Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. CA and Sps.
Sotero Cailipan, Jr and Sotero opposed the motion to dismiss; he testified that be is the
Zenaida Lopez andGeorge Cailipan
G.R. No. 80447 January 31, 1989
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
George – was a paying passenger on a Baliwag bus
who suffered multiple serious physicalinjuries when he was
thrown off said bus driven in a careless and negligent manner
byLeonardo Cruz, the bus driver, along Brgy. Patubig, Marilao,
Bulacan; as a result, he wasconfined in the hospital for
treatment, incurring medical expenses, which were borne byhis
parents in the sum of about P200,000.00 plus other incidental e
xpenses of aboutP10,000.00
George’s parents, Spouses Cailipan filed a complaint for
damages arising from breach of contract of carriage
Baliwag Transit alleged that the cause of the injuries sustained
by George was solelyattributable to his own voluntary act
in that, without warning and provocation, he suddenlystood up
from his seat and headed for the door of the bus as if in a daze,
opened it and jumped off while said bus was in motion, in spite
of the protestations by the driver andwithout the knowledge of
the conductor a third-Party Complaint against Fortune Insurance
& Surety Company, Inc., on its third-party liability insurance in
the amount of P50,000.00; Fortune Insurance claimed limited
liability, the coverage being subject to a Schedule
of Indemnities forming part of theinsurance policy
Fortune Insurance and Baliwag filed Motions to Dismiss the
complaint filed against themon the
ground that George, in consideration of the sum of P8,020.50
had executed a“Release of Claims”
father of George, who atthe time of the incident was a student,
living with his parents and totally dependent onthem for their
support; that the expenses for his hospitalization were
shouldered by hisparents; and that they had not signed the
“Release of Claims”
RTC dismissed the complaint (dismissal was predicated on
George’s execution of Releaseof Claims)
ISSUE:
what is the legal effect of the Release of Claims executed by
George
HELD:
Since the suit is one for breach of contract of carriage, the
Release of Claims executed byhim, as the injured party,
discharging Fortune Insurance and Baliwag from any and
allliability is valid. He was then of legal age, a graduating
student of Agricultural Engineering,and had the capacity to do
acts with legal effect (Article 37 in relation to Article 402,
CivilCode). Thus, he could sue and be sued even without the
assistance of his parents.
The contract of carriage was actually between George, as the
paying passenger, andBaliwag, as the common carrier; since a
contract may be violated only by the partiesthereto, as against
each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in
interest,either
as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to said contract (
real party-in-interest-plaintiff – one who has a legal right;
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 1
real party-in-interest-defendant – onewho has a correlative
legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal right of
theformer); in the absence of any contract of carriage between
Baliwag and George’s parents,the latter are not real parties-in-
interest in an action for breach of that contract
Release of Claims – have the effect of a compromise
agreement since it was entered intofor the purpose of making a
full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of
thecause of action involved
Compromise – contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid alitigation or put an end to one
already commenced.
British Airways, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 12
th
Division, First International Tradingand General Services
G.R. No. 92288 February 9, 1993
Nocon, J.
FACTS:
First International Trading and General Services Co. – duly
licensed domestic recruitmentand placement agency; it received
a telex message from its principal ROLACO Engineeringand
Contracting Services in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to recruit Filipino
contract workers inbehalf of said principal
ROLACO paid to the Jeddah branch of petitioner British
Airways, Inc. airfare tickets for 93contract workers with specific
instruction to transport said workers to Jeddah on or
beforeMarch 30, 1981
March 1981: First International was informed by British Airways
that ROLACO hadforwarded 93 prepaid tickets; First
International instructed its travel agent, ADB Travel and Tours.
