VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004 655
  8171   has
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 163256. November 10, 2004. *
CICERON   P.   ALTAREJOS,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE
ALMIÑE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.
Actions; Moot   and   Academic   Questions; Courts   will
decide   a   question   otherwise   moot   and   academic   if   it   is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.—As stated by the
Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,   where   the   issues   have
become   moot   and   academic,   there   is   no   justiciable
controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of
no practical use or value. Nonetheless, courts will decide a
question   otherwise   moot   and   academic   if   it   is   capable   of
repetition, yet evading review.
Citizenship; Repatriation; In   addition   to   taking   the
Oath  of   Allegiance  to the  Republic of   the   Philippines,   the
registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper
civil   registry   and   the   Bureau   of   Immigration   is   a
prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of  a citizen.—The
law is clear that repatriation is effected “by taking the oath
of   allegiance   to   the   Republic   of   the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and
in the Bureau of Immigration.” Hence, in addition to taking
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
the   registration   of   the   Certificate   of   Repatriation   in   the
proper   civil   registry   and   the   Bureau   of   Immigration   is   a
prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
Same; Same; While   Republic   Act   No.
impliedly repealed Presidential Decree No. 725, the Court’s
ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA
727 (1996), that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of
one’s   application   for   repatriation   subsists   and   applies   to
repatriation under R.A. No. 8171.—Republic Act No. 8171
has  impliedly repealed Presidential Decree  No. 725. They
cover   the   same   subject   matter:   Providing   for   the
repatriation   of   Filipino   women   who   have   lost   their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural­
born   Filipinos.   The   Court’s   ruling   in Frivaldo   v.
Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the
date of filing of one’s  application for repatriation subsists
for the
_______________
*
 EN BANC.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
same   reasons   quoted   above.   Accordingly,   petitioner’s
repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application
in   1997.   Petitioner   was,   therefore,   qualified   to   run   for   a
mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this
fact   since   it   did   not   implement   the   assailed   Resolutions
disqualifying   petitioner   to   run   as   mayor   of   San   Jacinto,
Masbate.
Same; Same; Election   Law; It   is   incumbent   upon
candidates   for   an   elective   office,   who   are   repatriated
citizens,   to   be   ready   with   sufficient   evidence   of   their
repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned.
—The   Court   cannot   fault   the   COMELEC en   banc for
affirming   the   decision   of   the   COMELEC,   First   Division,
considering   that   petitioner   failed   to   prove   before   the
COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of
repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents
proving   compliance   with   the  requirements   of   repatriation
only   during   his   motion   for   reconsideration,   when   the
COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence.
As   the   COMELEC en   banc correctly   stated:   The   Comelec
Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to
justify   the   decision   is   a   ground   for   a   motion   for
reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred
to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion
for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during
the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of
the parties which are already part of the records of the case.
In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able
to overcome the evidence of the petitioners. It is, therefore,
incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are
repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of
their   repatriation   in   case   their   Filipino   citizenship   is
questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.  that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Paris G. Real for petitioner.
AZCUNA, J.:
This   is   a   petition   for certiorari,   with   prayer   for   the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ
of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside
the Resolution prom­
657
VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004 657
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
ulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
First   Division,   on   March   22,   2004   disqualifying
petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor
of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the
COMELEC en   bancpromulgated   on   May   7,   2004
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner   Altarejos   was   a   candidate   for  mayor   in
the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May
10, 2004 national and local elections.
On   January   15,   2004,   private   respondents   Jose
Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters
of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a
petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground
false representation in his certificate of candidacy that
“[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to
a foreign country.”
Private   respondents   alleged   that   based   on   a
letter  from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25,
1
2001,   petitioner   was   a   holder   of   a   permanent   U.S.
resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No.
E139507   issued   on   November   3,   1997,   and   an
Immigration   Certificate   of   Residence   No.   320846
issued   on   November   3,   1997   by   the   Bureau   of
Immigration. 2
On   January   26,   2004,   petitioner   filed   an
Answer stating, among others, that he did not commit
3
false representation in his application for candidacy as
mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was
already   issued   a   Certificate   of   Repatriation   by   the
Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a
petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No.
8171.   Thus,   petitioner   claimed   that   his   Filipino
citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified
to run as
_______________
 COMELEC (First Division) Resolution, Rollo, p. 36.
1
 COMELEC en banc Resolution, Rollo, p. 43.
2
 Rollo, p. 73.
3
658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought
the dismissal of the petition.
On   the   date   of   the   hearing,   the   parties   were
required   to   submit   their   Memoranda   within   three
days.   Private   respondents   filed   their   Memorandum,
while   petitioner   did   not   file   one   within   the   required
period.  Petitioner,   however,   filed   a   Reply
4
Memorandum  subsequently.
5
Atty.   Zacarias   C.   Zaragoza,   Jr.,   regional   election
director for Region V and hearing officer of this case,
recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified
from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San
Jacinto,   Masbate   in   the   May   10,   2004   national   and
local elections. He found, thus:
x x x
The  provisions   of  law  governing the qualifications  and
disqualifications   of   elective   local   officials   are   found   in
Sections   39   and   40   of   Republic   Act   No.   7160   otherwise
known   as   the   Local   Government   Code   of   1991,   which
provide as follows:
SEC.  39. Qualifications.—(a) An elective local  official must be a
citizen   of   the   Philippines;   a   registered   voter   in   the   barangay,
municipality,   city   or   province   or,   in  the   case   of   member   of   the
sangguniang   panlalawigan,   sangguniang   panlungsod,   or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.
x x x.
(c)   Candidates   for   the   position   of   mayor   or   vice­mayor   of
independent component cities, component cities or municipalities
must be at least twenty­one (21) years of age on election day.
[SEC.   40. Disqualifications.—The   following   persons   are
disqualified from running for any elective position:]
x x x.
_______________
 Supra, note 2.
4
 5
 Supra, note 3, at p. 87.
659
VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
     (d) Those with dual citizenship.
x x x.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; x x x
Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it
is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship;
must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or
must not have acquired the right to reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear and
convincing   evidence   that   respondent   is   a   citizen   of   the
United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3
November  1997   and   Immigration   Certificate  of   Residence
(ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the
Alien   Registration   Division,   Bureau   of   Immigration   and
Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated
25   June   2001   of   then   Commissioner   ANDREA   D.
DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation
as   a   Filipino   citizen   under   Republic   Act   No.   8171   on   17
December   1997,   this   did   not   restore   to   respondent   his
Filipino   citizenship,   because   Section   2   of   the   aforecited
Republic   Act   No.   8171   specifically   provides
that “repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary
oath   of   allegiance   to   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration.”
659 It appears from the records of this case that respondent
failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements
of   the   above­quoted   Section   2   of   Republic   Act   8171   to
perfect   his   repatriation   and   reacquire   his   Filipino
citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to
prove   that   he   has   taken   his   oath   of   allegiance   to   the
Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his
fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau   of   Immigration.   In   fact,   in   a   letter   date   25   June
2001,   Commissioner   ANDREA   DOMINGO   stated   that
RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with
an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying
that respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of
Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his
Alien
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in
case   of   doubt   concerning   the   grant   of   citizenship,   such
doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and against
the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L­16999, 22 June 1965).
x x x
Not   having   been   able   to   prove   that   he   has   fully
reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized
as a citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent
is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of
San   Jacinto,   Masbate,   in   the   10   May   2004   National   and
Local   Elections,   pursuant   to   the   aforequoted   Sections   39
and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
As   a   further   consequence   of   his   not   being   a   Filipino
citizen, respondent has also committed false representation
in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he is a
natural­born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet
even   perfected   the   reacquisition   of   Filipino   citizenship.
Such   false   representation   constitutes   a   material
misrepresentation   as   it   relates   to   his   qualification   as   a
candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x.  6
In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the
COMELEC,  First   Division,  adopted  the  findings   and
recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive
portion of said Resolution stated, thus:
“WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   respondent
CICERON   PEREZ   ALTAREJOS   is   hereby   disqualified   to
run   as   Mayor   of   San   Jacinto,   Masbate.   Accordingly,   his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor
of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled
and his name deleted from the certified list of candidates
for the May 10, 2004 elections.” 7 Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it
On   March   25,   2004,   petitioner   filed   a   motion   for
reconsideration and attached the following documents
to prove that he
_______________
6
 Supra, note 1, at pp. 39­40.
7
 Id., at p. 41.
661
VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004 661
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
had   completed   all   the   requirements   for   repatriation
which   thus   entitled   him   to   run   for   an   elective
office, viz.:
1. (1)Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;
2. (2)Identification   Certificate   No.   116543   issued
by   the   Bureau   of   Immigration   on   March   1,
2004;
3. (3)Certification from the City Civil Registration
Office,   Makati   City,   that   the   Certificate   of
Repatriation   and   Oath   of   Allegiance   of
petitioner   was   received   by   said   office   and
registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on
February 18, 2004;
4. (4)A   letter   dated   December   17,   1997   from   the
Special   Committee   on   Naturalization   to   the
was   furnishing   said   office   with   the   Oath   of
Allegiance   and   Certificate   of   Repatriation   of
petitioner   for   the   cancellation   of   petitioner’s
registration in said office as an alien, and the
issuance   to   him   of   the   corresponding
Identification Card as Filipino citizen;
 5. (5)A   letter   dated   December   17,   1997   from   the
Special   Committee   on   Naturalization   to   the
Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it
was sending petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and
Certificate   of   Repatriation   for   registration   in
their records and for petitioner’s reacquisition
of his former Philippine citizenship.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated
a   resolution   denying   the   motion   for   reconsideration,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En
Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the
Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT
and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.” 8
The Comelec en banc held, thus:
_______________
 Supra, note 3, at p. 47.
8
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
“The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency
of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion
for   reconsideration   (Rule   19,   Section   1). The   evidence
referred to in the above provision and to be considered in
the   Motion   for   Reconsideration   are   those   which   were
submitted   during   the   hearing   and   attached   to   the
respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part
of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the
respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the
petitioners.
When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the
Commission (First Division) the respondent’s only evidence
was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December 1977
and   marked   as   Annex   “1”   of   his   answer.   This   piece   of
evidence was not enough to controvert the evidence of the
petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of
Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June
2001 which stated that as of the even date respondent is a
holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records)
and   the   certification   of   Josephine   C.   Camata   dated   28
January 2004 certifying, that the name of the respondent
could not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of
the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order
as   the   evidence   submitted   by   the   respondent   were
insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner.
Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration,
attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of evidence,
which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion for
Reconsideration.   These   are   the   following   a)   Annex   “2”—
Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex “3”—Bureau of Immigration
Identification Certificate; c) Annex “4”—Certification of the
City   Civil   Registrar   of   Makati   City;   d)   Annex   “5”—Letter
addressed   to   the   Local   Civil   Registrar   of   San   Jacinto,
Masbate   by   Aurora   P.   Cortes   of   Special   Committee   on
Naturalization; and e) Annex “6”—Letter addressed to the
Bureau   of   Immigration   and   Deportation   by   Aurora   P.
Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization.
Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are
admitted, with more reason should we cancel his certificate
of  candidacy for  his  act  of   [misrepresenting]  himself  as  a
Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy,   he   has   not   yet   perfected   the   process   of
repatriation.   He   failed   to   comply   with   the   requirements
under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides
that  repatriation shall  be effected  by taking the  necessary
oath of
663
VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
allegiance   to   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration.
The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine
C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated February 18, 2004.
This   time,   she   certifies   that   Ciceron   Perez   Altarejos   was
registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series
of   2004   and   paid   under   OR   nos.   88325/8833256   dated
February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he
was   able   to   register   in   the   proper   civil   registry   only   on
February 18, 2004.
The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of
Immigration   only   on   March   1,   2004   as   evidenced   by   the
Bureau   of   Immigration   Identification   Certificate   attached
to the Motion as Annex “3.”
This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First
Division) that at the time respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy   he   is   yet   to   complete   the   requirement   under
section two (2) of RA 8171.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has
committed   false   representation   in   his   certificate   of
candidacy. Such false representation constitutes a material
misrepresentation   as   it   relates   to   his   qualification   as   a
candidate.   As   such   the   certificate   of   candidacy   may   be
cancelled on such ground.” (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778) 9
On   May   10,   2004,   the   election   day   itself,   petitioner
filed   this   petition   praying   that:   (1)   The   petition   be
given   due   course   and   a   temporary   restraining   order
and/or   writ   of   preliminary   injunction   be   issued ex
663
parte restraining   the   respondents   and   all   persons
acting   on   their   behalf,   from   fully   implementing   the
questioned   COMELEC   Resolutions   promulgated   on
March   22,   2004   and   May   7,   2004;   (2)   a   writ   of
preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering
the COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to
allow   petitioner   to   run   as   Mayor   of   San   Jacinto,
Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count
and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim
him   as   the   winning   mayor   of   San   Jacinto,   Masbate;
and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered
de­
_______________
 Id., at pp. 44­47.
9
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
claring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC
Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May
7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or
its   representatives   which   have   the   effect   of   illegally
preventing   petitioner   from   running   as   Mayor   of  San
Jacinto, Masbate.
In its Comment,  the Office of the Solicitor General
10
stated that, based on the information relayed to it by
the   COMELEC,   petitioner’s   name,   as   a   mayoralty
candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the
list of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the
said   municipality.   Hence,   the   cancellation   of
petitioner’s   certificate   of   candidacy   was   never
implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office
of the Solicitor General that petitioner’s opponent, Dr.
Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly
elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
The   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General   contends   that
said   supervening   event   has   rendered   the   instant
petition   moot   and   academic,   and   it   prayed   for   the
dismissal of the petition.
In his Reply,  petitioner opposed the dismissal of his
11
petition.   He   claims   that   the   COMELEC   resolutions
disqualifying   him   from   running   as   a   mayoralty
candidate  adversely   affected   his   candidacy,   since   his
supporters were made to believe that his votes would
not   be   counted.   Moreover,   he   stated   that   said
COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner   points   out   that   he   took   his   Oath   of
Allegiance   to   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   on
December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was
even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during
the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in
the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with
the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil
registry, the same was brought about by the inaction
on   the   part   of   said   offices   since   the   records   of   the
Special Committee
_______________
 Id., at p. 106.
10
 Id., at p. 112.
11
665
VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004 665
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
on   Naturalization   show   that   his   Certificate   of
Repatriation   and   Oath   of   Allegiance   have   long   been
transmitted to said offices.
Petitioner   also   asserts   that   the   subsequent
registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the
Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of
Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has
the   effect   of   curing   the   defect,   if   any,   in   the
reacquisition   of   his   Filipino   citizenship   as   his
repatriation   retroacted   to  the  date  of  his  application
for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.
The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is
the   registration   of   petitioner’s   repatriation   with   the
proper   civil   registry   and   with   the   Bureau   of
Immigration   a   prerequisite   in   effecting   repatriation;
and   (2)   whether   or   not   the   COMELEC en
banc committed   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting
to   excess   or   lack   of   jurisdiction   in   affirming   the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.
As   stated   by   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,
where   the   issues   have   become   moot   and   academic,
there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering
the   resolution   of   the   same   of   no   practical   use   or
value.  Nonetheless,   courts   will   decide   a   question
12
otherwise   moot   and   academic   if   it   is   capable   of
repetition, yet evading review. 13
First   Issue:   Is   the   registration   of   petitioner’s
repatriation   with   the   proper   civil   registry   and
with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in
effecting repatriation?
_______________
 Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23,
12
2004, 435   SCRA  98; Garcia  v. Commission  on  Elections, 258  SCRA
754, 757 (1996); Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76, 77 (1961).
 Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23,
13
2004, supra,   citing Brillantes,   Jr.   v.   Commission   on   Elections, G.R.
No. 163193, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 269.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2
of Republic Act No. 8171,  thus: 14
_______________
14
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171:
“AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN
WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO
ALIENS AND OF NATURAL­BORN FILIPINOS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and natural­born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic
necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner   provided   in   Section   4   of   Commonwealth   Act   No.   63,   as
amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
1. (1)Person   opposed   to   organized   government   or   affiliated   with   an
association  or  group   of   persons   who   uphold  and   teach   doctrines
opposing organized government;
2. (2)Person   defending   or   teaching   the   necessity   or   propriety   of
violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of
their ideas;
3. (3)Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
4. (4)Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases.
SEC.  2. Repatriation  shall  be  effected  by  taking  the  necessary  oath  of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration
shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue
the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
SEC. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
667
VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004 667
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
SEC.   2.   Repatriation   shall   be   effected   by   taking   the
necessary   oath   of   allegiance   to   the   Republic   of   the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and
in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration
shall   thereupon   cancel   the   pertinent   alien   certificate   of
registration   and   issue   the   certificate   of   identification   as
Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected “by taking
the   oath   of   allegiance   to   the   Republic   of   the
Philippines andregistration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau of Immigration.” Hence, in addition
to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines,   the   registration   of   the   Certificate   of
Repatriation   in   the   proper   civil   registry   and   the
Bureau   of   Immigration   is   a   prerequisite   in   effecting
the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance
on   December   17,   1997,   but   his   Certificate   of
Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of
Makati   City   only   after   six   years   or   on   February   18,
2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1,
2004.   Petitioner,   therefore,   completed   all   the
requirements   of   repatriation   only after he   filed   his
certificate   of   candidacy   for   a   mayoralty   position,
but before the elections.
When   does   the   citizenship   qualification   of   a
candidate for an elective office apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,  the Court 15
ruled   that   the   citizenship   qualification   must   be
construed as “applying to the time of proclamation of
the elected official and at the start of his term.” The
Court,   through   Justice   Artemio   V.   Panganiban,
discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, “(a)n elective
local official must be:
_______________
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.”
15
 257 SCRA 727 (1996).
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
 * a citizen of the Philippines;
 * a   registered   voter   in   the   barangay,   municipality,
city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
 * a   resident   therein   for   at   least   one   (1)   year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
 * able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.”
 * In   addition,   “candidates   for   the   position   of
governor x x x must be at least twenty­three (23) years of
age on election day.”
From   the   above,   it   will   be   noted   that   the   law   does   not
specify   any   particular   date   or   time   when   the   candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must   consist   of   at   least one   year’s   residency   immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three
years of age on election day).
Philippine   citizenship   is   an   indispensable   requirement
for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation,
shall   govern   our   people   and   our   country   or   a   unit   of
territory   thereof.   Now,   an   official   begins   to   govern   or   to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on
the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re­assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the
very day the term of office of governor (and other elective
officials)   began—he   was   therefore   already   qualified   to   be
proclaimed,   to   hold   such   office   and   to   discharge   the
functions   and   responsibilities   thereof   as   of   said   date.   In
short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his
native   Sorsogon.   This   is   the   liberal   interpretation   that
should   give   spirit,   life   and   meaning   to   our   law   on
qualifications   consistent   with  the  purpose   for   which   such
law   was   enacted.   x   x   x   Paraphrasing   this   Court’s   ruling
in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose
of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people
and   country   do   not   end   up   being   governed   by
aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that
aim   or   purpose   would not   be   thwarted   but   instead
achieved by construing the citizenshipqualification as
applying to the time of proclamation of the
669
VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
elected official and at the start of his term.  (Emphasis 16
supplied.)
Moreover,   in   the   case   of Frivaldo   v.   Commission   on
Elections, the   Court   ruled   that   “the   repatriation   of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application.” In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo
was   by   virtue   of  Presidential   Decree  No.   725,   which
took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared
that   Presidential   Decree   No.   725   was   a   curative
statute,   which   is   retroactive   in   nature.   The
retroactivity   of   Frivaldo’s   repatriation   to   the   date   of
filing   of   his   application   was   justified   by   the   Court,
thus:
x x x
. . . The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it
was   the   intent   of   the   legislative   authority   that   the   law
should   apply   to past events—i.e., situations   and
transactions existing even before the law came into being—
in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos
possible  thereby  enabling   them   to  enjoy  and   exercise   the
constitutionally   guaranteed   right   of   citizenship,   and   such
legislative   intention   is   to   be   given   the   fullest   effect   and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such
law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can
and   should   be   made   to   take   effect   as   of   date   of   his
669 application.  As  earlier  mentioned,  there is nothing in  the
law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention
on   the   part   of   the   legislative   authority;   and   there   is   no
showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything
unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to
his   repatriation.   Neither   has   Lee   shown   that   there   will
result   the   impairment   of   any   contractual   obligation,
disturbance   of   any   vested   right   or   breach   of   some
constitutional guaranty.
x x x
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is
that  it  would prevent  prejudice to applicants.  If P.D.  725
were   not   to   be   given   retroactive   effect,   and   the   Special
Committee decides not to
_______________
16
 Id., at pp. 748­749.
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
act, i.e., to   delay   the   processing   of   applications   for   any
substantial  length of time,  then  the former  Filipinos  who
may   be   stateless,   as   Frivaldo—having   already   renounced
his   American   citizenship—was,   may   be   prejudiced   for
causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be
presumed   that   the   law­making   body   intended   right   and
justice to prevail. 17
Republic   Act   No.   8171  has   impliedly   repealed
18
Presidential   `Decree   No.   725.   They   cover   the   same
subject   matter:   Providing   for   the   repatriation   of
Filipino   women   who   have   lost   their   Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural­born
Filipinos.   The   Court’s   ruling   in Frivaldo   v.
Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to
the date of filing of one’s application for repatriation
subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly,   petitioner’s   repatriation   retroacted   to
the   date   he   filed   his   application   in   1997.   Petitioner
was,   therefore,   qualified   to   run   for   a   mayoralty
position   in   the   government   in   the   May   10,   2004
elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of
this   fact   since   it   did   not   implement   the   assailed
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of
San Jacinto, Masbate.
Second   Issue:   Whether   or   not   the   COMELEC   en
banc   gravely   abused   its   discretion   in  affirming
the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?
The   Court   cannot   fault   the   COMELEC en   banc for
affirming   the   decision   of   the   COMELEC,   First
Division,   considering   that   petitioner   failed   to   prove
before the COMELEC that he had complied with the
requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the
necessary   documents   proving   compliance   with   the
requirements of repatriation only during his motion for
reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no
_______________
 Id., at pp. 754­756.
17
 Republic Act No. 8171 took effect on January 12, 1996.
18
671
VOL. 441, NOVEMBER 10, 2004 671
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
longer   consider   said   evidence.   As   the   COMELEC en      Quisumbing, J., In the result.
banccorrectly stated:      Corona, J., On Leave.
“The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency
of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion Petition denied.
for   reconsideration (Rule   19,   Section   1). The   evidence Notes.—A resolution dismissing a petition for being
referred to in the above provision and to be considered in moot   and   academic   after   “considering   the   pleadings
the   Motion   for   Reconsideration   are   those   which   were and the annexes together with the Comment filed by
submitted   during   the   hearing   and   attached   to   the the successor of respondent mayor” resolves the issues
respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part raised in the pleadings,
of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the _______________
respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the
petitioners.”19 19
 Supra, note 3, at p. 44.

It   is,   therefore,   incumbent   upon   candidates   for   an 672

elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready 672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

with   sufficient   evidence   of   their   repatriation   in   case
their   Filipino   citizenship   is   questioned   to   prevent   a
repetition of this case.
WHEREFORE,   the   petition   seeking   the
nullification   of   the   Resolution   of   the   COMELEC en
banc of   May   7,   2004,   affirming   the   Resolution   of   its
First   Division   dated   March   22,   2004,   is   hereby
DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide,   Jr. (C.J.), Panganiban, Ynares­
Santiago,Sandoval­Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria­
Martinez, Carpio­Morales, Callejo,   Sr., Chico­
Nazario and Garcia, JJ.,concur.
     Puno and Tinga, JJ., On Official Leave.
Altarejos vs. Commission on Elections
and   upon   attaining   finality,   becomes   the   law   of   the
case   and   constitutes   a   bar   to   any   relitigation   of   the
same   issues   in   any   other   proceeding   under   the
principle   of res   judicata.   (Rosete   vs.   Court   of
Appeals, 264 SCRA 147 [1996])
Courts   will   decide   a   question   otherwise  moot   and
academic   if   it   is   “capable   of   repetition,   yet   evading
review.” (Alunan III vs. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501 [1997])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
 VOL. 436, AUGUST 10, 2004
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004.
ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor represented by
her   father   ROLANDO   CIPRIANO,   (AND   OTHER
YOUTH   OF   THE   LAND   AFFECTED   AND
SIMILARLY   SITUATED),
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT   OF   INTERIOR   AND   LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,   Election   Officer   LOPE   GAYO,   JR.,
1st   District,   Pasay   City,   SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY thru its Chairman JOHNNY SANTIAGO
of Barangay 38, Pasay City, GREG PAOLO ALCERA
in  his  capacity  as  SK Federation  President  of Pasay
City,   EDNA   TIBAR—a   minor   assisted   by   parents,
KRISTAL   GALE   BONGGO—a   minor   assisted   by
parents,   SK   Chairman   RUEL   TAYAM   DECENA   of
Barangay 142, Pasay City, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PAMBANSANG   KATIPUNAN   NG   MGA
SANGGUNIANG   KABATAAN,   and   ALL   SK
OFFICERS   AND   YOUTH   OF   THE   LAND
SIMILARLY   SITUATED   and   THEIR   AGENTS   AND
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Powers; As an
independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with
the   three   powers   of   government—executive   or
administrative, legislative, and quasi­judicial powers.—The
COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to
govern   the   conduct   of   elections   and   to   ensure   that   the
electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is
45 mandated   to   “enforce   and   administer   all   laws   and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
* initiative,   referendum   and   recall.”   As   an   independent
Constitutional   Commission,   it   is   clothed   with   the   three
powers   of   government—executive   or   administrative,
legislative,   and   quasi­judicial   powers.   The   administrative
powers of the COMELEC, for example, include the power to
determine   the   number   and   location   of   polling   places,
appoint   election   officials   and   inspectors,   conduct
registration   of   voters,   deputize   law   enforcement   agencies
and  government  instrumentalities  to ensure  free,  orderly,
honest,   peaceful   and   credible   elections;   register   political
parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens’ arms of
the   Commission,   prosecute   election   offenses,   and
recommend to the President  the removal  or  imposition of
any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it
has   deputized   for   violation   or   disregard   of   its   directive,
order or decision. It also has direct control and supervision
over   all   personnel   involved  in  the conduct   of   election.  Its
legislative   authority   is   found   in   its   power   to   promulgate
rules   and   regulations   implementing   the   provisions   of   the
Omnibus   Election   Code   or   other   laws   which   the
Commission is required to enforce and administer.
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
46
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
The Constitution has also vested it with quasi­judicial
powers when it was granted exclusive original jurisdiction
over   all   contests   relating   to   the   elections,   returns   and
qualifications   of   all   elective   regional,   provincial   and   city
officials;   and   appellate   jurisdiction   over   all   contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of   general   jurisdiction,   or   involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Limitation; Certificate   of
Candidacy; The Court has ruled that the Commission has
no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s
certificate   of   candidacy.—The   Commission   may   not,   by
itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a
candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC
has   a   ministerial   duty   to   receive   and   acknowledge   its
receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election
Code,   thus:   Sec.   76. Ministerial   duty   of   receiving   and
acknowledging   receipt.—The   Commission,   provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated
by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under
the   succeeding   section   shall   have   the   ministerial   duty   to
receive   and   acknowledge   receipt   of   the   certificate   of
candidacy. The Court has ruled that the Commission has no
discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give
due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is
ministerial  in  character.   While  the Commission  may  look
into   patent   defects   in   the   certificates,   it   may   not   go   into
matters   not   appearing   on   their   face.   The   question   of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the
usual and proper cognizance of said body.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due   Process; It   is   therefore
clear   that   the   law   mandates   that   the   candidate   must   be
notified of the petition against him and he should be given
the   opportunity   to   present   evidence   in   his   behalf.—It   is
therefore clear that  the law mandates  that  the candidate
must be notified of the petition against him and he should
be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf.
This   is   the   essence  of   due  process.   Due   process   demands
prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also
necessary that the tribunal shows substantial evidence to
support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that
a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to
support his side of the case and that the evidence should be
considered in the adjudication of the case. In a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, since
the   proceedings   are   required   to   be   summary,   the   parties
may, after due notice, be required to submit their position
papers   together   with   affidavits,   counter­affidavits,   and
other documentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony. When
there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at the
discretion   of   the   Commission en   banc or   Division,   the
parties may be allowed to cross­examine the affiants.
47
VOL. 436, AUGUST 10, 2004 47
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It   is   not   sufficient
that the candidate be notified of the Commission’s inquiry
into   the   veracity   of   the   contents   of   his   certificate   of
candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own
evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the
office   he   seeks.—The   determination   whether   a   material
representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not,
or the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the
position   he   is   seeking   involves   a   determination   of   fact
where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such
fact   may  result   to   a   deprivation   of   one’s   right   to   run   for
public office, or, as in this case, one’s right to hold public
office,   it   is   only   proper   and   fair   that   the   candidate
concerned  be  notified  of   the proceedings   against  him   and
that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations
against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as
the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the
Commission’s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his
certificate   of   candidacy,   but   he   must   also   be   allowed   to
present   his   own   evidence   to   prove   that   he   possesses   the
qualifications for the office he seeks.
SPECIAL   CIVIL   ACTION   in   the   Supreme   Court.
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     (Darill) Roque A. Amante, Jr. for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
 
