Active Individuality and the Language of Confession: The

Figure of the Beautiful Soul in the Lehrjahre and the

Phänomenologie

Benjamin C. Sax

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Number 4, October 1983,

pp. 437-466 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1983.0107

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/226995/summary

Access provided at 26 Mar 2019 21:22 GMT from King's College London
 Active Individuality and the
Language of Confes, sion:
The Figure of the Beautiful
Soul in
the Lehrjahre and the
Phi~nomenologie
B E N J A M I N C. SAX

THE NAMES OF Goethe and Hegel have too often, and even too easily, been
linked together as the co-founders o f a particularly G erm an tradition in
literature and thought. More often than not such c o m m o n characteristics as
genetic d ev el opm e nt and the ideal totalities of Faust ant the Phiinomenologie,
have been the basis of these comparisons.' But basing such comparisons
u p o n the similarities of these final, "grand" systems often blurs the differ-
ences both between their ideas and between their authors' i n d e p e n d e n t lines
o f intellectual development. Such an approach also screens the diverse and
rich cultural melieu in which they worked. A comparison of the formative
years o f Goethe and Hegel reveals new points o f comparison between them
as well as some of the common cultural features of their age. O ne such
feature for both o f them was the figure of the Beautiful Soul (die sch6ne
Seele). This figure was at the center o f much of Goethe's work in the 177os

' See, tor instance, Johannes Hoffmeister, Goethe und der deutsche ldealismus, (Leipzig,
1932); Karl LOwith, From Hegel to Neitzsche, (New York, 1967); Hans Mayer, Goethe, (Frankfurt,
1973). Marxist writers also emphasize the relatiol) between Hegel and Goethe as well. See Oeorg
Luk~cs, Goethe and his Age, (New York, 1967), and Ernst Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, (New
York, 197o ). An attempt to break away from this coupling has recently been offered by Riidiger
Bubner, "Hegel und Goethe," in Euphorion, le Beiheft, (1978).

[437]
438 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 21:4 OCT i983
and o f the writings of the young Hegel in the 179os. This com m on feature
derives from a mutual indebtedness to the same tradition and cannot be
explained by sequential influence, since the Beautiful Soul was widely
known as a type in eighteeth-century G e r m a n y both in the form o f living
models of Pietistic "saints" and t h r o u g h the well-known literature of Pietis-
tic autobiographies. In fact it might be m ore difficult to establish who
among the educated in Protestant G e r m a n y did not feel the influence o f
the Pietistic religious revival either in its strictly confessional m o d e or
th r o u g h the various popular expressions o f it in such forms as the poetry
o f Klopstock? In addition to its appearance in the writings o f Goethe and
Hegel, the Beautiful Soul has a place in the works o f Jacobi, Schiller, and
S c h l e i e r m a c h e r / T h r o u g h this figure as well as t hrough Peitism as a whole,
fundamentally Christian values and ideas became one o f the bases o f Ger-
man Classicism and Idealism and thus o f m o d e r n G e r m a n t h o u g h t and
culture as a whole.
Initially both Goethe and Hegel came to an understanding and definition
o f h u m a n existence t h r o u g h the figure o f the Beautiful Soul. This figure
was not just the starting point for a psychology, for it became a way o f
understanding the relation of the self to the world, the shape o f its consci-
ousness, its mode o f being, as well as with a form o f language which was
appropriate to it. In this and each in his own way, they were reacting against
the notions of the self developed by the Enlightenment. T h e y rejected the
various reformulations of Lockean psychology held by Voltaire, d'Holbach,
and Helvetius, among others, which posited the self as a simple bundl e o f
mechanically associated sense impressions. 4 Such sensationalism not only
downplayed the inner dept h and creative unity o f the self but also obscured
the central moral questions o f h u m a n f r e e d o m and individual reponsibility
since it denied any i n d e p e n d e n t activity to the mind. Helvetius is p e r h a p s
the most extreme on this point. He argues in De l'homme that only a complete
control of" the e nvi r onm e nt would lead to a complete control over the devel-
o p m e n t o f the personality, a manipulation of external stimuli which slowly
builds up the internal processes would form the behavioral pattern of" the
individual. 5 Even Rousseau, who went so much f u r t h e r in his analysis both

Ernst Troehsch, "Leibniz und die Anf~nge des Pietismus," in Gemmmelts Schriflen, 4 vols.
(Ttibingen, a925), 4:488-53 I. Karl J. Weintraub, The Value of the Individual, (Chicago, 1978),
pp. 336-9 •
~ See Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, (Evanston,
1974), p. 512-7 •
4 Jean A. Perkins, The Concept of the Self in the French Enlightenment, (Geneva, ~969), pp.
39-42.
Ibid., p. 69.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 439
of the unity of the self through the experience of "le sentiment de
l'existence" and of the moral freedom of the individual, had to be rejected
since he continued to speak with the Enlightenment of a common human
nature and a universal form of ethics.
For both Goethe and Hegel, the Beautiful Soul placed moral action at the
center of individual existence and it both found a form of self-definition that
emphasized the unique and incommensurable quality of the individual and
provided a language appropriate to this individuality which joined it to its
world. But even when shorn of its direct connections with Pietism, this
figure proved eventually to be too contemplative, too cut off from its world,
to be totally acceptable to them. Even after Goethe and Hegel rejected the
Beautiful Soul as the highest form of self-definition, they nevertheless still
incorporate it as an important stage within the developmental models of
their later, and in terms of their entire careers, the first works of their
mature period. In both the Lehrjahre (1796) and the Phi~nomenologie (18o7)
action replaces contemplation as the central concern, and the self becomes
less definable in terms of a substantive nature t h a n as the result of a contin-
ual process of interaction with a specific world. The value of individuality is
retained but now seen in relation to a self that only comes to know itself in
action. T h e importance placed upon confessional language is retained also,
if only in relation to a set of mutual confessions. This move not only shifts
the emphasis to action and mutual recognition but also redefines the nature
of consciousness and the relation of consciousness to freedom and necessity.
In the sixth book of the Lehrjahre and the sixth chapter of the Phi~no-
menologie, the figure of the Beautiful Soul both completes a phase of devel-
opment and acts as a bridge to the symbolically disclosed view of the world
in Goethe and to the fulfilled Begriff and the form of absolute knowledge in
Hegel.
Goethe records in his autobiography that his first encounter with the
figure of the Beautiful Soul was in the living person of Susanne von Kletten-
berg. Although the "serenity (Heiterkeit) and peace of mind which never left
her" deeply impressed the internally disturbed and outwardly distracted
poet of nineteen years, her immediate influence upon his own life was seem-
ingly transitory. 6 Only after the young "genius" of the Sturm und Drang met
another "Beautiful Soul," Charlotte von Stein, did the idea of inner-self
formation and the outer calm which accompanies it begin to have a lasting
effect upon his undisciplined personality. Under the inspiration of von
Stein, he composed a classical drama completely around the figure of the
Beautiful Soul. In Iphigenie auf Tauris (first version 1779), Goethe combined

6 Goethe, The Autobiography of Johann Wolfgang yon Goethe, (New York, 1969), p. 367-8.
44 ° JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 21:4 OCT x983
the heightened sense of self-consciousness which resulted from a developed
conscience, but without a specifically Christian notion of sin, with what he
considered a specifically Greek acceptance of nature and the natural in the
individual. Clearly articulating the inner demands of her "heart" into a fully
realized form of her personality, Iphigenie has the strength o f personality to
stand up against seemingly insuperable odds. Unlike Werther, who also
attempts to base his own life upon the inner yearnings of his heart, but who,
in an attempt to feel himself in each and every part of creative nature, fails
to find any proper limitations for his infinitely yearning heart, Iphigenie
discovers the basis of such limitations within her own self, in the externally
realized inner form of her personality. Formed in this way, her life becomes
a harmonious order which brings structure to her inner life, strength to her
actions in the world, and beauty to her entire personality. Without reflect-
ing, or resorting to the principles of an ethical theory, the Beautiful Soul acts
through the strength given her by her own pure convictions. Not only does
she soothe the frustrated passions o f king Thaos and brings an end to the
practice of blood-sacrifices in Scythia, but she also purifies Orestes from the
stain o f matricide and its attending furies and even expiates "with pure hand
and pure heart" the generations-old curse of the house of Tantalus. With
the quiet calm and beautiful expression of her personality alone, Iphigenie
stills the stormy seas which threatens to engulf both men and gods alike.
The young Hegel too came to see in the figure of the Beautiful Soul the
highest expression of self-consciousness. Like Goethe, Hegel in his pre-Jena
writings came to see the means of uniting the inner demands of conscience
and heart with the restraints o f law and limitation as a particular synthesis o f
Christian internality and Greek beauty. In his "The Spirit of Christianity and
its Fate," Hegel identifies the figure of the Beautiful Soul with Jesus. Jesus is
no longer seen as the f o u n d e r of a Kantian type rational morality which was
subsequently lost upon his followers as Hegel had argued earlier; rather he
teaches the doctrine of love, based upon the "heart" or "the subjective in
general." Opposed to Kant's moral principles, "this love arises from the
natural impulses and inclinations within the individual. ''7 Kant only partially
solves the problem of individual autonomy by making the law of conscience
arise from the free choice of the individual, since even in this form of the
law, "there remains a residuum of indestructable positivity," the dead form
of established legalisms and creeds. One part of the soul is still set in opposi-
tion to the other; reason which excludes inclination confronts inclination
which is suppressed by reason; but "above bondage to a command, above the

7 Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" in Early Theological Writings, (Philadel-
phia, 1948), p. 2o9.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 441

purity or impurity o f an object, he [Jesus] puts purity or impurity o f heart. ''s