Inc., to book the 93 workers with petitioner but the latter failed to
fly said workers,thereby compelling private respondent to
borrow money in the amount of P304,416.00 inorder to
purchase airline tickets from the other airlines for the 93 workers
it had recruitedwho must leave immediately since the visas of
said workers are valid only for 45 days andthe Bureau of
Employment Services mandates that contract workers must be
sent to the job site within a period of 30 days
June 1981: First International was again informed by British
Airways that it had received aprepaid ticket advice from its
Jeddah branch for the transportation of 27 contract workers;First
International instructed its travel agent to book the 27 contract
workers with thepetitioner but the latter was only able to book
and confirm 16 seats on its June 9, 1981flight; on the date of the
scheduled flight only 9 workers were able to board said
flightwhile the remaining 7 workers were rebooked to June 30,
1981 which bookings were againcancelled by the petitioner
without any prior notice to either private respondent or
theworkers; thereafter, the 7 workers were rebooked to the July
4,1981 flight of petitionerwith 6 more workers booked for said
flight; but the confirmed bookings of the 13 workerswere again
cancelled and rebooked to July 7, 1981
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 2
First International paid the travel tax of the said workers as
required by British Airways
butwhen the receipt of the tax payments was submitted, the latt
er informed FirstInternational that it can only confirm the seats
of the 12 workers on its July 7, 1981 flight;but the confirmed
seats of said workers were again cancelled without any prior
noticeeither to First International or said workers; the 12 workers
were finally able to leave for Jeddah after First International had
bought tickets from the other airlines
July 1981: First International sent a letter to petitioner
demanding compensation for thedamages in the amount of
P350,000.00 it had incurred by the latter’s repeated failure
totransport its contract workers despite confirmed bookings and
payment of thecorresponding travel taxes
British Airways’ narration:
it received a telex message from Jeddah advising that ROLACO
had prepaid the airfares of 100 persons to transport First
International’s contract workers from Manila to Jeddah on
orbefore March 30, 1981; however, due to the unavailability of
space and limited time, it hadto return to its sponsor in Jeddah
the prepaid ticket advice consequently not even one of the
alleged 93 contract workers were booked in any of its flights
June 1981: British Airways received another prepaid ticket
advice to transport 16 contractworkers of First International to
Jeddah but the travel agent of First International bookedonly 10
contract workers for British Airways’ June 9, 1981 flight;
however, only 9 contractworkers boarded the scheduled flight
with 1 passenger not showing up as evidenced bythe Philippine
Airlines’ passenger manifest
First International’s travel agent booked seats for 5 contract
workers on British Airways’ July 4, 1981 flight but said travel
agent cancelled the booking of 2 passengers while theother 3
passengers did not show up on said flight
July 1981: the travel agent of First International booked 7 more
contract workers inaddition to the previous 5 contract workers
who were not able to board the July 4, 1981flight with British
Airways’ July 7, 1981 flight which was accepted by British
Airways subjectto reconfirmation
July 1981: British Airways’ computer system broke down which
resulted to its failure to
geta reconfirmation from Saudi Arabia Airlines causing
the automatic cancellation of thebookings of First International’s
12 contract workers; the computer system of thepetitioner was
reinstalled the next day and immediately British Airways tried to
reinstatethe bookings of the 12 workers with either Gulf Air or
Saudi Arabia Airlines but both airlinesreplied that no seat was
available on that date and had to place the 12 workers on
thewait list; said information was duly relayed to the First
International and the 12 workersbefore the scheduled flight
ISSUE:
WON British Airways is liable
HELD:
Yes. Its repeated failures to transport First International’s
workers in its flight despiteconfirmed booking of said workers
clearly constitutes breach of contract and bad faith on itspart.
two aspects of contract of common carriage of passengers:
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 3
a. contract to carry at some future time –consensual and is
necessarily perfected bymere consent
b. contract of carriage or of common carriage itself –real
contract for not until thecarrier is actually used can the carrier be
said to have already assumed the obligation of a carrier contract
to carry was involved in the case; its elements are consent,
consideration andobject certain
CONSENT: British Airways consent to the contract
was manifested by its acceptance of
thePTA or prepaid ticket advice that ROLACO has prepaid the a
irfares of the FirstInternational’s contract workers advising the
appellant that it must transport the contractworkers on or before
the end of March, 1981 and the other batch in June, 1981
CONSIDERATION: the fare paid for the passengers by the
principal of First International
OBJECT CERTAIN: the transport of the passengers from the
place of departure to the placeof destination
First International has fully complied with the obligation, namely,
the payment of the fareand its willingness for its contract
workers to leave for their place of destination.
On the other hand, British Airways was remiss in its obligation to
transport the contractworkers on their flight despite confirmation
and bookings made by First International’stravelling agent.
British Airways should have refused acceptance of the PTA
from by
FirstInternational’s principal or to at least inform by First Internati
onal that it could notaccommodate the contract workers.
Mr. and Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil v. CA, The
Word for the WorldChristian Fellowship, Inc., Amyline Antonio,
etc.
