G.R. No.

L-5932 February 27, 1912

DEAN C. WORCESTER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO M. KALAW, LOPE K. SANTOS,
FIDEL A. REYES, FAUSTINO AGUILAR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellants.
W. A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 23rd day of January, 1909, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication.
The complaint was in the following language:
COMPLAINT.
I. That the plaintiff as well as the defendants are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
II. That for a long time before the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw,
Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete , Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano,
Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the owners, directors, writers
(redactores), editors (editores) and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which newspaper during all the time mentioned in this complaint
was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila, having a
large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.
III. That for a long time the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said
newspaper, until at last on the 30th of October, 1908, with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff,
who on said date was, and still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of
the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the honesty and reviled the fame of the
plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as an official of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, printed, wrote
(redactaron), and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of the 30th of October, 1908, a
malicious defamation and false libel which was injurious (injurioso) to the plaintiff, said libel reading as
follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten and devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against an order of things
which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former. At times they have been
fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in the majority of cases they did not obtain but
a change of name or plumage.
"The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation: the relation between the ones and the others
is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creatures' expense.
"Among men it is very easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon. And for some
psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and most
harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have done so by
a secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated vanity, making
themselves appear that which they are not nor ever can be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most adepts. And men,
collectively and individually, have desired to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird in order to
triumph in the plundering of their fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the
vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots and study and
civilize them and to espy in his flight, with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the large deposits of
gold, the prey concealed amidst the lonely mountains, to appropriate them to himself afterwards,
thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for his own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances, an illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle in order to derive
benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his
official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his life in
the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is confined o dissecting
insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were less nourishing and less
savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindoro, in Mindanao, and in other
virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the pretext of the public
good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data and the key to the national
wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of immense properties
registered under he names of others.
"Promoting, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of worthless land at fabulous
prices which the city fathers dare not refuse, from fear of displeasing the one who is behind the
motion, and which they do not refuse for their own good.
 "Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in-land, with the prospects of enormous profits, at the
expense of the blood of the people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and devours,
a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulent
omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and their aim are never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the booty and the plunder. Others are too weak to raise a voice of protest. And others
die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
IV.
That the plaintiff was, on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government
of the Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to public in general, personally
as well as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior, and the
defamation and libel, and the words, terms and language used in said defamation and libel were employed by
the said defendants with the intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and that should be understood, as in
effect they were understood, by the public officials of the Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff, by reason of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff in
compliance with his duties in his position as such member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as
such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, ascended on a previous occasion the mountains of the
Province of Benguet to study the native tribe known as Igorot, residing in said region; by reason of the publicly
known fact that in the said mountains of Benguet there exist large deposits of gold, and for the reason that, as
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines, which is the legislative body of the Philippine Islands, the
plaintiff takes part in the enactment and repealing of laws in said Islands; by reason furthermore of the fact,
publicly known, that the plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has had under his
direction and control the enforcement of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of
Manila relating to the slaughtering of cattle; by reason furthermore of the fact, publicly known that said plaintiff,
as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, had under his direction and control the Bureau of
Science of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and he is generally known as a man devoted to the
study of science; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that the said plaintiff, as such Secretary of
the Interior of the Philippine Islands, at a previous time, caused the importation into the Philippine Islands of
fish eggs for the purpose of supplying the mountain streams of the Philippine Islands with fish-hatcheries; by
reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, has journeyed to and explored the Islands of Mindoro, Mindanao, and other regions of the
Philippine Archipelago; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary
of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, at one time investigated and prepared a report for the Civil
Commission of the Philippines in regard to a certain proposition for the purchase of a parcel of land for the city
of Manila; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as member of said Civil
Commission of the Philippines together with the other members of said legislative body, once opened
negotiations with a certain firm engaged in the hotel business in regard to the location of a prospective hotel
on one of the filled-in lands of the city of Manila.
That said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with wasting
public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; with the violation of the laws of the Philippine
Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of
robbing the people; with the object of gain for himself and for others; and lastly with being "a bird of prey;" and
that said defamation should be understood, as in effect it was understood, by the public officials of the
Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct,
actions and things above specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said
plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatsoever.
That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large and showy type,
and every effort made by said defendants to see that said defamation and libel should attract the attention of
the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.
V.
Besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing the said
libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was a vile
despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose his
administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to
create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular
that he would have to resign his office as member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of
the Interior.
In fact said defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in said mentioned newspaper, have
been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the plaintiff and to incite the people to place
obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which the plaintiff has met
 with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors as a public official in every one
of the Departments.
VI.
And for all these reasons the plaintiff alleges: That he has been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for
the additional work to which he has been put, by the said defendants, in the compliance of his duties, both in
the past and the future, as well as for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, and besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the
defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, in the way of punitive
damages, as a warning to the defendants.
Wherefore the plaintiff files this complaint, praying the court:
(1) That the defendants be summoned according to law.
(2) That judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages as above stated, and the costs of
the action.
On the 23d of February, 1909, the defendants presented the following demurrer to the said complaint:
DEMURRER.
Now come the defendants, through their undersigned attorney, and demur to the complaint filed herein, upon
the following grounds:
First, That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.
Second. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause or right of action.
Third. That there is another action pending between the plaintiff and several of the defendants for the same
cause; and
Fourth. That some of the defendants have been erroneously included therein.
Therefore, they respectfully ask the court to dismiss the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.
On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, overruled said demurrer in the following
decision, to which the defendants duly excepted:
ORDER.
The defendant demur upon several grounds:
(1) The first ground is that the complaint is vague and unintelligible and this is directed principally to paragraph
2, in which it is alleged that the defendants were "dueños, directores, redactores", etc., but it is not alleged
that they were such simultaneously. If this were the sole averment of the defendants' connection with the
alleged libel, the objection might be well taken, but paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges that the defendants
"imprimieron, redactaron y publicaron", etc., the article complained of. Under section 2 of Act 277 "every
person" who "publishes or procures to be published any belief is made responsible. (Cf. U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil.
Rep., 752.) We think, therefore, that the connection of the defendants with the publication complained of is
sufficiently charged.
(2) It is also claimed that the facts alleged are not sufficient to state a cause of action and it is urged in support
of this that the article complained of and which is copied in the complaint, fails to mention the plaintiff or to
show on its face that it refers to him. It is, however, specifically alleged in paragraph 4 that the article was
intended to refer to the plaintiff and was so understood by the public, and this allegation is admitted by the
demurrer. Under the rule announced in Causin vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep., 155), where the words
complained of do refer to the plaintiff "an action for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory
publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name."
(3) It is further argued that there is another action pending between the parties for the same cause. This, it is
true, is made a ground for demurrer by the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 91 (3), but like all grounds therein
mentioned, it must "appear upon the face" of the pleading objected to, and where it does not so appear "the
objection can only be taken by answer." (Code C. P., sec. 92.) There is no averment in the complaint which
indicates that there is no another action pending.
The fourth ground of the demurrer is not one recognized by law (Code C. P., sec. 91) nor do we find anything
in Sanidad vs. Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep., 204) which would necessitate any change in the views already
expressed.
The demurrer is, therefore, overruled and defendants are given the usual five days to answer.
On the 15th day of November, 1909, the defendants presented their amended answer, which was as follows:
ANSWER.
The defendants in the above-entitled cause, through their undersigned attorney, by their answer to the
complaint, state:
That the defendants deny generally the allegation of the complaint.
As a special defense, the defendants allege:
First. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute this action, as it clearly appears from the allegations of
the complaint and which the defendants hereby deny.
Second. That the facts are set out as constituting cause of action in the complaint, are insufficient to constitute
such cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
Third. That the said complaint is manifestly improper, for the reason that there is now pending in the Court of
First Instance of this city a criminal cause, No. 4295, for the crime of libel against the defendants herein,
Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, both actions, criminal and civil, being based upon the
same facts which the plaintiffs herein, who is also a party to the said criminal action, now alleges as the basis
of his action.
 Fourth. That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been extinguished for the reason that plaintiff did
not expressly reserve the right to enforce the same in the aforesaid cause 4295, for the crime of libel, after the
said criminal cause had been finally disposed of.
Fifth. That the defendants, Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were erroneously included in
the complaint for the simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said criminal cause No. 4295, for libel,
the third was used as a witness for the prosecution in the said criminal cause, and the others have no interest,
either directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El Renacimiento" in which it is alleged by the plaintiff the
editorial, which is the basis of the complaint, and which it is claimed to be libelous, was published.
Wherefore the defendants pray that they be acquitted of the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the arguments if the respective attorneys, the
Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge, on the 14th of January, 1910, rendered the following decision:
DECISION.
This is a civil action sounding in damages to the amount of P100,000 for an alleged libel of the plaintiff by the
defendants.
The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands,
and Secretary of the Interior of Insular Government. The defendants are twelve persons designated by name
in the complaint and alleged therein to be the owners, directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores), and
administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which
defendants, as well as the plaintiff, are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants were
the owners, directors, writers, editors, and administrators of said daily newspaper, and that said newspaper,
during all the time mentioned in the complaint, was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog
languages in the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.
It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the
plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last, on said date, with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff who
then was still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in the
Government of the Philippines, they attacked the integrity and reviled the reputation of the plaintiff, not only as
a private citizen, but also as an official of the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of
exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and published in said
newspaper in its ordinary number of the said 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false libel,
which was injurious to the plaintiff, said libel, as translated from the Spanish, reading as follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten and devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against an order of things
which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former. At times they have been
fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in a majority of cases they do not obtain
anything but a change of name or plumage.
"The situation is the same in all spheres of creation; the relation between the ones and the others is
that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creature's expense.
"Among men it is easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon. And for some
psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and most
harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have done so by
a secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated vanity, making
themselves appear that which they are not nor ever will be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most adepts. And men,
collectively and individually, have desired to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird in order to
triumph in the plundering if their fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the
vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots and study and
civilize them, and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the large deposits of
gold, the prey concealed amongst the lonely mountains, to appropriate them to himself afterwards,
thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for his own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances an illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle in order to derive
benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his
official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his life in
the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is confined to dissecting
insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were less nourishing and savory, so
as to make it worth the while replacing them with species coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao, in Mindoro, and in other
virgin regions of the archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the pretext of the public
good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data and the key to the national
 wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of immense properties
registered under the names of others.
"Promoting through secret agents and partners, the sale of the city worthless land at fabulous prices
which the city fathers dare not refuse from fear of displeasing the one who is behind the motion, and
which they do not refuse to their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in lands, with the prospects of enormous profits, at the
expense of the blood of the people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and devours,
a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant
omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and aim are never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the body and plunder, Others are too weak to raise a voice to protest. And others die
in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the complaint, that the plaintiff was on the date of said
publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and to the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to the public generally, personally as well as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as a Secretary of the Interior; and the defamation and libel, and the words,
terms, and language used in said defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the
intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and that they should be understood, as in fact they were understood,
by the public officials of the Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as referring
to the plaintiff. (Here follow the reasons for saying the editorial referred to plaintiff and why the public
understood it as referring to him.)
The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil Commission of
the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with wasting public funds for
the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; and with the violation of the laws of the Philippine Islands and
the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal combination of the purpose of robbing the
people, with the object of gain for himself and for others; and lastly, with being a bird of prey, and that said
defamation should be understood, as in effect it was understood by the public officials of the Government and
the people of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and
things above specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff, as
above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatever. That said defamation and libel were
published by the defendants under a heading in large and showy type, and every effort was made by said
defendant to see that said defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public and be read by all the
subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.
In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the
reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting
the Filipino to believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which
he held, and for this reason to oppose of his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the
Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his
official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior. In fact, said defendants, by means of said libel
and other false statements in said mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the
confidence of the public in the plaintiff, and to in incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the
performance of his official duties, in consequence of which said plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties
which have increased to a great extent his labors as a public official in every one of the Departments.
And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the plaintiff states that for all these reasons has been
damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to which he has been put by said defendants
in compliance with his duties, both in the past and in the future, as well as for the injuries to his reputation and
feelings, in the sum, of P50,000, and that besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the
defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the
defendants.
The complaint concludes with a prayer, among other things, that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendants to pay the damages as above stated and the costs of the action; and is dated and signed, Manila,
P.I., January 23, 1909, Hartigan and Rohde, Kincaid and Hurd, attorneys for plaintiff.
A demurrer to this complaint was filed by the defendants, through their attorney, Sr. Felipe Agoncillo, which
demurrer was heretofore heard and overruled by the Court, and the defendants required to answer.
Accordingly, the defendants within the prescribed time, filed their answer; and on November 16, 1909, through
their attorney, filed and amended answer, which is as follows (after stating the case):
The defendants in the above-entitled action, through their undersigned attorney, answering the
complaint, state: That they make a general denial of the allegations in the complaint, and as a special
defense allege:
"(1) That the plaintiff lacks the necessary personality to institute the complaint in question, as evidently
appears from the allegations in the same, and which the defendants deny;
"(2) That the facts set forth as a cause of action in the complaint are insufficient to constitute a cause of action
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;
"(3) That the said complaint is in every sense contrary to law, criminal case No. 4295, for libel, against the
defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, in the Court of First Instance of this city,
being still pending, inasmuch as both causes, criminal and civil, are based upon the same facts which the
plaintiff, who is also interested in said criminal cause, considers a cause of action;
"(4) That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been destroyed as a consequence of the fact that the
plaintiff did not expressly reserve his right to the same in the said mentioned cause No. 4295 for libel, in order
to exercise it after the termination of said criminal cause:
"(5) That the defendants Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit have been erroneously
included in the complaint, for the simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said cause No. 4295 for
libel, the third was used as a witness by the prosecution in the same cause, and the latter ones have no
interest, directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El Renacimiento," in which the plaintiff presumes, was
published the editorial which forms the basis of the complaint, and which is said to be libelous; and concluding
with a prayer to the court to dismiss the case, with cost against the plaintiff."
The second paragraph of this "special defense" is nothing other than a general demurrer to the complaint,
which has been overruled, as already stated.
The first paragraph is not clearly stated, but the court construes it as meaning a simple denial that the plaintiff
is the person referred to in the alleged libelous article "Birds of Prey," which issue is sufficiently raised by the
general denial of the allegations in the complaint.
The third paragraph is not a valid defense in law, for the simple reason that section 11 of Act 277 of the
Philippine Commission, under which this suit is brought, especially provides for a separate civil action for
damages, as well as for a criminal prosecution. (See Mr. Justice Johnson's recent decision.) This third
paragraph is therefore without merit; and the same may be said of the fourth paragraph thereof. As to
paragraph five, it contains no material averment which could not have been set up and insisted upon under
the general issue.
One part if this so-called special defense is therefore a demurrer already and adjudicated, another part is
covered by the general issue, and the residue is without merit as a legal defense, and might have been
stricken out. The defense is therefore tantamount to the general issue only, there being no special plea that
these charges are true, nor any plea of justification.
The trial of this case on its merits began November 16, and ended December 10, 1909, and the proceedings
and evidence introduced are to be found in the exhibits and stenographic notes taken by the court's official
reporter. At the trial Judge Kincaid said Major Hartigan appeared for the plaintiff and Señores Agoncillo, Cruz
Herrera, and Ferrer for the defendants.
After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel and a due consideration of the case, the court finds the
following facts established by the admissions and a decided preponderance of the evidence:
That the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, seven in number, are the proprietors and owners of the said daily
newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," and that "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," are one and the same newspaper, owned, managed, printed and published by the same persons;
that Teodoro M. Kalaw and Lope K. Santos were the editors in chief of directors of this paper on the 30th of
October, 1908, and that said nine defendants named were the owners, editors, proprietors, managers and
publishers of said newspaper on said 30th of October, 1908, for a long time prior thereto, and during all the
time mentioned in the complaint.
As to the defendants, Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete, they appear from the evidence to have been editors of said
paper, but in subordinate position to the chief editors or directors, Kalaw and Santos, and to have acted under
the direction of their latter two defendants.
The court further finds that every essential or material allegation of the complaint is true substantially as
therein stated, with the exception noted to Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, and Leoncio G. Liquete, and as
may be hereinafter indicated. The case is therefore dismissed as to these three defendants.
The only serious contention of the defense is (1) that the editorial "Birds of Prey" does not refer to a
determinate person; and (2) that, conceding that it does refer to the plaintiff, none of the defendants, except
Teodoro M. Kalaw, is responsible for the writing, printing, or publication of the alleged libelous article of the
damages to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.
In the opinion of the court this article so indubitably refers to the plaintiff, and was so easily and well
understood by the readers of said paper as indicating the plaintiff, that it would be an act of superrogation to
elaborately discuss the evidence adduced in support of or against the proposition. It is as clear to the court
from the evidence adduced as the noonday sun, that the plaintiff is the identical and only person meant and
referred to in said article "Birds and Prey;" and it requires no argument to prove that it does mean and refer to
him and was so intended by the writer, and therefore by said nine defendants, and could not have been
otherwise understood by any intelligent reader or subscriber of said paper, in view of the reasons assigned in
the complaint, which reasons are clearly disclosed and fully established by the evidence. And it may be added
that much valuable time was needlessly consumed by the defense at trial in an effort to establish the contrary.
It seems to the court a reflection upon the intelligence of the subscribers and readers of "El Renacimiento" to
contend that this editorial was not well understood by them as referring to the plaintiff, and as fully as if his
name had been mentioned in every paragraph thereof. And assuredly the omission of his name from the
editorial has made the libel less hurtful and disastrous in its results to the reputation and feelings of the
plaintiff.
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelve defendants were the
owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had originally contributed their
money as a partriotic donation to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and
property of the paper as trustees for this people, and that the paper was being devoted exclusively to
philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo and Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends, but
had not done so.
This proposition in the light of evidence is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration.
To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and common sense. That
those seven defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to the
foundation of said newspaper in 1901 for their own personal benefit and profit is fully and unmistakably
established. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he
has been and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that the other six persons
named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof, and were such on said 30th of October, 1908.
Arcadio Arellano testified positively that Galo Lichauco was one of the seven founders, and that Lichauco
contributed P1,000. Martin Ocampo testified that Galo Lichauco promised to contribute an amount which he
(the witness) did not remember but that Lichauco did not keep his promise. (See pp. 107, 108, and 231 of the
evidence.)
The other evidence and circumstances strongly corroborate Arcadio Arellano, and the court is constrained to
believe that Arellano told the truth and Ocampo did not. See Exhibit B-J, a copy of "El Renacimiento"
containing the article "Infamy Among Comrades," page 87 of the evidence, in which there was published that
these seven persons named are the shareholders of the paper.
Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to appear and testify, so as to enlighten the court as to which witness,
Arellano or Ocampo, told the truth, or whether chief editor Kalaw had his authority to publish in said paper, as
he did in November 22, 1907, that he, Galo Lichauco, was one of the shareholders. The presumptions are
therefore against Galo Lichauco. See S.S. Co. vs. Brancroft-Whitney Co. (36 C. C. A., 136 and 153).
It also appears from the evidence that Teodoro M. Kalaw was the chief editor or director of the Spanish
section of said paper, and that Lope K. Santos was the chief editor or director of the Tagalog section on said
30th of October, 1908, and that the Spanish and Tagalog sections are, and then were, one and the same
newspaper, but printed and published in different languages.
It is alleged that said newspaper has a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, and was published
and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila. Not only are these allegations
true, but it is also true that said newspaper has a daily circulation and subscribers in other parts of the world,
notably in the United States and Spain; and it has subscribers numbering in toto not less than 5,200, and a
daily issue of 6,000 copies.
It is also true as alleged, and the court so finds that since the year 1906 to said 30th of October, 1908, these
nine defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in their said newspapers, until at
last, on said 30th of October, 1908 with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, who on said date was
and still is a member of the Civil Commission and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippine
Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote,
printed, and published in their said newspaper, in its ordinary number of said 30th of October, 1908, the
malicious defamation and false libel of and concerning the plaintiff, entitled and herein alluded to as the
editorial "Birds of Prey," which libel was and is highly injurious to the plaintiff and from which the plaintiff has
sustained serious damage.
This editorial, when properly interpreted and read between the lines, means, besides other things, and was
intended by the writer to mean and be understood by the readers thereof as meaning substantially the
following:
That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, was born on the surface of the globe to eat and devour, like a bird of
prey, and that others, born to be eaten and devoured, are the prey and the food of the insatiable voracity of
the plaintiff; that the plaintiff had a desire to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird, the eagle, in order to
triumph in plundering his fellowman; that the plaintiff besides being an eagle, has the characteristics of
the vulture, the owl, and the vampire.
That the plaintiff ascended the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots, and
study and civilize them and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey the large deposits of gold-the
prey concealed amidst the mountains-and to appropriate them to himself afterwards, and that to this end the
plaintiff had the legal facilities, made and unmade at his own will, and that this is always done for his own
benefit.
That the plaintiff authorized, inspite of laws and ordinances, the illegal slaughtering is diseased cattle in order
to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meant which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his
official position; that while the plaintiff presents himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist
who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, his whole scientific labor is confined to
dissecting insects and importing fish eggs.
That although the plaintiff gave an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao and
Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the people, under the pretext of the
public good, as a strict matter of truth his object was to possess all the data and the key to the national wealth
for his essentially personal benefit, and that this is shown by his acquisition of immense properties registered
under the names of others.
That the plaintiff promoted, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of Manila of worthless land
at fabulous prices, which the city fathers dared not refuse from fear of displeasing the plaintiff, who was
behind the project, and which they did not refuse for their own good; that the plaintiff favored concessi ons for
hotels in Manila on filled-in land; with the prospect of enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of the
people.
That such are the characteristics of the plaintiff, who is at the same time an eagle that surprises and devours,
a vulture that gorges his self on deed and rotten meats, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a
vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. And this libelous article concludes with
the asseveration in substance that the plaintiff has been "weighed in the balance and found wanting" —
"Mane, Tecel, Phares."
That this editorial is malicious and injurious goes without saying. Almost every line thereof teems with
malevolence, ill will, and wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and feelings of the plaintiff; and from the
very nature and the number of the charges therein contained the editorial is necessarily very damaging to the
plaintiff.
That this editorial, published as it was by the nine defendants, tends to impeach the honesty and reputation of
the plaintiff and publishes his alleged defects, and thereby exposes him to public hatred, contempt, and
ridicule is clearly seen by a bare reading of the editorial.
It suffices to say that not a line is to be found in all the evidence in support of these malicious, defamatory and
injurious charges against the plaintiff; and there was at the trial no pretense whatever by the defendants that
any of them are true, nor the slightest evidence introduced to show the truth of a solitary charge; nor is there
any plea of justification or that the charges are true, much less evidence to sustain a plea.
In the opinion of the court "Birds of Prey," when read and considered in its relation to and connection with the
other articles libelous and defamatory in nature, published of and concerning the plaintiff by these nine
defendants anterior and subsequent to the publication of this article, and having reference to the same subject
matter as shown by the evidence, is one of the worst libels of record. It is safe to say that in all the court
reports to the Philippine Islands, or of Spain, or the United States, there is not to be found a libel case in which
there is a more striking exemplification of the spirit of hatred, bad faith, evil motive, mischievous intent, actual
malice, nefarious purpose, base malignity, or gross malevolence.
It is proper to observe also that since the beginning of this attack on the plaintiff in the year 1906 down almost
to the present time, so far from there being any apology, retraction, or effort to repair the injury already done
as far as lay in the power of the defendants, the persecution, wrong, and tortious injury to the plaintiff had
been steadily kept up and persisted in, without the slightest abatement of the malevolent spirit.
There has been neither retraction, apology, nor reparation; per contra, the libel has been repeated, reiterated,
and accentuated, and widely and extensively propagated by these nine defendants through the columns of
their said paper and otherwise; and it appears from the evidence that especial effort has been made by these
same defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the libelous and defamatory words used of and
concerning the plaintiff in said editorial.
Through their instrumentality and persistency in asserting and reasserting its truth, this diabolical libel has
been spread broadcast over the Philippine Islands and to other parts of the world. In said criminal case No.
4295 some of these nine defendants pleaded the truth of the charges; and in Exhibit A-Q is to be found this
language: "The defense will adduce its evidence demonstrating the truth of every one of the facts published."
In their said paper of the 11th of January, 1909, there is published statement:
"The brief period of time allowed us by the court, at the request of the counsel, to gather evidence
which we are to adduce in our effort to demonstrate the truth of the accusation that we have
formulated in the article which is the subject of the agitation against us, having expired, the trial of the
case against our director had been resumed." (See pp. 63 and 67 of the evidence.)
And about the same time they also declared in their said paper that "there is more graft than fish in the rivers
of Benguet." And this in the year of our Lord 1909! the persecution having begun in 1905; thus indicating that
there is to be no "let-up" or cessation of the hostile attitude toward the plaintiff or the vilification of his name
and assaults upon his character, much less a retraction or an apology, unless drastic means and measures
are made use of to the end that there may be no further propagation of the libel, or asseveration, or reiteration
of its truth.
This article "Birds of Prey" charges the plaintiff with malfeasance in office and criminal acts, and is therefore
libelous per se. It in substance charges the plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippine Islands and Secretary of the Interior of said Islands for personal ends. It is
charged also substantially that plaintiff in his official capacity wasted the public funds for the purpose of
promoting his own personal welfare, and that he violated the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances
of the city of Manila.
In its essence he is charged with taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing the people with
the object of gain for himself and for others; with being a bird of prey, a vulture (buzzard), an owl, and a
vampire that sucks the blood of the victim (meaning the people) until he leaves it bloodless, that is to say, robs
the people, until he leaves them wretched and poverty-stricken, deprived of all worldly possessions; and
lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like Belshazzar, has been weighed in the balance and found wanting as a high
Government functionary; all of which charges are false and malicious and without and foundation whatever in
fact, as the evidence fully demonstrates.
It is also a matter of fact, and the court so finds, that said defamation was written and published that it might
be understood, and it was understood, by the public officials of the Government and the people of the
Philippine Islands in general, and wherever else said newspaper may have circulated and been read, as
charging the plaintiff with the tortious and criminal acts and conduct charged in said editorial as hereinbefore
specified and interpreted.
The court finds it also true that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said
nine defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to
believe that the plaintiff was despotic and corrupt and unworthy of the position which he held, and for this
reason to oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they
endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him
so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines
and Secretary of the Interior.
It is also true that the said nine defendants, by means of said libel, and other like false statements in their said
newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the plaintiff and to incite
the people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which the
plaintiff has met with many difficulties which have greatly increased his labors as a public official.
It further appears from the evidence that not only has an effort been made by these nine defendants to give as
much publicity as possible to the charges, but in order that said defamation should attract the attention of the
public, they published the same under a heading in large, bold and showy type, so that it might be easily seen
and read by all the subscribers and readers of said paper.
In full view of all the evidence, therefore, it is clearly seen that every essential allegation of the complaint is
true substantially as therein claimed, and that the whole of the said editorial relating to the misconduct and
bad character of the plaintiff is false and without the slightest foundation in fact. Not a scintilla of evidence was
introduced in support of any injurious charge made therein against the plaintiff, to say nothing of the plaintiff's
evidence that each and every charge of malfeasance therein contained is false, and without reference to
whether a failure to plead the truth admits the falsity of the charge.
The evidence shows no "special" or "actual pecuniary damage," and none is alleged in the complaint. Two
other kinds of damages, however are claimed, to wit, general damages for injuries to the feelings and
reputation of the plaintiff and additional work to which he has been put by the conduct of the defendants,
which are laid in the sum of P50,000, and "punitive," exemplary, or vindictive damages, "as a warning to the
defendants," or as expressed in Act 277 of the Philippine Commission, as a just punishment to the libelers
and an example to others," which are laid in the same sum of P50,000.
The nine defendants being liable to the plaintiff for damages, the next question to be decided is what amount
of damages should be awarded the plaintiff for the injury to his reputation and feelings and his being a proper
case for punitive damages, the further question is, what sum shall be awarded as a just punishment to these
nine libelers and as an example to others. In neither of these cases is there any precise measure of damages.
In determining the amount to be awarded in the first instance it is proper to consider the previous character,
influence, reputation, standing, official position, hope of advancement, prospect of promotion, and social
status of the plaintiff and his family, and all the circumstances connected with the case.
The plaintiff is a man in the prime of life, holding, as he has held for the last ten years an important,
responsible, lucrative, high and exalted position of trust and honor in the service of the Government of the
United States, in the Philippine Islands, without a blotch on his family escutcheon, so far as the evidence
shows, and with an untarnished reputation as a man, as a citizen, and as a Government official.
He is a man of honesty, integrity, and high social position; a man of learning, famous as a scientist, and
scientific achievements and scholarly attainments, a man of industrious habits, genuine worth, and intellectual
force. He has read, studied, traveled and learned much, and is an author of merit and distinction. He was for a
long while a professor in one of the largest and most renowned institutions of learning in the world; he is a
man of vast experience, broad and liberal views, and an extensive acquaintanceship, not only in the Philippine
Islands, but in the United States and other countries of the world. He was well and favorably received by the
people wherever he journeyed previous to this atrocious libel upon his integrity and reputation.
He has discharged the duties of his lofty official position in a manner that reflects credit upon himself as well
as the Government which he represents, and apparently with entire satisfaction to all of his superiors in office
and the people generally; and but for this pernicious, outrageous, and highly reprehensible assault upon his
good name, fame and reputation, there were prospects of promotion to higher honors. And so far as his
personal and private record is concerned it was without a blemish anterior to the time when these unfounded
and dastardly aspersions were cast upon it by these nine defendants.
Indeed, it is only necessary to advert to the testimony of the defense itself to ascertain that the plaintiff is an
honorable man, and without a stain upon his character, officially or otherwise. It would be interesting to note
here in parallel columns and compare the charges made in "Birds of Prey" and the testimony of one of the
witnesses for the defendants.
Felipe Buencamino, an intelligent witness for the defense, in his testimony (p. 240) when asked the question,
Do you know Mr. Worcester?" he answers, "Yes, sir: I know him as an honorable man. I also know him as
an honest, honorable public official." In answer to another question he says, "As I have said, I know Mr.
 Worcester as a private citizen and as a public official, and my opinion of him is that of honorable man and an
upright official." And no other witness testified anything to the contrary.
"A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches and loving favor rather than silver of gold."
"Who steals my purse steals trash;
xxx xxx xxx
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed."
The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or
property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole scheme of human
civilization.
"The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a well-spent life vouchsafed
to man in this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth, and their possession the solace of
later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen and known of his fellowmen in the
active pursuits of life for many years, and who has developed a great character and an unblemished
reputation, has secured a possession more useful, and more valuable than lands, or houses, or silver,
or gold . . .
"The law recognizes the value of such a reputation, and constantly strives to give redress for its injury.
It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words, or libelous publication, a liability to make full
compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame and obloquy, and for the injury to the
feelings of the owner, which are caused by the publication of the slander or the libel.
"It goes further. If the words are spoken, or the publication is made, with the intent to injure the victim,
or with the criminal indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as a jury (in this case the
judge), in view of all the circumstances of the particular case adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay
as an example to the public, to deter others from committing like offenses, and as a punishment for
the infliction of the injury.
"In the ordinary acceptance of the term, malice signifies ill will, evil intent, or hatred, while it is legal
signification is defined to be "a wrongful act done intentionally, without legal justification." (36 C. C. A.,
475.)
Surely in the case at bar there was a wrongful or tortious act done intentionally and without the semblance of
justification or excuse, or proof that the libelous charges against the plaintiff were "published and good
motives and justifiable ends."
But the Legislature and the highest judicial authority of these Islands have spoken in no uncertain words with
regard to the rights of the plaintiff in this case; and we need not necessarily turn to the law of libel elsewhere,
or the decision of the courts in other jurisdictions to ascertain or determine his rights.
In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Libel Law (Act 277, Philippine Commission) is to be found the law of
these Islands especially applicable to this case. Section 1 thereof defines libel. Section 2 provides that every
person who willfully and with a malicious intent to injure another publishes, or procures to be published, any
libel shall be punished as therein provided. Section 3 provides that an injurious publication is presumed to
have been malicious if no justifiable motive for making it is shown. Section 4 provides, among other things,
that in all criminal prosecutions the truth may be given in evidence; but to establish this defense, not only must
the truth of the matter charged as libelous be proven, but also that it was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends; and the presumptions, rules of evidence, and special defenses are equally applicable in civil
and criminal actions, according to section 11 of said Act.
Section 6 is as follows:
"Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the
publication of any words contained in any part of such book or number of each newspaper or serial as
fully as if he were the author of the same."
And section 11 provides as follows:
"In addition to such criminal action, any person libeled as hereinbefore set forth shall have a right to a
civil action against the person libeling him for damages sustained by reason of such libel, and the
person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such civil action not only the actual pecuniary
damages sustained by him, but also damages for injury to his feelings and reputation, and in addition