PUNO, J.:
May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on
its   own,   in   the   exercise   of   its   power   to   enforce   and
administer election laws, look into the qualifications of
a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on
the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed
by law? This is the issue that needs to be resolved in
this   petition   for certiorari filed   by   Ellan   Marie   P.
Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay
38,   Pasay   City,   whose   certificate   of   candidacy   was
cancelled   by   the   COMELEC motu   proprio on   the
ground   that   she   was   not   a   registered   voter   in
the barangaywhere she intended to run.
On   June   7,   2002,   petitioner   filed   with   the
COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of
the Sangguniang  Kabataan (SK)  for  the  SK  elections
held on July 15, 2002. 1
_______________
Annex “E”, Petition, Rollo, p. 73.
1
48
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
 
On   the   date   of   the   elections,   July   15,   2002,   the
COMELEC   issued   Resolution   No.   5363   adopting   the
recommendation of the Commission’s Law Department
to   deny   due   course   to   or   cancel   the   certificates   of
candidacy of several  candidates for the SK elections,
including   petitioners.   The   ruling   was   based   on   the
findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all
the other candidates affected by said resolution were
not   registered   voters   in   the barangay where   they
intended to run. 2 including pre­proclamation controversies. Finally, she
Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the
July   15   SK   elections   and   her   name   was   not   deleted
from   the   official   list   of   candidates.   After   the
canvassing   of   votes,   petitioner   was   proclaimed   by
the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK
Chairman of  Barangay  38, Pasay  City.  She took her
3
oath of office on August 14, 2002. 4 Annex “F”, Petition, Rollo, p. 74.
On   August   19,   2002,   petitioner,   after   learning   of
Resolution   No.   5363,   filed   with   the   COMELEC   a
motion   for   reconsideration   of   said   resolution.   She
argued   that   a   certificate   of   candidacy   may   only   be
denied   due   course   or   cancelled via an   appropriate
petition filed by any registered candidate for the same
position   under   Section   78   of   the   Omnibus   Election
Code in relation to Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6646. According to petitioner, the report of
the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered
a  petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus  Election
Code, and the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due
course   to   or   cancel   one’s   certificate   of   candidacy.
Petitioner   also   claimed   that   she   was   denied   due
process when her certificate of candidacy was cancelled
by   the   Commission   without   notice   and   hearing.
Petitioner   further   argued   that   the   COMELEC en
banc did   not   have   jurisdiction   to   act   on   the
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first
instance because it is the Division of the Commission
that   has   authority   to   decide   election­related   cases,
contended that she may only be removed by a petition
for quo   warranto after   her   proclamation   as   duly­
elected SK Chairman. 5
_______________
Annex “A”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 53­56.
2
3
Annex “G”, Petition, Rollo, p. 75.
4
Annex “B”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 57­62.
5
49
VOL. 436, AUGUST 10, 2004 49
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
 
On   October   7,   2002,   the   COMELEC   issued
Resolution No. 5781,  resolving petitioner’s motion for
6
reconsideration.   It   cited   its   previous   resolution,
Resolution   No.   5584,   in   relation   to   Resolution   No.
4801. The Commission stated in Resolution No. 5584
its   policy   on   proclaimed   candidates   found   to   be
ineligible for not being registered voters in the place
where they were elected. It explained:
A   portion   of   Resolution   No.   5584   explained   the
procedure   adopted   by   the   Commission   in   denying   due
course the certificate of candidacy of a candidate. It reads:
Under   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   4801,   Election
Officers   were   given   the   duty   to:   (1)   verify   whether   all
candidates   for barangayand sangguniang
kabataan positions   are   registered   voters   of
the barangay where   they   filed   their   certificates   of
candidacy; and (2) examine the entries of the certificates of
candidacy   and   determine   on   the   basis   of   said   entries
whether   the   candidate   concerned   possesses   all   the
qualifications of a candidate.
Further,   Election   Officers   are   mandated   to   report   by
registered   mail   and   by   rush   telegram   to   the   Law
Department  of  this  Commission  the  names  of   candidates
who are not registered voters in the place where they seek
to run for public office within three (3) days from the last
day   for   filing   of   certificates   of   candidacy.   The   names   of
these   candidates,   however,   shall   still   be   included   in   the
certified   lists   of   candidates   until   the   Commission   directs
otherwise.
By virtue of the said report, the Law Department makes
a   recommendation   to   the   Commission En   Banc,   and   the
latter, by virtue of an En Banc Resolution either gives due
course to or denies/cancels the certificates of candidacy of
the said candidates.
Verily, the administrative inquiry of the Commission on
the eligibility of candidates starts from the time they filed
their certificates of candidacy. The candidates, by virtue of
the publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 on May
25, 2002 in the Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin are
deemed   to   have   constructive   notice   of   the   said
administrative inquiry. Thus, the Commission, by virtue of
its   administrative   powers,   may motu   proprio deny/cancel
the certificates of candidacy of candidates who are found to
be not registered voters in the place where they seek to run
for public office.
Any registered candidate for the same office may also
file   a   verified   petition   to   deny   due   course   to   or   cancel   a
certificate   of  candidacy   pursuant  to  Section   69   (nuisance
candidate)   or   Sec.   78   (material   misrepresentation   in   the
certificate of candidacy) of the Omnibus
_______________
Annex “C”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 63­71.
6
50
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
Election   Code   either   personally   or   through   a   duly
authorized   representative   within   five   (5)   days   from
the   last   day   for   filing   of   certificate   of   candidacy
directly   with   the   Office   of   the   Provincial   Election
Supervisor or with the Office of the Election Officer
concerned.
Hence, as long as the Election Officer reported the
alleged   ineligibility   in   accordance   with   COMELEC
Resolution   No.   4801,   or   the   petition   to   deny   due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy was filed
within   the   reglementary   period,   the   fact   that   the
Resolution of this Commission, denying due course to
or   canceling   the   certificate   of   candidacy   of   an
ineligible candidate, was not promulgated or did not
arrive   prior   to   or   on   the   day   of   the   elections   is
therefore   of   no   moment.   The   proclamation   of   an
ineligible candidate is not a bar to the exercise of this
Commission’s power to implement the said Resolution
of   the   Commission En   Banc because   it   already
acquired the jurisdiction to determine the ineligibility
of   the   candidates   who   filed   their   certificates   of
candidacy even before elections by virtue of either the
report of the Election Officer or the petition to deny
due   course   to   or   cancel   the   certificate   of   candidacy
filed against them.
On the matter of petitions for disqualification, the
provisions   of   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   4801   are
 likewise clear: (1) ‘A verified petition to disqualify a
candidate   on   the   ground   of   ineligibility   or   under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code may be filed
at   anytime before   proclamationof   the   winning
candidate by any registered voter or any candidate for
the same office,’ (2) ‘All disqualification cases filed on
the ground of ineligibility shall survive, although the
candidate has already been proclaimed.’
Clearly, by virtue of the above­quoted provisions,
the  proclamation   of   a   candidate  who  is   found   to  be
disqualified   is   also   not   a   bar   to   the   Commission’s
power to order a proclaimed candidate to cease and
desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming
the position to which he was elected.
By   way   of   contrast,   in   case   of   proclaimed
candidates who were found to be ineligible only after
they   were  elected   and   proclaimed,   the   provisions   of
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code are clear:
The remedy of losing candidates is to file a petition
for quo warranto before the metropolitan or municipal
trial court. This is logical—The Commission did not
acquire jurisdiction over these proclaimed candidates
prior  to  election  (i.e., There  was  no  report  from  the
Election   Officer   regarding   their   ineligibility   and   no
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy   and/or   petition   for   disqualification   was
filed   against   them.)   Thus,   the   Commission   has   no
jurisdiction to annul their proclamation on the ground
of   ineligibility,   except   in   cases   wherein   the
proclamation   is   null   and   void   for   being   based   on
incomplete canvass.
51
VOL. 436, AUGUST 10, 2004 51
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
Thus, the Commission ruled:
Premises considered, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to establish a policy as follows:
ON   PROCLAIMED   CANDIDATES   FOUND   TO   BE
INELIGIBLE   FOR   BEING   NOT   REGISTERED   VOTERS
IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.
1. (a)For   a   proclaimed   candidate   whose   certificate   of
candidacy was denied due course to or cancelled by
virtue of a Resolution of the Commission En Banc
albeit such Resolution did not arrive on time.
1. 1.To   DIRECT   the   Election   Officers   concerned   to
implement   the   resolution   of   the   Commission
deleting   the   name   of   the   candidate   whose
certificate of candidacy was denied due course;
2. 2.To   DIRECT   the   candidate   whose   name   was
ordered deleted to cease and desist from taking his
oath   of   office   or   from   assuming   the   position   to
which   he   was   elected,   unless   a   temporary
restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court;
and
3. 3.To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the
purpose of proclaiming the duly­elected candidates
and   correcting   the   Certificate   of   Canvass   of
Proclamation. 7
 
 The Commission further stated:
Considering that there are queries as to the status of the
proclamation   of   disqualified   candidates   as   an   offshoot   of
Resolution No. 5584, the same was amended by virtue of
Resolution No. 5666, the dispositive portion of which now
reads:
Considering   the   above­quoted   provision,   the  
Commission   RESOLVED,   as   it   hereby   RESOLVES,   to
APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain to
amend   Resolution   No.   5584   promulgated   on   10   August
2002 with modification.
Accordingly,   Resolution   No.   5584   shall   now   read   as
follows:
I COMELEC   actions   and   resolutions   which   are
ON   PROCLAIMED   CANDIDATES   FOUND   TO   BE
INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS
IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED X X X X
X X
1. (a)x x x
2. (b)x x x
3. (c)x x x
_______________
Rollo, pp. 67­69.
7
52
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
(d)   For   both   (a)   and   (b),   in   the   event   that   the
disqualified   candidate   is   proclaimed   the   winner
despite   his   disqualification   or   despite   the   pending
disqualification case filed before his proclamation, but
which   is   subsequently   resolved   against   him,   the
proclamation of said disqualified candidate is hereby
declared   void   from   the   beginning,   even   if   the
dispositive portion of the resolution disqualifying him
or   canceling   his   certificate   of   candidacy   does   not
provide for such an annulment. 8
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:
1. a)To   declare   illegal   and   unconstitutional   the
COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on 15
July   2002   and   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   5781
promulgated   on   October   7,   2002   and   any   other
intended to summarily oust and remove petitioner
as   SK   Chairman   of   Barangay   38,   Pasay   City
without   any   notice,   inquiry,   election   protest,
petition   for quo   warranto,   investigation   and
hearing,   and   therefore   a   clear   violation   of   due
process of law.
2. b)To   declare   illegal   the   aforesaid   COMELEC
Resolutions   sitting en   banc which   does   not   have
authority to decide election related case, including
pre­proclamation   controversies,   in   the   first
instance,  in  consonance  to this  Honorable  Court’s
ruling   in   the   cases   of Sarmiento   vs.
COMELEC,G.R.   No.   87308,   August   29,   1989
and Garvida  vs.   Sales, G.R.   No.   124893,   April   18,
1997.
 3. c)To   declare   unconstitutional   Sections   6   and   7   of
R.A.   9164   and   also   to   declare   the   age   of
membership   and   its   officers   of   the   KK   or   SK
organization from 15 to 21 years old in accordance
with   Sec.   39   (f)   and   Sec.   423   (b)   and   other
provisions of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as Local
Government Code of 1991.
4. d)If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are sustained as
constitutional   to   direct   all   SK   Officers   and
Members who are now more than 18 years old to
cease and desist from continuously functioning as
such SK Officers and Members and to vacate their
respective   SK   Officers   position,   as   they   are   no
longer   members   of   the   Sangguniang   Kabataan
organization   or   Katipunan   ng   Kabataan
organization for being over age upon attaining the
age of 18 years old.
5. e)To direct respondents to pay the salary, allowance
and   other   benefits   of   the   petitioner   as   SK
Chairperson of Barangay 38, Pasay City. 9
 
Stripped of the non­essentials, the only issue in this
case   is   the   validity   of   Resolution   No.   5363   of   the
COMELEC.
_______________
Rollo, p. 70.
8
Petition, Rollo, pp. 6­7.
9
53
VOL. 436, AUGUST 10, 2004 53
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
 
Petitioner   argues   that   she   was   deprived   of   due
process   when   the   COMELEC   issued   Resolution   No.
5363 canceling her certificate of candidacy. She claims
that the resolution was intended to oust her from her
position   as   SK   Chairman   without   any   appropriate
action and proceedings.
The   COMELEC,   on   the   other   hand,   defends   its
resolution   by   invoking   its   administrative   power   to
enforce   and   administer   election   laws.   Thus,   in   the
exercise   of   such   power,   it   may motu   proprio deny   or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates who
are found to be unqualified for the position they are
seeking.   The   Commission   further   contends   that   the
publication   of   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   4801
governing   the   conduct   of   the Barangay and   SK
elections   in   two  newspapers   of  general   circulation   is
sufficient   notice   to   the   candidates   regarding   the
Commission’s   administrative   inquiry   into   their
certificates of candidacy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The   COMELEC   is   an   institution   created   by   the
Constitution to govern the conduct of elections and to
ensure   that   the   electoral   process   is   clean,   honest,
orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to “enforce and
administer   all   laws   and   regulations   relative   to   the
conduct   of   an   election,   plebiscite,   initiative,
referendum   and   re­call.”  As   an   independent
10
Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with the three
powers   of   government—executive   or   administrative,
legislative,   and   quasi­judicial   powers.   The
administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example,
include   the   power   to   determine   the   number   and
location of polling places, appoint election officials and
inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law
enforcement   agencies   and   government
instrumentalities   to   ensure   free,   orderly,   honest,
peaceful   and   credible   elections;   register   political
parties,   organization   or   coalitions,   accredit   citizens’
arms   of  the   Commission,  prosecute   election   offenses,
and   recommend   to   the   President   the   removal   or
imposition  of  any  other  disciplinary   action  upon   any
officer   or   employee   it   has   deputized   for   violation   or
disregard of its directive, order or decision. It also has
direct   control   and   supervision   over   all   personnel
involved   in   the   conduct   of   election.  Its   legislative
11
authority is found in its power to promul­
_______________
Sec. 2 (1), Article IX C, 1987 Constitution.
10
 Sec.   2,   Article   IX   C,   1987   Constitution; Sandoval   vs.
11
Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 403 (2000).
54
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
gate   rules   and   regulations   implementing   the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws
which   the   Commission   is   required   to   enforce   and
administer.  The Constitution has also vested it with
12
quasi­judicial   powers   when   it   was   granted   exclusive
original   jurisdiction   over   all   contests   relating   to   the
elections,   returns   and   qualifications   of   all   elective
regional,   provincial   and   city   officials;   and   appellate
jurisdiction   over   all   contests   involving   elective
municipal   officials   decided   by   trial   courts   of   general
jurisdiction,   or   involving   elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 13
Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution,
the Commission also exercises other powers expressly
provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is
the   authority   to   deny   due   course   to   or   to   cancel   a
certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority,
however, must be in accordance with the conditions set
by law.
The   COMELEC   asserts   that   it   is   authorized
to motu   proprio deny   due   course   to   or   cancel   a
certificate   of   candidacy   based   on   its   broad
administrative   power   to   enforce   and   administer   all
laws   and   regulations   relative   to   the   conduct   of
elections.
We   disagree.   The   Commission   may   not,   by   itself,
without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel   a   certificate   of   candidacy   filed   in   due   form.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC   has   a   ministerial   duty   to   receive   and
acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of
the Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging
receipt.—The   Commission,   provincial   election   supervisor,
election registrar or officer designated by the Commission
or   the   board   of   election   inspectors   under   the   succeeding
section   shall   have   the   ministerial   duty   to   receive   and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
The   Court   has   ruled   that   the   Commission   has   no
discretion   to   give   or   not   to   give   due   course   to
petitioner’s   certificate   of   candidacy.  The   duty   of   the
14
COMELEC   to   give   due   course   to   certificates   of
candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character.
While the Commission may look into patent defects in
the certificates, it may
_______________
Sec. 52(c), Omnibus Election Code.
12
Sec. 2 (2), Article IX C, 1087 Constitution.
13
Abcede vs. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958).
14
55
VOL. 436, AUGUST 10, 2004
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
not go into matters not appearing on their face. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is
thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said
body. 15
Nonetheless,   Section   78   of   the   Omnibus   Election
Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy   on   the   ground   that   any   material
representation therein is false. It states:
Sec.   78. Petition   to   deny   due   course   to   or   cancel   a
certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny
due   course  or   to  cancel   a  certificate  of   candidacy  may  be
filed   by   any   person   exclusively   on   the   ground   that   any
material   representation   contained   therein   as   required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at
any time not later than twenty­five days from the time of
the   filing   of   the   certificate   of   candidacy   and   shall   be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
the petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the
candidate must be notified of the petition against him
and   he   should   be   given   the   opportunity   to   present
evidence   in   his   behalf.   This   is   the   essence   of   due
process.   Due   process   demands   prior   notice   and
hearing.  Then  after  the  hearing,  it   is   also  necessary
that   the   tribunal   shows   substantial   evidence   to
55 support its ruling. In other words, due process requires
that   a   party   be   given   an   opportunity   to   adduce   his
evidence to support his side of the case and that the
evidence   should   be   considered   in   the   adjudication   of
the case.  In a petition to deny due course to or cancel
16
a   certificate   of   candidacy,   since   the   proceedings   are
required   to   be   summary,   the   parties   may,   after   due
notice,   be   required   to   submit   their   position   papers
together with affidavits, counter­affidavits, and other
documentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony. When
there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at
the discretion of the Commission en banc or Division,
the   parties   may   be   allowed   to   cross­examine   the
affiants. 17
_______________
Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, 111 Phil. 733; 1 SCRA 1102 (1961).
15
Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
16
 Saya­ang,   Sr.   vs.   Commission   on   Elections, G.R.   No.   155087,
17
November 28, 2003, 416 SCRA 650.
56
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cipriano vs. Commission on Elections
 
Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the
denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate
of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of
the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its
quasi­judicial   functions.   Administrative   power   is
concerned   with   the   work   of   applying   policies   and
enforcing   orders   as   determined   by   proper
governmental   organs.  We   have   earlier   enumerated
18
the   scope   of   the   Commission’s   administrative
functions. On the other hand, where a power rests in
judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature
or   character,   but   does   not   involve   the   exercise   of
functions   of   a   judge,   or   is   conferred   upon   an   officer
other   than   a   judicial   officer,   it   is   deemed   quasi­
judicial. 19
The   determination   whether   a   material
representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or
not,   or   the   determination   whether   a   candidate   is
eligible   for   the   position   he   is   seeking   involves   a
determination   of   fact   where   both   parties   must   be
allowed   to   adduce   evidence   in   support   of   their
contentions. Because the resolution of such fact  may
result to a deprivation of one’s right to run for public
office,   or,   as   in   this   case,   one’s   right   to   hold   public
office,   it   is   only   proper   and   fair   that   the   candidate
concerned be notified of the proceedings against him
and   that   he   be   given   the   opportunity   to   refute   the
allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is
not   sufficient,   as   the   COMELEC   claims,   that   the
candidate be notified of the Commission’s inquiry into
the   veracity   of   the   contents   of   his   certificate   of
candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his
own   evidence   to   prove   that   he   possesses   the
qualifications for the office he seeks.
In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   we   rule   that
Resolution   No.   5363   and   Resolution   No.   5781,
canceling petitioner’s certificate of candidacy without
proper   proceedings,   are   tainted   with   grave   abuse   of
discretion and therefore void.
We   need   not   rule   on   the   question   raised   by
petitioner as regards the constitutionality of Sections 6
and   7   of   Republic   Act   No.   9164   lowering   the   age   of
membership in the SK as it is not the lis mota of this
case.
 IN   VIEW   WHEREOF,   COMELEC   Resolution   No. © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
5363   promulgated   on   July   15,   2002   and   COMELEC
Resolution   No.   5781   issued   on   October   7,   2002   are
hereby SET ASIDE.

_______________

Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 150 (1998).
18

Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
19

57
VOL. 436, AUGUST 11, 2004 57
Barbuco vs. Beltran
 
SO ORDERED. 
Davide,
Jr. (C.J)., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares­Santiago, 
Carpio, Austria­Martinez, Corona, Carpio­Morales,
Callejo,   Sr.,   Azcuna,   Tinga and Chico­Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Sandoval­Gutierrez, J., On Leave.
COMELEC Resolution  No.  5363 and  COMELEC
Resolution No. 5781 set aside.
Note.—Proceedings   for  denial   or  cancellation  of  a
certificate   of   candidacy   are   summary   in   nature.
(Coquilla   vs.   Commission   on   Elections, 385   SCRA
607 [2002])

——o0o——
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 163302. July 23, 2004. * value. Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise
ROBERTO   ALBAÑA,   KATHERINE   BELO,
GENEROSO   DERRAMAS,   VICENTE   DURAN,
RICARDO   ARAQUE,   LILIA   ARANAS,   MERLINDA
DEGALA,   GABRIEL   ARANAS,   ERNESTO   BITO­ON
AND   JUVIC   DESLATE,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS,   PIO
JUDE   S.   BELO,   RODOLFO   DEOCAMPO   AND
LORENCITO B. DIAZ, respondents.
Election Law; Moot and Academic Questions; “Capable
of Repetition Yet Evading Review” Rule; The expiration of
the challenged term of the offices renders the corresponding
petition for the nullification  of  the COMELEC resolutions
and   the   proclamation   of   winning   candidates   moot   and
academic; Court will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.—
On the first issue, we agree with the COMELEC that the
petition for the nullification of its October 21, 2003 and May
5,   2004   Resolutions   and   the   proclamation   of   the   private
respondents on June 10, 2004 was mooted by the election
and proclamation of a new set of municipal officials after
the May 10, 2004 elections. In fact, the records show that
petitioner Katherine Belo was elected as Mayor, petitioner
Generoso Derramas as Vice­Mayor, and petitioners Ricardo
Araque   and   Ernesto   Bito­on   as   members   of   the
Sangguniang Bayan. The expiration of the challenged term
of the offices renders the corresponding petition moot and
academic.   Where   the   issues   have   become   moot   and
academic,   there   is   no   justiciable   controversy,   thereby
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or
moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.   In   this   case,   we   find   it   necessary   to   resolve   the
issues raised in the petition in order to prevent a repetition
thereof   and,   thus,   enhance   free,   orderly,   and   peaceful
elections. For this reason, we resolve to grant the petition.
Same; Disqualification   Cases; The   COMELEC   is
mandated to dismiss a complaint for disqualification of a
candidate who has been charged with an election offense but
who has already been proclaimed as winner by the Board of
Canvassers.—Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050
is as clear as day: the COMELEC is mandated to dismiss a
complaint   for   the  disqualification  of   a  candidate  who  has
been charged with an election offense but who has already
been   proclaimed   as   winner   by   the   Municipal   Board   of
Canvassers.   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   2050   specifically
mandates   a   definite   policy   and   procedure   for
disqualification cases;  hence,  should be applied and given
effect.
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
99
VOL. 435, JULY 23, 2004 99
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; If   the   COMELEC   finds   that   there   is
probable cause, it shall order its Law Department to file the
appropriate   Information   with   the   Regional   Trial   Court
(RTC) which has territorial jurisdiction over the offense, but
shall, nonetheless, order the dismissal of the complaint for
disqualification,   without   prejudice   to   the   outcome   of   the
criminal case.—It bears stressing that Resolution No. 2050
was approved precisely because of the variance in opinions
of the members of the respondent COMELEC on matters of
procedure   in   dealing   with   and   evaluating   cases   for
disqualification   filed   under   Section   68   of   the   Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646.
Under the said resolution, if a complaint is filed with the
COMELEC   against   a   candidate   who   has   already   been
proclaimed   winner,   charging   an   election   offense   under
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by
Rep.   Act   Nos.   6646   and   8436,   and   praying   for   the
disqualification of the said candidate, the COMELEC shall
determine the existence of probable cause for the filing of
an   Information   against   the   candidate   for   the   election
offense   charged.   However,   if   the   COMELEC   finds   no
probable cause, it is mandated to dismiss the complaint for
the disqualification of the candidate. If the COMELEC finds
that   there   is   probable   cause,   it   shall   order   its   Law
Department   to   file   the   appropriate   Information   with   the
Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   which   has   territorial
jurisdiction over the offense, but shall, nonetheless, order
the dismissal of the complaint for disqualification, without
prejudice to the outcome of the criminal case. If the trial
court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged, it shall also order his disqualification
pursuant to Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, as
amended by Section 46 of Rep. Act No. 8189.
Same; Same; It is well­settled that the ineligibility of a
candidate   receiving   majority   votes   does   not   entitle   the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to   be   declared   elected—a   minority   or   defeated   candidate
cannot   be   deemed   elected   to   the   office.—The   COMELEC,
likewise, committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it
ordered the Municipal Election Officers to convene a new
Board   of   Canvassers   and   proclaim   the   winners   after   the
petitioners were declared disqualified. It is well­settled that
the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number   of   votes   to   be   declared   elected.   A   minority   or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
The votes intended for the disqualified candidate should not
be   considered   null   and   void,   as   it   would   amount   to
disenfranchising   the   electorate   in   whom   sovereignty
resides. As we held in Reyes vs. Commission on Elections:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received   the   other   votes   would   be   to   substitute   our
judgment   for   the mind  of   the  voter.  The  second  placer   is
just   that,   a   second   placer.   He   lost   the   elections.   He   was
repudiated  by either a majority or  plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candi­
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
date, the conditions would have substantially changed.
We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. 
Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
      Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. for petitioners.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
for   the   nullification   of   the   Resolution   of   the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division,
dated October 21, 2003 annulling the proclamation of
the petitioners as the duly­elected municipal officials
of Panitan, Capiz, during the May 14, 2001 elections,
and   the  Resolution  of  the  COMELEC En  Banc dated
May 5, 2004, denying their motion for reconsideration.
The   petitioners   aver   that   the   public   respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or   excess   of   jurisdiction   in   issuing   the   assailed
resolutions.
The Antecedents
During the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioners and
private   respondents   ran   for   the   positions   of   Mayor,
Vice­Mayor   and   Members   of   the Sangguniang
Bayan in the Municipality of Panitan, Capiz. On May
18,   2001,   the   petitioners   were   duly   elected   and
proclaimed winners to the following positions:
1. (a)Roberto Albaña—Mayor
2. (b)Katherine Belo—Vice­Mayor
3. (c)Generoso   Derramas—Member   of  
Sang[g]uniang Bayan (SB)
4. (d)Vicente Duran—Member of the SB
5. (e)Ricardo Araque—Member of the SB
6. (f)Lilia Aranas—Member of the SB
7. (g)Merlinda Degala—Member of the SB
8. (h)Gabriel Aranas—Member of the SB
9. (i)Ernesto Bito­on—Member of the SB
101
VOL. 435, JULY 23, 2004 101
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
1. (j)Juvic Deslate—Member of the SB 1
On   June   23,   2001,   the   private   respondents   filed   a
complaint against the petitioners with the COMELEC
Law   Department,   alleging   that   the   latter   committed
acts of terrorism punishable by Section 261(e)  of the 2
Omnibus Election Code, and engaged in vote­buying,
punishable   under   Section   261(a)  of   the   Omnibus
3
Election   Code.   The   private   respondents   prayed   that
the   petitioners   be   charged   of   the   said   crimes   and
disqualified from holding office under Section 68  of the 4
said Code, and Section
_______________
the
 Rollo, p. 131.
1
  Sec.   261. Prohibited  Acts.—The   following  shall   be  guilty   of  an
2
6  of Republic Act No. 6646. The case was docketed as
5

election offense: Election Offense Case No. 01­111.
. . .
(e) Threats,   intimidation,   terrorism,   use   of   fraudulent   device   or   other
The   Law   Department   of   the   COMELEC   found
forms   of   coercion.—Any   person   who,   directly   or   indirectly,   threatens, a prima facie case and issued a Resolution on January
intimidates   or   actually   causes,   inflicts   or   produces   any   violence,   injury,
15, 2002, recommending  the filing  of an Information
punishment,  damage,   loss  or  disadvantage   upon   any  person   or   persons  or
that of the immediate members of his family, his honor or property, or uses against the petitioners for violation of Section 261(e) of
any   fraudulent   device   or   scheme   to   compel   or   induce   the   registration   or the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 28 of
refraining from registration of any voter, or the participation in a campaign
or refraining or desistance from any campaign, or the casting of any vote or Republic Act No. 6648. It, likewise, recommended the
omission   to   vote,   or   any   promise   of   such   registration,   campaign,   vote   or disqualification   of   all   the   petitioners   from   further
omission therefrom.
holding   office,   and   the   reconvening   of   the   Municipal
 The provisions reads, thus:
3