G.R. No. 111127 July 26, 1996
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife – owners of a 1982 model
Mazda minibus; they used thebus principally in connection with
a bus service for school children which they operated inManila;
they had a driver, Porfirio Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after
trying him out fortwo weeks; his job was to take school children
to and from the St. Scholastica’s College inMalate, Manila
Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. arranged with
Fabres for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back
usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen,
Pangasinan; however, the bridge atCarmen was under repair,
so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area
(itbeing his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour
through the town of Baay inLingayen, Pangasinan; Cabil came
upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a southto east
direction, which he described as “siete;” the road was slippery
because it wasraining, causing the bus, which was running at
the speed of 50 kph, to skid to the left roadshoulder; the bus hit
the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 4
thefence of Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its
left side, coming to a full stoponly after a series of impacts
several passengers were injured; Amyline Antonio was thrown
on the floor of the bus andpinned down by a wooden seat which
came down by a wooden seat which came off afterbeing
unscrewed; she is now suffering from paraplegia (total inability
to move both legsand usually the lower part of the trunk, often
as a result of disease or injury of the spine)and is permanently
paralyzed from the waist down
Cabil’s answer: he did not see the curve until it was too late; he
was not familiar with thearea and he could not have seen the
curve despite the care he took in driving the bus,because it was
dark and there was no sign on the road; he saw the curve when
he wasalready within 15 to 30 meters of it; he allegedly slowed
down to 30 kilometers per hour,but it was too late
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners (a. Cabil; b. employers Fabres) were neglige
nt; 2. WONpetitioners were liable for the injuries suffered
by private respondents
HELD:
1. On Cabil’s negligence: On the night of the accident, it was
raining, and as aconsequence, the road was slippery, and it was
dark. Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50kilometers per hour
and only slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30
metersahead. By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off
the road. Given the conditions of the road and considering that
the trip was Cabil’s first one outside of Manila
First Philippine Industrial Corp. v. CA, Paterno Tac-an,
Bantangas City, andAdoracion Arellano (treasurer of
Batangas)
G.R. No. 125948 December 29, 1998
Martinez, J.
FACTS:
FPIC – grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No.
387, as amended, tocontract, install and operate oil pipelines
It applied for a mayor’s permit with the Office of the Mayor of
Batangas City. Before thepermit could be issued, it was required
by the City Treasurer to pay a local tax based on itsgross
receipts for the fiscal year 1993 pursuant to the Local
Government Code. It paid thetax under protest.
It filed a complaint for tax refund alleging that 1) the imposition
and collection of thebusiness tax on its gross receipts violates
Section 133 of the Local Government Codewhich grants tax
exemption to common carriers; 2) the authority of cities to
impose andcollect a tax on the gross receipts of “contractors
and independent contractors” under Sec.141 (e) and 151 does
not include the authority to collect such taxes on
transportationcontractors for, as defined under Sec. 131 (h), the
term “contractors” excludestransportation contractors; and, 3)
the City Treasurer illegally and erroneously imposedand
collected the said tax, thus meriting the immediate refund of
the tax paid.
ISSUES:
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 5
1. WON FPIC is a common carrier; 2. WON it is exempted from
paying the taxesrequired by the City Treasurer
HELD:
1. Yes. FPIC is engaged in the business
of transporting or carrying goods, i.e.petroleum products, for
hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all
personsindifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to
employ its services, and transports thegoods by land and
for compensation.
