COLLECTION LATOMUS

Fondee par M. RENARD en 1939

Continuee par J. DUMORTIER-BIBAUW
et C. DEROUX (directeur honoraire)
Dirigee par D. ENGELS
VOLUME 355

Hans BECK, Martin JEHNE, and John SERRATI (eds.)

1
Money and Power
in the Roman Republic/

ISBN 978-90-429-3302-6 .
D/2016/0602/55

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2016

I 3855161
 BELLVM SE IPSVM ALEI? FINANCING MID-REPUBLICAN IMPERIALISM 115

the state.' 4 Other scholars might not go that far but nevertheless suggest that the
Republic's conquests at least broke even. 'In her dealings with foreign powers,'
one writes, 'Rome had for some time taken the convenient view that since wars
Bellum se ipsum alet? were always the fault of the other party, the other party should re-imburse [sic]
Rome for the outlay she had been forced to W1dertake.' 5 Scipio Africanus insisted
Financing Mid-Republican Imperialism
on precisely this point in imposing terms on Antiochus after the latter's defeat
at Magnesia. 6
Nathan ROSENSTEIN
The spoils displayed in these triumphs and the indemnities sometimes paid
by the vanquished make it possible to calculate the value of the riches deposited
in the aerarium between 200 and 167. However, we have no way to detennine
the expenses those victories incurred and thus no ability to decide whether
Money was a mainstay of Republican military power. Because Rome and its allies
they were won_ at a profit or a loss. The only scholar to approach the problem
paid their soldiers and supplied much of their equipment, legionaries and socii
systematically, Tenney Frank, concluded that the costs of military pay, food,
could wage a very different and far more effective form of warfare than tempo-
and transport during the first half of the second century exceeded the income
rary levies of farmers who campaigned for only a few weeks in the summer. 1
from booty and foreign tribute payments by nearly a million and a half denarii.
Where, then, did this money come from? Did Roman wars 'feed themselves',
Unfortunately, he had to admit that his figures were 'decidedly conjectural at
as Cato the Elder claimed his operations in Spain would do (Bellum se ipsum
many points' because there is no way to ascertain the costs of all the equipment
a/et: Liv. 34.9.12)?
and food Roman armies required, or to determine the numbers and pay of the
One might suppose so in view of the enormous wealth displayed in the tri-
support personnel who accompanied them 7. Further, the expenses that might
umphs celebrated during the first third of the second century. Some scholars
have questioned the veracity of the figures Livy and other ancient authors pre-
.
'.i
have been incurred in transporting all this. material and the costs of warships
' and their crews are completely unknown. And although Rome obtained much
serve, but needlessly. 2 Most recognize the importance that the Romans, and
of the food for its armies and fleets after 241 through taxation in kind from
especially the generals themselves, attached to their spoils. They manifested the
Sicily, Sardinia, and eventually Spain, the amounts were arguably never suffi-
magnitude of the victory won and the glory accruing to the commander. There
cient to meet all of its military' s needs during the third and second centuries. 8
was every reason to record and preserve these figures in the archives and at
Preparations in 191 for the war against Antiochus the Great illustrate this last
times even on stone as in the inscription that trumpets C. Duilius' victories over
point. The senate requisitioned not only double tithes of wheat from both Sicily
Carthaginian forces in 260 and the sums he brought back to Rome. 3 Such evi-
and Sardinia but also acquired additional grain from Carthage and Numidia
dence certainly explains the tendency among some scholars to assume that
amounting to some 1.3 million modii (about 8,700 metric tons). Sizable contri-
Rome's acquisition of an empire in the third and second centuries naturally
butions also came from several allies in the Greek East - all to feed the two
turned a profit. As one eminent historian puts it, '[E]xpansion before the Second
legions and socii - some 26,500 soldiers - that would march east in that year
Punic War had greatly increased public revenues without a comparable increase
along with upwards of 32,000 sailors and marines serving with the fleet. 9
in regular liabilities. Once the war was over, the impression must have returned
to senatorial minds that in general both war and expansion were profitable to
4 HARRIS 1979: 68-9.
5 CRAWFORD 1977: 43; cf. GRUEN 1984: 292. And note NAco DEL HoYo 2011: 381:
1 All dates BC unless otherwise indicated. ROSENSTEIN 2004: 63-6, 107.
2 E.g., BEARD 2007: 159-73. Her skepticism seems unwarranted in view of the 'Considered a true compensation for the effort of war, these exactions [i.e. booty and
'meticulous detail with which warriors kept lists of their achievements in war': OAKLEY indemnities] were intended in the first place to pay for the very troops involved in the
1997-2005: 3.596; cf. generally IBID. 3.596-99; COlJDRY 2009: 52-62. victory ... '.
3 CIL :12, 25 line 17 = ILLRP 319 = lnscr. Ital. 13.3.69. Although Mommsen believed 6 POL. 21.17.4, cf. 21.14.7; LN. 37.45.14, cf. 35.7-9 even if the sum he demanded
the text an Augustan forgery, Degrassi and others accept it as a genuine artifact of the third vastly exceeded anything the war could have cost Rome.
7 FRANK 1933: 1.126-46, esp. the table at 145; for the quotation: loc. cit.
century, although recopied imperfectly in connection with a restoration of Duilius' columna
8 Cf Serrati's chapter in this volume.
rostrata during the reign of Augustus. Cf BLECKMANN 2002: 116-25; KONDRATIEFF 2004:
9 LN. 36.3.1, 4.1~10; ERDKAMP 1998: 89~90. On the size of the anny: AFzELTIJS 1944:
10-14, 26-32; BECK 2005a: 220 n. 17; OsTENBERG 2009: 58. Spoils turned over to the
quaestor for recording: PoL. 10.19.1-2; LN. 26.44.7; for records of items from a triumph 50, 62, cf. 47; on the size of the fleet: THIEL: 1946: 295; number of rowers and marines
deposited in the treasury: C1c., Verr. 2.1.57, cf. COUDRY 2009: 29-30. per q'uinquireme: BRUNT 1971: 670.
116 NATHAN ROSENSTEIN
Clearly, since the patres felt that double tithes from Sicily and Sardinia were
not going to be enough to support forces of this size, it is difficult to believe
that the single tithe normally exacted sufficed to feed the eight or nine legions,