(a) Vote­buying and vote­selling.— Board of Canvassers (MBC) in order to proclaim the
qualified candidates who obtained the highest number
1. (1)Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of of votes. 6

value,   gives   or   promises   any   office   or   employment,   franchise   or

grant,   public   or   private,   or   makes   or   offers   to   make   an Acting   on   the   said   resolution,   the   COMELEC En
expenditure,   directly   or   indirectly,   or   cause   to   be   made   to   any
Bancissued,   on   February   28,   2003,   a   Resolution
person association, corporation, entity, or community in order to
induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any directing  its  Law Department  to file the  appropriate
candidate   or   withhold   his   vote   in   the   election,   or  to   vote   for   or Information   against   the   petitioners   for   violation   of
against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in
a convention or similar selection process of a political party. Section   261(e)   of   the   Omnibus   Election   Code   and
directing   the  Clerk   of   the   Commission   to  docket   the
2. (2)Any   person,   association,   corporation,   group   or   community   who electoral aspect of the complaint as a disqualification
solicits   or   receives,   directly   or   indirectly,   any   expenditure   or
promise of any office or employment, public or private, for any of case. The dispositive portion reads:
the foregoing considerations.
_______________
 Sec. 68. Disqualifications.—Any candidate who, in an action or
4

court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given
protest   in   which   he   is   a   party   is   declared   by   final   decision   of   a
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
competent
the   voters   or   public   officials   performing   electoral   functions;   (b)
102
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections (d)   solicited,   received   or   made   any   contribution   prohibited   under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83,
85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall
be   disqualified   from   continuing   as   a   candidate,   or   if   he   has   been
The   petitioners   filed   a   motion   for
elected,   from   holding   the   office.   Any   person   who   is   a   permanent
reconsideration  thereon, alleging that the COMELEC
8

resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
did not make any findings of fact in its resolution, and
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
that there was even no disquisition as to the merits of
waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the   affidavits   of   their   witnesses   and   the   evidence
the election laws.
presented by  them.  The  petitioners  also  alleged   that
5
 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has
the COMELEC erred in ordering the docketing of the
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
electoral aspect of the complaint, in light of Section 2
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If, for any reason,
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
On   June   3,   2003,   the   COMELEC   issued   a
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
Resolution denying   the   said   motion   for   lack   of   merit
the   trial   and   hearing   of   the   action,   inquiry   or   protest   and,   upon
9

and for having been filed out of time. The Clerk of the
motion   of   the   complainant   or   any   intervenor,   may   during   the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
Commission docketed the disqualification case against
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
the petitioners as SPA No. 03­006.
6
 Id., at p. 29.
103
On October 21, 2003, the COMELEC First Division
VOL. 435, JULY 23, 2004 103 rendered   the   assailed   resolution   in   SPA   No.   03­006
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections annulling the petitioners’ proclamation on the ground
IN   VIEW   OF   THE   FOREGOING,   We   DIRECT   the   LAW that   they   violated   Section   261(a)   and   (e)   of   the
DEPARTMENT   to   FILE   THE   NECESSARY Omnibus   Election   Code,   and   directing   the   election
INFORMATION   against   ROBERTO   ALBAÑA, officer of Panitan to constitute a new municipal board
KATHERINE BELO, GENEROSO DERRAMAS, VICENTE of canvassers, thus:
DURAN,   RICARDO   ARAQUE,   LILIA   ARANAS, “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the proclamation
MERLINDA   DEGALA,   GABRIEL   ARANAS,   ERNESTO of  respondents  Roberto  Albaña,  Katherine  Belo,  Generoso
BITO­ON   and   JUVIC   DESLATE   before   a   court   of Derramas,   Vicente   Duran,   Ricardo   Araque,   Lilia   Aranas,
competent jurisdiction. Merlinda   Degala,   Gabriel   Aranas,   Ernesto   Bito­on   and
The   Clerk   of   the   Commission   is   likewise   directed   to Juvic   Deslate   as   Mayor,   Vice­Mayor   and   members   of   the
docket   the   electoral   aspect   of   the   complaint   as   a Sangguniang Bayan of Panitan, Capiz, are hereby annulled
disqualification case and immediately assign the same to a on   the   ground   that   they   committed   election   offenses   as
division   which   shall   resolve   the   case   on   the   basis   of   the provided for under Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election
recommendation of the Law Department. 7
Code in relation to Section 28 of RA 6646 and Section 261
(e) of the same Code in relation to Section 68 thereof. The
Election   Officer   of   the   municipality   of   Panitan   is   hereby
directed to constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers
which   shall   disregard   the   votes   garnered   by   the
respondents, prepare a new Certificate of Canvass on the
_______________
resolutions   on   the   ground   that   decisions   on   election
contests rendered by the COMELEC may be executed
pending appeal for good reasons. They contended that
a   good   reason   existed   in   this   case,   considering   that
their terms of office were about to expire. 12

The Present Petition
7
 Id. On May 13, 2004, the petitioners filed this Petition for
 Id., at p. 56.
Certiorari   and   Prohibition   with   Application   for   a
8

9
 Id., at p. 63.
104
Temporary   Restraining   Order   (TRO)   or   a   Writ   of
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Preliminary   Injunction   seeking   to   nullify   the   two
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections Resolutions dated October 21, 2003 and May 5, 2004.
basis of the votes of the candidates for the position held by Since the Court did not issue a temporary restraining
the   respondents   to   the   exclusion   of   the   latter   and order,   the   COMELEC   declared   the   assailed
immediately, proclaim the winners. Resolutions   as   final   and   executory   and   directed   the
SO ORDERED.” 10
Regional Election Director to implement the same in
The   petitioners’   motion   for   reconsideration   and an Order dated May 27, 2004. 13

supplement   to   the   motion   for   reconsideration   were
denied by the COMELEC En Banc in the Resolution of
May 5, 2004, declaring that the disqualification case
was the result of the findings of the Commission En
On   June   1,   2004,   the   Municipal   Election   Officer
issued a Notice to the Members of the Municipal Board
of   Canvassers   informing   them   that   the   Board   shall
convene   on   June   8,   2004.  On   June   10,   2004,   the
14

Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the private
Banc. It also held that as an aftermath of petitioners’
violation of Section 261(e) in relation to Section 68 of _______________
the   Omnibus   Election   Code,   they   are   considered
disqualified candidates and, therefore, the votes they  Id., at p. 35.
10

received   are   deemed   stray   votes. Commissioners

11  Id., at pp. 45­48.
11

Mehol  K. Sadain and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. filed  Id., at p. 113.

12

 Id., at p. 158.
13

separate dissenting opinions.
 Id., at p. 169.
14

On the same day, the private respondents moved for 105
the   execution   pending   appeal   of   the   assailed VOL. 435, JULY 23, 2004 105
 Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
respondents   as   the   winners   in   the   May   14,   2001
elections,   with   Pio   Jude   S.   Belo   as   Mayor,   Rodolfo
Deocampo as Vice­Mayor and Lorencito B. Diaz as a
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 15
The  threshold issues  raised by  the parties  in  this
case   are   the   following:   (a)   whether   the   petition   was
mooted by the election and proclamation of the new set
of municipal officials after the May 10, 2004 elections;
and,   (b)   if   in   the   negative,   whether   the   COMELEC
committed   a   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to
excess   or   lack   of   jurisdiction   in   issuing   the   assailed
resolutions.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, we agree with the COMELEC that
the petition for the nullification of its October 21, 2003
and May 5, 2004 Resolutions and the proclamation of
the private respondents on June 10, 2004 was mooted
by   the   election   and   proclamation   of   a   new   set   of
municipal officials after the May 10, 2004 elections. In
fact, the records show that petitioner Katherine Belo
was elected as Mayor, petitioner Generoso Derramas
as   Vice­Mayor,   and   petitioners   Ricardo   Araque   and
Ernesto   Bito­on   as   members   of   the   Sangguniang
Bayan.   The   expiration   of  the   challenged   term  of   the
offices   renders   the   corresponding   petition   moot   and
academic. 16
Where the issues have become moot and academic,
there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering
the   resolution   of   the   same   of   no   practical   use   or
value. Nonetheless,   courts   will   decide   a   question
17
otherwise   moot   and   academic   if   it   is   capable   of
repetition, yet evading review.  In this case, we find it
18
necessary to resolve the issues raised in the petition in
order   to   prevent   a   repetition   thereof   and,   thus,
enhance free, orderly, and peaceful elections. For this
reason, we resolve to grant the petition.
On the second issue, the petitioners aver that since
they   were   already   proclaimed   the   duly­elected
municipal officials of Panitan, Capiz, on May 18, 2001,
the COMELEC should  have dismissed  the complaint
for   their   disqualification   which   the   private
respondents filed only on June 23, 2001, more than a
month after such procla­
_______________
 Id., at p. 178.
15
 Trinidad vs. Commission on Elections, 315 SCRA 175 (1999).
16
 Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 258 SCRA 754 (1996).
17
 Sixto   S.  Brillantes,   Jr.   vs.   Commission   on   Elections, G.R.   No.
18
163193, 15 June 2004, 432 SCRA 269.
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
mation. They aver that such dismissal was mandated
by   Section   2   of   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   2050,
adopted on November 3, 1988, which reads:
2. Any   complaint   for   disqualification   based   on
Section 68 ofthe Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election
against   a   candidate   who   has   already been
proclaimed   as   winner   shall   be   dismissed   as   a
disqualification case. However, the complainant shall be
referred   for   preliminary   investigation   to   the   Law
Department of the commission.
Where   a   similar   complaint   is   filed   after   election   but
before   proclamation   of   the   respondent   candidate,   the
complaint   shall,   nevertheless,   be   dismissed   as   a
disqualification   case.   However,   the   complaint   shall   be
referred   for   preliminary   investigation   to   the   Law
Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court,
the complainant  may file a  petition  for  suspension  of  the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which
the criminal case is pending and the said court may order
the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong. (Emphasis supplied)
The   petitioners   cite   the   ruling   of   this   Court
in Bagatsing   vs.   COMELEC,  and   the   dissenting
19
opinion of Commissioner Mehol Sadain, that after the
COMELEC directed its Law Department on February
28, 2003 to file the appropriate Informations against
the petitioners for violations of Section 261(a) and (e)
of the Omnibus Election Code, it should have refrained
from   making   a   finding   of   disqualification   before   the
petitioners’  conviction by  final  judgment,  since  by so
doing,   the  COMELEC   preempted   the   decision   of   the
trial court.
The   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,   for   its   part,
asserts   that   the   petition   at   bar,   considering   the
petitioners’ plea for a writ of preliminary injunction,
was   designed   to   eschew   criminal   prosecution   for
violation of Section 261(a)(e) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
We rule for the petitioners.
Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is as
clear as day: the COMELEC is mandated to dismiss a
complaint for the disqualification of a candidate who
has been charged with an election offense but who has
already been proclaimed as winner by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers. COMELEC Resolution No. 2050
_______________
 320 SCRA 817 (1999).
19
107
VOL. 435, JULY 23, 2004 107
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure
for   disqualification   cases;  hence,   should   be   applied
20
and   given   effect.   In Bagatsing   vs.   Commission   on
Elections,  this   Court   ruled   that   a   complaint   for
21
disqualification   filed   after   the   election   against   a
candidate before or after his proclamation as winner
shall be dismissed by the COMELEC, viz.:
Second,   as   laid   down   in   paragraph   2,   a   complaint   for
disqualification   filed after   the   election against   a   candidate
(a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who
has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the
complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but
shall be referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC
for preliminary investigation. . . .
. . .
In   sharp   contrast,   the   complaint   for   disqualification
against private respondent in the case at bar was lodged on
May   18,   1998   or   seven   (7)   days   after   the   1998   elections.
Pursuant   to   paragraph   2   of   Resolution   No.   2050,   the
complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case and
shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department   of   the   COMELEC.   Under   this   scenario,   the
complaint   for   disqualification   is   filed   after   the   election
which may be either before or after the proclamation of the
respondent candidate. 22
It   bears   stressing   that   Resolution   No.   2050   was
approved precisely because of the variance in opinions
of   the   members   of   the   respondent   COMELEC   on
matters   of  procedure  in  dealing  with  and  evaluating
cases for disqualification filed under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep.
Act No. 6646. 23
Under   the   said   resolution,   if   a   complaint   is   filed
with   the   COMELEC   against   a   candidate   who   has
already been proclaimed winner, charging an election
offense   under   Section   261   of   the   Omnibus   Election
Code,   as   amended   by   Rep.   Act   Nos.   6646   and   8436,
and   praying   for   the   disqualification   of   the   said
candidate,   the   COMELEC   shall   determine   the
existence   of   probable   cause  for   the   filing   of   an
24
Information against the candidate for the election
_______________
 Lozano vs. Yorac, 203 SCRA 256 (1991).
20
 Supra.
21
 Id., at pp. 828­830.
22
 Lozano vs. Yorac, supra.
23
 See Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995).
24
108
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
offense charged. However, if the COMELEC finds no
probable   cause,   it   is   mandated   to   dismiss   the
complaint for the disqualification of the candidate.
If the COMELEC finds that there is probable cause,
it   shall   order   its   Law   Department   to   file   the
appropriate Information with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)   which   has   territorial   jurisdiction   over   the
offense, but shall, nonetheless, order the dismissal of
the complaint for disqualification, without prejudice to
the outcome of the criminal case. If the trial court finds
the   accused   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt   of   the
offense charged, it shall also order his disqualification
pursuant to Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code,
as amended by Section 46 of Rep. Act No. 8189 which
reads:
SEC.   46. Penalties.—Any   person   found   guilty   of   any
Election   offense   under   this   Act   shall   be   punished   with
imprisonment   of   not   less   than  one   (1)   year   but   not   more
than six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation. In
addition,   the   guilty   party   shall   be   sentenced   to   suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the
right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported
after the prison term has been served. Any political party
found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine not less One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
In this case, the petitioners were proclaimed winners
on May 18, 2001. The private respondents filed their
complaint for violation of Section 216(a) and (e) of the
Omnibus Election Code and for the disqualification of
the petitioners only on June 23, 2001. The COMELEC
found probable cause against the respondents for the
offense   charged  and  directed   its   Law   Department   to
file   the   appropriate   Information   against   the
petitioners. Patently then, the COMELEC committed a
grave   abuse   of   its   discretion   amounting   to   excess   or
lack of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed resolutions
disqualifying   the   petitioners   from   the   positions   they
were respectively elected, in defiance of Resolution No.
2050.
The plaint of the Office of the Solicitor General, that
the petitioners filed their petition merely and solely to
eschew   criminal   prosecution   for   violation   of   Section
216(a)   and   (e)   of   the   Omnibus   Election   Code,   as
amended, has no factual basis. In fact, the petitioners
stated   in   their   petition   that   “inasmuch   as   the
COMELEC had already directed the prosecution of the
herein   petitioners   in   a   criminal   case   which   is   now
pending in the Regional Trial Court of
109
VOL. 435, JULY 23, 2004
Albaña vs. Commission on Elections
Capiz,   their   supposed   disqualification   should   be
adjudged   by   the   latter   court   and   not   by   the
COMELEC.”
The COMELEC, likewise, committed a grave abuse
of its discretion when it ordered the Municipal Election
Officers   to   convene   a   new   Board   of   Canvassers   and
proclaim   the   winners   after   the   petitioners   were
declared disqualified.
It is well­settled that the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving   majority   votes   does   not   entitle   the   eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to   be   declared   elected.   A   minority   or   defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The
votes   intended   for   the   disqualified   candidate   should
not be considered null and void, as it would amount to
disenfranchising   the   electorate   in   whom   sovereignty
resides.  As   we   held   in Reyes   vs.   Commission   on
25
Elections: 26
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received   the   other   votes   would   be   to   substitute   our
judgment   for   the mind  of   the  voter.  The  second  placer   is
just   that,   a   second   placer.   He   lost   the   elections.   He   was
repudiated  by either a majority or  plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,
the   conditions   would   have   substantially   changed.   We   are
not   prepared   to   extrapolate   the   results   under   the
109 circumstances.  27
WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   GRANTED.   The
COMELEC   Resolutions   dated   October   21,   2003   and
May   5,   2004   are   hereby   NULLIFIED   AND   SET
ASIDE. As a necessary consequence, the proclamation
of   the   private   respondents   on   June   10,   2004   by   the
Municipal Board of Canvassers as the elected Mayor,
Vice­Mayor   and   Members   of   the Sangguniang
Bayan of   the   Municipality   of   Panitan,   Capiz,
respectively,   is,   likewise,   NULLIFIED   AND   SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares­
Santiago, Sandoval­Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria­
Martinez, Carpio­Morales, Azcuna, Tinga and Chico­
Nazario, JJ., concur.
_______________
first   among   qualified   candidates.   (Aquino   vs.
Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 400 [1995])
A possible exception to the rule that a second placer
may   not   be   declared   the   winning   candidate   is
predicated   on   the   concurrence   of   two   assumptions,
namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number
of votes is disqualified, and (2) the electorate is fully
aware   in   fact   and   in   law   of   a   candidate’s
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within
the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their
votes   in   favor   of   the   ineligible   candidate.   (Grego   vs.
Commission on Elections, 274 SCRA 481 [1997])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

 Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 211 SCRA 297 (1992).
25

 254 SCRA 514 (1996).
26

 Id., at p. 529.
27

110
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications
Commission
     Corona, J., On Leave.
Petition granted.
Notes.—The   second   placer   is   just   that,   a   second
placer—he   lost   the   elections,   he   was   repudiated   by
either a majority or plurality of voters—he could not be
proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the
 VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002.
VICTORINO   DENNIS   M.   SOCRATES,   Mayor   of
Puerto   Princesa   City,   petitioner, vs. THE
COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS,   THE
PREPARATORY   RECALL   ASSEMBLY   (PRA)   of
Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong
Bgy.   MARK   DAVID   HAGEDORN,   PRA   Interim
Secretary   Punong   Bgy.   BENJAMIN   JARILLA,   PRA
Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S.
BUENVIAJE   and   PRA   Secretary   Punong   Bgy.
CARLOS ABALLA, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 154683. November 12, 2002.
457 PRA members, we ruled that—“Needless to state, the issue
of   propriety   of   the   notices   sent   to   the   PRA   members   is
* factual   in   nature,   and   the   determination   of   the   same   is
therefore  a   function   of   the   COMELEC.   In  the   absence   of
patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the
Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of
the   COMELEC,   based   on   its   own   assessments   and   duly
supported   by   gathered   evidence,   are   conclusive   upon   the
court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on
the validity of the same.” In the instant case, we do not find
any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC’s findings of
fact are patently erroneous.
_______________
*  EN BANC.
*

458
VICENTE   S.   SANDOVAL,   JR.,   petitioner, vs. THE
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. Nos. 155083­84. November 12, 2002. *