A l t h o u g h Hegel recognizes that "subjective religion can take on a rational
f o r m which does not contradict its inner d e m a n d s a n d so realize itself in the
"objective" forms o f a fully rational f o r m of religion, he nonetheless empha-
sizes that when this subjective basis is lacking, as in the case o f ancient
Judaism, religion becomes merely "positive."
Jesus overcomes this Jewish sense o f separation and alienation f r o m na-
ture, not t h r o u g h a notion o f sin, but t h r o u g h a Greek sense o f love and
acceptance o f the world, o f the natural in man, a n d of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
others in all their limitations. O p p o s e d to this separation e m b e d d e d in the
law, he "sets the higher genius o f reconcilability (a modification of love)
which not only does not act c o u n t e r to this law but makes it wholly super-
flous; it has in itself a so m u c h richer, m o r e living fullness that so poor a
thing as a law is n o t h i n g for it at all. In reconcilability the law loses its form,
the concept is displaced by life. ''9 While the law only divides, setting up the
oppositions between particular a n d universal, between objective a n d positive
relations, there stands love which has the power to join individuals in a
loving relation which fulfills the "longing for the lost life" which resulted in
Jewish and Kantian "bad conscience.' .... Love as reconcilability is not the
subsuming of one part over another, it is neither the subjugation or destruc-
tion of something alien, or the separation of " m a n as concept and m a n as
reality," of creator and creature. Based on the d e m a n d o f the "spirit o f
beauty" to love all, religious practice must c o n f o r m to this love and become
actual; for the "most holy, the most beautiful, o f all things is o u r e n d e a v o r to
unify the discords necessitated by o u r d e v e l o p m e n t and o u r a t t e m p t to ex-
hibit the unification in the ideal as fully existent, as no longer opposed to
reality . . . . " "
Initially coming to the Beautiful Soul f r o m rather d i f f e r e n t concerns,
both Goethe aDd Hegel nonetheless find within this c o m m o n figure the
means of f o r m u l a t i n g an ideal of self-integration. R e f o r m u l a t i n g an origi-
nally Pietistic self-conception, they combined in this figure specifically Chris-
tian notions of "conscience" (Gewissen) a n d "heart" (Herz) with what they
considered a particularly Greek f o r m of acceptance and even love o f n a t u r e
and the world. T h e Beautiful Soul accepts its natural impulses a n d inclina-
tons as the basic elements of its character and recognizes that these elements
must be developed into the external f o r m of its personality. Greek accep-
tance of the natural within m a n and a t h o r o u g h l y this-worldly u n d e r s t a n d -

s Ibid., p p . ~o 9, ~12.
9 Ibid., p. 215.
'° Ibid., p p . 231, 217.
" I b i d . , p. 214.
442 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 1:4 OCT l 983
ing o f his existence is j o i n e d with a Christian notion o f i n n e r d e p t h a n d
strength o f self-definition. Yet in what can be c o n s d e r e d the first m a t u r e
works o f both G o e t h e and H e g e l this figure is displaced f r o m its position as
the final synthesis and highest f o r m o f self-consciousness; for it is now seen
only as a stage towards the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n o t h e r , substantially d i f f e r e n t ,
u n d e r s t a n d i n g both o f the self a n d o f the world.

In Goethe's works, the figure o f the Beautiful Soul r e a p p e a r s in Wilhelm

Meisters Lehrjahre. H e r e with some i m p o r t a n t alterations, it resumes its m o r e
traditional Pietistic form. And, as is well known, G o e t h e employs the autobi-
o g r a p h y o f Susanne von K l e t t e n b e r g as the model for the "Confessions o f a
Beautiful Soul," which f o r m s the sixth book o f the c o m p l e t e d novel. '~ T h i s
book, along with books five, seven, and eight, was a d d e d by G o e t h e in the
mid-179os to a novel he originally i n t e n d e d to call Wilhelm Meisters The-
atralische Sendung. T h i s additional material greatly altered the t o n e a n d
m e a n i n g o f the first version, which was a r a t h e r capacious story, full o f life
and color, as the y o u n g Meister comes to find himself t h r o u g h active en-
g a g e m e n t with the world. As is m a d e even m o r e explicit in the additions,
this novel was to c e n t e r a r o u n d the workings o f fate ( t h o u g h not in the
Hegelian sense) as it brings Meister to the discovery o f his true talents a n d
capabilities. ':~ T h r o u g h letting fate take its course in his life, Meister is led
t h r o u g h various e x p e r i e n c e s and into various social strata until he eventually
finds his identity as a national playwright and poet. With the a d d i t i o n o f the
last t h r e e chapters o f the revised novel, G o e t h e criticizes this n o t i o n o f fate.
In o r d e r to find himself, Meister must c o n t i n u e to interact with the world,
but fate itself proves to be a too "expensive schoolmaster. '''1 S o m e type o f
conscious control and active self-definition must also a c c o m p a n y this search
['or identity. In the last two books t h e r e f o r e , the m e m b e r s o f the Society o f
the T o w e r debate and discuss various forms o f education, the self-concep-
tions which u n d e r l i e t h e m , a n d the ends at which they aim. C o m p a r e d to the
lively a n d active first five books, these last two a p p e a r as abstract a n d theo-
retical and have been criticized by readers f r o m Schiller o n w a r d as far tot)
"pedantic." Yet these discussions m a r k a definite stage in Meister's Bildung,
his self-development. T h r o u g h listening to and participating in t h e m , he is
led to develop a m u c h m o r e distanced stance toward his own life a n d a m u c h
m o r e d e e p l y u n d e r s t o o d definition o f Bildung.'5

"~ Goethe, Autobiography, p. 367 .

':~ Eric A. Blackall, Goetheand the Novel, (Ithica, 1976), pp. 111--36.
,4 Go
,5 Ibid., pp. 385-542 .
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 443
B e f o r e Meister meets the m e m b e r s o f the T o w e r he reads " T h e Confes-
sions o f a Beautiful Soul," which comprises the entirety o f book six. T h i s
book provides a bridge, both thematically and stylistically, between the first
five books and the r e m a i n i n g two. T h r o u g h " T h e Confessions" he is intro-
d u c e d to the c o n c e p t o f Bildung for the first time a n d comes to realize that
self-discovery is m o r e a process o f active self-formation than o f the chance
o p e r a t i o n s o f fate. By r e a d i n g this account o f the life o f a highly pious
woman, Meister comes to his first u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f self-cultivation as a
f o r m a t i v e process arising f r o m the i n n e r f o r m o f the u n i q u e personality.
Originally like Meister, the Beautiful Soul was c a u g h t u p with the images
and values o f the world a r o u n d her, but she discovers t h r o u g h a n u m b e r o f
unsuccessful attempts at finding happiness in this world that s o m e t h i n g
m o r e personal, m o r e internal to herself, was pulling h e r in a n o t h e r direction
and toward a n o t h e r goal o f personal fulfillment. With the gradual recogni-
tion o f the c o r r u p t i v e qualities o f society, she discovers that h e r identity did
not lie in the world without b u t in the soul within. T h i s soul has a s t r u c t u r e
and f o r m o f its own, which she now knows must be fully realized in itself
and m a d e the guiding ideal o f all h e r interaction with the outside world. She
t h e r e f o r e dedicates h e r life to d e v e l o p i n g h e r s e l f " a c c o r d i n g to h e r own
individual m a n n e r " (nach seiner eigenen Art zu entwickeln) in o r d e r to realize
"the t r u e f o r m o f my h e a r t " o r as she later describes it "die wahrhafte Gestalt
meiner Seele. '''6
A l t h o u g h the Beautiful Soul o f the Lehrjahre is m u c h closer to the Pietistic
model o f i n n e r spiritual d e v e l o p m e n t and a l t h o u g h she is for a time at-
tracted to the writings o f the H e r r n h u t h B r o t h e r h o o d , it is i m p o r t a n t to
r e m e m b e r that she n e v e r joins the Pietists n o r even becomes a Christian in a
traditional sense. T h e Beautiful Soul n e v e r possesses a sense o f personal sin,
o f the innate depravity o f her nature. W h a t she senses as truly herself, as h e r
relation to the Almighty, arises not f r o m a sense o f i n n e r n e e d or lack, but
f r o m a desire to cultivate the good within h e r a c c o r d i n g to the d e m a n d s o f
its own internal f o r m . H e r m e a n s o f self-realization are not derived f r o m a
Christian sense o f self-mortification but f r o m a u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f self-devel-
o p m e n t and cultivation. T h e idea o f r e n u n c i a t i o n (Entsagung), which lies at
the h e a r t o f h e r notion o f Bildung, does not stress the innate evil and c o r r u p t
inclinations within h e r s e l f which must be given u p but emphasizes what must
be voluntarily rejected because it obstructs the full d e v e l o p m e n t o f h e r i n n e r
form. W i t h o u t this basis in sin, r e n u n c i a t i o n is a m e a n s o f limiting h e r goals
but not o f restricting h e r personality. In fact it is the m e a n s o f h e i g h t e n i n g
her sense o f being a u n i q u e personality, which derives its worth precisely