some 104,000-117 ,000 Romans and allies, that the Republic levied on average
in the first third of the second century to say nothing of the fleets it occasionally
em-ployed. 10 Single tithes are unlikely even to have fed the four legions, perhaps
36,000-45,000 men, typically in the field prior to 218. 11 And although contri-
butions from the Republic's friends (whether voluntary or coerced), requisitions
from states and communities in the war zone, and demands from defeated foes
could make up some of the shortfall, the Republic still had to purchase a sub-
stantial portion of the wheat that fed its armies. The senate paid for the North
African grain in 191 and possibly for the second tithes from Sicily and Sardinia
as well. 12 It had earlier purchased grain from Hiero around 225 in preparation
for the looming conflict with the Gauls (Diod. 25.14). And in 172 it sent three
legati to purchase grain in Apulia and Calabria in anticipation of the coming
war against Perseus (Liv. 42.27.8).
Even Cato the Eider's boast that his war would feed itself was made by way
of justifying his decision to send away the merchants who were there to pur-
chase grain for his anny. The treasury in other words expected to fund Cato's
military operations at least at their outset. Fortuitously Cato was beginning his
campaign when the wheat harvest was being threshed, enabling him to capture
enough grain to support his army, but this was unusual. No anny could live off
the land for very long. 13 Once Rome established a pennanent military presence
in Spain after 194, for the next twenty-five years the senate regularly sent grain
to support its forces there. 14 Even with the tithes from Sicily and Sardinia, food
costs will have constituted a significant but unquantifiable item in the Republic's
military budget throughout the period.
The only expense we can be reasonably sure of is the legionaries' pay, their
stipendium. Polybius reports that in his day an ordinary infantryman earned
two obols a day, a centurion double that, and a cavalryman a drachma daily
(6.39.12). Conversion of Polybius' Greek currency into its Roman equivalent
yields rates of three, six, and nine asses respectively. 15 These rates probably had
10 Assuming 5,500 Romans and 7,500 socii per legion; AFzELIUS 1944: 48-79; BRUNT
1971: 671-84; average number of legions, op. cit., 423-4.
11 Especially since Rome drew tax revenues only from the western portion of Sicily
before the war (cf. SERRATI 2000: 122-6). Figures assume the ratio of Romans to allies
at this point ranged between 1: 1 and 2:3: BRUNT 1971: 677-9.
12 LIV. 36.3.l, 4.9; ERDKAMP 1998: 94-102, 112-21; cf. ROTH 1999: 224-32 for other
examples and discussion.
" LIV. 36.9.12; ERDKAMP, 1998: 122-40.
14 LIV. 40.35.4; infra.
15 Most scholars hold that Polybius' Greek drachma was the equivalent of a Roman
denarius, e.g. CRAWFORD 1985: 146-7; a minority would disagree, e.g. Lo CASCIO 1989:
BELLVM SE IPSVM ALET? FINANCING MID-REPUBLICAN IMPERIALISM 117
been in force since the monetary reforms of ca 212/211 that introduced the
system of coinage based on the denarius and the bronze sextantial as of two
ounces and they remained unchanged until Julius Caesar doubled military pay. 16
Further, the value of the legionaries' stipendium prior to that date was probably
about the same even though they earned fewer asses since these weighed ten
ounces rather than two. The total weight of bronze that a legion's stipendium
represented before ca 212/211 would therefore have been more or less equal to
its weight after that date. On that basis, the arumal cost of a legion's pay during
the third and second centuries can be estimated and so the Republic's yearly
outlay for stipendium in this period. That figure enables comparison between
this expense and the income Rome d•erived from booty and indemnities year by
year where these totals are preserved. Even though the result cannot yield the
total cost of Roman warfare and so tell us whether or not the Republic was
making or losing money, the stipendium undoubtedly represented its principal
ongoing expense, probably well over half of the cost in most years. The extent
to which income from war exceeded or fell short of it would at least serve as a
very rough gauge of the profitability of conquest.
Still, one might wonder whether the treasury bore the whole of this outlay
every year. Possibly all or part of the stipendium was exacted directly from
those Rome conquered rather than always coming from the aerarium. Livy
claims for example that in 293 the consul Spurius Carvilius demanded that the
defeated Faliscans furnish the year's pay for his army (10.46.12). Yet even
though similar demands for pay, food, and/or clothing from the vanquished
appear from time to time in Livy's first decade, a measure of skepticism seems
warranted in these early cases. 17 An episode from 180 however may carry
greater weight. At the beginning of that year, envoys from the proconsul in
Nearer Spain, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, announced to the senate that it need not send
out the usual shipment of food and money to his army in view of his victories
in the previous year (Liv. 40.35.4). However the issue here was not really about
funding the Spanish legions' stipendium for the coming year but about laying
the groundwork for a request for a triumph. The envoys went on to ask the
senate to order a thanksgiving for Flaccus' successes in Spain and for permis-
sion to bring his army home, both important factors in the patres' deliberations
101-20. Although Polybius' daily rates are commonly converted to 31/2 asses, etc., e.g.
WALBANK 1957-89: 1.722; RATHBONE 1993: 151-2, argues convincingly that Polybius'
figures yield the rates given here.
16
On the reform and its date: CRAWFORD 1985: 55-6 with further references; Caesar's
increase in military pay: SUET., Jul. 26.3.
17
E.g., 9.43.6, 2.54.1, 8.2.4, 9.36.3; cf. OAKLEY 1997-2005: 3.539-41 for other
instances and sensible cautions about the reliability of these early notices. CouoRY 2009:
40-1, believes that this may have been tried in the late fourth and early third centuries
as a means of financing the Republic's wars.
118 NATHAN ROSENSTEIN
over whether or not to grant a triumph. 18 Flaccus' anny in other words would
not need stipendium or grain for the next year, at least in his mind, not because
the spoils it had won in the past year would meet those expenses but because it