common carrier - holds himself out to the public as engaged in t
he business of transporting persons or property from place to pl
ace, for compensation, offering hisservices to the public
generally (see also Art. 1732)
test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of
goods:
a. engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a
public employment, and musthold himself out as ready to
engage in the transportation of goods for person generally asa
business and not as a casual occupation;
b. undertakes to carry goods of the kind to which his business is
confined
c. undertakes to carry by the method by which his business is
conducted and over hisestablished roads
d. transportation is for hire
common service coincides with public service
public service
– includes every person that now or hereafter may own,
operate. manage,or control in the Philippines, for hire or
compensation, with general or limited clientele,whether
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general
business purposes, anycommon carrier, railroad, street railway,
traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either
forfreight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and
whatever may be itsclassification, freight or carrier service of an
y class, express service, steamboat, orsteamship line, pontines,
ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passeng
ers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or
dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system
gas, electric light heat and power, water supplyand power
petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications
systems, wire orwireless broadcasting stations and other similar
public services (CA No. 1416, as amended,otherwise known as
the Public Service Act)
FPIC - considered a common carrier under Art. 86 of the
Petroleum Act of the Philippines(RA 387), which provides that:
Art. 86. Pipe line concessionaire as common carrier. — A
pipe line shall have the preferential right to utilize installations
for the transportation of petroleum owned by him, but is
obligated to utilize the remaining transportation capacitypro rata
for the transportation of such other petroleum as may be offered
by others fortransport, and to charge without discrimination
such rates as may have been approved bythe Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 6
FPIC is also a public utility pursuant to Art. 7 of RA 387 which
states that “everythingrelating to the exploration for and
exploitation of petroleum . . . and everything relating tothe
manufacture, refining, storage, or transportation by special
methods of petroleum, ishereby declared to be a public utility”
2. Yes. Legal basis is Section 133 (j), of the Local Government
Code which provides that“Unless otherwise provided herein, the
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,municipalities,
and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
Taxes on thegross receipts of transportation contractors and
persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight
by hire and common carriers
by air, land or water, except asprovided in this Code”.
Reason for the exception: to avoid duplication of tax
Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. CAGr, No. 147246,
August 19, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner was contracted as carrier by a corporation from
Portland, Oregon to deliver a cargoto theconsignee's warehouse
at Pasig City. The cargo, however, never reached the consignee
asthe bargethat carried the cargo sank completely, resulting
in damage to the cargo. Privaterespondent, asinsurer,
indemnified the consignee for the lost cargo and thus, as
subrogee,sought recovery frompetitioner. Both the trial court
and the appellate court ruled in favor ofprivate respondent. The
Court ruled in favor of private respondent. Whether or not
petitioner isa common carrier, theCourt ruled in the affirmative.
The principal business of petitioner is thatof lighterage and
drayage,offering its barges to the public, although for limited
clientele, forcarrying or transporting goods bywater for
compensation. Whether or not petitioner failed toexercise
extraordinary diligence in its careand custody of the consignee's
goods, the Court alsoruled in the affirmative. The barge
completelysank after its towing bits broke, resulting in theloss of
the cargo. Petitioner failed to prove that thetyphoon was the
proximate and only causeof the loss and that it has exercised
due diligence before,during and after the
occurrence.HCISEDISSUE:Whether or Not the petitioner is a
common carrier.RULING:YES.Petitioner is a common carrier
whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular
ratherthanscheduled manner, and with an only limited
clientele. A common carrier need not havefixed andpublicly
known routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or
issue tickets. Tobe sure, petitionerfits the test of a common
carrier as laid down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals.The test to
determine acommon carrier is "whether the given undertaking is
a part of thebusiness engaged in by the carrierwhich he has
held out to the general public as his occupationrather than the
quantity or extent of thebusiness transacted." In the case at bar,
the petitioneradmitted that it is engaged in the business of
shipping and lighterage, offering its barges to thepublic, despite
its limited clientele for carrying ortransporting goods by water
forcompensation.Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common
carriers as persons, corporations,firms or associationsengaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods
orboth, by land, water, or air,for compensation..offering their
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 7
services to the public. Petitionercontends that it is not a
commoncarrier but a private carrier. Allegedly, it has no fixed
andpublicly known route, maintains no terminals,and issues no
tickets. It points out that it is not
obliged to carry indiscriminately for any person. It isnot bound to
carry goods unless itconsents. In short, it does not hold out its
services to the generalpublic. In De Guzman vs. Courtof
Appeals, we held that the definition of common carriers in
Article1732 of the Civil Codemakes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is thecarrying of persons
orgoods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity. Wealso did notdistinguish between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on
regularorscheduled basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduledbasis.Further, we ruled
that Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering
itsservices to thegeneral public, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from anarrow segment of thegeneral
population.Common carriers are bound to observeextraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goodstransported by them.
They are presumedto have been at fault or to have acted
negligently if thegoods are lost, destroyed ordeteriorated. To
overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss,
destruction ordeterioration of the goods, deterioration of the
goods, the common carrier mustprove that itexercised
extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule. Article1734 ofthe Civil Code enumerates the instances
when the presumption of negligence does notattach:Art. 1734.
Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration ofthe goods,unless the same is due to any of
the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm,earthquake,
lightning, orother natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the
public enemy in war,whether international or civil; (3)Act or
omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) Thecharacter
of the goods or defects in thepacking or in the containers; (5)
Order or act ofcompetent public authority
Transportation Digest: LRTA V. Navidad (2003)
G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (transportation)
a Laws Cited: Art. 1755,Art. 1756,Art. 1759,Art. 1763
FACTS:
October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor)
entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token”. While
Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the
guard Junelito Escartin approached him.
Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight
Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being
hit by a moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman
December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Escartin,
Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of
security guards) for the death of her husband.
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 8
LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a
cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent
Prudent: denied liability – averred that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and surpervision of its security guards
LRTA and Roman: presented evidence
Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had
failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task
RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin,
complaint against LRT and Roman were dismissed for lack of
merit
CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and
Roman liable
ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the
contract of carriage
HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is
DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/ compensatory damages) (b)
Roman is absolved.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from
the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
burdened with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in
ensuring the safety of passengers
Civil Code:
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances
Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of
the former’s employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers
This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon
proof that they Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered
by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father
of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieaved of the duty to
still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that
the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure
Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of
an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task, the
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 9
common carrier is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage
GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and
related provisions in conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code. (Tort may arise even under a contract, where tort [quasi-
delict liability] is that which breaches the contract)
EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee, employer can be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of
its employees.
EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee
Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of
Nicanor for the reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT
proven
NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability
Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical
relation bet. Nicanor and Roman
Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence
PERENA VS. ZARATE
PERENA VS. ZARATE
G.R. NO. 157917
August 29, 2012
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
Perenas were engaged in the business of transporting students
to Don Bosco. The Zarates engaged Perenas services to
transport their son, Aaron, to school.
While on the way to school, the van’s air-conditioned unit was
turned on and the stereo playing loudly. The driver took a detour
because they were running late due to the traffic in SLEX. The
detour was through a narrow path underneath the Magallanes
Interchange used as short cut into Makati. When the van was to
traverse the PNR railroad crossing, the van was tailing a large
passenger bus so the driver’s view of the oncoming train was
blocked. The train hit the van at the rear end and the impact
threw 9 students including Aaron out of the van. Aaron landed in
the path of the train which dragged his body and severed his
head, instantaneously killing him.
The Zarates filed for damages against Alfaro, Perenas, PNR,
and the train driver. The cause of action against Perena was for
contract of carriage while for PNR, quasi delict. Perena posited
the defense of diligence of a good father in the selection and
supervision of their driver
ISSUE/S: Were Perenas and PNR jointly and severally liable for
damages? Is the petitioner a common carrier?
RULING:
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 10
YES. A school bus operator is a common carrier.
Perena’s defense of diligence of a good father in the selection
and supervision of their driver is unavailable for breach of
contract of carriage. Perenas operated as a common carrier;
and their standard of care was extraordinary diligence, not only
diligence of a good father.
A carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to transport
or convey goods from one place to another, gratuitously or for
hire. They may be private or common
Private carrier is one who, without holding himself or itself out to
the public as ready to act for all who may desire his or its
services, undertakes, by special agreement in a particular
instance only, to transport goods or persons from one place to
another either gratutitously or for hire. The diligence required of
a private carrier is only ordinary
Common Carrier is a person, corporation, firm or association
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering such services to the public. Diligence required is to
observe extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to be at fault
or to have acted negligently in case of the loss of effects of
passengers, or death or injuries to passengers
The true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent
of business actually transacted, or the number of conveyances,
BUT WHETHER the undertaking is a part of the activity that he
has held out to the general public as his business or occupation.
The Perenas held themselves out as a ready transportation
indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living
within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.
Perena, being a common carrier, was already presumed to be
negligent at the time of the accident because death occurred to
their passenger. The omissions of care on the part of the driver
constituted negligence.
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112287 December 12, 1997
Panganiban, J.
Doctrine:
The stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers
protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a
private carrier.
Facts:
Plaintiff National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Charterer and
defendant Vlasons Shipping, Inc. (VSI) as Owner, entered into a
Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired VSI’s
vessel, the MV Vlasons I to make one voyage to load steel
products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor,
Manila. The handling, loading and unloading of the cargoes
were the responsibility of the Charterer.
The skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets shipped were
allegedly found to be wet and rusty. Plaintiff, alleging
negligence, filed a claim for damages against the defendant
who denied liability claiming that the MV Vlasons I was
seaworthy in all respects for the carriage of plaintiff’s cargo; that
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 11
said vessel was not a “common carrier” inasmuch as she was
under voyage charter contract with the plaintiff as charterer
under the charter party; that in the course its voyage, the vessel
encountered very rough seas.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers pursuant to which there exists a presumption of
negligence against the common carrier in case of loss or
damage to the cargo are applicable to a private carrier.
Held:
No. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely
stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be
binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common
carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public.
Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be
applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private
carrier.
It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the
carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space, for all
who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee
[Mendoza vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 90 Phil. 836, 842-843
(1952)]. A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is
deemed a private carrier. “Generally, private carriage is
undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold
himself out to carry goods for the general public.
Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the ship
owner’s obligations are governed by the foregoing provisions of
the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a
general rule, places the prima facie presumption of negligence
on a common carrier.
Filcar Transport v Espinas
G.R. No. 174156
June 20, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon
Guinto Street in Manila when he was suddenly hit by another
car. Upon verifying with the LTO, Espinas learned that the
owner of the other car is Filcar. This car was assigned to Filcar's
Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor and, at the time of the
incident, was driven by Atty. Flor's personal driver, Timoteo
Floresca.
Espinas sued Filcar for damages. Filcar denied liability, claiming
that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since
Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the
motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be held
liable for the damages caused to the Espinas
HELD:
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 12
Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the
driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176
in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor
vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas' car. It is on
this basis that Filcar is primarily and directly liable to Espinas for
damages.
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or
omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for
the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general
rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
provides to wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify
another for damage caused by one's act or omission is imposed
upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who committed the
negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides for
exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or
omission of another.
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for
the tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code states:
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil
Code, an action predicated on an employee's act or omission
may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the
negligent act or omission committed by his employee.
Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law
makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law
principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of one's subordinates to prevent damage
to another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the
employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable
for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
In so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner
of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver,
and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent
of such owner.
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 13

Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered
owner of the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for
damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the
Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required. It is
sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered owner of the
motor vehicle causing damage in order that it may be held
vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable
The rationale for the rule that a registered owner is vicariously
liable for damages caused by the operation of his motor vehicle
is explained by the principle behind motor vehicle registration,
viz:
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage
or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual,
the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles
running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of
the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification.
It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or
prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is
primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of
persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public
highways.
Employer-employee relationship between registered owner and
driver is irrelevant
Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship
between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in
determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury
or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets
and highways.
The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration
is the protection of innocent third persons who may have no
means of identifying public road malefactors and, therefore,
would find it difficult if not impossible to seek redress for
damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths,
injuries and other damages; by fixing the person held primarily
and directly liable for the damages sustained by victims of road
mishaps, the law ensures that relief will always be available to
them.
To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the
damages would also prevent a situation where a registered
owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing
on the blame to anther who may have no means to answer for
the damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of
road accidents. We take note that some motor vehicles running
on our roads are driven not by their registered owners, but by
employed drivers who, in most instances, do not have the
financial means to pay for the damages caused in case of
accidents.
Filcar cannot pass on the liability to another party
The agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the
motor vehicle to the latter does not bind Espinas who was not a
party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose
only recourse is to the motor vehicle registration.
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 14
Filcar cannot use the defense that the employee acted beyond
the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180
of the Civil Code – that the employee acts beyond the scope of
his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage – because the motor
vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article
2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to
the registered owner of the motor vehicle. Thus, for as long as
Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular
accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages
caused to Espinas.
Filcar's recourse is against the actual employer of the driver and
the driver himself
This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any
recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the driver
himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be
indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount
that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury
caused to another.
o Registered owner is deemed employer of the driver and
is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with
Article 2180 of the Civil Code
o The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify
the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage
or injury is caused by the vehicle on public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner.
o The motor vehicle registration law modified Article 2180
to a certain extent so that the defense available thereunder
cannot be used by the registered owner
o The registered owner can recover from the actual owner
and the driver under the doctrine of unjust enrichment
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.,
- versus -
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 162267
(July 4, 2008)
FACTS:
A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by UCPB, insured with
UCPB General Insurance Co., was traversing the Laurel
Highway, Barangay Balintawak, LipaCity. It was driven
by Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo (Asst. Manager of said
bank), was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck,
owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc.
allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas
& Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee,
defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga. The impact caused heavy
damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the
rear part of the car. The driver and passenger suffered physical
injuries. However, the driver defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued
on its way to its destination and did not bother to bring his victims to the
hospital.