,6 Ibid., p. 333"
444 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 l: 4 OCT ~983
because it is this unique form of being human. Renunciation intensifies the
specific form of her identity by stressing what can genuinely be formed into
a unified totality of a personality. Realized through renunciation, this inner
form brings order, harmony and even beauty into a life which otherwise
would be lost within a confusion of competing inclinations and desires and
in a chaotic array of outer images and impressions. Without resorting to any
general understanding of a universal h u m a n nature or of a depraved hu-
man will, the Beautiful Soul has achieved a deeper sense of self-awareness.
T h r o u g h the notion of individuality, she has structured life and given shape
to her daily existence according to the demands of her inner form and
thereby created something morally beautiful.
"The Confessions" present the purest description of Bildung as a process
of realizing inner form, and as such it comes at a critical point in the novel.
Meister's apprenticeship, however does not end here, for althought the Lehr-
jahre reaches a certain climax in "The Confessions" it is only in opposition to
this type of self-development and with a reintegration and a reconceptualiza-
tion of the outside would that Goethe develops a broader definition of
Bildung. Even within "The Confessions" itself this criticism of the Beautiful
Soul begins. The Uncle has the highest regard for his niece, but he also
recognizes that while this form of cultivation may he appropriate for her, it
cannot be the type of Bildung for everyone. Possessing an overly emotional
and imaginative nature, the Beautiful Soul, he recognizes, could cultivate
her moral sensitivities only in isolation from the world. She has achieved a
form of self-realization at the expense of eliminating all influences from the
external world, for these all too easily and too often distort and corrupt her
own inner form. Hers is a powerful example of a self-ordered life, but
ordered only because it does not acknowledge what might be disruptive o f
this calm. She has learned to renounce all attractions and even all inclina-
tions which draw her into the world.
This inner turning has reached such an extreme degree with the Beauti-
ful Soul that she has cut herself off from all visual images arising from the
outside, even from all images whatsover. Originally she turned to the in-
spired "images and impressions pointing to God as presented to us by the
institutions of the Church" in the hope of "keeping my fancy always full of
images, which had some reference to God; a practice so far truly useful; for
noxious images and their baneful consequences are by that means kept
a w a y . ''17 But she finds no such lasting support in them, for she finds that the
Church's "preachers were blunting their teeth on the shell while I enjoyed
the kernel . . . . I required images, I wanted impressions from without; and

'7 Ibid.,p. 364.

 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 445
reckoned it a pure spiritual desire I felt. '''8 She is finally left to conclude that
the members of the established Church could never have had a true sense of
spiritual ecstasy. Rejecting the Church and momentarily drawn toward the
Pietistic community of the H e r r n h u t t Brotherhood, she finds that its mem-
bers at least have a sense of the inner spiritual needs of the individual. Here
too, however, she is soon disappointed as she realizes that they could "really
feel the sense of those affecting words and emblems; and that from these
they draw as little benefit as formerly they did from the symbolic language
of the Church." Finally she decides to "lay aside this H e r r n h u t h dollwork" as
well. '~
Even images which arise in her own soul are found wanting in their
power to convey her religious experiences, and these too are ultimately
rejected. These images have all been associated with bodily sufferings and
pictures of bleeding and hemorrhaging. Her initial spiritual awakening as
well as every other major turning point in her spirtual j o u r n e y has been
associated with these images. Each one has led to a higher consciousness of
her inner form and of her direct relation with God; but as she reaches the
stage of full consciousness of this ideal, all impressions of bodily existence
fall away since they fail to represent fully this inner form. Recognizing the
limitations involved with all spiritual images, the Beautiful Soul finds that
her true self cannot be expressed through images and that her religious state
is one of pure emotion. This self not only cannot be captured in images, for
words too fail to convey it. "Words fail us in describing such emotions," she
says in an attempt to portray her sense of self, "I could most distinctly
separate them from all fantasy: They were entirely without fantasy, without
image."~"
Finding that all images imperfectly represent her feelings, she merely
floats in the indefinable flow of her emotions. Her true self is not the one
which exists in the world or sees objects in that world, but only the one
which senses the presence of God within her. Her contacts with "the Invisi-
ble One" is no longer a visual, but now fully a kinaesthetic relation. At the
height of her ecstatic experiences, she feels like a snail; the intimations of the
divine are by way of soft tactile impressions, and declares "my soul has only
feelers, and not eyes, it gropes, but does not see. T M T h e Beautiful Soul has
overcome all restrictive images and all external impressions and exists in a
world of pure feelings: "I freely follow my emotions and know as little of
constraint as of repentence." Her "Christian course" achieves its goal when

,8 I b i d . , p. 3 6 5 .
,9 I b i d . , p. 3 6 9 .
~" I b i d . , p. 3 6 4 .
'~ I b i d . , p. 3 6 5 .
446 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2t: 4 OCT 1983

she feels h e r s e l f soaring like a bird above the e a r t h and finally senses that
"serenity o f soul," that Heiterkeit, which she has b e e n seeking all h e r life. In
this m o m e n t she leaves all material restraints b e h i n d and becomes aware o f
h e r s e l f as a p u r e spiritual essence which looks back at its own body: "It was
as if my soul were thinking separately f r o m the body: she looked u p o n the
body as a foreign substance, as we look u p o n a g a r m e n t . . , the body too will
fall to pieces like a vesture; but I, the well-known I, I am." As in h e r first
e x p e r i e n c e o f such a state, h e r "soul b e c a m e all feeling, all m e m o r y [Seele
ganz Empfindung und Gedachtnis]. ''~ In a quite literal sense, the Beautiful Soul
has lost sight o f h e r world. W i t h o u t any images o r external s u p p o r t , she has
f o u n d the certainty (Gewissheit) o f h e r individuality in the e x p e r i e n c e o f h e r
emotions. " T h e Confessions" concludes with h e r conviction that she will
c o n t i n u e to strive a f t e r this p e r f e c t i o n which is at once the true f o r m o f h e r
being and in direct relation with the divine. But such a total loss o f contact
with the world is not without its dangers. T h e Uncle tells h e r that such
individuals as herself, who "follow m o r a l cultivation in a solitary a n d exclu-
sive m a n n e r . . , r u n the risk o f sinking f r o m the moral height, by giving way
to the e n t i c e m e n t s o f a lawless fancy, a n d d e g r a d i n g his m o r a l n a t u r e by
allowing it to take delight in tasteless baubles, if not in s o m e t h i n g worse. '''~3
But h e r discovery o f individuality a n d its i n n e r form, leads the Beautiful
Soul in a direction opposite to that o f W e r t h e r . H e yearns to e m b r a c e the
entire world and feel himself part o f the all and all yet c a n n o t f o r m an image
o f his own self, c a n n o t perceive the p r o p e r limits to his heart; whereas she
uncovers a u n i q u e f o r m o f h e r own heart and the definite shape o f h e r
personality but only at the e x p e n s e o f cutting h e r s e l f o f f f r o m the world a n d
even r e m o v i n g all images f r o m h e r experiences.
Meister reads " T h e Confessions" at a critically i m p o r t a n t m o m e n t in his
own education. H e is b e g i n n i n g to see the ridiculousness o f his idea that only
a n o b l e m a n can achieve t r u e Bildung, a n d that he, a son o f the m i d d l e class,
can only take on the o u t w a r d f o r m o f the e d u c a t e d m a n t h r o u g h m e r e l y
seeming to be so as an actor in the theatre. His whole o u t e r life, he now
recognizes, has b e e n a sham, a series o f m e r e attempts to play various parts.
Equally absurd is his i n n e r life. H e has built no lasting friendships a n d his
love affairs have all been the results o f chance and circumstance. F u r t h e r -
m o r e he has s u r r o u n d e d himself with a n u m b e r o f individuals, notably
M i g n o n a n d the Harpist, who are totally lost within the c o n f u s i n g web o f
their own emotions. Like Meister himself in his feelings toward his lost love
Marianne, these figures have b e e n o v e r p o w e r e d by a sense o f e i t h e r infinite

~'~ Ibid., p. 365 .

~3 Ibid., p. 371 .
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 447
y e a r n i n g or guilt o v e r past actions; and they have associated specific images
with their strong emotions which c o n t i n u e to h a u n t them. F u r t h e r m o r e ,
these fixed images p r e v e n t t h e m f r o m seeing the world a r o u n d t h e m in a
clear fashion. T h e i r visions o f the world a n d t h e r e f o r e o f themselves as
participants in the world are c o n f u s e d o r blocked altogether. T h e y c o n t i n u e
to exist in a fantasy world c o m p r i s e d o f set impressions, vague senses o f guilt
and longing, and ill-defined notions o f their own identities.
In h e r e x t r e m e f o r m o f religious inwardness, the Beautiful Soul is obvi-
ously related to Mignon, the Harpist, and Meister at this point o f his a p p r e n -
ticeship; but she differs f r o m t h e m in one i m p o r t a n t aspect. W h e r e a s they
float in a realm o f ill-defined f o r m s and vague emotions, she has h a r n e s s e d
the emotional f o u n d a t i o n o f h e r life, discovered the i n n e r f o r m o f h e r
inclinations, a n d has, t h r o u g h the process o f Bildung, m a d e her whole life
c o n f o r m to the d e m a n d s o f h e r u n i q u e personality. T h e Beautiful Soul has
not only given direction a n d m e a n i n g to h e r life she has also in the process
discovered h e r identity. She is t h e r e f o r e a m o d e l o f Bildung in a p u r e f o r m
since it is unalloyed with the material o f the world. She is t h e r e f o r e a m o d e l
o f such self-development, b u t a m o d e l as h e r niece Natalie informs Meister
that must be t h o u g h t o f in a specific way: "Such persons are outside us, what
the ideal is within us: models not for being imitated, but for being aimed
at. TM Meister will use this m o d e l o f the Beautiful Soul in this way. H e will
cease to strive after a m e r e e x t e r n a l show o f cultivation; and instead o f
indulging himself in past emotions and lost loves, he will actively try to
u n c o v e r the f o r m o f his i n n e r m o s t inclinations and realize this i n n e r f o r m as
the s t r u c t u r e and m o d e l o f his own existence.
As he learns in the last two books o f the Lehrjahre, this Bildung must not
lead him out o f the world but into a m u c h m o r e intimate relation with it.
T h e initial criticism o f the Beautiful Soul m a d e by the Uncle within the
pages o f " T h e Confessions" is c o n t i n u e d in the r e m a i n i n g books. Bildung
and the f o r m o f identity which results f r o m it leads to an ideal o f individual-
ity, o f the inestimable worth o f the individual person; but as Meister learns
f r o m the Society o f the T o w e r , this e d u c a t i o n must not lead to a rejection o f
the world b u t to r e p e a t e d attempts to discover the self within the world. An
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f his inclinations, o f his i n n e r f o r m , is not revealed t h r o u g h
introspection or in calm contemplation. R a t h e r constant activity, even " e r r o r
o n the back o f e r r o r , " is the s u r e r means o f discovering what in fact he is.
Activity must be linked to the m o r e distanced, interpretive act o f defining
i n n e r f o r m ; but it is m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y linked to the process o f "objective
viewing" (gegenstandlicheAnschauung) the world. B e y o n d the emotional haze