would soon be marching home while money for any new forces the senate
might elect to send to Spain would accompany them, as was the senate's normal
practice. 19
However, Polybius reports one instance in which stipendium clearly is said
to come directly from a defeated enemy. Probably in 187 during a meeting of
the senate, someone asked Scipio Africanus to account for the money Antio-
chus the Great had handed over after his defeat at Magnesia 'for the army's
pay.' Notoriously, that request led Scipio to tear up the account books demand-
ing to know how anyone could ask him about this money when he was respon-
sible for bringing so much wealth into the treasury and so many lands under
Roman sway. 20 This episode formed part of the attack against the Scipios that
would ultimately lead to the prosecution of Lucius and to Africanus' retire-
ment froni Rome. 21 However, it also served as an important step in a much
larger senatorial effort to set limits on generals' heretofore broad authority to
dispose as they saw fit of the vast wealth that their armies were winning in the
East. 22 Africanus, or more properly speaking his brother Lucius, the consul
in command of the war against Antiochus, had apparently used the money to
award double pay to his soldiers after their victory at Magnesia. 23 The fact that
Africanus' questioner could make an issue out of Lucius' generosity to the
troops indicates that it was not only unusual but objectionable. That it could
form the substance of Lucius' subsequent criminal trial demonstrates unequiv-
ocally that paying the soldiers out of funds destined for the treasury was any-
thing but standard practice at this date. 24 And this makes sense. It would have
been dangerous for Rome to depend on the booty its armies won for something
18 LIV. 40.35.5-14; PELIKAN PITTENGER 2008: 84-103; BEARD 2007: 186-218; BASTIEN
2007; 287-303.
19 As when the elder Africanus arrived in Spain: POL. 10.19.2.
20
POL. 23.14. 7-11; cf. Dmo. 29.21. The date of this episode is notoriously uncertain:
cf. GRUEN 1995: 78-80. Other reports of the episode contain no mention of the money
being earmarked for army pay: GELL. 4.18.7-12; VAL. MAX. 3.7.le.
21 Sources and bibliography in SCULLARD 1973: 290; BRISCOE 2008: 170-1 and op.
cit. 170-208 for the most recent discussion of the many problems involved.
22 GRUEN 1995: 70-80. On a general's authority over booty: CHURCHil..L 1999: 85-116;
SHATZMAN 1972b; 177-205.
23 LIV. 37.59.6; negotiations after Magnesia: PoL. 21.17.5; LIV. 37.45.14. LIVY claims
double pay was also awarded after Lucius' triumph, forgetting apparently that most of
his army remained in Asia Minor: 37 .50.2-3.
24 GRUEN 1995: 75; BRISCOE 2008: 394. On the trial of Lucius cf. ID. 1981: 173-5. The
trial apparently turned on the question of whether the money fanned part of the indemnity
imposed on Antioch us or was booty, over the use of which generals traditionally had
considerable discretion: SCULLARD 1973: 142-3.
BELLVM SE IPSVM ALET? FINANCJN'G MID-REPUBLICAN IMPERIALISM 119
as vital as money to pay its soldiers. Even though victories were frequent, they
':ere never regular enough to constitute a reliable source of cash. A few excep-
tions can be found, but these occurred during the Second Punic War when a
treasury regularly strapped for cash often forced generals to fend for them-
25
selves. Armies ordinarily went to war with a chest full of money provided by
the treasury, and the regular dispatch of additional funds from Rome thereafter
met their expenses over the longer term. As Polybius notes, 'The legions require
constant supplies, and without the consent of the senate, neither com, clothing,
nor pay can be provided .. .' (6.15.4). Moreover, a general had every incentive
not to use the spoils from a victory to meet the army's ordinary expenses:
better to reserve them to be paraded during his triumph in order to enhance the
luster of the occasion and his own glory. 26
Food is the only other factor that might have affected the Rei,ublic 's annual
outlay for stipendium, since the cost of their grain rations was deducted from
the legionaries'· pay. Yet any savings here was to some extent offset by the
practice of providing free grain to the socii, who ordinarily outnumbered the
legio_n~es in this period. 27 And as argued above, tribute grain from Sicily and
Sard1ma was probably insufficient to meet all of the food needs of Roman
armies in the ~econd and, probably, the third centuries. Purchases to make up
the shortfall will have further offset whatever the Republic saved by making its
legionaries pay for their grain allotments. And while at times defeated enemies
were forced to supply food for a Roman army as part of the price of peace, it is
diffi~ul~ to beli~ve that a general will have made his legionaries pay for it when
he d1stnbuted 1t to them. 28 They will have considered the grain as part of the
spoils from the victory they had won, something they were entitled to rather
than a commodity they had to purchase.
Therefore, we may with due caution use stipendium as a rough proxy for the
cost of Rome's wars, bearing in mind that some factors may have reduced it, as
when defeated enemies were made to pay the troops, or because food costs were
met by deducting the price of the legionaries' rations from their pay, or by
25
. This fact acco~nts for the inclusion of pay for the soldiers in the peace terms
1mp?s~d on the rebellious S~anish tribes in 205: Lrv. 29.3.5; APP., Hisp. 38; and in the
p~elimmar_y peace terms with Carthage following Zama while the treaty was being
discussed m Rome: POL. 15.18.6; LIV. 30.37 .5; APF., Pun. 54; on the inconsistencies in
the latter account, cf. WALBANK 1957-89: 2.470. Cf. further on Spain, RICHARDSON
1986: 57, 116.
26
• Perhaps, too, senators will hav~ v.:ant~d a_ ge!1eral to award bonuses to his troops
m Rome, where peer pressure could Iunu his WIIllllilg excessive favor thereby.
27
POL. 6.39.15; on the ratio of allies to legionaries in the third and second centuries
cf. ~RUNT 1971: 677-84. The Hannibalic War forms an exception, however. '
E.g. Liv. 29.3.5; APP., Hisp. 38; PoL. 15.18.6; LIV. 30.37.5; A!>P., Pun. 54;
PoL. 21.40.8-12; Lrv. 37.59.6; 38.13.9-14, 15.11, 37.7-9. 43.4.9. Cf OAKLEY 1997-2005·
3.539-41 for earlier examples and cp. Caesar: SUET., Iul. 26.3. ·
120 NATHAN ROSENSTEIN BEUVM SE /PSVM ALET? FINANCING MID-REPUBLICAN IMPERIALISM 121