such punitive damages as the court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler and an exa mple
to others. Suit may be brought in any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the parties. The
presumptions, rules or evidence and special defenses provided for in this chapter for criminal
prosecutions shall be equally applicable in civil actions under this section."
"The proprietor of a printing plant is responsible for publishing a libel. According to the legal doctrines
and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable
for the same." (Mr. Justice Torres, in U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 757.) But said section 6 plainly fixes
the liability of editors and proprietors of newspapers, and is clear enough for all the purposes of this
case.
Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep. 1551), speaking for our Supreme Court, says:
"When there is an averment in the complaint that the defamatory words used refer to the plaintiff, and
it is proven that the words do in fact refer to him and are capable of bearing such special application,
 an action for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory publication does not refer to the
plaintiff by name."
And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep., 4282), for the same high authority, says:
"In an action for libel damages for injury to feelings and reputation may be recovered though no actual
pecuniary damages are proven.
"Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless the tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice,
deliberate violence or oppression."
That is to say, if there is evil motive, or actual malice or deliberate violence, or oppression then punitive
damages, or "smart money," may be recovered.
And Justice Carson (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14 Phil., Rep., 338), also says:
"Actual or express malice of an alleged libelous publication may be inferred from the style and tone of
the publication.
"The publication of falsehood and calumny against public officers and candidates for public office is
specially reprehensible and is an offense most dangerous to the people and to the public welfare.
"The interest of society require that immunity should be granted to the discussion of public affairs, and
that all acts and matters of a public nature may be freely published with fitting comments and
strictures; but they do not require that the right to criticise public officers shall embrace the right to
base such criticism under false statements of fact, or attack the private character of the officer, or to
falsely impute to him malfeasance or misconduct in office."
And there are almost numberless English and American authorities in perfect harmony with these decisions of
our Supreme Court too numerous indeed to be cited here; and it is not necessary.
Among the leading cases, however, in the United States, is that of Scott vs. Donald (165 U.S., 58) and cases
therein cited. In this case the court says: "Damages have been defined to be the compensation which law will
allow for an injury done, and are said to be exemplary and allowable in excess of the actual loss when the tort
is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression," which is in entire harmony with
Justice Willard's decision hereinbefore cited.
And quoting from the decision in Day vs. Woodworth (13 Howard, 371) the same high court says:
"In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious, or gross or outrageous,
courts permit juries (here the court) to add to the measured compensation of the plaintiff which he
would have been entitled to recover, had the injury been inflicted without design or intention,
something further by way of punishment or example, which has sometimes been called "smart
money." "
It thus clearly appears that the facts established in the case at bar are more than sufficient to bring it within the
rule of law here laid down by the highest judicial authority.
Section 11 of the Libel Law expressly allows general damages; and Mr. Justice Willard, in Macleod vs.
3
Philippine Publishing Company, says:
"The general damages which are allowed in actions of libel are not for mental suffering alone, but they
are allowed for injury to the standing and reputation of the person libeled, and the common law of
England and America presumed that such damages existed without proof thereof from the mere fact
of publication of the libel."
In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the power of a jury in certain
actions in tort to assess against the tort feasor punitive damages. Where the injury has been inflicted
maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely, or indignity, the judge or jury, as the case may
be, is not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong committed against the
aggrieved person.
"The public position of the plaintiff, as an officer of the Government, and the evil example of libels, are
considerations with the jury (here the judge) for increasing damages." (Tillotson vs. Cheetham, 3
Johns, 56.)
"The character, condition and influence of the plaintiff are relevant on the matter of the extent of
damages." (Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How. Prac., 345; 13 Abb. Prac., 41, 311.)
"Where the publication is libelous, the law presumes that it was made with malice — technical, legal
malice, but not malice in fact — and the amount of damages depends in a large degree upon the
motives which actuated the defendants in its publication; and in such cases the law leaves it to the
jury (here the judge) to find a return such damages as they think right and just, by a sound,
temperate, deliberate, and reasonable exercise of their functions as jurymen." (Erber vs. Dun. (C. C.)
12 Fed., 526.)
"Actions of libel, so far as they involve questions of exemplary damages, and the law of principal and
agent, are controlled by the same rules as are other actions of tort. The right of a plaintiff to recover
exemplary damages exists wherever a tortious injury has been inflicted recklessly or wantonly, and it
is not limited to cases where the injury resulted from personal malice or recklessness of the
defendant. It follows that the owner of a newspaper is as responsible for all the acts of omission and
commission of those he employs to edit it and manage its affairs, as he would be if personally
managing the same.' (Malloy vs. Bennett, (C. C.) 15 Fed., 371.)
"The fact that a publication, libelous per se, was made without any attempt to ascertain its correctness
is sufficient to justify a finding that defendant committed libel client with a wanton indifference, and
 with actual malice sufficient to sustain exemplary damages." (Van Ingen vs. Star Co., 1 App. Div.,
429, 37 N.Y., 114.)
"The court is not authorized to set aside a verdict for $45,000 in an action for libel, where it appears
that plaintiff was persistently persecuted in the columns of defendant's newspaper, and that he and
his family were held up to public contempt and ridicule, and defendants withdraw from the case after
failing to establish a plea of justification." (Smith vs. Times Co., (Com. p. 1) 4 Pa. Dist. Rep., 399.)
"In considering the amount with the defendant shall pay, on this account (exemplary damages) the
turpitude of his conduct and his financial ability are only considered; and such consideration is not in
view of the injury or distress of the plaintiff, but in behalf of the public; the wrongful act is regarded as
an indication of the actor's vicious mind — an overt deed of vindictive or wanton wrong, offensive and
dangerous to the public good. This is the view of those damages which generally prevails."
(Sutherland on Damages, vol. 2, p. 1092. title Exemplary Damages.)
"Punitive damages are recoverable not to compensate the plaintiff, but solely to punish the defendant.
This legal motive would suffer defeat if punitive damages could not be given for a malicious attack on
a reputation too well established to receive substantial injury at the hands of a libeler." (Judge Bond in
Ferguson vs. Pub. Co., 72 Mo. App., 462.)
It may be suggested that the reputation of the plaintiff in this case is too well established to be seriously
affected by the defamatory words used of and concerning him in "Birds of Prey," but it would not be proper to
gravely consider this suggestion.
The conditions in these Islands are peculiar. The minds, thoughts, and opinions of the people are easily
molded, and the public is credulous and perhaps frequently too ready to believe anything that may be said in
derogation of an American official, especially when it is published and vouched for by the editorial and
business management and proprietors if a newspaper of the prominence, pretensions, circulation and
influence if "El Renacimiento," which paper is everlastingly proclaiming in its columns that it is being
conducted and published solely in the interests of the Filipino people — pro bono publico. There is stronger
disposition to give credence to what is said in a newspaper here in the Islands the elsewhere, and when
abuse, vilification, and defamation are persistently practiced for a period of several years, without modification
or retraction, but with renewed emphasis, the people naturally come to believe in its verity and authenticity.
It is apparent from the evidence that as an effect of the persecution of the plaintiff by "El Renacimiento" and
the libel published in its columns, the minds of the major part of the Filipino people have been poisoned and
prejudiced against the plaintiff to such an extent that he is regarded by these people as odious, dishonest,
unscrupulous and tyrannical.
It may be that his reputation has not suffered so severely with those of his own race, but when it is considered
that his vocation has tenfold more to do with the Filipinos than with his own people, that his official duties
place him in constant contact with them, and that his success in his chosen career is largely dependent upon
their good will and support, it is manifest that the damage to his reputation has been very great and that a
large sum of money should be awarded to indemnify him, as far as money can indemnify, for the loss of his
good name with the Filipino people.
The plaintiff came to the Philippine Islands when a young man, full of hope and ambition. Since his arrival he
has devoted himself incessantly and indefatigably to the uplifting of the inhabitants of the Archipelago and to
the faithful performance, as far as he was able, of the pledges and promises of the Government to the Filipino
people. The duties of his particular office were such as brought him in more immediate and constant contract
with the people than any other official of the same category in these Islands.
It is clearly shown that the plaintiff faithfully endeavored to perform, and did efficiently perform, all of these
duties, doing everything that he could in an unselfish and disinterested manner of the welfare and
development of the country and its people, knowing full well that his career, as well as his advancement,
depended largely upon the good will of these people, and that by incurring their censure or displeasure he
would have little hope of success in his chosen work.
Imagine, therefore, the chagrin, disappointment, mortification, mental suffering, and distress, and perturbation
of spirit that would necessarily be occasioned him when he discovered that through the nefarious, studied,
and practiced persecution of the paper in question, these high hopes were blasted, and that, instead of having
gained the respect and gratitude of the people for the assiduous labors devoted to their uplifting, they had
been made to believe that, instead of being a benefactor, he was a vampire that was sucking their life blood, a
corrupt politician who was squandering the money wrung from the people by means of taxation, in schemes
for his own personal aggrandizement and enrichment.
That instead of developing the mineral wealth of the Islands he was taking up all the rich veins and
appropriating them in the names of subservient tools, to his own personal use, benefit and profit. That instead
of protecting the people from disease, he was, by means of infected meat and for his own personal gain,
spreading contagion among them.
That he united in his person all the bad qualities of the vulture, the eagle, and the vampire; that, in short, he
was a "bird of prey," with all that is implied in that term in its worst acceptation; that he was a corrupt tyrant,
who never lost an opportunity to do the people hurt; that instead of wishing them well and seeking their
advancement, he was their enemy, who never lost an opportunity to degrade and humiliate them; that instead
of preferring them for office and positions of official trust, he treated them with all sorts of contempt and
indifference.
 It is difficult to appreciate the feelings of a refined soul in its contemplation of a result so disastrous, so unjust,
and so unmerited.
It is furthermore shown that when the plaintiff came to these Islands a young scientist he had already won
fame in his own country; that he is a fellow of the important scientific associations in the world. His election as
a fellow or member of these scientific bodies shows that his labors in the Philippines were the object of
solicitude by the prominent scientific and learned men not only of his own race, but in many other civilized
countries of the world. Important results were evidently expected of him by them, and it can not be doubted
that they expected of him of life honestly devoted to the conscientious discharge of his duties as a trusted
public functionary of the American Government in the Philippine Islands.
And yet he is falsely denounced in the columns of said newspaper to his fellows of these societies as a man
who is so absolutely corrupt, so inordinately selfish and avaricious that he has not considered for a moment
the duties incumbent upon him; that he has been oblivious to every obligation of trust and confidence, and
that he is unworthy of the respect of honest men.
One witness testified that he read this libel in the public library of the city of Boston. It is furthermore shown
that copies of this paper went to Spain, England, and to different parts of the United States; and inasmuch as
the plaintiff is a man of prominence in the scientific world, it is to be inferred that his fellows became more or
less aware of these heinous charges.
Thus we find that the plaintiff is here confronted with disappointed ambition and frustrated hopes, and placed
in the humiliating attitude of having to explain to his fellows that the charges are untrue, of adducing evidence
to clear himself, perhaps never with complete success, of the stain that has been cast upon his reputation by
the libelous and defamatory declarations contained in "Birds of Prey."
In view of the foregoing findings of fact and circumstances of the case and the law applicable thereto,
It is the opinion of the court, and the court so finds, that the plaintiff has sustained damages on account of
wounded feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of thirty-five
thousand (P35,000) pesos, and that he is entitled to recover this sum of the nine defendants named, as being
responsible for having written, printed, and published said libel; and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover of
them the further sum of twenty-five thousand (P25,000) pesos, as punitive damages, which the court thinks
will be a just punishment to these nine libelers and an example to others.
Wherefore, it is so ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, have and recover of the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel
Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, the sum of sixty
thousand (P60,000) pesos, and the costs of suit, for which execution may issue.
It is ordered. At Manila, P.I., this 14th day of January , 1910.
From said decision the defendants appealed and made the following assignments of error in this court:
I. The court erred in overruling our motions for suspension of this case, in its present state, until final judgment
should be rendered in criminal case No. 4295 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, pending appeal in the
Honorable Supreme Court, for libel based also on the editorial, "Birds of Prey."
II. The court erred in admitting as evidence mere opinion adduced by counsel for the plaintiff with the intention of
demonstrating to whom the editorial, alleged to the libelous, refers.
III. The court erred in giving greater preponderance to the opinions of the witnesses for the plaintiff than to the
expert testimony of the defense.
IV. The court erred in declaring the editorial on which the complaint is based to be libelous per se and to refer
necessarily to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester.
V. The court erred in declaring the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose,
Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco to be owners of "El Renacimiento."
VI. The court erred in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 3 presented by counsel for the defendants.
VII. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendants.
VIII. The court erred in sentencing the defendants jointly "and severally" to pay to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester,
the sum of P60,000.
IX. The court erred in not ordering that execution of the judgment to be confined to the business known as "El
Renacimiento" and to the defendant Teodoro M. Kalaw, without extending to property of the alleged owners of
said newspaper which was not invested therein by them at its establishment.
X. The court erred in granting damages to the plaintiff by virtue of the judgment rendered against the defendants.
XI. The court, finally, erred in granting to the plaintiff punitive damages against the alleged owners of "El
Renacimiento," admitting the hypothesis that said editorial is libelous per se and refers to the Honorable Dean
C. Worcester.
The theory of the defendants, under the first assignment of error, is that the civil action could not proceed until the
termination of the criminal action, relying upon the provisions of the Penal Code in support of such theory. This court,
however, has decided in the case of Ocampo et al. vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment in a criminal
prosecution for libel, under the provisions of Act 277 of the Civil commission, constitutes no bar or estoppel in a civil
action based upon the same acts or transactions. The reason most often given for this doctrine is that the two
proceedings are not between the same parties. Different rule as to the competency of witnesses and the weight of
evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings always exist. As between civil and criminal actions under
said Act (No. 277) a judgment in one is no bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the other. A judgment in a criminal
cause, under said Act, can not be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action. (Stone vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 178;
Boyd vs. U.S., 616 U. S., 616, 634; Lee vs. U.S., 150 U.S., 476, 480; U.S. vs. Jaedicke, 73 Fed. Rep., 100;
U.S. vs.Schneider, 35 Fed. Rep., 107; Chamberlain vs. Pierson, 87 Fed. Rep., 420; Steel vs. Cazeaux, 8 Martin (La.),
318, 13 American Decisions, 288; Betts vs. New Hartford, 25 Conn., 185.)
In a criminal action for libel the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the defendant, beyond
a reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by a preponderance of
evidence only. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins (supra); Reilly vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 27 American
decisions, 708; Cooley on Torts, sec. 208; Greenleaf on Evidence, 426; Wigmore on Evidence, secs. 2497, 2498.)
With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, we find that this court has already decided the
question raised thereby, in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1).
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called several witnesses for the purpose of showing that the statements made
in said alleged libelous editorial were intended to apply to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior.
The defendants duly objected to these questions and excepted to the ruling of the court admitting them.
In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642) the same question was raised and the court, in its decision, said:
The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the application of the slanderous words to the
plaintiff and the extrinsic matters alleged in the declaration may be shown by the testimony of witnesses who
knew the parties and circumstances and who can state their judgment and opinion upon the application and
meaning of the terms used by the defendant. It is said that where the words are ambiguous on the face of the
libel, to whom it was intended to be applied, the judgment and opinion of witnesses, who from their knowledge
of the parties and circumstances are able to form a conclusion as to the defendant's intention and application
of the libel is evidence for the information of the jury.
Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says:
The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted with the circumstances, to state that, in
reading the libel, they at once concluded it was aimed at the plaintiff. It is not necessary that all the world
should understand the libel. It is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he is the person
meant. (See also Falkard's Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th English edition, 589.)
The correctness of this rule is not only established by the weight of authority but is supported by every consideration
of justice and sound policy. The lower court committed no error in admitting the opinion of witnesses offered during the
trial of the cause. One's reputation is the sum or composite of the impressions spontaneously made by him from time
to time, and in one way or another, upon his neighbors and acquaintances. The effect of a libelous publication upon
the understanding of such persons, involving necessarily the identity of the person libeled is of the very essence of the
wrong. The issue in a libel case concerns not only the sense of the publication, but, in a measure its effect upon a
reader acquainted with the person referred to. The correctness of the opinion of the witnesses as to the identity of the
person meant in the libelous publication may always be tested by cross-examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72
Fed. Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417; Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236; Smith vs.Miles, 15 Vt., 245;
Miller vs. Butler, 6 Cushing (Mass.), 71.)
It is true that some of the courts have established a different rule. We think, however, that a large preponderance of
the decisions of the supreme courts of the different States is in favor of the doctrine which we have announced here.
We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may fairly be considered together, the question being
whether or not the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court shows, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the said editorial was libelous in its character. Here again we find that this question has been passed
upon by this court in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1), and we deem it unnecessary to discuss this
question again, for the reason that the evidence adduced in the present cause was practically the same, or at least to
the same effect, as the evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo et al. It is sufficient here to say that the
evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause shows, by a large preponderance of the evidence, that said
editorial was one of the most pernicious and malicious libels upon a just, upright and honorable official, which the
courts have ever been called upon to consider. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the entire record, notwithstanding
the fact that the defendants from time to time attempted to make a show of proving the truthfulness of the statements
made in said editorial, which in any way reflects upon the character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C. Worcester, in the
administration of his department of the Government.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court erred in holding that the defendants, Martin
Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco,
were the proprietors of "El Renacimiento," the lower court said:
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelve defendants were the
owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had originally contributed their
money as a patriotic donation to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and
property of the paper as trustee for this people, and that the paper was being devoted exclusively to
philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends but had
not done so.
"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the evidence, is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if an y,
serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and common
sense. That those seven defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to
the foundation of said newspaper in 1901, for their own personal benefit and profit, is fully and unmistakably
established. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he has been
and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that the other six persons named are
shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof and were such on the said 30th of October, 1908."
Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court, we find, sometime before the commencement of
the present action and before any question was raised with reference to who were the owners of the said newspaper,
that the defendant, Arcadio Arellano, in the case of United States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338), testified upon
that question as follows:
Q. Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"?
A. I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto, and Galo Lichauco.
Q. Who else?
A. No one else.
Q. And Rafael Palma — is not so?
A. No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.
During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that his declarations in other cause were true.
It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of November, 1907, long before the commencement of
the present action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an article which was published in "El Comercio," published the
following statement:
They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the publication of "El Renacimiento") "is sustained by
Federal money; that we are inspired by Federal personages. We declare that this, besides being false, is
calumnious. The shareholders of this company are persons well known by the public, and never at any
moment of their lives have they acted with masks on--those masks for which "El Comercio" seems to have so
great an affection. They are, as the public knows: Señores Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano,
Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit.
Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause that he contributed P750 to the establishment of "El
Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of P500; that Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel
Jose contributed the sum of P250 or P500 each; that Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of P1,000 and that Manuel
Palma contributed P3,000.
During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose testified as witnesses, relating
to the ownership of the newspaper called "El Renacimiento." They testified that whatever money they gave for the
purpose of establishing said newspaper, was given as a donation, and that they were neither the owners nor
coowners of said periodical. The defendants, Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit,
did not testify as witnesses during the trial of the cause in the lower court. No reason is given for their failure to appear
and give testimony in their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether or not the declarations of Arcadio
Arellano, in the case of U. S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at the time they were made, were called to the attention
of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to "El Comercio," above
noted. Proof of said declarations and publication was adduced during the trial of the cause in the present case, and
the attorney of these particular defendants well knew the purpose and effect of such evidence, if not disputed; but,
notwithstanding the fact that said declarations and publication were presented in evidence, and notwithstanding the
fact that the attorney for the defendants knew of the purpose of such proof, the defendants, Palma, Lichauco, Barretto,
and Cansipit, were not called as witnesses for the purpose of rebutting the same. It is a well settled rule of evidence,
that when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all
the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to
offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences
against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway Company vs. Ellis, C. C. A. Reports, vol.
4, p. 454; Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295; People vs.McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)
Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63, 65) said:
It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power
of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other side to have contradicted.
Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that:
The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in elucidation of the subject matter in dispute, which is
within his power and which rests peculiarly within his own knowledge, frequently offers occasion for
presumptions against him, since it raises the strong suspicion that such evidence, if adduced, would operate
to his prejudice. (Pacific Coast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A. Reports, 136, 153.)
At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the time of the said publication in
reply to "El Comercio," there was no reason for stating anything except the truth: neither does there seem to have
been any reason for publishing the fact that the defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" unless it was true.
At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they were donors and public benefactors only. They
seemed to be proud of the fact that they were the owners. The editors, publishers, and managers of "El
Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El Comercio" was published, seemed to be anxious to announce to the public
who its owners were. It ("El Renacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged to no one; that it had been born into
the community without percentage; that it had been created a terrible machine for the purpose of destroying the good
character and reputation of men without having any one to respond for its malicious damage occasioned to honorable
men; that it was a cast-off, without a past or the hope of a future; that it was liable to be kicked and buffetted about the
persecuted and destroyed without any one to protect it; that its former friends and creators had scattered hither and
thither and had disappeared like feathers before a cyclone, declaring, under oath, that they did not know their offspring
and were not willing to recognize it in public. It seems to have been a Moses found in the bulrushes, destined by its
creators to be a great good among the Filipino people, in teaching them to respect the rights of persons and property;
but, unlike its Biblical prototype, it became, by reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in the
State, to enter the private abode of lawabiding citizens and to take from them their honor and reputation, which neither
it nor the State could restore. To rob a man of his wealth is to rob him of trash, but to take from him his good name
and reputation is to rob him of that which does not make the robber richer and leaves the person robbed poor indeed.
The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which they gave for the establishment of "El Renacimiento" was
a pure donation. They claim that it was a donation to the Filipino people. They do not state, however, or attempt to
show what particular persons were to manage, control, and direct the enterprise for which the donation was made. A
donation must be made to definite persons or associations. A donation to an indefinite person or association is an
anomaly in law, and we do not believe, in view of all of the facts, that it was in fact made. A donation must be made to
some definite person or association and the donee must be some ascertained or ascertainable person or association.
A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be made, in the very nature of things, to some
definite person or association. A donation made to no person or association could not be regarded as a donation in
law. It could not be more than an abandonment of property. Of course where a donation is in fact made, without
reservation to a particular person or association, the donor is no longer the owner of the thing donated nor
responsible, in any way, for its use, provided that the object, for which the donation was made, was legal. A person
does not become an owner or part owner of a church, for example, to the construction of which he has made a
donation; neither is he responsible for the use to which said edifice may be applied. No one disputes the fact that
donations may be made for the public use, but they must be made to definite persons or associations, to be
administered in accordance with the purpose of the gift.
We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the defendants and appellants, at the time they presented the
defense that they were donors simply and not owners, had a reasonable hope that their declarations as to said
donation, given in the manner alleged, would be believed by the court.
After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and taking into consideration the failure of the other
defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a preponderance of such evidence shows that the defendants, Martin
Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit,
were the coowners of the newspaper known as "El Renacimiento," at the time of the publication of the said alleged
libel.
With reference to the sixth assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the lower court committed an error in not
admitting in evidence the judgment of acquittal of the defendant, Lope K. Santos, rendered in the criminal cause, we
are of the opinion that the refusal to admit said evidence in the civil cause was not an error. The fact that the evidence
in the criminal cause was insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was guilty of the crime charged, in no way barred
the right of the person injured by said alleged libel to maintain the present civil action against him.
(Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep., 681.) The criminal action had to be sustained by evidence showing the culpability
of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the civil action it is sufficient to show that the defendants injured
the plaintiff by the alleged libelous publication, by a preponderance of the evidence only. (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec.
426; Cooley on Torts, 208; Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 23 Am. Dec., 708.)
In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin, La., 318; 13 American Decisions, 288), the supreme court of Louisiana
said:
A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution can not be given in evidence in a civil action.
In the case of Betts et al. vs. New Hartford (25 Conn., 180) Mr. Justice Ellsworth said (in a case where a judgment in a
criminal case was offered in evidence):
A conviction in a criminal case is not evidence of facts upon which the judgment was rendered, when those
facts come up in a civil case, for this evidence would not be material; and so the law is perfectly well settled.
(1 Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 536, 524; 1 Phillips on Evidence, 231; Hutchinson vs. Bank of Wheeling, 41
Pa. St., 42; Beausoleil vs. Brown, 12 La. Ann., 543; McDonald vs. Stark, 176 Ill., 456, 468.)
While we believe that the lower court committed no error in refusing to admit the sentence acquitting Lope K. Santos
in the criminal case, we are of the opinion, after a careful examination of the record brought to this court, that it is
insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was responsible, in any way, for the publication of the alleged libel, and
without discussing the question whether or not the so-called Tagalog edition of "El Renacimiento" and "El
Renacimiento" constituted one and the same newspaper, we find that the evidence is insufficient to show that Lope K.
Santos is responsible in damages, in any way, for the publication of the said alleged libel.
The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error together, and claim that the lower court committed
an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants and in allowing an execution against the
individual property of said owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in support of their
contention. The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present
action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for
the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The defendants might have been sued
separately for the commission of the tort. They might have been sued jointly and severally, as they were.
(Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the
plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because
the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey, Common Law Pleadings, 86.) It is not necessary
that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give an example, in a case of assault and battery
committed by various persons, under the common law all are principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or
assists in any way he commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or counseled, in any
way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.
(Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)
It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they
had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312
and note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N. Y.), 612;
Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them,
or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the
whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined
with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with
that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English Reports), 343; Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171;
Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1;
Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among
themselves. They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly
and severally liable for the full amount. (Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417;
Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)
A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist
against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement,
generally operates to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.), 290;
Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387; Turner vs.Hitchcock,
20 Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)
Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors are liable and that others are
not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And
this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson (N. Y.), 382;
Drake vs. Barrymore, 14 Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)
This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section 6 provides that:
Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part . . . or number
of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.
In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants and
allowing an execution against their individual property. The provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes cited by the
defendants and appellants have no application whatever to the question presented in the present case.
The tenth assignment of error above noted relates solely to the amount of damages suffered on account of wounded
feelings, mental suffering and injury to the good name and reputation of Mr. Worcester, by reason of the alleged
libelous publication. The lower court found that the damages thus suffered by Mr. Worcester amounted to P35,000.
This assignment of error presents a most difficult question. The amount of damages resulting from a libelous
publication to a man's good name and reputation is difficult of ascertainment. It is nor difficult to realize that the
damage thus done is great and almost immeasurable. The specific amount the damages to be awarded must depend
upon the facts in each case and the sound discretion of the court. No fixed or precise rules can be laid down
governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It is difficult to include all of the facts and conditions which enter
into the measure of such damages. A man's good name and reputation are worth more to him than all the wealth
which he can accumulate during a lifetime of industrious labor. To have them destroyed may be eminently of more
damage to him personally than the destruction of his physical wealth. The loss is immeasurable. No amount of money
can compensate him for his loss. Notwithstanding the great loss which he, from his standpoint, sustains, the courts
must have some tangible basis upon which to estimate such damages.
In discussing the elements of damages in a case of libel, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, who tried the present case
in the court below, correctly said that, "The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the
possession of life, liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society, that underlie the whole
scheme of human civilization. The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a wellspent life
vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth and its possession is a solace in later
years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen known by his fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for
many years, and who has developed a great character and an unblemished reputation, has secured a possession
more useful and more valuable than lands or houses or silver or gold. The law recognizes the value of such a
reputation and constantly strives to give redress for its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words
or libelous publications, the liability to make full compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame,
obloquy and for the injury to the feelings of its owner, which are caused by the publication of the slander or libel. The
law goes further. If the words are spoken or the publication is made with the intent to injure the victi m or with criminal
indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as the jury, in view of all the circumstances of the particular
case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public and to deter others from doing likewise,
and for punishment for the infliction of the injury."
As was said above, the damages suffered by Mr. Worcester to his good name and reputation are most difficult of
ascertainment. The attorney for the appellants, in his brief, lends the court but little assistance in reaching a
conclusion upon this question. The appellants leaves the whole question to the discretion of the court, without any
argument whatever.
After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that part of the judgment of the lower court relating to the damages
suffered by the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be modified, and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of
Mr. Dean C. Worcester and against the defendants, jointly and severally, for the sum of P15,000, with interest at 6 per
cent from the 23d of January, 1909.
With reference to the eleventh assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the court erred in imposing punitive
damages upon the defendants, we are of the opinion, after a careful examination of the evidence, and in view of all of
the facts and circumstances and the malice connected with the publication of said editorial and the subsequent
publications with relation to said editorial, that the lower court, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 277 of the
Philippine Commission, was justified in imposing punitive damages upon the defendants.
Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for libel, to render a judgment for punitive damages, in an
amount which the court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be recovered if the defendant or defendants are actuated by
malice. In the present case there was not the slightest effort on the part of the defendants to show the existence of
probable cause or foundation whatever for the facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred, and ill will against the
plaintiff are seen throughout the record. The said editorial not only attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain, but upon
every occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of the severest kind.
Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a conclusion relating to the damages which should be imposed upon the
defendants for the purpose of punishment. Upon this question the courts must be governed in each case by the
evidence, the circumstances and their sound discretion. Taking into consideration the fact that some of the defendants
have been prosecuted criminally and have been sentenced, and considering that fact as a part of the punitive
damages, we have arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of the lower court should be modified, and that a
judgment should be rendered against the defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of the plaintiff, the Honorable
Dean C. Worcester, in the sum of P10,000, as punitive damages, with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d day of
January, 1909.
Therefore, after a full consideration of all the facts contained in the record and the errors assigned by the appellants in
this court, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be modified and that a judgment should be
rendered in favor of Dean C. Worcester and against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally,
for the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of January, 1909, with costs, and that a judgment
should be entered absolving Lope K. Santos from any liability under said complaint. So ordered.
Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 9010. March 28, 1914. ]
J. H. CHAPMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, Defendant-Appellee. Wolfson & Wolfson
for Appellant. Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MASTER AND SERVANT; NEGLIGENCE OF AUTOMOBILE DRIVER. — The owner of an automobile, present in
the vehicle, is not liable for the negligent acts of a competent driver unless such acts are continued for such a
length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist
therefrom, and to fail to do so.
2. ID.; ID. — If a competent driver of an automobile in which the owner thereof is at the time present, by a sudden
act of negligence, without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, violates
the law, the owner of the automobile is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that he, by acquiescence, makes his
driver’s act his own.
3. ID.; ID. — Quaere. Whether the owner of an automobile would be responsible for the acts of a competent driver,
whether present or not, where the automobile causing the injury is a part of a business enterprise and is being
driven in furtherance of the owner’s business at the time the injury complained of is caused.
DECISION
MORELAND, J. :
At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action, there was a single-track street-car line
running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. One of these
switches was located at the scene of the accident.
The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of Creveling, in front of whose house the accident
happened. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being
told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed from the gate into
the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the
front or the rear platform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without
extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in
order to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant’s automobile.
The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a
competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately in front of him, he followed along
behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which he was following took the switch — that
is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the defendant no
longer followed that street car nor went to the left, but either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to
the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that
in which defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff attempted to board, was
almost in front of defendant’s automobile, defendant’s driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the
plaintiff, as above described.
The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that defendant’s driver was guilty of negligence
in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in comi ng
out to board the car, was not obliged for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his
left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no
automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for
cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street
car.
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and circumstances
of this case. As we have said in the case of Johnson v. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list
of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts
were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligence acts of the
driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to
continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of
an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without
any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both
criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden
act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures
a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s act his own.
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the wrong
side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to
correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and
pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the
negligence of the driver.
 Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver, would be responsible, whether
present or not, for the negligence acts of his driver when the automobile was a part of accident in furthermore of the
owner’s business, we do not now decide.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the Appellant. Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ.,
concur. Trent, J., concurs in the result.
[G.R. No. L-20392. December 18, 1968.]
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO,
ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, Defendants-Appellants.
Norberto J. Quisumbing, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso & Divino for defendants- appellants.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY FOR DRIVER’S NEGLIGENCE THEREFOR. — The applicable
law relative to the solidary liability of the employer with the driver is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the foregoing
provision if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of the due diligence. The rule is not new, although
formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS THEREOF. — The basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather
the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or
damage.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF NEGLIGENCE. — The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to
a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are
professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for
them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to
appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What
would be a negligent omission under the aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and
knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not
similarly equipped.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER IS NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE INSTANT CASE. — In the present case the defendant’s
evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai’s driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by
Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of
traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence
on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in
his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also
sufficient time to act upon it. Such negligence may not be imputed. The car was not running at an unreasonable
speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner
to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of
the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not
constitute negligence for he was not himself at the wheel. And even he did see it at the distance, he could not have
anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was that there was such no reasonable opportunity for Yu
Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was
that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a
thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to present the misfortune. We
hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai solidarily with Rafael Bernardo is an error.

DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his family were injured
they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo Et. Al., the sum
of P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000 for moral damages; P10,000 for exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for
attorney’s fees, with costs against the defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby
ordered dismissed, for lack of merits.

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the
plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of the total amount of the
plaintiffs’ claim.

There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was
defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the first question
the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with him.

The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue)
in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to
the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo
and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael
Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The
two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic —
the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers).
Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a
carretela owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled
around the rig’s vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro’s son, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away. This
is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they
should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as
he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful,
as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing
down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did
so the curved end of his car’s right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig’s left wheel wrenching it off and
carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle . On his
part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the
carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble - beat the
Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a
risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to
35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo
saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the
oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car’s right side was insufficient. Its
rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the
unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful.
The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at
the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable on Rafael Bernardo’s negligence and that he must be
held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the
Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads: :

"ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that driver was
negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months."

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was
present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not
new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed Chapman v. Underwood
(1914) 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held: :

". . . The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a
length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the
law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that
the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his
chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although
he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results
produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the otherhand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the
owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal
law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either
civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length
of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s act his own."

The basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of pater familias. The
theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by
him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants’ evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai’s driver since 1937, and
before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time
he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be
imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him
clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.
The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of
traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to
rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only
twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the
wheel. And even when he did see it at the distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass
the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time
element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the
driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only
make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of
that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In
many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because
they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative
dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent
omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a
motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells
him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level
imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe
and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers’ services, would be
effectively prescribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next
question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48,000 by way of moral damages
is itemized as follows:.
1. Marcial Caedo ................ P20,000.00 4. Eileen Caedo ................. 4,000.00
2. Juana S. Caedo ................ 15,000.00 5. Rose Elaine Caedo .............. 3,000.00
3. Ephraim Caedo ................ 3,000.00 6. Merilyn Caedo ................ 3,000.00
Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them also actual or compensatory
damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the
amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for either side.
The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their injuries, other than expenses for
medical treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain
and suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual,
damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following: :
"MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall, anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, 1st to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a double fracture; Subparieto-pleural
hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.
JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior; left with displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx, right big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals, III and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.
EPHRAIM CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital.
EILEEN CAEDO:
A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.
B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx, middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral (37 shin, lower 1/3).
ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasobial region; (4) leg, lower third, anterior.
MARILYN CAEDO:
 A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third.
B. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See Exhibits, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4 and D-
5)."
It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral
damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai
free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., did not take part.
G.R. No. L-62988 February 28, 1985
FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA, JR., petitioners, vs. THE HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS DELA ROSA, respondents.
Ezequiel S. Consulta for petitioners.
David M. Castro for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals. The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna
who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive,
and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.
In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa,
the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose
dela Rosa to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net
earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his
companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. (Record on Appeal, p. 35.)
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which in a decision dated May 22, 1979, affirmed in totothat
of the trial court. (Rollo, p. 48.) However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants-appellants, the
Court of Appeals, in a resolution dated June 19, 1981, modified its judgment thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in this case is hereby modified insofar as the judgment ordering
the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P 1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with legal interest
from July 5, 1973, is concerned. In lieu thereof, defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as unearned net
earnings of Roberto R. Luna, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint
until the whole amount shall have been totally paid.
The rest of the other dispositions in the judgment a quo stand. (Rollo, pp. 33-34.)
Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate court's decision.
In G.R. No. 57362, the petition for review of Jose and Luis dela Rosa was denied for lack of merit on October 5, 1981.
Subsequently, they informed that the decision sought to be reviewed was not yet final because the Lunas had a
pending motion for reconsideration. For prematurity, this Court set aside all previous resolutions. On February 16,
1983, acting upon the motion and manifestation of the petitioners, they were required to file an amended petition
within thirty days from notice. On June 20, 1983, this Court resolved: "For failure of the petitioners to file an amended
petition as required, this case is hereby DISMISSED and the dismissal is final."
The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 — is the separate appeal of the Lunas. Their petition contains the following
prayer:
1. That the petition be given due course;
2. That after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered, setting aside or modifying the RESOLUTION
of respondent Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1981, attached as Annex "A" to the petition, only
insofar as it reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, s• as to affirm the trial court's finding
as to the unearned net earnings of the deceased in the amount of P1,650,000.00;
3. Ordering that the award of attorney's fees shall also be with interest, at the legal rate. (Rollo, p. 27.)
On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due course. (Rollo, pp. 122-123.)
In the light of the foregoing, the resolution stated:
It thus appears that the questions in esse are with respect to the award for unearned net earnings —
should the award be P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 as originally adjudged; and
whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate.
The Court takes notice that the wrongful death occurred as early as January 18, 1970, and that until
now the process of litigation is not yet over. In the meantime the value of the Philippine peso has
been seriously eroded so that the heirs of the deceased may ultimately have a greatly depreciated
judgment. In the interest of justice, the private respondents are hereby ordered to PAY to the
petitioners within thirty (30) days from notice the following amounts adjudged against them:
P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased; (P12,000.00 as compensatory damages;
P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship with legal interest from July 3, 1973; and P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the award for unearned net earnings shall be
increased to P1,650,000.00; and whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at
the legal rate. The costs will be adjudged as a matter of course. (Rollo, p. 123.)
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they said that they had no cash
money. Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the attempt of the special sheriff
to enter the private respondent's premises so that he could make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by
guards and this Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in enforcing the writ of execution.
The execution yielded only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly
enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet." (Rollo, p. 208.)
1. On the amount of the award.
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have
lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross
income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
This is what the trial court said on Luna's life expectancy:
According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33 the life expectancy of Roberto
Luna was 33.4 years, and under the Commissioner Standard Ordinary, used by our domestic
insurance companies since 1968 for policies above P5,000.00 his life expectancy was 38.51 years.
Dr. Vicente Campa, medical director of San Miguel Corporation, testified that he was the regular
physician of Roberto Luna since his marriage to Felina Rodriguez in 1957. He said that except for a
slight anemia which he had ten years earlier, Roberto Luna was of good health. Allowing for this
condition, he could reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of 30 years. (Record on Appeal, p.
33.)
The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court's conclusion said:
We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion that the deceased had a life expectancy of
thirty years. At the time of Luna's death, he was only thirty-three years old and in the best of health.
With his almost perfect physical condition and his sound mind, the expectation that he could have
lived for another thirty years is reasonable, considering that with his educational attainment, his social
and financial standing, he had the means of staying fit and preserving his health and well-being. That
he could have lived at least until the age of sixty-three years is an assessment which is more on the
conservative side in view of the testimony of Dr. Vicente Campa that the general life expectancy
nowadays had gone up to seventy years. (Rollo, p. 45.)
The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court in respect of Luna's annual income and expense. This is what
the trial court said:
Roberto Luna was 33 years old when he died, and was survived by his wife Felina Rodriguez-Luna,
and two children, Roberto Jr., 13 years, and Jose, 12 years. His wife was 35 years old at the time. He
declared a gross income of P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit I), P29,700,000 for 1968 (Exhibit H) and
P45,117.69 for 1969 (Exhibit G). He had investments in various corporations amounting to
P136,116.00 (Exhibits K, M, M-1, N, N-1 to N-3, O, O-1, P, Q and R) and was the president and
general manager of Rodlum Inc.; general manager of Esso Greenhills Service Center; Assistant
manager of Jose Rodriguez Lanuza Sons; director of Steadfast Investment Corporation; chairman
and treasurer of Greenhills Industrial Corporation; vice-president of Oasis, Inc.; director of Nation
Savings Association; director of Arlun Taxi; and treasurer of National Association of Retired Civil
Employees.
... . His income tax returns show an increase in his income in the short period of three years. It is
reasonable to expect that it would still go higher for the next fifteen years and reach a minimum of
P75,000.00 a year. The potential increase in the earning capacity of a deceased person is recognized
by the Supreme Court. ... the court believes that the expected gross earnings of Roberto Luna should
be fixed in the sum of P75,000.00 a year for the period of his life expectancy of 30 years, but
deducting his personal expenses which, because of his business and social standing the court in the
amount of P20,000.00 a year, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 32-34.)
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court of Appeals took into account the fact "that the
deceased Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing as a sport, having participated in tournaments both here
and abroad;" it said that Luna's habit and manner of life should be "one of the factors affecting the value of mortality
table in actions for damages;" and, consequently, concluded that Luna could not have lived beyond 43 years. The
result was that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna was reduced to 10 years only.
Further on the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled in respect of Luna's annual personal expenses:
... . Considering the escalating price of automobile gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R.
Luna's social standing, We should increase that amount to P30,000.00 as the would be personal
expenses of the deceased per annum. (Rollo, p. 33.)
The Court of Appeals then determined the amount of the award thus: P75,000.00 annual gross income less
P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10 years of life expectancy and the product is
P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its resolution of June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life
expectancy from 30 to 10 Years and increased his annual personal expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We
sustain the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years said that his habit and manner of life
should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car racing is not based
on any evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing
cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly
larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to have disturbed
the determination of the trial court which it had previously affirmed.
Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the deceased by increasing his
annual personal expenses but without at the same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands to reason that if
his annual personal expenses should increase because of the "escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in
Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose
that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof.
In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.
2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at the legal rate.
The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the petitioners in the sum of P50,000.00. This award was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its decision of May 22, 1979. The resolution of June 19, 1981, reaffirmed the award. The two
decisions as well as the resolution do not provide for interest at the legal rate to be tacked to the award.
The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of
the complaint. There is merit in this prayer. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi -
delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court.
(See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the date of the
trial court's decision.
The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26,1977; 77 SCRA 98, where it was held that Article
2180 of the Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his
son but since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary
to that of his son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the
liability of his father should be subsidiary only.
We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice.
Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property either
in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1981, is hereby set aside; its decision dated May
22, 1979, is reinstated with the sole modification that the award for attorney's fees shall earn interest at the legal rate
from July 5, 1973, the date of the trial court's decision. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, * JJ., concur.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., I reserve my vote.
G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957
SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant, Vs. ELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.
Magno T. Bueser for appellant.
Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and Vencedor A. Alimario for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of
Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No.
15001). During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a
separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged
and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed
the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno
asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set
up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his
father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the
latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay
the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was
certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Bilintawak
Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor
of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other
students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat
on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and
Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son
at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when
his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of
minor Dante Capuno.
The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the
minor children who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son
Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a
minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is
evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision
only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law,
1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with
some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of
that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not
then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only
way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to
prove.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno
shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE
GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents. Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners. Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V.
Ortiz for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL
OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. — The parents are and should be held primarily
liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under
15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon
the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed
by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration
is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those
whose lives they have touched. While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through
seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended
judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners
are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-
G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal portion: :

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby reversed; and instead,
judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed."

Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of
Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January
14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners
are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and
who also died in the same event on the same date.

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic
and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her.
In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina
and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm,
a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene
of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of
the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting
her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other
hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended
that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann
to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for
insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit." 2

On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-
appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the
present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this case:

1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws;
and

2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners
liable for vicarious liability.

In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his
findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell
Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or
tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the
only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.

It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in
the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have
been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the
occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left
untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was
negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on
Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.

More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours
after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death; that when he
arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the
stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he
admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or
washed in the area of the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In
fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet
and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself.

He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that he found no burning
or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general characteristics of
contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification: :

"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black residue or tattooing that
could result from these guns because they are what we call clean
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.

ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule
out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.

Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the
trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have
been fired by the person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the
right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the
angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7

As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime, each of which were the
bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at
the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:
x x x

"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges
inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right
external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a
punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the
brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges
(e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:
x x x

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder
tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or
separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are absent." 10

On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record, thus

"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the
bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court
how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?

WITNESS:

A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length

ATTY. SENINING:
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm almost straight towards
his head."

Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of defendants’ witnesses Lydia
Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the
second, a resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person
at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the gas station; that it is
the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall
between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of
the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan
and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop.

However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having
talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it;
that his house is next to Felipe Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions:

"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your house?
WITNESS:
A It is about 8 feet.

ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)

Q And where were you looking from?

WITNESS:
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high.
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire credence as to the
reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high
walls in their respective houses in relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness
Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were
waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was
going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another
shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s
direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan
saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.

We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot
Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor
did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell
Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial —
the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his
persistent pleas for a reconciliation. :red

Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should not be
civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record either.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in
a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box
and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son
Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety
deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been
exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have
gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free
access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent,
of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from
the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the
activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17
or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten
dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why
he was in possession of that firearm.

In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start of this
opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say: :

". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity
involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son,
Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong.
Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:

‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by their minor
children who live in their company.’

"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in
a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of
said minor who was living in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated
by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31,
1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:

‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.’

‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with discernment is
determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to
hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage
is caused with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the
drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing
from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and
dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said
gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
x x x

"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower court was not correct in
dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-
appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from
committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for
they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19

We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based on
what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to
digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et.
Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children
imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused
by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for
purposes of the discussion hereunder.

Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization of their
liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of
this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability
of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor
be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence
would constitute a valid and substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary
liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, i n
case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not
subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages."

We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise
primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides: :

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —

x x x

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine
years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve
upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the
parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of
lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the
corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own
property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors,
Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . .
shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For
civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit: :
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person
be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with civil law."

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of
Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta
v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al.
26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed
by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of
aye or over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court
held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold
that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in
the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused
with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in
the Court’s determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their
minor children, is primary or subsidiary.

In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence, in a
separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of
the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary
liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found
guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of
two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.

However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the conviction of his son, who
was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil
Code. In the present case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line
with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical injuries
committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged
solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was
acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180
of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although married, was living with his
father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the
father was only held subsidiarily liable.

It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for persons causing
damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers,
tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in
industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other
classes.

Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is not exactly
accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what
respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to F uellas,
was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization
does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde,
Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise: :

"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted therein by both
parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the
present action was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence
under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion
as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of no moment."

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under
15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall
devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity,
upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability
arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182
of the Civil Code, as so modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi -delict
committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom.
Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and
CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the
tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted
from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt
the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition
for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura,
were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment
the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period,
or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three
(3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both
motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice
had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's
Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution
of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to
appeal, may still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was
yet lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court,
not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of
Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial
court held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of
paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is
the service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be
served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to
treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental
motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal.
As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very
rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override, substantial justice.
if d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a
cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
 The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of
"imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself,
but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental
authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of
vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to
cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions
are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited
control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual
liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly
imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and
control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy
a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis
Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be
based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that
when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course,
only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still
lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural
parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by the
adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of
the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious
conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or
duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that
the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period has
been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of
adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree
shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the
same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the
surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption
was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor
child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted
this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the
tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
companyand under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive
affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority
had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States
and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,
would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could
have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting
parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their
adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or
bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with
his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to
the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the
indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for
further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-24101. September 30, 1970.]
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. ALFONSO MONFORT, Defendant-Appellant. Rodolfo J. Herman for Plaintiffs-Appellees. Luis G.
Torres & Abraham E. Tionko for defendant appellant.

DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified the same
to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other
classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic
headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had
found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the
latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl
related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical
operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three
days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa
Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso
Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort’s father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00
as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes
damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly
Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read: :