~4 Ibid., p. 466.
448 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 21:4 OCT I983
and fixated images which dominated Meister's inner life, he must come to
see the world clearly and as comprised of objects and persons which are
independent of his own desires and uncolored by his emotional relation to
them. Unlike the Beautiful Soul, who withdraws from all images of the
world, Meister must come to see the world fully and clearly. His identity is
not a process of rejecting the world for the sake of the purity of his inner
form but of actively participating and objectively seeing the world so that in
the "repeated mirror images" of the world he discovers the true contours of
his personality.
Meister completes this "theoretical" phase of his Bildung, not when he
engages with the Abb6 or J a r n o on the nature of education, but when he
accurately perceives how Natalie (symbolically the woman he has been
searching for through most of the novel) is the highest representative o f
completed Bildung. Only in Natalie do the two sides of Bildung, the active
and the reflective, come together. She has found the pure form of her
individuality and has sought to cultivate it in her daily activity. She possessed
the clearest sense of Anschauung in the novel and has made her particular
vision of the world the foundation of her identity. From earliest childhood
she has sensed the needs felt by others and she has cultivated this inclination
within herself into a mode of objective viewing and direct activity. Natalie
sees need, rather than feeling or vaguely sensing it as Meister tends to do.
She realizes that she has a unique perspective on the world and has carved
out a position in the world that she alone can fill: "I seemed born for seeing
them [the needs of others] alone . . . . My most delightful occupation was,
and is, when a deficiency, a want, appears anywhere before me, to set about
devising a supply, a remedy, a help for it. '''~5 More so than any other char-
acter in the Lehrjahre, she has realized her personality as an integration o f
inner form and outward activity; her deepest inclinations (Neigungen) have
found their appropriate objects (Gegensti~nde) through the power of clearly
and fully seeing the world a r o u n d her.
The Beautiful Soul, as with the entire section of the novel which she
introduces, then represents in her life of spiritual internality and inactivity
an extreme contrast to Meister's hitherto active, unself-conscious, fate-
directed life. She and the life she represents is, in the language Goethe
developed in his botanical studies, the polar opposite for his Bildung. She is
not just any opposite but the only one which Meister feels pulled towards,
the one which draws out unrealized aspects of his inner nature. In this case,
it is her inner certainty and strength which derives from the discovery of her
inner form. Although Meister now attempts to renounce his past as a total

~ Ibid.,p. 473.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 449

waste of time and tries to find a much more inward form of existence, he
can in fact do neither. This past has also spoken to elements deep within
him, and the Beautiful Soul, however attractive to him now, cannot simply
become his in an immediate manner. Having established this polarity be-
tween action and contemplation within the compass of Meister's own unique
form of existence, Goethe in the remaining section of the novel begins the
movement of reconciling them through ever more concrete, ever less ex-
treme polarities until the point is reached in which Meister discovers the
form of his own individuality and raises it to the level of self-consciousness.
In the course of the debates in the Society of the Tower, in which various
forms of education (Bildung) are discussed both in a theoretical and personal
fashion, Meister comes to understand his identity, through reflection upon
his past actions and mutual "confessions" of personal experiences. Meister
finally comes to see his life not only as a series of polarities (Polariti~ten) and
reconciliations but also as a heightening (Steigerung) of his consciousness
both of the unique form of the self and of an understanding of the world in
a more concrete manner. T h r o u g h this Polariti~t and Steigerung an upward
spiral development is discernable. ~6 At the end of the novel, Meister realizes
that his identity is not just the unfolding of some innate form but an active
interplay between his specific nature and a specific world, and that the
proper language of this mode of selfhood is not just the personal confessions
of his past actions but a commonly defined and accepted language arising
from a series of mutual confessions.
Beyond seeing the world objectively and herself as a part of that world
objectively, Natalie also perceives that she participates in a higher order as
well. Her identity is not just the result of revealing the inner form of the
personality within an active and objective existence, she also realizes that she
is linked to a higher order as well. Where Jarno can just speak about de-
mands on the individual to develop himself up to the level of Humanity,
Natalie actively perceives and acts within this all-inclusive order. At the end
of the novel when she, as the "worthy priestess," leads Meister into the Hall
of the Past, she reveals to him the symbolic representations of H u m a n i t y Y
She teaches Meister not only that Bildung develops a sense of individuality
which reveals a constant form of identity through the continued interaction
with the world, but also that self-identity is only sustained through the con-
stant participation in this larger order. In the Hall of the Past, Natalie
introduces Meister to symbolic viewing (symbolische Anschauung) which be-
yond objective viewing of the world around him reveals this inclusive, ulti-

,~6 Ibid.,p. 492.

'~7 Ibid.,pp. 483-4 .
45 ° J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 9 1 : 4 OCT 1 9 8 3

mately sustaining, source o f his own existence. Natalie is the highest repre-
sentation o f Bildung in the Lehrjahre and although Meister does not complete
his own Bildung in this novel, t h r o u g h an understanding of her m ode of
self-cultivation, he is at least p r e p a r e d to realize the inner form o f his iden-
tity and actively participate in the world. T h e promised fulfillment as well as
the symbolic disclosure o f the p e r m a n e n t forms of existence is achieved in
the Wanderjahre.

II
In the Lehrjahre Goethe employes the Beautiful Soul both as an example o f
that form o f self-cultivation which is directed to internal d e v e l o p m e n t alone
and as a stage in the growing self-awareness which results from a mediation
of action in the world and reflection u p o n this action. Meister finally realizes
a personality ideal which is based u p o n a full valuation o f his individuality.
His identity no longer stands in opposition to its world, for it is symbolically
disclosed to him t hr ough various relations, leading from his immediate cir-
cumstances to an under s t andi ng o f self within the compass o f nature, his-
tory, and even o f Humanity. In a similar fashion in the Phiinomenologie,
Hegel moved beyond his original formulation of the Beautiful Soul as the
synthesis o f a Greek concept of Beauty with a Christian "heart" to establish it
as a figure which insures the full d e v e l o p m e n t of individuality and prevents
it from lapsing into a language o f universals which would either distort the
full expression o f individuality or deny its existence altogether. By openi ng
individuality to the universal, the Beautiful Soul also propels it to a concep-
tual grasp o f Spirit in the f or m o f absolute knowledge. Just as G oet he em-
ploys the Beautiful Soul as a means of leading Meister to the p r o p e r integra-
tion o f action and thought, so Hegel t h r o u g h his figure propels the move
from what would otherwise be a m er e theory o f praxis to the foundations o f
speculative philosophy itself. And as Meister ends his education in the Lehj-
rahre not only with an awareness o f the isolated self but with an awareness o f
Humanity in the Hall o f the Past, so Hegel elevates us from the concept of
individuality in-and-for itself in the realm o f self-conscious Spirit, into the
"midst o f those who know themselves in the form o f pure knowledge. ''~s
Hegel introduces the Beautiful Soul, not as Goethe does as an example of
the initial, inner form o f individuality, but only after individuality has been
conceptually grasped, and in fact at a point at which the entire d e v e l o p m e n t
o f the Phi~nomemologie has reached a resting point and an a p p a r e n t conclu-
sion. Self-conscious individuality has achieved a direct, conceptual awareness
of its actual existence, come to u n d e r s t a n d its own selfhood and its specific

~ Hegel,The Phenomenologyof Spirit, (Oxford, 1977), p. 4o9.

 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 45 l

actions in terms of the universal, and finally, through the recognition of

itself in the language of the community, it has integrated its heightened
self-consiousness with the substance of Spirit itself. Self-conscious individual-
ity, the form of consciousness of "conviction," (Uberzeugung) marks an Aufhe-
bung of Spirit and what looks like the culmination of the entire phenomeno-
logical project as laid out in the "Introduction. ''~9 In this sense Hegel speaks
of individuality as the "third self" of the Phftnomenologie which is the suppres-
sion and the preservation of the first two selves. The first self is the juridical
person of the Roman world which is the expression of an immediate unity
with the universal, while the "second self," the self of "The Terror," is not
abstract hut the product of the attempt at overcoming the divisions and
self-estrangements which resulted on the level o f " C u l t u r e " (Bildung, but not
in the Goethean sense) and by making itself actual in an immediate fashion.
Whereas the "first self" has an immediate relation with substance, but no
individuality, the "second self" has a heightened self-consciousness but no
world. 3° T h e "third self" overcomes the oppositions present in the two ear-
lier selves and merges self-consiousness with the substance of the world. It
also avoids the difficulties of Kant's definition of autonomy which itself was
an attempt to overcome the immediate universal freedom of "The Terror"
by making knowledge and truth, the knowing subject and the knowledge
(the goal of his actions which arises from within himself) equal to each other
and not to some abstract universal. 3'
Hegel's move to "Conscience" establishes this third self and the certainty
of its actions, not on the basis of ethical principles, but on the actual exis-
tence of the individual. Its mode of being is the concrete, individual self in
all its existential contingency. Only at the end of chapter six does Hegel
speak of "das Dasein selbst" in which the individual "knows that it has truth
in the immediate certainty of itself. '':~ As in Goethe this form of self-defini-
tion is only constituted through action. In this section Hegel wants to em-
phasize, not that the self-definition of individuality is a form of knowledge,
but that certainty arises from the individual who acts out of the conviction of
his individuality. Conscience, Gewissen at once becomes both Wissen
(knowledge) and gewiss (certain). T h e individual acts to confirm his individu-
ality in every act, and this form of selfhood becomes his duty and even the
law of his being: "It is now the law that exists for the sake of the self, not the
self that exists for the sake of the law. ''33