acquiring grain through contributions, requisition, or pillage. 29 However, other

expenditures will have increased costs appreciably: equipment, transport,
occasional food purchases, and perhaps military slaves, but especially naval
operations. 30 Ultimately, total costs are not likely to have fallen much below the
stipendium and may often have far exceeded it. 31 In comparing the spoils that
~
triumphs brought into the treasury between 200 and 167 to the anny's stipen-
dium it is also important to bear in mind that in these years the senate regularly -
deployed several armies annually, not all of which won victories and produced '--

-
income for the treasury. Nevertheless, the stipendium for all legions, not simply
those that triumphed, needs to be included in any calculation of the annual cost -Iii
of Roman warlare.
By this rec~oning, the treasury took in the equivalent of over 267 million

~
denarii in the first third of the second century and paid out in stipendium about
171.5 million, for a profit of about 95.5 million denarii or. 56 percent - not bad
at all. However, this overall total masks a considerable fluctuation in the rela-
tionship between the ongoing annual cost of the legions' pay and the income
from victories as Chart 1 indicates. More importantly, the figures for total income
include not only coins and precious metals actually carried in the triumphs but

~
also the multi-year indemnities imposed on some of the Republic's defeated
opponents. The Carthaginians were required to pay 200 talents of silver annu-
ally for fifty years following their surrender in 201; Philip V of Macedon had
to hand over 500 talents immediately in 196 and pay an additional 500 in annual
installments spread over ten years. 32 Similarly, Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, paid

29 Stipendium for one legion: (4,940 legionaries at 3 asses/day = 14,820 asses) +

(60 centurions at 6 asses/day= 360 asses) + (300 cavalry at 9 asses/day= 2,700 asses) =
17,880 asses/day x 355 days of a pre-Julian Roman year = 6,347,400 asses / 10 =
634,740 denarii. Use of RATHBONE's figures (supra: n. 15) here minimizes the cost of
stipendium; assuming the usual figure of 31/3 asses/day, etc. increases the costs, as does
adopting the ntinority view that Polybius' drachma here is worth more than a denarius
(supra: n. 15). In either case, the result is that costs for stipendium will be higher than
the figures in the text, making it more expensive for Rome to wage war.
30 There is no data to tell us what it cost the Republic to build and fit out a quin-

quireme or to pay and feed its crew (rowers, officers, and marines) of 400: BRUNT 1971:

----
670. Comparative evidence from Athens indicates that expenses for triremes and their
crews of 200 could vary considerably but were always very large: GABRIELSEN 1994:
105-69. MARCHETTI 1978a: 250-3, assumes an implausibly low annual cost per ship
during the Second Punic War.
31 Note, too, that for purposes of the analysis that follows, I have assumed that all

spoils displayed in a triumph were deposited in the treasury. However, if a portion of

the spoils was set aside by the army's commander for his own purposes, as CttlJRCHil,L
1999: 93-101, argues, then the profits available to off-set the costs of a victory will have
been less.
32 Carthage: POL. 15.18.7; LIV. 30.37.5; Philip: PoL. 18.44.7, although the final four
![J~u•p
payments were forgiven in 190 out of gratitude for Philip's assistance in the war against
Antiochus: POL. 21.2.3; APP., Syr. 23, etc.
 BEUVM SE IPSVM ALET? FINANCING MID-REPUBLICAN IMPERIALISM 123
122 NATHAN ROSENSTEIN