"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or
the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one
person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different
cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis
of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which
accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted.
This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the
defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with
a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate
company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to
"all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant
circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage
could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in
failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his
duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the
defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but
only the moral compulsion of good conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave. Fernando, J., did not take part. Barredo, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011
AQUINAS SCHOOL, Petitioner, versus SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA S. INTON, on their behalf and on
behalf of their minor child, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the private schools liability for the outside catechists act of shoving a student and kicking him on
the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom.
The Facts and the Case
In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent
Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that
year, taught Jose Luis grade three religion class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a
classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while,
Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the childs behavior,
Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on
the classmates seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the
notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of
their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case
67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she
pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal
claims but ruled in Jose Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary
damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.[1]
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).[2] They asked the CA to increase the award
of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation existed
between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined to
increase the award of damages.[3] Jose Luis moved for partial reconsideration but this was denied. Aquinas, for its
part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision through a petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
The Courts Ruling
The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon the CAs belief that the school
was Yamyamins employer. Aquinas contests this.
The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship:
the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has
control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the employer,
whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means and methods by
which he accomplishes the same.[4]
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which,
in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its
students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the task
of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach
religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over
Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony in this regard.
Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are
allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the
occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation
of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she would behave properly
towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for
handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that
June of 1998.[5]
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach[6] to ensure that she was really
catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation.[7] Unfortunately, since she was
new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At
any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident. [8] It cannot
be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the Court finds no justification for this since
they did not appeal from the decision of the CA. The Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the
petition. They thus cannot obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than those that the CA already granted
them in its decision.[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
88106 dated August 4, 2008, and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School not liable in damages to respondent Jose Luis
Inton.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P.
DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural
guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO
ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he
would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These
ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as
well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
2
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's
parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two
other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00,
representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed
and all the defendants were completely absolved .4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school
of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal
gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in
its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts,
the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his
graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submi t that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no
longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important because of an
earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private respondents.
It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose
Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking any further
action .6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the
petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not
have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the
gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked
by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v.
Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a
better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a
Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its
wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found
guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action flied against them, his father was held
solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by
the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter
dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2)
heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should
apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade
during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits
parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not
been sued that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the
custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents." Justice J.B.L.
Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in
the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not
boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court
declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" — means
the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by
the present decision.
10
This decision was concurred in by five other members, including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to
the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the
custody of the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining
the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed by students not
yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that
"since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal
provision to academic institutions will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be
held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is
supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which
case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis"teachers"
should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in
part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades
and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the
proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic
teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of
third Persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In
my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903
of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments." The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y
artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise
of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere
with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is
under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under
his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde
and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades
liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no
liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the
head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school would
be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis
only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-
academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of
the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of
the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that
he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-
academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts
committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades
were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his
students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and
trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal
contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account
the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing
studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners
themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v.
Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student
should be within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the
injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start
of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of
registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the view of the
Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should
such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites
to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the like.
During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in
the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in practically
the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the
one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in t he
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but
refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus,
for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held
to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior,
but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to
answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180,
which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable
only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of the
technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc
that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing activism among the
students that is likely to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly liable.
Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the
acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students. Ms
should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by
its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable
for the damage caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his
influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility
imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It need not be
stressed that such dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's
influence, besides being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the students'
desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be
held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less
tractable than the minor — then there should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less
accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is
no longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's
control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the
student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was
there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school
authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body
and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and
thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of
the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his
physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of
Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing
discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their
non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the
custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been
established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private
respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of
the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the
same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article
because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by
the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has
been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced
that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the
latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize
with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable
to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no part.
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA,
BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA
CADIZ, respondents. Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.
Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with the following modifications: (1) Exemplary
damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual damages of
P30,000.00, moral damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 awarded to
plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis High School, represented by the Spouses Fernando
Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held jointly and severally liable with
defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment to plaintiffs of the
abovementioned actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, and for costs;
and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are hereby absolved from liability, and the case against
them, together with their respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School,
wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's
parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their
son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back
home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought
to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead
on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch LVIII of Lucena City, against the St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and
Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio,
Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from the death of
their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the
petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning,
respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones,
Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual
damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The court a
quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes that the defendant teachers namely:
Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to
exercise the diligence required of them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had
foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning
incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could
be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)
The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted to the sea without
aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders allegedly performed by the
defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard required by law under the circumstances. While the
defendants-teachers admitted that some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are deep, the supposed
lifeguards of the children did not even actually go to the water to test the depth of the particular area where
the children would swim. And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was
confirmed by the fact that three persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the defendant
teachers made an actual and physical observation of the water before they allowed the students to swim, they
could have found out that the area where the children were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not only
that, the male teachers who according to the female teachers were there to supervise the children to ensure
their safety were not even at the area where the children were swimming. They were somewhere and as
testified to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora
Cadorna. Said the court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a
school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and
Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. It
has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did
 not join it. On the other hand, defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she
was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which
Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents-spouses assigned the following
errors committed by the trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School and its administrator/principal
Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for its approved co-curricular activities but also for those which they
unreasonably failed to exercise control and supervision like the holding of picnic in the dangerous water of
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School and principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly
and solidarily liable with their co-defendants-teachers Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of
Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20, 1982.
3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral damages for the untimely and
tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all the defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-sponsored activity, nonetheless it cannot be
gainsaid that the same was held under the supervision of the teachers employed by the said school,
particularly the teacher in charge of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged, and those whom she invited to
help her in supervising the class during the picnic. Considering that the court a quo found negligence on the
part of the six defendants-teachers who, as such, were charged with the supervision of the children during the
picnic, the St. Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176
taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. They cannot escape
liability on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an "extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High School."
We find from the evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had knowledge of the
picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited to attend the affair; and yet he did not express
any prohibition against undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted
during the picnic. At the least, We must find that the school and the responsible school officials, particularly
the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal must be found jointly and
severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death
of their son. It is the rule that in cases where the above-cited provisions find application, the negligence of the
employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner
and/or manager of the establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and while
this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner
and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or
supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-
teachers). The record does not disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the aforesaid
presumption and absolve the St. Francis High School and its principal from liability under the above-cited
provisions.
As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants, while We cannot but commiserate with the
plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the untimely death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and understand
their suffering as parents, especially the victim's mother who, according to appellants, suffered a nervous
breakdown as a result of the tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed by the court a quo as actual damages
and moral damages (P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those which are
sustained by the evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P20,000.00 may and should be,
as it is hereby, imposed in the present case by way of example of correction for the public good, pursuant to
Article 2229 of the Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by the trial court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and
Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and severally liable for damages such finding not being supported
by facts and evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of the victim Ferdinand Castillo,
were not able to prove by their evidence that they did not give their son consent to join the picnic in question.
However, We agree with the trial court in its finding that whether or not the victim's parents had given such
permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the existence of liability on the part of the
defendants for the damage incurred by the plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is
material to such a determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of defendants vis-a-visthe
supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the trial court, an affirmative
reply to this question has been satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already pointed out.
However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones, are concerned. As to them, the trial court found:
 While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the
drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their
liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the
students.
The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to the
picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the entrance examination being conducted by the school which
is part of their duty as teachers thereof. Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in
question, it cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence attributable to the other
defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in the supervision of the children during the picnic and
which failure resulted in the drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission to the
two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury caused to the plaintiffs
because of the death of their son resulting from his drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved
from any liability.
As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We agree with the court a quo that the
counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
The issues presented by petitioners are:
A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the award of
damages to the plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the circumstances surrounding
the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)
In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence or the negligence of people under
them. In the instant case however, as will be shown hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or
guilty of the negligence of those under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot be held liable for
damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the
excursion.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores
Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not ask him where he will bring this?
A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the picnic, and when I asked him
where, he did not answer, sir.
Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?
A No more, sir.
Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned in the picnic came to you, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March 20, 1982, you did not know that
your son join the picnic?
A No, sir, I did not know.
Q Did you not look for your son during that time?
A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.
Q You did not ask your wife?
A I did not, sir.
Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?
A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire whether your son have joined that
picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign
of consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:
Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?
A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt guilty about the death of
her son because she cooked adobo for him so he could join the excursion where her son died of
drowning.
Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the one who personally cooked
the adobo for her son?
 A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient herself. She was very sorry had
she not allowed her son to join the excursion her son would have not drowned. I don't know if she
actually permitted her son although she said she cooked adobo so he could join. (Emphasis Supplied)
(TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro — witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner
school liable for the death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act
or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his
assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students
were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some
members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit
from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither i s
it considered as an extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by
the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of
the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any
jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed
to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such
act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the
picnic.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout
masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo
Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of
emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly
possible to save the child.
Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached the boy and claim also having
applied first aid on him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children were covering you up or were
surrounding you?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?
A No, sir.
Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?
A Yes, sir.
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your application of first aid?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of your application of the first aid on
the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid that we were doing, sir.
Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed the boy did not respond, were
you not disturb anyway?
A I was disturbed during that time, sir.
Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure?
A From 9 to 11 times, sir.
Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on the body of Ferdinand
Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back pressure?
A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then the face was a little bit facing right
and doing it by massaging the back of the child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30, 1984)
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination
ATTY. FLORES:
 Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child?
A Myself, sir.
Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?
A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I applied back to back pressure and
took notice of the condition of the child. We placed the feet in a higher position, that of the head of the
child, sir.
Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the feet were on a higher level than
that of the head, what did you do next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after putting the child in that position, I
applied the back to back pressure and started to massage from the waistline up, but I noticed that the
boy was not responding, sir.
Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
Q What about Mr. Vinas?
A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.
Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you do?
A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed the position of the boy by placing
the child facing upwards laying on the sand then we applied the mouth to mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp.
92-93, Rollo)
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The
case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral
damages can be assessed against them.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that
the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in
ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the
required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding petitioners herein guilty of
negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET
ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their
counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL,
JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution denying
reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student
who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa
Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and
related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay
herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys
Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who was under special
parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same
being adjudged against defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier
discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City
conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students
were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. [2]
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00
but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However,
on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. [5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles
218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. [9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated mi nor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. [10]
 However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was
the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. [11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury
must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. [12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits
establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the
cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not
dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on
Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the
jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. [13]
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep
owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which
was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendants wrongful act or omission.[14] In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to
petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering
petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as
part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. [15] The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article
2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification. [16] Thus, the grant of attorneys fees against
the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never
denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets.[17] Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and
the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the
trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding
petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., in the result.
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO PINEDA, defendants-appellees.
Angel A. Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for defendants-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of law from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit.
The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., which together
with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the
manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit
and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by
Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered
injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings
amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had
no cause of action against him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company
and its driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of
an establishment or enterprise" (dueños o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil
Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation
of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context
of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he
himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la responsabilidad subsidiaria establecida en el num 3.0 del (art.)
1903, el director de un periodico explotado por una sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su jerarquia y aunque Ileve la
direccion de determinadas convicciones politicas no por eso deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la
Empresa" (Decision of Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912 cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español 5th
Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica Española 992).
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue which was not alleged in their
complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its
capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their
subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25
and P25, respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and
Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on
the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a
personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was raised in the lower court and
which is within the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not
be permitted to change his theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so, could be unfair to the adverse party (2
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989.]
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA, thru her personal guardian
FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her behalf and in behalf of her minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE,
EDMUNDO and SHARON ICO, Respondents.
Efren N. Ambrosio & Associates for petitioner PNEI.
Emiliano S. Micu for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE; WHEN APPLICABLE. — The doctrine of last clear
chance applies only in a situation where the defendant, having the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed
to do so, becomes liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION TO MAKE DOCTRINE APPLICABLE. — In order that the doctrine of last clear chance may
be applied, it must be shown that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril or with exercise of due care should have been aware of it.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO PERSON ACTING INSTANTANEOUSLY OR BY AVAILABLE MEANS. — This
doctrine of last chance has no application to a case where a person is to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by using all means available after the peril is or should have been discovered.
4. ID.; ID.; PROVISION OF R.A. NO. 4136 RE VEHICLE ENTERING A THROUGH HIGHWAY OR A STOP
INTERSECTION. — Section 43 (c), Article III, Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 1436 cannot apply to case a bar where at
the time of the accident, the jeepney had already crossed the intersection.
5. ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF LIES ON THE EMPLOYER. — A finding of negligence on the part of the
driver establishes a presumption that the employer has been negligent and the latter has the burden of proof that it has
exercised due negligence not only in the selection of its employees but also in adequately supervising their work.
6. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. — Plaintiff’s failure to present
documentary evidence to support their claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased victim does not bar
recovery of the damages, if such loss may be based sufficiently on their testimonies.
7. ID.; ID.; INDEMNITY FIXED AT P30,000. — The indemnity for the death of a person was fixed by this Court at
(P30,000.00).

DECISION

CORTES, J.:

In this Petition, Pantranco North Express Inc. (PANTRANCO), asks the Court to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05494-95 which affirmed the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Rosales, Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 561-R and Civil Case No. 589-R wherein PANTRANCO was ordered to pay damages and attorney’s fees
to herein private respondents.

The pertinent fact are as follows:

At about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold
Jim, Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other
persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth
wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa.

The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the
registered owner thereof. From Ilagan, Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some viands to one Mrs.
Bascos and thenceforth to San Felipe, taking the highway going to Malalam River. Upon reaching the highway, the
jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards
Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s
lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.

As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and
Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively damaged. After the
accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From
that time on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding.

All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein private respondents settled the case amicably under the "No
Fault" insurance coverage of PANTRANCO.

Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed
separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO, respectively docketed as Civil Case No.
561-R and 589-R of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

In its answer, PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico’s alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the
accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio
Ramirez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On July 3, 1984, the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a decision against PANTRANCO awarding the total amount of Two
Million Three Hundred Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven (P2,304,647.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as
attorney’s fees and costs to Maricar Baesa in Civil Case No. 561-R, and the total amount of Six Hundred Fifty Two
Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Two Pesos (P652,672.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as attorney’s fees and costs to
Fe Ico and her children in Civil Case No. 589-R. On appeal, the cases were consolidated and the Court of Appeals
modified the decision of the trial court by ordering PANTRANCO to pay the total amount of One Million One Hundred
Eighty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Seven Pesos (P1,189,927.00) as damages, plus Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) as attorney’s fees to Maricar Baesa, and the total amount of Three Hundred Forty-Four Thousand Pesos
(P344,000.00) plus Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney’s fees to Fe Ico and her children, and to pay the costs
in both cases. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by ordering the defendant PANTRANCO North Express,
Inc. to pay:

I. The plaintiff in Civil Case No. 561-R, Maricar Bascos Baesa, the following damages:

A) As compensatory damages for the death of Ceasar Baesa — P30,000.00;

B) As compensatory damages for the death of Marilyn Baesa — P30,000.00;

C) As compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa — P30,000.00;

D) For the loss of earnings of Ceasar Baesa — P630,000.00;

E) For the loss of earnings of Marilyn Bascos Baesa — P375,000.00;

F) For the burial expenses of the deceased Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa — P41,200.00;

G) For hospitalization expenses of Maricar Baesa — P3,727.00;

H) As moral damages — P50,000.00;

I) As attorney’s fees — P20,000.00;

II. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 589-R, the following damages:

A) As compensatory damages for the death of David Ico — P30,000.00;

B) For loss of earning capacity of David Ico — P252,000.00;

C) As moral damages for the death of David Ico and the injury of Fe Ico — P30,000.00

D) As payment for the jeepney — P20,000.00;

E) For the hospitalization of Fe Ico — P12,000.000;

F) And for attorney’s fees — P10,000.00;

and to pay the costs in both cases.

The amount of P25,000 paid to Maricar Bascos Baesa, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 561-R, and the medical expenses in the
sum of P3,273.55, should be deducted from the award in her favor.

All the foregoing amounts herein awarded except the costs shall earn interest at the legal rate from date of this decision
until fully paid. [CA Decision, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 57-58.]
PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal’s decision, but on June 26, 1987, it denied the
same for lack of merit. PANTRANCO then filed the instant petition for review.
I

Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance" against the jeepney driver.
Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence
his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.

The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil.
397 (1958), in this wise:

The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of
the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People’s
Lumber and Hardware, Et. Al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, Et Al., G.R. No. 70493, May
18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff
becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra].

Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

To avoid liability for the negligence of its driver, petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the
proximate cause of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the jeepney driver
David Ico in failing to avoid the accident. It is petitioner’s position that even assuming arguendo, that the bus encroached
into the lane of the jeepney, the driver of the latter could have swerved the jeepney towards the spacious dirt shoulder on
his right without danger to himself or his passengers.

The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine
to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to
avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is
nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the
approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right
since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching
from the opposite direction. As held by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 618, a motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway is generally entitled to assume
that an approaching vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane of traffic. There was
nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not return to its own lane or was prevented from returning to the proper
lane by anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo Marantan, an alternate driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated
beside the driver Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice but to swerve the steering
wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepney’s lane because there was a steep precipice on the right [CA Decision, p. 2;
Rollo, p. 45]. However, this is belied by the evidence on record which clearly shows that there was enough space to
swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50].

Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was
speeding towards Manila [CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. By the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not
returning to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The speed at
which the approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in
time to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the
actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply
where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered" [Ong v. Metropolitan Water District,
supra].chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of Republic
Act No. 4136 * which provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the
right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway.

Petitioner’s misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this case. The cited law itself provides that it
applies only to vehicles entering a through highway or a stop intersection. At the time of the accident, the jeepney had
already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River. Petitioner itself cited Fe Ico’s testimony that the
accident occurred after the jeepney had travelled a distance of about two (2) meters from the point of intersection [Petition
p. 10; Rollo, p. 27]. In fact, even the witness for the petitioner, Leo Marantan, testified that both vehicles were coming from
opposite directions [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50], clearly indicating that the jeepney had already crossed the
intersection.

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of petitioner’s driver in encroaching into the lane of the
incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the
opposite direction was the sole and proximate cause of the accident without which the collision would not have occurred.
There was no supervening or intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which would have made the prior
negligence of petitioner’s driver a mere remote cause of the accident.
II

On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a fami ly
to prevent damage, conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Petitioner adduced evidence to
show that in hiring its drivers, the latter are required to have professional driver’s license and police clearance. The drivers
must also pass written examinations, interviews and practical driving tests, and are required to undergo a six-month
training period. Rodrigo San Pedro, petitioner’s Training Coordinator, testified on petitioner’s policy of conducting regular
and continuing training programs and safety seminars for its drivers, conductors, inspectors and supervisors at a
frequency rate of at least two (2) seminars a month.

On this point, the Court quotes with approval the following findings of the trial court which was adopted by the Court of
Appeals in its challenged decision:

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has
been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. Although this presumption is
only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family, this Court
believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the case of Ramirez, as a company driver is far from sufficient. No support evidence has been adduced. The professional
driver’s license of Ramirez has not been produced. There is no proof that he is between 25 to 38 years old. There is also
no proof as to his educational attainment, his age, his weight and the fact that he is married or not. Neither are the result
of the written test, psychological and physical test, among other tests, have been submitted in evidence [sic]. His NBI or
police clearances and clearances from previous employment were not marked in evidence. No evidence was presented
that Ramirez actually and really attended the seminars. Vital evidence should have been the certificate of attendance or
certificate of participation or evidence of such participation like a logbook signed by the trainees when they attended the
seminars. If such records are not available, the testimony of the classmates that Ramirez was their classmate in said
seminar (should have been presented) [CA Decision, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 51-52].chanrobles law library

Petitioner contends that the fact that Ambrosio Ramirez was employed and remained as its driver only means that he
underwent the same rigid selection process and was subjected to the same strict supervision imposed by petitioner on all
applicants and employees. It is argued by the petitioner that unless proven otherwise, it is presumed that petitioner
observed its usual recruitment procedure and company polices on safety and efficiency [Petition, p. 20; Rollo, p. 37].

The Court finds the above contention unmeritorious.

The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the
part of petitioner and the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in the selection of its employees but
also in adequately supervising their work rests with the petitioner [Lilius v. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934);
Umali v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623]. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no presumption
that the usual recruitment procedures and safety standards were observed. The mere issuance of rules and regulations
and the formulation of various company policies on safety, without showing that they are being complied with, are not
sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to
show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver, the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed. Petitioner failed to do this. Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by the petitioner, which consists mainly of the
uncorroborated testimony of its Training Coordinator, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against
petitioner.cralawnad
III

On the question of damages, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in fixing the damages for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased victims. Petitioner assails respondent court’s findings because no documentary evidence in
support thereof, such as income tax returns, pay-rolls, pay slips or invoices obtained in the usual course of business, were
presented [Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 39]. Petitioner argues that the "bare and self-serving testimonies of the wife of the
deceased David Ico and the mother of the deceased Marilyn Baesa . . . have no probative value to sustain in law the
Court of Appeals’ conclusion on the respective earnings of the deceased victims." [Petition, pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 38-39.] It
is petitioner’s contention that the evidence presented by the private respondent does not meet the requirements of clear
and satisfactory evidence to prove actual and compensatory damages.

The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased victims. While it is true that private respondents should have presented documentary
evidence to support their claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims, the absence thereof
does not necessarily bar the recovery of the damages in question. The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to
the earning capacity of David Ico, and the spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from which the
court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the three deceased
victims. Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased victim, the court can consider the
nature of his occupation, his educational attainment and the state of his health at the time of death.

In the instant case, David Ico was thirty eight (38) years old at the time of his death in 1981 and was driving hi s own
passenger jeepney. The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa were both thirty (30) years old at the time of their death.
Ceasar Baesa was a commerce degree holder and the proprietor of the Cauayan Press, printer of the Cauayan Valley
Newspaper and the Valley Times at Cauayan, Isabela. Marilyn Baesa graduated as a nurse in 1976 and at the time of her
death, was the company nurse, personnel manager, treasurer and cashier of the Ilagan Press at Ilagan, Isabela.
Respondent court duly considered these factors, together with the uncontradicted testimonies of Fe Ico and Francisca
Bascos, in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of David Ico and the spouses
Baesa.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

However, it should be pointed out that the Court of Appeals committed error in fixing the compensatory damages for the
death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa. Respondent court awarded to plaintiff (private respondent) Maricar
Baesa Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as "compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino
Baesa." [CA Decision, p. 14; Rollo, 57]. In other words, the Court of Appeals awarded only Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) as indemnity for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and another Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) for the
death of Marcelino Baesa. This is clearly erroneous. In the case of People v. de la Fuente, G.R. Nos. 63251-52,
December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518, the indemnity for the death of a person was fixed by this Court at Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00). Plaintiff Maricar Baesa should therefore be awarded Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as
indemnity for the death of her brothers, Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa or Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
for the death of each brother.

The other items of damages awarded by respondent court which were not challenged by the petitioner are hereby
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that the amount of compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and
Marcelino Baesa are increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) each.chanrobles law library

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143360. September 5, 2002]
EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA ENANO, MYRNA TAMAYO and
FELIX OLEDAN, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the negligence of the driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject of
an unregistered Deed of Sale in favor of another person. Unless registered with the Land Transportation Office, the sale --
while valid and binding between the parties -- does not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents involving the
said transport equipment. Thus, in the present case, petitioner, which is the registered owner, is liable for the acts of the
driver employed by its former lessee who has become the owner of that vehicle by virtue of an unregistered Deed of Sale.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 12, 2000 Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55474.The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision,
dated May 5, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 95-73522, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is DELETED.[3]
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 95-73522, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 14) had earlier
disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Equitable Leasing
Corporation ordering said defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the following:
A. TO MYRNA TAMAYO
1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Reniel Tamayo;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P56,000.00 for the damage to the store and its contents, and funeral expenses.
B. TO FELIX OLEDAN
1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Felmarie Oledan;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P30,000.00 for medical expenses, and funeral expenses.
C. TO MARISSA ENANO
1. P7,000.00 as actual damages
D. TO LUCITA SUYOM
1. The sum of P5,000.00 for the medical treatment of her two sons.
The sum of P120,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[4]
The Facts
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo
located at Pier 18, Vitas, Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed. Pinned to death under the engine of the
tractor were Respondent Myrna Tamayos son, Reniel Tamayo, and Respondent Felix Oledans daughter, Felmarie
Oledan. Injured were Respondent Oledan himself, Respondent Marissa Enano, and two sons of Respondent Lucita
Suyom.
Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 296094-SA, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12. [5]
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, respondents were furnished a copy of Official Receipt No.
62204139[6] and Certificate of Registration No. 08262797, [7] showing that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable
Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation
(Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint [8] for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73522
in the RTC of Manila, Branch 14.
The trial court, upon motion of plaintiffs counsel, issued an Order dropping Raul Tutor, Ecatine and Edwin Lim from
the Complaint, because they could not be located and served with summonses. [9] On the other hand, in its Answer with
Counterclaim,[10] petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer in
possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable,
but of Ecatine.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision ordering petitioner to pay actual and moral damages and
attorneys fees to respondents. It held that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had not been registered
with the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the legal owner was still Equitable. [11] Thus, petitioner was liable to
respondents.[12]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner was still to be legally deemed the owner/operator of the tractor, even
if that vehicle had been the subject of a Deed of Sale in favor of Ecatine on December 9, 1992. The reason cited by the
CA was that the Certificate of Registration on file with the LTO still remained in petitioners name.[13]In order that a transfer
of ownership of a motor vehicle can bind third persons, it must be duly recorded in the LTO. [14]
 The CA likewise upheld respondents claim for moral damages against petitioner because the appellate court
[15]
considered Tutor, the driver of the tractor, to be an agent of the registered owner/operator.
[16]
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:
I
Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when they decided and held that petitioner [was]
liable for damages suffered by private respondents in an action based on quasi delict for the negligent acts of a driver who
[was] not the employee of the petitioner.
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when they awarded moral damages to private
respondents despite their failure to prove that the injuries they suffered were brought by petitioners wrongful act.[17]
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Liability for Wrongful Acts
Petitioner contends that it should not be held liable for the damages sustained by respondents and that arose from
the negligence of the driver of the Fuso Road Tractor, which it had already sold to Ecatine at the time of the accident. Not
having employed Raul Tutor, the driver of the vehicle, it could not have controlled or supervised him. [18]
We are not persuaded. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may sue the negligent party under (1) Article
100[19] of the Revised Penal Code, for civil liability ex delicto; or (2) under Article 2176[20] of the Civil Code, for civil
liability ex quasi delicto.[21]
Furthermore, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers may be held subsidiarily liable for felonies
committed by their employees in the discharge of the latters duties. [22] This liability attaches when the employees who are
convicted of crimes committed in the performance of their work are found to be insolvent and are thus unable to satisfy
the civil liability adjudged.[23]
On the other hand, under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 [24] of the Civil Code, an action predicated on quasi
delict may be instituted against the employer for an employees act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of
the subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee.[25] The enforcement of the judgment against the employer for an action based on Article 2176 does not require
the employee to be insolvent, since the liability of the former is solidary -- the latter being statutorily considered a joint
tortfeasor.[26] To sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered by
the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. [27]
These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of, subject to the caveat[28] that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. [29] Since these two civil
liabilities are distinct and independent of each other, the failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in
the other.[30]
In the instant case, respondents -- having failed to recover anything in the criminal case -- elected to file a separate
civil action for damages, based on quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[31] The evidence is clear that the
deaths and the injuries suffered by respondents and their kins were due to the fault of the driver of the Fuso tractor.
Dated June 4, 1991, the Lease Agreement [32] between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of
the parties to enter into a FINANCE LEASE AGREEMENT.[33] Under such scheme, ownership of the subject tractor was to
be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.[34] Further, in the
Lease Schedule,[35] the monthly rental for the tractor was stipulated, and the term of the Lease was scheduled to expire on
December 4, 1992. After a few months, Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. [36] Thus, on
December 9, 1992, a Deed of Sale[37] over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin
Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.
We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the
tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994. [38]The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a
motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned;
consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. [39] In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely
its agent.[40] The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service. [41]
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths and
the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver. [42]
The finance-lease agreement between Equitable on the one hand and Lim or Ecatine on the other has already been
superseded by the sale. In any event, it does not bind third persons. The rationale for this rule has been aptly explained
in Erezo v. Jepte,[43] which we quote hereunder:
x x x. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or
injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries
caused on public highways.[44]
Further, petitioners insistence on FGU Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals is misplaced.[45] First, in FGU Insurance,
the registered vehicle owner, which was engaged in a rent-a-car business, rented out the car. In this case, the registered
owner of the truck, which is engaged in the business of financing motor vehicle acquisitions, has actually sold the truck to
Ecatine, which in turn employed Tutor. Second, in FGU Insurance, the registered owner of the vehicle was not held
responsible for the negligent acts of the person who rented one of its cars, because Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not
applicable. We held that no vinculum juris as employer and employee existed between the owner and the driver.[46] In this
case, the registered owner of the tractor is considered under the law to be the employer of the driver, while the actual
operator is deemed to be its agent.[47] Thus, Equitable, the registered owner of the tractor, is -- for purposes of the law on
quasi delict -- the employer of Raul Tutor, the driver of the tractor. Ecatine, Tutors actual employer, is deemed as merely
an agent of Equitable.[48]
True, the LTO Certificate of Registration, dated 5/31/91, qualifies the name of the registered owner as EQUITABLE
LEASING CORPORATION/Leased to Edwin Lim.But the lease agreement between Equitable and Lim has been
overtaken by the Deed of Sale on December 9, 1992, between petitioner and Ecatine. While this Deed does not affect
respondents in this quasi delict suit, it definitely binds petitioner because, unlike them, it is a party to it.
We must stress that the failure of Equitable and/or Ecatine to register the sale with the LTO should not prejudice
respondents, who have the legal right to rely on the legal principle that the registered vehicle owner is liable for the
damages caused by the negligence of the driver. Petitioner cannot hide behind its allegation that Tutor was the employee
of Ecatine. This will effectively prevent respondents from recovering their losses on the basis of the inaction or fault of
petitioner in failing to register the sale.The non-registration is the fault of petitioner, which should thus face the legal
consequences thereof.
Second Issue:
Moral Damages
Petitioner further claims that it is not liable for moral damages, because respondents failed to establish or show the
causal connection or relation between the factual basis of their claim and their wrongful act or omission, if any. [49]
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate [50] and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. [51] Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. [52] This is so because moral
damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer.[53]
Viewed as an action for quasi delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), [54] which
provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. [55] Having established the liability of petitioner as the
registered owner of the vehicle,[56] respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the factual basis for the
award[57] and its causal connection to the acts of Raul Tutor, who is deemed as petitioners employee. [58] Indeed, the
damages and injuries suffered by respondents were the proximate result of petitioners tortious act or omission. [59]
Further, no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court.[60] The evidence gives no ground for doubt that such discretion was
properly and judiciously exercised by the trial court. [61] The award is in fact consistent with the rule that moral damages are
not intended to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate the moral suffering undergone by that party by reason of the
defendants culpable action.[62]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City

FIRST DIVISION

OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., G.R. No. 173870

Petitioner,

- versus - Present:

GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

representing the children, namely: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, BERSAMIN,
ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN DEL CASTILLO, and
B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B. VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
MONSALUD, LEONARDO B.
MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B.
MONSALUD, Promulgated:
Respondents. April 25, 2012
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] the registered owner of a motor vehicle challenges the Decision[2] dated July 11, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 which held him liable for damages to the heirs of the victims who were run over by
the said vehicle.

Factual Antecedents

At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their
daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a Christmas party they attended in Poblacion,
Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing
plate number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar
del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur
and vice versa route.

Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-10347[3] for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide
was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13,
1997, said court declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.[4]

During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor
children[5] of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219,[6] an independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside
from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma
del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo prayed for the reimbursement
of funeral and burial expenses, as well as the award of attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages resulting from the death of the
three victims, and loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a public school teacher at the time of her death.[7]

Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds have no cause of
action against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan.[8] For his part,
Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends[9] stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers
rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started by mere
pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but without any headlights on.[10] And implying that this was the
manner by which the vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the statements[11] of Jemar
Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of the accident, declared
before the investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles headlights were off. Because of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed
before the same trial court a carnapping case against Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-10380.[12] The
[13]
case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latters brother, Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who
was employed as the driver.[14] In any event, Allans employment as conductor was already severed before the mishap occurred on
January 1, 1993 since he served as such conductor only from the first week of December until December 14, 1992.[15] In support of
this, Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio Junior Baobao (Cresencio).Faustino, a resident
of Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to Sominot on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the
conductor. He also believed that Crecencio started to work as such at around December 15 or 16, 1992.[16] Cresencio, for his part,
testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that Rodrigo was his driver.[17] He
stated that upon learning that the jeep figured in an accident, he never bothered to verify the news. Instead, he went to Midsalip to
work there as a conductor for his brothers vehicle, thereby terminating his employment with Oscar Jr.[18]

Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a days trip, the jeep would be parked beside Rodrigos rented
house[19] for the next early-morning operation.

Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent to December 14, 1992. To prove
this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his
fare to Allan every time he would board the jeep in going to Molave and that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on
December 23, 1992. He also claimed that immediately before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to park the jeep at the yard of
his house.[20] Jose likewise attested that Allan was still the jeep conductor during the said period as he had ridden the jeep many times
in mid-December of 1992.[21]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision[22] dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency of
evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the
principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused
an injury is shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary course of things, the accident would not have happened had
there been an exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the
same through his driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that
the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition key, they should have taken the necessary precaution to
prevent the vehicle from being used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus concluded that such lack of proper precaution,
due care and foresight constitute negligence making the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the
same.

The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Allan
Maglasang and Oscar del Carmen, Jr. ordering

1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in case of insolvency, for defendant OSCAR
DEL CARMEN, JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:

a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;

b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Emilia Monsalud;
c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Leonardo Monsalud, Sr.;
d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Glenda Monsalud;
e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
g. The cost of this proceedings.

2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR. and
NORMA DEL CARMEN.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration[24] contending that the provision on vicarious liability of the employer under Article 2180
of the Civil Code[25] requires the existence of employer-employee relationship and that the employee was acting within the scope of his
employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his employee, he was hired not as a driver but as
a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he drove the jeep.
 Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without its headlights on at the time of the accident indubitably
shows that the same was stolen. He further alleged that the jeep could not have been taken by only one person. As Rodrigo declared
in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 (carnapping case), based on his experience, the jeep cannot be pushed by only one person but by at
least five people in order for it to start. This was due to the vehicles mass and the deep canal which separates the parking area from
the curved road that was obstructed by a house.[26]

Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its Order[27] dated June 21, 2000 granted the Motion for Reconsideration
and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability.It cited Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that for an employer to be
subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his employee, the latter should have committed the same in the discharge of his duties. The
court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this condition is wanting in Allans case as he was not acting in the discharge of his duties as a
conductor when he drove the jeep.
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the property owner cannot be made responsible
for the damages caused by his property by reason of the criminal acts of another. It then adjudged that only Allan should bear the
consequences of his criminal acts. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. is hereby absolved from all civil
liability arising from the felonious acts of convicted accused ALLAN MAGLASANG.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[28]

Geronimo appealed.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its July 11, 2006 Decision,[29] the CA granted the appeal.

In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of whether there was an employer-employee relationship
between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident. It ruled in the affirmative and gave more credence to the testimonies of
Geronimos witnesses than to those of Oscar Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio. The CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness
presented by Geronimo, Faustino never resided in Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge of the place. His testimony was also
unreliable considering that he only rode the subject jeep twice[30] during the last two weeks of December 1992. As regards Cresencios
testimony, the appellate court found it puzzling why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon learning that the jeep was the
subject of an accident when it was his bread and butter. Said court likewise considered questionable Oscar Jr.s asseveration that
Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor when Cresencio testified that he replaced a certain Sumagang Jr.[31]

With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the
registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of
such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and
his companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied
permission to use the subject vehicle. To support its conclusion, the CA cited the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan
were both employees assigned to the said jeep; after a days work, said vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house where
Allan also lived; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced or
secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the ignition key.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated 21 June
2000 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, in Civil Case No. 96-20,219 is SET
ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered. OSCAR DEL CARMEN, Jr. and ALLAN MAGLASANG are held primarily
liable, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellants:

1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud
in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each or for the total amount of One hundred fifty thousand
pesos (P150,000.00);

2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each for the death of
Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud (collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount
of Seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00);
 3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each for the death of the
Monsaluds or for a total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00);

4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. [32]

Issues

As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging that the CA erred in:

1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, surmises and conjectures;

misapprehension of facts which are in conflict with the findings of the trial court;

2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with law and with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court;

3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial proceedings in the disposition of the appeal and
[in going] beyond the issues of the case.[33]

Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000 Order which was in accord with Article
2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by an employee should have been done within the scope of his assigned tasks for
an employer to be held liable under culpa aquiliana. However, the CA never touched upon this matter even if it was glaring that Allans
driving the subject vehicle was not within the scope of his previous employment as conductor. Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep
was stolen and stresses that the liability of a registered owner of a vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, should not apply to him. He asserts that although Allan and his companions were not found to have committed the crime of
carnapping beyond reasonable doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly taken by them from a well secured
area. This is considering that the vehicle was running without its headlights on at the time of the accident, a proof that it was started
without the ignition key.

Our Ruling

Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by
Allan and his alleged cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.

Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that
the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was indeed carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and
his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking area and the weight of the jeep.

Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of
evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA, the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence
required was likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was unlawfully taken.

Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and Benjamin, declared before the police that when Allan invited
them to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep:

04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.

05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that] happened?
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang
arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together with Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel
Rezada and Joven Orot.[34]
 xxxx

04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening more or less on December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that] happened?
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan
Maglasang arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol,
Arniel Rizada and Joven Orot.[35]

There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched by Allan who was driving the jeep, this would
mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to Rodrigos testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be pushed by
at least five people so that it could start without the ignition key.

On direct examination,[36] Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo, his driver who had informed him about the accident on January 1,
1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him after the incident, viz:

Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about the accident, what did he carry with him if any and
turned over to you?
A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of Registration) Sir.

Q: How about the key of the vehicle?

A: It was not turned over, Sir.[37]

Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group, the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as
he was entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, at the time Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to
expect that the driver should have also returned the key to the operator together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the police for reasons unexplained and
not available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attest on cross-
examination that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo:

Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was Rodrigo Maglasang who gave the key to Allan
Maglasang. Is that correct?
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an affidavit to show that he turned it over to the police.
Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of December 31, 1992, when it was driven by Allan Maglasang, you
did not know that the key was voluntarily given by Rodrigo Maglasang to Allan Maglasang?
A: I was not there.

Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct?

A: Yes Sir, I was not there.[38]

Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the carnapping case, thus:

Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and [his] x x x co-accused x x x [n]amely: Benjamin
Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and [Arniel] Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.

Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on December 31, 1992, your jeep was carnapped by Allan
Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.

Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And you could well remember that this representation is the counsel of the co-accused of Allan Maglasang, is
that correct?
A: Yes Sir.

Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that correct?

A: Yes Sir.
 Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is that correct
A: Yes Sir.

Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that the jeep was carnapped, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.[39]

While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that his jeep was stolen, this circumstance by
itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason why the headlights were not on at the time of the accident was not sufficiently
established during the trial. Besides, the fact that the headlights were not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition key
in starting the jeep as there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems, broken headlights, or that they were simply turned
off.

Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to support the defense of unauthorized taking, we
cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen. The evidence on record brings forth more questions than clear-cut
answers.

Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for itself) should
not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well secured area not
remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, [w]here the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical
explanation by defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.[40] Res ipsa loquitur is merely
evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the
burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.[41] It recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct
proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence.It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby
place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.[42] The doctrine is based partly on the theory
that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general
terms.[43]

The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:

1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;

2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and

3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.[44]

The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just
walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said
vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When
Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use,
including who or who may not drive it.As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to
park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the
death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he
could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately,
he failed to do so.

What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan to
use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide solid proof that he ensured that the parking area is well secured and that he
had expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by
the CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo
any specific and strict instructions on matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given the absolute
discretion as to the vehicles operation, including the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for
the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the
employee drove the registered owners vehicle in connection with his
employment.

Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still his
employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep in his
private capacity and thus, an employers vicarious liability for the employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to
him.

The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank,[45] the car of therein respondent bank caused
the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for
damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor
vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public
or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.[46] We have already
ratiocinated that:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with
very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public,
that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.[47]

Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use[48] or that the subject vehicle was stolen[49] which are valid defenses available to
a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.

All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court
concurs with the findings of the CA and sustains the awards made. In addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[50] an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the
judgment of the RTC is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this Decision
until the payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per annum
on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this Decision
until the payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000]
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY
(for herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all
surnamed Dy), respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] affirming the decision and
supplemental decision of the trial court, [3] as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the appeals interposed by both
accused and Reyes Trucking Corporation and affirming the Decision and Supplemental Decision dated
June 6, 1992 and October 26, 1992 respectively.
"SO ORDERED."[4]
The facts are as follows:
On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela,
Branch 19, Cauayan an amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in
double homicide and damage to property, reading as follows:
"That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being the driver and
person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A-867 registered in the name of Rafael
Reyes Trucking Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of beer grande, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated the same while along the National Highway of Barangay
Tagaran, in said Municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, rules and ordinances and without taking the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to persons
and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said trailer truck
to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco
Dy, Jr., @ Pacquing, due to irreversible shock, internal and external hemorrhage and multiple injuries,
open wounds, abrasions, and further causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount of
P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and damages to his Nissan Pick-Up
bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total amount of P2,000,000.00.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.
"(Sgd.) FAUSTO C. CABANTAC
"Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor"
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the offended
parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a
separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged. [5] On November 29, 1989, the offended parties
actually filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the
claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private respondents
opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On
December 15, 1989, private respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and
manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action.[6] However, they did not withdraw
the separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the
accused driver.[7]
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the
same.
The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be undisputed, are as follows:
"The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short) from the latters San Fernando,
Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white
truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside from the
Corporations memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles before each
trip (Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMCs Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this
White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989 (Exh. 17). In addition to a professional drivers license, it also
conducts a rigid examination of all driver applicants before they are hired.
"In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan
bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at
the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At
around 4:00 oclock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the
national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the
full width of the trucks right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of
 the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this
damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and
Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this
damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle,
they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the
truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Duncas vehicle rammed the
incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder
where it finally stopped. (see Exh. A-5, p. 8, record). The Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8,
A-9 and A-14, pp. 9-11, record), and its two passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr.
died instantly (Exh. A-19) from external and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp. 15 and 16,
record).
"For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the time of his
death he was 45 years old. He was the President and Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic Wood
Products and Development Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing establishment, from which he was
receiving an income of P10,000.00 a month (Exh. D). In the Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the
spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy appear to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each with
par value of P100.00 per share out of its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of 60,000 shares
valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K-1 & 10-B). Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns (Exh. J) the DWPC had
a taxable net income of P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle University graduate in
Business Administration, past president of the Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the
Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976, respectively, and World Vice-President of Jaycees International in
1979. He was also the recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. C). His children were all
studying in prestigious schools and spent about P180,000.00 for their education in 1988 alone (Exh. H-4).
"As stated earlier, the plaintiffs procurement of a writ of attachment of the properties of the Corporation
was declared illegal by the Court of Appeals. It was shown that on December 26, 1989, Deputy Sheriff
Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units of Truck Tractors and trailers
of the Corporation at its garage at San Fernando, Pampanga. These vehicles were kept under PC guard
by the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the Corporation to operate them. However, on December
28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dissolved the writ (p. 30, record) and on December 29, 1989, said Sheriff
reported to this Court that the attached vehicles were taken by the defendants representative, Melita
Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31, record). The defendants general Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per day
for the non-operation of the six units during their attachment (p. 31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran,
proceedings on December 10, 1990)." [8]
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties
of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six months and twenty days as
maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory
damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;
"2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages in the
amount of P84,000.00; and
"3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED.
"Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.
"(Sgd.) ARTEMIO R. ALIVIA
"Regional Trial Judge"[9]
On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from the joint decision. [10]
On the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold
petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the
accused.[11]
On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion by inserting an
additional paragraph reading as follows:
"2:A Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded
to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused but deducting therefrom the
damages of P84,000.00 awarded to said defendant in the next preceding paragraph; and x x x" [12]
On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental
decision.[13]
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated December
[14]
29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case.
On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision affirming that of the trial court, as set out in the
opening paragraph of this decision.[15]
On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended decision. [16]
On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [17]
Hence, this petition for review.[18]
On July 21, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. [19]
On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment. [20] On April 13, 1998, the Court granted leave to petitioner
to file a reply and noted the reply it filed on March 11, 1998. [21]
We now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the case.
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the petition, which, however, boil down to two (2) basic issues,
namely:
1.....May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for the
damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing
of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the truck driver?
2.....May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil
action against the employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property? [22]
We grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to the trial court for
determination of the civil liability of petitioner as employer of the accused driver in the civil action quasi ex delicto re-
opened for the purpose.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he
may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. [23] This is the rule against double
recovery.
In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability." [24]
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer
of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or
negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions
of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated
on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would
necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the
employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being
statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. [25] The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of
his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is
found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged. [26]
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused
who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of
the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent
filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil
action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.[27]
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private
respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other
available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the
recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. [28]
The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of accused truck
driver became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on quasi delict.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer
of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties
in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex
delicto.
It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil
action against the driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal
action. However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made because private
respondents did not withdraw the civil action against petitioner based on quasi delict. In such a case, the provision of Rule
111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear that the reservation to file or the filing of a
separate civil action results in a waiver of other available civil actions arising from the same act or omission of the
accused. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are the civil actions deemed waived upon such reservation
or filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically provides:
"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others."
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or
omission of the offender. The restrictive phraseology of the section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil
actions, regardless of their source in law, provided that the action has for its basis the same act or omission of the
offender.[29]
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict, may be
held liable thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the Court of Appeal s
erred in affirming the trial courts decision. Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from such dismissal and could
not be granted affirmative relief.[30]
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to promote their objectives and assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding" [31] or exempted "a particular case
from the operation of the rules."[32]
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in dismissing
the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil
case. However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so that it may render
decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the evidence. [33]
With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As
enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong,[34] "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue
brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein,
but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the
accused became final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The damages
awarded in the criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void because the
action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount of damages alleged in
the amended information, the issue is de minimis.At any rate, the trial court erred in awarding damages in the criminal
case because by virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a separate civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be
no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the
civil liability of the accused.[35]
As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the
same act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. [36] The injured party
must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring. [37]
Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide
Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." There is no such
nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused "to
suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum." This is erroneous because in reckless
imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime or crimes
committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes. [38]
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if erroneous, as it is, because it has become final and
executory.
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the
common use of such descriptive phrase as homicide through reckless imprudence, and the like; when the strict technical
sense is, more accurately, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; or simple imprudence causing damages to
property."[39]
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance
of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997, and the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 1992.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property, defined and penalized under Article 365,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, with violation of the automobile law (R. A. No. 4136, as amended), and
sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum,[40] without indemnity, and to
pay the costs, and
(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders the case re-opened to determine the liability of the defendant Rafael
Reyes Trucking Corporation to plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendants counterclaim.
No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992
ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents.
Roberto M. Cabangis for petitioner.
Benjamin R. Reonal for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
This case turns on the proper application of the familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation.
Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o'clock in the morning of
May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo,
Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto
Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
alleging inter alia that he was liable to it in the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees and litigation costs as the employer
of Nestor Martin. The petitioner's main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his employee.
After the plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no evidence had been
adduced to show that Nestor Martin was his employee. The motion was denied. The case was considered submitted for
decision with the express waiver by the defendant of his right to present his own evidence. The defendant thus did not
rebut the plaintiff's allegation that he was Nestor Martin's employer.
In the decision dated August 27, 1985, Judge Eutropio Migriño held in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him the amount
claimed, with 12% interest, and P4,000.00 attorney's fees, plus costs.1 The decision was seasonably elevated to the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto on February 22, 1988, 2 prompting this petition for review.
The petition has merit.
It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed by the private respondent against only Ernesto Martin as
alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the time of the accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded. The
action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, providing in part that:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not necessary that the
employer be engaged in any business or industry. It differs in this sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
which requires that the employer be engaged in an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony committed by his
employee in the course of his employment.
Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed by
his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship.
Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in that
article. 3
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the employer of
Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee
relationship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It noted that although the defendant alleged that
he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present any proof to substantiate his allegation."
As the trial court put it:
There is no need to stretch one's imagination to realize that a car owner entrusts his vehicle only to his
driver or to anyone whom he allows to drive it. Since neither plaintiff nor defendant has presented any
evidence on the status of Nestor Martin, the Court presumes that he was at the time of the incident, an
employee of the defendant. It is elementary that he who makes an allegation is required to prove the
same. Defendant alleges that Nestor Martin was not his employee but he did not present any proof to
substantiate his allegation. While it is true plaintiff did not present evidence on its allegation that Nestor
Martin was defendant's employee, the Court believes and so holds, that there was no need for such
evidence. As above adverted to, the Court can proceed on the presumption that one who drives the motor
vehicle is an employee of the owner thereof.
A presumption is defined as an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection
with another which is known, 4 or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily
take. 5 It is either a presumption juris, or of law, or a presumption hominis, or of fact. 6
There is no law directing the deduction made by the courts below from the particular facts presented to them by the
parties. Such deduction is not among the conclusive presumptions under Section 2 or the disputable presumptions under
Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is not a presumption juris.
Neither is it a presumption hominis, which is a reasonable deduction from the facts proved without an express direction of
law to that effect. 7 The facts proved, or not denied, viz., the ownership of the car and the circumstances of the accident,
are not enough bases for the inference that the petitioner is the employer of Nestor Martin.
In the modern urban society, most male persons know how to drive and do not have to employ others to drive for them
unless this is needed for business reasons. Many cannot afford this luxury, and even if they could, may consider it an
unnecessary expense and inconvenience. In the present case, the more plausible assumption is that Nestor Martin is a
close relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed the car for some private purpose. Nestor would
probably not have been accommodated if he were a mere employee for employees do not usually enjoy the use of their
employer's car at two o'clock in the morning.
As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for
the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty "to present evidence on the fact in
issue necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this
was fatal to its action.
It was enough for the defendant to deny the alleged employment relationship, without more, for he was not under
obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. 8 This Court has consistently
applied the ancient rule that "if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception
or defense." 9
The case of Amor v. Soberano, 10 a Court of Appeals decision not elevated to this Court, was misapplied by the
respondent court in support of the petitioner's position. The vehicle involved in that case was a six-by-six truck, which
reasonably raised the factual presumption that it was engaged in business and that its driver was employed by the owner
of the vehicle. The case at bar involves a private vehicle as its license plate indicates. No evidence was ever offered that it
was being used for business purposes or that, in any case, its driver at the time of the accident was an employee of the
petitioner.
It is worth mentioning in this connection that in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 11 the owner of the jeep
involved in the accident was absolved from liability when it was shown that the driver of the vehicle was not employed as
such by the latter but was a "working scholar" as that term is defined by the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code. 12 He was assigned to janitorial duties. Evidence was introduced to establish the employment relationship but it
failed nonetheless to hold the owner responsible. Significantly, no similar evidence was even presented in the case at bar,
the private respondent merely relying on its mere allegation that Nestor Martin was the petitioner's employee. Allegation is
not synonymous with proof.
The above observations make it unnecessary to examine the question of the driver's alleged negligence or the lack of
diligence on the part of the petitioner in the selection and supervision of his employee. These questions have not arisen
because the employment relationship contemplated in Article 1860 of the Civil Code has not been established.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED, and Civil Case No. 48045
in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, is DISMISSED, with costs against the respondent. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medidialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992
MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court of Region III, Angeles City,
and the REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its President, respondents.
Mariano Y. Navarro for Republic Central Colleges.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private respondent Republic Central
Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The
complaint alleged that:
. . . on 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and premises
of the defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular enrolled student of
said school taking his morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on said date and
hour in the premises of said school performing his duties and obligations as a duly appointed security
guard under the employment, supervision and control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY
AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff
on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained
would have caused plaintiff's death were it not for the timely medical assistance given to him. The plaintiff
was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the
plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of
his usual work for a duration of from three to four months before his wounds would be completely
healed. 1
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it.
Private respondent argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that
private respondent school was not the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not
responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of
the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil,
student or apprentice of the school.
In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent Judge granted private respondent school's motion to dismiss, holding
that security guard Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of the school which accordingly could not be held liable for his
acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, without success.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that respondent trial judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion when he refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the
Civil Code and granted the school's motion to dismiss.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or
negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law
responsible. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
xxx xxx xxx
The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding the Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security
guard Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy
Solomon. The employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client or customer
of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work
of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. 2Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of
such agency. 3 As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool
of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client
whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or
directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the
security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no
more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. There being
no employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose
vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in
fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
similarly not available for imposing liability upon the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy
Solomon.
The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the
pupil or student.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner, the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades
known as the "Manila Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila, responsible in damages for the death of Dominador
Palisoc, a student of Institute, which resulted from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L. Daffon, another student of the
Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180,
quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the
child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who
committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic
Central Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.
Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's claim as one based wholly and exclusively on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial judge was correct. Does it follow, however, that respondent
Colleges could not be held liable upon any other basis in law, for or in respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as
to entitle respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's complaint in respect of itself?
The very recent case of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) v. Court of Appeals, 5 requires us to
give a negative answer to that question.
In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one
who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same
time, however, the Court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts
students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in
obligations for both parties:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of
the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms
around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof. 6
In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of
the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
 The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-
mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students
against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university
belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms
of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass
upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an
individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should
this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation
to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of
diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person,
time and place. 7
In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the Court of
Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been
based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in
character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in
serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of
justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of
respondent Colleges.
In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage
of justice, and putting aside technical considerations, we consider that respondent trial judge committed serious error
correctible by this Court in the instant case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to TREAT the comment of respondent
Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated 29 November 1983. This case is REMANDED
to the court a quo for further proceedings consistent with this Resolution.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-
appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for the respondents.
Bernabe Africa, etc. for the petitioners.
MAKALINTAL., J.:
This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dismissing petitioners' second amended complaint against respondents.
The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. It appears that in the afternoon of March
18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started
while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the recei ving tank
where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the
personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.),
Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation.
Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had
exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire
Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Portions of the first two reports are as
follows:
1. Police Department report: —
Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948, while Leandro Flores was transferring
gasoline from a tank truck, plate No. T-5292 into the underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline Station
located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a
cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of the said underground tank. Due to the
gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose
connecting the truck with the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the flames
scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck and the following
accessorias and residences.
2. The Fire Department report: —
In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic) subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and
cigarette stand, the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which is
submitted herewith. it appears in this picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which
according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the
gasoline pumps and the underground tanks.
The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline
station and what the chief of the fire department had told him on the same subject.
The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by the Court of Appeals and hence inadmissible. This ruling is
now assigned as error. It is contended: first, that said reports were admitted by the trial court without objection on the pa rt
of respondents; secondly, that with respect to the police report (Exhibit V-Africa) which appears signed by a Detective
Zapanta allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the latter was presented as witness but respondents waived their right to
cross-examine him although they had the opportunity to do so; and thirdly, that in any event the said reports are
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of Rule 123, now Rule 130.
The first contention is not borne out by the record. The transcript of the hearing of September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170)
shows that the reports in question, when offered as evidence, were objected to by counsel for each of respondents on the
ground that they were hearsay and that they were "irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent." Indeed, in the court's resolution
only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6 were admitted without objection; the admission of the others, including the disputed ones,
carried no such explanation.
On the second point, although Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand, he was not examined and he did not testify
as to the facts mentioned in his alleged report (signed by Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was one of those
who investigated "the location of the fire and, if possible, gather witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he brought the
report with him. There was nothing, therefore, on which he need be cross-examined; and the contents of the report, as to
which he did not testify, did not thereby become competent evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony would still
have been objectionable as far as information gathered by him from third persons was concerned.
Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves, that is, without further testimonial evidence on their
contents, fall within the scope of section 35, Rule 123, which provides that "entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer,
or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the
reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who
conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? As to
some facts the sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an
employee at the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was
being transferred at the time to the underground tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not,
according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as "official
information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have
1
personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by
the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees. Both the trial court and the appellate court
refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that "as to (its) applicability ... in the Philippines, there
seems to he nothing definite," and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, "in the case at bar,
however, we find no practical use for such doctrine." The question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The
doctrine has actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co.
(CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949), wherein the decision of the Court of Appeals was penned by Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes now a member of the Supreme Court.
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows:
In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while the plaintiff-appellee and other companions were loading grass between
the municipalities of Bay and Calauan, in the province of Laguna, with clear weather and without any wind
blowing, an electric transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and
Development Co., Inc. alongside the road, suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the
plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts carried by
the wire and was knocked unconscious to the ground. The electric charge coursed through his body and caused
extensive and serious multiple burns from skull to legs, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and causing
intense pain and wounds that were not completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one
year after the mishap.
The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence ,
but the appellate court overruled the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said:
The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to place appellant on its defense. While it is
the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it
is also a recognized principal that "where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation,
that the injury arose from defendant's want of care."
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. (San Juan
Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680.) This rule is known by the name of res ipsa
loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned
that the plaintiff had every right to be on the highway, and the electric wire was under the sole control of
defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair weather and injure
people, unless they are subjected to unusual strain and stress or there are defects in their installation,
maintenance and supervision; just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure
passersby, unless some one was negligent. (Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & Co. 722; 159 Eng. Reprint 299, the leading
case that established that rule). Consequently, in the absence of contributory negligence (which is admittedly not
present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation,
care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock, "if there are any facts inconsistent with
negligence, it is for the defendant to prove."
It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not lay down doctrines binding on the Supreme Court, but we
do not consider this a reason for not applying the particular doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a
highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not
considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from some act of man. A case strikingly similar to the one
before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al., 171 So. 447:
Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city of Hammon which in the year 1934 was leased to the Shell
Petroleum Corporation for a gasoline filling station. On October 8, 1934, during the term of the lease, while
gasoline was being transferred from the tank wagon, also operated by the Shell Petroleum Corporation, to the
underground tank of the station, a fire started with resulting damages to the building owned by Jones. Alleging
that the damages to his building amounted to $516.95, Jones sued the Shell Petroleum Corporation for the
 recovery of that amount. The judge of the district court, after hearing the testimony, concluded that plaintiff was
entitled to a recovery and rendered judgment in his favor for $427.82. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed this judgment, on the ground the testimony failed to show with reasonable certainty any negligence on
the part of the Shell Petroleum Corporation or any of its agents or employees. Plaintiff applied to this Court for a
Writ of Review which was granted, and the case is now before us for decision.1äwphï1.ñët
In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
Plaintiff's petition contains two distinct charges of negligence — one relating to the cause of the fire and the other
relating to the spreading of the gasoline about the filling station.
Other than an expert to assess the damages caused plaintiff's building by the fire, no witnesses were placed on
the stand by the defendant.
Taking up plaintiff's charge of negligence relating to the cause of the fire, we find it established by the record that
the filling station and the tank truck were under the control of the defendant and operated by its agents or
employees. We further find from the uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff's witnesses that fire started in the
underground tank attached to the filling station while it was being filled from the tank truck and while both the tank
and the truck were in charge of and being operated by the agents or employees of the defendant, extended to the
hose and tank truck, and was communicated from the burning hose, tank truck, and escaping gasoline to the
building owned by the plaintiff.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of defendant's failure to explain the cause of the
fire or to show its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are
many cases in which the doctrine may be successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J. #768, p. 1193).
This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely approved and adopted by the courts of last resort.
Some of the cases in this jurisdiction in which the doctrine has been applied are the following, viz.: Maus v.
Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25 So. 977; Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, etc., Co., 111 La. 522, 35 So. 731, 64
L.R.A. 101, 100 Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 115 La. 63, 38 So. 892; Bents v. Page, 115 La.
560, 39 So. 599.
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and
their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano of the Manila Police Department (Exh. X-1 Africa) the following
appears:
Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed that the Caltex Gasoline Station complained of occupies a lot
approximately 10 m x 10 m at the southwest corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo. The location is within a very
busy business district near the Obrero Market, a railroad crossing and very thickly populated neighborhood where
a great number of people mill around t
until
gasoline
tever be theWactjvities of these peopleor lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded and this constitute a secondary
hazard to its operation which in turn endangers the entire neighborhood to conflagration.
Furthermore, aside from precautions already taken by its operator the concrete walls south and west adjoining the
neighborhood are only 2-1/2 meters high at most and cannot avoid the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
Records show that there have been two cases of fire which caused not only material damages but desperation
and also panic in the neighborhood.
Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated, this gasoline service station is also used by its operator as a
garage and repair shop for his fleet of taxicabs numbering ten or more, adding another risk to the possible
outbreak of fire at this already small but crowded gasoline station.
The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own
personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts,
descriptive of the location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question,
strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more
stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
There is no more eloquent demonstration of this than the statement of Leandro Flores before the police investigator.
Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without assistance, was transferring the contents thereof
into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said: "Before loading the underground tank there were no
people, but while the loading was going on, there were people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which
is about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank was almost filled he went to
the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on
the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping
over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized
iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the second amended complaint that "the fire was
caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant, passed through the
gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but
assuming the allegation to be true — certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken against
Boquiren — it does not extenuate his negligence. A decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to
those of the present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here. "It is the rule that those who distribute a
dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate with a danger
involved ... we think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the effects of the actor's negligent conduct
actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous
operation of the effects of a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm, does not protect the actor from liability.' (Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, p. 1184, #439). Stated in another
way, "The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences
of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury."
(MacAfee, et al. vs. Traver's Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)
The next issue is whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants. This issue depends on
whether Boquiren was an independent contractor, as held by the Court of Appeals, or an agent of Caltex. This question, in
the light of the facts not controverted, is one of law and hence may be passed upon by this Court. These facts are: (1)
Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station
and all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised control over Boquiren in the management of the state; (4) the delivery
truck used in delivering gasoline to the station had the name of CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store
gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees. (Exhibit T-Africa; Exhibit U-Africa; Exhibit X-
5 Africa; Exhibit X-6 Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa).
In Boquiren's amended answer to the second amended complaint, he denied that he directed one of his drivers to remove
gasoline from the truck into the tank and alleged that the "alleged driver, if one there was, was not in his employ, the driver
being an employee of the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the owners of the gasoline station." It is true that Boquiren later on
amended his answer, and that among the changes was one to the effect that he was not acting as agent of Caltex. But
then again, in his motion to dismiss appellants' second amended complaint the ground alleged was that it stated no cause
of action since under the allegations thereof he was merely acting as agent of Caltex, such that he could not have
incurred personal liability. A motion to dismiss on this ground is deemed to be an admission of the facts alleged in the
complaint.
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted
at the service station in question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with
Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at the time of the fire. There must have been one in exi stence at
that time. Instead, what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case, since it was
entered into shortly before the expiration of the one-year period it was intended to operate. This so-called license
agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on November 29, 1948, but made effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to
cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This retroactivity provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the
conclusion that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility with respect to the fire, as shown by the
clause that Caltex "shall not be liable for any injury to person or property while in the property herein licensed, it being
understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an employee, representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under
that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the
equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the
approval, in other words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the consent
of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until
terminated by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel and terminate the agreement in
case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct the business with due diligence, in the judgment of
Caltex. Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to Boquiren. These provi sions of
the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was virtually an
employee of the former.
Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his position to the company and the latter could remove
him or terminate his services at will; that the service station belonged to the company and bore its tradename and
the operator sold only the products of the company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged to the
company and were just loaned to the operator and the company took charge of their repair and maintenance; that
an employee of the company supervised the operator and conducted periodic inspection of the company's
gasoline and service station; that the price of the products sold by the operator was fixed by the company and not
by the operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator indicated that he was a mere agent, the finding of the
 Court of Appeals that the operator was an agent of the company and not an independent contractor should not be
disturbed.
To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not bound to rely upon the name or title given it by
the contracting parties, should thereby a controversy as to what they really had intended to enter into, but the way
the contracting parties do or perform their respective obligations stipulated or agreed upon may be shown and
inquired into, and should such performance conflict with the name or title given the contract by the parties, the
former must prevail over the latter. (Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Firemens' Insurance Company of
Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil. 757).
The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of creating the apparent relationship of employer and
independent contractor, and of avoiding liability for the negligence of the employees about the station; but the
company was not satisfied to allow such relationship to exist. The evidence shows that it immediately assumed
control, and proceeded to direct the method by which the work contracted for should be performed. By reserving
the right to terminate the contract at will, it retained the means of compelling submission to its orders. Having
elected to assume control and to direct the means and methods by which the work has to be performed, it must
be held liable for the negligence of those performing service under its direction. We think the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. (Gulf Refining Company v. Rogers, 57 S.W. 2d, 183).
Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in the station belonged to Boquiren. But no cash invoices were presented to
show that Boquiren had bought said gasoline from Caltex. Neither was there a sales contract to prove the same.
As found by the trial court the Africas sustained a loss of P9,005.80, after deducting the amount of P2,000.00 collected by
them on the insurance of the house. The deduction is now challenged as erroneous on the ground that Article 2207 of the
New Civil Code, which provides for the subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the insured, was not yet in effect when
the loss took place. However, regardless of the silence of the law on this point at that time, the amount that should be
recovered be measured by the damages actually suffered, otherwise the principle prohibiting unjust enrichment would be
violated. With respect to the claim of the heirs of Ong P7,500.00 was adjudged by the lower court on the basis of the
assessed value of the property destroyed, namely, P1,500.00, disregarding the testimony of one of the Ong children that
said property was worth P4,000.00. We agree that the court erred, since it is of common knowledge that the assessment
for taxation purposes is not an accurate gauge of fair market value, and in this case should not prevail over positive
evidence of such value. The heirs of Ong are therefore entitled to P10,000.00.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants, and
ordered to pay them the aforesaid sum of P9,005.80 and P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of the
complaint, and costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996
RICHARD LI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover
damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a
vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by
the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident.
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos
highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she
had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat
and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away,
put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at
the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was
suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the
car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle
connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found
to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for
twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement
(P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including
loss of expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering
that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving
along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was
suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction,
travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid
colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue
in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense
that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer
portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's
witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the
sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was
not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three
cars involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car was "near the sidewalk"; this witness did not
remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did not notice if there was an early warning
device; there was a street light at the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not
mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the
trunk compartment, defendant's car came approaching very fast ten meters from the scene; the car was
"zigzagging". The rear left side of plaintiff's car was bumped by the front right portion of defendant's car; as a
consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to
the windshield of defendant's car, which was destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that defendant was
under the influence of liquor as he could "smell it very well" (pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence
and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and
severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her
severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiff's Bistro La Conga
restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of
the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment and (c)
P30,000.00, a month for unrealized profits in plaintiff's two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of this
decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing
testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as depicted
by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial
court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial
court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by
1
defendant's car." Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center
of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car was at or near center of
the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.2 The respondent court furthermore observed that:
Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not
corroborated. It was in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he was outside his beerhouse
located at Aurora Boulevard after A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when his attention was
caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk compartment; he
noticed the car of Richard Li "approaching very fast ten (10) meters away from the scene"; defendant's car was
zigzagging", although there were no holes and hazards on the street, and "bumped the leg of the plaintiff" who
was thrown against the windshield of defendant's care, causing its destruction. He came to the rescue of the
plaintiff, who was pulled out from under defendant's car and was able to say "hurting words" to Richard Li
because he noticed that the latter was under the influence of liquor, because he "could smell it very well" (p.
36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but did not
know either plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of
Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards
petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for
exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney's
fees and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants' counterclaims. 3
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate petitions before this Court.
Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of
the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent court's decision insofar as it
absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces
the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court. 4
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated.
It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in effect,
attempts to have this Court review are factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding
Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early morning hours of Ju ne
24, 1990. This we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon
us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 5
In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio
Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the accident. On trial, he testified that
he observed a car being driven at a "very fast" speed, racing towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue. 6 Rodriguez
further added that he was standing in front of his establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of the
accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer,
from where she eventually fell under the defendant's car. Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed the street,
noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from the offending vehicle in order to survey the
incident.7 Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela's car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk,8 contrary to Li's allegation that Valenzuela's car was close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as
between Li's "self-serving" asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not even know the accident victim
personally and who immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his testimony to the investigator immediately
after the incident, the latter's testimony deserves greater weight. As the court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside
the trial court's reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendant's assertion that he was driving at a
safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his perception of speed is not necessarily impaired. He
was subjected to cross-examination and no attempt was made to question .his competence or the accuracy of his
statement that defendant was driving "very fast". This was the same statement he gave to the police investigator
after the incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We see no compelling basis for disregarding his
testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony are not borne out by an examination of the testimony.
Rodriguez testified that the scene of the accident was across the street where his beerhouse is located about ten
to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the accident transpired immediately in
front of his establishment. The ownership of the Lambingan se Kambingan is not material; the business is
registered in the name of his mother, but he explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn, June 20, 1991).
Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his side of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident
transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was a streetlight at the
corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the
rain has stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn, June
17, 1991). This was consistent with plaintiff's testimony that it was no longer raining when she left Bistro La Conga
(pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, 1991). It was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in an attempt to
explain why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that
it was raining, he arrived at the scene only in response to a telephone call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-
10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguez's testimony that would impair the
essential integrity of his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to affirm the trial court's
acceptance of the testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li's testimony was peppered with so many
inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version,
obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuela's
corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the
course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph. when "out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiff's car". He alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition" he put o n
his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.9
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations.
The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed
claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan
thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he
were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological "fight or flight" 10 mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.11 Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore
have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by
Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. 12 Either factor working independently would have diminished
his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car,
rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by
respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan Police immediately after the incident, he said that
while driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him which was
plaintiff's car, indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of his surroundings and
the road ahead of him, because if he was not, then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance the
parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding
forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at the left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiff's
car in front of him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes to show again, that, contrary to his
claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could have easily completely stopped his car,
thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if,
indeed, he was running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and
slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the
proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police
immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes but
simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-coming car with glaring headlights, from the opposite
direction, in order to avoid it.
 For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at
the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to
safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue separated at
the center by a dotted white paint, and there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running at the right
lane going towards Manila on the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao. 13
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question
for us to determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside
Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
14
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Based on the
foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her
own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held
up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of
impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of
thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. 15
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds himself
in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. 17
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two
children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,18 that the driver therein,
Jose Koh, "adopted the best means possible in the given situation" to avoid hitting the children. Using the "emergency
rule" the Court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with an oncoming
truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.19
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by
the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A
woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which i s
both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It
would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard
is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the
instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat
tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As narrated by
respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her
home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car." 20 In fact, respondent court
noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very
close to the sidewalk.21 The sketch which he prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's car partly straddling the
sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself
corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez. 22
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and
could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of
one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of
her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident.
"Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others." 23 It is the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.24 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want of care
required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly
negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a
heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to
show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing
conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Presser and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of
obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one who sees a child on
the curb may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his failure to act properly when they
appear may be found to amount to negligence.26
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of his own
making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's employer. In denying liability on the part of
Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit was in connection with official matters. His
functions as assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work outside the office as he has to visit
buyers and company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the accident he came from BF Homes
Paranaque he did not have "business from the company" (pp. 25-26, ten, Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the
company car was partly required by the nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is
a "benefit", apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of their respective
duties, the basis of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater familias, which theory
bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton
and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act
or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the actual performance of his
assigned tasks or duties (Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an employer's
liability for the acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this
includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for
in the performance of any act "indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer" (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's finding that since defendant Li was authorized
by the company to use the company car "either officially or socially or even bring it home", he can be considered
as using the company car in the service of his employer or on the occasion of his functions. Driving the company
car was not among his functions as assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes would appear to be a
fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his position. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing that the damage was caused by their employees
in the service of the employer or on the occasion of their functions. There is no evidence that Richard Li was at
the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of the company's business or its interests, or at least for
its benefit. The imposition of solidary liability against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore
fail.27
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior,
which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the
employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater
familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals29 upon which respondent court has placed undue reliance,
dealt with the subject of a school and its teacher's supervision of students during an extracurricular activity. These cases
now fall under the provision on special parental authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which generally
encompasses all authorized school activities, whether inside or outside school premises.
Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176)
of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced
showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's burden
is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employee's
private activities or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee's
tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with
either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with courtesy vehicles. These company
cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to various plans through which
employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many
companies provide liberal "car plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars, which,
given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to the
employee; in the second example, the car is really owned and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing vehicles
to such employees, are companies totally absolved of responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued car
occurs during private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road
worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In
other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee
to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or
menace to himself, the company or to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a co mpany car to its
employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the privilege of using a company-issued car. For
large companies other than those cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important
business purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in
general, or - for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents
to reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes. Since important business
transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for
the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only
incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales
agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image,
a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts
virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he
admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was
required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with
company clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well
as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as
well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele.
It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because he was coming from a
social visit with an officemate in Paranaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was
obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate's place, the same could give rise to speculation that
he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work
related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company
took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car.31 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,
ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the respondent court, except as to the amount
of moral damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the
expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we
are of the opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P800,000,00 by the Court of
Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the
distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory functions of
her left extremity, even with the use of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization
(which was paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage of the
stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and
therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her
lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause,
for example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate
decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her
would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes
which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require
corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting damage because it would be
highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing
of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable
amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The
resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of
P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury - physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li's grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early
morning hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with the effect of
REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff
for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to
P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to
two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed
by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between
the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in
holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going
toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve
miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said
streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after
passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance
and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street,
into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the
plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who
examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a
depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood
issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain was had
suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the
operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His
right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be
regarded as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The
patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter
weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted
to use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to
the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical
condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had
constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not
now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his
efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach
the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved
the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making
mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up
a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plainti ff's
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the
award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the
plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing
the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a
contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which
the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that
the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two
months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for
the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is
P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry
at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for
damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March
twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against
the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said
Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability
to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also
admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the
plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judg ment
accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any,
to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court
for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the
accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we
have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to
hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the United
States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act
No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs,
except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest."
(Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs.
States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal injuries
received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for
the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit
the industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those
sought by the public school system. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers
or agents, the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or
unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs.
State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs.
State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of
either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
 merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the
bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha County,
Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of
settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly
authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the
State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka
Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha,
Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the
acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see
how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act
is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the
door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be
in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in
this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to
mere inference, but would have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass.,
28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not allowed
by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring
suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same
to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise
provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both it
was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed
before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not
been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this
statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized
class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can
be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York,
jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief
Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of
its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously
recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers,
agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is
based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that
the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private
persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature
governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
 That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence;
and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person
who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the
damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain
fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in
consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal
presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for
acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and
not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners
or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of
a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this
kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for
all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made
by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an
external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in
the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the
exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of
the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent(and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among
others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to
the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in
not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second
class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above
quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as
special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the
Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient
funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 70547 January 22, 1993
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and HONORIO CABARDO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Leopoldo Sta. Maria for private respondents.