,9 Ibid., p. 366.
3,, Ibid., p. 384 •
3, Ibid., p. 384 .
3' Ibid., p. 386.
33 Ibid., p. 387 •
45 z JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 21:4 OCT 1983
Individuality is n e i t h e r a m e r e passive k n o w e r o f its world n o r does it
simply externalize its own law o n t o the merely receptive world. T h e world
no l o n g e r stands opposite to the self but is seen as a set o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d
conditions for active individuality. It knows this actuality in an i m m e d i a t e
and c o n c r e t e m a n n e r . T o m e r e k n o w i n g consciousness, this k n o w l e d g e is
merely c o n t i n g e n t in that it is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n itself, but to acting
individuality these contingencies are circumstances for actualizing itself.
T h e y are o p p o r t u n i t i e s for action; and in action, self and circumstances
b e c o m e one. T h i s conversion is simple and u n m e d i a t e d , a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
e f f e c t e d by the p u r e Begriff without alteration o f the content, the c o n t e n t
being d e t e r m i n e d by the interest o f the consciousness knowing it. In action
the self changes the world a n d in action the world which resulted f r o m the
action changes the self's view o f itself. In "Gewissen," the world, the thing
itself (die Sache selbst), is m a d e into a subject for the first time: "It is in
conscience that it is for the first time a subject which had m a d e explicit all the
m o m e n t s , substantiality in general, e x t e r n a l existence and the essential na-
ture o f t h o u g h t , are c o n t a i n e d in this certainty o f itself. TM "Conscience"
t h e r e f o r e is b o t h subject a n d substance; it acts in its world a n d knows it as a
spiritual circumstance for the fulfillment o f its individuality a n d it recognizes
its individuality as the specific f o r m o f its e n c o u n t e r s with this world.
While conviction will n e v e r r e v e r t to the abstract universal o f " T h e Moral
View o f the World," it must still claim a f o r m o f universality and universality
in a full sense and not only in the practical sense o f e i t h e r o n e particular
d u t y fulfilled o r duty as a m e r e m o m e n t o f conviction. It needs the confir-
mation o f its own universality in the recognition o f the other. This being-for-
a n o t h e r is t h e r e "the substance which remains in-itself o r unexplicated," a n d
is the clue to the transition f r o m the concept of" conviction to that o f
r e c o g n i t i o n ? 5 A n d this n e e d does not arise f r o m external d e m a n d s but f r o m
within the acting consciousness itself. It is the "over" ({Qber) o f the "witness"
(Zeugnis) o f active individuality itself which is e m b e d d e d within "conviction"
((lberzeugung). '.~6 Individuality not only acts, for it also stands b e f o r e its acts
and witnesses and j u d g e s them. T h e recognition o f this action as the d u t y
d e m a n d e d by this specific individuality in these specific circumstances is the
basis o f recognition both for the individual d o e r and by all others. T h e
actuality o f its universality and the t r u t h o f its individuality is t h e r e b y con-
f i r m e d in the m u t u a l recognition o f the c o m m u n i t y and the fulfillment o f
Spirit: " T h e Spirit and substance o f their association are thus the m u t u a l

~4 Ibid., p. 389 .
:,5 Ibid., p. 388.
:~'~ Ibid., p. 388.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 453
assurance of their conscientiousness, good intentions, the rejoicing over the
mutual purity, and the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and
uttering, of cherishing and fostering, such an excellent state of affairs. ':~7
"Conviction," "duty," and "recognition" then, defines the individual within
the mutually-defined actuality called Spirit.
This world of good intentions, of mutual assurance of conscientiousness,
and of "rejoicing over their mutual purity," is broken by the appearance of
the Beautiful Soul. It scorns this supposed reconciliation of duty and nature,
of the particular and the universal, of recognition and Spirit. It opposes this
reconciliation neither by presenting yet another set of principles of moral
action nor by establishing another universal form of duty. Unlike similar
figures within "Faith and Pure Insight" and "The Moral View of the World,"
the Beautiful Soul has accepted the necessity of Gewissen and has recognized
the need of conviction to realize itself in the world through action. But it is
also a condemnation of active individuality and its attempts at reaching an
immediate reconciliation of its specific nature in a universal form of recogni-
tion. From within conviciton itself it speaks to the superficiality of this uni-
versal claim and by so doing, reveals a deeper understanding of action itself
and of the nature of finitude involved in the self-conception of individuality.
The Beautiful Soul reveals this deeper side of action by accepting and then
rejecting it. Recognizing the importance of action, but at the same time,
fearing its possible evil consequences, it renounces action itself. In this act of
renunciation (Entsagung), it constructs a self-image which is internally har-
monious with itself and morally beautiful in all its parts. It lives only within
the goodness of its own feelings: "it lives in dread o f besmirching the splen-
dor of its inner being by action and an existence; and in order to preserve
the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with the actual world. '':~ Its
conviction, devoid of any need to actualize itself or to be recognized by
others, now perfects the beautiful form of its own conscience. The Beautiful
Soul withdraws into its innermost being from which all the confusion and
chaos of the external world have vanished. Arising from the mists of consci-
ence, the Beautiful Soul is the "silent fusion o f the pithless essentialities of
the evaporated life. ''39
In itself, withdrawn into itself and without an actual existence, the Beauti-
ful Soul floats in a vague, vaporous form; since it has accepted action and
found it wanting it originates a further turn in the dialectic. Where others
see in the deed itself the confirmation of the universal and its actuality

37 Ibid.,p. 398.
~s Ibid.,pp. 399-400.
~9 Ibid.,p. 400.
454 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2i: 4 OCT 1983
sustained in language, the Beautiful Soul sees only the negation of con-
science. As a witness to the actions of others, it can only condemn their
deeds and deny the meaning attached to them. Thus a new antithesis arises
between the acting individual and those who bestow universality and truth to
his actions on the one side and the Beautiful Soul with its refusal to recog-
nise such things on the other. In this refusal the Beautiful Soul introduces
an analytic of the deed and its meaning into what up to this point has been a
mere phenomenology of it. T h r o u g h this phenomenology, individuality, the
deed, and their universal acceptance in the language of the community have
all been established as part of the self-conscious existence in the Spirit. T h e
Beautiful Soul presides over this new analytic and breaks this phenomeno-
logically-founded realm of individuality. T h e Beautiful Soul challenges the
claim that it is the form of duty itself, rather than the specific content of the
deed, that attains a universal meaning. T h e identity of deed and duty lasts
only in the action itself. Once done, set in the medium of being, this identity
is no longer just knowing, no longer this process of differentiation in which
duty and conviction coincide and their opposites are superceded. Universal-
ity and individuality split apart both between the Beautiful Soul and active
individuality and between conviction's realization in action and conviction's
desire for universal recognition.
By claiming to be universal, the acting individuality claims to have acted
conscientiously, that it, in the full knowledge of his purposes and his circum-
stances; but through the analysis of the deed itself, the Beautiful Soul shows
how this too is a false claim. T h e conviction of the doer of the deed itself
demands this universal, "in it the m o m e n t of universality, conscious action
requires that the actual case before it should be viewed unrestrictedly in all
its bearings, and therefore that all the circumstances of the case should be
accurately known and taken into consideration. ''4'' Universal consciousness
should, in the doer's opinion look at the deed from his point of view; but
once this standpoint is denied, as is done by the Beautiful Soul, this claim to
universality becomes insupportable, and is recognized as such, even by act-
ing individuality itself. By refusing recognition, the Beautiful Soul insists
that an individual acts always with a certain blindness to his circumstances.
Within the deed itself there is always an opacity which even the doer of the
act is not aware of. Individuality's intentions and choices form only the
surface of the deed; it is the part open to the consciousness of the doer. He
has no true knowledge of his deeper motives, unconscious convictions, and
no knowledge of the full set of circumstances around him and of alternative
circumstances and other choices. But even more disquieting for the doer is

4c, Ibid.,pp. 389-9o.

