A.C. No.

2285 August 12, 1991

MARIA TIANIA complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO, respondent.
A.C. No. 2302 August 12, 1991
FELICIDAD LLANOS ANGEL and ALFONSO ANGEL, complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
These disbarment proceedings against Attorney Amado Ocampo were filed by Maria Tiania, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 2285, and by Spouses Felicidad Angel and Alfonso Angel (hereinafter referred to as the
Angel Spouses), docketed as Administrative Case No. 2302.
Both cases were consolidated upon the instance of Atty. Amado Ocampo who, in his answer, denied the imputations.
The complaints in Adm. Case No. 2285 and Adm. Case No. 2302 were filed on July 14, 1981 and August 10, 1981,
respectively.
On January 27, 1982, after Atty. Ocampo filed his comment, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report, and recommendation as provided, then, by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1
It was only on April 25, 1990, more than eight years later, that the Office of the Solicitor General returned the entire
records of Adm. Cases Nos. 2285 and 2302 with the accompanying complaint for disbarment.
Hence, the administrative complaint for disbarment in both cases was filed.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2285
Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that respondent Amado Ocampo who has been her "retaining (sic)
counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases as early as 1966, has always had her unqualified faith and
confidence.
In 1972, one Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for ejectment 2 from a parcel of land described as "Lot 4131, TS-
308." Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock. Tiania confronted Ocampo about this but the latter reassured
Tiania that he will take care of everything and that there was no need for Tiania to hire a new lawyer since he is still
Tiania's lawyer. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment case, which Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made
Tiania sign a Compromise Agreement3 which the latter signed without reading.
Two years from the submission of the Compromise Agreement, Tiania was shocked when she received an order to
vacate4 the property in question. To hold off her ejectment for another two years, Ocampo advised Tiania to pay him a
certain amount for the sheriff.5
Ocampo denied the charges in detail. Although he handled some legal problems and executed some notarial deeds
for Tiania from 1966-1971, Tiania had also engaged the services of various counsel to represent her in several
criminal and civil cases, involving violations of municipal ordinances and estafa. Thus, he could not be the
complainant's "retaining counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases.
Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs. Blaylock, and not as counsel of Tiania, in Civil Case No.
1104-0. He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such
could not have discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer, and more so the preparation of the
answer in the said case. He admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania showed to him a document
which supported her claim, over the property in question. Ocampo, after going over the document, expressed his
doubts about it authenticity. This convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay the acquisition cost to
Blaylock over a period of six (6) months.6
But Tiania never fulfilled any of her obligations. She moreover made the situation worse by selling the contested
property to a third party even after an alias writ of execution had ordered the transfer of the possession of the disputed
property to Blaylock.7
Significantly, the petition was filed five years after Tiania allegedly suffered "terrible shock" upon receiving the Notice
to Vacate.
Citing Arboleda v. Gatchalian,8 Ocampo said that the overdue filing of a complaint against a lawyer should already
create a suspicion about the motives of the complainant or the merit of the complaint.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2302
The Angel spouses, complainants in A.C. No. 2302, allege that sometime in 1972, they sold their house in favor of
Blaylock (the same Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock in A.C. No. 2285) for the amount of seventy thousand pesos,
(P70,000.00). Ocampo (the same respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo), acted as their counsel and prepared the Deed of
Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.
With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared the
Deed of Sale which was signed by the vendor, a certain Laura Dalanan, and the Angel spouses, as the vendees. In
addition, Ocampo allegedly made the Angel spouses sign two (2) more documents which, accordingly, were made
parts of the sale transaction.
Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate Mortgage of the same property purchased from Laura
Dalanan and a Promissory Note,9 both in favor of Blaylock.
The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said documents until they received a complaint naming them as
defendants in a collection suit10 filed by Ocampo on behalf of the plaintiff, Commercial Corporation of Olongapo, a firm
headed by Blaylock.
The Angel spouses added that Ocampo reassured them that there was no need for them to engage the services of a
new lawyer since he will take care of everything. Ocampo even appeared as counsel for the Angel spouses in a civil
case11 they filed sometime in 1976. However, in 1978, a Notice to Vacate,12 on the basis of the two (2) documents
they signed in 1972, was served on them.
These acts, the complainants charge, violate the ethics of the legal profession. They lost their property as a result of
the respondent's fraudulent manipulation, taking advantage of his expertise in law against his own unsuspecting and
trusting clients.
As in the first case, Ocampo presented an elaborate explanation.
Ocampo alleged that it was his client, Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock, who introduced to him the Angel spouses in 1972.
Blaylock wanted Ocampo to check the background of the Angel spouses in connection with the loan they were
seeking from Blaylock.
In his interview with Mrs. Angel, Ocampo learned that the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to be
loaned to the Angel spouses from Blaylock would be used to repurchase the property at 39 Fendler Street, Olongapo
City, which the Angel spouses had originally owned. In turn, the Angel spouses should sell the same to Blaylock.
Ocampo himself facilitated the transfer by delivering to the complainants the P20,000.00 for the repurchase of the
Fendler property. This in turn was sold to Blaylock. 13
Since the sale of the Fendler property would render the Angel spouses homeless, they suggested to Blaylock that
they would need an additional loan of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) to purchase from Laura Dalanan another
property located at #66 Kessing Street, Olongapo City, which was mortgaged in favor of a certain Salud Jimenez.
To expedite the transfer of the Kessing property from Dalanan to the Angel spouses, Ocampo himself delivered to
Salud Jimenez twenty two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos from Blaylock in payment of the mortgage debt of Dalanan.
The balance of eighteen thousand (P18,000.00) pesos was then delivered to Mrs. Angel upon the execution of the
14
final documents between the Angel spouses and Dalanan.
Ocampo explained that simultaneously he executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the Kessing property and a
Promissory Note for the Angel spouses in favor of Blaylock for the amount of seventy-four thousand seventy five
(P74,075.00) pesos. Although only forty thousand (P40,000.00) was received by Mrs. Angel and Dalanan, the
difference between seventy-four thousand seventy five pesos and forty thousand pesos represented the interests in
advance over a period of five years in which the loan would be paid.
When the monthly amortizations became due, the Angel spouses never paid any of it despite repeated demands from
Blaylock. Blaylock assigned the promissory note to the Commercial Credit Corporation which later on filed a civil case
against the Angel spouses.
The Angel spouses never filed an answer and were declared in default. Upon execution, the Kessing property was
levied on and sold at public auction followed by a Notice to Vacate.
Ocampo admits appearing for the Angel spouses in Civil Case No. 1458, filed July 26, 1976, but only because he had
his client Blaylock's interest foremost in his mind.
Blaylock, through Ocampo, had sued one Benedicto Hermogeno a lessee of Blaylock's property, in an ejectment
case.1âwphi1 But before the institution of the ejectment case, Hermogeno leased out the same premises to Mrs.
Angel on June 14, 1976. Four days later, Hermogeno without the knowledge and consent of Mrs. Angel, regained
possession of the leased premises. Thus, Ocampo, in filing a complaint against Hermogeno on behalf of Blaylock,
was also doing so for Mrs. Angel.
These explanations notwithstanding, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo with
malpractice and gross misconduct punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
and violation of his oath of office as an attorney for the following acts:
a) Administrative Case No. 2285
At the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 11 04-0, the respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and while
appearing for the same, gave advice and warnings to the defendant which paved the way for an amicable
settlement and which may have prejudiced the defendant's rights.
b) Administrative Case No. 2302
(1) Respondent while acting as counsel for Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation;
also acted as counsel of the complainant Mrs. Angel when he prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential
House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot for Mrs. Angel in favor of Zenaida Blaylock, daughter of Concepcion
Blaylock.
(2) Respondent, while acting as counsel for Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock and her Commercial Credit
Corporation, also acted as counsel of Mrs. Angel when he proceeded to Cavite and paid Salud Jimenez the
sum of twenty two thousand pesos (P22,000.00) for Dalanan's Kessing Property.
(3) Respondent was representing conflicting interests when he simultaneously prepared the Deed of Sale of
the Kessing property in favor of Mrs. Angel and the Real Estate Mortgage for the same property to be signed
by Mrs. Angel in favor of Mrs. Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation.
(4) Respondent used Mrs. Angel by pretending to protect her interest as his client in Civil Case No. 2020-0,
when admittedly he was only "forced to help and assist Mrs. Angel in said case to protect the property of Mrs.
Blaylock."
Was the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests?
The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
We prohibit the representation of conflicting interests not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney
has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this
confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers. 15
The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.16 Considering this criterion and applying it to
the present administrative cases, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Solicitor General upholding
the complaints against the respondent. Indeed, the aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing Blaylock,
and at the same time advising Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and once again
representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the legal documents of another opposing party as in the second
case, whether the said actions were related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct. They are improper to
the respondent's office as attorney.
However, taking into consideration the advanced age of the respondent, who would have reached seventy three (73)
years, as of this date, the Court, while uncompromisingly firm in its stand against erring lawyers, nonetheless
appreciates the advance years of the respondent in his favor.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, we hereby SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.
Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts and
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 1359 October 17, 1991
GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO BOLISAY, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. HAROLD M. HERNANDO, respondent.
Jorge A. Dolorfino for petitioners.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p
On 22 August 1974, spouses Generosa Buted and Benito Bolisay filed an administrative complaint for malpractice
against respondent Atty. Harold M. Hernando, charging the latter with having wantonly abused professional secrets or
information obtained by him as their counsel.
After respondent Hernando filed his Answer on 25 June 1974, the Court, in a resolution dated 4 October 1974 referred
the complaint to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 10 February 1975, complainants presented a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 1
On 24 October 1975, the Solicitor-General conducted a hearing where respondent took the witness stand on his own behalf.
The record of the case shows the following background facts:
In an action for partition instituted by Generosa as compulsory heir of the deceased Teofilo Buted, respondent was counsel for Luciana Abadilla and a certain Angela Buted. Involved
in said partition case was a parcel of land Identified as Lot 9439-B. Respondent ultimately succeeded in defending Luciana Abadilla's claim of exclusive ownership over Lot 9439-B.
When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his appearance from that partition case.
It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay and a new Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot was issued in the name of complainant spouses.

