 s2 + K + pn sn
n
= v + ∑ pi si
i =1

and

E(don 't) = p0 (0) + p1s1 + p2 s2 + K + pn sn

n
= ∑ pi si
i =1

Now we can estimate the expected impact of our vote:

 n n
(v + ∑ pi si ) − ∑ pi si
i =1 i =1 v
E(λ) = n
= n

∑ps i i ∑ps i i
i =1 i =1

Then our expected utility is given by

v
E(U ) = α + β ⋅[ n
]−ϕ
∑ps i i
i =1

In deciding whether or not to vote, we have to compare our expected utility in voting
with an expected utility of the alternative. Let’s call the alternative E(U’) and assume that
it is higher than any other alternative. This will serve as our opportunity cost for voting.
We know that if E(U) > E(U’), then someone rational will vote, and vice-versa:

v
Vote if α + β n
− ϕ > E(U ')
∑ps i i
i =1

v
Don't vote if α + β n
− ϕ < E(U ')
∑ps i i
i =1

Now, we can measure the effects of our parameters on whether or not a rational person
will vote:

• As α increases, so does the expected utility of voting against the alternative. This
illustrates how “get out the vote” and “vote or die” and “your vote counts”
campaigns try to target voters’ expected utility for voting. The effectiveness of
such campaigns vary, and from the six minutes’ research I just did, mostly impact
independent voters.

For many people, voting may be their only opportunity to explicitly participate in
governmental proceedings. In that case, I’m sure that perception has a large
impact on α and therefore the likelihood that those people will vote.

• The expected impact of your vote depends mostly on pisi, the probability that the
outcome excluding your vote is small or large. As the probability that si is small
n
increases, the weighted value of ∑ps i i decreases, increasing the expected utility.
i =1
 This variable says that as your perception of the outcome excluding your vote is
important to your expected impact in the election. If you believe the likelihood is
high that the election will be a landslide in either direction, you are unlikely to
vote. You are more likely to vote if you believe that you could cast (one of) the
deciding vote(s) in the election.

• β’s impact really measure’s how much you value your impact. If a voter cares
only for her impact in a specific election and doesn’t put stock into civic duty or
participation in this process, then she may have a high β and a low α. As β
increases, she is more likely to derive utility from voting. But the effect could be
low or negligible if she expects her impact to be very small.

• ϕ represents the cost of voting. It could easily be included in the figure E(U’)
supposing the activity in question doesn’t include walking to the polling place or
standing in line.

This is the figure some campaigns seek to diminish by combining registration and
early voting, or by registering people on the sidewalk.

What does this model say that we don’t already know? Well, nothing. It only points out
that voters derive utility from voting based on certain characteristics that they have
developed or that have developed around them. Then should a rational person vote? My
answer would be that a rational person should try to decide which parameter is important
to them, and make a decision based on the answer.