 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 455
that the consequences o f the d e e d f o r m the aspect o f the action which
escapes his control and knowledge. T h e s e consequences can n e v e r be k n o w n
b e f o r e h a n d a n d they belie any a t t e m p t by the individual to be totally respon-
sible for his actions. While action itself constitutes its actuality, it can no
l o n g e r be claimed that action and duty, individuality and recognition, have
attained the level o f full t r a n s p a r e n c y in language.
B e y o n d this m e r e claim t h e r e lurks s o m e t h i n g m u c h m o r e t h r e a t e n i n g to
conscience and its a t t e m p t to f o r m a world o f individualities. T h e universal
is not only claimed in itself; it also contains the m e a n i n g o f the d e e d itself.
Individuality not only says that the d e e d as a f o r m o f d u t y is universal but
that this specific d e e d as a f o r m o f the universal is good. Based o n its own
individuality, it claims that the c o n t e n t o f its action is good. This claim brings
out a contradiction which has b e e n c o v e r e d o v e r and u n e x p l i c a t e d u p to this
point. While the m u t u a l recognition o f the d e e d has bestowed t r u t h a n d
actuality to the d e e d a n d individuality to the doer, it has assumed that the
m e a n i n g o f the d e e d will be the same for all. H e has m a d e this d e e d a n d the
declaration o f it into the c o m m o n reality o f a spiritual c o m m u n i t y ; but the
m e a n i n g o f the d e e d escapes him a n d is o p e n to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f others.
This escape a n d this j u d g m e n t by the Beautiful Soul is no theft or perver-
sion o f the deed. Meaning forms a part o f the d e e d itself. T h e Beautiful
Soul witnesses the disparity between what the d o e r says and what he in fact
does. T h e individuality uses its own language to describe the d e e d ; but this is
not the only language that is possible. What individuality does, it immedi-
ately attempts to justify, not t h r o u g h the universal, but only t h r o u g h the
specificity o f its own nature. T o claim universality for one's own individuality
is to fall once again into dissemblance and hypocrisy. This hypocrisy is
equally h i d d e n f r o m those who must a c k n o w l e d g e the d e e d as f r o m the d o e r
himself: "hypocrisy, as is c o m m o n l y said, d e m o n s t r a t e s its respect for d u t y
and virtue just by m a k i n g a show o f t h e m , and using t h e m as a mask to hide
itself f r o m its own consciousness, no less than f r o m others. "4' It uses such
justifications only for the sake o f the o t h e r and t h e r e b y implies its own
c o n t e m p t for what others consider an essence in the e x p o s u r e o f it as lacking
any substantial being a n d its m e r e use as "an external i n s t r u m e n t . "
In refusing to acknowledge the universal claim o f active individuality, the
Beautiful Soul not only o p e n s the d e e d to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f its meanings, it
also reveals an u n d e r s i d e o f all action. B e y o n d m e r e l y attesting to the simple
fact that all actions b e a r the stain o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n which c a n n o t simply,
t h r o u g h its abstract form, claim universality, the Beautiful Soul also claims
that every d e e d is an act o f violence. T o act at all is to i n t e r f e r e with the

4, Ibid., p. 4ol.
456 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y ~l: 4 OCT 1983
course o f things, to i m p i n g e o n others. Individuality is always guilty; it must
i m p r i n t his own individuality u p o n the world and so institute the c o m m o n
world o f Spirit with his own f o r m o f selfhood. T h e r e is always violence
involved in active individuality, a violence which is o v e r c o m e n e i t h e r in
conviction's good intentions n o r in individuality's attempts to justify its activ-
ity t h r o u g h m u t u a l recognition. A world that is free o f violence is not a
world o f true selfhood a n d certainty o f individuality. A world o f p e r p e t u a l
peace is at best only a utopia, a n o w h e r e . T o be an individuality is to be in
conflict with others. One's own active constitution o f the world is in o p e n
conflict not only with the actions o f o t h e r but also with their j u d g m e n t s , " f o r
by expressing only the self o f a n o t h e r , " it does not express "their own self."4~
T h e Beautiful Soul's refusal o f recognition is not just an o b s t r e p e r o u s act for
in this it confirms its own selfhood. By withholding the universal a n d its
claim to goodness, T h e Beautiful Soul reveals that any ethic, even o n e based
u p o n individuality, must o p e r a t e between responsibility and violence. T h e
Beautiful Soul c a n n o t know w h e t h e r this individuality acted f r o m a sense o f
duty or not, w h e t h e r "this conscience is morally good o r evil." In fact it cares
little for these considerations; for, since all action carries with it the violence
o f the d e e d itself, the Beautiful Soul "must also take it to be evil. ''43 It must
declare that t h e r e are no i n n o c e n t actions a n d must u n m a s k all a t t e m p t s to
cover up or displace this evil u n d e r the claim to the universal. T h e Beautiful
Soul must call evil "evil," violence, "violence."
T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f evil into this conflict drives the two consciousnesses
f u r t h e r apart; but it also brings a b o u t their eventual reconciliation. T h i s
resolution is achieved t h r o u g h the vocabulary o f evil, the crisis o f conviction
is r e f o r m u l a t e d in terms o f confession and m u t u a l forgiveness. By standing
witness to the i n h e r e n t evil in all deeds, the Beautiful Soul has also un-
covered a weakness in the l a n g u a g e o f conviction. In its quest for the univer-
sal, conviction employs a l a n g u a g e which is not used to express the self but
only to convince others o f its goodness. L a n g u a g e which is claimed as the
existence o f the Spirit a n d the self within the Spirit, has b e c o m e a m e r e f o r m
o f apology. It no longer is a m e a n s o f reaching universal a c k n o w l e d g m e n t ,
but only a means o f h i d i n g the innate evil o f the d e e d . In the f o r m o f an
apology, it shifts the action f r o m the realm o f deeds to that o f words. Be-
y o n d u n m a s k i n g the hypocrisy involved in this apology, the Beautiful Soul
calls for a d i f f e r e n t f o r m of" language, o n e which is truly revelatory o f the
self. It d e m a n d s that individuality declare the " f o r m a l p r o d u c t i o n o f an
identity o f what the evil consciousness is in its own self a n d what it declares

4~ Ibid., pp. 394-5;4ol.

4:~ Ibid., p. 394.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 457
itself to be; it must be m a d e a p p a r e n t that it is evil, and thus its existence
m a d e to c o r r e s p o n d to its essence. TM But if it claimed simply that it is evil
and a denial o f the universal it does not d o justice to its knowledge that it is
at the same time its own i n n e r law o f its own individuality and the t r u t h o f its
being. It knows that even if its actions are its own, and even that its individu-
ality is a denial o f others' individuality and "is w r o n g i n g t h e m , " it is still the
universal, " f o r the universal is the e l e m e n t o f its existence, and its language
declares its action to be an a c k n o w l e d g e d duty. ''45
Instead it calls for a confession o f individuality's own u n i q u e selthood.
Confession, the language a n d literature o f the "heart," is the true language
o f such individuality. It makes no i m m e d i a t e claim to universality but simply
to have e x p r e s s e d the individuality o f the doer. In confession, the act a n d
the language o f the act are one. It is only t h r o u g h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the
specific n a t u r e o f the self, its natural impulses and inclinations, its f o r m o f
self-understanding, its k n o w l e d g e o f circumstances, and o f the d e e d that it
p e r f o r m e d , that the self is revealed and o p e n e d to others. No generalization
o f h u m a n nature, n o claim to be e x p r e s s i n g the universal in every action, is
a d e q u a t e to this p u r p o s e . As with Werther o r with the "Confessions o f a
Beautiful Soul" o f the Lehrjahre, a true language o f individuality has b e e n
f o u n d , a language which is at once expressive and not distortive o f being
and a language in which its object, the self, is at last t r a n s p a r e n t to the
knowing subject. L a n g u a g e itself is revealed as s o m e t h i n g essential and not
as s o m e t h i n g a d d e d o n t o the deed. In language the self recognizes itself as
Dasein. In confession, individuality expresses its i n n e r certainty o f its convic-
tions directly and b e y o n d any d o u b t which separates m e r e discourse f r o m
the deed. In b e c o m i n g t r a n s p a r e n t to itself in confession, it also becomes
truly r e c o g n i z e d by other: "it perceives itself just as it is perceived by others,
and the percieving is just existence which has become a self.'46 T h e self exhibited
in confessionl language is n e i t h e r a m e r e d o e r o f d e e d s n o r some b u n d l e o f
impulses and inclinations, some u n r e a l i z e d nature, but a self that acts and
has acted and recognizes itself both as the a g e n t o f these actions and as the
self who is a c k n o w l e d g e d by o t h e r s as this agent. T h e self is the m u t u a l
constitution o f individuality in language in the c o m m u n i t y o f Spirit.
T h e stage is now set for the final episode o f the Phiinomenologie. B e f o r e
the m o v e to "Religion" and "Absolute Knowledge," this last c o n f r o n t a t i o n
between active individuality and the Beautiful Soul takes us to their final
reconciliation t h r o u g h m u t u a l recognition. Initially, the active individuality

44 Ibid., pp. 4Ol-9.

45 Ibid., p. 402.
6 Ibid., p. 395.
458 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 21:4 OCT 198 3
stands b e f o r e the j u d g e . O n each side, hypocrisy r a t h e r than the language o f
actuality p r e d o m i n a t e s : "In b o t h alike, the side o f reality is distinct f r o m the
words u t t e r e d ; in the one, t h r o u g h the selfish p u r p o s e o f the action, in the
o t h e r t h r o u g h the failure to act at all. ''47 T h e d e e d has been d o n e , individu-
ality c o n f i r m e d , the d e e d has b e e n j u d g e d , and f o u n d wanting in its univer-
sality; but the m e a n i n g o f the d e e d has b e e n left to float away u n g r a s p e d by
e i t h e r the d o e r o r the j u d g e . Individuality has a p p e a l e d to others to c o n f i r m
the m e a n i n g o f his actions, and he has not f o u n d that m u t u a l confirmation;
and the j u d g e has invoked the universal and stands o n this universal to
c o n d e m n this claim o f duty. I f the Beautiful Soul remains firm in this posi-
tion, it turns into the " h a r d - h e a r t e d " j u d g e who refuses to accept the indi-
viduality o f o t h e r s o n a level equal to itself a n d who rejects the o t h e r as a
m e r e source o f evil and n e g a t i o n o f the universal. T h e Beautiful Soul takes
o n "the e x t r e m e f o r m o f the rebellion o f the Spirit" which knows itself to be
certain o f itself alone, self-contained in the purity o f its own conviction? s In
failing to u n d e r s t a n d individuality o f the o t h e r , it falls into hypocrisy not
only because it denies the basis o f its own f o r m o f self-consciousness but
because it j u d g e s not in t e r m s o f s o m e t h i n g actual, but only in terms o f m e r e
t h o u g h t , "the absolutely fluid continuity o f p u r e knowing" a n d t h e r e b y re-
sorts to the level o f the " m o r a l view o f the world. ''4"
Misconstruing its own existence as part o f a m u t u a l l y - d e f i n e d world o f
the Spirit, the Beautiful Soul constructs a world for itself, a world that it
thinks is real, but is only a world o f words. In this way it divides language
into two halves. What to active individuality is the means of" e x p r e s s i n g its
own self in the language o f conviction is h e r e used for the Beautiful Soul's
i n n e r dialogue with itself. T h r o u g h this language the Beautiful Soul divorces
conviction f r o m action, replaces things by signs, actions by shadows. Cer-
tainty retreats into itself, conviction becomes a m e r e voice, and language, no
l o n g e r tied to actuality, eventually even fails to provide the basis o f a r e t u r n
to an i n n e r dialogue with the self: "This r e t u r n , t h e r e f o r e , does not m e a n
that the self is in essence a n d actuality p r e s e n t in its speech; for essence is
not for it an it-self or m e r e l y implicit being, but its very self" which u n a n -
c h o r e d in the world o r in its own actualizations becomes s w a m p e d within
itselfS"' In a pastiche c o m p o s e d o f r e f e r e n c e s to the writings o f Novalis,
Hegel sees how this u n g r o u n d e d self loses itself in itself. It looks within and
finds its own emptiness: " T h e hollow object which it has p r o d u c e d for itself
now fills it, t h e r e f o r e , with a sense o f emptiness." Its only activity is a yearn-