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 15
 As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI
Leasing, repeated demands were made by plaintiff-appellee for the
payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no payment was made.
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (petitioner) interposed the defense that
it could not be held liable for the collision, since the driver, Gonzaga,
was not its employee, but that of its co-defendant SUGECO. In fact, it
was SUGECO, that was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a
Contract of Lease signed by petitioner and SUGECO. Petitioner,
however, admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question. RTC
rendered judgment in favour of UCPB General Insurance and ordered
PCI Leasing and Gonzaga, to pay jointly and severally the former. CA
affirmed with the lower court’s decision.
ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that
figured in a quasi-delict may be held liable, jointly and severally, with
the driver thereof, for the damages caused to third parties.
2) Whether petitioner, as a financing company, is absolved from
liability by the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8556, or the
Financing Company Act of 1998.
RULING:
1) YES. The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable
for quasi-delicts resulting from its use is well-established in
jurisprudence. As explained in the case of Erezo v. Jepte, thus:
Registration is required not to make said registration the
operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, as in land registration cases, because the
administrative proceeding of registration does not bear
any essential relation to the contract of sale between
the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39
Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of
the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act
No. 3992, as amended.) The main aim
of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or
injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner. Instances are
numerous where vehicles running on public highways
caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other
vehicles without positive identification of the owner or
drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is
to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or
prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or
injuries caused on public highways.
2) NO. The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding developments in
foreign jurisdictions, do not supersede or repeal the law on compulsory
motor vehicle registration. No part of the law expressly repeals
Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known
as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Thus, the rule remains
the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not
registered with the Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third
persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents, for the latter need
only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive
evidence of ownership. A lease such as the one involved in the
instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs
to be registered in order for it to bind third parties. Under this policy,
the evil sought to be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of
victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty
party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to
register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the
parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.
Teja Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian v. IAC and Pedro Nale
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 16
 G.R. No. L-65510 March 9, 1987
Paras, J.
FACTS:
Jaucian bought from the Nale a motorcycle with complete
accessories and a sidecar; out of the total purchase price the
Jaucian gave a downpayment of 1,700.00 with a promise thathe
would pay Nale the balance within sixty days. The Jaucian,
however, failed to complywith his promise and so upon his own
request, the period of paying the balance wasextended to one
year in monthly installments until January 1976 when he
stopped paying any more a chattel mortgage was constituted as
a security for the payment of the balance of thepurchase price
It has been the practice of financing firms that whenever
there is a balance of thepurchase price the registration papers
of the motor vehicle subject of the sale are notgiven to the buyer
The motorcycle sold to the defendant was first mortgaged to
the Teja Marketing by Jaucianbecause the latter had no
franchise of his own (CPC) so he attached the unit to Nale’s
MCHLine
The agreement of the parties was for Nale to undertake the
yearly registration of themotorcycle with the Land Transportation
Commission; pursuant to this agreement
Jauciangave Nale P90.00, the P8.00 would be for
the mortgage fee and the P82.00 for theregistration fee of the
motorcycle; Nale failed to register the motorcycle on the
groundthat the Jaucian failed to comply with some requirements
such as the payment of theinsurance premiums and the bringing
of the motorcycle to the LTC for stenciling, Nalesaying that the
defendant was hiding the motorcycle from him; Nale explained
that thoughthe ownership of the motorcycle was already
transferred to Jaucian, the vehicle was stillmortgaged with the
consent of the Jaucian to the Rural Bank of Camaligan for the
reasonthat all motorcycle purchased from Nale on credit was
rediscounted with the bank
Because of the failure of Nale to register the motorcycle Jaucian
suffered damages
whenhe failed to claim any insurance indemnity for the more tha
n two times that themotorcycle figured in accidents
Nale filed an action for collection of sum of money with
damages against Nale
ISSUE:
WON not respondent court erred in applying the doctrine of pari
delicto
HELD:
No.
kabit system is contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and
in existent under Article1409 of the Civil Code; the court will
not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, butwill leave
both where it finds then
Art. 1412: “If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
consists does not constitutea criminal offense, the following
rules shall be observed: 1. When the fault is on the part of both
contracting parties, neither may recover that he has given by
virtue of the contract,or demand, the performance of the other’s
undertaking.”