MELO, J.:
The imputation of culpa on the part of herein petitioners as a result of the collision between its strain, bound for Manila
from La Union, with a Baliwag transit bus at the railroad crossing on the road going to Hagonoy, Bulacan on August l0,
1974, is the subject of the petition at bar directed against the judgment of affirmance rendered by respondent court,
through the Fourth Civil Cases Division (Sison, Bidin (P), Veloso, JJ.), vis-a-vis the decretal portion handed down by the
court of origin in:
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the amount of P179,511.52 as actual
damages.
2. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff P436,642.03 as reimbursement for the
damages paid by the plaintiff to death, injury and damage claimants.
3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50, 000.00
to the plaintiff.
4. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P5,
000.00.
5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff interest at the legal rate on the above
amounts due the plaintiff from August 10, 1974 until fully paid.
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the cost of this suit.
7. Ordering the dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim for lack of factual and legal basis. (p. 101,
Record on Appeal; p. 103. Rollo.)
Culled from the text of the assailed disposition are the facts of the case at bar which are hereunder adopted verbatim:
The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant Philippine National Railways,
(PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag
Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad
crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got
stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers,
eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the
proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive
engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars,
semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass
through the crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their
Answer traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the
collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo
Hughes.
At the pre-trial conference held on June 23, 1976, the parties agreed on a partial stipulation of facts and
issues which as amplified at the continuation of the pre-trial conference, on July 12, 1976, are as follows:
1 That plaintiff is a duly constituted corporation registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission engaged in the business of transportation and operating public
utility buses for the public with lines covering Manila, Caloocan City, Quezon City,
Malabon, Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga and Nueva Ecija, and particularly from Manila to
Hagonoy, Bulacan and return in the month of August, l974 passing thru the town of
Calumpit Bulacan, temporarily while the bridge at Hagonoy, Bulacan was under
construction;
2 That defendant Philippine National Railways is a purely government owned and
controlled corporation duly registered and existing virtue of Presidential Decree No. 741,
with capacity to sue and be sued, and is likewise engaged in transporting passengers
and cargoes by trains and buses and that, it operates a train line between San Fernando,
La Union and Manila particularly Passenger Express Train with Body No. 73, passing
along the intersection of Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan, in going to San Fernando,
La Union from Manila and return;
3. That on August 10, 1974, at about 1:20 o'clock in the afternoon, a Baliuag Transit Bus
with Body No. 1066 and Plate No. XS-929 PUB-Bulacan '74 was driven by its authorized
driver Romeo Hughes and PNR Train No. 73 was operated by Train Engineer Honorio
Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado and at the railroad intersection at Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan, said passenger train No. 73 hit and bumped the right mid portion of
the plaintiff's passenger bus No. 1066, while the rear portion of said bus was at the
 railroad track and its direction was towards Hagonoy, Bulacan at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon;
4. That at the time of the collision there was a slight rainfall in the vicinity of the scene of
the accident and that there was at said intersection no bars, semaphores, and signal
lights that would warn the public of the approaching train that was about to pass through
the intersection and likewise there was no warning devices to passing trains showing that
they were about to pass an intersection in going to Manila from San Fernando, La Union
and back;
5. That on account of said collision, the Baliuag Transit Bus with Body No. 1066 driven by
Romeo Hughes was damaged and eighteen (18) of its passengers died and the rest who
were more than fifty three (53) passengers suffered physical injuries;
6. That after the investigation the Chief of Police of Calumpit, Bulacan, filed a criminal
case of Reckless Imprudence Causing Multiple Homicide with Multiple Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property against Romeo Hughes y Parfan, driver of the Baliuag Transit
bus docketed under Crim. Case No. 2392; while the train Engineer Honorio Cabardo
alias Honorio Cirbado was not included as an accused in said case, although his train
No. 73 was the one that hit and bumped the right rear portion of the said bus;
7. That immediately after the said accident Major Manuel A. Macam, Chief of the
Municipal Police of Calumpit, Bulacan, together with some of his policemen conducted an
investigation of the accident;
8. That at the railroad crossing in Calumpit, Bulacan where the accident took place there
is no railroad crossing bar, however, during the pre-war days there was a railroad
crossing bar at said intersection; that, however, there was only one sign of railroad
crossing "Stop, Look and Listen" placed on a concrete slab and attached to a concrete
post existing at the approach of the railroad track from the Highway going towards
Hagonoy, Bulacan and that after the said railroad track there was a designated jeep
parking area at the right side in the direction from the Highway to Hagonoy Bulacan;
9. That the train No. 73 driven by Train Engineer Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado
stopped after passing the railroad crossing at a distance of about 50 meters from the said
intersection after the collision on August, 1974;
10. That the expected time of arrival of said Train No. 73 in Manila was 2:41 P.M. and its
departure time from San Fernando, La Union was 9:00 A.M. and its expected arrival at
Calumpit, Bulacan was 1:41 P.M. with no stop at Calumpit, Bulacan.
SIMPLIFICATION OF ISSUES
11. That the principal issue in the instant case is who between the driver Romeo Hughes
of Baliuag Transit, Incorporated and the train engineer Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio
Cirbado of the Philippine National Railways was negligent or whether or not both are
negligent; that likewise which of said companies was negligent at said railroad
intersection;
12. That another additional issue is whether the Baliuag Transit Incorporated has
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its employees. (pp.
85-87, Record on Appeal). ( Annex A, Petition; pp. 79-82, Rollo)
In addition, respondent court deemed it necessary to reflect the salient findings of the case for damages as formulated by
the trial court:
Posed for resolution are the following issues: Who between the driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag
Transit Incorporated and Honorio Cabardo, train Engineer of the Philippine National Railways was
negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles, or whether or both were negligent? Could either of
the companies Baliuag Transit Incorporated and the Philippine National Railways be held accountable for
the collision because of negligence?
The defendants presented several statements or affidavits of alleged witnesses to the collision,
specifically Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19; the Court is at a loss as to why the
persons who gave the said statements were not presented as witnesses during the trial of the
case, as aptly said, the statements are hearsay evidence (Azcueta v. Cabangbang, — 45 O.G. 144); at
most they be taken as proof only of the fact that statements of said persons were taken and that
investigation was conducted of the incident; the Court cannot consider the averments in said statements
as testimonies or evidence of truth.
Defendants endeavored to show that the proximate and immediate cause of the collision was the
negligence of the bus driver because the driver did not make a stop before ascending the railtrack; he did
not heed the warning or shoutings of bystanders and passengers and proceeded in traversing the
railtrack at a fast speed; that the bus driver was in fact violating Section 42(d) of R.A. 4136, otherwise
known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code for failure to "stop, look, and listen" at the
intersection, before crossing the railtrack; that it is incumbent upon him to take the necessary precautions
at the intersection because the railroad track is in itself a warning; and the bus driver ignored such a
warning and must assume the responsibility for the result of the motion taken by him (U.S. v. Mananquil,
42 Phil. 90)
Except the testimony of the train engineer Cabardo, there is no admissible evidence to show that indeed,
the bus driver did not take the necessary precaution in traversing the track. Note that he first noticed the
bus when it was only 15 meters away from him; he could not have possibly noticed the position of the bus
before negotiating the track.
On the other hand, it was shown by plaintiff that the bus driver Romeo Hughes took the necessary
precautions in traversing the track.
The bus driver had stopped before traversing the track and in fact asked the conductor to alight and made
a "Look and Listen" before proceeding; the conductor had done just that and made a signal to proceed
when he did not see any oncoming train. (TSN, October 2l, 1976, p. 4); plaintiff's bus drivers and
conductors are enjoined to observe such a precautionary measure in seminars conducted by the
company. (TSN, September 23, 1976. pp. 26-27).
The evidence disclosed that the train was running fast because by his own testimony, the train engineer
had testified that before reaching the station of Calumpit the terrain was downgrade and levelled only
after passing the Calumpit bridge (TSN, July 28, 1976, p. 14 ); the tendency of the train, coming from a
high point is to accelerate as the gravity will necessarily make it so, especially when it is pulling seven
coaches loaded with goods and passengers.
Moreover, upon impact, the bus loaded with passengers was dragged and thrown into a ditch several
meters away; the train had stopped only after the engine portion was about 190 meters away from the
fallen bus; several passengers were injured and at least 20 died; such facts conclusively indicate that the
train was speeding, because if it were moving at moderate speed, it would not run some 190 meters after
impact and throw the bus at quite a distance especially so when it is claimed that the train's emergency
brakes were applied.
Further, the train was an express train; its departure was 9:00 A.M. at San Fernando, La Union and
expected in Manila at 2:41 P.M.; the collision occurred at 1:30 P.M. or 4 1/2 hours after it left La Union;
surely, the train could have not negotiated such a distance in so short a time if it were not running at fast
speed.
It may be argued that a railroad is not subject to the same restrictions to the speed of its train as a
motorists (Mckelvey v. Delaware L. and W.R. Co. 253 App. D.V. 109, 300 NYS 1263 ); but it does not
follow that a train will be permitted to run fast under all conditions at any rate of speed it may choose. It
must regulate its speed with proper regard for the safety of human life and property (Johnson v. Southern
Pacific Company (Cal. App. 288 p. 81), considering the surrounding circumstances particularly the nature
of the locality (Atchinson, T. and SFR Co. v. Nicks (Arts) 165 p. 2d 167).
Cabardo's route included the passage over the said intersection; he could have noticed that it is a very
busy intersection because the crossroad leads to the Calumpit Poblacion as well as to the neighboring
town of Hagonoy; there was a parking lot by the side of the track whereat passengers board jeepneys for
the neighboring barrios and towns; stalls abound in the vicinity and bystanders congregate nearby. A
prudent train operator must, under the circumstances, slacken his speed almost for the protection of
motorists and pedestrians, not only when a collision is inevitable but even if no hindrance is apparent on
the way;
Moreover, there was an intermittent rain at the time of the collision (see stipulation of facts and
photographs); the condition of the weather was such that even if for this reason alone, the train engineer
should have foreseen that danger of collision lurked because of poor visibility of slippery road; he should
have taken extra precaution by considerably slackening its speed. This he failed to do even if the nature
of his job required him to observe care exercised by a prudent man.
Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver; it was evident that he had taken the
necessary precautions before passing over the railway track; if the bus was hit, it was for reasons beyond
the control of the bus driver because he had no place to go; there were vehicles to his left which
prevented him in swerving towards that direction; his bus stalled in view of the obstructions in his front
where a sand and gravel truck stopped because of a jeep maneuvering into a garage up front. All the
wheels at the bus have already passed the rail portion of the track and only the rear portion of the bus'
body occupied or covered the railtrack. This was evident because the part of the bus hit by the train was
the rear since the bus fell on a nearby ditch. Otherwise, if the bus was really hit in mid-body, the bus
could have been halved into two because of the force of the impact.
The stipulation of facts between the parties show that there was no crossing bar at the railroad
intersection at Calumpit, Bulacan at the time of collision (par. 8, Stipulation of Facts); the plaintiff
contended and the defendants did not deny, that there were no signal lights, semaphores, flagman or
switchman thereat; the absence of such devices, the plaintiff argues constitute negligence on the part of
the Philippine National Railways.
 A railroad is not required to have a gate (crossing bar) or a flagman, or to maintain signals at every
intersection; only at such places reasonably necessary; what is considered reasonably necessary will
depend on the amount of travel upon the road, the frequency with which trains pass over it and the view
which could be obtained of trains as they approach the crossing, and other conditions (Pari v. Los
Angeles, Ry. Corporation (Cal A2d) 128 p2d 563; Swdyk v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. 148 F. 2d 795, and
others).
As has been amply discussed, the crossroad at the intersection at Calumpit is one which is a busy
thoroughfare; it leads to the Poblacion at Calumpit and other barrios as well as the town of Hagonoy; the
vicinity is utilized as a parking and waiting area for passengers of jeepneys that ply between the barrios,
clearly, the flow of vehicular traffic thereat is huge. It can be said also that, since there is no other railtrack
going North except that one passing at Calumpit, trains pass over it frequently;
A portion of the intersection is being used as a parking area with stalls and other obstructions present
making it difficult, if not impossible, to see approaching trains (see photographs).
The failure of the Philippine National Railways to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphores is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or
ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said devices or equipments be installed, in the
light of aforesaid jurisprudence. In the opinion of this Court the X sign or the presence of "STOP, LOOK,
LISTEN" warnings would not be sufficient protection of the motoring public as well as the pedestrians, in
the said intersection;
The parties likewise have stipulated that during the pre-war days, there was a railroad crossing bar at the
said intersection (Par-8, Stipulation of Facts). It appears that it was a self imposed requirement which has
been abandoned. In a case it was held that where the use of a flagman was self imposed, the
abandonment thereof may constitute negligence. (Fleming v. Missouri and A. Ry. Co. 198 ARDC 290,
128 S.W. 2d 286 and others; cited in Sec. 1082 SCRWARTZ, Vol. 2). Similarly, the abandonment by the
PNR of the use of the crossing bar at the intersection at Calumpit constitutes negligence, as its
installation has become imperative, because of the prevailing circumstances in the place.
A railroad company has been adjudged guilty of negligence and civilly liable for damages when it failed to
install semaphores, or where it does not see to it that its flagman or switchman comply with their duties
faithfully, to motorist injured by a crossing train as long as he had crossed without negligence on his part
(Lilius vs. MRR, 39 Phil. 758). (Decision, pages 94-100, R A.; pp. 83-89, Rollo).
On the aspect of whether the Philippine National Railways enjoys immunity from suit, respondent court initially noted that
an exculpation of this nature that was raised for the first time on appeal may no longer be entertained in view of the
proscription under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, apart from the fact that the lawyer of petitioner agreed
to stipulate inter alia that the railroad company had capacity to sue and be sued. This being so, respondent court
continued, PNR was perforce estopped from disavowing the prejudicial repercussion of an admission in judicio. Even as
the laws governing the creation and rehabilitation of the PNR were entirely mute on its power to sue and be sued,
respondent court nonetheless opined that such prerogative was implied from the general power to transact business
pertinent or indispensable to the attainment of the goals of the railroad company under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4156
as amended by Republic Act No. 6366:
Sec. 4 General Powers — The Philippine National Railways shall have the following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental
or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation law.
in conjunction with Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 741:
(b) To own or operate railroad transways, bus lines, trucklines, subways, and other kinds of land
transportation, vessels, and pipelines, for the purpose of transporting for consideration, passengers, mail
and property between any points in the Philippines;
Thus, respondent court utilized the doctrine of implied powers announced in National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro,
Sr. and Philippine Airlines, Inc. (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), to the effect that the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the
faculty to transact private business. At any rate, respondent court characterized the railroad company as a private entity
created not to discharge a governmental function but, among other things, to operate a transport service which is
essentially a business concern, and thus barred from invoking immunity from suit.
In brushing aside petitioners' asseveration that the bus driver outraced the train at the crossing, respondent court
observed that the bus was hit by the train at its rear portion then protruding over the tracks as the bus could not move
because another truck at its front was equally immobile due to a jeep maneuvering into a nearby parking area. Under
these tight conditions, respondent court blamed the train engineer who admitted to have seen the maneuvering jeep at a
distance (TSN, July 28, 1976, page 18) and had the last clear chance to apply the brakes, knowing fully well that the
vehicles following the jeep could not move away from the path of the train. Apart from these considerations, it was
perceived below that the train was running fast during the entire trip since the train stopped 190 meters from the point of
impact and arrived at Calumpit, Bulacan earlier than its expected time of arrival thereat.
Moreover, respondent court agreed with the conclusion reached by the trial court that the absence of a crossing bar,
signal light, flagman or switchman to warn the public of an approaching train constitutes negligence per the
pronouncement of this Court in Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company (59 Phil 758 [1934]).
Concerning the exercise of diligence normally expected of an employer in the selection and supervision of its employees,
respondent court expressed the view that PNR was remiss on this score since it allowed Honorio Cabardo, who finished
only primary education and became an engineer only through sheer experience, to operate the locomotive, not to mention
the fact that such plea in avoidance was not asserted in the answer and was thus belatedly raised on appeal.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but respondent court was far from persuaded. Hence, the petition before Us which, in
essence, incorporates similar disputations anent PNR's immunity from suit and the attempt to toss the burden of
negligence from the train engineer to the bus driver of herein private respondent.
The bone of contention for exculpation is premised on the familiar maxim in political law that the State, by virtue of its
sovereign nature and as reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is insulated from suits without its consent (Article 16, Section
3, 1987 Constitution). However, equally conceded is the legal proposition that the acquiescence of the State to be sued
can be manifested expressly through a general or special law, or indicated implicitly, as when the State commences
litigation for the purpose of asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters into a contract (Cruz,Philippine Political Law,
1991 edition, page 33; Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, 1962, page 34). When the State participates in a
covenant, it is deemed to have descended from its superior position to the level of an ordinary citizen and thus virtually
opens itself to judicial process. Of course, We realize that this Court qualified this form of consent only to those contracts
concluded in a proprietary capacity and therefore immunity will attach for those contracts entered into in a governmental
capacity, following the ruling in the 1985 case of United States of America vs. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487 [1985]; cited
by Cruz, supra at pages 36-37). But the restrictive interpretation laid down therein is of no practical worth nor can it give
rise to herein petitioner PNR's exoneration since the case of Malong vs. Philippine National Railways (138 SCRA 63,
[1985]); 3 Padilla, 1987 Constitution with Comments and Cases, 1991 edition, page 644), decided three months
after Ruiz was promulgated, was categorical enough to specify that the Philippine National Railways "is not performing
any governmental function" (supra, at page 68).
In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en banc, declared:
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune from suit
under Act No. 1510, its charter.
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential
Decree No. 741, provides that the PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership
during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Republic
Act No. 6366 provides:
Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. — The Philippine National Railways, being a factor for
socio-economic development and growth, shall be a part of the infrastructure program of
the government and as such shall remain in and under government ownership during its
corporate existence. The Philippine National Railways must be administered with the
view of serving the interests of the public by providing them the maximum of service and,
while aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation must be
ensured so that service can be rendered at the minimum passenger and freight prices
possible.
The charter also provides:
Sec. 4. General powers. — The Philippine National Railways shall have the following
general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly
necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation;
and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law.
(This refers to Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporations, not
reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate
name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any
court.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends (Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. 3d 834).
The public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be
subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition
of the means required for the proper administration of the Government (The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152,
19 L. ed. 129). (at pp.
65-66).
To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR for the purpose of
engaging in transportation, Malong continued to hold that:
 . . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which
is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune
from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common
carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized."
(Nat. Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil.
281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593).
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or
nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the State (81 C.J.S. 1319).
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in
a private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations
created by the State for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the
nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character,
are not regarded as suits against the State.
The latter is true, although the State may own the stock or property of such a corporation,
for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the State divests itself so
far of its sovereign character, and by implicating consents to suits against the
corporation. (81 C.J.S. 1319).
The foregoing rule was applied to State Dock Commissions carrying on business relating to pilots,
terminals and transportation (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. U.S., 27 Fed. 2nd 370) and to State
Highways Commissions created to build public roads and given appropriations in advance to discharge
obligations incurred in their behalf (Arkansas State Highway Commission vs. Dodge, 26 SW 2nd 879 and
State Highway Commission of Missouri vs. Bates, 296 SW 418, cited in National Airports case).
The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation (Bank of the U.S. vs. Planters' Bank, 9
Wheat. 904, 6 L ed. 244, cited in Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company, et al.,
73 Phil. 374, 388). The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings:
By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.
When the State acts in its proprietary capacity, it is amenable to all the rules of law which
bind private individuals.
There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject, but when the
sovereign engages in business and the conduct of business enterprises, and contracts
with individuals, whenever the contract in any form comes before the courts, the rights
and obligation of the contracting parties must be adjusted upon the same principles as if
both contracting parties were private persons. Both stand upon equality before the law,
and the sovereign is merged in the dealer, contractor and suitor (People vs. Stephens, 71
N.Y. 549).
It should be noted that in Philippine National Railways vs. Union de Maquinistas, etc., L-31948, July 25,
1978, 84 SCRA 223, it was held that the PNR funds could be garnished at the instance of a labor union.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue
the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons
engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.
Thus, the National Development Company is not immune from suit. It does not exercise sovereign
functions. It is an agency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary or business functions
(National Development Company vs. Tobias, 117 Phil. 703, 705 and cases cited therein; National
Development Company vs. NDC Employees and Workers' Union, L-32387, August 19, 1975, 66 SCRA
18l, 184).
Other government agencies not enjoying immunity from suit are the Social Security System (Social
Security System vs. Court of Appeals,
L-41299, February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 707) and the Philippine National Bank (Republic vs. Philippine
National Bank, 121 Phil. 26). (at pp. 66-68).
We come now to the question of whether respondent court properly agreed with the trial court in imputing negligence on
the part of the train engineer and his employer.
It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the pre-trial hearings held for the purpose of stipulating on crucial facts
that the bus was hit on the rear portion thereof after it crossed the railroad tracks. Then, too the train engineer was frank
enough to say that he saw the jeep maneuvering into a parking area near the crossing which caused the obstruction in the
flow of traffic such that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of herein private respondent were not able to move
forward or to take the opposite lane due to other vehicles. The unmindful demeanor of the train engineer in surging
forward despite the obstruction before him is definitely anathema to the conduct of a prudent person placed under the
same set of perceived danger. Indeed:
When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of reasonable diligence commensurate with the surroundings
it should be apparent, to the company that a person on its track or to get on its track is unaware of his
danger or cannot get out of the way, it becomes the duty of the company to use such precautions, by
warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him. (65 Am.
Jur., Second Edition. p. 649).
Likewise, it was established that the weather condition was characterized with intermittent rain which should have
prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled
arrival thereat, indicating that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30 kilometers per hour. If the train
were really running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it would probably not have
travelled 190 meters more from the place of the accident (page 10, Brief for Petitioners). All of these factors, taken
collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that the train engineer was negligent who, moreover,
despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis the weather condition including the presence of people near the
intersection, could have obviated the impending collision had he slackened his speed and applied the brakes (Picart vs.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918]).Withal, these considerations were addressed to the trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, was in a better position to assign weight on factual questions. Having resolved the question of negligence
between the train engineer and the bus driver after collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter thus
commands great respect especially so in this case where respondent court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the
court of origin (Co vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 198; 206 [1991]); Amigo vs. Teves, 50 O.G. 5799; Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Fifth edition, page 353).
What exacerbates against petitioners' contention is the authority in this jurisdiction to the effect that the failure of a railroad
company to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public of the passing train
amounts to negligence (Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 [1934]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of respondent court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Nolan R. Evangelista for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In a civil action 1 for recovery of damages filed by the petitioner Florentina A. Guilatco, the following judgment was
rendered against the respondent City of Dagupan:
xxx
(1) Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P 15,924
(namely P8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses [Exhs. H to H-60], P 7,420.00 as lost income
for one (1) year [Exh. F] and P 450.00 as bonus). P 150,000.00 as moral damages, P 50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, plus costs and to
appropriate through its Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) said amounts for said purpose;
(2) Dismissing plaintiffs complaint as against defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco; and
(3) Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant City of Dagupan and defendant City Engr. Alfredo G.
Tangco, for lack of merit. 2
The facts found by the trial court are as follows: 3
It would appear from the evidences that on July 25, 1978, herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III,
CFI--Dagupan City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd.
(a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a
manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she
had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, from July 25
to August 3, 1978 (or for a period of 16 days). She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other
expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 (Exh. H to H-60) or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were
either lost or misplaced; during the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered
severe or excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body;
the pain has persisted even after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on October 9,
1978, to the present. Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches
and the Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the mishap on
July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has
difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located near the city hall in Dagupan City. She
earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of income, but since
July 25, 1978 up to the present she has been deprived of said income as she has already consumed her
accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and
she is no longer her former jovial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other
activities which she used to do prior to the incident.
Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr. Antonio Sison of
the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal (Exh. I; see also Exhs. F, G, G-1 to G-19) have
confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the fracture and injuries sustained by the plaintiff as
a result of the mishap. On the other hand, Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo corroborated the
testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap and they have confirmed the existence of the manhole
(Exhs. A, B, C and sub-exhibits) on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time of the incident on July 25,
1978 which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. long by 1 1/2
feet wide or 42 cms. wide by 75 cms. long by 150 cms. deep (see Exhs. D and D-1).
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway Engineer,
City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted the existence of said
manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges. He
also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National
Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National
Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or
drainage system and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his
subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera (Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a
maintenance Engineer. In his answer defendant Tangco expressly admitted in par. 7-1 thereof, that in his
capacity as ex-officio Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over
National roads, including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened.
On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court 4 reversed the lower court findings on the ground that
no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over
Perez Boulevard. 5
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the
control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the
Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is
held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.
After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the appellate court, as well as the
arguments presented by the parties, we agree with those of the trial court and of the petitioner. Hence, we grant the
petition.
In this review on certiorari, we have simplified the errors assigned by the petitioner to a single issue: whether or not
control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages
in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of
roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach.
The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. 6
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer who has the following duties:
Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-There shall be a city engineer, who
shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a salary of not
exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the following duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of
water supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance with the
ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use of all private systems for supplying water to
the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their connection with the public sewer system.
xxx
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and
alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board . 7 Thus the charter
clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is
located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or property
due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the city, as in th e
case at bar.8
The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in
particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works." 9
The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits that he exercises control or supervision over the said road. But the city
can not be excused from liability by the argument that the duty of the City Engineer to supervise or control the said
provincial road belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway than as
a city officer. This is because while he is entitled to an honorarium from the Ministry of Public Highways, his salary from
the city government substantially exceeds the honorarium.
We do not agree.
Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio
City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the
following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways; P 100.00
from the Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively." 10 This function of supervision over
streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance
Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.11 Although these last two officials are employees of the National Government,
they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City
Engineer.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question.
Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced to the
proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. In determining actual
damages, the court can not rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof of
loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous. 12
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the determination
of the amount is discretionary on the court.13 Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages are in the nature
of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not be proven. However,
in awarding moral damages, the following should be taken into consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts.14
 (2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the factual basis for
damages.15
(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the Civil
Code. 16
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the
petitioner's place of work testified to the degeneration in her disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She refrained from
attending social and civic activities.17
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled
her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the
award of damages,18 the moderating hand of the law is called for. The Court has time and again called attention to the
reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis,19 resulting in exhorbitant amounts.20
Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court 21 under preceding jurisprudence,
the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P 20,000.00.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed out the basis:
To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the Court, through this case, should serve
warning to the city or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to their
constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on their
sidewalks or streets which are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order to minimize or prevent
accidents to the poor pedestrians.22
Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives, the end is more important than the
manner in which the work is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced flower
pots betray the careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting accidents.
Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the trial court to the appellate court, the petitioner was able to
secure an order for garnishment of the funds of the City deposited with the Philippine National Bank, from the then
presiding judge, Hon. Willelmo Fortun. This order for garnishment was revoked subsequently by the succeeding presiding
judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and became the basis for the petitioner's motion for reconsideration which was also
denied. 23
We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court pending appeal was premature. We do not find any good
reason to justify the issuance of an order of execution even before the expiration of the time to appeal .24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13,
1979, is hereby REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded:
(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P 15,924
(namely P 8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P 7,420.00 as lost income for one (1) year
and P 450.00 as bonus); P 20,000.00 as moral damages and P 10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The attorney's fees of P 3,000.00 remain the same.
SO ORDERED.
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT G.R. No. 150304
and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ
Promulgated:
*
FULGENCIO DACARA,
Respondent. June 15, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