47 Ibid., p. 403 .
4~ Ibid., pp. 405-6.
49 Ibid., p. 406.
2,, Ibid., p. 399.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 459

ing which merely loses itself, as consciousness becomes an object d e v o i d o f

substance. Rising above this loss, a n d falling back o n itself, it reveals itself
only as a lost soul. ''5' T h e a t t e m p t at constructing a morally beautiful self
ends in failure and "its light dies away within it, and it vanishes like a
shapeless v a p o u r that dissolves into thin air. ',~'~
In so d o i n g the Beautiful Soul o p e n s the possibility o f a p e r m a n e n t clash
between the linguistic d i m e n s i o n o f conviction a n d its actual, c o n c r e t e side,
between declaration and actual c o m m i t m e n t . In such a clash the Beautiful
Soul contradicts itself; for, while not accepting the confessions o f the o t h e r
because it is the expression o f m e r e words, it fails to see that its own j u d g -
m e n t is also only the e x p r e s s i o n o f words a n d that these words, without a
basis in actuality, have even less o f a claim to t r u t h than those o f the "evil"
individuality. Severed f r o m action, language becomes discourse (Re&),
which no l o n g e r elevates above action but only separates itself f r o m it, no
l o n g e r is the fulfillment o f Spirit but only a snare to Spirit. T h e call for
confessions o f limitations must be mutual; and the act o f j u d g i n g itself
brings this to the fore. In calling for a confession o f the evil o f the other's
actions, in d r a w i n g out a confession o f his very individuality, the Beautiful
Soul must also confess its own limitations and lack o f an absolute universal-
ity. In j u d g i n g then, it must recognize its equality with the j u d g e d . T h i s
equality is not based o n u n i f o r m i t y o r the r e d u c t i o n to an i n d i f f e r e n t univer-
sal, but on the m u t u a l recognition o f individuality. Mutual a c k n o w l e d g m e n t
o f individuality results. While the j u d g i n g consciousness sees "the latter as
the same as himself," the j u d g e d "does not merely find himself a p p r e h e n d e d
by the o t h e r as s o m e t h i n g alien a n d s e p a r a t e d f r o m it, but r a t h e r finds that
other, a c c o r d i n g to its own n a t u r e a n d disposition, identical with himself. ''5:~
Identity is t h e r e f o r e , not a result o f sameness; it is likeness as the m u t u a l
recognition o f individuality. T h e confession o f the acting individuality "is
not an abasement, a humiliation, a throwing-away o f himself in relation to
the o t h e r ; for this u t t e r a n c e is not a one-sided affair, which would establish
his disparity with the other; o n the contrary, he gives himself u t t e r a n c e
solely on account o f his having seen his identity with the o t h e r . TM This in
t u r n leads to a confession by the j u d g e . H e too is partial. H e makes his
j u d g m e n t s o f the universal itself. T h e Beautiful Soul must t h e r e f o r e confess
its own hypocrisy in j u d g i n g a c c o r d i n g to the unreality of" its analysis o f
action and t h e r e f o r e to its own baseness, which accompanies all such anal-
yses. Only w h e n the j u d g e confesses his own limitations, his own partiality,

3, Ibid., p. 400.
-~* Ibid., p. 400.
5:~ Ibid., p. 405 .
54 Ibid., p. 4o5 .
460 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 21:4 OCT ~983
his own stain of n o n - d e t e r m i n e d determination, his universal law as only his
law, when, in other words he recognizes not only the individuality of the
other but the true n a t u r e o f his own individuality is mutual recognition
possible.
These mutual confessions a n d the mutual renunciations which they in-
volved lead both to a d i f f e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sameness and to a new
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the relation o f language a n d being, which has plagued all
the a r g u m e n t s in the Phi~nomenologie since the o p e n i n g section on "sense cer-
tainty." T h e confession o f the Beautiful Soul is no longer the still, small voice
of the self talking with itself, a n d discourse that is merely an echo; but a true
dialogue with a n o t h e r which mutually clarifies the individuality of each and
confims t h e m in a new f o r m of identity with each other. In this dialogue,
arising from the inmost and most particular aspect o f selfhood, the universal
a c k n o w l e d g m e n t desired by the acting individuality is finally f o u n d and "the
contradictions present in the a p p r e h e n d i n g consciousness, a n d its identity
with the first consciousness become still m o r e complete. ''55 H e r e in this
knowledge o f one's own certainty o f selfhood as the constituter o f reality one
finds that a f o r m o f language both in its private and now in its public aspects
has c o n f o r m e d to that reality. L a n g u a g e no longer distorts being, but in the
form o f the concept o f individuality which is mutually recognized as such,
being coincides with saying, existence with meaning, fact with consciousness.
This is "the reason that language is the existence o f Spirit as an i m m e d i a t e
self. ''~'~ L a n g u a g e is here no longer the conveyer o f "the perverted a n d per-
verting and distracted self o f the world of culture." It is neither the language
of ethical substance, which "is law and simple c o m m a n d and c o m p l a i n t . . , the
s h e d d i n g of a tear about necessity" o f the Stoic, nor the language o f moral
consciousness, which "is still d u m b , shut up with itself within its inner life."
L a n g u a g e has now f o u n d its true place; it "emerges as the middle term medi-
ating between i n d e p e n d e n t a n d acknowledged self-consciousnesses; and the
existent se!f is immediately universal acknowledgment, an a c k n o w l e d g m e n t on
the part o f many, a n d in this manifoldness a simple acknowledgment. ''57 Mu-
tual confession, arising f r o m the individuality of each and recognizing the
stain of determination, provides the appropriate ibrm of joining existence to
the universal o f social recognition.
T h e content of language is now the self that knows itself as an essential
being; "it is the Spirit that has r e t u r n e d into itself, is certain of itself, and
certain in itself of its truth, of its own recognition [of that truth]. ''r's T h i s

~' Ibid., p. 409.

5~i Ibid., p. 405 .
~7 Ibid., p. 396.
~ Ibid., p. 397.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 461
consciousness o f itself as certain o f its own essentiality, o f its actuality o f self
and its world is what it expresses in language: "This alone is what it declares
and this declaration is the true actuality o f the act, and the validation o f the
action," which realizes this individuality. 59 L a n g u a g e is t h e n self-conscious
existing for itself and it is "self-consciousness existing for others, self con-
sciousness which as such is immediately present, and as this self-consciousness
is universal." It is the true universal for in being this self which is certain of
itself it is also the self that is recognized by others as this self. It becomes
objective to itself in language, '~iust as it coalesces directly with other selves
and is their self-consciousness. It percieves itself just as it is percieved by
others, and the perceiving is just existence which has become a self. ''~'' In recog-
nizing that the essence of actuality is active individuality with all its incum-
bent evil, the Beautiful Soul renounces itself and its claim to place an unreal
essence o f its being on the level with the other and its actual activity. It also
"acknowledges that what t h o u g h characterized as bad, viz. action, is good; or
rather it abandons this distinction o f the specific t h o u g h t a n d its subjectively
d e t e r m i n e d j u d g m e n t . " Spirit is thus confirmed as the truth o f the mutually
recognizing a n d mutually acting a n d saying individualities. " T h e word of
reconciliation is the objectively existent Spirit, which beholds the p u r e
knowledge o f itself qua universal essence, in its opposite, in the p u r e
knowledge of itself qua absolutely self-contained and exclusively individ-
uality--a reciprocal recognition which is absolute Spirit. ''6'
T h e Beautiful Soul must r e n o u n c e its exclusive position in regard to the
universal and its j u d g m e n t of the other; but the figure of the Beautiful Soul
is not thereby dissolved. In the f o r m of the confessions, of the "kind-
hearted" j u d g e , it remains a form o f consciousness whose "majesty o f its
elevation above specific law and every content o f duty, puts whatever con-
tent it pleases into its knowing and willing." As such "it is the moral genius
which knows the inner voice o f what it immediately knows to be a divine
voice. ''6'~ A n d in r e n o u n c i n g its own absolute stance, it recognizes that the
world is a world of mutually-affirming individualities, and, "in knowing this,
it has equally immediate knowledge o f existence, it is the divine creative
power which in its notion (Begrif]) possesses the spontaneity of life." It re-
cognizes itself as the Begriff, as the f o r m o f knowledge which is the appropri-
ate grasp of its own essential n a t u r e a n d it recognizes the other as the pure
Begriff o f its own individuality: "Both determinatenesses are thus p u r e con-