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 17
 HELD:
Lita Enterprises, Inc. v. Second Civil Cases Division, IAC,
Nicasio Ocampo andFrancisca Garcia Yes.

G.R. No. L-64693 April 27, 1984 kabit system

Escolin, J. – system whereby a person who has been granted a certificate

of convenience allows another person who owns motors
FACTS: vehicles to operate under suchfranchise for a fee; contrary to
public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent underArticle
Ocampo and Garcia – purchased in installment from the Delta
1409 of the Civil Code; as a result, the court will not aid either
Motor Sales Corporation 5 Toyota Corona Standard cars to
party to enforce anillegal contract, but will leave them both
be used as taxicabs; they had no franchise to operatetaxicabs,
where it finds them (pari delicto rule)
so they contracted with Lita Enterprises for the use of the latter’s
certificate of public convenience in consideration of an initial Art. 1412: “If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
payment of 1,000.00 and a monthly rentalof 200.00 per taxicab consists does not constitutea criminal offense, the following
unit; the aforesaid cars were then registered in the name of rules shall be observed; (1) when the fault, is on the
LitaEnterprises partof both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of thecontract, or demand the performance of the
One of the taxicabs driven by Ocampo and Garcia’s employee,
other’s undertaking.”
Emeterio Martin, collidedwith a motorcycle whose driver,
Florante Galvez, died from the head injuries sustainedtherefrom the defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent and
incurable, and cannot be cured byratification or by prescription.
A criminal case was filed against the driver Martin, while a civil
case for damages wasinstituted by heir of the victim against Lita
Enterprises
Spouses Hernandez
ISSUE:
v
WON Lita Enterprises is liable to the heir of the victim who died
as a result of . Spouses DolorG.R. No. 160286. July 30, 2004FACTS:
thegross negligence of Ocampo and Garcia’s driver while drivin
g one private respondents’taxicabs
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 18
Lorenzo Menard Boyet Dolor, Jr. was driving an owner-type
jeepney owned by hermother, Margarita, towards Anilao,
Batangas. As he was traversing the road, his vehiclecollided
with a passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Juan Gonzales
and owned by his co-petitioner Francisco Hernandez. Boyet and
his passenger died. Passengers also on boardthe owner-type
jeep, which was totally wrecked, suffered physical injuries. The
collisionalso damaged the passenger jeepney of Francisco
Hernandez and caused physical injuriesto its passengers.
Respondents commenced an action for damages alleging that
driver JuanGonzales was guilty of negligence and lack of care
and that the Hernandez spouses wereguilty of negligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
Petitionerscountered that the proximate cause of the death and
injuries sustained by the passengers ofboth vehicles was the
recklessness of Boyet who was driving in a zigzagging manner
underthe influence of alcohol. Petitioners also alleged that
Gonzales was not the driver-employeeof the Hernandez
spouses as the former only leased the jeepney on a daily basis.
Hernandezspouses further claimed that even if an employer-
employee relationship is found to existbetween them, they
cannot be held liable because as employers they exercised due
care inthe selection and supervision of their employee. The trial
court rendered a decision in favorof respondents. CA affirmed
with modifications. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Hernandez spouses are solidarily liable with Juan
Gonzales, although it is ofrecord that they were not in
the passenger jeepney when the accident occurred.
HELD:YES.
They are still answerable under several provisions of the Civil
Code namelyArticle 2180 and Article 2176. While the above
provisions do not expressly provide for thesolidary liability, they
should be read in consonance with Article 2180
–
one can be liablefor the acts or omission of another whom he is
responsible for, meaning that an employer isaccountable for the
actions of his employees. Article 2194 categorically states
thatresponsibility of two or more persons who are liablefor
quasi-delict is solidary. TheHernandez spouses maintained that
Julian Gonzales is not their employee because thelatter pays
them daily for the use of the jeepney. They argued that they are
practicing a
lease agreement using the “boundary system”. SC held that
there exists an employer-employee relationship because by
agreeing with spouses Hernandez, there would be aviolation of
the Public Service Law and the riding public is placed at the
mercy of recklessand irresponsible drivers because most drivers
are in no position to pay for damages whenaccidents occur.
***** END ****
Transpo Digested Cases (P. 1-2 of the Syllabus) 19