When an action for specific performance was lodged by a couple named Luis Sy and Elena Sy against Benito Bolisay as one of the defendants, 2
the latter retained the
services of respondent Atty. Hernando however claims that he rendered his services to Benito Bolisay free of charge.
Subject of this case was a contract of lease executed by Benito's co-defendant therein, Enrique Buted, over a house
standing on a portion of Lot No. 9439-B. It appears that the Sy's were claiming that the lease extended to the
aforementioned lot. Benito was then asserting ownership over the realty by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by
Luciana Abadilla in his favor. Eventually, the Sy's were ordered to vacate the house subject of the lease. Respondent
avers that the relationship between himself and Benito Bolisay as regards this case was terminated on 4 December
1969. 3
On 23 February 1974, respondent Hernando, without the consent of the heirs of Luciana Abadilla and complainant spouses, filed a petition on behalf of the heirs of Carlos, Dionisia
and Francisco all surnamed Abadilla, seeking the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of complainant spouses over the lot. Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco were
Luciana's registered co-owners in the original certificate of title covering Lot No. 9439-B. 4
At the hearing, respondent Hernando testified that if the
petition for cancellation of TCT was granted, Lot 9439-B would no longer be owned by complainant spouses but would
be owned in common by all the heirs of Luciana Abadilla. 5
Complainant spouses, upon learning of respondent's appearance against them in the cadastral proceeding, manifested their disapproval thereof in a letter dated 30 July
1974. 6
Respondent however, pursued the case until it was eventually dismissed by the trial court on 2 September 1974
on the ground of prescription. 7
At the hearing before the Office of the Solicitor General and in his Answer, respondent Hernando admitted his involvement in the cadastral case as counsel for the Abadillas but
denied having seen or taken hold of the controversial Transfer Certificate of Title, and having availed himself of any confidential information relating to Lot 9439-B.

In its Report and Recommendation dated 29 March 1990, the Solicitor General recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months for violation
of the Canons of Professional Ethics by representing clients with conflicting interests, and filed before this Court the corresponding Complaint 8
dated 30 March 1990.
The issue raised in this proceeding is: whether or not respondent Hernando had a conflict of interests under the
circumstances described above.
The Canons of Professional Ethics, the then prevailing parameters of behavior of members of the bar, defines a
conflict of interests situation in the following manner:
6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests.—
xxx xxx xxx
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids
also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Though as regards the first and second cases handled by respondent, no conflict of interest existed, the same cannot
be said with respect to the action for specific performance and the cadastral proceeding. By respondent's own
admission, he defended the right of ownership over Lot 9439-B of complainant Benito Bolisay in the action for specific
performance. He assailed this same right of ownership when he subsequently filed a petition for cancellation of
complainants' Transfer Certificate of Title over that same lot. Respondent Hernando was in a conflict of interest
situation.
It is clear from the above-quoted portion of the Canons of Professional Ethics that in cases where a conflict of
interests may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all the parties concerned are necessary. 9 The
present Code of Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter considering that consent of the parties is now
required to be in written form. 10 In the case at bar, such consent was wanting.
Respondent persistently argues that contrary to the claims of complainant spouses, he had never seen nor taken hold
of the Transfer Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 9439-B nor obtained any confidential information in handling the
action for specific performance. 11 The contention of respondent is, in effect, that because complainant has not clearly
shown that respondent had obtained any confidential information from Benito Bolisay while representing the latter in
the action for specific performance, respondent cannot be penalized for representing conflicting interests. That is not
the rule in this jurisdiction. The rule here is, rather, that the mere fact that respondent had acted as counsel for Benito
Bolisay in the action for specific performance should have precluded respondent from acting or appearing as counsel
for the other side in the subsequent petition for cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses
Generosa and Benito Bolisay. There is no necessity for proving the actual transmission of confidential information to
an attorney in the course of his employment by his first client in order that he may be precluded from accepting
employment by the second or subsequent client where there are conflicting interests between the first and the
subsequent clients. The reason for this rule was set out by the Court in Hilado v. David 12in the following terms:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said
in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to
the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's
cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential
communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character
of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the
freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are
their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the
attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would be in
consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation
be held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him.
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n. 183 III., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792) It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said another case, the question is not necessarily one
of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court went further in San Jose v. Cruz, 14
where the lawyer was charged with malpractice for having represented a new client
whose interest was opposed to those of his former clients in another case:
The record shows that the respondent offered his services to the Matienzo spouses knowing that the
petitioner had obtained a favorable judgment in the civil case No. 5480 and that his efforts in the subsequent
civil case No. 5952 would frustrate said judgment and render it ineffectual, as has really been the result upon
his obtaining the writ of injunction above-mentioned. Obviously his conduct is unbecoming to an attorney and
cannot be sanctioned by the courts. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not a good practice to
permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that
the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
The appropriate rule has been expressed by Justice Malcolm in the following manner:

An attorney is not permitted, in serving a new client as against a former one, to do anything which will injuriously affect the former client in any manner in which the
attorney formerly represented him, though the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and the new employment is in a different case; nor can the attorney use
against his former client any knowledge or information gained through their former connection. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt the lawyer from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases where a conflict of interest exists. The prohibition
attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship.
The Court therefore agrees with the Solicitor-General that respondent Hernando is guilty of violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics by representing clients with
conflicting interests. We believe, however, that a heavier penaltyis appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Harold M. Hernando from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. A copy of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of
respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
DE LA ROSA March 21, 1914
In the matter of the investigation of certain charges preferred by Severino Caoibes against LUCIANO DE LA
ROSA, attorney and counselor at law.
Sumulong & Estrada for respondent.
Attorney-General Villamor for the Government.
PER CURIAM:
The charges presented are threefold. The complaint charges:
1. That the respondent attorney, in collusion with his client, Juliana Bayubay y Garcia, withheld the payment to the
petitioner of certain sums of money which represented, in part, the purchase price of a piece of land sold by
complainant to said Juliana Bayubay y Garcia, which retardation, by depriving him of money on which he was
depending, prevented the complainant from redeeming certain jewelry which he had sold with a right to repurchase,
thereby causing him serious damage.
2. That the said respondent maliciously placed obstacles in the way of the petitioner in the collection of the sum which
his client owed to the complainant, thereby obliging the complainant to pay to said respondent, P350 on one occasion
and P550 on another occasion, a total of P900, which was received by said respondent as a consideration for his
permitting his client to make the payments which she had agreed to make to the complainant.
3. That the said respondent has refused to pay to the complainant the sum of P1,330 which his client had placed in his
possession for said complainant, the same being the remainder of the purchase price of the land sold as above
stated.
From the evidence taken in this case it appears that, on the 24th of March, 1912, the complainant, by an instrument in
writing, duly acknowledged before Luciano de la Rosa, a notary public, sold to Juliana Bayubay y Garcia a parcel of
sugar land situated in the barrio of Canda, municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, the area and boundaries
whereof were duly set out in the first paragraph of that instrument for P15,500, to be paid as stated in said instrument
as follows:
4th. That, of the said sum of fifteen thousand five hundred pesos (P15,500), Philippine currency, the said
purchaser, Juliana Bayubay y Garcia, will pay immediately on the execution of this instrument the sum of two
thousand pesos (P2,000), Philippine currency, which I have received to my entire satisfaction; and that said
Juliana Bayubay y Garcia will pay to me, in addition, the sum of four thousand two hundred pesos (P4,200),
Philippine currency, or whatever sum may be necessary to redeem the property from Vicente Noble and
Matilde Martinez, his wife, and that immediately after the redemption of said property she will pay to me the
sum of one thousand eight hundred pesos (P1,800), Philippine currency, or the sum necessary to make a
total of eight thousand pesos (P8,000), Philippine currency; that the balance of seven thousand five hundred
pesos (P7,500), Philippine currency, will be paid to me by the said Juliana Bayubay y Garcia on or before the
10th day of January, 1913, it being understood that the vendor, Severino Caoibes y Calzado, will continue in
the possession and use of the said lands so sold until the payment of the total sum has been effected.
The sum of P8,000 was paid at the time specified, namely, the execution of the instrument. With respect to the second
payment of P7,500, at the request of the vendor the vendee made several payments in advance, amounting in all to
P2,170, so that, at the beginning of January, 1913, there was a balance in favor of the vendor of only P5,330. Of this
sum the said purchaser, in accordance with the suggestion of her attorney, the respondent herein, paid to the
complainant the sum of P2,000 on the 10th of January, 1913, another P2,000 on the 22d of February of the same
year, and P1,000 of the balance was levied upon under an execution against the vendor and taken from the
possession of the purchaser and applied upon said execution. As a result there remains unpaid at this time the sum of
P330.
Relative to the first charge the accused attorney alleges that, after having mad the purchase of the land in question
and having paid thereon all but P5,330, it was discovered that the land was far less area than that represented by the
vendor. This fact was, by the accused attorney, brought to the attention of his client, the purchaser, and it was
discussed between them whether or not, for that reason, the purchaser should refuse to pay the price agreed upon.
Following this discussion the respondent had a talk with the complainant in which he stated that this client was not
disposed to pay the P5,330, and that, instead of dealing directly with her, as he had in the past, the vendor was to
negotiate with her attorney, the respondent.
It appears from the evidence in the case that, according to the representations of the vendor and the statements in the
conveyance itself, the land sold by Caoibes to Juliana Bayubay y Garcia was 90 hectares in area. When, however,
application was made by the purchaser to the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the title thereto, it was
found, from the measurement of the Bureau of Lands, that the lands contained only 60 hectares. Whether or not by
reason of this shortage in area the purchaser would have had the right to demand and obtain a reduction in the
purchase price or a cancellation of the sale, we do not now undertake to decide; but it is clear that this difference in
area determined the purchaser to retain at least a portion of the moneys then remaining in her hands as an equivalent
for the complainant and charged her son, Ramon Maglumot, to have De la Rosa tell him the same thing. It does not
appear anywhere in the evidence that the respondents, prior to talking with the complainant, had advised his client,
Juliana Bayubay y Garcia, to reduce the purchase price, s she had stated to the complainant she was going to do.
Respondent himself says that, with the purchase price of the land in question, he had nothing whatever to do until he
had been asked by Caoibes to intervene in connection therewith, Caoibes having dealt directly with the purchaser
both as to the sale and as to the collection of the purchase price until the purchaser discovered the difference in area
between that alleged and that delivered.
We are satisfied from a review of the evidence relative to the first charge that it cannot be sustained. There appears
no effort on the part either of the respondent or of his client to embarrass the complainant by delays and there is
shown no act upon their part to delay payment which could not be justified sufficiently to refute the charge.
We may say the same with regard to the third charge. The allegation that there still remains in the hands of the
respondent P1,330 belonging to the complainant is not only not proved, but the contrary appears. According to the
evidence, of the P5,330 which remained in the hands of the purchaser, P2,000 was paid to Caoibes by the purchaser
through the respondent in the month of January, 1913; P2,000 was paid by the respondent in the month of February
to attorney Mariano P. Leuterio, who at that time represented the complainant; and P1,000 was paid by the
respondent to the office of Kincaid and Hartigan upon an execution issued upon a judgment obtained against the
complainant. There still remains in the hands of the purchaser the sum of P330. This sum is not in the possession of
the respondent, nor has he anything to do therewith.
In relation to the second allegation against the respondent, namely, that he, by reason of the influence which he had
with Juliana Bayubay y Garcia, prevented certain payments from her to the complainant, and thereby, taking
advantage of the complainant's straitened financial circumstances, forced him, in order to obtain that to which he was
in law entitled, to pay to the respondent P900, P350 at one time and P550 at another, it may be said that the charge,
as it appears in the complaint,, is very indefinite in its allegations. Strictly speaking, those allegations are insufficient to
put the respondent upon his trial; but no objection having been made on that or any other ground and the evidence in
the case having been presented in support thereof and such evidence having clarified fully the purchase of the
allegation, we pass its sufficiency without comment.
From the evidence one might gather one and possibly two different charges, namely, that the respondent, knowing
complainant's straitened financial circumstances and being able to control the payments which Juliana Bayubay y
Garcia was to make to the complainant, took advantage of these conditions to squeeze out of complainant certain
sums of money; or that, respondent being the attorney for Juliana Bayubay y Garcia, became also, in effect, the
attorney of the complainant for the recovery of the payments agreed upon between him and said Juliana Bayubay y
Garcia, and that, acting as attorney for both parties, whose interests were opposed to each other, he collected fees
from both. These two charges being fairly within the evidence adduced, we have considered both of them.
It is undoubted from the evidence that the respondent attorney was retained by the purchaser, Mrs. Bayubay, to
prosecute inquiries to determine whether or not she could procure a reduction in the purchase price by reason of the
discrepancy in the area of the land. On the other hand, accepting the testimony of the respondent himself, he was
asked by the complainant to intervene on his behalf and to induce the purchaser to pay the full purchase price in spite
of her expressed purpose of obtaining a reduction therein, and accepted that commission from the complainant.
Respondent testified:
Later, at the request of Mrs. Caoibes, I saw Juliana Bayubay and her son, Ramon, as the latter is the one who
attended to the matter and was always consulted by his mother. I told them that Mrs. Caoibes had sent me
there to intercede in his behalf to the end that Juliana Bayubay should pay him the P5,500 which remained
due, notwithstanding the difference in the extent of the land. Juliana Bayubay at last told me, `out of
consideration for you we will reduce the purchase price two thousand pesos or three thousand pesos by
reason of the misrepresentation as to the area of the land, because the difference is very great, and that he
should agree to this instead of the P5,000 which he ought to lose.' Two or three days later I saw Mr. Caoibes
and told him that Juliana Bayubay insisted on discounting something by reason of the difference in area.
Thereupon Mr. Caoibes insisted that I investigate further to see if I could not recover all of the P5,000. As I
had already done several things for Mr. Caoibes without his having paid me anything, I said to him frankly: `I
am tired of this matter. I am not the attorney of Juliana Bayubay but rather you are the one who is utilizing my
services without having paid me anything up to the present time. Now, if I am able to get Doña Juliana
Bayubay to pay you P5,000, notwithstanding the difference in the area of the land which you sold, what am I
going to get out of it?' Mr. Caoibes at first offered me P100, then P200. I told him that I could not accept it. He
then asked me what I wanted and I told him that in view of the fact that he was being benefited in about
P5,000 I could not accept less than P1,000 in case I was able to get the consent of Juliana Bayubay to make
the payment, which payment I was not sure I was able to accomplish. We finally agreed that he should pay
me P1,000.
It appears from the evidence that De la Rosa collected from Caoibes under his agreement with him the sum of P900.
It does not appear that he collected anything from Juliana Bayubay y Garcia in relation to this matter. What does
appear is that he was to receive as attorney for the purchaser Juliana Bayubay for the registration of her title thereto
under the Torrens system the sum of P800, but, according to the testimony of the respondent, corroborated by Ramon
Maglumot, the son of the purchaser, the respondent forgave the payment of the P800 and obtained the registration of
the title without exacting any fee whatever. This gift of services was brought about by the assertion of the purchaser
that he ought not to collect the P800 from her inasmuch as she had lost so much by reason of the difference in the
area of the land for which she had not collected anything from Caoibes.
It should be noted that, although it appears that the respondent was acting as attorney for both parties, the vendor and
the purchaser, whose interest were diametrically opposed to each other, he was doing so with the knowledge and
consent of both parties. The complainant knew that De la Rosa was acting for and on behalf of the purchaser because
he had conferred with him as her representative. the purchaser knew that he was acting for and on behalf of the seller
for pay because he had obtained from her express permission to do so.
Although it appears from the evidence that the respondent was acting for and on behalf of both parties to the
controversy, we do not regard this as constituting malpractice under the law, it appearing undisputed in the record that
he acted thus with the knowledge and consent of both parties interested. This being the case, neither party was
deceived by respondent, and neither one suffered involuntary damages by reason of his actions.
While it is true that the conduct of respondent in this case does not constitute malpractice within the provisions of
section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nevertheless it does constitute a practice severely to be condemned as
strongly tending to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those special elements which make it one of trust and
confidence, with the corresponding obligations, and to change it into one which may be modified and dallied with in
the interest of the attorney who thinks he sees an opportunity of making more money by a combination with his client's
adversary. It is very difficult for an attorney to give interested advice where he represent both parties to a controversy
— so difficult, in fact, that it has become a fixed rule in all branches of the law that, when one is representing another
in a given matter, he cannot, at the same time, legally represent his principal's adversary. "No servant can serve two
masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other." We
discourage the practice indulged in by the attorney in this case as dangerous in its possibilities.
The proceedings are dismissed, costs de oficio.
Arellano, C.J., Carson, Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ.
[A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s during their
schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their families and respondent
became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. [1] For
lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would
keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent
obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and
renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondents name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent
acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976,
respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate.
Complainant was appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears that respondent
excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his
title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent and his corporation. In
defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to disbar the
respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the estate he
was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he prepared for a client-estate
and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded property as a
liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family
corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel and
auditor.[2]
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve as lawyer and auditor to
settle her husbands estate.Respondents law firm then filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased
Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the estates inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to
his corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of
maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has
expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his correspondences [3] with the Baguio
City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and Co., CPAs)
excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet included in the claims against the estate
the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husbands loans applied probably
for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associates) filed the
petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs)
acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting
interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her
husbands estate which was represented by respondents law firm. Complainant averred that there is no di stinction
between respondents law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both firms which
are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER, [4] respondent initially asserted that
the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the result of the pending action in the CFI for
reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case that he did not hold
the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never
bought back the Moran property from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the
inventory of Nakpils estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate which included his
loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans
against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in
respondents name were applied probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
Respondent insisted that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase probably for the
purchase did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit H) of his accounting firm to
the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended
that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
 Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the Moran property for: (1)
complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2)
complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms in the settlement of
her husbands estate.[5] However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as
1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the
inestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm represented the estate
in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate
and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following
reasons for his thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a
family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the
late Nakpil who, upon the latters death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants had been clients
of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of
conflicting interests was with the knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict
of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims
would be satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not
controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil
and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to
the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes and Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for
the firm prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting
firms as early as August 15, 1974.[6] He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the
SECs certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but
Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes and Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On
the other hand, the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged
that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such misconduct not as
a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held
accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY. [7] She maintained that the pendency of the
reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue
in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondents conduct as a CPA-
lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets & Liability of the
Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran
property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the
intestate court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not
proofs that respondent owned the Moran property but were part of respondents scheme to remove the property from
the estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because of the
professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged
respondent with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims against the estate
and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the Moran property) which were prepared by his law and
accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred
that respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his
firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976 to several years later.
She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm. The
documents merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for representing the interests of
both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per
se anomalous for respondents accounting firm to act asaccountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that
he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and
its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN,
Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law
firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm.
He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of
respondents law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case until after resolution of
the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio.
Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not
prejudicial to her complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-
lawyer. We granted her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report and recommendation. [10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that respondent held the
Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived her right over it.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that respondent was the
absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the OSG submitted its
Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending
review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of complainants claim over the property. It