59 Ibid., p. 396.
~' Ibid., p. 397"
6, Ibid., pp. 4o7-8.
~ Ibid., p. 397"
462 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 i : 4 OCT 1 9 8 3
scious notions (Begriffe), whose determinateness is itself immediately a know-
ing, or whose relationship and antithesis is the 'I'. ''63
Only in knowledge is this actuality existent and identity truly the result of
the self-constituting self. The language of reconciliation is both the superses-
sion of the conflict between the Beautiful Soul and the acting individuality,
and the return of the self to its self-identity with itself as well. In this super-
session, each individuality, the acting and the judging, confirms its own
existence as an individuality in this knowledge of itself and of the other:
" T h r o u g h this externalization, this knowledge which in its existence is self-
discordant returns to the unity of the self. It is the actual "I," the universal
knowledge of itself in its absolute opposite, in the knowledge which remains
internal and which, on account of the purity of its separated being-within-self is
itself completely universal." It is "the reconciling Yea" which lets go its anti-
thetical existence and has achieved complete knowledge of itself "in its com-
plete externalization and opposite" and thereby has complete knowledge of
itself as the essence of actuality.64 In this knowledge of its notion it is
knowledge of the whole, "it is God manifested in the midst of those who
know themselves in the form of pure knowledge." It is the end of pheno-
menological probing and the beginning of speculative knowledge of totality;
"it is in its own self divine worship, for its action is the contemplation of its
own divinity. ''65
With this "return to discourse" a resting place has once again been found,
which in its reconciliation of acting and judging, of individuality and univer-
sality, of essence and existence, and most importantly of being and language,
appears to be the final episode of the Phiinomenologie. This is the conclusion
Hegel originally intended in the "Introduction." but with the additions of
chapters seven and eight the Phi~nomenologie moves beyond its function as
phenomenological "ladder" to true science and becomes true science itself.
The chapters on "Religion" and "Absolute Knowledge" are less intrinsically
part of the phenomenological approach per se than they are the opening
sections of a speculative logic. Why Hegel moves on within the scope of the
Phi~nomenologie itself is that the basis for "Absolute Knowledge" has been
sufficiently laid in this final episode to at least outline such an absolute form
of knowing. And it is precisely in the figure of the Beautiful Soul that such a
foundation is found. T h e Beautiful Soul with the universal and the power of
language on its side opens the Phi~nomenologie to its conclusion in a form of

~:~ Ibid.,pp. 4o8-9 .

~4 Ibid.,pp. 4o8- 9.
~5 Ibid.,p. :397.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 463
knowing, to speculative philosophy itself, and curtails its conclusion as
merely a theory of praxis. T r u e reconciliation takes place in the Spirit and
the mutual recognition through language, which makes the world of praxis
inferior to the world of language; for this figure brings with it the added
claim that a world of mere activity would collapse without language.

III

Even after Goethe and Hegel have rejected the specifically Pietistic model of
the self as too passive and too contemplative, they nonetheless employ a
transformed image of the Beautiful Soul in the understanding of the self in
their later thought. Whether as an example of "Bildung" or a figure repre-
senting a moment of "Gewissen" within the individual, the Beautiful Soul
continued to influence their idea of individuality. This personality ideal
emphasized the unique and inestimable worth of the individual and pro-
vided a structure for understanding the disparate feelings and concepts,
experiences and growth of h u m a n existence. In a sense Goethe and Hegel
fulfilled the project of the Enlightenment in its attempt at comprehending
existence from a man-centered viewpoint. The Enlightenment represented
the first time since antiquity that Europeans attempted to understand exis-
tence in a fully secular manner. More so than in Renaissance Humanism, the
followers of the Enlightenment placed man at the center of a fully scientific
view of the world. In fulfilling this project, Goethe and Hegel broke from
the Enlightenment's idea of a common h u m a n nature and a universal sci-
ence as a basis for understanding it. Individuality stressed, not some prede-
termined substance at the basis of the life of the individual, be it sense
impressions or potential rationality, but a form of self which only comes to
know itself through its actions. As with Rousseau the existence of the indi-
vidual becomes the basis for all knowledge of the self, but they did not
follow him in his idea that sentiment and one true nature underlies the self.
To them action was the means of realizing what in fact the self is; but instead
of positing a fundamental division between self and world, or subject and
object, they emphasized that the self comes to understand itself only through
the interactions between this specific self and this specific world. In acting
within a world the individual not only transforms the world but also trans-
forms the self. Self-conscious understanding of identity comes not just from
self-confession, but from a mutual recognition of the appropriate language
of reality through dialogical confessions. Self and world become two poles of
a mutual expressivity. The identity of the individual is only revealed in this
dynamic interrelation: "the individual knows himself only insofar as he
knows the world, and he knows the world only insofar as he knows
464 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 21:4 OCT 198 3
himself. ,,66 The language of confession is able to express this set of particular
relations and expresses it to a world in a way that a new form of"universal"
understanding is revealed.
This form of selfhood and its relations to the world could not be compre-
hended through the Enlightenment's method of analysis and its epistemol-
ogy derived from the natural sciences. In order to break out of these more
traditional forms of understanding man and his world, both Goethe and
Hegel developed new methods and forms of comprehension. Goethe repeat-
edly emphasized the need for direct total viewing of any object under study,
be it a process in nature, an artwork, or man himself. Objective Anschauung
was the process of viewing and reviewing until both the inner formative
development and external interaction with its world is clearly seen and com-
prehended. His concept of Bildung is not just a process of education or a
means of realizing an identity. It is an education in Anschauung, to a direct
and objective view of the world and of the self as an active viewer of the
world. For Hegel his redefinition of the concept, the Begriff, served a similar
function. T h e Begriff broke with all attempts to merely represent the world
in the form of VorsteUungen. It is a DarsteUung, a direct grasp of its object
which captures both its inner dynamics and its interrelation with its world.
The Phi~nomenologie as a whole, as the "labor of the Begriff' only comes to a
conclusion when being is fully brought into the language of the Begriff and
revealed in the form of absolute knowledge.
Hegel's Phiinomenologie is not just a phenomenological description of the
world; it is also the introduction to speculative philosophy itself. By captur-
ing each and every expression of being in the concept and placing it within a
logical system of the whole, he attempts to re-establish philosophy in the
light of his new understanding of individuality and development, of being
and language, through the clear articulation of a system of interrelated
concepts. In the process, Hegel redefines the relation of symbol to concept.
While the symbol forms the basis of religion and the community based upon
religion, the symbol is not the highest form of thought. The concept frees
the thought content which remains frozen in the symbol and opens it for its
fuller articulation within the system of absolute knowledge. While this criti-
cism of the symbols lies at the basis of Hegel's evaluation of art, it might not
so readily apply to Goethe. Like Hegel, he sees a world that is not merely
comprised of individuality, development, and historical change. Amidst such
transformation, Goethe saw abiding, eternal forms both within nature and
within the h u m a n realm as well. Especially in the h u m a n reahn, these eternal

6~ Goethe, Werke, Briefe und Gesprache. Ernst Beutler, ed., 24 vols., (Zurich, 1948-53),
17:879-8o.
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUALITY 465
forms were revealed by symbols, which beyond any conceptual grasp and
even beyond any attempt at ultimate interpretation of them, remained the
way in which the individual understands himself as part of a larger and
sustaining order. Precisely in the mysterious quality of the symbol, the ineff-
able quality of individuality is preserved. T hese symbols, and the narrative
linking o f symbols in myths, f o r m e d the basis of man's comprehension o f the
beginnings and ends of his existence and o f the nature of the being in which
he participated. Faust H reveals these eternal symbols in the form o f a myth
o f m o d e r n man; and Faust's Bildung is an education, not just to objective
viewing but to symbolic Anschauung as well. He realizes his identity only
when he sees himself within a totality o f being which has been disclosed to
him th r o u g h symbols, and symbols which do not limit or close o f f f u r t h e r
thought, but ones which open the existence to ever repeated attempts at
interpretation. Although Goethe and Hegel differ in their methods and in
many o f their conclusive formulations, they nevertheless continued to share
a co mmo n desire to open this world as the world for man, to illuminate all
aspects o f it t h r o u g h thought, and to let each individual find himself "at
home" (Hegel uses the verb, einzuhausen) within it. Both the thinker and the
poet were able in their mature works to combine the individual with his
world, action with thought, personal experience with tradition, as well as
language with Being.
T h e specific ways in which Goethe and Hegel work out this notion of
"at-homeness" acounts for much o f their grand "systems" of thought, and
bears witness to one of the many possible points of comparison between
speculative idealism and the writings of one of the major poets o f m o d e r n
times. But the contrasts between such ideas as Begriff and symbol, logic and
Anschauung, a closed dialectic and an ()pen one, point to as many differences
as similarities, and to the j u d g m e n t that, while both men, in an equally
strong way, left their imprint on the times that followed, their thoughts in
their final form, are very different. Yet Hegel and Goethe can be related in
a more subtle and a more complex way. While their fully-realized world
views differ, the origins, the initiating problematic which set them into the
creative process itself, possess many points of comparison. Both felt the need
of breaking t h r o u g h the accumulated cultural forms and intellectual pat-
terns which had been handed down to them and of establishing some imme-
diate contact with existence itself. This drive to existence was to be found in
the substance and form of the individual life, their own included, as it was to
be f o u n d in the world as a whole. This existential move both introduced the
figure o f the Beautiful Soul and saw it as a means of integrating a Pietistic
form o f personal depth and individuality with a "Greek" form of a loving
acceptance of the world. Even after this figure is eventually displaced as the
466 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2I: 4 OCT i983
highest form of synthesis, it nevertheless continued to provide a model of
individual identity and integration. Even though in their later works, this
emphasis upon completion and synthesis overshadows this existential mo-
ment, the initial difficulties set by the problems of immediate self-definition
and the ways in which the Beautiful Soul helped both Goethe and Hegel to
solve this problem form one of the fundamental and continuing bases of
comparison between them.

University of Kansas