T he review of cases under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh
evidence all over again. Under the circumstance, the factual findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial courts will be conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal or certiorari. Finally, this Court reiterates the principle that moral
damages are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
Hence, absent any definite finding as to what they consist of, the alleged moral damages suffered would become a
penalty rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 21, 2001
Decision[2] and the October 9, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 29392. The challenged
Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June 29, 1990 in Civil Case No. Q-88-
233 should be AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellants.[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA summarized the facts in this manner:

Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara,
Sr. and owner of 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic), while driving the said vehicle,
rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being
repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries
and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.

Indemnification was sought from the city government (Record, p. 22), which however, yielded negative
results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter referred to as FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of
his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint (Record, p. 1) for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir
Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101,
Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-233. FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less
than P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages, P30,000.00 exemplary
damages, and P20,000.00 attorneys fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him.
 In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses (Record, p. 11), defendants admitted the
occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a moun[d] of soil and
barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the
incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by
providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latters negligence and failure to
exercise due care.[5]

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 101, Quezon City, rendered its Decision [6] dated June 29,
1990. The evidence proffered by the complainant (herein respondent) was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of
herein petitioners. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, [7] the latter were held liable as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises above considered, based on the quantum of evidence presented by the
plaintiff which tilts in their favor elucidating the negligent acts of the city government together with its
employees when considered in the light of Article 2189, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory
damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys
fees and other costs of suit.[8]

In their appeal to the CA, petitioners maintained that they had observed due diligence and care in installing preventive
warning devices, and that it was in fact the plaintiff who had failed to exercise prudence by driving too fast to avoid the
diggings. Moreover, the lower court allegedly erred in using Article 2189 of the Civil Code, which supposedly applied only
to liability for the death or injuries suffered by a person, not for damage to property.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA agreed with the RTCs finding that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the damage
suffered by respondent.[9] Noting the failure of petitioners to present evidence to support their contention that
precautionary measures had indeed been observed, it ruled thus:

x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to show that they placed sufficient and
adequate precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the dangers to life and limb
under the circumstances. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the [petitioners], namely Engr.
Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito and Eduardo Castillo, that there were signs, gasera which was buried
so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress and
prove the sufficiency and adequacy of said contention. [10]
Further upholding the trial courts finding of negligence on the part of herein petitioners, the CA gave this opinion:

x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of [petitioners] was clear based on the
investigation report of Pfc. William P. Villafranca stating to the effect that the subject vehicle rammed into
a pile of earth from a deep excavation thereat without any warning devi[c]e whatsoever and as a
consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost control of his driven car and finally turned-turtle causing substantial
damage to the same. As a defense against liability on the basis of quasi-delict, one must have exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family which [petitioners] failed to establish in the instant case. [11]

Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death or physical injury, the CA ruled in
the affirmative:

x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to death or personal injury only as
argued by appellants in the case at bar applying the foregoing provisions. For, injury is an act that
damages, harms or hurts and mean in common as the act or result of inflicting on a person or thing
something that causes loss, pain, distress, or impairment. Injury is the most comprehensive, applying to
 an act or result involving an impairment or destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness, or loss of
[12]
something of value.

Hence, this Petition.[13]

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of moral damage suit (sic) the amount of P10,000.00.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of exemplary damage sin (sic) the amount of P5,000.00 and
attorneys fee in the [a]mount of P10,000.00.

3. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred and/;or (sic) had acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to hold that respondents son in the person
of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was negligent at the time of incident.[14]

Because the issues regarding the liability of petitioners for moral and exemplary damages presuppose that their
negligence caused the vehicular accident, we first resolve the question of negligence or the proximate cause of the
incident.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Negligence

Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs
to alert the public of a roadside construction. They argue that the driver (Fulgencio Dacara Jr.) of respondents car was
overspeeding, and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident.

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.[15] Proximate cause is determined
from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. [16]
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their
conclusions.[17] The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners negligence was
the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. The
function of this Court is limited to the review of the appellate courts alleged errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over
again the factual evidence already considered in the proceedings below. [18] Petitioners have not shown that they are
entitled to an exception to this rule.[19] They have not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a
factual review.
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower courts finding,
which we quote:
Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost
the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth
from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a
reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist
especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive.

Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried
so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the
point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs
were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman
which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident.

xxxxxxxxx

Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the
attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is
the degree of care required to be observed.

xxxxxxxxx

The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and
supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the
subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh
application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the
maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability
would deem just and equitable.[20] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he
met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with light
traffic, when not designated through streets, as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act
4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent
pursuant to Article 2185[21] of the Civil Code.[22]

These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident from the records
that they brought up for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration [23] of the CA
Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well -settled that points of
law, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal.[24] To
consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair
play, justice, and due process.[25]

Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record,
clearly point to petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondents car. No adequate
reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.

Second Issue:
Moral Damages

Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable only in the instances specified in Article 2219 [26] of the Civil Code.
Although the instant case is an action for quasi-delict, petitioners contend that moral damages are not recoverable,
because no evidence of physical injury were presented before the trial court. [27]
 To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury -- whether
physical, mental, or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established;
(3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the
award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. [28]

Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or
omission caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical
injury.[29] This rule was enunciated in Malonzo v. Galang[30]as follows:

x x x. Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, as an

instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting
in physical injuries are excluded, excepting of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art.
2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art.
2219).

In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondents son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son
testified that he suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had been left in
the open without any warning device whatsoever.

It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such as a medical
certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare assertion of physical injury. Thus,
there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim of respondent that his moral sufferings
were due to the negligence of petitioners. The Decision of the trial court, which summarizes the testimony of respondents
four witnesses, makes no mention of any statement regarding moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like.

Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. [31]Intended for the restoration of the psychological or
emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent and substantial
proof of the
suffering experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation are definite findings as to what the supposed
moral damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty rather than a compensation for
actual injury suffered.[32]

Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether in a civil[33] or a criminal case[34] --
in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. [35] The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a
definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice;
they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. [36]

Third Issue:
Exemplary Damages

Petitioners argue that exemplary damages and attorneys fees are not recoverable. Allegedly, the RTC and the CA
did not find that petitioners were guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their duty and responsibilities. [37]

Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. [38] While granting them is subject to the discretion
of the court, they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages.[39] In the case before us, respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners negligence was
the proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. He has adduced
adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. The question that remains, therefore, is whether
exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory damages.
 Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if
the defendant acted with gross negligence. [40] Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption
that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they
must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. [41] The
negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance obtains in the
instant case.

A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of both the CA and the trial court. We quote
from the RTC Decision:

Sad to state that the City Government through its instrumentalities have (sic) failed to show the
modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected of them (sic) by the constituents of this City. It is
even more deplorable that it was a case of a street digging in a side street which caused the accident in
the so-called premier city.[42]

The CA reiterated the finding of the trial court that petitioners negligence was clear, considering that there was no
warning device whatsoever[43] at the excavation site.

The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even
a single warning device at the area under renovation. Considering further that the street was dimly lit, [44] the need for
adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By carrying on the road diggings without any warning or barricade,
petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Indeed, the February 28, 1988 incident was bound to
happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear that under the circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a findi ng
of gross negligence on their part.

Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. [45] Public policy
requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender. [46] It must be emphasized that local governments and
their employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the
public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate precautionary measures.

Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is justified only by public
service. Hence, local governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public foremost in
their agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very parties responsible
for endangering the public through such a rash and reckless act.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125183. September 29, 1997]
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ADRIANO A. DELAMIDA, SR. CELSO T. TORRES, TARCILA V. ZATA, QUIRICO T. TORRES, CATALINA
BONGAT, MILAGROS A. HERBOLARIO, ROSALINDA A. PIMENTAL, PURIFICACION MORELLA,
FRANCISCO RENION, SR., MARCELINA CORPUZ, BENEDICTO FALCON, MAXIMO FALCON, MARIO
BOLANOS, VICENTE T. SURIAO, ROSARIO GREGORIA G. DORADO, JEREMIAS Z. PATRON, ALEX
RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LUISA ALPAPARA, HERMINIA C. RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIANO ESPANOL, MARIO L.
AGUILAR, FREDDIE AMADOR, SILVERIO PURISIMA, JR., PROCOPIO B. PENARANDA, ELADIO
MAGLUYAN, HELENITA GUEI, CELESTINO MONTANO, ROMEO GOMEZ, OFELIA LOGO, JIMMY MACION,
DAISY A. MANGA, MAURO MANGA, ARTHUR HERBOLARIO, MANOLITO HERBOLARIO, ROSARIO
ANCHETA, TERESITA A. VICTORIA, ROSALINA SAMPAGA, MARIQUITA RUADO, FELIPE ANCHETA,
MAGDALENA CABREZA, MARIA BIANDILLA, NILDA ARENSOL, LORENZO S. TOLEDO, and NAPOLEON
D. VILORIA, SR., respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing and seeking to reverse
and set aside: a) the decision dated November 23, 1995 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 159; and b) the resolution dated May 28, 1996 denying reconsideration of said
decision.
The generative facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal
Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality
of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters. Only after
resettling these squatters would the municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal government center on the
subject land.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government
center by constructing the INP Building, which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and
the site to house the two salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed
thereon are the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High School Annex Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as
follows:
PROCLAMATION NO. 164
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1716, DATED FEBRUARY 17, 1978, WHICH RESERVED FOR
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METROPOLITAN MANILA, ISLAND OF
LUZON, BY EXCLUDING FROM ITS OPERATION THE PARCELS OF LAND NOT BEING UTILIZED FOR
GOVERNMENT CENTER SITES PURPOSES BUT ACTUALLY OCCUPIED FOR RESIDENTIAL
PURPOSES AND DECLARING THE LAND OPEN TO DISPOSITION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS AMENDED.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me
by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1716, dated February
17, 1978, which established for municipal government center site purposes certain parcels of land mentioned therein
situated in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, by excluding from its operation the parcels of land not being
utilized for government center site purposes but actually occupied for residential purposes and declaring the land so
excluded, together with other parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless occupied for
residential purposes, open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended, subject to future
survey, which are hereunder particularly described as follows :
Lot 1 (Port.) Psu-73270
xxxxxxxxx
Lot 4 (Port.) Psd-740
and Psd-810
xxxxxxxxx
Lot 5 (Port.) Psu-73270
xxxxxxxxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be
affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
By the President :
(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Acting Executive Secretary
(Rollo, pp. 148-151.)
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer for restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan
Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming
that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is being
utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164
is absent.
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed in a decision dated July 17, 1991. This decision became final
and the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a private surveyor to make
consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the same to respondent Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private
respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the
parcels of land covered by Proclamation No. 164.
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present recourse.
Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that ultimately, the central question and bone of contention in the
petition before us boils down to the correct interpretation of Proclamation No. 164 in relation to Proclamation No. 1716.
Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by hammering on the issue of res judicata in view
of the fact that an earlier judgment, which had become final and executory, had already settled the respective rights of the
parties under Proclamation No. 164. This notwithstanding, petitioner reiterates the reasons why the court had previously
ruled in favor of petitioners rights over the subject property against the claims of private respondents.
We find good legal basis to sustain petitioners position on the issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area
covered by Proclamation No. 164, which was the subject matter of the earlier case, is concerned.
The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action (Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241
SCRA 21 [1995]).
The existence of the first three elements can not be disputed. As to identity of parties, we have ruled that only
substantial identity is required and not absolute identity of parties (Suarez vs. Municipality of Naujan, 18 SCRA 682
[1966]). The addition of public respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no moment. Likewise, there is identity
of cause of action since the right of the municipality over the subject property, the corresponding obligation of private
respondents to respect such right and the resulting violation of said right all remain to be the same in both the first and the
second actions despite the fact that in the first action, private respondents were the plaintiff while in the second action,
they were the respondents.
The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res judicata only extends to such portion of land covered by
Proclamation No. 164 which the court ruled may not be automatically segregated from the land covered by Proclamation
No. 1716. It does not include those portions which are outside the coverage of Proclamation No. 1716.
Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon the above premise and our discussion
may properly end here. However, there exists a more basic reason for setting aside the appealed decision and this has
reference to a fundamental and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 on October 16, 1987 by then
President Aquino.
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due
exercise of legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation,
said Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a
valid act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the
reigns of power under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986, she issued her historic Proclamation No. 3,
promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II,
Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is
elected and convened under a new constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft constitution, to be known later as
the 1987 Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under
the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when
legislative power was already solely on Congress.
Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the attention of petitioner as well as the courts before which this
case has already passed through, this Court cannot help noticing this basic flaw in the issuance of Proclamation No.
164. Because this unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the most basic principle in the
separation of powers between the three branches of government enshrined in our Constitution, we cannot simply close
our eyes and rely upon the principle of the presumption of validity of a law.
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid (Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734
[1970]; Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978]).However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted
by legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive
branch. For this Court to allow such disregard of the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of
presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus,
also, it is in the discharge of this task that we take this exception from the Courts usual practice of not entertaining
constitutional questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative
power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent Department
of Environment and Natural Resources is hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.
SO ORDERED.
EDUARDO VARELA, G.R. No. 171705
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MA. DAISY REVALEZ, MENDOZA, JJ.
RAMON BORROMEO,
YOLANDA BARCENILLA,
ERNA LOCSIN, GRACE BARUC,
VICENTE MIJARES, JR.,
LOIDA TAJONERA,
NIRMLA AGNES MARTINEZ,
ANALYN MAYPA,
LEMUEL MAYPA,
BERDITH GANCETA,
ROGER RAMOS,
SUZETTE DE LOS SANTOS,
JUDE JAROPILLO,
JOCELYN AZUCENA,
VILMA PABALAN,
CHANNIBAL BERJA,
JERNEY BARZO,
BRIGIDA MANGUINO,
SOL GRACE GUSTILO,
MARILOU AREVALO,
LUCILLE ARGONOSO,
MARCOS BACOMO,
MELVIN BACOMO, JR.,
MERIAM BULLAG,
ZOSIMA DESUYO,
MARLENE BACOMO,
EUGENE BALASA,
ROY DE ASIS, LOLITA RUBEN,
JOSE DIEZ, MILA DIEZ,
JESUS DIEZ, DONNABEL ALFON,
FRANCISCO DERIADA,
ALEJANDRIA PORDIOS,
LIGAYA MAGBANUA,
DAISY GORECHO,
ANARIEL BACOMO,
FRED DELOTINA,
STEPHEN DIPLOMA,
MARITES BACABAC,
ARACELI MAHINAY,
JULIO OLVIDO,
ANTONIO REBOTON,
NENETTE JUMUAD,
ROSEMARIE ALICANTE,
AGUSTIN JAVIER, JR.,
LEODY JAVA, NAZARITO PIDO,
NENITA BERMEO,
DELILAH FERNANDEZ,
WILDABETH LACSON,
CYNTHIA DAZA,
ROMMEL DELGADO,
FLORITA GELACIO,
ROSALLY LEAL,
AILEEN VILLANUEVA,
NINFA BENIGAY,
ROSIE PALMA,
FERNANDO DELGADO,
ROMULO BARCENILLA,
ROBERTO APIADO,
MARIO OLVIDO,
BETTY DELA CRUZ,
MARTIN APILADAS,
SOLEDAD MAGBANUA,
NIDA VISTAL,
FRANCISCO DE LARA,
ANTHONY ROCH ACEVEDO,
FELIX RAFOLS,
YOLANDA FERNANDEZ,
ERNISTINA ALARCON,
EMIE ABANID,
LOURY TOMPONG,
MA. FE RAFOLS SIA,
YOLANDA OLVIDO,
FIDEL ARROYO,
VITALIANO POBLACION,
ZALDY TERENCIO,
ROVIC ESCOBA,
JENNIFER CABAHUG,
HELEN PAGAY,
ARTURO SALVE,
AIDA GOMEZ, and Promulgated:
CITY OF CADIZ,
Respondents. July 29, 2010
x-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 17 August 2005
Decision[1] and 27 February 2006 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73212. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the 20 June 2001 Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Negros Occidental, Judicial
Region 6, Branch 60, Cadiz City in Civil Case No. 547-C.