100 talents in 195 and another fifty every year for eight years to end his war
' '
with Rome (Liv. 34.34.11), while Antiochus of Syria was hit with a whopping
15,000 talent indemnity, 500 following his defeat at Magnesia in 190, another .J1
.1
2,500 when the peace was ratified at Rome, and the remaining 12,000 in a
dozen payments of 1,000 talents over as many years (Pol. 21.17.4-5). Finally,
the Aetolians following their surrender in 189 faced a demand for 500 talents,
200 at once and 50 annually for six years (Pol. 21.30.1-2). In all, these indem-
nities amounted to over 140 million denarii, over 50% of Rome's total profits
from its wars between 200 and 167. In other words, the 95.5 million denarii
surplus over the cost of stipendium in these years was overwhelmingly the _.., 5
product of annual indemnity payments rather th~ booty. Without them, Rome's -- 6
take from its wars in this era fell short of the cost of stipendium by about
44.5 million denarii.
Two points deserve emphasis here. The first is how rarely the Republic
imposed these sorts of enormous annual payments upon those it defeated, as
opposed to one-time demands for cash. The only certain examples prior to the

.,f
Carthaginians' indemnity of 201 are the indemnities Rome forced these same
enemies to pay in the wake of the First Punic War and its seizure of Sardinia,
and the 100 talents Hiero was forced to pay apparently in installments. 33 More
importantly, when the figures for booty are disaggregated from indemnities and
compared to stipendium as in Chart 2, it is obvious that only in a minority of
years between 200 and 167, 8 out of 33, did the value of the cash and precious
metals displayed in triumphs exceed the total cost of pay for all legions. In the
first of these caSes, in 200, booty exceeded stipendium only because that year
saw two generals celebrate triumphs, and even here the overage was not large.
Likewise in 196, only the combined spoils from the five triumphs celebrated
that year enabled the aerarium to show a surplus. In 194 Cato the Eider's loot
from Spain did not equal the outlay for stipendium; only the addition of Flamin-
inus' tremendous booty from Greece put the treasury in the black as far as army
pay was concerned. Indeed, those eastern spoils by themselves exceeded the
!
total cost of that year's stipendium, and the same was true of the other eastern

33 Carthage: PoL. 1.62.8-63.3, 88.12; Hiero: PoL. 1.16.9, cf. ZONAR. 8.16 with
WALBANK 1957-89: 1.68-69. Teuta, the Illyrian queen, agreed to pay tribute-phoros -
following her defeat in 229: POL. 2.12.3, while in 217 the Romans sent envoys to the
current king, Pineus, with a demand for the stipendium he owed, which was at that point
overdue: LIV. 22.33.5. As WALBANK 1957-89: 1.165 notes, the latter was probably not
identical with the fonner but a new levy imposed following the Roman expedition against
the Illyrians in 219. Further, characterizing it as stipendium suggests that it was a one-
time payment similar to the stipendium Livy claims was demanded of the Faliscans in
293: 10.46.12, and cf. supra n. 26. Pineus had likely delayed paying what was owed
I
while he awaited the outcome of Rome's conflict with Hannibal. The tribute demanded
of Teuta is likely to have been similar to the cash extorted from various cities in Asia
Minor by Manlius Vulso in 189: LIV. 38.13.11-15.11.
124 NATHAN ROSENSTEIN BEI.LVM SE IPSVM ALE/'? FINANCING :MID-REPUBLICAN IMPERIALISM 125

triumphs: Lucius Scipio's over Antiochus, Fulvius Nobilior's and Manlius Vulso's
over the Aetolians and Gauls of Asia, and of course most spectacularly Aemil-
ius Paullus' over Perseus. Of those victories ov~r non-eastern enemies, only the " ..i-
~
"
spoils that L. Postumius Albinos and Ap. Claudius Centho brought home in 178
and in 174, both from Spain, exceeded the Republic's outlay for stipendium in -.=~
these two years. In other words, a few spectacularly rich victories in the East - "
account for the positive balance between income and expenditure for stipen-
-" ";
dium in the first third of the second century, through both the spoils returned to
the treasury and the annual indemnity payments they produced. Take them
away, and Roman imperialism ran at a loss, at least as far as the public fisc was
concerned.
~- - "55
-- "!
m:~-
This conclusion is important for a several reasons, most immediately for the
broader question of how Rome financed the conquests that laid the foundation
for its Mediterranean-wide empire through the subjugation of Italy in the later
fourth and third centuries. Between 337 and 218 Roman armies celebrated some
89 triumphs, and one might ask whether these victories produced enough wealth
-
-,,
_,
!

to pay not only for the expenses of winning them but also for all of the other
military outlays the Republic made in these years. We have no way of arriving ...... E
at an answer of course, but the evidence from the early second century is highly ;
suggestive. Not only did the spoils won in most years not match or exceed the
total cost of the year's stipendium. More significantly, as Chart 3 indicates,
= ••
about half of all triumphs celebrated during these thirty-three years did not even
return enollgh money to the treasury to offset the pay of the legions that cele-
;r~
•
brated them. 34 No Gallic victory is certain to have paid for the stipendium of "
the legions that won it. 35 The same is true for triumphs celebrated over the
Ligurians. 35 And while the carry-forward from the great eastern victories cer-

34 ROSENSTEIN 201 I: 133-58: Table 1. It is important to note in this context that several m;.~ !
years of campaigning might have preceded a decisive battle. Flamininus' legions, for =l!!
example, fought for three years in Greece before they won their victory at Cynocephalae
in 197. Any estimate of the cost of a specific conquest therefore must reckon an army's
stipendium from the time it first took the field.
-. l!!
35
Possibly P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica's Gallic triumph in 191 forms an exception, since ~l!!
the weight and hence the value of the 1,471 gold torques he won is unknown: Lrv. 36.40.12. ~ \ < : l!!