Same; Constitutional   Law; Term   of   Office; The   intent

MA.   FLORES   P.   ADOVO,   MERCY   E.   GILO   and
BIENVENIDO   OLLAVE,   SR.,   petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS,   and   EDWARD   S.
HAGEDORN, respondents.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Court is bound
by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within
the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the
findings   are   patently   erroneous.—This   Court   is   bound   by
the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the
competence   and   expertise   of   the   COMELEC,   unless   the
findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,
which also dealt with alleged defective service of notice to
in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and under Section
43 (b) of RA No. 7160 is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three­term limit rule; Involuntary severance
from   office   for   any  length  of   time   interrupts   continuity  of
service.—These constitutional and statutory provisions have
two   parts.   The   first   part   provides   that   an   elective   local
official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms.
The   clear   intent   is   that   only   consecutive   terms   count   in
determining   the   three­term   limit   rule.   The   second   part
states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear
intent   is   that   involuntary   severance   from   office   for   any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the   service   before   and   after   the   interruption   from   being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
Same; Same; Same; After   three   consecutive   terms,   an
elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a
fourth term; Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is
no   longer   covered   by   the   prohibition.—After   three
consecutive   terms,   an   elective   local   official   cannot   seek
immediate   reelection   for   a   fourth   term.   The   prohibited
election   refers   to   the   next   regular   election   for   the   same
office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent   election,   like   a   recall   election,   is   no   longer
covered   by   the   prohibition   for   two   reasons.   First,   a
subsequent   election   like   a   recall   election   is   no   longer   an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second,
the   intervening   period   constitutes   an   involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.
Same; Same; Same; Recall; A   recall   election   mid­way
in   the   term   following   the   third   consecutive   term   is   a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the
third term.—Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate   reelection   for   a   fourth   term   following   three
consecutive   terms.   The   Constitution,   however,   does   not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as
the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive   term.   A   recall   election   mid­way   in   the   term
following   the   third   consecutive   term   is   a   subsequent
election   but   not   an   immediate   reelection   after   the   third
term.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The   winner   in   the   recall
election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of
three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of
an elective official’s terms in office.—In Adormeo, the recall
term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office
after  winning  the  recall  election.  Talaga’s   recall  term  did
not   retroact   to   include   the   tenure   in   office   of   his
predecessor. If Talaga’s recall term was made to so retroact,
then   he  would   have  been   disqualified  to  run  in  the  2001
elections   because   he   would   already   have   served   three
consecutive terms prior
459
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 459
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall
term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only
the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall
term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes
an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo
established the rule that the winner in the recall election
cannot  be charged or credited with the full term of three
years   for   purposes   of   counting   the   consecutiveness   of   an
elective official’s terms in office.
DAVIDE, JR., (C.J.), Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinion:
Election  Law; Constitutional  Law; Term  of  Office; For
one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms, he
has   to   rest   for   the   entire   immediately   succeeding   fourth
term.—I   wish   to   add   that   the   Constitutional   Commission
debates on the issue of “no immediate reelection” after three
consecutive   terms   for   members   of   Congress   clearly
indicated   that   the   “no   immediate   reelection”   after   the   3­
term limit would equally apply to the elective local officials.
This   accounted   for   the   immediate   acceptance   by   the
Committee   on   Local   Governments   of   the   aforementioned
Amendment of Commissioner Davide, which is now Section
8   of   Article   X   of   the   Constitution.   These   debates   clearly
showed the intent of the Commission that the ban against
an   immediate   reelection   after   three   consecutive   terms
applies   to   the fourthterm, i.e.,   the   term   immediately
following the three consecutive terms, to be filled up by the
regular election for such fourth term. For one to be able to
run again after three consecutive terms, he has to rest for
the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the next
fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three
consecutive terms.
Same; Same; Same; The   term   of   office   of   one   who   is
elected   in   a   special   election   is   considered   one   term   for
purposes   of   determining   the   three   consecutive   terms.—On
the contrary,  it  is clear from  the views of  Commissioners
Suarez   and   Davide   that   the   term   of   office   of   one   who   is
elected   in   a   special   election   is   considered   one term for
purposes of determining the three consecutive terms.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.  convened   themselves   into   a   Preparatory   Recall
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Stephen V. Jaromay for petitioners.
     Edwin   B.   Gastanes for   petitioner   in G.R.   No.
154512.
     Aristotle Q. Sarmiento for petitioner in G.R. No.
154683.
     George   Erwin   M.   Garcia; Dela   Cruz, Albano   &
Associates and
     M.M. Lazaro & Associates for private respondent
E. Hagedorn.
460
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before   us   are   consolidated   petitions   for
certiorari  seeking   the   reversal   of   the   resolutions
1
issued by the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”
for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor
of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then
incumbent   barangay   officials   of   the   Puerto   Princesa
Assembly   (“PRA”   for   brevity)   at   the   Gymnasium   of
Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The
PRA   was   convened   to   initiate   the   recall  of   Victorino
2
Dennis   M.   Socrates   (“Socrates”   for   brevity)   who
assumed office as Puerto Princesa’s mayor on June 30,
2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David
M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay
Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No.
01­02 (“Recall Resolution” for, brevity) which declared
its   loss   of   confidence   in   Socrates   and   called   for   his
recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule
the   recall   election   for   mayor   within   30   days   from
receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On   July   16,   2002,   Socrates   filed   with   the
COMELEC   a   petition,   docketed   as   E.M.   No.   02­010
(RC),   to   nullify   and   deny   due   course   to   the   Recall
Resolution.
On   August   14,   2002,   the   COMELEC en
banc promulgated   a   resolution   dismissing   for   lack   of
3
merit   Socrates’   petition.   The   COMELEC   gave   due
course   to   the   Recall   Resolution   and   scheduled   the
recall election on September 7, 2002.
_______________
 Filed under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
1 as SPA   No.   02539,   against   Hagedorn   alleging
Civil   Procedure   with   prayers   for   preliminary   injunction   and
temporary restraining orders.
 Pursuant   to   the   provisions   of   Republic   Act   7160   or   the   Local
2
Government Code of 1991, Chapter 5, Sections 69 to 75.
 Composed   of   Benjamin   S.   Abalos,   Sr.   as   Chairman   with
3 fourth   consecutive   term,   having   been   elected   and
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ralph
C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino
A. Tuason, Jr.
461
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
On   August   21,   2002,   the   COMELEC en
banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the
calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited
acts   in   connection   with   the   recall   election.   The
COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27,
2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On   August   23,   2002,   Edward   M.   Hagedorn
(“Hagedorn”   for   brevity)   filed   his   certificate   of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo (“Adovo”
for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo (“Gilo” for brevity) filed
a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No.
02­492,   to   disqualify   Hagedorn   from   running   in   the
recall   election   and   to   cancel   his   certificate   of
candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido
Ollave,   Sr.   (“Ollave”   for   brevity)   filed   a   petition­in­
intervention   in   SPA   No.   02­492   also   seeking   to
disqualify   Hagedorn.   On   the   same   date,   a   certain
Genaro   V.   Manaay   filed   another   petition,   docketed
substantially   the  same   facts   and   involving   the   same
issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground
that   “Hagedorn   is   disqualified   from   running   for   a
having   served   as   mayor   of   the   city   for   three   (3)
consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant
recall election for the same post.” Subsequently, SPA
461 Nos. 02­492 and 02­539 were consolidated.
 In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002,
the   COMELEC’s   First   Division  dismissed  for  lack   of
4
merit   SPA   Nos.   02­492   and   02­539.   The   COMELEC
declared   Hagedorn   qualified   to   run   in   the­recall
election. The COMELEC also reset the recall election
from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On   September   23,   2002,   the   COMELEC en
bancpromulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration   of   Adovo   and   Gilo.   The   COMELEC
affirmed   the   resolution   declaring   Hagedorn   qualified
to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
_______________
 With   Mehol   K.   Sadain   as   Presiding   Commissioner   and
4
Luzviminda   G.   Tancangco   and   Resurreccion   Z.   Borra   as
Commissioners.
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en
banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02­
010   (RC)   which   gave   due   course   to   the   Recall
Resolution   and   scheduled   the   recall   election   on
September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused
its   discretion   in   upholding   the   Recall   Resolution.
Socrates   cites   the   following   circumstances   as   legal
infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its
issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members
of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the
resolution;   (2)   the   proof   of   service   of   notice   was
palpably and legally deficient; (3) the members of the
PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate
from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of
the   resolution   was   exercised   with   grave   abuse   of
authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted
in   a   manner   that   violated   his   and   the   public’s
constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner   Vicente   S.   Sandoval,   Jr.   seeks   to   annul
COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002
insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7,
2002, giving the candidates only a ten­day campaign
period.   He   prayed   that   the   COMELEC   be   enjoined
from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002
and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at
least an additional 15 days to campaign.
In   a   resolution   dated   September   3,   2002,   the
Court en   banc enjoined   the   COMELEC   from
implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed
the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002.
The   Court   directed   the   COMELEC   to   give   the
candidates   an   additional   fifteen   15   days   from
September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly,   on   September   9,   2002,   the
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving
the candidates an additional 15 days from September
7,   2002   within   which   to   campaign.   Thus,   the
COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24,
2002.
463
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. Nos. 155083­84
Petitioners   Adovo,   Gilo   and   Ollave   assail   the
COMELEC’s   resolutions   dated   September   20,   2002
and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02­492 and 02­
539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in
the   recall   election.   They   likewise   prayed   for   the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
proclamation   of   the   winning   candidate   in   the   recall
election.
Petitioners   argue   that   the   COMELEC   gravely
abused   its   discretion   in   upholding   Hagedorn’s
qualification   to   run   for   mayor   in   the   recall   election
despite   the   constitutional   and   statutory   prohibitions
against   a   fourth   consecutive   term   for   elective   local
officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court
ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any
winning candidate in the recall election until further
orders   from   the   Court.   Petitioners   were   required   to
post a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for
leave   to   file   an   attached   petition   for   intervention
seeking the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo
and Ollave.
In   the   meantime,   Hagedorn   garnered   the   highest
number   of   votes   in   the   recall   election   with   20,238
votes.   Rival   candidates   Socrates   and   Sandoval
463 obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining
the   COMELEC   from   proclaiming   the   winning
candidate   and   to   allow   him   to   assume   office   to   give
effect to the will of the electorate.
On   October,   1,   2002,   the   Court   granted   Socrates’
motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. 1.In G.R.   No.   154512,   whether   the   COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the
recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
464
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
1. 2.In G.R.   Nos.   155083­84,   whether   Hagedorn   is
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of
Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
In G.R.   No.   154683,   the   issue   of   whether   the
COMELEC   committed   grave   abuse   of   discretion   in
fixing a campaign period of only 10 days has become
moot.   Our   Resolution   of   September   3,   2002   and
COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional
15   days   for   the   campaign   period   as   prayed   for   by
petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner   Socrates   argues   that   the   COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130
PRA   members   and   the   defective   service   of   notice   to
other PRA members. The COMELEC, however, found
that—
“On   various   dates,   in   the   month   of   June   2002,   the
proponents   for   the   Recall   of   incumbent   City   Mayor
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening
of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70
of the Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice are
in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof
of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the
Petition and marked as Annex “G” of Volumes II and III of
the Petition.
Notices   were   likewise   posted   in   conspicuous   places
particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the
same were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex
“H”.   The   proponents  likewise  utilized  the  broadcast   mass
media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices   of   the   convening   of   the   Puerto   Princesa   PRA
were   also   sent   to   the   following:   [a   list   of   25   names   of
provincial   elective   officials,   print   and   broadcast   media
practitioners,  PNP  officials,   COMELEC  city,  regional  and
national officials, and DILG officials].
x x x
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her
Certification   dated   10   July   2002   certified   that   upon   a
‘thorough   and   careful   verification   of   the   signatures
appearing in PRA Resolution 01­02, x x x the majority of all
members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution.’
She likewise certified ‘that not a single member/signatory of
the   PRA   complained   or   objected   as   to   the   veracity   and
authenticity of their signatures.’
465
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 465
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
The   Provincial   Election   Supervisor   of   Palawan,   Atty.
Urbano   Arlando,   in  his   Indorsement   dated   10  July   2002,
stated,   upon   proper   review,   all   documents   submitted   are
found in order.’
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30
July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:
‘This   Office,   after   evaluating   the   documents   filed,   finds   the
instant Petition sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA
was   validly   constituted   and   that   the   majority   of   all   members
thereof   approved   Resolution   No.   01­02   calling   for   the   recall   of
Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.’
x x x.”
This   Court   is   bound   by   the   findings   of   fact   of   the
COMELEC   on   matters   within   the   competence   and
expertise   of   the   COMELEC,   unless   the   findings   are
patently   erroneous.   In Malonzo   v.   COMELEC,  which 5
also   dealt   with   alleged   defective   service   of   notice   to
PRA members, we ruled that—
“Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent
to   the   PRA   members   is   factual   in   nature,   and   the
determination   of   the   same   is   therefore   a   function   of   the
COMELEC.   In   the   absence   of   patent   error,   or   serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb
the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on
its   own   assessments   and   duly   supported   by   gathered
evidence,   are   conclusive   upon   the   court,   more   so,   in   the
absence   of   a   substantiated   attack   on   the   validity   of   the
same.”
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to
hold that the COMELEC’s findings of fact are patently
erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no
authority   to   adopt   the   Recall   Resolution   on   July   2,
2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking
a   new   electoral   mandate   in   the   barangay   elections
scheduled  on July  15, 2002. This  argument  deserves
scant   consideration   considering   that   when   the   PRA
members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of
office   had   not   yet   expired.   They   were   all de
jure sangguniang   barangay   members   with   no   legal
disqualification   to   participate   in   the   recall   assembly
under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
_______________
 269 SCRA 380 (1997).
5
466
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents
conducted   the   PRA   proceedings   violated   his
constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of
the   PRA   meeting   and   of   even   sending   his
representative  and   counsel   who   were   present   during
the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall
election   submitted   to   the   COMELEC   the   Recall
Resolution,   minutes   of   the   PRA   proceedings,   the
journal   of   the   PRA   assembly,   attendance   sheets,
notices   sent   to   PRA   members,   and   authenticated
master   list   of   barangay   officials   in   Puerto   Princesa.
Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these
public records in the official custody of the COMELEC.
Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC
denied   him   this   right.   There   is   no   legal   basis   in
Socrates’   claim   that   respondents   violated   his
constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of
the   Recall   Resolution   and   in   scheduling   the   recall
election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn’s qualification to run for
mayor   in   the   recall   election   of   September   24,
2002.
The three­term limit rule for elective local officials is
found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
states:
“Section   8.   The   term   of   office   of   elective   local   officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.”
This three­term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43
(b)   of   RA   No.   7160,   otherwise   known   as   the   Local
Government Code, which provides:
“Section 43. Term of Office.—(a) x x x
(b)   No   local   elective   official   shall   serve   for   more   than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the
467
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.”
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two
parts.   The   first   part   provides   that   an   elective   local
official  cannot  serve for more  than  three  consecutive
terms.   The   clear   intent   is   that   only consecutive
terms count in determining the three­term limit rule.
The second part states that voluntary renunciation of
office   for   any   length   of   time   does   not   interrupt   the
continuity   of   service.   The   clear   intent   is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the
service   before   and   after   the   interruption   from   being
joined   together   to   form   a   continuous   service   or
consecutive terms.
After   three   consecutive   terms,   an   elective   local
official   cannot   seek immediate   reelection   for   a   fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election   for   the   same   office   following   the   end   of   the
third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a
recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition
for   two   reasons.   First,   a   subsequent   election   like   a
recall   election   is   no   longer   an   immediate   reelection
after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening
period constitutes  an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.
467 When   the   framers   of   the   Constitution   debated   on
the  term   limit   of elective local  officials,  the question
asked was whether there would be no further election
after   three   terms,   or   whether   there   would   be   “no
immediate reelection” after three terms. This is clear
from the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
“THE   PRESIDENT:  The   Acting   Floor   Leader   is
recognized.
MR. ROMULO:   We are now ready to discuss the two
6
issues,   as   indicated   on   the   blackboard,   and   these
are   Alternative   No.   I   where   there   is   no   further
election after a total of three terms and Alternative
No. 2   where   there   is   no   immediate   reelection  after
three successive terms.” 7
_______________
  Ricardo   J.   Romulo,   Commissioner   of   the   1986   Constitutional
6
Convention.
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 236.
7
468
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports
the   following   manifestation   on   the   term   of   elective
local officials:
“MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon  resumption  of  session,  Mr.   Romulo  manifested  that
the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues
on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely:
1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of
three   terms),   and   2)   Alternative   No. 2   (no   immediate
reelection after three successive terms).” 8
The   framers   of   the   Constitution   used   the   same   “no
immediate reelection” question in voting for the term
limits of Senators  and Representatives of the House.
9 10
_______________
8
 Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 420.
9
 “MR. ROMULO: Madam President, we are now ready to vote on
the  question  of the Senators, and the schemes are as follows: The
first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the second scheme
is,   no   immediate   reelection   after   two   successive   terms. Madam
President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the same
as those for the House of Representatives I move that we go directly
to the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE   PRESIDENT:   Please   distribute   the   ballots   for   this
particular   item   for   Senators.   Are   we   ready   now?   The   Secretary­
General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY­GENERAL: We have 43 ballots here, Madam
President. We shall now begin to count.
THE PRESIDENT: Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY­GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I—/////­/////­//
Scheme No. II—/////­/////­/////­/////­/////­/////­//
THE PRESIDENT: The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I
and   32   votes   for   Scheme   No.   II;   Scheme   No.   II   is   approved.”
(Emphasis supplied) Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2,
pp. 244­245.
 “MR. GASCON: Is this voting just for Congressmen?
10
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
The Secretary­General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY­GENERAL: Madam President, we have here
43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.
469
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 469
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Clearly,   what   the   Constitution   prohibits   is
an immediate   reelection for   a   fourth   term   following
three   consecutive   terms.   The   Constitution,   however,
does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth
term as long as the reelection is not immediately after
the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid­way   in   the   term   following   the   third   consecutive
term   is   a   subsequent   election   but   not   an   immediate
reelection after the third term.
Neither  does  the  Constitution  prohibit  one   barred
from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term.   The  debates   in   the  Constitutional   Commission
evidently show that the prohibited election referred to
by   the   framers   of   the   Constitution   is   the immediate
reelection after   the   third   term,   not   any   other
subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied
to   any   election   within   the   three­year   full   term
following   the   three­term   limit,   then   Senators   should
also be prohibited from running in any election within
the  six­year  full   term  following their  two­term   limit.
The   constitutional   provision   on   the   term   limit   of
Senators   is   worded   exactly   like   the   term   limit   of
elective local officials, thus:
“No   Senator   shall   serve   for   more   than   two   consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time   shall   not   be   considered   as   an   interruption   in   the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.” 11
In   the   debates   on   the   term   limit   of   Senators,   the
following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is
instructive:
_______________
Alternative No. 1—no further election after a total of three terms:
/////­/////­/////­//
Alternative No. 2—no immediate reelection after three successive
terms://///­/////­/////­/////­/////­/
THE PRESIDENT: The results show 17 votes for Alternative No.
I and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2; Alternative No. 2 is approved.”
(Emphasis supplied) Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2,
pp. 243­244.
11
 Second paragraph of Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution.
470
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
“GASCON:   I would like to ask a question with regard
12
to the issue after the second term. We will allow the
Senator to rest for a period of time before he can
run again?
DAVIDE:   That is correct.
13
GASCON:  And the question that we left behind before
—if the Gentleman will remember—was: How long
will that period of rest be? Will it be one election
which is three years or one term which is six years?
DAVIDE:  If   the   Gentleman   will   remember,
Commissioner   Rodrigo   expressed   the   view   that
during the election following the expiration of the
first 12 years, whether such election will be on the
third or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a
period   of   hibernation   for   sixyears.   That   was   the
Committee’s stand.
GASCON:  So, effectively,   the   period   of   rest   would   be
three years at the least.”  (Emphasis supplied)
14
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a
Senator   can   run after   only   three   years  following   his
15
completion   of   two   terms.   The   framers   expressly
acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only
to the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent
election, during the six­year period following the two
term   limit.   The   framers   of   the   Constitution   did   not
intend “the period of rest” of an elective official who
has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the
succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall
election  on  September  24,   2002  is   not  an  immediate
reelection after his third consecutive term which ended
on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to
the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek
reelection in the 2001 elections.
_______________
 Jose   Luis   Martin   C.   Gascon,   Commissioner   of   the   1986
12
Constitutional Commission.
 Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional
13
Commission, and now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 590.
14
 Bernas, The   Intent   of   the   1986   Constitution   Writers,   p.   341
15
(1995).
471
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in
the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full
his   three   consecutive   terms   as   mayor   of   Puerto
Princesa.   Under   the   Constitution   and   the   Local
Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for
mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the
Local   Government   Code   disqualified   Hagedorn,   who
had   reached   the   maximum   three­term   limit,   from
running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus,
Hagedorn   did   not   run   for   mayor   in   the   2001
elections.  Socrates   ran   and   won   as   mayor   of   Puerto
16
Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased
to   be   mayor   on   June   30,   2001,   he   became   a   private
citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002
when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.
From   June   30,   2001   until   the   recall   election   on
September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was
Socrates.   During   the   same   period,   Hagedorn   was
simply   a   private   citizen.   This   period   is   clearly   an
interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as
mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but
because   of   a   legal   prohibition.   Hagedorn’s   three
consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn’s
new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30,
2004   is   not   a   seamless   continuation   of   his   previous
three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch
together   Hagedorn’s   previous   three­terms   with   his
471 new   recall   term   to   make   the   recall   term   a   fourth
consecutive   term   because   factually   it   is   not.   An
involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001
to September 24, 2002, which broke the continuity or
consecutive character of Hagedorn’s service as mayor.
 In Lonzanida v. Comelec,  the Court had occasion to
17
explain   interruption   of   continuity   of   service   in   this
manner:
“x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision
under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which he
was   elected.”   The   clear   intent   of   the   framers   of   the
constitution   to   bar   any   attempt   to   circumvent   the   three­
term limit by a
_______________
16
 Hagedorn instead ran for Governor of Palawan in the 2001 elections
but lost.
 311 SCRA 602 (1999).
17
472
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
voluntary   renunciation   of   office   and   at   the   same   time
respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in   the   computation   of   the   three­term   limit; conversely,
involuntary   severance   from   office   for   any   length   of   time
short   of   the   full   term   provided   by   law   amounts   to   an
interruption   of   continuity   of   service.   x   x   x.”   (Emphasis
supplied)
In Hagedorn’s case, the nearly 15­month period he was
out   of   office,   although   short   of   a   full   term   of   three
years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of
his   service   as   mayor.   The   Constitution   does   not
require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of
three years. The clear intent is that interruption “for
any length of time,” as long as the cause is involuntary,
is   sufficient   to   break   an   elective   local   official’s
continuity of service.
In   the   recent   case   of Adormeo   v.   Comelec   and
Talaga,  a   unanimous   Court   reiterated   the   rule   that
18
an   interruption   consisting   of   a   portion   of   a   term   of
office   breaks   the   continuity   of   service   of   an   elective
local   official.   In Adormeo,   Ramon   Y.   Talaga,   Jr.   had
served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena
City.   In  his   third  bid   for   election   as   mayor   in   1998,
Talaga   lost   to   Bernard   G.   Tagarao.   However,   in   the
recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served
the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to
June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in
the   2001   elections,   Raymundo   Adormeo,   the   other
candidate   for   mayor,   petitioned   for   Talaga’s
disqualification on the ground that Talaga had already
served three consecutive terms as mayor.
Thus,   the   issue   in Adormeo was   whether   Talaga’s
recall   term   was   a   continuation   of   his   previous   two
terms so that he was deemed to have already served
three   consecutive   terms   as   mayor.   The   Court   ruled
that Talaga was qualified to run in the 2001 elections,
stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12,
2000   when   Talaga   was   out   of   office   interrupted   the
continuity of his service as mayor. Talaga’s recall term
as   mayor   was   not   consecutive   to   his   previous   two
terms because of this interruption, there having been a
break of almost two years during which time Tagarao
was the mayor.
_______________
 G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90.
18
473
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
We held  in Adormeo that  the period  an  elective local
official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his
service   and   prevents   his   recall   term   from   being
stitched   together   as   a   seamless   continuation   of   his
previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we
likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was
out of office interrupted his continuity of service and
prevents his recall term from being stitched together
as   a   seamless   continuation   of   his   previous   three
consecutive   terms.   The   only   difference
between Adormeo and the instant  case is the time of
the   interruption.   In Adormeo, the   interruption
occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the
instant case, the interruption happened after the first
three   consecutive   terms.   In   both   cases,   the
respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the   recall   term   of   Talaga   began   only
from   the   date   he   assumed   office   after   winning   the
recall election. Talaga’s recall term did not retroact to
include   the   tenure   in   office   of   his   predecessor.   If
Talaga’s recall term was made to so retroact, then he
would   have   been   disqualified   to   run   in   the   2001
elections because he would already have served three
consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who
wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full
term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term.
The   period   of   time   prior   to   the   recall   term,   when
473 another   elective   official   holds   office,   constitutes   an
interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo
established   the   rule   that   the   winner   in   the   recall
election   cannot   be   charged   or   credited   with   the   full
term   of   three   years   for   purposes   of   counting   the
consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office.
In  the same manner, Hagedorn’s   recall   term   does
not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates.
Hagedorn   can   only   be   disqualified   to   run   in   the
September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is
made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can
the  recall  term   constitute a   fourth consecutive term.
But to consider Hagedorn’s recall term as a full term of
three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the
fact that he won his recall term only last September
24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare
as   consecutive   or   successive   terms   of   office   which
historically and factually are not.
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Worse,   to   make   Hagedorn’s   recall   term   retroact   to
June   30,   2001   creates   a   legal   fiction   that   unduly
curtails   the   freedom   of   the   people   to   choose   their
leaders through popular elections. The concept of term
limits   is   in   derogation   of   the   sovereign   will   of   the
people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term
limits   must   be   construed   striptly   to   give   the   fullest
possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As
this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
“Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art.
X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional   Commission   were   as   much   concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they
were   with   preventing   the   monopolization   of   political
power. Indeed,   they   rejected   a   proposal   put   forth   by
Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further
reelection   for   local   and   legislative   officials. Instead,   they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian
Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running
for the same position in the succeeding election following the
expiration   of   the   third   consecutive   term. Monsod   warned
against   ‘prescreening   candidates   [from]   whom   the   people
will   choose’   as   a   result   of   the   proposed   absolute
disqualification,   considering   that   the   draft   constitution
contained   provisions   ‘recognizing   people’s   power.’
” (Emphasis supplied)
19
A   necessary   consequence   of   the   interruption   of
continuity   of   service   is   the   start   of   a   new   term
following the interruption. An official elected in recall
election   serves   the   unexpired   term   of   the   recalled
official.   This   unexpired   term   is   in   itself one term   for
purposes of counting the three­term limit. This is clear
from   the   following   discussion   in   the   Constitutional
Commission:
“SUAREZ:   For   example,   a   special   election   is   called
20
for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would
have   to   serve   the   unexpired   portion   of   the   term.
Would   that   mean   that   serving   the   unexpired
portion of the term is already considered one term?
So,   half   a   term,   which   is   actually   the   correct
statement,   plus   one   term   would   disqualify   the
Senator concerned from run­
_______________
 295 SCRA 157 (1998).
19
 Jose   E.   Suarez,   Commissioner   of   the   1986   Constitutional
20
Commission.
475
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 475
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
ning?   Is   that   the   meaning   of   this   provision   on
disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE:  Yes, because we speak of ‘term,’ and if there
is   a   special   election,   he   will   serve   only   for   the
unexpired portion of that particular term plus one
more term for the Senator and two more terms for
the Members of the Lower House.” 21
Although   the   discussion   referred   to   special   elections
for   Senators   and   Representatives   of   the   House,   the
same   principle   applies   to   a   recall   election   of   local
officials.   Otherwise,   an   elective   local   official   who
serves   a   recall   term   can   serve   for   more   than   nine
consecutive   years   comprising   of   the   recall   term   plus
the regular three full terms. A local official who serves
a recall term should know that the recall term is in
itself one term although less than three years. This is
the   inherent   limitation   he   takes   by   running   and
winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to
run   in   the   September   24,   2002   recall   election   for
mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. 1.Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection
following   his   three   consecutive   terms   as   mayor
which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. 2.Hagedorn’s   continuity   of   service   as   mayor   was
involuntarily   interrupted   from   June   30,   2001   to
September   24,   2002   during   which   time   he   was   a
private citizen;
3. 3.Hagedorn’s recall term from September 24, 2002 to
June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June
30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because
factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive
term; and
4. 4.Term limits should be construed strictly to give the
fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate
to choose their leaders.
WHEREFORE,   the   petitions   in   G.R.   Nos.   154512,
154683   and   155083­84   are   DISMISSED.   The
temporary   restraining   order   issued   by   this   Court   on
September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclama­
_______________
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 592.
21
476
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
tion   of   the   winning   candidate   for   mayor   of   Puerto
Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is
lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares­
Santiago, Sandoval­Gutierrez, Carpio­Morales and Cal
lejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
     Davide,   Jr. (C.J.), See concurring   and
dissenting opinion.
     Puno, J., Pls. see concurring opinion.
     Vitug, J., In the result.
     Mendoza, J., In the result, without to the filing
of separate opinion.
     Austria­Martinez, J., On leave.
     Corona, J., No part—prior consultation.
     Azcuna,   J.,   I   join   the   Chief   Justice   in   his
separate opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
I concur with the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice
Antonio   T.   Carpio   in G.R.   No.   154512 and G.R.   No.
154683.   The   Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC)
committed no grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Recall Resolution. Dismissal then of G.R.
No. 154512 is inevitable. This notwithstanding, I still
hold   on   to   my   dissenting   view   in G.R.   No.
111511 (Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA
100, 121 [1993]) that the provision on the preparatory
recall assembly in Section 70 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 is unconstitutional.
Our issuance of the Resolution of 3 September 2002
in G.R.   No.   154683 enjoining   the   COMELEC   from
implementing   its   Resolution   No.   5673   insofar   as   it
fixed the recall election on 7 September 2002, and the
subsequent   Resolution   of   the   COMELEC   giving   the
candidates   an   additional   campaign   period   of   fifteen
days   from   7   September   2002   rendered   moot   and
academic the principal issue in G.R. No. 154683. The
dismissal of the petition therein is also in order.
477
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
However, I regret I cannot concur with the argument
and   conclusion   relative   to   G.R.   Nos.   155083­84.   I
respectfully submit that private respondent Edward S.
Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position
of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election
in question.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution expressly
provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three   consecutive   terms.   Voluntary   renunciation   of   the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Paragraph (b), Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local
Government   Code)   restates   this   constitutional
restriction, thus:
SEC. 43. Term of office.—
. . .
(b)   No   local   elective   official   shall   serve   for   more   than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution was not found
in the Report of the Committee on Local Governments
of   the   Constitutional   Commission   of   1986.   It   was
477 introduced   at   the   plenary   session   by   Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Commenting thereon in his book
emitted “The Intent of 1986 Constitution Writers” (1995
ed., p. 699), Commissioner Joaquin Bernas states:
This   provision   was   not   found   among   the   Committee’s
proposals   but   came   as   an   amendment   proposed   by
Commissioner   Davide.   It   was   readily   accepted   without
much discussion and formally approved.
Section 8 sets the duration of a term at three years,
and   prohibits   elective   local   officials   from   serving   for
more than three consecutive terms.
Pursuant   to   the  second   paragraph   of  Section   1   of
Article   XVIII   (The   Transitory   Provision)   of   the
Constitution,   and   Executive   Order   No.   270,   as
amended by R.A. No. 6636, the first local election,
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
that   is,   the   election   for   the   first   term   under   the
Constitution   for   elective   local   officials,   was   on   18
January 1988. By express provision of Section 5 of R.A.
No. 6636, in relation to Section 2 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution,   that   term   expired   at   noon   of   30   June
1992.   The   second   election, i.e.,   the   election   for   the
second term of elective local officials which expired at
noon of 30 June 1995, for elective local officials, was on
the second Monday of May 1992 pursuant to R.A. No.
7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms). The third
election, i.e., for the third term which expired at noon
of 30  June 1998, was on the second Monday of May
1995,   pursuant   to   Section   2   of   R.A.   No.   7166.   The
fourth election, or for the fourth term which expired at
noon of 30 June 2001, was on the second Monday of
May   1998.   The   fifth   election, i.e.,   for   the   fifth   term
which would expire at noon of 30 June 2004, was on
the second Monday of May 2001.
Conformably   with   Section   8   of   Article   X   of   the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160, a local
official elected in the first local election of 18 January
1988 may be reelected in the synchronized elections in
May 1992 and in May 1995. He could not seek another
reelection in the May 1998 election because that would
have   been   his   fourth   term.   Similarly,   a   local   official
who   was   elected   in   the   May   1992   election   could   be
reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections.
Private   respondent   Hagedorn   was   first   elected   as
City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the May 1992
election. He was reelected in the May 1995 and May
1998 elections. His third term, by virtue of his election
in   the   May   1998   election,   expired   on   30   June   2001.
Therefore,   he   was   constitutionally   and   statutorily
barred   from   seeking   reelection   in   the   May   2001
election, which would have been his fourth term.
The term of office covered by the May 2001 election
is   up   to   30   June   2004. Section   8   of   Article   X   of   the
Constitution   and   Section   43(b)   of   R.A.   No.   7160   are
clear   in   what   is   prohibited,   which   is   the fourth
term. Nothing   can   be   clearer   from   the   wordings
thereof: “the term of office of elective local officials ...
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more   that   three   consecutive   terms.”   In   short,   an
elective local official who has served three consecutive
479
 VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
terms, like Hagedorn, is disqualified from seeking re­
election for the succeeding fourth term. The provision
bars the holding of four consecutive terms.
The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the
three­term   limit   bars an   immediate   reelection for   a
fourth term. But I disagree when it rules that in the
case   of   Hagedorn   he   did   not   seek   an   immediate
reelection   for   a   fourth   term   because   he   was   not   a
candidate  for  reelection   in  the May   2001   election.   It
forgets that what would have been his fourth term by
virtue of the May 2001 election was for the period from
30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling
results   from  
apparent confusion between term and election, the   root
cause of which is the attempt to distinguish “voluntary
renunciation”   of   office   from   “involuntary   severance”
from office and the term of office to which it relates.
Let   me   first   discuss   the   matter   of   whether   the
Constitutional Commission did approve the rule of “no
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms.” In
support   of   its   affirmative   conclusion
the ponencia quotes   the   Manifestation   of
Commissioner Romulo as entered in the Journal of the
Constitutional Commission, thus:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
479 Upon  resumption  of  session,  Mr.   Romulo  manifested  that
the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues
on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely:
a) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of
three   terms),   and   2)   Alternative   No. 2 (no   immediate
reelection after three successiveterms).
This is inaccurate. What actually happened was that
the issue was originally for elective national and local
officials. However, the Commission decided to consider
first the term of the members of Congress; and to defer
the   discussion   on   the   term   of   elective   local   officials
until the. Commission would consider the report of the
Committee   on   Local   Governments.   On   this   point   I
quote   the   pertinent   portions   of   Volume   Two,   pages
238­245   of   the   Record   of   the   Constitutional
an
Commission of its proceedings on 25 July 1986:
THE   PRESIDENT. Maybe   it   will   be   of   help   we   just
remind ourselves that what we have before us now
is the report of the Committee on the Legislative.
Therefore, maybe we should confine
480
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
ourselves   first   to   what   is   covered   by   the   report
which   is   the   term   of   office   of   the   Senators   and   the
Representatives. And with respect to the local officials,
let   us   await   the   report   of   the   Committee   on   Local
Governments as to its recommendation on this matter.
MR. RODRIGO.  As a matter of fact, I will go further
than that. It is my belief, as regards local officials,
that we should leave this matter to the legislative.
THE PRESIDENT.  So what is the pleasure now of the
Acting   Floor   Leader   or   of   the   Chairman   of   the
Committee on the Legislative?
MR.   RODRIGO.  I   wonder   if   the   two   proponents,
Madam   President,   will   agree   that   we   first   talk
about   the   term   of   office   of   the   Representatives
because   we   are   now   discussing   the   legislative
department.
MR. DAVIDE.  Madam President.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   Davide   is
recognized.
MR.   DAVIDE.  I   will   agree   really   that   this   matter
should   relate   only   to   the   term   of   office   of   the
Representatives.
THE   PRESIDENT.  But   are   we   agreed   on   these   two
proposals—the one of Commissioner Garcia  where
there   is   no   further   election   after   a   total   of   three
terms  and the other where there is  no immediate
reelection after three successive terms?
MR.   OPLE.  Madam   President,   originally   if   I
remember   right,   the   Commission   decided   to
consider the synchronization of elections. And from
that original commitment, we proceeded to fix the
terms   and   decided   related   questions   within   the
context of synchronization. Are we now abandoning
the   original   task   of   synchronization   which   could
only be fully settled in terms of delimitations on the
proposed   terms   of   the   President   and   the   Vice­
President, the Members of Congress and the local
officials,   or   do   we   want   to   postpone   the
synchronization task to a later time after we hear
from the Committee on Local Governments and the
other concerned committees?
THE   PRESIDENT.  What   does   the   Acting   Floor
Leader   say   to   this   particular   question   of
Commissioner Ople?
MR. ROMULO.  In a way, Madam President, we have
settled the synchronization task, because we have
decided on the officials’
481
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Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
absolute terms. All we are really talking about now
is whether or not they are eligible for reelection, and I
think those are separable issues.
MR.   OPLE.  If   they   are   separable,   and   we   have
already   settled   the   synchronization   task,   then   I
think that is something to be thankful about. But
considering   the  immediate   business   at   hand,   is   it
the wish of the Acting Floor Leader that the election
of the local officials should be eliminated from the
consideration of those two choices?
MR. ROMULO.  Yes. I think the sense of the body now
is to limit this choice to the Members of the House
of Representatives.
MR.   OPLE.  And   do   the   manifestations   of   both
Commissioners Garcia and Monsod still stand after
the elimination of the election of the local officials?
MR. ROMULO.  Yes, I think so.
. . .
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   Davide   is
recognized.   MR.   DAVIDE.  Madam   President,   as
worded, it is a personal disqualification.
MR.   ROMULO.  We   are   now   ready   to   vote,   Madam
President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE   PRESIDENT.  We   are   now   ready   to   vote   by
ballot.   Let   us   distribute   the   ballots.   Anyway   the
voting would take only about 10 minutes.
The session is suspended.
It was 3:40 p.m.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed, and  COUNTING OF BALLOTS
the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:50 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT.  The session is resumed.
MR.   GASCON.  Madam   President,   may   I   have   a
clarification before we count the ballots. The voting
now is just for Representa­
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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tives. We are not speaking of the term of office of
the Senators yet. Is that correct?
THE PRESIDENT.  The term of office of the Senators
was disposed of this morning.
This voting now is only for Representatives.
MR.   GASCON.  I   think   the   issue   of   whether   the
Senators could run again for election after their two
consecutive   terms   or   12   years   after   a   lapse   of   a
period of time has not yet been finalized.
THE PRESIDENT.  I beg the Commissioner’s pardon.
MR. GASCON.  Is this voting just for Congressmen?
THE PRESIDENT.  Yes.
The   Secretary­General   will   now   please   proceed   to
count the votes.
THE SECRETARY­GENERAL.  Madam President, we
have   here   43   ballots   cast.   We   will   now   start   the
counting.
Alternative No. 1—no further election after a total
of three terms; /////­/////­/////­//
Alternative   No.   2—no   immediate   reelection   after
three successive terms: /////­/////­/////­/////­/////­/
THE   PRESIDENT.  The   results   show   17   votes   for
Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2;
Alternative No. 2 is approved.
What does the Acting Floor Leader say?
MR.   ROMULO.  Alternative   No.   2   has   won,   Madam
President. It seems there are some doubts as to the
term of Office of the Senators, so I propose that we
similarly vote on that to end any doubt. It was my
understanding this morning that when we voted for
the term of office of the Senators, they would not be
perpetually disqualified.
THE   PRESIDENT.  From   the   transcripts,   it   appears
here that with respect to Senators, 22 votes went to
Scheme No. II; that is, with one reelection. This is
already a majority. So, does the Acting Floor Leader
propose that we vote again?
MR. ROMULO.  The question  is  whether  or not  that
will be perpetual, Madam President, or after resting
for six years they can
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Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
run   again.   That   is   the   question   that   is   not
answered. I am talking of the Senators.
THE   PRESIDENT.  This   morning,   Scheme   No.   1,
without reelection, has 3 votes; Scheme No. II, with
one reelection—22  votes;  Scheme No. III, no limit
on reelection—17 votes.
MR. REGALADO.  Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO.  Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.  May we first clarify this from the
Secretary­General?
MR.   ROMULO.  The   question   is   whether   or   not   in
voting for the term of six years with one reelection,
the Senator is perpetually disqualified, so that is a
similar question to what we had posed with regard
to the House of Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT.  In other words, after serving with
one   reelection,   whether   or   not   he   is   perpetually
disqualified after serving 12 years?
MR. ROMULO.  Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO.  Madam President.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Yes,   Commissioner   Rodrigo   is
recognized.
MR.   RODRIGO.  Or,   if   after   one   reelection,   he   is
perpetually   disqualified   or   he   can   hibernate—the
very word used—for six years and then run again
for reelection but not consecutive, not immediate. In
other   words,   he   is   entitled   to   one   immediate
reelection.
483 REV. RIGOS.  Another point, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO.  And then, after that, if there is a gap,
when he is not a Senator, then he can run for the
same office.
REV. RIGOS.  Madam President.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Yes,   Commissioner   Rigos   is
recognized.
REV. RIGOS.  In relation to that, if he will be allowed
to   run   again   as   Senator   after   a   period   of
hibernation, we have to clarify how long that should
 be. It could be three years, because in the proposed
scheme,   every   three   years   we   can   elect   the
Senators.
MR.   RODRIGO.  Yes,   Madam   President,   it   can   be
three years.
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SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT.  I will suspend the session again so
as to allow the parties to compare with the Acting
Floor   Leader   so   that   we   will   know   what   we   are
going to vote on.
The session is suspended
It was 3:58 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 4:05 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT.  The session is resumed.
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO.  Madam President, we are now ready
to   vote   on   the   question   of   the   Senators,   and   the
schemes   are   as   follows:   The   first   scheme   is,   no
further election after two terms; the second scheme
is,   no   immediate   reelection   after   two   successive
terms.   Madam   President,   Inasmuch   as   the
principles applicable here are the same as those for
the   House   of   Representatives,   I   move   that   we   go
directly   to   the   voting   and   forego   any   further
discussions.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Please   distribute   the   ballots   for
this particular item for Senators.
Are we ready now?
The Secretary­General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE   SECRETARY­GENERAL.  We   have   43   ballots
here,   Madam   President.   We   shall   now   begin   to
count.
THE PRESIDENT.  Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY­GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I—/////­/////­//
Scheme No. II—/////­/////­/////­/////­/////­/////­//
THE   PRESIDENT.  The   results   show   12   votes   for
Scheme   No.   I   and   32   votes   for   Scheme   No.   II;
Scheme No. II is approved.
485
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 485
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
All the results will be considered by the Committee on the MR. DAVIDE.  As may be determined by law.
Legislative in preparation of their report. MR.   NOLLEDO.  As   provided   for   in   the   Local
So can we leave this matter now? Government Code.
The corresponding proposal on the three­term limit for MR. DAVIDE.  Yes.
elective   local   officials   without   immediate   reelection   was
MR.   NOLLEDO.  We   accept   the   amendment.   The
taken up by the Constitutional Commission much later or
Committee accepts the amendment.
specifically on 16 August 1986. On this point, the pertinent
portions   of   Vol.   Three,   pages   406­408,   Record   of   the . . .
Constitutional Commission, read as follows: THE PRESIDENT.  May we have the reaction of the
MR.   RAMA. Madam   President,   I   ask   that Committee?
486
Commissioner Davide be recognized.
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   Davide   is
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
recognized.
MR.   NOLLEDO.  The   Committee   accepts   the
MR. DAVIDE:  Thank you, Madam President.
amendment, as amended, Madam President.
After   Section   4,   I   propose   to   insert   a   new   section   to   be
denominated later as Section 5. It provides as follows: THE THE PRESIDENT.  Is there any other comment?
TERM   OF   OFFICE   OF   ELECTIVE   LOCAL   OFFICIALS, MR. OPLE.  Madam President.
EXCEPT   BARANGAY   OFFICIALS,   WHICH   SHALL   BE THE PRESIDENT.  Commissioner Ople is recognized.
DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND MR.   OPLE.  May   we   ask  the  Committee  to   read   the
NO SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN proposed amendment now.
THREE   CONSECUTIVE   TERMS.   VOLUNTARY MR. NOLLEDO.  May we ask Commissioner Davide to
RENUNCIATION   OF  THE   OFFICE   FOR   ANY   LENGTH read the new section.
OF   TIME   SHALL   NOT   BE   CONSIDERED   AS   AN MR.   DAVIDE. THE   TERM   OF   OFFICE   OF
INTERRUPTION   IN   THE   CONTINUITY   OF   HIS ELECTIVE   LOCAL   OFFICIALS,   EXCEPT
SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS
BARANGAY   OFFICIALS,   WHICH   SHALL   BE
ELECTED. This is in accordance with the mandate of the
DETERMINED   BY   LAW,   SHALL   BE   THREE
Commission when we voted on the terms of officials up to
local   officials,   excluding   the   term   of   barangay   officials YEARS AND NO SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE
which was a very specific exception. FOR   MORE   THAN   THREE   CONSECUTIVE
MR.   NOLLEDO.  One   clarificatory   question,   Madam TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE
President.   What   will   be   the   term   of   the   office   of OFFICE   FOR   ANY   LENGTH   OF   TIME   SHALL
barangay officials as provided for? NOT BE  CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION
 IN   THE   CONTINUITY   OF   HIS   SERVICE   FOR
THE   FULL   TERM   FOR   WHICH   HE   WAS
ELECTED.
. . .
THE   PRESIDENT.  Then   let   us   vote   first   on   the
Davide amendment.
Is   there   any   objection   to   this   new   section   proposed   by
Commissioner   Davide   which   has   been   read   to   the   body?
(Silence)   The   Chair   hears   none;   the   proposed   section   is
approved.
I   wish   to   add   that   the   Constitutional   Commission
debates on the issue of “no immediate reelection” after
three   consecutive   terms   for   members   of   Congress
clearly   indicated   that   the   “no   immediate   reelection”
after   the   3­term   limit   would   equally   apply   to   the
elective   local   officials.   This   accounted   for   the
immediate   acceptance   by   the   Committee   on   Local
Governments   of   the   aforementioned   Amendment   of
Commissioner   Davide,   which   is   now   Section   8   of
Article   X   of   the   Constitution.   These   debates   clearly
showed   the   intent   of   the   Commission   that   the   ban
against   an   immediate   reelection   after   three
consecutive   terms   applies   to   the fourth term, i.e.,   the
term   immediately   following   the   three   consecutive
terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such
fourth term. For one to be able to run again after three
consecutive terms, he has to rest for
487
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the
next fifth term he can run again to start a new series
of three consecutive terms. We quote these pertinent
portions of the debates, recorded in Volume Two, pages
232­233   of   the   Record   of   the   Constitutional
Commission:
MR.   ROMULO. Madam   President,   the   following   are
the various alternatives:
Scheme No. I is without reelection; Scheme No. 11 is
with one reelection; and Scheme No. III is reelection
without limit. This is for the Senators.
At   this   juncture,   pieces   of   paper   were   distributed
and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
THE   PRESIDENT.  The   Chair   asks   the   Chairman,
Commissioner   Davide,   to   please   consolidate   the
results   of   the   voting   for   President   and
VicePresident.
THE SECRETARY GENERAL.  Madam President, we
are ready.
THE PRESIDENT.  The Secretary­General will please
proceed.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY­GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I—///
Scheme No. II—/////­/////­/////­/////­//
487
Scheme No. III—/////­/////­/////­//
THE   PRESIDENT.  The   results   show   3   votes   for
Scheme No. I; 22 votes for Scheme No. II; and 17
votes for Scheme No. III; Scheme No. II is approved.
MR. ROMULO.  Madam President, the next position is
for the House of Representatives, the Congressmen.
I would assume we can use the same choices. Does
any one want any variation?
MR. RODRIGO.  Madam President.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   Rodrigo   is
recognized.
MR.   RODRIGO.  For   the   record,   I   would   like   to   ask
Commissioner Romulo some questions.
MR. ROMULO.  Yes.
488
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
MR.   RODRIGO.  Scheme   No.   II   says   “the   Vice­
President—with one reelection.”
THE PRESIDENT.  No, that is for Senators.
MR. GUINGONA.  Madam President.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Yes,   Commissioner   Guingona   is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA.  May I suggest one more scheme—
with two reelections for the Members of the House
of Representatives?
THE   PRESIDENT.  So,   we   shall   distribute   ballots
again.
MR.   ROMULO.  While   the   ballots   are   being
distributed,   may   I   read   the   following   four
propositions for Congressmen:
Scheme No. I, without reelection.
Scheme No. II, with one reelection.
Scheme No. III, with two reelections.
Scheme No. IV, no limit on reelection.
MR. DE LOS REYES.  Madam President.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   de   los   Reyes   is
recognized.
MR. DE LOS REYES.  The term of the Members of the
House   of   Representatives   will   be   three   years,
according   to   the   first   voting;   the   term   of   the
Senators, if they are entitled to one reelection, will
be 12 years. So, in order for a Member of the House
of Representatives to have also 12 years, he must be
entitled   to   three   reelections.   I   propose   another
scheme with three reelections to make it equal.
MR.   RODRIGO.  Will   the   Gentleman   maintain   the
number there and add that as No. V. I filled up my
ballot   already   and   if   I   erase,   this   might   be
disqualified as a marked ballot.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   Rodrigo   may
change his ballot.
MR. DE CASTRO.  Madam President.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   de   Castro   is
recognized.
MR.   DE   CASTRO.  The   situation   stated   by
Commissioner de los Reyes is apparently covered by
Scheme No. II which we agreed upon earlier. The
 situation   will   not   happen,   because   both   the election get  the  highest  number of  votes,  then  we
Senators   and   the   Congressmen   will   have   five   (5) vote again to get the key majority.
years on the first election. So, the possibility that THE PRESIDENT.  We will do that. Are all the votes
the   Senators   will   have   a   longer   term   than   the in?
Congressmen is remote.
489 COUNTING OF BALLOTS
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 489
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections THE SECRETARY­GENERAL.  Madam President, we
MR. MONSOD.  Madam President. have 43 ballots.
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   Monsod   is THE PRESIDENT.  The Secretary­General will please
recognized. proceed.
MR.   MONSOD.  Madam   President,   it   occurred   to   us THE SECRETARY­GENERAL, reading:
that the three alternatives are not really mutually
exclusive.   Can   we   have   only   these   three:   without Scheme No. I—0
reelection,   with   reelection   and   with   unlimited
Scheme No. II—//
reelection?   We   are   asking   here   for   plurality   only,
Madam President. Can we eliminate? Scheme No. III—/////­/////­/////­/////­/
THE PRESIDENT.  In other words, we shall have the
same   schemes   as   those   for   Senators;   without Scheme No. IV—/////­/////­/////
reelection,   with   one   reelection   and   unlimited
reelection. Scheme No. V—/////­/
REV.   RIGOS.  Madam   President,   besides   we   have
THE   PRESIDENT.  The   results   show   no   vote   for
already submitted our ballots.
Scheme No. I; 2 votes for Scheme No. II; 21 votes for
MR.   MONSOD.  I   withdraw   my   proposal,   Madam
Scheme No. III; 14 votes for Scheme No. IV; and 6
President.
votes for Scheme No. V; Scheme No. III is approved.
MR. GARCIA.  Madam President, I would suggest that
MR. RODRIGO.  Madam President.
the   two   schemes   with   the   highest   votes   be   voted
490
upon   to  get   the  key   majority.   For  example,  if   the 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
schemes   with   two   reelections   and   no   limit   to Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
THE   PRESIDENT.  Commissioner   Rodrigo   is
recognized.
MR.   RODRIGO.  I   would   like   to   ask   a   question   for
clarification.
THE PRESIDENT.  Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO.  If the Members of the Lower House
can   have   two   reelections,   does   this   mean   two
Immediate reelections, or a term of nine consecutive
years?   Let   us   say   that   a   Member   of   the   Lower
House has been reelected twice; that means he will
serve for nine years. Can he let three years elapse
and then run again?
THE PRESIDENT.  We will ask the Chairman of the
Committee   on   the   Legislative   to   answer   the
question.
MR.   DAVIDE.  That   is   correct,   Madam   President,
because   two   reelections   mean   two   successive
reelections.   So   he   cannot   serve   beyond   nine
consecutive years.
MR. RODRIGO.  Consecutively?
MR. DAVIDE.  Consecutively.
MR. RODRIGO.  But after nine years he can let one ...
MR. DAVIDE.  He can rest. He can hibernate for Three
years.
MR. RODRIGO.  And run again.
MR. DAVIDE.  He can run again.
MR.   RODRIGO.  And   again   have   nine   years   as   a
maximum.
MR.   DAVIDE.  I   do   not   know   if   that   is   also   the
thinking of Commissioner Garcia who is the main
proponent   of   this   proposal   on   two   reelections.   I
would seek the opinion of Commissioner Garcia for
the record. (italics supplied for emphasis.) . . .
The   dichotomy   made   in   the   ponencia   between
“voluntary   renunciation   of   the   office”   as   used   in
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and “involuntary severance from
office”   is   unnecessary,   if   not   misplaced.   From   the
discussion in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply
to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term immediately
following   three   consecutive   terms.   Speaking   now   of
Hagedorn,   he   cannot   have   suffered   “involuntary
severance from office” because there was nothing to be
severed; he was not a holder of an office either in a de
jureor de
491
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 491
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
facto capacity.   He   knew   he   was   disqualified   from
seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is,
definitely,   not   synonymous
with involuntary severance.   Even   if   we   concede   that
involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the
continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three­
term   principle   the   rule   laid   down   in Lonzanida   vs.
COMELEC (311   SCRA   609 [1999]),   cited   in   the
ponencia,   page   17,   is   not   applicable   in   the   case   of
Hagedorn.   The   involuntary   severance   referred   to   in
that  case was one  that  took  place during any of the
three terms; hence, the term during which it occurred
should be excluded in the computation. In the case of
Hagedorn,   no   such   involuntary   severance   took   place
during   any   of   his   three   terms   brought   about   by   his
election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998.
More   importantly,   the voluntary
renunciation, referred to in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one
that   takes   place   at  any   time   during   either   the  first,
second, or third term of, the three consecutive terms.
This   is   very   clear   from   the   last   clause   of   Section   8,
Article X of the Constitution, which reads: “shall not
be  considered  as  an  interruption  in  the  continuity   of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective
local official from voluntarily resigning from office for
the   purpose   of   circumventing   the   rule   on   the   belief
that   the   term   during   which   he   resigned   would   be
excluded   in   the   counting   of   the   three­term   rule.   In
short, the provision excluded is intended to impose a
penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery
of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in
the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned
on his third term he would still be barred from seeking
reelection in the May 2001 election.
Hagedorn   cannot   likewise   avail   of   the   ruling
in Adormeo   vs.   COMELEC (G.R.   No.   147927,   4
February   2002, 376   SCRA   90)   because   in   that
case Talaga did  not   win  in   his   second  reelection   bid,
or, for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won
in   the   recall   election   of   12   May   2000. Hagedorn,   as
earlier stated, fully served three successive terms.
Neither   can   we   allow   Hagedorn   to   take   refuge
under   the   exchange   between   Commissioner   Suarez
and Commissioner Davide
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
found   on   page   592,   Vol.   II   of   the   Record   of   the
Constitutional Commission and quoted on pages 19­20
of the ponencia:
SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a
Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have
to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would
that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the
term   is   already   considered   one   term?   So,   half   a
term, which is actually the correct statement, plus
one   term   would   disqualify   the   Senator   concerned
from running? Is that the meaning of this provision
on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE:  Yes,   because   we   speak   of   “term.”   And   if
there is a special election, he will serve only for the
unexpired portion of that particular term plus one
more term for the Senator and two more terms for
the Members of the Lower House.
On   the   contrary,   it   is   clear   from   the   views   of
Commissioners   Suarez   and   Davide   that   the   term   of
office   of   one   who   is   elected   in   a   special   election   is
considered   one term for   purposes   of   determining   the
three consecutive terms.
A   declaration   that   Hagedorn   is   qualified   to   seek
reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who
was   elected   for   a   term   for   which   Hagedorn   was
constitutionally   and   statutorily   disqualified   to   be
reelected to or to hold is to subvert the rationale of the
three­consecutive­term rule and make a mockery of it.
Worse,   it   abets   destructive   endless   partisan   politics
and unsound governance. An elective local official who
is   disqualified   to   seek   a   fourth   term   because   of   the
three­term   limit   but   obsessed   to   hold   on   to   power
would   spend   the   first   year   of   the   fourth   term
campaigning   for   the   recall   of   the   incumbent   in   the
second year of said term. This would not be a problem
if the disqualified official has a solid following and a
strong political machinery. Interestingly, in this case,
as stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of
the   Association   of   Barangay   Captains   of   Puerto
Princesa City is one Mark David M. Hagedorn and he
was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as
interim Chairman.
I therefore vote to grant the petition In G.R. Nos.
155083­84,   to   set   aside   the   resolution   of   the
COMELEC   holding   private   respondent   Edward
Hagedorn   a   qualified   candidate   for   the   position   of
Mayor  of  Puerto  Princesa  City in the  recall  election,
and to declare
493
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 493
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
him   DISQUALIFIED   from   seeking   reelection   for   a
fourth term or from being a candidate for Mayor in the
recall election in question.
CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The correctness of the decision so ably written by Mr.
Justice   Carpio   speaks   for   itself.   Nonetheless,   the
complex   constitutional   dimensions   of   the   issue   for
resolution   compels   this   humble   concurring   opinion.
The issue is whether private respondent Hagedorn is
disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002
recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City and
from  serving  the  unexpired  portion of the 2001­2004
mayoralty   term   considering   that   he   has   thrice   been
consecutively elected and has served three full terms
as   Puerto   Princesa   City   mayor   from   1992­1998.   In
illuminating the gray interstices of this election case,
prudence dictates that “... where the sovereignty of the
people is at stake, we must not only be legally right
but also politically correct.” 1
Private respondent Hagedorn was elected mayor of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in 1992, 1995 and 1998
and   served   three   full   terms.   In   the   May   14,   2001
national and local elections, he ran for governor for the Hagedorn’s   disqualification.   The   following   day,
Province   of   Palawan   and   lost.   Petitioner­intervenor petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. filed a motion
Victorino   Dennis   M.   Socrates   was   elected   mayor   of for   reconsideration   imploring   the   COMELEC en
Puerto Princesa City. banc to   reverse   the   September   20   resolution.   On
On July 2, 2002, three hundred twelve (312) out of
September  23,   2002,  the  COMELEC en   bancaffirmed
five   hundred   twenty   eight   (528)   members   of   the
the resolution of the First Division holding Hagedorn
Barangay   Officials   of   Puerto   Princesa   City   convened
qualified to run in the recall election.
themselves   into   a   Preparatory   Recall   Assembly   to
On   September   24,   2002,   petitioners   Adovo,   Gilo,
initiate   the   recall   of  Mayor   Socrates.   On   August   21,
and Ollave, Sr. sought recourse in this Court with a
2002,   COMELEC   promulgated   Resolution   No.   5673
Very   Urgent   Petition   for   Certiorari   and   Prohibition
prescribing   a   calendar   of   activities   for   the   recall
with   Preliminary   Injunction   and   Prayer   for
election. Two days after, Hagedorn filed his certificate
Temporary,   Restraining   Order.   On   the   same   date,
of candidacy for mayor in said election.
Mayor   Socrates   filed   a   petition­in­intervention   to
On   August   27,   2002,   petitioners   Adovo   and   Gilo
nullify the September 23 resolution of the COMELEC.
sought   for   Hagedorn’s   immediate   disqualification   on
The petitions before us raise the following issues:
the ground that he had served three consecutive full
terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa City immediately “I.
prior to the recall election and was thus pro­
THE   COMELEC   GRAVELY   ABUSED   ITS   DISCRETION
_______________ WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS
NOT   DISQUALIFIED   FROM   RUNNING   FOR   THE
 Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996).
1

POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY IN
494
THE   SCHEDULED   RECALL   ELECTION,   THE   CLEAR.
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
AND   UNAMBIGUOUS   CONSTITUTIONAL   AND
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections STATUTORY   PROHIBITION   AGAINST   A   FOURTH
scribed   by   the   Constitution   from   running   in   said CONSECUTIVE   TERM   FOR   LOCAL   ELECTIVE
election.   On   August   30,   2002,   petitioner   Ollave,   Sr. OFFICIALS NOTWITHSTANDING.
intervened to disqualify Hagedorn on the same ground.
The recall election was set on September 24, 2002. II.
On   September   20,   2002,   public   respondent
COMELEC’s   First   Division   denied   the   petitions   for
 THE   HONORABLE   COMELEC   GRAVELY   ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PROCEEDED
TO DIVIDE A SINGLE TERM OF OFFICE INTO TWO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED  GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE INTENT
AND   PURPOSE   FOR   HOLDING   THE   SCHEDULED
RECALL ELECTIONS FOR THE POSITION OF MAYOR
OF   PUERTO   PRINCESA   CITY   AND   THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BAR AGAINST A
FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM.
495
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 495 disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
IV.
THE   HONORABLE   COMELEC   GRAVELY   ABUSED   ITS
DISCRETION   WHEN   IT   RULED   THAT   RESPONDENT
HAGEDORN IS NOT DISQUALIFIED  FROM  RUNNING
IN   THE   UPCOMING   RECALL   ELECTIONS   AS   HIS
INELIGIBILITY IS NOT APPARENT UNDER SECTIONS
65   AND   68   OF   THE   OMNIBUS   ELECTION   CODE,
SECTIONS   39   AND   40   OF   RA   7160   (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE), AND RULES 23 AND 25 OF THE
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
V.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED  GRAVE
ABUSE   OF   DISCRETION   WHEN   IT   RULED   THAT
RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS QUALIFIED TO RUN IN
THE   RECALL   ELECTION   EVEN   IF   HE   STANDS
DISQUALIFIED   FROM   SERVING   UNDER   A   FOURTH
CONSECUTIVE   TERM   AS   SUCH   IS   ALLEGEDLY   NOT
THE   PROVINCE   OF   THE   INSTANT
DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS.
VI.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED  GRAVE
ABUSE   OF   DISCRETION   WHEN   IT   ISSUED   A
DEFECTIVE AND CLEARLY VOID RESOLUTION.” 2
The foregoing issues may be reduced to the singular
issue of whether or not private respondent Hagedorn is
recall election and serving as mayor of Puerto Princesa
City considering that he has been thrice consecutively
elected and has served three full terms in that position
from 1992 to 2001.
I find the petitions devoid of merit.
Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides:
“Sec.   8.   The   term   of   office   of   elective   local   officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as
_______________
2
 Very   Urgent   Petition   for   Certiorari   and   Prohibition   with
Preliminary   Injunction   and   Prayer   for   Temporary   Restraining   Order
(Petition), pp. 9­10. The Petition­in­Intervention of Mayor Socrates raises
similar issues.
 496
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.”
This  constitutional  provision is restated in the Local
Government Code of 1991, to wit:
“Sec. 43. Term of Office.—. . . (b) No local elective official
shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the   continuity   of   service   for   the   full   term   for   which   the
elective official concerned was elected.”
We   have   not   interpreted   Art.   X,   Sec.   8   of   the
Constitution in the recall election context of the cases
at   bar.   It   is   imperative   to   distill   the   intent   of   the
framers of the Constitution and the people who ratified
it.  Mere reliance on the surface meaning of the words
3 497
of   the   above   provision,   however,   will   not   suffice   to
capture   this   elusive   intent.   Thus,   we   turn   to   the
proceedings   and   debates   of   the   Constitutional
Commission   (ConCom)   as   an   extrinsic   aid   to
interpretation.  The   Record   of   the   Constitutional
4
Commission   shows   that   Art.   X,   Sec.   8   was   readily
accepted   by   the   Commissioners   without   much
discussion; nonetheless,   their   debates   on   setting   the
5
term limit for Representatives show that the rationale
for   the   limit   applies   to   both   Representatives   and
elective local officials. We quote at length the relevant
portions of the debates, to wit:
“MR. GARCIA. I would like to advocate the proposition that
no   further   election   for local   and   legislative   officials be
allowed after a total of three terms or nine years. I have
four   reasons   why   I   would   like   to   advocate   this   proposal,
which   are   as   follows: (1)   to   prevent   monopoly   of   political
power; (2) to broaden the choice of the people; (3) so that no
one is indispensable in running the affairs of the country;
(4) to create a reserve of statesmen both in the national and
local levels. May I explain briefly these four reasons.
_______________
3
 I L. Tañada and F. Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 95­96
(1961).
 R. Martin, Philippine Political Law 27 (New ed. 1998).
4
5
 J.  Bernas, The Intent   of the  1986 Constitution  Writers 699  (1995);
Record of the Constitutional Commission (“Record”), vol. III, pp. 406­408,
451.
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 497
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
First:   To   prevent   monopoly   of   political   power—Our
history has shown that prolonged stay in public office can
lead   to   the   creation   of   entrenched   preserves   of   political
dynasties. In this regard, I would also like to advocate that
immediate   members   of   the   families   of   public   officials   be
barred from occupying the same position being vacated.
Second: To broaden the choice of the, people—Although
individuals have the right to present themselves for public
office, our times demand that we create structures that will
enable more aspirants to offer to serve and to provide the
people a broader choice so that more and more people can be
enlisted to the cause of public service, not just limited only
to those who may have the reason or the advantage due to
their position.
Third: No one is indispensable in running the affairs of
the   country—After   the   official’s   more   than   a   decade   or
nearly a decade of occupying the same public office, I think
we   should   try   to   encourage   a   more   team­oriented
consensual  approach  to  governance  favored  by  a  proposal
that will limit public servants to occupy the same office for
three   terms.   And   this   would   also   favor   not   relying   on
personalities no matter how heroic, some of whom, in fact,
are now in our midst.
Lastly, the fact that we will not reelect people after three
terms   would   also   favor   the   creation   of   a   reserve   of
statesmen both in the national and local levels.
Turnovers   in   public   office   after nine years   will   ensure
that new ideas and new approaches will be welcome. Public
office   will   no   longer   be   a   preserve   of   conservatism   and
tradition.   At   the   same   time,   we   will   create   a   reserve   of
statesmen, both in the national and local levels, since we
will not deprive the community of the wealth of experience
and advice that could come from those who have served for
nine years in public office.
Finally, the concept of public service, if political dynasty
symbolized by prolonged stay in particular public offices is
barred, will have fuller meaning. It will not be limited only
to   those   who   directly   hold   public   office,   but   also   to
consultative bodies organized by the people, among whom
could be counted those who have served in public office with
accomplishment and distinction, for public service must no
longer be limited only to public office.
x x x      x x x      x x x
MR.   MONSOD.   Madam   President,   I   was   reflecting   on
this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in this draft
Constitution,   we   are   recognizing   people   power.   We   have
said   that   now   there   is   a   new   awareness,   a   new   kind   of
voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time, we
are prescreening candidates among whom they will choose.
We   are   saying   that   this   48­member   Constitutional
Commission has decreed that
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
those who have served for a period of nine years are barred
from running for the same position.
The argument is that there may be other positions. But
there   are   some   people   who   are   very   skilled   and   good   at
legislation,   and   yet   are   not   of   a   national   stature   to   be
Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly competent
and with integrity. They get voted into office at the age of 25,
which  is   the   age   we   provide   for   Congressmen.   And   at   34
years old we put them to pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of
the   people.   We   are   talking   here   only   of   congressional   or
senatorial seats. We want to broaden the people’s choice but
we are making a prejudgment today because we exclude a
certain   number   of   people.   We   are,   in   effect,   putting   an
additional   qualification   for   office—that   the   officials   must
not have served a total of more than a number of years in
their lifetime. Third, we are saying that by putting people to
pasture,   we   are   creating   a   reserve   of   statesmen,   but   the
future   participation   of   these   statesmen   is   limited.   Their
skills may only be in some areas, but we are saying that they
are going to be barred from running for the same position.
Madam   President,   the   ability   and   capacity   of   a
statesman depend as well on the day­to­day honing of his
skills   and   competence,   in   intellectual   combat,   in   concern
and contact with the people, and here we are saying that he
is going to be barred from the same kind of public service.
I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very
important and momentous decision with respect to many of
our countrymen in the future who may have a lot more years
ahead of them in the service of their country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do
not set up structures that will perpetuate them, then let us
give   them   this   rest   period   of   three   years   or   whatever   it
is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their
fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree should
not run. But let us not bar them for life after serving the
public for a number of years.
x x x      x x x      x x x
MR. OPLE. . . . The principle involved is really whether
this Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual
disqualification   on   those   who   have   served   their   terms   in
accordance with the limits on consecutive service as decided
by   the   Constitutional   Commission. I   would   be   very   wary
about the Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power
in  order to disqualify those  who  will  already  have   served
their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think
the   Commission   achieves   its   purpose   in   establishing
safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
499
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 499
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
result of consecutive terms. We do put a gap on consecutive
service—in the case of the President, six years; in the case of
the   Vice­President,   unlimited;   and   in   the   case   of   the
Senators,   one   reelection.   In   the   case   of   the   Members   of
Congress,   both   from   the   legislative   districts   and   from   the
party   list   and   sectoral   representation,   this   is   now   under
discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials
will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments.
The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent
future   situations   where,   as   a   result   of   continuous   service
and frequent reelections, officials from the President down
to   the   municipal   mayor   tend   to   develop   a   proprietary
interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers
and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to
transfer   these   posts   to   members   of   their   families   in   a
subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we
put   a   gap   on   the   continuity   or   unbroken   service   of   all   of
these   officials.   But   were   we   now   (to)   decide   to   put   these
prospective servants of the people or politicians, if we want
to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I
have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the
people, whereas we should be giving as much to the people
as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice.
I think the veterans of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives   here   will   say   that   simply   getting
nominated on a party ticket is a very poor assurance that
the people will return them to the Senate or to the House of
Representatives. There are many casualties along the way
of   those   who  want   to  return   to   their   office,   and   it   is   the
people’s decision that matters. They judge whether or not a
Soc   Rodrigo,   a   Sumulong,   a   Padilla,   an   Alonto   and   a
Rosales, after a first and second term, should go back to the
Senate. That is a prerogative of the people that we should
not   take,   away   from   them—the   right   to   judge   those   who
have served. In any case, we already take away from the
people the freedom to vote for the third termers because we
say that a Senator, say, Mr. Rodrigo, is only good for twelve
years. But if he wants to be like Cincinnatus, if he is called
back by his people to serve again, let us say for a period of
six  years—which   Commissioner  Davide   called  a  period  of
hibernation   which   is   spent   at   his   fishpond   in   Bulacan,
Bulacan—because there is a new situation in the country
that   fairly   impels   the   people   to   summon   him   back,   like
Cincinnatus in the past, then there will no longer be any
Cincinnatus.
That is not perhaps a very important point, but I think
we already have succeeded in striking a balance of policies,
so that  the structures,  about   which Commissioner  Garcia
expressed   a   very   legitimate   concern,   could   henceforth
develop   to   redistribute   opportunities,   both   in   terms   of
political and economic power, to the great majority of the
people,   because   very   soon,   we   will   also   discuss   the
multiparty   system.   We   have   unshackled   the   Philippine
politics   from   the   two­party   system,   which   really   was   the
most   critical   support   for   the   perpetuation   of   political
dynasties in the
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Philippines. That is quite a victory, but at the same time,
let us not despise the role of political parties. The strength
of   democracy   will   depend   a   lot   on   how   strong   our
democratic parties are, and a splintering of all these parties
so that we fall back on, let us say, nontraditional parties
entirely will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency
of our democracy . . .
x x x      x x x      x x x
BISHOP   BACANI.   I   think   when   we   voted   on   the
provision that the illiterate be allowed to vote and when we
proposed in this Constitutional Commission for initiative as
a   way   also   of   empowering   our   people   to   engage   in   the
legislative exercise, we are really presupposing the political
maturity   of   our   people.   Why   is   it   that   that   political
maturity seems now to be denied by asking that we should
put   a   constitutional   bar   to   a   further   election   of   any
Representative after a term of three years? Why should we
not   leave   that   to   the   premise   accepted   by   practically
everybody   here   that   our   people   are   politically   mature?
Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient
for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice
for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve
longer?
x x x      x x x      x x x
MR.   GARCIA.   I   would   like   to   answer   Commissioner
Bacani.   We   put   a   constitutional   bar   to   reelection   of   any
Representative basically because of the undue advantage of
the   incumbent.   It   is   not   because   of   lack   of   trust   in   the
people.   We   realize   from   history   that   Mexico   fought   a
revolution   simply   because   of   the   issue   of   reelection. No
reelection, sufragio universal. Basically, it is because of the
undue   advantage   of   the   incumbent   that   he   accumulates
power,   money,   party   machine   or   patronage.   As   regards
what Commissioner Aquino has said, politics is not won by
ideals   alone;   it   is   won   by   solid   organizing   work   by
organizations that have the capacity to do so; and normally
the incumbent has all the advantages . . .
x x x      x x x      x x x
THE   SECRETARY­GENERAL.   Madam   President,   we
have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.
Alternative   No.   1—no   further   election   after   a   total   of
three terms: /////­/////­/////­//
Alternative   No.   2—no   immediate   reelection   after   three
successive terms: /////­/////­/////­/////­/////­/”  (emphasis supplied)
6
In   several   cases,   this   Court   was   guided   by   the
proceedings of the ConCom in construing Art. X, Sec. 8
of the Constitution in relation
_______________
 Record, vol. II, pp. 236­237, 239­240, 243.
6
501
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
to Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Different from the issue presented by the cases at bar,
however,   the   question   in   those   cases   was   what
constitutes a “term” for purposes of counting the three
consecutive terms allowed under Art. X, Sec. 8. It is
apropos to revisit these cases to aid us in extracting
the   intent   behind   said   Constitutional   provision   and
properly   apply   it   to   the   unique   case   of   private
respondent Hagedorn.
The maiden case was Borja, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections and Jose T. Capco  which involved the 1998
7
mayoralty   election   in   Pateros.   In   1989,   private
respondent Capco became mayor by operation of law
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. In 1992,
he  was   elected mayor  for  a   term  ending  in  1995.  In
1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three
years ending in June 1998. In March 1998, he filed his
certificate   of   candidacy   for   the   May   1998   mayoralty
election   of   Pateros.   Petitioner   Borja,   Jr.,   another
candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on
the ground that by June 30, 1998, Capco would have
already  served  as  mayor  for  three consecutive terms
and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another
term. The COMELEC en banc declared Capco eligible
to  run   for  mayor,   thus   Borja,   Jr.   sought   recourse  in
this Court. In dismissing the petition, we considered
the   historical   background   of   Art.   X,   Sec.   8   of   the
Constitution, viz.:
501
“. . . a consideration of the historical background of Article
X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional   Commission   were   as   much   concerned   with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with   preventing   the   monopolization   of   political   power.
Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner
Edmundo   F.   Garcia   that   after   serving   three   consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for
local   and   legislative   officials.   Instead,   they   adopted   the
alternative   proposal   of   Commissioner   Christian   Monsod
that   such   officials   be simply   barred   from   running   for   the
same   position   in   the   succeeding   election   following   the
expiration   of   the   third   consecutive   term (2   RECORD   OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 236­243 [Session
of July 25, 1986] . . .). Monsod warned against ‘prescreening
candidates [from] whom the people will choose’ as a result
of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering  that
the   draft   constitution   contained   provisions   ‘recognizing
people’s power.’
_______________
 295 SCRA 157 (1998).
7
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
x x x      x x x      x x x
Two   ideas   thus   emerge   from   a   consideration   of   the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is
the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about
the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in
office.  The second  is the idea  of election, derived from  the
concern that the right of the people to choose whom they
wish to govern them be preserved. (emphasis supplied)
x x x      x x x      x x x
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials
must   be   taken   to   refer   to   the right   to   be   elected as   well
as the   right   to   serve   in   the   same   elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has   served   three   consecutive   terms   in   an   elective   local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position
for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply.  This  point  can  be  made clearer   by  considering  the
following cases or situations:
Case   No.   1. Suppose   A   is   a   vice­mayor   who   becomes
mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months
before   the   next   election,   he   resigns   and   is   twice   elected
thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election?
Yes,   because   although   he   has   already   first   served   as
mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office
before   the   full   term   expired,   he   has   not   actually   served
three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term
limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the office
is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term only if the term is one “for which he
was elected.” Since A is only completing the service of the
term   for   which   the   deceased   and   not   he   was
elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term.
His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
x x x      x x x      x x x
. . . the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because
the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
provisions   have   not   concurred,   namely,   that   the local
official  concerned  has  been elected three  consecutive  times
and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the
first   case,   even   if   the   local   official   is   considered   to   have
served   three   full   terms   notwithstanding   his   resignation
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has
not been elected three times . . .
Case No. 3. The case of vice­mayor C who becomes mayor
by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions
to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, § 8. Suppose he
is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again
in the next election?
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VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the
first   term   but   simply   found   himself   thrust   into   it   by
operation   of   law.   Neither   had   he   served   the   full   term
because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first
term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection   would   be   not   only   to   falsify   reality   but   also  to
unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they
wish to govern them. If the vicemayor turns out to be a bad
mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not
reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand,
he   proves   to   be   a   good   mayor,   there   will   be   no   way   the
people can return him to office (even if it is just the third
time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first
term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term
limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord
with   the  understanding  of   the  Constitutional   Commission
that while the people should be protected from the evils that
a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should
be   taken   that   their   freedom   of   choice   is   not   unduly
curtailed.”  (Italics supplied)
8
We   reiterated   the Borja   ruling in Lonzanida   v.
Commission   on   Elections,   et   al.  which   involved   the
9 winner.   COMELEC   ruled   that   Lonzanida   was
election for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Prior to
the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner Romeo Lonzanida
served   two   consecutive   terms   as   municipal   mayor   of
San Antonio, Zambales. In the May 1995 elections, he
503 ran for mayor, was proclaimed winner, and assumed
office. His proclamation was, however, contested by his
opponent Juan Alvez in an election protest filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Zambales which rendered a
decision declaring a failure of elections. Upon appeal of
the decision to the COMELEC, Alvez was declared the
duly elected mayor of San Antonio. In February 1998,
the   COMELEC   issued   a   writ   of   execution   ordering
Lonzanida   to   vacate   the   post,   and   Alvez   served   the
remainder of the term.
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy for the
May 11, 1998 election for mayor of San Antonio. His
opponent   Eufemio   Muli   filed   with   the   COMELEC   a
petition to disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he
had   already   served   three   consecutive   terms   in   the
same office and was thus prohibited from running in
the upcoming
_______________
 Id., pp. 163, 165.
8
 311 SCRA 602 (1999).
9
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504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
election. On May 13, 1998, Lonzanida was proclaimed
disqualified   as   his   assumption   to   office   in   1995,
although he was unseated before the expiration of the
term,   was   considered   one   full   term   for   purposes   of
counting the three term limit under the Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991.
On appeal to this Court, we ruled, viz:
“It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected
and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the
May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales  and  was  proclaimed  winner.   He  assumed  office
and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March
1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of
the COMELEC  decision dated  November  13,  1997 on the
election   protest   against   the   petitioner   which   declared   his
opponent   Juan   Alvez,   the   duly   elected   mayor   of   San
Antonio.   Alvez served  the  remaining  portion  of  the  1995­
1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term
rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as
having   been   duly   elected   to   the   post   in   the   May   1995
elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995­1998   mayoral   term   by   reason   of   voluntary
relinquishment of office. After a reappreciation and revision
of   the   contested  ballots   the   COMELEC   itself   declared   by
final  judgment   that  petitioner  Lonzanida  lost  in  the May
1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as a
winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office
as   mayor  cannot   be   deemed   to   have   been   by   reason   of   a
valid election but by reason of a void proclamation . . .
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served
the   May   1995   to   1998   term   because   he   was   ordered   to
vacate   his   post   before   the   expiration   of   the   term.   The
respondents’   contention   that   the   petitioner   should   be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995­1998
because he served the greater portion of that term has no
legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite
for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor
and   he   did   not   hold   office   for   the   full   term;   hence,   his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot
be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three
term limit.”  (Italics supplied)
10
_______________
10
 Lonzanida v. COMELEC, et al., 311 SCRA 602 (1999), pp. 612­
613.
505
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 505
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Finally, in the recent case of Adormeo v. COMELEC,
et al.,  we ruled that a mayor who assumed office via a
11
recall election and served the unexpired portion of the
mayoralty term is not considered to have served a full
term for purposes of applying the three term limit. In
this   case,  therein   private  respondent   Ramon  Talaga,
Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992 and served the full
term. In 1995, he was reelected and again served the
full   term.   In   1998,   he   lost   to   Bernard   G.   Tagarao.
About two years later, a recall election was held where
Talaga, Jr. ran against Tagarao. He (Talaga, Jr.) won
and served the remainder of Tagarao’s term.
 In   view   of   the   upcoming   May   2001   mayoralty
election, Talaga, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy.
On March 2, 2001, therein petitioner Adormeo sought
the cancellation of Talaga, Jr.’s certificate of candidacy
and/or his disqualification on the ground that he had
been thrice elected and had served three consecutive
terms   as   city   mayor.   Talaga,   Jr.,   however,   was
declared   qualified   for   the   position   of   city   mayor.
Adormeo thus sought recourse before this Court.
Citing   the Borja and Lonzanida   rulings, we   ruled
that   Talaga,   Jr.   was   not   disqualified   as   the   two
conditions for disqualification, namely (1) the elective
official   concerned   was   elected   for   three   consecutive
terms   in   the   same   post   and   (2)   he   has   fully   served
three   consecutive   terms,   were   not   met.   We   did   not
consider Talaga, Jr.’s service of the unexpired portion
of Tagarao’s term as service of a fullterm for purposes
of the three term limit. We also ruled that he did not
serve for three consecutive terms as there was a break
in   his   service   when   he   lost   to   Tagarao   in   the   1998
elections. We held, viz:
“COMELEC’s   ruling   that   private   respondent   was   not
elected   for   three   (3)   consecutive   terms   should   be   upheld.
For   nearly   two   years,   he   was   a   private   citizen. The
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in
the 1998 elections.
Patently   untenable   is   petitioner’s   contention   that
COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the
May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution.   (footnote   omitted)   To   bolster   his   case,
respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a
_______________
11
 G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90.
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506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Constitutional   Commission   member,   stating   that   in
interpreting   said   provision   that   ‘if   one   is   elected
representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired (term), no matter how short, will be considered
one   term   for   the   purpose   of   computing   the   number   of
successive terms allowed.’
As   pointed  out   by   the   COMELEC en  banc, Fr.   Bernas’
comment   is   pertinent   only   to   members   of   the   House   of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is
no recall election provided for members of Congress. (Rollo,
pp. 83­84)”  (Italics supplied)
12
The deliberations of the ConCom and the ruling case
law of Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo show that there
are two principal reasons for the three term limit for
elective local officials: (1) to prevent political dynasties
perpetuated by the undue advantage of the incumbent
and (2) to broaden the choice of the people by allowing
candidates   other   than   the   incumbent   to   serve   the
people.   Likewise   evident   in   the   deliberations   is   the
effort   to   balance   between   two   interests,   namely,   the
prevention   of   political   dynasties   and   broadening   the
choice of the people on the one hand, and respecting
the freedom of choice and voice of the people, on the
other;   thus,   the   calibration   between   perpetual
disqualification   after   three   consecutive   terms   as
proposed by Commissioner Garcia, and setting a limit
on   immediate   reelection   and   providing   for   a
hibernation period.
In   all   three   cases—Borja,   Lonzanida and Adormeo
—we   ruled   that   the   “term”   referred   to   in   the   three
term  limit is  service  of  a full term  of three years  for
elective local officials. This ruling furthers the intent
of the ConCom to prevent political dynasties as it is
the service of consecutive full terms that makes service
continuous   and   which   opens   the   gates   to   political
dynasties limiting the people’s choice of leaders. In the
words of Commissioner Ople, “. . . we want to prevent
future   situations   where, as   a   result   of   continuous
service   and   frequent   reelections, officials   from   the
President   down   to   the   municipal   mayor   tend   to
develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to
accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit
them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts
to members of their families in a subsequent election. I
think that
_______________
 Adormeo v. COMELEC, et al., supra, p. 6.
12
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VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity
or unbroken service of all of these officials. (emphasis
supplied)” Thus, ConCom set the limit on consecutive
full terms to no more than three. Otherwise stated, it
is a fourth consecutive full term that is prohibited.
In   the   cases   at   bar,   however,   private   respondent
Hagedorn   will   not   serve   a   prohibited   fourth
consecutive   full   term   as   he   will   be   serving   only
the unexpired   portion   of   the   2001­2004   mayoralty
term. Similar   to Talaga,   Jr.   in   the Adormeo
case, Hagedorn’s   service   as   mayor   will   not   be
continuous from the third to a fourth consecutive full
term as it was broken when Socrates was elected in the
2001   regular   mayoralty   election   and   served   for   one
year. In the same vein that Talaga, Jr. was elected into
office by recall election and his service of the unexpired
portion of the incumbent’s term was not considered a
consecutive   full   term   for   purposes   of   applying   the
three term limit, Hagedorn’s service of the unexpired
portion of Socrates’ term should not also be counted as
a prohibited fourth consecutive full term. It should not
make   a   difference   whether   the   recall   election   came
after   the   second   consecutive   full   term   as   in   the
Adormeo case or after the third consecutive term as in
the cases at bar because the intent to create a hiatus
507 in service is satisfied in both instances.
Even a textual analysis of Art. X, Sec. 8 will yield
the   interpretation   that   what   is   prohibited   is   the
service   of   a   fourth   consecutive full term.   Petitioners
are correct in foisting the view that “term” is a fixed
and   definite  period   of   time   prescribed  by  law   or   the
Constitution during which the public officer may claim
to hold the office as a right. It is a fixed and definite
period of time to hold office, perform its functions, and
enjoy   its   privileges   and   emoluments   until   the
expiration of the period.  In ascertaining what “term”
13
means for elective local officials, the Constitution itself
provides   in   Art.   X,   Sec.   8   that   it   means   a   fixed,
definite,   and full period   of   three   years, viz.:   “Sec.   8.
The   term   of   office   of   elective   local   officials,
except barangay officials,   which   shall   be   determined
by law, shall be three years . . .” Although one or more
persons may discharge the duties of the office during
this fixed three­year period, the term
_______________
 Petition, p. 23, citing Martin and Martin, Administrative Law,
13
Law of Public Officers and Election Law, Revised Edition, p. 173.
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508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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is   not   divided   into   smaller   terms   by   the   number   of
incumbents   who   may   fill   the   office.   It   is   one   and
indivisible, and term follows term in successive cycles
of three years each. If the incumbent or the one elected
to   the   office   fills   a   higher   vacant   office,   refuses   to
assume   office,   fails   to  qualify,   dies,   is   removed   from
office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office,
thereby   creating   a   permanent   vacancy,  the   term 14
would remain unbroken until the recurring election for
the office. 15
The   provisions   on   voluntary   renunciation   under
Art.   X,   Sec.   8   and   other   articles   of   the   Constitution
bolster the interpretation that for purposes of applying
the   three   term   limit,   service   of   a full   term of   three
years is contemplated, viz:
“Art. X, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption   in   the   continuity   of   the   service   for   the full
term for which he was elected.”
“Art. VI, Sec. 4. . . . No Senator shall serve for more than
two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Sec. 7. . . . No Member of the House of Representatives
shall   serve   for   more   than   three   consecutive   terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
x x x      x x x      x x x
 Art. VII, Sec. 4. . . . No Vice­President shall serve more
than   two  successive  terms.   Voluntary  renunciation  of   the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption   in   the   continuity   of   the   service   for   the full
term for which he was elected.” (Italics supplied)
Similarly,   the   Local   Government   Code   of   1991
provides in Sec. 43(b), viz.:
_______________
14
 Local Government Code of 1991, Sec. 44(d).
 See Schardein v. Harrison, et al., 18 S.W. 2d 316 (1929).
15
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VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
“Sec. 43(b) . . . No local elective official shall serve for more
than   three   (3)   consecutive   terms   in   the   same   position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of   service   for   the full   term for   which   the   elective   official
concerned was elected.” (Italics supplied)
Likewise, because “term” is understood to be a fixed,
definite, and full period, the Constitution, in Art. VI,
Sec. 9, uses the qualifier “unexpired term” to refer to
only a portion of a term, viz.:
“Art. VI, Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the
House of Representatives, a special election may be called
to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but
the   Senator   or   Member   of   the   House   of   Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.” (Italics
supplied)
Similarly,   Sec.   44   of   the   Local   Government   Code   of
1991   uses   the   phrase   “unexpired   term”   to   mean   the
remainder of the term, viz.:
“Sec.   44(d).   The   successors   as   defined   herein   shall   serve
only   the unexpired   terms   of   his   predecessors.   .   .”   (Italics
supplied)
Thus,  when  Art. X, Sec. 8  of the Constitution states
that “...no such (local elective) official shall serve for
more   than   three   consecutive   terms,”   it   consistently
means   that   it   allows   service   of   a   maximum   of three
consecutive   full   termsand   prohibits   service   of   a
509 minimum fourth consecutive full term.
In putting a cap on the number of consecutive full
terms an elective local official can serve, the ConCom
sought to curb the undue advantage of the incumbent
over other aspirants, which advantage makes it easier
to   found   a   political   dynasty.   At   the   time   of   the
September 24, 2002 recall election, however, Hagedorn
was not the incumbent favored with this feared “undue
advantage of the incumbent.” On the contrary, he ran
against the incumbent Mayor Socrates who alone could
be the subject of recall election and who, by law, was
automatically a candidate in the election.  Hagedorn 16
_______________
 Section 71 of the Local  Government  Code  of 1991 provides in
16
relevant part, viz.:
“Section   71.   .   .   .   The   official   or   officials   sought   to   be   recalled   shall
automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty election of
Puerto   Princesa   City   which   Socrates   won,   precisely
because he was aware of the three term limit.
It is my respectful submission that the Constitution
and   the  Local   Government  Code  of   1991   proscribe  a
local official who has been thrice consecutively elected
in regular elections and has served three full terms in
the   same   position,   from   running   in   the regular
election succeeding   his   third   consecutive   term.   It   is
this   situation   that   is   prohibited   because   it   makes
possible service   of   more   than   three   consecutive   and
continuous   full   terms,   i.e.,   service   of   a   fourth
consecutive  full  term. We cannot  overstress   that  it  is
this   continuousness   that   the   ConCom   feared   would
open the gates to the two evils sought to be avoided:
the incumbent’s use of his undue advantage to put up
a political dynasty and limiting the people’s choice of
leaders. It is in this context of regular elections that
our obiter   dictum in   the Lonzanida   case,   which
petitioners   harp   on,   should   be   understood.   In   that
case,  we  opined  that   “[a]s   finally  voted  upon,   it   was
agreed that an elective local government official should
be barred from running for the same post after three
consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term,
he may again run for the same office.” Indeed, insofar
17
as   regular   local   elections   are   concerned,   which   were
the elections involved in that case, there should be a
hiatus of at least one full term of three years.
On the other hand, in the case of a local official who
assumes office through a recall election—whether after
his first, second, or third consecutive term—there is a
break   in   his   service   caused   by   the   election   of   the
incumbent   who   was   recalled.   Even   in   the   case   of   a
local   official   who   initially   assumes   office   via   recall
election,   then   wins   the   two   succeeding   regular
elections and serves two full terms in the same post,
he   is   not   prohibited   from   seeking   another   reelection
and serving another full term. This is so because his
service of the remainder of the incumbent’s term via
recall election is not, in reality and in law, a full term
continuing on to his three succeeding
_______________
candidates   to   the   pertinent   positions   and,   like   other
candidates, shallbe entitled to be voted upon.”
 Petition, p. 18, citing Lonzanida v. Comelec, supra, p. 609.
17
511
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002 511
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
full terms. Local officials who assume office via recall
election   serve   only   the   unexpired   portion   of   the
incumbent’s term and this service is not counted as a
full term, despite the Constitutional mandate that the
term of office of elective local officials is three years.
Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of
the   Constitution   also   prescribe   synchronization   of
regular national and local elections beginning on the
second Monday of May 1992, which is accomplished if
18
the   local   official   who   assumes   office   through   recall
election serves only the incumbent’s unexpired term.
It   is   only   in   the   case   of   Representatives   (and
Senators)   that   “if   one   is   elected   Representative   to
serve  the unexpired  term  of  another,  that   unexpired
term   will   be   considered   one   term   for   purposes   of
computing   the   number   of   successive   terms
allowed.”  The   election   herein   contemplated   is   a
19
special   election   thus   this   Constitutional   intent   does
not   apply   to   a   recall   election   which   involves   only
elective local officials. The Record bear this out, viz.:
“MR.   SUAREZ.   .   .   May   we   ask   a   clarificatory   question
regarding the interpretation of the provisions in Sections 3
and 6 in relation to Section 9 regarding the disqualification
on the part of the Senator to run for two consecutive terms,
and   in   the   case   of   the   Members   of   the   House   of
Representatives, for three consecutive terms. For example,
a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator
newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of
the   term.   Would   that   mean   that   serving   the   unexpired
portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half
a  term,   which  is  actually  the  correct  statement,   plus  one
term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running?
Is   that   the   meaning   of   this   provision   on   disqualification,
Madam President?
MR.   DAVIDE.   Yes,   because we  speak  of   “term”  and   if
there   is   a   special   election,   he   will   serve   only   for   the
unexpired   portion   of   that   particular   term   plus   one   more
term for the Senator and two terms for the Members of the
Lower House.” 20
As   we   ruled   in   the Adormeo   case, service   of   an
unexpired term is considered service of a full term only
with respect to Representa­
_______________
 Osmena, et al. v. Del Mar, et al., 199 SCRA 750 (1991).
18
 II J. Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines:
19
A Commentary 96 (First ed. 1988).
 Record, vol. II, p. 592.
20
512
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
tives (and Senators) because unlike local government
officials,   Representatives   cannot   be   recalled.   It   is
continuous   prolonged   stay   in   office   that   breeds
political  dynasties. Understandably therefore, insofar
as   Representatives   who   cannot   be   recalled   are
concerned,   service   of   an   unexpired   term   is   strictly
counted as service of a full term because the purpose of
the   ConCom   was   to   limit   the   right   to   run   and   be
elected in Congress. 21
In   allowing   Hagedorn   to   participate   in   the
September 24 recall election, we are not unmindful of
the   intent   of   the   ConCom   to   broaden   the   people’s
choice of leaders. The three term limit was adopted to
allow the electorate to choose from other candidates in
the regular   electionsucceeding   the   incumbent’s   third
consecutive term. This is clear in the Commissioners’
alternatives   for   voting   on   the   term   limit   for
Representatives and the outcome of their voting where
17 voted for “no further election after a total of three
terms” and 26 voted for “no immediate reelectionafter
three successive terms.” A reelection is immediate if a
local official wins in the election succeeding the third
consecutive term.  This is not the case with Hagedorn
22
who did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty election
and   left   that   political   arena   to   other   contenders,
thereby   upholding   the   intent   of   the   ConCom   to
broaden the choice of the electorate.
The intent of the ConCom to create a hiatus in the
service of elective local officials after three consecutive
full terms cannot be undermined through abuse of the
power of recall. The Local Government Code of 1991
provides limitations on recall in Section 74, viz.:
“Section   74. Limitations   on   Recall.—(a)   any   elective   local
official   may   be   the   subject   of   a   recall   election   only   once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
date   of   the   official’s   assumption   to   office or   one   (1)   year
immediately   preceding   a   regular   local   election.”   (Italics
supplied)
_______________
 Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., supra, p. 167.
21
 Id., p. 163.
22
513
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 12, 2002
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Thus, an elective local official cannot perpetually hold
on to his office through the mechanism of recall as at
the very least, there will be a hiatus of one year after
an   unbroken   service   of   three   terms.   He   could   not
simply create, in the words of Commissioner Monsod,
“structures that will perpetuate him (them)” in power
with   the   assurance   that   they   will   not   be   exposed
because after serving three consecutive full terms, he
will certainly be replaced. Within the one­year period
under Sec. 74, his successor could discover and begin
to dismantle these manipulative structures. This one
year   period   also   provides   a   reasonable   basis   for   the
electorate to judge the performance of the incumbent
successor, thus obviating fear of political maneuvering
through   initiation   of   recall   proceedings   by   a
Preparatory Recall Assembly dominated by minions of
the previous local official.  In Claudio v. COMELEC, et
23
al., we held, viz.:
24
_______________
23
 Section 70 of the Local Government Code provides, viz.:
“Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process.—(a) Recall may be initiated by a
preparatory   recall   assembly   or   by   the   registered   voters   of   the   local
government   unit   to   which   the   local   elective   official   subject   to   such   recall
belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city,
district, and municipality which shall be composed of the following:
1. (1)Provincial   level.   All   mayors,   vice­mayors,
and sanggunian members   of   the   municipalities   and   component
513 cities;
 2. (2)City   level.   All punong   barangay and sanggunian
barangay members in the city;
3. (3)Legislative   district   level.   In   cases   where sangguniang
panlalawiganmembers   are   elected   by   district,   all   elective
municipal officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang
panglungsod members   are   elected   by   district,   all
elective barangay officials in the district; and
4. (4)Municipal   level.   All punong   barangay and sangguniang
barangay members in the municipality.
(c)   A   majority   of   all   the   preparatory   recall   assembly   members   may
convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against
any   elective   official   in   the   local   government   unit   concerned.   Recall   of
provincial,   city,   or   municipal   officials   shall   be   validly   initiated   through   a
resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall
assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.”
 331 SCRA 388 (2000).
24
514
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
“In the Bower case (In re Bower 41 Ill. 777, 242 N.E. 2d 252
[1968]) cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC (269
SCRA 245, 256 [1997]), it was held that ‘The only logical
reason  which we  can ascribe  for requiring the electors  to
wait   one   year   before petitioning for   recall   election   is   to
prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove
a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to
evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions.’ ” 25
If,   after   one   year   in   office,   the   incumbent   proves
himself   to   be   worthy   of   his   position,   then   his
constituents will confirm this should a recall election
be called, as in the case of Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of
Caloocan  City.   If,   on   the  other   hand,   the   incumbent
turns out to be an ineffective leader, there is no reason
why   the   electorate   should   not   be  allowed   to  make   a
Cincinnatus of their past leader.
The imagined fear of  abuse of  the  power of  recall
does   not   suffice   to   disqualify   private   respondent
Hagedorn and should not prevail over the resounding
voice of the people of Puerto Princesa City. They have
spoken   and   there   is   no   mistaking   that   Hagedorn   is
their overwhelming choice. We cannot subscribe to the
petitioners’ position and allow an overly literal reading
of the law to mute the electorate’s cry and curtail their
freedom to choose their leaders. This freedom was as
much a concern of the ConCom as was the prevention
of political dynasties and broadening the choice of the
people.   This   Court   has   not   just   once   admonished
against a too literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of the authors. 26
In   sum,   private   respondent   Hagedorn   is   not
disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002
recall election as the disqualification under Art. X, Sec.
8 of the Constitution applies to the regular mayoralty
election succeeding the third consecutive term served.
Nor is he precluded from serving the unexpired portion
of the 2001­2004 mayoralty term as this is not service
of a prohibited fourth consecutive full term.
I vote to deny the petition, giving due consideration
to   the   tenet   of   representative   democracy   that   the
people should be allowed to
_______________