opined that there was no trust agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner
thereof. Thus, it upheld respondents right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of interests
as the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative
case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer
for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized
with utmost honesty and good faith.[12] The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his
dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms
length.[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of
the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take
advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of
[14]
wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor.
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These findings were based
mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in
1993.[15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the aforementioned
reconveyance case.[16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the complainant the services of his law and
accounting firms by reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in
respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late
Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the
trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate
court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the trust nature of the
Moran property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his family corporation is well discussed in this
Courts Decision,[17] thus:
x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil.
On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he) excluded Pulong
Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be bolstered by Exh. I-2,
an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel
Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit I-2,
which is a list of the application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December
1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent. If
ownership of Pulong Maulapwas already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have
been included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in Exh. J was
that respondent Valdes would x x x take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests
due on the notes while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live in the disputed
property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses. This does
not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse
Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could already automatically assume ownership of Pulong
Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to
proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary evidence (Exhibits H, J and L),
which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran
property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil. [18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate which his law firm was
representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property
belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its
ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring
the property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings.
Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by respondent for the purchase and
renovation of the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by
disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estates liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of
the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how
these two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his
name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondents loans against the estate could not
have been committed without respondents participation. Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it too and
subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally
the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to
represent both sides of an issue.[19] The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter [20] and is applicable however slight such
adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.[21] However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the
representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed
consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of conflict and the
possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients. [22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it creditors are adverse to each
other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which
stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance,
respondents law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate proceedings. He points
out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case
in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As
established in the records of this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and accountant
of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he resigned from his law and accounting
firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit. Respondents claim of
resignation from his law firm is not supported by any documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show
respondents resignation from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent
returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Joses
estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his
corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events
shows that respondent could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was the legal counsel
of the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and the two
claimants against it.[26] The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be
taken against her as there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal
situation and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an
acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest. When
a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by
complainant, if she had a claim against her husbands estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the
intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to
his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm was to contest the claims of
these two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and
did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest
in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from
said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be charged before
this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior
partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging
respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged
for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to
represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics
and undesirable as it placed respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that
respondents misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a
member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. [27] Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of
the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to
his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients. [29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning
that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4411. June 10, 1999]
JAIME CURIMATMAT, ET AL., complainants, vs. ATTY. FELIPE GOJAR, respondent.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
On April 25, 1995, respondent Atty. Felipe G. Gojar was administratively charged by his clients, former
employees of the Uniwide Sales, Inc., with lack of fidelity to his clients' cause. The alleged prejudicial acts of
respondent, as alleged in the letter-complaint, are herein enumerated as follows:
1. We file a petition for review with the Supreme Court under G.R. No. 113201 entitled Associated Trade Unions, et al.
vs. Honorable Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al.Our lawyer was Atty. Felipe G. Gojar. We had been following it up with
our said lawyer since then and up to the start of this year, 1995. But, we were advised by our lawyer Atty. Gojar that
the petition was still pending with the Honorable Supreme Court. Lately, we discovered that our Lawyer, Atty. Gojar
moved for the dismissal of the petition without our consent and authority. Attached is a copy of the Manifestation and
Motion as Annex A.
2. In the meantime, an Unfair Labor Practice case was also filed with the NLRC, Manila entitled Rex Alfonte, et al. vs.
Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, et al. Under NLRC Case No. NCR-00-12-07755-93. This case was dismissed. The
decision was received by Atty. Gojar on July 14, 1994. He filed an appeal on August 8, 1994 which was beyond the
ten (10) day period. However, he stated in his appeal that he received the decision on July 29, 1994, which is not
true. Attached is a copy of his receipt of the decision on July 14, 1994.
3. Also, another case was filed with the NLRC involving money claims. The case was dismissed. Atty. Gojar filed an
appeal. The appeal was also dismissed. He told us that he will prepare a petition for review with the Supreme
Court. We have been going to his office for several times so that the petition for review will be filed.On one occasion,
he told us that he cannot yet prepare the petition for varied reasons like: he has volume of professional work; failing
health and others but, up to the present, the petition is not filed.
4. Another case is likewise filed with the National Labor Relation Commission, Manila NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-
04380-93 entitled Aniceta Salgado et. al. vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club Edsa et. al. We have been following it up
with Atty. Gojar but, his response was The case is still pending. On February 21, 1995, I, Ines Salgado went to the
office of the Labor Arbiter. In the said office, it was found out that a decision was already rendered on September 30,
1994 and Atty. Gojar had already received said decision but, he failed to file the necessary appeal. What had been
told to us that there was not yet decision. In short, Atty. Gojar deliberately hide to us that a decision was already
rendered on September 30, 1994.
(Rollo, pp. 1-4.)
On August 31, 1995, respondent filed his Comment vehemently denying all the allegations in the complaint,
thusly:
1. Contrary to the false and malicious allegations of complainants in paragraph 1 of the letter-complaint, the
Manifestation and Motion dated July 21, 1994 (Annex A of Complaint) in G.R. No. 113201 was filed by respondent
after due consultation and with the conformity of the petitioners therein. x x x.
Respondent never misrepresented to the ATU members anything regarding the proceedings in G.R. No. 113201. As
the counsel for the said union and its members, respondent was never remiss in his duties to his clients and promptly
informed them of all proceedings not only in G.R. No. 113201 but also in all other cases filed in behalf of ATU
members.
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent therefore is at a loss as to why the complainants brought an administrative complaint against him for
alleged violation of his oath as a lawyer. Likewise, it is inconceivable how the withdrawal of the petition prejudiced the
complainants when the CBA sought to be discertified had already expired in April of 1995.
2. It is not true as falsely claimed by the complainants in paragraph 2 of the letter-complaint, that respondent filed an
appeal in behalf of complainants beyond the ten-day reglementary period.
The truth of the matter is that, in the case being referred to, NLRC Case No. NCR-00-12-07755-93 (Alfante, et al. vs.
Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, et al.), the appeal being referred to was not filed by the respondent. The said appeal
was filed in behalf of complainants by Francisco Listana, a National Officer of ATU (a copy of the Appeal is attached
hereto as Annex 2).
xxxxxxxxx
Complainants are making it appear that respondent was remiss in his duties in not appealing on time the
decision. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The complainants deliberately did not disclose to this Honorable Court
that the respondent, immediately upon receipt of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 14, 1994, called the
complainants to a meeting to inform them of the decision which was unfavorable to them. Upon being informed of
such decision, the complainants discussed among themselves and after some time, they told the respondent of their
disappointment of the outcome of the case and that they have decided to get another lawyer to handle their
case. Respondent had no choice but to follow the wishes of his clients and so he informed them to come back the
next day to get the records from the National Officer of ATU. Respondent gave instructions to the National Officer to
arrange the records and give them to the complainants.
But the complainants did not come back and respondent was not informed of such fact until sometime in the first week
of August 1994, when the National Officer told him. By that time, the reglementary period to appeal had expired. At
any rate, the National Officer took it upon himself to file an appeal in behalf of the complainants. Unfortunately, the
complainants, instead of being grateful, denied having authorized the National Officer to file the appeal in their behalf.
xxxxxxxxx
In the case adverted to by the complaints (NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-04380-93), it is not true that respondent
deliberately hide to the complainants the fact that a decision had been rendered in that case on September 30,
1994. How can respondent hide the decision from complainants when they are very diligent in following up the case
with the respondent and even with the labor arbiter?
Contrary to the utterly perjurious and malicious allegations of complainants in paragraph 4 of their letter, it is not the
fault of respondent that no appeal was filed in that case. The complainants have no one to blame but
themselves. Even before respondent informed the complainants that he received a decision adverse to them, the
latter had already known from their source at the labor arbiter that such a decision had been issued.
The complainants in that case, like those in the first case mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof, felt disappointed at the
outcome of the decision and told the respondent that they secured the services of another lawyer to represent them in
their appeal. They never contacted the respondent after their last meeting sometime in the first week of October
1994. Respondent cannot therefore be faulted for it was the complainants themselves who led him into believing that
their rights were amply protected as their remedy of appeal would be carried on by the new counsel of their choice.
(Rollo, pp. 38-43.)
In a Resolution dated November 22, 1995, the Court referred the letter-complaint to the Board of Governors of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Hearings were set on October 1, 1996,
November 19, 1996, July 14, 1997, March 14, 1997, May 9, 1997, and June 20, 1997.Respondent was duly notified of
all the scheduled hearings but he opted not to appear in any of them. Complainants, therefore, presented their
evidence ex parte.
On November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines passed a resolution
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for failure to demonstrate the
required fidelity to his clients cause.
In Gamalinda vs. Alcantara (206 SCRA 468 [1992]), we ruled that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Legarda vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 722 [1992]). In the case at bar, respondent is
alleged to have been remiss in his duty to appeal on time the adverse Resolution of the DOLE Secretary in Case No.
OS-MA-A-6-84-93 affirming the dismissal of the unions Petition for Certification Election at the Uniwide Sales
Branches; and for having moved for the dismissal of complainants petition for review with the Court against the
decision of DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, et al. (G.R. No. 113201) without their consent. In his
Comment (supra), respondent attempted to refute the allegations against him and explained his side of the
controversy. He did not, however, substantiate his self-serving claim that he was not remiss in his duties towards his
clients and that he consulted complainants and sought their conformity to the withdrawal of their case before the
Court, which case was thereafter rendered moot and academic due to the expiration of the CBA that was sought to be
discertified. Worse, respondent chose to ignore the hearings before the IBP where he could have shed more light on
the controversy.
We do not, however, believe that respondents shortcomings warrant his suspension from the practice of
law. Considering that this is his first offense, a reprimand would be in order.
At this juncture, we would like to remind litigants that lawyers are not demi-gods or magicians who can always
win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel
about their cause. While lawyers are expected to serve their clients with competence and diligence, they are not
always expected to be victorious. In every litigation, there will always be a winner and a loser, unless the parties agree
to settle the controversy between themselves and to work at a win-win solution to their problems.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondent Atty. FELIPE GOJAR is hereby REPRIMANDED with
a warning that any repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5108. May 26, 2005]
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment
from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification
of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client
relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED).[1]
Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco, for
annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been
dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992. [2]
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent
entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant. [3]
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, [4] informing the RTC of Pasig City that
he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and docketed as I.S.
No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal
Code.[5] Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children,
Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she
is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth,
she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other name than Rosa F.
Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or decided
upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City; [6] (2) administrative case for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business,
vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption; [7] (3)
complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the
Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month
[8]
suspension without pay; and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as
amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before
the Sandiganbayan.[9]
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-
9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent
Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that,
in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-
client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the complaint for
disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of
separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment,
and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. [10] He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman
finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on
appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in
good faith.[11]
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the
bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected
with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant
confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the
alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the
Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone. [12]
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [13]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both.
Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondents motion to file his memorandum, and the
[14]
case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding
the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
 On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now
found forgiveness for those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and administrative cases
filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the guilt or
innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the
complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential
in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client
when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on attorney-client
privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their
relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and
confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest. [15]Only by such confidentiality and protection will a
person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.[16] Thus, the preservation and protection
of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to
the administration of justice.[17] One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to
keep inviolate his clients secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. [18] Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,[19] and continues even after
the clients death.[20] It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a
man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute
assurance that the lawyers tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. [21] With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the
client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the
prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the
existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. [22]
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even
if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. [23] The reason for
this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells
the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client.[24]
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on
account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v.
Palanca,[25] where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten
years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to
the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client
alleged that the list of creditors which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms
of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to
parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of
the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the confidential list of his
creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation
of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a
breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. [26] The client must intend
the communication to be confidential.[27]
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney
and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose fo r
which it was given.[28]
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a
[29]
lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for
settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, [31] are not privileged
[30]