If each on average weighed somewhat more than half a Roman pound, his victory will
-"
have paid the stipendium of his army: ROSENSTEIN 2011: Table 1 with note f.
36
Again, the triumph of L. Aemilius Paullus in 180 may form an exception, since -
- "
the weight of the 25 gold crowns he displayed in his triumph is unknown: LIV. 40.34.8.
Although some spectacularly heavy 'crowns' are recorded, e.g. POL. 21.30.10: 150 talents
(over 12,000 Roman pounds, and so probably in this case simply a 'gift' of silver, cf.
W ALBANK 1957-89: 3.130 ad foe., 3.86 ad 20.12.5; Lrv. 38.9.13 mistakenly changes the
- "•
figure to 150 (Roman) pounds; LIV. 38.14.5: 15 talents (about 1,200 Roman pounds, and
so again probably a 'gift' of silver). Each of Paullus' crowns would have had to weigh
on average almost 135 pounds to equal the stipendium for his legions, something very 1111\IN~ll
I
difficult to believe of a notoriously poor region such as Liguria, cf. Lrv. 39.1.6-7.
126 NATHAN ROSENSTEIN
tainly paid for many subsequent years in which Rome's wars failed to show a
profit, the same cannot be said of many others. Spain alone forms an exception.
Eight victories there resulted in money returned to the aerarium beyond the
expense of the stipendium for the legions that had won them. Talcing only the
seven victories won through 178, when the settlement imposed by Tiberius
Gracchus made the Spanish provinces largely self-supporting as far as Rome's
military presence was concerned, the profit from these was large enough to
pay the annual stipendium of about 20 legions in addition to the stipendia of the
11 victorious legions themselves for a total of 31 annual stipendia. 37 However,
the Roman military effort in Spain cost the treasury 62 annual stipendia over
this same period, meaning that even here, Rome's conquest and pacification
of its Spanish prouinciae came at a net loss, at least as far as army pay was
concerned. 38
Spain, of course, abounded in silver, gold, and other minerals. 39 Polybius
reports that in his day the yield of the silver mines around New Carthage amounted
to 25,000 denarii daily or 9 million annually. 40 So it is hardly surprising that the
Spanish possessed plenty of accumulated wealth for Roman armies to plunder.
Yet even so rich a victim did not fully pay for what it cost the Republic in sti-
pendium to pacify it. Italy was not similarly blessed with stocks of precious met-
als, as reflected in the absence of victories there after 200 that returned booty to
the treasury equal to the stipendium it had expended to win them. That fact should
caution against the easy assumption that many of the wars between 337 and 218
paid for themselves much less that they resulted in a substantial profit for Rome.
To be sure, some of these conquests must have been rich. Apart from the evidence
of the Duilius inscription cited above, Livy reports that in 306 the consul Q. Mar-
cius Tremulus forced the Samnites to provide the year's stipendium for his
37 The victories and the additional stipendia they funded are:
1. L. Cornelius Lentulus in 200: + 3 stipendia (counting only the cost of his legions
for 200)
2. Cn. Cornelius Blasio in 196: + 1.2 stipendia
3. L. Stertinius in 196: + 2.98 stipendia
4. M. Helvius in 196: + 1.95 stipendia
5. Q. Minucius Thermos in 196: + 4.6 stipendia
6. M. Porcius Cato in 194: + 5.6 stipendia
7. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 178: + .78 stipendia
8. Ap. Claudius Centho in 174: + 6.18 stipendia.
Note that the 20 stipendia surplus over stipendia for the legions that won these victories
is inflated owing to the fact that Helvius and Thermus commanded no legions, only
contingents of socii.
38 Possibly L. Manlius Acadinus' victory turned a profit if the 52 gold crowns he
displayed in his triumph weighed on average above 10 pounds each: LIV. 39.29.6-7. If so,
then the shortfall is reduced to 27 or somewhat fewer stipendia.
39 E.g. WILSON 2007: 109-25.
40 POL. 34.9.8-9 = STRAB. 3.2.10, assuming once again that Polybius' drachmas are the
equivalent of Roman denarii.
BELLVM SE IPSVM ALET? FINANCING MID-REPUBLICAN ll\.1PERIALISM 127
troops. 41 In 293, the same historian claims that the spoils of the consul L. Papirius
Cursor would have paid the tributum collected from the citizens for the coming
year while his colleague Sp. Carvilius Maximus deposited 380,000 pounds of
bronze into the aerarium as well as forced the enemy to pay his legions' stipen-
dium for that year (Liv. 10.46.5-6, 10.12-14). Dionysius of Halicarnassus reports
that the consul of 282, C. Fabricius Luscinus, declared during a speech that he
returned the tributum to the citizens and brought 400 talents into the treasury after
his victories over the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians (19.16.3). Fabius Pictor
asserted that the Romans first knew wealth when they conquered the Sabines (ca.
290; F 20 Peter= F 26 Beck and Walter= Strab. 5.3.1), and Florus claims the
spoils from Pyrrhus and Tarentum ,were like nothing the Romans had ever seen
before (1.13.25-28). However, such achievements were something to boast about
precisely because they were exceptional. They rarely appear in our sources. Of the
eighty-nine triumphs or ovations celebrated between 337 and 218, one may legit-
imately question whether very many produced enough wealth to equal the stipen-
dium of the legions that marched in them much less furnished pay for the legions
that won no victories. Over that 119-year period an,annual deployment of four
legions will have required 476 annual stipendia. If each triumph produced enough
money to compensate for the cost of two legions' annual pay, the Republic will
still have needed funds to cover the remaining 298 stipendia. If that sum were to
come from the additional wealth the 89 triumphs had produced, each triumph will
on average have had to pay for 3.35 annual stipendia above the cost of the stipen-
dia of the pair of legions that triumphed. 42 Rome's Spanish victories in the period
200-167 by comparison each funded on average only 3.29 additional stipendia. 43
It is difficult to believe therefore that the victories Rome won in Italy between 338
and 218 were on average as rich or richer than those in Spain during the early
second century.
Not even the First Punic War forms an exception in this regard. Rome's
victory produced an indemnity of 3,200 talents with an additional 1,200 talents
extorted from the Carthaginians in 238 (Pol. 1.62.9-63.3, 88.12). In addition,
Roman armies won a number of significant victories during the conflict. To get
a sense of what at least some of the costs might have been, we can assume, as
argued above, that the value of a legionary' s stipendium in the third century was
41
LIV. 9.43.21, cf. PLJN., Nat. 34.23, and note that he also made the Hemici surrender
two month's stipendium: LIV. 9.43.8.
42
476 stipendia ~ 178 stipendia = 298 stipendia I 89 = 3.35. The Romans began
fielding four legions sometime before 311, but the date is uncertain: OAKLEY 1997-2005:
3.390-91. This calculation assumes they did so after the extension of citizenship to the
Latins. The number of triumphs includes Calvinius' in 283 but not Decius' in 312,
Calvus' in 222, or the two alleged triumphs of Caudex in 264 and 263. Cf. the catalogue
in ITGENSHORST 2005 under the appropriate years.
43
Supra n. 37. This calculation includes the triumph and spoils of Ap. Claudius
Centho in 174: 26.29 stipendia I 8 triumphs = 3.29.
128 NATHAN ROSENSTEIN
about equivalent to what his second century counterpart earned: even though he
was paid fewer asses, they were five times heavier. 44 On that assumption, a
rough calculation of the cost of the legions' annual stipendium can be offered,
expressed in post-211 denarii. If over the 23 years of the war Rome mobilized
four legions annually, the cost of 92 annual stipendia would have been 50.6 mil-
lion denarii. 45 4,400 talents on the other hand were equal to 29,660,000 denarii,
leaving a shortfall of over 25 million denarii. Even adding in the 100 talent
indemnity Hiero paid in 263 (Pol. 1.16.9, a portion of which was forgiven in
248: Zonar. 8.16), Duilius' booty, the spoils taken after the fall of Agrigentum
in 263 (Pol. 1.19.15), in the capture of Panormus in 254 (Diod. 23.18.5), and
during the raid on Africa in the preceding year (Pol. 1.29.6-10) along with the
gains from a number of other, lesser victories (e.g. Pol. 1.24.10-13), it is difficult
to imagine that all this wealth matched the sums Rome expended on stipendium.
Moreover, this reckoning talces no account of the hundreds of ships and crews
that Rome employed during the war, the cost of which in materials, food, and
pay is likely to have been enonnous. 46 The treasury was empty in 242 when the
senate sought funds to construct and man the fleet that would finally end the
war with its victory off the Aegates islands. The patres were forced to tum
instead to loans from private citizens (Pol. 1.59.6-7). The Carthaginian indem-
nity may have repaid those loans, but the other costs of the war are not likely
to have been fully reimbursed. That shortfall may have been at least part of
what impelled the senate to demand an additional 1,200 talents from the
Carthaginians in 238.
If stipendium only rarely exceeded spoils between the late fourth and the first
half of the second century, the conclusion seems inescapable that the Republic's
wars in this era almost never paid for themselves when all the other costs - food,
equipment, transport, support personnel, ships and crews - are brought into the
reckoning. It is very difficult therefore to believe that greed ever motivated the
senate to embark upon a war during the middle Republic. To be sure, some
hoped that conquest would make them rich. Voters in the comitia centuriata
readily approved a proposal to aid the Mamertines in 264 once the consuls
pointed out to them the great plunder they could expect; volunteers in 172
44 CRAWFORD 1985: 22-3.
At an annual stipendium of 549,540 denarii per legion since each legion contained
45
only 4,140 legionaries at this date.
46 On the numbers: POL. 1.63.8-9; analysis of Polybius' figures: TARN 1907: 48-60;
THIEL 1954: 83-94; WALBANK 1957-89: 1.128. Again, we have no way to estimate the cost.
Pay for the crew of a trireme at Athens during the early phases of the Peloponnesian war
could be a talent per month: RAWLINGS 2007: 114-5, who also notes that rates of pay
could be significantly higher. Assuming for the sake of illustration that pay for the crew
of a quinquireme was a talent per month during the First Punic War, keeping a fleet of
100 ships at sea for six months would have meant an expenditure of just over 4 million
denarii for pay, nearly double the annual cost of stipendium for four legions.
BEILVM SE IPSVM ALFF? FINANCING MID-REPUBLICAN IMPERIALISM 129
flocked to the levy for the Third Macedonian War because they had seen those
who had fought earlier wars in the East come back wealthy. 47 And some of the
generals who led these and other campaigns may have enriched themselves,
although they had probably done so illicitly. 48 But most of the patres will not
have expected to win command or even serve in a prospective war, nor could
they anticipate that any of their male relations would do so either. They cannot
have anticipated therefore that voting for war would result in any personal
financial gain. Moreover, they will have been well aware as they pondered
going to war that in all likelihood the profits of victory would not match what
the Republic would spend to win it. And yet they never hesitated to open hos-
tilities out of concern for the financial burdens this would impose. The senators
simply assumed that the assidui, the Republic's tax-paying citizens, would keep
on paying tributum year after year for the stipendium and the other costs of
waging war, despite having little prospect of ever seeing these loans repaid. 49
And the patres were right; voters in the comitia centuriata only once displayed
any reluctance to approve a declaration of war, in 200 when they refused to
renew the war against Macedon. Here though, the issues involved not who
would pay but who would serve and the severity of the threat Philip posed.
Once the consul, at the senators' prompting, had reintroduced the bill and
argued that Rome could either fight Macedon in Greece or in Italy and, it
appears, promised that no one who had seived in Scipio's African anny would
be sent to Greece involuntarily, the centuries readily voted for war. 50 Indeed,
the patres insisted on undertaking this new conflict despite the fact that the
treasury lacked the funds to repay the large debts the Republic had incurred
during the war with Hannibal (Liv. 31.13.1-9).
Roman military power in the middle Republic rested squarely on the finan-
cial shoulders of the assidui. But what did the Romans get out of it? Of course
when an existential threat like Hannibal presented itself, their willingness to pay
and pay and pay some more as they did between 218 and 201 is understandable.
Yet how much of a danger would the Brutti - or the Ligurians, Lucanians, or
Illyrians - have posed in the minds of ordinary Romans? Did the rhetoric of
protecting amici and allies and punishing those who challenged Roman might
really weigh more heavily among the citizens than the damage a war would
inflict upon their purses? To be sure, expansion of the ager publicus added
immeasurably to the wealth of the Roman state. But unless we assume a huge,
unorganized influx of settlers into newly won lands, the primary way the majority
47
Mamertines: PoL. 1.11.2 with WALBANK 1957-89: ad Joe. On this episode,
cf. HOYOS 1984: 88-93. Third Macedonian War: LIV. 42.32.6.
48
On generals' ability to help themselves to a share of the spoils, cf. CHURCHILL
1999 refuting SHATZMAN 1972b.
49
On tributum as a forced loan that could be repaid: NICOLET 1976c.
50
LIV. 31.6.3-8.1, 6, cf. 32.3.4. ECKSTEIN 2006: 257-88 for discussion of the deci-
sion; on the promises to the soldiers, cf. BRISCOE 1973: 71.
130 NATHAN ROSENSTEIN