 Claudio v. COMELEC, et al., supra, p. 406.
25

 Paras v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 491 (1996).
26

515
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 13, 2002 515
Danao vs. Franco, Jr.
choose whom they wish to govern them.  In the end, “. .
27

. more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment
of   the  tribunal   of  the   people   is  final   for  ‘sovereignty
resides   in   the   people   and   all   government   authority
emanates from them.’ ” 28

Petitions dismissed.
Note.—Public interest and the sovereign will of the
people expressed in their ballot must at all times be
the   paramount   consideration   in   all   election
controversy.   (Olondriz,   Jr.   vs.   Commission   on
Elections, 313 SCRA 128[1999])
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001. *
ANG BAGONG BAYANI­OFW LABOR PARTY (under
the   acronym   OFW),   represented   herein   by   its
secretary­general,   MOHAMMAD   OMAR   FAJARDO,
petitioner, vs.COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS;
CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA
DROGA;   GO!   GO!   PHILIPPINES;   THE   TRUE
MARCOS   LOYALIST   ASSOCIATION   OF   THE
PHILIPPINES;   PHILIPPINE   LOCAL   AUTONOMY;
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL
ESTATE   BUILDERS   ASSOCIATION;   SPORTS   &
HEALTH   ADVANCEMENT   FOUNDATION,   INC.;
ANG   LAKAS   NG   OVERSEAS   CONTRACT
WORKERS   (OCW);   BAGONG   BAYANI
ORGANIZATION   and   others   under
“Organizations/Coalitions” of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785;   PARTIDO   NG   MASANG   PILIPINO;   LAKAS
NUCD­UMDP;   NATIONALIST   PEOPLE’S
COALITION;   LABAN   NG   DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP­LABAN;
LIBERAL   PARTY;   NACIONALISTA   PARTY;   ANG
BUHAY   HAYAANG   YUMABONG;   and   others   under
“Political   Parties”   of   Omnibus   Resolution   No.   3785,
respondents.
G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001. *
BAYAN   MUNA,   petitioner,   vs.   COMMISSION   ON
ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE’s COALITION
(NPC); LABAN NG DE
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
699
VOL. 359, JUNE 6, 2001 699
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
MOKRATIKONG   PILIPINO   (LDP);   PARTIDO   NG
MASANG   PILIPINO   (PMP);   LAKAS­NUCD­UMDP;
LIBERAL   PARTY;   MAMAMAYANG   AYAW   SA
DROGA;   CREBA;   NATIONAL   FEDERATION   OF
SUGARCANE   PLANTERS;   JEEP;   and   BAGONG
BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
Election   Law; Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings   and
Practice; Under   both   the   Constitution   and   the   Rules   of
Court, a challenge on the validity of a Comelec Resolution
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion may
be brought before the Supreme Court in a verified petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.—At bottom, petitioners attack
the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having
been   issued   with   grave   abuse   of   discretion,   insofar   as   it
allowed respondents to participate in the party­list elections
of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules
of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court
in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions   for
Reconsideration; No motion for reconsideration of a Comelec
en banc resolution, order or decision is possible, the same
being   a   prohibited   pleading.—The   assailed   Omnibus
Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en
banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari   is   available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, “where the
issue raised is  one purely  of   law,  where  public   interest   is
involved, and in case of urgency.”—In any event, this case
presents   an   exception   to  the   rule  that   certiorari   shall   lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.   It   has   been   held   that   certiorari   is   available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, “where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency.” Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency,   for   it   potentially   involves   the   composition   of   20
percent of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; Educative   Function   of   the
Supreme Court.—Moreover, this case raises transcendental
constitutional   issues   on   the   party­list   system,   which   this
Court   must   urgently   resolve,   consistent   with   its   duty   to
“formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules.”
700
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission
on Elections
Same; Same; Same; Procedural   requirements   “may   be
glossed over   to  prevent  a  miscarriage  of   justice,   when  the
issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the
decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need
for   relief   is   extremely   urgent.”—Procedural   requirements
“may   be   glossed   over   to   prevent   a   miscarriage   of   justice,
when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x
when   the   decision   sought   to   be   set   aside   is   a   nullity,   or
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari
is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.”
Same; Party­List   System; Under   the   Constitution   and
Republic   Act   (RA)   7941,   political   parties   cannot   be
disqualified   from   the   party­list   elections   merely   on   the
ground that they are political parties.—We now rule on this
issue.   Under   the   Constitution   and   RA   7941,   private
respondents   cannot   be   disqualified   from   the   party­list
elections,   merely   on   the   ground   that   they   are   political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides
that   members   of   the   House   of   Representatives   may   “be
elected through a party­list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
Same; Same; The key words in the statutory policy set
out   in   RA   7941   are   “proportional   representation,”
“marginalized   and   underrepresented,”   and   “lack   [of]   well­
defined constituencies.”—The foregoing provision mandates
a state policy of promoting proportional representation by
means   of   the   Filipino­style   party­list   system,   which   will
“enable”   the   election   to   the   House   of   Representatives   of
Filipino   citizens,   1.   who   belong   to   marginalized   and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2.
who   lack   well­defined   constituencies;   but   3.   who   could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key
words   in   this   policy   are   “proportional   representation,”
“marginalized   and   underrepresented,”   and   “lack   [of]   well­
defined constituencies.”
Same; Same; Words   and   Phrases; “Proportional
representation” does not refer to the number of people in a
particular   district,   but   rather   to   the   representation   of   the
“marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the
enumeration   in   Section   5   of   the   law—namely,   “labor,
peasant,   fisherfolk,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas   workers,   and   professionals.”—“Proportional
representation” here does not refer to the number of people
in   a   particular   district,   because   the   party­list   election   is
national   in   scope.   Neither   does   it   allude   to   numerical
strength   in   a   distressed   or   oppressed   group.   Rather,   it
refers   to   the   representation   of   the   “marginalized   and
underrepresented”   as   exemplified   by   the   enumeration   in
Section 5 of the
701
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 701
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission
on Elections
law;   namely,   “labor,   peasant,   fisherfolk,   urban   poor,
indigenous   cultural   communities,   elderly,   handicapped,
women,   youth,   veterans,   overseas   workers,   and
professionals.”
Same; Same; The party­list organization or party must
factually   and   truly   represent   the   marginalized   and
underrepresented   constituencies   mentioned   in   Section   5,
and   the   persons   nominated   by   the   party­list   candidate­
organization   must   be   “Filipino   citizens   belonging   to
marginalized   and   underrepresented   sectors,   organizations
and parties.”—It is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation  of  the  marginalized and  underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The
partylist   organization   or   party   must   factually   and   truly
represent   the   marginalized   and   underrepresented
constituencies   mentioned   in   Section   5.   Concurrently,   the
persons nominated by the party­list candidate­organization
must   be   “Filipino   citizens   belonging   to   marginalized   and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Lack of well­defined
constituenc[y]”   refers   to   the   absence   of   a   traditionally
identifiable electoral groups, like voters of a congressional
district   or   territorial   unit   of   government.—“Lack   of   well­
defined   constituenc[y]”   refers   to   the   absence   of   a
traditionally   identifiable   electoral   group,   like   voters   of   a
congressional   district   or   territorial   unit   of   government.
Rather,   it   points   again   to   those   with   disparate   interests
identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”
Same; Same; Statutory   Construction; Noscitur   A
Sociis; It   is   a   fundamental   principle   of   statutory
construction   that   words   employed   in   a   statute   are
interpreted   in   connection   with,   and   their   meaning   is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with
which   they   are   associated   or   related.—While   the
enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors
is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law
that not all sectors can be represented under the party­list
system.   It   is   a   fundamental   principle   of   statutory
construction   that   words   employed   in   a   statute   are
interpreted   in   connection   with,   and   their   meaning   is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with
which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of
a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized
by those in immediate association.
Same; Same; The   party­list   system   seeks   to   enable
certain   Filipino   citizens.—specifically   those   belonging   to
marginalized   and   underrepresented   sectors,   organizations
and parties—to be elected to the House of Representatives,
and the assertion of the Office of the Solicitor General that
the party­list  system  is not  exclusive  to  the  marginalized
and underrepre
702
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission
on Elections
sented   disregards   the   clear   statutory   policy.—The
declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the
Office   of   the   Solicitor   General   (OSG).   We   stress   that   the
party­list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens—
specifically   those   belonging   to   marginalized   and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be
elected  to   the  House   of   Representatives.   The   assertion   of
the OSG that the party­list system is not exclusive to the
marginalized   and   underrepresented   disregards   the   clear
statutory   policy.   Its   claim   that   even   the   super­rich   and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party­list system.
Same; Same; Allowing   the   non­matginalized   and
overrepresented   to   vie   for   the   remaining   seats   under   the
party­list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice
the   chance   of   the   marginalized   and   underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it.—Verily,
allowing the  non­marginalized and overrepresented to  vie
for the remaining seats under the party­list system would
not   only dilute, but   also prejudice the   chance   of   the
marginalized   and   underrepresented,   contrary   to   the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party­list system is a
tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not
have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the
intended beneficiaries.
Same; Same; Constitutional   Law; Statutory
Construction; Verba   Legis; The   fundamental   principle   in
constitutional construction is that the primary source from
which   to   ascertain   constitutional   intent   or   purpose   is   the
language of the provision itself.—The fundamental principle
in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary
source   from   which   to   ascertain   constitutional   intent   or
purpose   is   the   language   of   the   provision   itself.   The
presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions   are  couched  express   the  objective   sought   to  be
attained.   In   other   words, verba   legis still   prevails.   Only
when   the   meaning   of   the   words   used   is   unclear   and
equivocal   should   resort   be   made   to   extraneous   aids   of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed.
 Same; Same; Same; The   function   of   all   judicial   and
quasi­judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they
find  it,   not   to  reinvent   or  second­guess   it.—When   a  lower
court,   or   a   quasi­judicial   agency   like   the   Commission   on
Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its
action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial
and quasi­judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second­guess it.
703
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001
Ang Bagong Bayqni-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission
on Elections
Same; Same; Guidelines   for   Screening   Party­List
Participants,—The   Court,   therefore,   deems   it   proper   to
remand the case to the Comelec fqr the latter to determine,
after   summary   evidentiary   hearings,   whether   the   154
parties   and   organizations   allowed   to   participate   in   the
party­list   elections   comply   with   the   requirements   of   the
law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down
the   following   guidelines,   culled   from   the   law   and   the
Constitution,   to   assist   the   Comelec   in   its   work. First, the
political   party,   sector,   organization   or   coalition   must
represent   the   marginalized   and   underrepresented   groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. Second, while even major
political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution   to   participate   in   the   party­list   system,   they
must   comply   with   the   declared   statutory   policy   enabling
Filipino   citizens   belonging   to   marginalized   and
underrepresented   sectors   to   be   elected   to   the   House   of
Representatives. Third, the   religious   sector   may   not   be
represented in the party­list system. Fourth, a party or an
organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA
7941. Fifth, the   party   or   organization   must   not   be   an
adjunct   of,   or   a   project   organized   or   an   entity   funded   or
assisted by, the government. Sixth, the party must not only
comply   with   t)ie   requirements   of   the   law.   Its   nominees
must   likewise   do   so. Seventh, not   only   candidate   party   or
organization   must   represent   marginalized   and
underrepresented   sectors.   So   also   must   its
nominees. Eighth, while   lacking   a   well­defined   political
703 constituency,   the   nominee   must   likewise   be   able   to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
VITUG, J,, Separate (Dissenting) Opinion:
Election   Law; Party­List   System; Neither   Article   6,
Section 5(2) of the Constitution, nor R.A. 7941 intended to
guarantee   representation   to   all   sectors   of   society   and,   let
alone,   hand   it   over   only   to   underrepresented   and
marginalized sectors.—It would seem to me that, construed
along with Section 3(d) of the statute, defining a “sectoral
party,”   the   enumeration   was   intended   to   qualify   only
“sectoral   parties”   and   not   the   other   eligible   groups   (e.g.,
political   parties,   sectoral   organizations   and   coalitions).
Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R,A, 7941 intended to
guarantee  representation  to  all   sectors   of   society  and,   let
alone,   hand   it   over   only   to   underrepresented   and
marginalized   sectors.   The   real   aim,   if   the   will   of   the
majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to
introduce the concept of party­list representation.
 Same; Same; Words   and   Phrases; “Political   Party,”
“Sectoral  Party,” “Sectoral Organization,” and “Coalition,”
Defined; The party­list system is limited to four groups—1)
political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission
on Elections
organizations,   and   4)   coalitions.—The   party­list
system   is   limited   to   four   groups—1)   political   parties,   2)
sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions.
A   political   party   is   an   organized   group   of   citizens
advocating   an  ideology,   or   platform,   principles   or   policies
for  the   general   conduct   of   government   and   which,   as   the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as   candidates   for   public   office.   A   sectoral   party   is   an
organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors,
such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the
1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban
poor,   indigenous   cultural   communities   and   women   and
those   added   by   R.A.   7941   like   the   fisherfolk,   elderly,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals.
A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the
same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests  or  concerns.   Coalition   is  an   aggrupation  of   duly
registered   national,   regional,   sectoral   parties   or
organizations for election purposes.
Same; Same; A feature of the party­list system is that
political   parties,   sectoral   groups   and   organizations,
coalitions   and   aggrupation   acquire   the   status   of
“candidates” and their nominees relegated to mere agents.—
A feature of the party­list system is that political parties,
sectoral   groups   and   organizations,   coalitions   and
aggrupation   acquire   the   status   of   “candidates”   and   their
nominees   relegated   to   mere   agents.   Thus,   if   a   party­list
representative   dies,   becomes   physically   incapacitated,
removed   from   office   by   the   party   or   the   organization   he
represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his
party   can   send   another   person   to   take   his   place   for   the
remaining   period,   provided   the   replacement   is   next   in
succession   in   the   list   of   nominees   submitted   to   the
COMELEC   upon   registration.   Furthermore,   a   party­list
representative   who   switches   party   affiliations   during   his
term   forfeits   his   seat.   So,   also,   if   a   person   changes   his
sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he
will   not   be   eligible   for   nomination   in   party­list
representative under his new party or organization.
Same; Same; Constitutional   Law; Statutory
Construction; Judicial   Legislation; Courts   are   bound   to
suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application
of  constitutional  provisions  according to their  plain terms
and import have been considered in advance and accepted
as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by
countervailing advantages; The ponencia itself, in ruling as
it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial
review   and   treading   the   dangerous   waters   of   judicial
legislation,   and   more   importantly,   of   a   constitutional
amendment.—The   polestar   in   the   constructions   of
constitutions always remains—“effect
705
 VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 705 urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission youth   sectors.—“The   most   important   single   factor   in
on Elections determining   the   intention   of   the   people   from   whom   the
must   be   given   to   the   intent   of   the   framers   of   the
organic law and of the people adopting it.” The law, in its
clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow­room
for   construction.   Courts   are   bound   to   suppose   that   any
inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional
provisions according to their plain terms and import have
been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable
than   those   avoided,   or   as   compensated   by   countervailing
advantages.   The ponencia itself,   in   ruling   as   it   does,   may
unwittingly,   be   crossing   the   limits   of   judicial   review   and
treading  the  dangerous  waters  of   judicial   legislation,   and
more   importantly,   of   a   constitutional   amendment.   While,
the   lament   of   herein   petitioners   is   understandable,   the
remedy   lies   not   with   this   Court   but   with   the   people
themselves   through   an   amendment   of   their   work   as   and
when better counsel prevails.
MENDOZA, J., Dissenting opinion:
Election   Law; Party­List   System; Constitutional
Law; Statutory   Construction;   The   most   important   single
factor in determining the intention of the people from whom
the   Constitution   emanated   is   the   language   in   which   it   is
expressed;   Textually,   Art.   VI,   §5(1)(2)   of   the   Constitution
provides no basis for petitioners’ contention that whether it
is sectoral representation or party­list system the purpose is
to   provide   exclusive   representation   for   “marginalized
sectors,” by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant,
Constitution   emanated   is   the   language   in   which   it   is
expressed.”   The   text   of   Art.   VI,   §5(1)(2)   is   quite   clear.   It
provides for a party­list system of “registered, regional, and
sectoral   parties   or   organizations,”   not   for   sectoral
representation. Only for three consecutive terms following
the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to
one­half   of   the  seats   allotted  to  party­list   representatives
does   it   allow   sectoral   representation.   Textually,   Art.   VI,
§5(1)(2)   provides   no   basis   for   petitioners’   contention   that
whether   it   is   sectoral   representation   or   party­list   system
the   purpose   is   to   provide   exclusive   representation   for
“marginalized sectors,” by which term petitioners mean the
labor,   peasant,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To the extent that it assures
parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature
that   reflects   their   public   support,   the   party­list   system
enables   marginalized   and   underrepresented   sectors   to
obtain   seats   in   the   House   of   Representatives.—Under   the
partylist system, a party or candidate need not come in first
in order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand,
in the “winner­take­all” single
706
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission
on Elections
 seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are
wasted   as   only   those   who   vote   for   the   winner   are
represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or
candidates   a   percentage   of   seats   in   the   legislature   that
reflects their public support, the party­list system enables
marginalized   and   underrepresented   sectors   (such   as,   but
not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain
seats   in   the   House   of   Representatives.   Otherwise,   the
party­list system does not guarantee to these sectors seats
in the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The   deliberations   of   the
Constitutional Commission show that the party­list system
is not limited to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors   referred   to   by   petitioners,   but   that   it   is   a   type   of
proportional representation intended to give voice to those
who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a
district   but   are   sufficiently   numerous   to   give   them   a  seat
nationwide.—The   deliberations   of   the   Constitutional
Commission show that the party­list system is not limited
to   the   “marginalized   and   underrepresented”   sectors
referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous   cultural   communities,   women,   and   the   youth,
but that it is a type of proportional representation intended
to   give   voice   to   those   who   may   not   have   the   necessary
number   to   win   a   seat   in   a   district   but   are   sufficiently
numerous   to   give   them   a   seat   nationwide.   It,   therefore,
misreads   the   debates   on   Art.   VI,   §5(1)(2)   to   say   that
“Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in
their   proposals   as   to   the   details   of   the   party­list   system,
both   proponents   worked   within   the   framework   that   the
party­list   system   is   for   the   ‘marginalized’   as   termed   by
Comm. Villacorta and the ‘underrepresented’ as termed by
Comm.   Monsod,   which   he   defined   as   those   which   are
“always third or fourth place in each of the districts.”
Same; Same; Same; The   Supreme   Court   cannot   hold
that the partylist system is reserved for the labor, peasants,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth   without   changing   entirely   the   meaning   of   the
Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of
the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6
that “A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve
according   to   the   free   choice   of   the   people,   subject   to   the
provisions of this Article.”—A problem was placed before the
Constitutional Commission that the existing “winner­take­
all”   one­seat   district   system   of   election   leaves   blocks   of
voters   underrepresented.   To   this   problem   of
underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral
representation   and   party­list   system   or   proportional
representation.   The   Constitutional   Commission   chose   the
party­list system, This Court cannot hold that the party­list
system is reserved for the labor,
707
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 707
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission
on Elections
peasants,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
communities,   women,   and   youth   as   petitioners   contend
without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution
which in fact mandates exactly the Opposite of the reserved
seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that “A free
and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according
to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of
this   Article.”   Thus,   neither   textual   nor   historical
consideration yields support for the view that the party­list
system   is   designed   exclusively   for   labor,   peasant,   urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
sectors.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. 
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Neri, Javier, Colmenares for   petitioner   Bayan
Muna.
     The Solicitor General for COMELEC.
     Chan, Robles   and   Associates for   Citizens   Drug
Watch Foundation, Inc.
     Cruz, Cruz & Navarro III for Mamamayan Ayaw
sa Droga.
     Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin &
Martinez   Law   Offices for   The   True   Marcos   Loyalist
Association of the Philippines.
     Fracis   A,   Ver for   Phil.   Local   Autonomy
Movement.
     Yap, Crisanto, Salvador & Calderon and Fornier
&   Fornier   Law   Office for   Chamber   of   Real   Estate
Builders Association.
     McAskell, Equilla,   &   Associates for   Ang   Lakas
ng Overseas Contract Workers.
     Juan   Carlos   T.   Cuna and Antonio   Dollete
&Associates for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
     Buhag, Kapunan, Migallos   &   Perez for   Aksyon
Demokratiko.
     Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.
     Yulo   and   Bello   Law   Offices for   LAKAS­NUCD­
UMDP.
     Ceferino   Padua   Law   Office, Gerardo A. Del
Afundo   Law   Office and Antonio   R.   Bautista   &
Partners for Bagong Bayani Organization.
708
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party­list system is a social justice tool designed
not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become   veritable   lawmakers   themselves,   empowered
to   participate   directly   in   the   enactment   of   laws
designed   to   benefit   them.   It   intends   to   make   the
marginalized   and   the   underrepresented   not   merely
passive recipients of the State’s benevolence, but active
participants   in   the   mainstream   of   representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups,
including those which now dominate district elections,
to have the same opportunity to participate in party­
list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize   the   social   justice   mechanism   into   an
atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rales
of   Court,   challenging   Omnibus   Resolution   No.
3785  issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
1 a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate
on   March   26,   2001.   This   Resolution   approved   the
participation   of   154   organizations   and   parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party­
list   elections.   Petitioners   seek   the   disqualification   of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party­list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented;   not   the   mainstream   political
parties, the non­marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With   the   onset   of   the   2001   elections,   the   Comelec
received   several   Petitions   for   registration   filed   by
sectoral   parties,   organizations   and   political   parties.
According to the Comelec, “[verifications were made as
to   the   status   and   capacity   of   these   parties   and
organizations   and   hearings   were   scheduled   day   and
night   until   the   last   party   w[as]   heard.   With   the
number of these petitions and the
_______________
 Signed   by   Chairman   Alfredo   L.   Benipayo   and   Commissioners
1
Luzviminda   G.   Tancangco,   Rufino   S.B.   Javier,   Ralph   C.   Lantion,
Mehol K. Sadain, Resurrecion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
709
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 709
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
observance of the legal and procedural requirements,
review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes
a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as
Omnibus   Resolution   and   individual   resolution   on
political   parties.   These   numerous   petitions   and
processes observed in the disposition of these petition
[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions
of  the Divisions  which were promulgated  only on  10
February 2001.” 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline
prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December   22,   2000,   the   registered   parties   and
organizations   filed   their   respective   Manifestations,
stating their intention to participate in the party­list
elections.   Other   sectoral   and   political   parties   and
organizations   whose   registrations   were   denied   also
filed   Motions   for   Reconsideration,   together   with
Manifestations   of   their   intent   to   participate   in   the
party list elections. Still other registered parties filed
their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The   Comelec   gave   due   course   or   approved   the
Manifestations   (or   accreditations)   of   151   parties   and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed   March   26,   2001   Omnibus   Resolution   No.
3785, which we quote:
“We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in that said certified list be accordingly amended.” It also
mind   that   this   system   of   proportional   representation asked,   as   an   alternative,   that   the   votes   cast   for   the
scheme will encourage multi­partisan [sic] and enhance the said   respondents   not   be   counted   or   canvassed,   and
inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to that the latter’s nominees not be proclaimed.  On April 4

directly participate in this electoral window.
11,   2001,   Bayan   Muna   and   Bayan   Muna­Youth   also
“It will be noted that as defined, the ‘party­list system’ is
filed   a   Petition   for   Cancellation   of   Registration   and
a ‘mechanism of proportional representation’ in the election
of   representatives   to   the   House   of   Representatives   from Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5

national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or On   April   18,   2001,   the   Comelec   required   the

coalitions   thereof   registered   with   the   Commission   on respondents   in   the   two   disqualification   cases   to   file
Elections. Comments within three days  from  notice. It also set
“However, in the course of our review of the matters at the   date   for   hearing   on   April   26,   2001,  but 6

bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep subsequently   reset   it   to   May   3,   2001. During   the

7

the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, hearing,   however,   Commissioner   Ralph   C.   Lantion

down   to   a   manageable   level,   keeping   only   those   who merely directed the parties to submit their respective
substantially comply with the rules and regulations and memoranda. 8