communications, the element of confidentiality not being present. [32]

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. [33]
 The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. [34]
If the client seeks an accounting service,[35] or business or personal assistance,[36] and not legal advice, the
privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants
allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by
respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent
violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public
documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by
respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court
cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to
the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not
impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.[37] The burden of proving that the privilege applies
is placed upon the party asserting the privilege. [38]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., out of the country.
[A.C. No. 5854. September 30, 2003]
NORA E. MIWA complainant, vs. ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a verified complaint[1] dated March 20, 2002, filed before the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), complainant Nora E. Miwa seeks the disbarment or suspension from law practice of
respondent, Atty. Rene O. Medina, for gross negligence in the handling of her case. Complainant alleges that Atty.
Medinas negligent and deceitful conduct effectively deprived her of a day in court, as a result of which she lost her
case and her property taken by order of the court. More specifically, Atty. Medina stands charged in CBD Case No.
02-951 with violating the Attorneys Oath as well as Canons 2,[2] 10,[3] 12,[4] and 18[5] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The facts, as gleaned from the record, are as follows:
On April 2, 1998, Nora E. Miwa was named as defendant in Civil Case No. 5147 for quieting of title, recovery of
possession, and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 29.
On August 24, 1998, Miwa secured respondents services as her counsel in Civil Case No. 5147.
On September 14, 1998, respondent herein filed Miwas answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 5147.
In its order dated December 18, 1998, the RTC set the pre-trial conference for February 8, 1999. The scheduled
pre-trial conference, however, did not push through as herein respondent failed to receive notice therefor. Hence, the
RTC reset the pre-trial to March 26, 1999.
On February 26, 1999, respondent filed his pre-trial brief.
However, no pre-trial conference was actually held at all. As explained by the trial court:
Pre-trial was scheduled several times and the records would show that at no single instance did the defendant, herself
appeared (sic) despite the fact that she was sent notices for all and every scheduled hearing at her address thru
registered mail. Due to the fact that pre-trial conference could not be conducted on several occasions, pre-trial was
terminated on October 22, 1999 by then Acting Presiding Judge Diomedes M. Eviota.[6]
Trial on the merits then proceeded until the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5147 rested their case. During the trial, the
RTC made the following observations:
When it was the defendants turn to present her evidence, several postponements were asked for that this Court on
November 22, 2000 ordered the defendant to reimburse the plaintiffs P10,000.00 for the transportation expenses and
appearance fee of plaintiffs counsel. (That order is until now ignored despite efforts by this Court to effect the same as
per Sheriffs return dated March 23, 2001.) In an Order of this Court dated April 2, 2001, the defendant was deemed to
have waived her right to present her evidence and her counsel was fined P500.00. [7]
Miwa, through counsel, moved for reconsideration of the trial courts order of April 2, 2001. Respondent also
moved to withdraw as counsel for Miwa. The trial court denied both motions in its order of June 21, 2001. The trial
court noted that:
If as alleged, counsel has not received the Order of this Court directing waiver on the part of the defendant to present
evidence, why file the instant motion to reconsider said Order? The Order was dated April 2, 2001 and was received
by defendants counsel, according to the records, on April 20, 2001. Yet he filed this Motion after the lapse of 40 days.
Besides, the Order of this Court dated April 2, 2001 sought to be reconsidered is a mere consequence (of) the non-
appearance of defendant and her counsel, without explanation nor excuse on the scheduled hearing on even date.
The notice of hearing on said date was received by the movant on February 19, 2001. Yet he did not bother to move
for postponement. Her counsel could not have been very busy in his role as campaign manager of LAKAS-NUCD for
the election period commenced on March 31, 2001. Unless, of course, counsel admits that he had been busy
campaigning prior to the campaign period allowed by law. He had sufficient time from February 19 to March 31, 2001
to inform this Court. Yet he did not bother to do so. He just ignored the lawful orders of this Court when as a lawyer
and an officer of this Court, his first priority is his duties before the courts of law.
Furthermore, the instant case had been, on motion of the defendant, postponed twice. As a matter of fact, in the Order
of this Court dated November 22, 2000, then Acting Presiding Judge Diomedes M. Eviota had ordered defendant to
pay reimbursement of P10,000.00 for the transportation expenses and appearance fee of Atty. Durante, plaintiffs
counsel, for filing a Motion for Postponement only a day prior to the hearing and was admonished to make timely
motion for postponement. The records would indubitably show that he received the Order setting the hearing for
November 22, 2000 on October 9, 2000. With due diligence, counsel could have filed his motion for postponement
several days prior to the scheduled hearing so as not to cause inconvenience to the other party and as a matter of
professional courtesy to the opposing counsel of record. Yet, he did not bother to do so. [8]
In denying respondents motion to withdraw as counsel, the trial court ratiocinated:
Defendants counsel further alleged that the defendant had already severed their client-lawyer relationship. Again this
is a denial pregnant with admission indicating falsity. If it were true, then counsel (has) no personality whatsoever to
file the instant Motion for and in behalf of the defendant. In effect, this Motion is a mere scrap of paper if the same
were true.
On the other hand, only on May 30, 2001 has this Court been informed of such termination of client-lawyer
relationship. Prior to that, Atty. Medina is still counsel on record of the defendant and has the duty to inform his client
of lawful orders of this Court. For notice to counsel is notice to party.
Moreover, it is alleged in his Motion that the defendant has retained the services of another lawyer to appear for her in
another case before the Municipal Trial Court of Surigao City. That was another case before the MTC, not necessarily
in this case before (the) RTC. When such client-lawyer relationship was terminated is not all too clear. The date is
important for notice to counsel on record is notice to the party. [9]
 On August 6, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 5147 declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner
of the property, ordered Miwa to vacate and deliver possession of the lot, demolish and remove all structures built
therein, and pay the plaintiff exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.
Hence, the filing of the instant complaint before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, with complainant Miwa
alleging that respondent:
(a) failed to give importance to his office as a lawyer and officer of the court by failing to appear three (3)
times on scheduled hearings, thus resulting in the trial courts ruling that she had waived her right to
present her evidence;
(b) showed grave disrespect to the court and utter ignorance of the Rules of Court by filing a motion for
postponement only one (1) day before a scheduled hearing;
(c) exhibited gross negligence and brazen omission of his duties, by filing a motion for reconsideration and
motion to withdraw as counsel forty (40) days too late, despite knowing that the reglementary period for
filing a motion to reconsider is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent stated that whatever lapses and negligence he might have committed
were never intentional but were due to the heavy burden he shouldered as a campaign manager of LAKAS-NUCD.
Respondent likewise signified his willingness to face sanctions for the lapses and negligence on his part.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-2002-459 disposing of CBD
Case No. 02-951 as follows:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and in view of violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month with a
stern WARNING that a repetition shall warrant a more severe penalty. [10]
On October 15, 2002, Miwa filed an appeal with the Office of the Bar Confidant claiming that since she lost
possession of a 3,700 square meters beach resort with a market value of P4 million due to respondents
unprofessional conduct, a more severe penalty was called for.
From the facts, it appears that respondent violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with
specific reference to Rule 18.03.[11]In fact, respondent admitted his lapses and negligence before the IBP Committee
on Bar Discipline. Hence, the only question for our resolution is the propriety of the penalty imposed.
In this case, however, we note that complainant is not exactly without blame. Recall that she herself did not
appear personally at the several pre-trial conferences scheduled by the RTC. Under Rule 18, Section 4 [12] of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is obligatory upon both a party and her counsel to appear at a pre-trial conference. The
failure of a party to appear at pre-trial, given its mandatory character, may cause her to be non-suited or considered
as in default.[13] Recall further that complainant was given every opportunity to fully ventilate her defenses before the
court and thus allow Civil Case No. 5147 to be decided completely on the merits. Yet, complainant never once
appeared at trial and was not even bothered by the several postponements sought by her counsel until the trial court
finally had to rule that she had waived her right to present her evidence as a result of her counsels dilatory
tactics. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. [14] Complainant cannot now come to us to say that her erring
lawyer be penalized severely without any mitigating circumstance at all.
We note also respondents averment that work as campaign manager for a political party during the 2001
elections took too much of his time, and that this circumstance might have understandably prejudiced his clients
cause. This Court must again remind lawyers to handle only as many cases as they can efficiently handle. [15] For it is
not enough that a practitioner is qualified to handle a legal matter, he is also required to prepare adequately and give
the appropriate attention to his legal work. A lawyer owes entire devotion to the cause of his client, warmth and zeal in
the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his learning and utmost ability that nothing can be
taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with law. By failing to show zeal and fidelity to his clients cause,
we are constrained to conclude that respondent acted with gross negligence.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, is SUSPENDED, as recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors, for one (1) month from the practice of law. He is also ORDERED to pay a FINE of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos for gross negligence, resulting in the violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and be spread upon the records of Atty. Rene O. Medina.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 94457. October 16, 1997]
VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC.,
THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991, decision of the Courts's First Division,
filed by private respondents New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay). A brief narration of facts is in order.
The parties hereto entered into a lease agreement over a certain Quezon City property owned by petitioner
Victoria Legarda. For some reason or another, she refused to sign the contract although respondent lessee, Cathay,
made a deposit and a down payment of rentals, prompting the latter to file before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 94 a complaint[1] against the former for specific performance with preliminary injunction and
damages. The court a quo issued the injunction. In the meantime, Legardas counsel, noted lawyer Dean Antonio
Coronel, requested a 10-day extension of time to file an answer which the court granted. Atty. Coronel, however,
failed to file an answer within the extended period. His client was eventually declared in default, Cathay was allowed
to present evidence ex-parte, and on March 25, 1985, a judgment by default was reached by the trial court ordering
Legarda to execute the lease contract in favor of, and to pay damages to, Cathay.
On April 9, 1985, a copy of said decision was served on Atty. Coronel but he took no action until the judgment
became final and executory. A month later, the trial court issued a writ of execution and a public auction was held
where Cathays manager, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., as highest bidder, was awarded the property for P376,500.00 in
satisfaction of the judgment debt. Consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued by the sheriff on June 27,
1985. Upon failure of Legarda to redeem her property within the one-year redemption period, a Final Deed of Sale
was issued by the sheriff on July 8, 1986, which was registered by Cabrera with the Register of Deeds three days
later. Hence, Legardas Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 270814 was cancelled with the issuance of TCT No.
350892 in the name of Cabrera.
Despite the lapse of over a year since the judgment by default became final and executory, Atty. Coronel made
no move on behalf of his client. He did not even inform her of all these developments. When Legarda did learn of the
adverse decision, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel [2] and prevailed upon him to seek appropriate
relief. Thus, on October 23, 1986, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction before the Court of Appeals. [3]
On November 29, 1989, the appellate court rendered a decision affirming the March 25, 1985, decision of the trial
court, dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment, and holding Legarda bound by the negligence of her
counsel. It considered her allegation of fraud by Cathay to be improbable, and added that there was pure and simple
negligence on the part of petitioners counsel who failed to file an answer and, later, a petition for relief from judgment
by default. Upon notice of the Court of Appeals decision, Atty. Coronel again neglected to protect his clients interest
by failing to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal therefrom until said decision became final on December 21,
1989.
Sometime in March 1990, Legarda learned of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1989, not from Atty. Coronel but from his secretary. She then hired a new counsel for the purpose of elevating her
case to this Court. The new lawyer filed a petition for certioraripraying for the annulment of the decision of the trial and
appellate courts and of the sheriffs sale, alleging, among other things, that Legarda lost in the courts below because
her previous lawyer was grossly negligent and inefficient, whose omissions cannot possibly bind her because this
amounted to a violation of her right to due process of law. She, therefore, asked Cathay (not Cabrera) to reconvey the
subject property to her.
On March 18, 1991, a decision[4] was rendered in this case by Mr. Justice Gancayco, ruling, inter alia, as follows:
(a) granting the petition; (b) nullifying the trial courts decision dated March 25, 1985, the Court of Appeals decision
dated November 29, 1989, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985, of the property in question, and the
subsequent final deed of sale covering the same property; and (c) ordering Cathay to reconvey said property to
Legarda, and the Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of said property in the name of Cathay (not Cabrera)
and to issue a new one in Legardas name.
The Court then declared that Atty. Coronel committed, not just ordinary or simple negligence, but reckless,
inexcusable and gross negligence, which deprived his client of her property without due process of law. His acts, or
the lack of it, should not be allowed to bind Legarda who has been consigned to penury because her lawyer appeared
to have abandoned her case not once but repeatedly. Thus, the Court ruled against tolerating such unjust enrichment
of Cathay at Legardas expense, and noted that counsels lack of devotion to duty is so gross and palpable that this
Court must come to the aid of his distraught client.
Aggrieved by this development, Cathay filed the instant motion for reconsideration, alleging, inter alia, that
reconveyance is not possible because the subject property had already been sold by its owner, Cabrera, even prior to
the promulgation of said decision.
By virtue of the Gancayco decision, Cathay was duty bound to return the subject property to Legarda. The
impossibility of this directive is immediately apparent, for two reasons: First, Cathay neither possessed nor owned the
property so it is in no position to reconvey the same; second, even if it did, ownership over the property had already
been validly transferred to innocent third parties at the time of promulgation of said judgment.
There is no question that the highest bidder at the public auction was Cathays manager. It has not been shown
nor even alleged, however, that Roberto Cabrera had all the time been acting for or in behalf of Cathay. For all intents
and purposes, Cabrera was simply a vendee whose payment effectively extinguished Legardas liability to Cathay as
the judgment creditor. No proof was ever presented which would reveal that the sale occurred only on paper, with
Cabrera acting as a mere conduit for Cathay. What is clear from the records is that the auction sale was conducted
regularly, that a certificate of sale and, subsequently, a final deed of sale were issued to Cabrera which allowed him to
consolidate his ownership over the subject property, register it and obtain a title in his own name, and sell it to Nancy
Saw, an innocent purchaser for value, at a premium price. Nothing on record would demonstrate that Cathay was the
beneficiary of the sale between Cabrera and Saw. Cabrera himself maintained that he was acting in his private (as
distinct from his corporate) capacity[5] when he participated in the bidding.
Since the decision of the Court of Appeals gained finality on December 21, 1989, the subject property has been
sold and ownership thereof transferred no less than three times, viz.: (a) from Cabrera to Nancy Saw on March 21,
1990, four months after the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and one year before the
promulgation of the March 18, 1991, decision under reconsideration; (b) from Nancy Saw to Lily Tanlo Sy Chua on
August 7, 1990, more than one year before the Court issued a temporary restraining order in connection with this
case; and (c) from the spouses Victor and Lily Sy Chua to Janet Chong Luminlun on April 3, 1992. With these
transfers, Cabreras TCT No. 350892 gave way to Saws TCT No. 31672, then to Chuas TCT No. 31673, and finally to
Luminluns TCT No. 99143, all issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on April 3, 1990, August 8, 1990, and