of Romans could have hoped to benefit was through participation in a colony.

Yet only 4,000-6,000 colonists were sent out every few years, not all of whom
were Romans. It seems difficult to believe that the slim chance of being included
among them would have reconciled two hundred thousand or even three hun-
dred thousand assidui to parting with the money it would cost to conquer the
lands that the colony would occupy. 51 Most assidui already owned farms, and
the wealthiest among them, whose votes predominated in the comitia centuriata
and who bore the heaviest burden of tributum, would seem the least likely to
want to participate in a colony. No assiduus can have relished paying tributum
that stood little chance of being refunded. For that reason, returning money
from his spoils to the citizens was something for a general to celebrate. 52 In 187
Manlius Vulso's friends urged the senate to use the booty from his triumph and
to pay off the arrears still owing in tributum in the belief that doing so would
boost his popularity (Liv. 39.7.4-5). Even Megadorus' lament in Plautus' Aulu-
laria over having to provide a soldier's pay indicates that the playwright and his
audience were well aware of the grumbling that levying tributum could occa-
sion (508-31).
Exploring these questions would take us well beyond the scope of this paper,
but by now it should be clear that the economic health of the Republic's assidui
was vital to its ability to project military power across Italy and the Mediter-
ranean in its middle years. That fact ought to have made the prosperity of the
citizenry a matter of serious concern to the senators, a conclusion that raises a
number of further questions, none more intriguing than this: how - if at all -
did the relationship between the patres and the assidui change after 167, when
the tributum was indefinitely suspended and the Republic no longer depended
on its citizens to finance its wars? 53

51 Colonies: CORNELL 1995: 380 Table 1; ROSENSTEIN 2004: 60 n. 195-6 for further

discussion. Population size: AFzEuus 1942.

52 ROSENSTEIN 2011: 137-8 for examples.
53 I would like to thank Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, and John Serrati for organizing

the 2011 conference where the talk out of which this chapter developed was first pre-
sented and for their lengthy efforts to bring it into print. Versions of the talk were pre-
sented at the Universities of Michigan, Canterbury, and Auckland, and at the annual
meetings of the Celtic Conference in Classics in Edinburgh and the Society for Classical
Studies in San Francisco, and I thank the audiences at each venue for helpful comments
and criticisms. Needless to say, any errors that remain are mine. I completed the chapter
in 2012, prior to the publication of P. KAY, Rome's Economic Revolution, and so have
been unable to take any account of this important work in it.