The Facts

Petitioner Eduardo G. Varela (Varela) was the mayor of Cadiz City. He created a reorganization committee. On 22
September 1998, he submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cadiz City the committees Proposed Reorganizational
Structure and Staffing Pattern of Cadiz City. On the same day, 22 September 1998, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
approved without modification and without hearing the proposal. The Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Resolution No.
98-112 authorizing and appropriating funds for the reorganization of the city government. Resolution No. 98-112 declared
all positions in the city government vacant, except elective positions and positions in the city and assistant city
treasurer. On 15 October 1998, Varela signed Resolution No. 98-112.

On 10 November 1998, Varela gave notices of termination to the city government employees, informing them that their
employment would end at the close of business hours on 31 December 1998. The employees opposed and questioned
the legality of Resolution No. 98-112. Varela ignored them.

Varela created a placement committee with City Administrator Philip G. Zamora, Delina, Negosa, Jimmy Navarro, Jerry
Batislaon and Napud as members. The committee allegedly met three times.

On 31 December 1998, Varela again gave notices of termination to the city government employees, informing them that
their employment would end at the close of business hours on 31 December 1998. On 4 January 1999, the employees
tried to report for work but were barred from entering their offices.
Among those laid off was Community Affairs Officer IV Ramon Borromeo (Borromeo). His department, the special
services department, was replaced by the community and barangay affairs division. The head of the community and
barangay affairs division performed the same functions as the head of the special services department. Three new
positions were created in the community and barangay affairs division. The three new positions were given to Oscar
Magbanua (Magbanua), Moises Seoren (Seoren), and Santos Ortega (Ortega). Magbanua, Seoren and Ortega were
political supporters of Varela and defeated barangay captain candidates.
Around half of the 101 employees of the city health department were laid off. Those laid off were the same ones who filed
a case, involving the magna carta for health workers, against Varela. They were also perceived not to have voted for
Varela as mayor.

On 12 January 1999, Ma. Daisy G. Revalez and 40 other city government employees filed with the RTC a
complaint[4] against Varela for the declaration of nullity of Resolution No. 98-112 and for damages. In a motion[5] dated 29
January 1999, 47 other city government employees intervened. In the complaint, the employees stated that, due to the
illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation.[6]

The RTCs Ruling

In its 20 June 2001 Decision, the RTC declared Resolution No. 98-112 void and ordered Varela to pay the government
employees P10,000 each for moral damages, P200,000 attorneys fees, P20,000 litigation expenses, and court
appearance fees at P3,000 per hearing. The RTC found that Varela acted in bad faith.The Court held:

There is no question that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cadiz City is the legislative arm of the local
government unit and as such it possesses the power to enact the questioned resolution. Plaintiffs
however challenge the manner Res. 98-112 was enacted, and the indecent haste that accompanied its
passage. The proposal emanated from the office of defendant mayor and in a short time after its
submission the measure was passed. The requisite deliberations, if at all there was one, could hardly be
considered adequate and could best be described as perfunctory. The minutes of the SP say it all. The
deliberations reflected a lackluster effort and a wimpish attempt by the members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to justify the grant to the mayor of legislative authority to carry out the reorganization. There
absolutely was no public hearing. The proposal coming as it did from the mayor, was a fait accompli,
a done deal in a manner of speaking. x x x

xxxx

Careful examination of the evidence submitted by the defendant, however, would reveal a
systematic effort to purge the city government of personnel who opposed the mayor politically, or
disagreed with him in his policies. Furthermore, perusal of the minutes of the deliberations of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod reveals that the City of Cadiz was not in dire financial straits necessitating
radical measures like mass lay-off of personnel. x x x

x x x The City of Cadiz as of 1998, was not in financial extremis. It had the money, the resources to
fund the salaries of personnel. x x x [Varela] even ignored the concern of a city councilor who said
that at that time (1998) the City already lacked the required personnel, and so why abolish certain
positions? The defendant mayor simply gave the assurance that they can create any position
when the need arises and the city has the money. This statement betrayed the real intentions of
the defendant insofar as the reorganization is concerned.

x x x The Mayor did not even explain what basic services would be affected. As a matter of fact, the office
hardest hit and greatly affected by the mass layoff was the health services department where 50 or so of
the 101 personnel complement were laid off. Does it mean that the delivery of health services is the least
of the priorities of Cadiz City? Or does it mean that health service from the point of view of the defendant
city mayor is not a basic service? The truth of the matter is that the health workers of Cadiz filed a case
against the mayor for his refusal to implement provisions of the Magna Carta for Health
Workers. Talk of vindictiveness. The poor health workers laid off were on the receiving end of the
ire of the defendant mayor. There seemed to be no rhyme or reason to the reorganization scheme.

xxxx

Was the reorganization of the Cadiz City government under Res. 98-112, done in good faith? The
testimony of Ramon Borromeo, which is uncontradicted, will show the true intent of the reorganization,
and whether or not it was done in good faith:
 Q (Atty. Lobrido) What about your position, Mr. Witness?
A My position as Community Affairs Officer was abolished but instead an Executive
Assistant IV was made under the Division Head of the Community and Barangay
Affairs Division.

Q What is the function of the Community and Barangay Affairs Unit?

A It performs the same function as that of the Community Affairs Unit of which I am the
Division Head as Community Affairs Officer IV.

Q Considering that you were laid off who took over your function?
A The Executive Assistant IV, but considering that the position is coterminous with that of the
mayor, the appointment of Executive Assistant IV was disapproved by the Civil Service
Commission as head of the Community Affairs Unit and the present situation as of now is
that the community Affairs and Barangay Unit is without a division head and that three
new positions were created.

Q Who were appointed to the three new positions you mentioned a while ago?
A Those appointed are Oscar Magbanua, Moises Seoren, and Santos Ortega.

Q Why do you know these three persons?

A Because they are supporters of the defendant city mayor and also because they are
barangay captains who were defeated in the last barangay elections.(TSN-Cerbo, pp. 8-
10, May 3, 2000).

From the afore-quoted testimony it is clear that the abolition of the office of Mr. Borromeo in the
guise of reorganization was not done in good faith. The abolition was done for political reasons,
(Arao vs. Luspo, L-23982, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 722). As stated in Urgello, if the abolition merely
resulted in placing another person or appointee with a different designation or name but substantially the
same duties, then it will be considered a device to unseat the incumbent. Clearly the reorganization is not
genuine and it is nothing but a ruse to defeat the constitutionally protected right of security of tenure.

xxxx

Since all the offices of the personnel of Cadiz City were declared vacant, and notices of initial termination
sent on November 10, 1998, the placement Committee barely had twenty (20) days to submit a final
report to defendant mayor. With 741 personnel to be reevaluated and screened, plus other new
applicants, the committee did not have enough time to do their work as envisioned. The Committee had
to screen and evaluate all applications to about 649 positions included in the new
plantilla. Notwithstanding time constraints, the Committee did not meet until November 17, barely two (2)
weeks from their deadline. Subsequently they met three (3) times. On their first meeting, the report states,
the placement Committee merely agreed to ask the defendant mayor to turn over to the Committee all the
application letters. Nothing by way of screening or evaluation was done that day. On the second meeting
November 18, the applications were lumped in bundles or files, and segregated by department. Then they
suggested to borrow the qualification standards from the Human Resource Management Office. Due to
time constraints, it was suggested that the screening should start immediately, and they agreed to meet
November 19, 1998. As of the second meeting the screening and evaluation had barely began. On
November 19, 1998 the committee met with Mr. Zamora suggesting that qualification standards be used
mainly eligibility performance rating, education and attainment, experience and awards and training
received. Mr. Napud suggested that the department heads be interviewed. As of November 19, the
committee had not started its deliberations and screening, but lo and behold Mr. Zamora came up with a
complete list in time for the last meeting. On November 29, 1998, Mr. Zamora presented to the members
of the committee the list of employees selected by the Placement Committee. Then the list was submitted
to the mayor. These were reflected in Minutes of the meeting of the Placement Committee.

On the other hand, what did Mr. Zamora say about the deliberations of the Placement Committee in his
capacity as chairman. His testimony is very instructive.

Q (Atty. Lobrido) And when was the first meeting?

 A I think November 17, 1998.

Q What transpired during the first meeting?

A I cannot remember.

xxx xxx

Q After November 18, 1998 meeting, was there other meeting of the placement
committee?
A Yes, sir.

Q When was that?

A On November 19, 1998.

Q And what transpired during that meeting on November 19, 1998?

A I cannot remember.

It seems incredulous that Mr. Philip Zamora, designated to represent defendant mayor, would not be able
to recall what transpired during the deliberations of the placement committee. Unless it is shown that Mr.
Zamora suffered severe bouts of amnesia, it would be the height of tomfoolery to accept that he would
not be able to recall the significant highlights of the meetings. Which can only lead this Court to the
inescapable conclusion that the minutes (Exhibits 15 to 15-C) were fabricated and contrived, and done
after the fact. x x x

x x x Why would Philip Zamora present a list of employees selected to members of the Placement
Committee and tell them this is the result of their evaluation? Were not the members of the committee the
ones who evaluated and selected the employees? The logical manner that should have taken place
would be that the committee members themselves would submit the list to the chairman telling him that
this was the result of their evaluation and screening and they were ready to submit the list to the
mayor. As it appears the list was a done deal, a fait accompli, and the members were merely told to put
their imprimatur to it. The truth of matter however, as can be gleaned from Mr. Zamoras testimony, is that
no meetings were ever conducted by the placement committee. Which explains Mr. Zamoras memory
lapses. Nothing of the sort happened. What happened was that the minutes were hastily produced as an
afterthought and later passed on as the real thing. The entire proceedings was [sic] a sham, a
rigmarole intended to put a stamp of legitimacy to what otherwise was a well calculated, well
planned scheme to rid Cadiz City of employees who were the political opponents of the defendant
mayor. The ploy was to use the law as a subterfuge to defeat the security of tenure clause of the
constitution. On top of this masquerade, the defendant city mayor did not show any compunction or
any hesitation to ram the reorganization down the throats of plaintiffs who resisted the move and
they actually complained. He did not give them the benefit of the doubt, nor listened to their plea
for justice. He simply ran roughshod over all of them discarding any pretense to uphold due
process of law. It was shocking no less to the 166 plaintiffs who become [sic] sacrificial lambs in
the altar of political convenience and expediency.This is anathema in a democratic system where the
rule of law reigns supreme.[7] (Emphasis supplied)

Cadiz City Chief Executive Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., through the Office of the City Legal Officer, filed with the RTC a
motion[8] to clarify who between Varela, in his personal capacity, and Cadiz City was liable for the payment of moral
damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and court appearance fees. In its 26 July 2001 Order,[9] the RTC held that, it
is the municipal corporation which is liable for the acts of its officers committed while in the performance of official
duties.[10]

Cadiz City, through the Office of the City Legal Officer, appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its 17 August 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTCs 20 June 2001 Decision. The
Court of Appeals held that Varela was personally liable for the payment of moral damages, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and court appearance fees. It reduced the amounts of attorneys fees and litigation expenses from P200,000
to P100,000 and from P20,000 to P10,000, respectively, and deleted the award of court appearance fees. The Court of
Appeals held that:

OUR jurisprudence is replete with cases involving the issue of whether or not a public officer may be held
liable for damages in the performance of their [sic] duties, to quote:

A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Settled is the principle that a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

In addition, Book I, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides, to quote:

Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for
acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence. x x x

In the case at bar, the court a quo found that bad faith attended the performance of the official acts of the
original defendant, Eduardo G. Varela. x x x

WE find no reason to disturb the finding of bad faith by the court a quo considering that the same was
amply supported by evidence.[11]

Hence, the present petition.

The Issue

Varela raises as issue that, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONER
PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES AS
THE PETITIONER WAS SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL, AND NOT IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY. [12] Varela states that:

All the proceedings in the lower court show beyond question that the petitioner was charged in his official
capacity as then mayor of the real party-defendant, the respondent City of Capiz.

This is expressly shown by the very title, caption and allegations of private respondents complaint dated
January 12, 1999. The fact that petitioner was sued in his representative and official capacity was not
contested, and, in fact, admitted by the parties. [13]

The Courts Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. In the complaint, the employees stated that, due to
the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation. The State can never be the author of illegal acts.

The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City. It did not categorically state that Varela was being
sued in his official capacity. The identification and mention of Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City did not automatically
transform the action into one against Varela in his official capacity. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature
of the cause of action.

In Pascual v. Beltran,[14] the Court held that:

[I]n the case at bar, petitioner is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal,
the State, can never be the author of any wrongful act. The Complaint filed by the private
respondent with the RTC merely identified petitioner as Director of the Telecommunications
Office, but did not categorically state that he was being sued in his official capacity. The mere
mention in the Complaint of the petitioners position as Regional Director of the
 Telecommunications Office does not transform the action into one against petitioner in his official
capacity. What is determinative of the nature of the cause of action are the allegations in the
complaint. It is settled that the nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is
to be determined not by the claim of the party filling [sic] the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. [15] (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 17 August 2005 Decision and 27 February 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73212.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73928 August 31, 1987
JOSE E. GENSON, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. EDUARDO ADARLE and SHERLITA MARI-ON, and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for review which seeks to set aside the decision in CA-G.R. No. 00783 on the ground that the findings of
the respondent Court of Appeals are based on misapprehension of facts and conflict with those of the trial court and that
the conclusions drawn therefrom are based on speculations and conjectures.
Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of junk and other unserviceable government property
located at the compound of the Highway District Engineer's Office of Roxas City. Private respondent Eduardo Adarle was
hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away scrap iron from the said compound with a daily wage of P12.00 or
about 312.00 a month.
On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, on a Saturday and a non-working day, while the private respondent
was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket
of the payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right back
portion of his head just below the nape of his neck. Adarle was rushed to the St. Anthony Hospital, Roxas City. According
to the medical certificate issued by the attending physician, the private respondent suffered the following injuries:
1) Comminuted fracture of the vertebral body of 13 with extreme Kyphosis of the segment by x-ray.
2) Cord compression 2nd to the injury with paralysis of the lower extremity, inability to defecate and
urinate. (E Exh. A, Exhibits for the plaintiff-appellant, Original Records.)
The medical certificate also reported that:
The patient recovered the use of his urinary bladder and was able to defecate 2 months after surgery. He
is paralyzed from the knee down to his toes. He can only sit on a wheel chair. The above residual
damage is permanent 2nd to the injury incurred by Mr. Adarle, he is still confined in the Hospital. (idem)
While still in the hospital, the private respondent instituted the action below for damages against Arbatin, his employer;
Buensalido, the payloader operator; Candelario Marcelino, the civil engineer; and petitioner, the Highway District
Engineer.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put up the defense that he had no knowledge of or participation in the accident
and that, when it happened, he was not present in the government compound. Apart from the fact that it was a Saturday
and a non-working day, he was in Iloilo. As part of his evidence, the petitioner presented a memorandum directed to a
certain Mr. Orlando Panaguiton ordering the latter to take charge of the district until his return (Exh. 1).
The trial court found that, with the exception of the petitioner, all of the defendants were present at the Highway's
compound when the accident occurred. However, it still adjudged the petitioner liable for damages because the petitioner
was supposed to know what his men do with their government equipment within an area under his supervision.
Thus, on January 19, 1982, the trial court rendered a decision finding all the defendants liable for damages under Articles
1172 and 2176 of the New Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this court orders the defendants to pay to plaintiff the amounts stated in the complainant's
prayer as follows:
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of 312.00 monthly from
September 8, 1979 until his release from the hospital.
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P7,410.63 for hospital
expenses up to January 14, 1980 and an additional amount for further hospitalization until the release of
plaintiff from the hospital;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of at least P100,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages, considering that plaintiff Eduardo Adarle is totally incapacitated for any
employment for life;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages
and another sum for exemplary damages which we leave to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(pp. 129- 130, Original Records).
The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court and further
ordered the defendants to pay P5,000.00 exemplary damages. Defendant Candelario Marcelino was, however, absolved
from liability.
In its decision, the appellate court ruled:
That payloader owned by the Government, as found by the lower court, should not have been operated
that Saturday, September 8, 1979, a Saturday, a non-working holiday. There is no official order from the
proper authorities authorizing Arbatin and plaintiff to work and Buensalido to operate the payloader on
that day inside the Highway compound. Thereabouts, we can logically deduce that Arbatin and plaintiff
went to the compound to work with the previous knowledge and consent of Highway District Engineer
Jose E. Genson. And allowed him, probably upon the request of Arbatin. We have noted that Genson
testified that his office does not authorize work on Saturdays.
 Genson testified that he was in Iloilo from September 9 and 10, 1979. The accident occurred on
September 8, in the morning. In his answer, Genson did not allege his presence in Iloilo on September 9
and 10 ... .
We fully concur with the lower court's conclusions regarding the physical presence of appellants inside
the compound on that fateful day, pursuant to a previous understanding with Arbatin for plaintiff to work
on the scrap iron and for Buensalido to operate the payloader inside the compound. Arbatin and plaintiff
would not go to the compound on that Saturday, if there was no previous understanding with Genson and
Buensalido.
The liability of Genson is based on fault, intentional and voluntary or negligent (Eleano v. Hill, 77 SCRA
106; Jimena v. Lincallo, 63 O.G. 11,15, 8 C. A.R. 2567). He gave permission to Arbatin, plaintiff and
Buensalido to work on Saturday, a non-working day, in contravention of his office' rules and regulations
outlawing work on Saturdays.. (pp. 29-30, Rollo)
In this present petition, the petitioner contends that the appellate court committed a palpable error when it ruled that the
petitioner was present when the accident happened and that he had given permission to the other defendants to work on
a Saturday, a non-working day. The petitioner argues that considering these were the facts relied upon by the said court
in holding that he was negligent and thus liable for damages, such a conclusion, is without basis.
The petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in not holding that the suit against the petitioner was, in
effect, a suit against the government and, therefore, should be dismissed under the principle of non-suability of the state.
As regards the petitioner's second contention, we hold that the petitioner's Identification as the Highway District Engineer
in the complaint filed by the private respondent did not result in the said complaint's becoming a suit against the
government or state.
In Belizar v. Brazas, (2 SCRA 526), we ruled that "the fact that the duties and positions of the defendants are indicated
does not mean that they are being sued in their official capacities, especially as the present action is not one against the
Government." Furthermore, the accident in the case at bar happened on a non-working day and there was no showing
that the work performed on that day was authorized by the government. While the equipment used belongs to the
Government, the work was private in nature, for the benefit of a purchaser of junk. As we have held in the case
of Republic v. Palacio (23 SCRA 899,906).
xxx xxx xxx
the ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract, and it is a well-entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable only for
torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of
such agent's regular duties (Merritt v. Insular Government, supra; Rosete v. Auditor General, 81 Phil. 453)
There being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its
funds can be made liable therefor.
Therefore, the defense of the petitioner that he cannot be made liable under the principle of non-suability of the state
cannot be sustained.
With regard to the main contention of the petitioner that the appellate court based its conclusions on an erroneous finding
of fact, we agree with him that the appellate court's finding that he was present within the premises when the accident
happened is not supported by evidence indisputably showing that he was indeed there.
Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence when the payloader's bucket fell on the head of Mr.
Adarle, any liability on his part would be based only on his alleged failure to exercise proper supervision over his
subordinates (See Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263, 267-268).
According to the trial court, Mr. Genson authorized work on a Saturday when no work was supposed to be done. It stated
that the petitioner should know what his men do with their government equipment and he should neither be lax nor lenient
in his supervision over them.
The petitioner contends that:
1. No evidence on record exists that Genson gave authority to Adarle and Arbatin, either verbally or in
writing, to enter the work inside the Highways Compound on September 8, 1979;
2. Genson never knew or met Arbatin until the trial of the case. This fact was never denied by Arbatin nor
rebutted by Adarle. How then could Genson have ordered or allowed Arbatin to enter the Highways
Compound with Adarle?
3. Adarle himself repeatedly admitted that Arbatin, his employer, gave him the instructions to enter the
compound, thus:
Q. Now particularly on September 8, 1979, did Arbatin ask you to go to the compound in
the Highway?
A. Yes sr.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did he say that to you?
A. We went to the Highway compound for many times already and that was the time
when I met the incident.
 Q. The particular day in question September 8. 1979, did you see Arturo Arbatin and he
asked you to go the compound on that day?
A. That date was included on the first day when "he instructed us to gather scrap
iron until that work could be finished." (pp. 25-26, tsn., October 10, 1980) (Emphasis
supplied)
Q. Who told you to work there?
A. "Through the instruction of Arturo Arbatin" (pp. 32, tsn., Oct. 10, 1980) (Emphasis
supplied) (pp. 12-13, Rollo).
Insofar as work on a Saturday is concerned, and assuming Mr. Genson verbally allowed it, we see nothing wrong in the
petitioner's authorizing work on that day. As a matter of fact, it could even be required that the hauling of junk and
unserviceable equipment sold at public auction must be done on non-working days. The regular work of the District
Engineer's office would not be disturbed or prejudiced by a private bidder bringing in his trucks and obstructing the smooth
flow of traffic and the daily routine within the compound. Obviously, it would also be safer for all concerned to effect the
clearing of the junk pile when everything is peaceful and quiet.
There is no showing from the records that it is against regulations to use government cranes and payloaders to load items
sold at public auction on the trucks of the winning bidder. The items were formerly government property. Unless the
contract specifies otherwise, it may be presumed that all the parties were in agreement regarding the use of equipment
already there for that purpose. Of course, it would be different if the junk pile is in a compound where there is no
equipment for loading or unloading and the cranes or payloaders have to be brought there.
There is likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in tort law to apply. Buensalido was not working
overtime as a government employee. It is doubtful if the district engineer can be considered an "employer" for purposes of
tort liability who may be liable even if he was not there. No evidence was presented to show that an application for
overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's office was ever filed. It is more logical to presume
that Buensalido, the operator of the payloader, was trying to earn a little money on the side from the junk buyer and that
his presence in the compound on that Saturday was a purely private arrangement. From the records of this case, we are
not disposed to rule that a supervisor who tolerates his subordinates to moonlight on a non-working day in their office
premises can be held liable for everything that happens on that day. It would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin br ought
his own payloader operator and perhaps, his own equipment but we are not dealing with sound office practice in this case.
The issue before us is subsidiary liability for tort comitted by a government employee who is moonlighting on a non-
working day.
This Court ruled in Dumlao v. Court of Appeals (114 SCRA 247, 251):
Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith,
(Mindanao realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814) or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (the
Philippine Racing Club v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-11844, August 31, 1960) The question, therefore, is
whether petitioner did act in any of the manner aforesaid.
Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of the respondent Court of Appeals, he was not sued in
his personal capacity, but in his official capacity. Neither was malice or bad faith alleged against him in
the complaint, much less proven by the evidence, as the respondent court made no such finding of malice
or bad faith.
Examining the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the evidence it would indeed be correct to say
that petitioner was sued in his official capacity, and that the most that was imputed to him is act of
culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross indifference in the performance of his official duties. Verily, this is
not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is more was not convincingly proven.
According to the respondent court, "Genson and Buensalido divested themselves of their public positions and privileges to
accomodate an acquaintance or probably for inordinate gain." (p. 31, Rollo).
There is no showing from the records that Genson received anything which could be called "inordinate gain." It is possible
that he permitted work on a Saturday to accomodate an acquaintance but it is more plausible that he simply wanted to
clear his compound of junk and the best time for the winning bidder to do it was on a non-working day.
At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part of Genson to hold him liable for the acts of
Buensalido and Arbatin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
against Jesus Genson is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five
minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce
his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out
of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after
which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the
left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These
injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further
medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint —
which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer,
city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of
Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the
University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising
Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation.
He was also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of
Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff
was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of
about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule
by his business associates and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and
anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff
has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section,
Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of
P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day
(Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the
said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to
the effect that the catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always
been a policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the
City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the
matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin
with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin
covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said
iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of
catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on
the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds
were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the
theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of
Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter
of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the
Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards
the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to
enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board,
or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death
of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took
place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover,
Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition
of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in
turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly
inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who
"have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by
law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not
been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or
supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and
to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public
places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the
inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and
other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and
the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of
nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and
maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-
flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or
frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles,
cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives;
. . . to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise
or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their
property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct
and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the
streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated
May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the
giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective
boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the
disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and
improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by
the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public
Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in
annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of
Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided
by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our
review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so
ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980
FELIX LANUZO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA, defendants-appellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Appeal certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 as it involves pure legal questions.
On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil
Case No. 6847) by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No.
T-57266, and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. As alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969,
while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, we rammed into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the
house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00.
Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used
to give him a monthly income of P300.00.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal Case No. 4250 for Damage to Property
through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties
for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal
case to institute a civil action for damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit.
The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P13,000.00 as damages, resulting to the loss of the store including the merchandise for sale
therein, the residential house of mixed materials, furnitures, clothing and households fixtures; (b) ordering
the said defendants to pay jointly and severally P300.00 monthly from July 24, 1969 which represents
plaintiff's monthly income from his store until the whole amount of P13,000.00 is fully paid; and (c) for
attorney's fees an amount equivalent to 20% of the total amount claimed by the plaintiff, plus the costs of
this suit.
Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and To Set Aside Order of Default" was denied.
Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 48399-R) they urged that the civil
action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3, providing in part that "after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Additionally,
they contended that even assuming their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed an error in holding them jointly
and severally liable.
On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this instance on pure questions of law.
We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as early as the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 2 that:
A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-
delitos or culpa-extracontractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
delito or culpa extracontractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose
which remedy to enforce.
Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court in the criminal case of his right to institute a civil action separately i s
quoted hereunder in full:
UNDERSIGNED offended party in the above-entitled case before this Honorable Court respectfully
alleges:
1. That this action which was commenced by the Chief of Police included in the complaint the claim of the
undersigned for civil liability;
2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to institute the civil action for damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6847 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, against accused herein and his employer;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that reservation be made of record therein and that the civil
aspect of the above-entitled case be not included herein.
xxx xxx xxx 3
The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident from the
recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship between the appellants, alleging that
damages to the house and store were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly, with
gross negligence and imprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to the safety of
persons and property", and praying that appellants be held jointly and solidarity liable for damages. These are, basically,
what should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. 4
As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from
proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil
action based on quasi-delict. 5 And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and regardless of
the result of the criminal case, 6 except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or commission of
7
the defendant.
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck
owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the
same Code, which explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision
of this employee, 8 he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver)
Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.
... What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision (Article 2180, Civil Code) is that the
employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer, likewise,
responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary and
solidary 9
But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimburse ment
from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's
claim. 10
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.