November 24, 1993, respectively.
We do not have to belabor the fact that all the successors-in-interest of Cabrera to the subject lot were
transferees for value and in good faith, having relied as they did on the clean titles of their predecessors. The
successive owners were each armed with their own indefeasible titles which automatically brought them under the
[6]
aegis of the Torrens System. As the Court declared in Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, (i)t is settled doctrine that one
who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on
the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. [7] In the case at bar, it
is not disputed that no notice of lis pendens was ever annotated on any of the titles of the subsequent owners. And
even if there were such a notice, it would not have created a lien over the property because the main office of a lien is
to warn prospective buyers that the property they intend to purchase is the subject of a pending litigation.Therefore,
since the property is already in the hands of Luminlun, an innocent purchaser for value, it can no longer be returned to
its original owner by Cabrera, much less by Cathay itself.
Another point to consider, though not raised as an issue in this case, is the fact that Cabrera was impleaded as a
party-respondent only on August 12, 1991, after the promulgation of the Gancayco decision.[8] The dispositive portion
itself ordered Cathay, instead of Cabrera to reconvey the property to Legarda. Cabrera was never a party to this case,
either as plaintiff-appellee below or as respondent in the present action. Neither did he ever act as Cathays
representative. As we held in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. NLRC, et al., [9] (j)urisdiction over a
party is acquired by his voluntary appearance or submission to the court or by the coercive process issued by the
court to him, generally by service of summons. [10] In other words, until Cabrera was impleaded as party respondent
and ordered to file a comment in the August 12, 1991, resolution, the Court never obtained jurisdiction over him, and
to command his principal to reconvey a piece of property which used to be HIS would not only be inappropriate but
would also constitute a real deprivation of ones property without due process of law.
Assuming arguendo that reconveyance is possible, that Cathay and Cabrera are one and the same and that
Cabreras payment redounded to the benefit of his principal, reconveyance, under the facts and evidence obtaining in
this case, would still not address the issues raised herein
The application of the sale price to Legardas judgment debt constituted a payment which extinguished her liability
to Cathay as the party in whose favor the obligation to pay damages was established. [11] It was a payment in the sense
that Cathay had to resort to a court-supervised auction sale in order to execute the judgment. [12] With the fulfillment of
the judgment debtors obligation, nothing else was required to be done.
Under the Gancayco ruling, the order of reconveyance was premised on the alleged gross negligence of
Legardas counsel which should not be allowed to bind her as she was deprived of her property without due process of
law.
It is, however, basic that as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course, she
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process. The chronology of events shows that the case took its regular course in the trial and appellate courts but
Legardas counsel failed to act as any ordinary counsel should have acted, his negligence every step of the way
amounting to abandonment, in the words of the Gancayco decision. Yet, it cannot be denied that the proceedings
which led to the filing of this case were not attended by any irregularity. The judgment by default was valid, so was the
ensuing sale at public auction. If Cabrera was adjudged highest bidder in said auction sale, it was not through any
machination on his part. All of his actuations that led to the final registration of the title in his name were aboveboard,
untainted by any irregularity.
The fact that Cabrera is an officer of Cathay does not make him a purchaser in bad faith. His act in representing
the company was never questioned nor disputed by Legarda. And while it is true that he won in the bidding, it is
likewise true that said bidding was conducted by the book.There is no call to be alarmed that an official of the
company emerges as the winning bidder since in some cases, the judgment creditor himself personally participates in
the bidding.
There is no gainsaying that Legarda is the judgment debtor here. Her property was sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment debt. She cannot claim that she was illegally deprived of her property because such deprivation
was done in accordance with the rules on execution of judgments.Whether the money used to pay for said property
came from the judgment creditor or its representative is not relevant. What is important is that it was purchased for
value. Cabrera parted with real money at the auction. In his Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985,[13] Deputy
Sheriff Angelito R. Mendoza certified, inter alia, that the highest bidder paid to the Deputy Sheriff the said amount
of P376,500.00, the sale price of the levied property.If this does not constitute payment, what then is it? Had there
been no real purchase and payment below, the subject property would never have been awarded to Cabrera and
registered in his name, and the judgment debt would never have been satisfied. Thus, to require either Cathay or
Cabrera to reconvey the property would be an unlawful intrusion into the lawful exercise of his proprietary rights over
the land in question, an act which would constitute an actual denial of property without due process of law.
It may be true that the subject lot could have fetched a higher price during the public auction, as Legarda claims,
but the fail to betray any hint of a bid higher than Cabreras which was bypassed in his favor. Certainly, he could not
help it if his bid of only P376,500.00 was the highest. Moreover, in spite of this allegedly low selling price, Legarda still
failed to redeem her property within the one-year redemption period. She could not feign ignorance of said sale on
account of her counsels failure to so inform her, because such auction sales comply with requirements of notice and
publication under the Rules of Court. In the absence of any clear and convincing proof that such requirements were
not followed, the presumption of regularity stands. Legarda also claims that she was in the United States during the
redemption period, but she admits that she left the Philippines only on July 13, 1985, or sixteen days after the auction
sale of June 27, 1985. Finally, she admits that her mother Ligaya represented her during her absence. [14] In short, she
was not totally in the dark as to the fate of her property and she could have exercised her right of redemption if she
chose to, but she did not.
Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legardas counsel. If she may
be said to be innocent because she was ignorant of the acts of negligence of her counsel, with more reason are
respondents truly innocent. As between two parties who may lose due to the negligence or incompetence of the
counsel of one, the party who was responsible for making it happen should suffer the consequences. This reflects the
basic common law maxim, so succinctly stated by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that . . . (B)etween two innocent parties, the
one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. [15] In this case, it was
not respondents, Legarda, who misjudged and hired the services of the lawyer who practically abandoned her case
and who continued to retain him even after his proven apathy and negligence.
The Gancayco decision makes much of the fact that Legarda is now consigned to penury and, therefore, this
Court must come to the aid of the distraught client. It must be remembered that this Court renders decisions, not on
the basis of emotions but on its sound judgment, applying the relevant, appropriate law. Much as it may pity Legarda,
or any losing litigant for that matter, it cannot play the role of a knight in shining armor coming to the aid of someone,
who through her weakness, ignorance or misjudgment may have been bested in a legal joust which complied with all
the rules of legal proceedings.
In Vales v. Villa,[16] this Court warned against the danger of jumping to the aid of a litigant who commits serious
error of judgment resulting in his own loss:
x x x Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been
defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and
lose money by them - indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and
restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong,
before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it."
Respondents should not be penalized for Legardas mistake. If the subject property was at all sold, it was only
after the decisions of the trial and appellate courts had gained finality. These twin judgments, which were nullified by
the Gancayco decision, should be respected and allowed to stand by this Court for having become final and
executory.
A judgment may be broadly defined as the decision or sentence of the law given by a court or other tribunal as
the result of proceedings instituted therein. [17] It is a judicial act which settles the issues, fixes the rights and liabilities
of the parties, and determines the proceeding, and it is regarded as the sentence of the law pronounced by the court
on the action or question before it. [18]
In the case at bar, the trial courts judgment was based on Cathays evidence after Legarda was declared in
default. Damages were duly awarded to Cathay, not whimsically, but upon proof of its entitlement thereto. The issue of
whether the plaintiff (Cathay) deserved to recover damages because of the defendants (Legardas) refusal to honor
their lease agreement was resolved. Consequently, the right of Cathay to be vindicated for such breach and the
liability incurred by Legarda in the process were determined.
This judgment became final when she failed to avail of remedies available to her, such as filing a motion for
reconsideration or appealing the case.At the time, the issues raised in the complaint had already been determined and
disposed of by the trial court.[19] This is the stage of finality which judgments must at one point or another reach. In our
jurisdiction, a judgment becomes ipso facto final when no appeal is perfected or the reglementary period to appeal
therefrom expires. The necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not void is self-evident. The interests of society
impose it. The opposite view might make litigations more unendurable than the wrongs (they are) intended to
redress. It would create doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would constantly arise as to what the judgment or
order was. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversies.[20] When judgments of lower courts gain finality, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to
modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court,
[21]
not even by the Supreme Court. In other words, once a judgment becomes final, the only errors that may be
corrected are those which are clerical.[22]
From the foregoing precedents, it is readily apparent that the real issue that must be resolved in this motion for
reconsideration is the alleged illegality of the final judgments of the trial and appellate courts.
 Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by a court without jurisdiction to do so and
those obtained by fraud or collusion. [23] This case must be tested in light of the guidelines governing the latter class of
judgments. In this regard, an action to annul a judgment on the ground of fraud will not lie unless the fraud is extrinsic
or collateral and facts upon which it is based (have) not been controverted or resolved in the case where (the)
judgment was rendered.[24] Where is the fraud in the case at bar? Was Legarda unlawfully barred from the
proceedings below? Did her counsel sell her out to the opponent?
It must be noted that, aside from the fact that no extrinsic fraud attended the trial and resolution of this case, the
jurisdiction of the court a quo over the parties and the subject matter was never raised as an issue by Legarda. Such
being the case, the decision of the trial court cannot be nullified.Errors of judgment, if any, can only be reviewed on
appeal, failing which the decision becomes final and executory, valid and binding upon the parties in the case and
their successors in interest.[25]
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that while Legarda went to the Court of Appeals claiming precisely that the
trial courts decision was fraudulently obtained, she grounded her petition before the Supreme Court upon her
estranged counsels negligence. This could only imply that at the time she filed her petition for annulment of judgment,
she entertained no notion that Atty. Coronel was being remiss in his duties. It was only after the appellate courts
decision had become final and executory, a writ of execution issued, the property auctioned off then sold to an
innocent purchasers for value, that she began to protest the alleged negligence of her attorney. In most cases, this
would have been dismissed outright for being dilatory and appearing as an act of desperation on the part of a
vanquished litigant. The Gancayco ruling, unfortunately, ruled otherwise.
Fortunately, we now have an opportunity to rectify a grave error of the past.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent New Cathay House, Inc. is hereby
GRANTED. Consequently, the decision dated March 18, 1991, of the Courts First Division is VACATED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the instant petition for review and AFFIRMING the November
29, 1989, decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487. Costs against petitioner Victoria Legarda.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72306 October 6, 1988
DAVID P. FORNILDA, JUAN P. FORNILDA, EMILIA P. FORNILDA OLILI, LEOCADIA P. FORNILDA LABAYEN
and ANGELA P. FORNILDA GUTIERREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE BRANCH 164, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IVTH JUDICIAL REGION, PASIG, JOAQUIN C. ANTONIO Deputy
Sheriff, RTC, 4JR Tanay, Rizal and ATTY. SERGIO I. AMONOY respondents.
Irene C. Ishiwata for petitioner A. Gutierrez.
Sergio L Amonoy for and in his own behalf.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Petition entitled "Petisiyung Makapagpasuri Taglay ang Pagpapapigil ng Utos", translated as one for certiorari
with Preliminary Injunction, was filed on 27 September 1985 by three (3) petitioners, namely David P. Fornilda, Emilia
P. Fornilda-Olili and Angela P. Fornilda-Gutierrez. They seek the reversal of the Order of respondent Trial Court,
dated 25 July 1985, granting a Writ of Possession, as well as its Orders, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May 1986 (p.
241, Rollo), directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff to demolish the houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia
Fornilda (who is listed as a petitioner but who did not sign the Petition). Neither is Juan P. Fornilda a signatory.
The facts disclose that the deceased, Julio M. Catolos formerly owned six (6) parcels of land located in Tanay, Rizal,
which are the controverted properties in the present litigation. His estate was the subject of settlement in Special
Proceedings No. 3103 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, at Pasig, Branch 1. Francesca Catolos Agnes
Catolos Alfonso I. ForniIda and Asuncion M. Pasamba were some of the legal heirs and were represented in the case
by Atty. Sergio Amonoy (hereinafter referred to as Respondent Amonoy). A Project of Partition was filed in the
Intestate Court whereby the Controverted Parcels were adjudicated to Alfonso I. Fornilda and Asuncion M. Pasamba.
On 12 January 1965, the Court approved the Project of Partition. It was not until 6 August 1969, however, that the
estate was declared closed and terminated after estate and inheritance taxes had been paid, the claims against the
estate settled and all properties adjudicated.
Eight (8) days thereafter, or on 20 January 1965, Alfonso 1. Fornilda and Asuncion M. Pasamba executed a Contract
of Mortgage wherein they mortgaged the Controverted Parcels to Respondent Amonoy as security for the payment of
his attorney's fees for services rendered in the aforementioned intestate proceedings, in the amount of P27,600.00
(Annex "A", Comment).
Asuncion M. Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso 1. Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. Petitioners
are some of the heirs of Alfonso I. Fornilda.
Since the mortgage indebtedness was not paid, on 21 January 1970, Respondent Amonoy instituted foreclosure
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, at Pasig, Branch VIII entitled "Sergio I. Amonoy vs. Heirs of
Asuncion M. Pasamba and Heirs of Alfonso 1. Fornilda" [Civil Case No. 12726] (Annex "B", Ibid.). Petitioners, as
defendants therein, alleged that the amount agreed upon as attorney's fees was only Pll,695.92 and that the sum of
P27,600.00 was unconscionable and unreasonable. Appearing as signatory counsel for Respondent Amonoy was
Atty. Jose S. Balajadia.
On 28 September 1972, the Trial Court 1 rendered judgement in the Foreclosure Case ordering the Pasamba and
Fornilda heirs to pay Respondent Amonoy, within ninety (90).days from receipt of the decision, the sums of
P27,600.00 representing the attorney's fees secured by the mortgage; Pl l,880.00 as the value of the harvest from two
(2) parcels of land; and 25% of the total of the two amounts, or P9,645.00, as attorney's fees, failing which the
Controverted Parcels would be sold at public auction (Annex "C", Ibid.).
On 6 February 1973, the Controverted Parcels were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973, an auction sale was held with
Respondent Amonoy as the sole bidder for P23,760.00 (Annex "D", Ibid.). Said sale was confirmed by the Trial Court
on 2 May 1973 (Annex "E", Ibid.). To satisfy the deficiency, another execution sale was conducted with Respondent
Amonoy as the sole bidder for P12,137.50. On the basis of an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership by Respondent
Amonoy, the corresponding tax declarations covering the Controverted Parcels were consolidated in his name.
On 19 December 1973, or a year after the judgment in the Foreclosure Case, an action for Annulment of Judgment
entitled "Maria Penano et al. vs. Sergio Amonoy, et al." (Civil Case No. 18731) was filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, at Pasig the Annulment Case (Annex "F", Ibid.) Petitioners were also included as plaintiffs.
Appearing for the plaintiffs in that case was Atty. Jose F. Tiburcio. Squarely put in issue were the propriety of the
mortgage, the validity of the judgment in the Foreclosure Case, and the tenability of the acquisitions by Respondent
Amonoy at the Sheriffs sale. Of particular relevance to the instant Petition is the contention that the mortgage and the
Sheriffs sales were null and void as contrary to the positive statutory injunction in Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code,
which prohibits attorneys from purchasing, even at a public or judicial auction, properties and rights in litigation, and
that the Trial Court, in the Foreclosure Case, had never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, i.e.,
the Controverted Parcels.
On 7 November 1977, the Trial Court 2 dismissed the Annulment Case holding that the particular disqualification in
Article 1491 of the Civil Code is not of general application nor of universal effect but must be reconciled with the rule
that permits judgment creditors to be bidders at sheriffs sales, so that Respondent Amonoy was "clearly not prohibited
from bidding his judgment and his acquisitions therefore are sanctioned by law" (Annex "G", Ibid.).
3
On 22 July 1981, the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 63214-R) (the Appealed Case) affirmed the aforesaid
judgment predicated on three principal grounds: (1) that no legal impediment exists to bar an heir from encumbering
his share of the estate after a project of partition has been approved, that act being a valid exercise of his right of
ownership; (2) res judicata, since petitioners never questioned the capacity of Respondent Amonoy to acquire the
property in the Foreclosure Case; and (3) the complaint in the Annulment Case did not allege extrinsic fraud nor
collusion in obtaining the judgment so that the action must fail.
Upon remand of the Foreclusure Case to respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 164, at Pasig, Respondent Sheriff,
on 26 August 1985, notified petitioners to vacate the premises (p. 17, Rollo), subject of the Writ of Possession issued
on 25 July 1985 (p. 18, Rollo).
On 27 September 1985, petitioners came to this Court in a pleading entitled "Petisiyung Makapagpasuri Taglay ang
Pagpapapigil ng Utos". On 11 November 1985, we dismissed the petition for non-payment of docket and other fees.
However, upon payment thereof, the Order of dismissal was set aside and respondents were directed to submit their
Comment. In his Comment, Respondent Amonoy denies that he had acquired the Controverted Parcels through
immoral and illegal means contending that "the question of attorney's fees, the mortgage to secure the same, the sale
of the mortgaged properties at public auction, which was confirmed by the Court, and ultimately, the ownership and
possession over them, have all been judicially adjudicated (p. 146, Rollo)
We gave due course to the petition and required the filing of the parties' respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, on motion of Respondent Amonoy, dated 24 April 1986, respondent Trial Court, in the Foreclosure Case,
issued Orders dated 25 April and 16 May 1986 authorizing the demolition of the houses and other structures of
petitioners Leocadia and Angela Fornilda (p. 241, Rollo).
On 1 June 1986 the house of Angela Fornilda was totally demolished while that of Leocadia was spared due to the
latter's assurance that she would seek postponement. On 1 June 1986, in a pleading entitled "Mahigpit na Musiyung
Para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng Paglalapastangan", followed by a Musiyung Makahingi ng Utos sa Pagpapapigil ng
Pagpapagiba at Papanagutin sa Paglalapastangan' petitioners applied for a Restraining Order, which we granted on 2
June 1986, enjoining respondents and the Sheriff of Rizal from demolishing petitioners' houses (p. 221, Rollo). In a
pleading entitled 'Mahigpit na Musiyung para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng Paglapastangan' and 'Masasamang Gawain
(Mal-Practices)' and 'Paninindigan (Memorandum)' both filed on 16 June 1988, petitioners likewise charged
Respondent Amonoy with malpractice and prayed for his disbarment (pp. 224; 226, Rollo).
In Respondent Amonoy's "Comment and Manifestations" filed on 30 June 1986, he indicated that the Restraining
Order received by the Deputy Sheriff of Rizal only on 6 June 1986 had already become moot and academic as Angela
Fornilda's house had been demolished on 2 June 1986 while Leocadia offered to buy the small area of the land where
her house is built and he had relented.
In the interim, Respondent Amonoy was appointed as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, and subsequently as a
Regional Trial Court Judge in Pasay City.
The threshold issue is whether or not the mortgage constituted on the Controverted Parcels in favor of Respondent
Amonoy comes within the scope of the prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent portions of the said Articles read:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase even at a public or judicial or auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, ... the property and rights in litigation or levied upon on
execution before the court within whose junction or territory they exercise their respective functions;
this prohibition includes the act of acquitting by assignment and shall apply to lawyers with respect to
the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue
of their profession. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforequoted provision, a lawyer is prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property
or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession ( Padilla Vol .
H Civil Law, 1974 Ed., p. 230 citing Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 773 and Rubias vs. Batiller 51 SCRA 130). The
prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales
(ibid., p. 221).
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons
(Paras, Civil Code, Vol. V, 1973., p. 70).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Controverted Parcels were part of the estate of the late Julio M. Catolos
subject of intestate estate proceedings, wherein Respondent Amonoy acted as counsel for some of the heirs from
1959 until 1968 by his own admission (Comment, p. 145, Rollo); that these properties were adjudicated to Alfonso
Fornilda and Asuncion M. Pasamba in the Project of Partition approved by the Court on 12 January 1965; that on 20
January 1965, or only eight (8) days thereafter, and while he was still intervening in the case as counsel, these
properties were mortgaged by petitioners' predecessor-in-interest to Respondent Amonoy to secure payment of the
latter's attorney's fees in the amount of P27,600.00; that since the mortgage indebtedness was not paid, Respondent
Amonoy instituted an action for judicial foreclosure of mortgage on 21 January 1970; that the mortgage was
subsequently ordered foreclosed and auction sale followed where Respondent Amonoy was the sole bidder for
P23,600.00; and that being short of the mortgage indebtedness, he applied for and further obtained a deficiency
judgment.
Telling, therefore, is the fact that the transaction involved falls squarely within the prohibition against any acquisition by
a lawyer of properties belonging to parties they represent which are still in suit. For, while the Project of Partition was
approved on 12 January 1965, it was not until 6 August 1969 that the estate was declared closed and terminated
(Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 3103, p. 44). At the time the mortgage was executed, therefore, the relationship of
lawyer and client still existed, the very relation of trust and confidence sought to be protected by the prohibition, when
a lawyer occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate terms to an harassed client. What is more, the mortgage
was executed only eight (8) days after approval of the Project of Partition thereby evincing a clear intention on
Respondent Amonoy's part to protect his own interests and ride roughshod over that of his clients. From the time of
the execution of the mortgage in his favor, Respondent Amonoy had already asserted a title adverse to his clients'
interests at a time when the relationship of lawyer and client had not yet been severed.
The fact that the properties were first mortgaged and only subsequently acquired in an auction sale long after the
termination of the intestate proceedings will not remove it from the scope of the prohibition. To rule otherwise would be
to countenance indirectly what cannot be done directly.
There is no gainsaying that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, as an heir, could encumber the property adjudicated to
him; that the Complaint in the Annulment Case did not contain any specific allegation of fraud or collusion in obtaining
the judgment appealed from as opined by the Court of appeals in the Appealed Case; and that the auction sale of the
properties to Respondent Amonoy was judicially confirmed and ownership and possession of the Controverted
Parcels ultimately transferred to him.
Nonetheless, considering that the mortgage contract, entered into in contravention of Article 1491 of the Civil
Code, supra, is expressly prohibited by law, the same must be held inexistent and void ab initio (Director of Lands vs.
Abagat, 53 Phil. 147).
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law. These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither
can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. (Civil Code)
Being a void contract, the action or defense for the declaration of its inesistence is imprescriptible (Article 1410, Civil
Code). The defect of a void or inexistence contract is permanent. Mere lapse of time cannot give it efficacy. Neither
can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived (Article 1409, Civil Code).
The Controverted Parcels could not have been the object of any mortgage contract in favor of Respondent Amonoy
and consequently neither of a foreclosure sale. By analogy, the illegality must be held to extend to whatsover results
directly from the illegal source (Article 1422, Civil Code). Such being the case, the Trial Court did not acquire any
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Foreclosure Case and the judgment rendered therein could not have
attained any finality and could be attacked at any time. Neither could it have been a bar to the action brought by
petitioners for its annulment by reason of res judicata. (Municipality of Antipolo vs. Zapanta, No. L-65334, December
26, 1984, 133 SCRA 820). Two of the requisites of the rule of prior judgment as a bar to a subsequent case, namely,
(1) a final judgment and (2) that it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter, are
conspicuously absent.
And since the nullity of the transaction herein involved proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act does not constitute a criminal offense, the return to petitioners of the Controverted Parcels is in
order.
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by
reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not
at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his
promise. (Civil Code).
WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted; the Order of respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July 1985, granting a Writ of
Possession, as well as its Orders, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May 1986, directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff
to demolish the houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia Fornilda are hereby set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order heretofore issued, is made permanent. The six (6) parcels of land herein controverted are hereby
ordered returned to petitioners unless some of them have been conveyed to innocent third persons.
With respect to petitioners' prayer for disbarment by reason of malpractice of Respondent Amonoy embodied in their
pleading entitled 'Mahigpit na Musiyung para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng Paglalapastangan' and 'Masasamang Gawain
(Mal-Pracrices) and "Paninindigan (Memorandum)" both filed on Sergio I. Amonoy is hereby required, within fifteen
(15) days from notice hereof, to submit an Answer thereto. After receipt of the same, a new docket number will be
assigned to the case.
Costs against respondent, Sergio I. Amonoy.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This concerns an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against Atty. Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the latter's
demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money from her client purportedly to expedite the proceedings of their
case which was pending before the Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with his siblings engaged the services
of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of
Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The complainant claimed that sometime in February 2007,
Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) from him to expedite the
proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a
contract.3
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza
had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora
Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case
before the Court. Handwritten receipts4 signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant, which
state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which, in turn shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should not be included in the Decision, the
300,000.00 shall be returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007
Receipt
The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to expedite the process before the courts. The
said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same should be reimbursed to her by her siblings upon
winning the case with finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the Court had
already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case was still
pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found. 7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarment 8 against Atty. De Taza. He
also attached several affidavits and documents 9 from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued
bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit 10which
was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks 11 in her favor amounting to ₱481,400.00,
which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit12 was attached to the complaint, averred that
Atty. De Taza issued a check13 for ₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was dishonored by the bank for
being drawn against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,14 stating that Atty. De Taza owes her ₱29,560.39
and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter 15 informed the Court that Atty. De Taza is planning to leave
the country as she was joining her husband in the United States of America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court to file a Comment. However, the
copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-Moved". The
Court then resolved by virtue of the Resolution 17 dated July 2, 2008, to send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s office address
at Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also returned unserved with the notation "RTS-not
connected."
It was then required in the Resolution 18 dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant inform the Court of Atty. De
Taza’s new address, which the complainant faithfully complied with by giving Atty. De Taza’s new address in the
U.S.A. The Court, in its Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk of Court to resend a copy of the
Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza using the latter’s U.S.A. address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with the complaint was returned;
this time, with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution 20 dated September 9, 2009,
held that the said copy of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having
waived the filing of her comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they failed to appear. Thus, the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. The complainant, in a letter 22 addressed to the IBP, averred that he
was already residing abroad and maintained that he had already submitted his documentary evidence at the time of
the filing of his complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any position paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that
Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommendation in a Resolution 24 dated
January 3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of [P]800,000.00 to expedite the case pending in
the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had long been dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS,
DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF HAVING THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the accusations against her. Numerous
attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to defend herself from the complainant’s allegations, but all these
efforts were only met with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an unscrupulous move on her part to evade
her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the Court is concerned, all means were exhausted to give
Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the complainant’s charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be
a hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by the Court to ascertain whether
a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. As this Court held in Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, 26 citing In the Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against
Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.28 (Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required." 29 Based on the documentary evidence submitted
by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing
checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason. The complainant even submitted a document
evidencing Atty. De Taza’s involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before
the Office of the City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a closed account,
among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting when
attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a
lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and
fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless
checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the
public interest and public order.1âwphi1 It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has
taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in
high esteem."30
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as she had the gall to make it
appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange
for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her
clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she even
used the name of the Court to defraud her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to
the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. 31 In this case, the purpose for which
Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made in
the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of
the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 32
The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33 suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two
years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services,
Inc. v. Valerio,34 the same penalty was meted out by this Court to the erring lawyer who issued worthless checks to
pay off her loan.
Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion, 35 the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for four years was
the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded his client into paying ₱42,000.00 to him for the purported filing of
a petition for annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to his client a copy of the petition with
stamped receipt from the trial court when in reality, no such petition was filed.
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00 from the complainant to be put up as
injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money on other occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was
handling the case. When the complainant verified this with the judge, the judge denied the respondent’s allegations.
The complainant later learned that the bond was also unnecessary, as the application for a writ was already denied by
the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." 37 "The Judiciary has been besieged enough with
accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of
38
mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated."
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO YEARS
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's record in
this Court.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., A.C. No. 5768
Complainant,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR.,
Respondent. Promulgated:

March 26, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and
filed a baseless suit against him.

The Facts and the Case

On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit[1] with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of
law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following
offenses:

1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply
with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which
insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.

2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged
falsification of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document
executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was
assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document.

3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the
start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala
na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo saCamarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito.

4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to
check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to
consider that a notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.

5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his
unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the
IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases
for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked
Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined,
Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.

Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:

1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination,

Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came about
because Atty. Ferrers clients filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.

2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that
her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
 3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon,
the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to stop,
admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.

4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was
drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received
various citations that speak well of his character.

5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still
pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum
shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats
subject of the criminal cases.

In his reply affidavit,[2] Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on December 29,
2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his sons taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting
in serious injuries to the tricycles passengers.[3] But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the
victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being
drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities.[4]

Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the citations
Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1,[5] the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed
his application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have the
qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge and that he was facing a criminal charge for
acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a
Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough
evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit
despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to
it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the
presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.

On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225,[6] adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioners recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.

Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution [7] of October 19, 2002 on
the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court
referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[8] On May 22, 2008 the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation [9] of the Investigating Commissioner that
denied Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[10]

On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-
2008.[11] On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for review under Rule 139
of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandonfiled his comment,[12] reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further,
he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in CamarinesNorte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing
in court drunk.[13]

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding
respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.

The Courts Ruling

We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. [14]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in
Rule 8.01, the Code provides:

Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the
falsification of the SalaysayAffidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he
had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.

Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using
offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to
dismiss:

1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and
FALSIFICATION of documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with
concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious
misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly FALSIFIED document, in violation of
his oath of office as a government employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that,
Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT, wherein her
fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative
defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the same,
from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for
DISBARMENT of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions. [15]

The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.[16]

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of
a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He
merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly
made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against
Atty. Ferrer.

Atty. Ferrer said, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling n
a abogado saCamarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito. Evidently, he uttered these with intent to
annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants
waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court
cannot countenance it.

Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in
the dignity of judicial forum.[17] Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down
the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness
Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.
Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of ones defense. [18] So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.[19] Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave
Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of
[20]
the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrers display of improper
attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the
court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-
809 and ORDERSthe suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his
receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrers personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.