_______________ Meanwhile,   dissatisfied   with   the   pace   of   the

Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani­OFW Labor Party filed a
 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
2
Petition before   this   Court   on   April   16,   2001.   This
9

710
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
April   17,   2001,  the   Court   directed   respondents   to
10

Elections
more importantly  the  sufficiency  of  the  Manifestations   or
comment   on   the   Petition   within   a   non­extendible
evidence   on   the   Motions   for   Reconsiderations   or period of five days from notice. 11

Oppositions.” 3

_______________
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed
before the Comelec a Petition praying that “the names 3
 Ibid., pp. 21­22; rollo, pp. 48­49.
of   [some   of   herein   respondents]   be   deleted   from   the 4
 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272­273.
 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250­263.
‘Certified   List   of   Political   Parties/Sectoral
5

6
 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282­283.
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions   Participating   in   the 7
 See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections’ and
  TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
8
 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4­73.
9
 Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.
10
 Comments   were   filed   by   MAD,   Bagong   Bayani,   The   True
11
Marcos   Loyalists,   the   Comelec,   Partido   ng   Masang   Pilipino,   the
Liberal   Party,   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,   CREBA,   Lakas­
NUCD­UMDP, the Philip
711
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 711
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed
before   this   Court   a   Petition,  docketed   as GR   No.
12
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No.   3785.   In   its   Resolution   dated   May   9,   2001,  the 13
Court   ordered   the   consolidation   of   the   two   Petitions
before   it;   directed   respondents   named   in   the   second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or before
noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral
Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec
may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes
cast   for   the   party­list   elections,   but   barred   the
proclamation   of   any   winner   therein,   until   further
orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments  on the second Petition were
14
received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument   was   conducted   as   scheduled.   In   an   Order
given   in   open   court,   the   parties   were   directed   to
submit   their   respective   Memoranda   simultaneously
within a non­extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During   the   hearing   on   May   17,   2001,   the   Court
directed the parties to address the following issues:
1. “1.Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper
under  the premises. More specifically, is there no
other   plain,   speedy   or   adequate   remedy   in   the
ordinary course of law?
_______________
pine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens
Drug Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas
ng OCW, and Sports and Health Foundation.
12
 Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3­45.
13
 Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.
14
 These   were   filed   by   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,   the
Comelec,  The   Bagong   Bayani   Organization,   Mamamayan   Ayaw   sa
Droga, and the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement.
15
 Memoranda   were   filed   by   Petitioners   Bayan   Muna   and   Ang
Bagong   Bayani­OFW   Labor   Party;   and   Respondents   Mamamayan
Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office
of   the   Solicitor   General,   and   Aksyon   Demokratiko.   Manifestations
instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas­NUCD and OCW.
712
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
1. “2.Whether  or   not  political   parties   may participate
in the partylist elections.
2. “3.Whether or not the party­list system is exclusive
to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations.
 3. “4.Whether   or   not   the   Comelec   committed   grave
abuse   of   discretion   in   promulgating   Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.”  16
The Court’s Ruling
The   Petitions   are   partly   meritorious.   These   cases
should   be   remanded   to   the   Comelec   which   will
determine,   after   summary   evidentiary   hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated
in   the   assailed   Omnibus   Resolution   satisfy   the
requirements   of   the   Constitution   and   RA   7941,   as
specified in this Decision.
First   Issue:  Elections
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents   contend   that   the   recourse   of   both
petitioners   under   Rule  65   is   improper  because   there
are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary   course   of   law.  The   Office   of   the   Solicitor
17
General   argues   that   petitioners   should   have   filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification
or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections
19,   20,   21   and   22   of   Comelec   Resolution   No.   3307­
A  dated November 9, 2000.
18 19
We   disagree.   At   bottom,   petitioners   attack   the
validity   of   Comelec   Omnibus   Resolution   3785   for
having   been   issued   with   grave   abuse   of   discretion,
insofar as it allowed respondents to participate
_______________
 See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p.
16
88.
 See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization’s Memorandum, pp.
17
3­4;   Aksyon   Demokratiko’s   Memorandum,   pp.   2­3;   and   MAD’s
Memorandum, pp. 3­6.
 Rules   and   regulations   governing   the   filing   of   a   petition   for
18
registration,   a   manifestation   to   participate,   and   the   names   of
nominees under the party­list system of representation in connection
with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.
 OSG’s Memorandum, pp. 6­14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151­
19
159.
713
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 713
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
in the party­list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both
the   Constitution  and   the   Rules   of   Court,   such
20
challenge   may   be   brought   before   this   Court   in   a
verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover,   the   assailed   Omnibus   Resolution   was
promulgated   by   Respondent   Commission   en   banc;
hence,  no  motion for  reconsideration was  possible, it
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule
13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna
had   filed   before   the   Comelec   a   Petition   for
Cancellation   of  Registration   and   Nomination  against
some   of   herein   respondents.  The   Comelec,   however,
22
did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of
the   elections,   Petitioner   Bayan   Muna   sought   succor
from   this   Court,   for   there   was   no   other   adequate
recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven
the   urgency   of   petitioner’s   action;   to   this   date,   the
Comelec   has   not   yet   formally   resolved   the   Petition
before   it.   But   a   resolution   may   just   be   a   formality
because   the   Comelec,   through   the   Office   of   the
Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter
quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the
rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
other plain, speedy
_______________
 Section   1, Article   VIII   of  the  Constitution,  provides:  “Judicial
20
power   includes   the   duty   of   the   courts   of   justice   to   settle   actual
controversies   involving   rights   which   are   legally   demandable   and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
 SECTION   1.   What   pleadings   are   not   allowed.—The   following
21
pleadings are not allowed:
x x x     x x x     x x x
d)   motion   for   reconsideration   of   an   en   banc   ruling,   resolution,
order or decision except in election offense cases;
x x x     x x x     x x x
 Docketed as SPA 01­113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed
22
before the Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as SPA­01­109. See
Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General; rollo
(GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and 266 et seq.
714
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
and adequate remedy.  It has been held that certiorari
23
is   available,   notwithstanding   the   presence   of   other
remedies, “where the issue raised is one purely of law,
where   public   interest   is   involved,   and   in   case   of
urgency.”  Indeed,   the   instant   case   is   indubitably
24
imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency,
for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent
of the House of Representatives.
Moreover,   this   case   raises   transcendental
constitutional   issues   on   the   party­list   system,   which
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent  with its
duty   to   “formulate   guiding   and   controlling
constitutional   principles,   precepts,   doctrines,   or
rules.” 25
Finally,   procedural   requirements   “may   be   glossed
over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the
decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available.” 26
Second   Issue: 
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani­OFW Labor Party
contends that “the inclusion of political parties in the
party­list system is the most objectionable portion of
the questioned Resolution.”  For its 27
_______________
23
 Section   1,   Rule   65.   See Filoteo   v.   Sandiganbayan, 263   SCRA
222, October 16, 1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March
27,  1998; GSIS  v.  Olisa, 304   SCRA   421,   March   10,   1999; National
Steel   Corporation   v.   CA, GR   No.   134437,   January   31,   2000, 324
SCRA 208; Sahali v. Comelec, GR No. 134169, February 2, 2000, 324 through   a   party­list   system   of   registered national,
SCRA 510.
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per
24
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
Panganiban,   J.   See also ABS­CBN   Broadcasting   Corporation   v. Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C)
Commission   on   Elections, GR   No.   133486,   January   28,   2000, 323 of the Constitution, political parties may be registered
SCRA 811; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972. under the party­list system.
“Sec.   7.   No   votes   cast   in   favor   of   a political
 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per
25

party, organization,   or   coalition   shall   be   valid,   except   for

Gutierrez, Jr., J. See also Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2,
1997; Guingona v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
those registered   under   the   party­list   system as   provided   in
 ABS­CBN   v.   Comelec, GR   No.   133486,   January   28,   2000, 323
26

this Constitution.
SCRA 811, per Panganiban, J.
“Sec.   8. Political   parties, or   organizations   or
 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani­OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo
27

(GR No, 147589), p. 18. coalitions registered under the party­list system, shall not be
715 represented   in   the   voter’s   registration   boards,   boards   of
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 715 election  inspectors,   boards  of   canvassers,   or  other   similar
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on bodies.   However,   they   shall   be   entitled   to   appoint   poll
Elections watchers in accordance with law.” 30

part,   Petitioner   Bayan   Muna   objects   to   the
participation of “major political parties.”  On the other
28
hand,   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,   like   the
impleaded   political   parties,   submits   that   the
Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to
During   the   deliberations   in   the   Constitutional
Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out
that the participants in the party­list system may “be
a   regional   party,   a   sectoral   party,   a   national   party,
UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Min­
31

participate   in   the   party­list   elections.   It   argues   that

_______________
the party­list system is, in fact, open to all “registered
national,   regional   and   sectoral   parties   or 28
 Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.
organizations.” 29 29
 OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution 30
 Emphasis   supplied. See   also §§17   and   18,   Article   VI   of   the
and   RA   7941,   private   respondents   cannot   be Constitution.
31
 It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in
disqualified from the party­list elections, merely on the the   early   days   of   the   post­Marcos   era,   UNIDO   was   the   dominant
ground   that   they   are   political   parties.   Section   5, political party.
Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members 716
of   the   House   of   Representatives   may   “be   elected 716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
danao.”  This   was   also   clear   from   the   following
32
exchange   between   Comms.   Jaime   Tadeo   and   Blas
Ople: 33
“MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay
pwedeng   paghati­hatian   ng   UNIDO,   PDP­Laban,
PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party­list
system sa lahat ng mga partido.”
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose
of the party­list provision was to open up the system,
in order to give a chance to parties that consistently
place third or fourth in congressional district elections
to win a seat in Congress.  He explained: The purpose
34
of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we
found   out   that   there   were   certain   groups   or   parties
that,   if  we  count   their   votes   nationwide,   have   about
1,000,000   or   1,500,000   votes.   But   they   were   always
third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have   no   voice   in   the   Assembly.   But   this   way,   they
would have five or six representatives in the Assembly
even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts.   So,   that   is   essentially   the   mechanics,   the
purpose and objectives of the partylist system.”
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for
“a   party­list   system   of   registered   national,   regional
and   sectoral parties or   organizations   or   coalitions
thereof, x x x.” Section 3 expressly states that a “party”
is   “either   a   political   party   or   a   sectoral   party   or   a
coalition of parties.” More to the point, the law defines
“political   party”   as   “an   organized   group   of   citizens
advocating   an   ideology   or   platform,   principles   and
policies   for   the   general   conduct   of   government   and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of
its   leaders   and   members   as   candidates   for   public
office.”
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt
as to the participation of political parties in the party­
list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
_______________
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
32
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570.
33
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
34
717
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“x x x     x x x     x x x
“For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5)
major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress   of   the   Philippines   shall   not   be   entitled   to
participate in the party­list system.
“x x x     x x x     x x x
Indubitably,   therefore,   political   parties—even   the
major ones—may participate in the party­list elections.
Third   Issue: 
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party­list
elections   does   not   mean,   however,   that any political
party—or any organization or group for that matter—
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of
the party­list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:
1. “(1)The House of Representatives shall be composed
of   not   more   than   two   hundred   and   fifty
members, unless  otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be   elected   from   legislative   districts   apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective   inhabitants,   and   on   the   basis   of   a
uniform   and   progressive   ratio,   and   those   who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party­
list   system   of   registered   national,   regional,   and
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. (2)The   party­list   representatives   shall   constitute
twenty   per   centum   of   the   total   number   of
representatives   including   those   under   the   party
list.   For   three   consecutive   terms   after   the
ratification   of   this   Constitution,   one­half   of   the
seats allocated to party­list representatives shall be
filled,   as provided   by   law, by   selection   or   election
from   the   labor,   peasant,   urban   poor,   indigenous
cultural   communities,   women,   youth,   and   such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision,
a   distinguished   member   of   the   Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party­list
provision was to give “genuine power
718
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
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to our people” in Congress. Hence, when the provision
was discussed, he exultantly announced: “On this first
day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new
chapter   to   our   national   history,   by   giving   genuine
power to our people in the legislature.” 35
The foregoing provision on the party­list system is
not   self­executory.   It   is,   in   fact,   interspersed   with
phrases  like “in accordance with law”  or “as  may be
provided by law”; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt
in   granite   the   lofty   objective   of   the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out
the statutory policy in this wise:
“SEC.   2. Declaration   of   Policy.—The   State   shall   promote
proportional   representation   in   the   election   of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a
party­list   system   of   registered   national,   regional   and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented   sectors,   organizations   and   parties,   and
who lack well­defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members   of   the   House   of   Representatives.   Towards   this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or  group interests in the
House   of   Representatives   by   enhancing   their   chances   to
compete   for   and   win   seats   in   the   legislature,   and   shall
provide the simplest scheme possible.”
The   Marginalized   and   Underrepresented 
to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The   foregoing   provision   mandates   a   state   policy   of
promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino­style partylist system, which will “enable” the
election   to   the   House   of   Representatives   of   Filipino
citizens.
1. 1.who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. 2.who lack well­defined constituencies; but
_______________
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561.
35
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1. 3.who   could   contribute   to   the   formulation   and
enactment   of   appropriate   legislation   that   will
benefit the nation as a whole.
The   key   words   in   this   policy   are   “proportional
representation,” “marginalized and underrepresented,”
and “lack [of] well­defined constituencies.”
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to
the number of people in a particular district, because
the   party­list   election   is   national   in   scope.   Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed   group.   Rather,   it   refers   to   the
representation   of   the   “marginalized   and
underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration
in   Section   5   of   the   law;   namely,   “labor,   peasant,
fisherfolk,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
communities,   elderly,   handicapped,   women,   youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation   of   the   marginalized   and
underrepresented,   because   representation   is   easy   to
claim and to feign. The party­list organization or party
must   factually   and   truly   represent   the   marginalized
and   underrepresented   constituencies   mentioned   in
Section 5.  Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
36
party­list   candidate­organization   must   be   “Filipino
719 citizens   belonging   to   marginalized   and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
Finally, “lack of well­defined constituency]” refers to
the   absence   of   a   traditionally   identifiable   electoral
group,   like   voters   of   a   congressional   district   or
territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again
to   those   with   disparate   interests   identified   with   the
“marginalized or underrepresented.”
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that
only   those   Filipinos   who   are   “marginalized   and
underrepresented” become members of Congress under
the party­list system, Filipino­style.
The   intent   of   the   Constitution   is   clear:   to   give
genuine power to the people, not only by giving more
law   to   those   who   have   less   in   life,   but   more   so   by
enabling   them   to   become   veritable   lawmakers
themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of
the imple­
_______________
 Infra.
36
720
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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menting law, we  repeat, is  likewise clear: “to enable
Filipino   citizens   belonging   to   marginalized   and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x
x   x,   to   become   members   of   the   House   of
Representatives.”Where   the   language   of   the   law   is
clear,   it   must   be   applied   according   to   its   express
terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
be   represented   under   the   party­list   system   are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
“SEC.   5. Registration.—Any   organized   group   of   persons
may   register   as   a   party,   organization   or   coalition   for
purposes   of   the   party­list   system   by   filing   with   the
COMELEC   not   later   than   ninety   (90)   days   before   the
election   a   petition   verified   by   its   president   or   secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party­list system as a
national,   regional   or   sectoral   party   or   organization   or   a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its   constitution,   by­laws,   platform   or   program   of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant   information   as   the   COMELEC   may
require: Provided,   that   the   sector   shall   include   labor,
peasant,   fisherfolk,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.”
While   the   enumeration   of   marginalized   and
underrepresented   sectors   is   not   exclusive,   it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party­list system.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction
that   words   employed   in   a   statute   are   interpreted   in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference   to,   the   words   and   the   phrases   with   which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a
term   in   a   statute   may   be   limited,   qualified   or
specialized by those in immediate association. 38
_______________
  Azarcon   v.   Sandiganbayan, 268   SCRA   747,   February   26,
37
1997; Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
 82 C.J.S. Statutes §331.
38
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The   Party­List   System   Desecrated  disparate;   hence,   the   OSG’s   position   to   treat   them
by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding   the   unmistakable   statutory   policy,
the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No.
7941 “does not limit the participation in the party­list
system   to   the   marginalized   and   underrepresented
sectors of society.”  In fact, it contends that any party
39
or group that is not disqualified under Section 6  of RA 40
7941   may   participate   in   the   elections.   Hence,   it
admitted   during   the   Oral   Argument   that   even   an
organization   representing   the   super   rich   of   Forbes
Park   or   Dasmarinas   Village   could   participate   in   the
party­list elections. 41
The   declared   policy   of   RA   7941   contravenes   the
position of the Office of the Solicitor General  (OSG).
We  stress  that   the party­list   system   seeks   to  enable
certain   Filipino   citizens—specifically   those   belonging
to   marginalized   and   underrepresented   sectors,
organizations and parties—to be elected to the House
of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the
party­list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and   underrepresented   disregards   the   clear   statutory
policy.   Its   claim   that   even   the   super­rich   and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of
the party­list system.
Indeed,   the   law   grafted   to   address   the   peculiar
721 disadvantages   of   Payatas   hovel   dwellers   cannot   be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park.
The   interests   of   these   two   sectors   are   manifestly
similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast,
and   with   admirable   candor,   Atty.   Lorna   Patajo­
Kapunan  admitted during the Oral Argument that a
42
group   of   bankers,   industrialists   and   sugar   planters
could not join the party­list system as representatives
of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega­rich are,
numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor un­
_______________
 OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
39
 Infra.
40
 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147­148.
41
 Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
42
 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178­180.
43
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derrepresented,   for   the   stark   reality   is   that   their
economic   clout   engenders   political   power   more
awesome   than   their   numerical   limitation.
Traditionally,   political   power   does   not   necessarily
emanate from the size of one’s constituency; indeed, it
is likely to arise more directly from the number and
amount of one’s bank accounts.
It   is   ironic,   therefore,   that   the   marginalized   and
underrepresented in  our  midst   are the majority  who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for
them that the party­list system was enacted—to give
them   not   only   genuine   hope,   but   genuine   power;   to
give   them   the   opportunity   to   be   elected   and   to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and
in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense,
the party­list system truly empowers the masses and
ushers   a   new   hope   for   genuine   change.   Verily,   it
invites   those   marginalized   and   underrepresented   in
the past—the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban
poor,   even   those   in   the   underground   movement—to
come   out   and   participate,   as   indeed   many   of   them
came   out   and   participated   during   the   last   elections.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them
by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because   the   marginalized   and   underrepresented
had not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional politicians
and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House
of   Representatives   were   set   aside   for   the   party­list
system.   In   arguing   that   even   those   sectors   who
normally   controlled   80   percent   of   the   seats   in   the
House could participate in the party­list elections for
the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec
disregard   the   fundamental   difference   between   the
congressional   district   elections   and   the   party­list
elections.
As   earlier   noted,   the   purpose   of   the   party­list
provision   was   to   open   up   the   system,  in   order   to
44
enhance   the   chance   of   sectoral   groups   and
organizations to gain representation in the House of
_______________
 Supra.   See   also §6,   Article   IX   (C)   of   the   Constitution,   which
44
reads:   “A   free   and   open   party   system   shall   be   allowed   to   evolve
according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of
this Article.”
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Representatives   through   the   simplest   scheme
possible. Logic shows that the system has been opened
45
to those who have never gotten a foothold within it—
those   who   cannot   otherwise   win   in   regular   elections
and who therefore need the “simplest scheme possible”
to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the
system to those who have long been within it—those
privileged   sectors   that   have   long   dominated   the
congressional district elections.
The   import   of   the   open   party­list   system   may   be
more vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory   “open   house,”   which   by   its   nature
allows outsiders to  enter  the  facilities.  Obviously,   the
“open house” is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the
dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the
open party­list system is only for the “outsiders” who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise;
it is not for the non­marginalized or overrepresented
who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily,   allowing   the   non­marginalized   and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under
the   party­list   system   would   not   only dilute, but
also prejudicethe   chance   of   the   marginalized   and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law
to enhance it.   The   party­list   system   is   a   tool   for   the
benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the
intended beneficiaries.
This   Court,   therefore,   cannot   allow   the   party­list
system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot
let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state
policy   must   permeate   every   discussion   of   the
qualification   of   political   parties   and   other
organizations under the party­list system.
_______________
45
 Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: “x x x. Towards
this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
by   enhancing   their   chances   to   compete   for   and   win   seats   in   the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”
724
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Refutation   of   the 
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues,
Justices   Jose   C.   Vitug   and   Vicente   V.   Mendoza,   are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers
of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The   fundamental   principle   in   constitutional
construction, however, is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is
the language of the provision itself. The presumption
is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are   couched   express   the   objective   sought   to   be
attained.  In   other   words, verba   legis still   prevails.
46
Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear
and   equivocal   should   resort   be   made   to   extraneous
aids   of   construction   and   interpretation,   such   as   the
proceedings   of   the   Constitutional   Commission   or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the
true   intent   or   purpose   of   the   provision   being
construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary  that “the debates and proceedings
48
of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in
order   to   arrive   at   the   reason   and   purpose   of   the
resulting   Constitution   x   x   x   only   when   other   guides
fail   as   said   proceedings   are   powerless   to   vary   the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention ‘are of value
as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give
us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did   not   talk,   much   less   of   the   mass   or   our   fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument
the   force   of   fundamental   law.   We   think   it   safer   to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face’ The
_______________
 JM   Tuason   &   Co.,   Inc.   v.   Land   Tenure   Administration, 31
46
SCRA 413, February 18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v.
Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259,264(1938).
 See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.
47
 194   SCRA   317,   February   22,   1991,   per   Fernan, C.J.;
48
quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl. 220.
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proper interpretation therefore depends more on how
it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers’ understanding thereof.”
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to
the   party­list   system,   is   couched   in   clear   terms:   the
mechanics   of   the   system   shall   be provided   by
law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding   and   implementing   party­list
representation,   we   should   therefore   look   at   the   law
first.   Only   when   we   find   its   provisions   ambiguous
should   the  use  of   extraneous   aids   of  construction   be
resorted to.
But,  as  discussed   earlier,  the  intent   of  the law  is
obvious   and   clear   from   its   plain   words.   Section   2
thereof unequivocally states that the party­list system
of electing congressional representatives was designed
to “enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties,   and   who   lack   well­defined   political
constituencies   but   who   could   contribute   to   the
formulation and enactment  of appropriate legislation
that   will   benefit   the   nation   as   a   whole   x   x   x.”   The
criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is
no   need   for   recourse   to   constitutional   deliberations,
not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event,
the   framers’   deliberations   merely   express   their
individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in
725 construing   the   meaning   and   purpose   of   the
constitution or statute.
Be   it   remembered   that   the   constitutionality   or
validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue
here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must
be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth   Issue:  Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x.”
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest
that   the   Comelec   failed   to   appreciate   fully   the   clear
policy   of   the   law   and   the   Constitution.   On   the
contrary,   it   seems   to   have   ignored   the   facet   of   the
party­list   system   discussed   above.   The   OSG   as   its
counsel   admitted   before   the   Court   that   any   group,
even the non­marginalized and overrepresented, could
field candidates in the party­list elections.
726
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
When a lower court, or a quasi­judicial agency like the
Commission   on   Elections,   violates   or   ignores   the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down
by   this   Court   on   the   ground   of   grave   abuse   of
discretion. Indeed,   the   function   of   all   judicial   and
49
quasijudicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second­guess it. 50
In   its   Memorandum,   Petitioner   Bayan   Muna
passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of
the   major   political   parties—Respondents   Lakas­
NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP—on the ground that
under   Comelec   Resolution   No.   4073,   they   have   been
accredited   as   the   five   (six,   including   PDP­Laban)
major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It
argues that because of this, they have the “advantage
of   getting   official   Comelec   Election   Returns,
We   note,   however,   that   this   accreditation   does   not
refer   to   the   partylist   election,   but, inter   alia, to   the
election of district  representatives  for the  purpose  of
determining   which   parties   would   be   entitled   to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What   is   needed   under   the   present   circumstances,
however,   is   a   factual   determination   of   whether
respondents   herein  and,  for   that   matter,  all   the  154
previously   approved   groups,   have   the   necessary
qualifications to participate in the party­list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out
Respondent   Mamamayan   Ayaw   sa   Droga   (MAD),
because “it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges.” This Court, however, is not a
trier   of   facts,  It   is   not   equipped   to   receive   evidence
51
and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
_______________
 Tañada   v.   Angara, 272   SCRA   18,   May   2,   1997.   See
49
also Santiago   v.   Guingona, 298   SCRA   756,   November   18,
1998; Miranda   v.   Aguirre, 314   SCRA   603,   September   16,
1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
 Veterans   Federation   Party,   et   al   v.   Comelec,   et   al., GR   No.
50
136781, October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA 244.
 See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18,
51
1999; Inciong, Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v.
NLRC, 257   SCRA   680,   June   28,   1996; Heirs   of   the   Late   Teodoro
Guaring,
 727 underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 727 conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on the interest of such sectors.
Elections Second, while   even   major   political   parties   are
Basic   rudiments   of   due   process   require   that
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
respondents   should   first   be   given   an   opportunity   to
participate in the party­list system, they must comply
show   that   they   qualify   under   the   guidelines
with the declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino
promulgated   in   this   Decision,   before   they   can   be
citizens   belonging   to   marginalized   and
deprived of their right to participate in and be elected
underrepresented   sectors   x   x   x   to   be   elected   to   the
under the party­list system.
House of Representatives.” In other words, while they
Guidelines   for   Screening 
are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
Party­List Participants political parties, they must show, however, that they
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the represent   the   interests   of   the   marginalized   and
case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko
summary   evidentiary   hearings,   whether   the   154 and other simi­
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
_______________
party­list   elections   comply   with   the   requirements   of
the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to Jr.   v.   CA, 269   SCRA   283,   March   7,   1997; Sebreño   v.   Central
lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law Board of Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG
and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. v. Cojuangco, Jr., 302 SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
728
First, the   political   party,   sector,   organization   or
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
coalition   must   represent   the   marginalized   and
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
Elections
7941.   In   other   words,   it   must   show—through   its
larly   situated   political   parties   admitted   as   much
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
during   the   Oral   Argument,   as   the   following   quote
platform   of   government   and   track   record—that   it
shows:
represents   and   seeks   to   uplift   marginalized   and
“JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in
underrepresented   sectors.   Verily,   majority   of   its
my question. All I am saying is, the political party
membership   should   belong   to   the   marginalized   and
 must   claim   to   represent   the   marginalized   and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY.   KAPUNAN: Yes,   Your   Honor,   the   answer   is
yes.”52
Third, in   view   of   the   objections  directed   against   the
53
registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which
is   allegedly   a   religious   group,   the   Court   notes   the
express   constitutional   provision   that   the   religious
sector may not be represented in the party­list system.
The   extent   of   the   constitutional   proscription   is
demonstrated   by   the   following   discussion   during   the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
“MR. OPLE. x x x In the event that a certain religious
sect   with   nationwide   and   even   international
networks   of   members   and   supporters,   in   order   to
circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own
political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and
philosophies  from well­established religious faiths,
will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR.   MONSOD.   If   the   evidence   shows   that   the
intention   is   to   go   around   the   prohibition,   then
certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal
fiction.” 54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
“MR.   VILLACORTA. When   the   Commissioner
proposed   “EXCEPT   RELIGIOUS   GROUPS,”   he   is
not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors
who   may   be   elected   by,   say,   the   indigenous
community sector to represent their group.
_______________
 TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.
52
 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani­OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo
53
(GR No. 147589), p. 19.
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
54
729
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 729
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody
who   represents   the   Iglesia   ni   Kristo,   the  Catholic
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera.” 55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that “religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered.”  The 56
prohibition   was   explained   by   a   member  of   the 57
Constitutional   Commission   in   this   wise:   “[T]he
prohibition is on any religious organization registering
as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here
against   a   priest   running   as   a   candidate. That   is   not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect
as a political party.” 58
Fourth, a   party   or   an   organization   must   not   be
disqualified   under   Section   6   of   RA   7941,   which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
1. “(1)It   is   a   religious   sect   or   denomination,
organization or  association organized for  religious
purposes;
2. 2.It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
 3. 3.It is a foreign party or organization;
4. 4.It   is   receiving   support   from   any   foreign
government,   foreign   political   party,   foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers   or   members   or   indirectly   through   third
parties for partisan election purposes;
5. 5.It   violates   or   fails   to   comply   with   laws,   rules   or
regulations relating to elections;
6. 6.It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7. 7.It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8. 8.It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections   or   fails   to   obtain   at   least   two per
centum(2%)   of   the   votes   cast   under   the   party­list
system   in   the   two   (2)   preceding   elections   for   the
constituency in which it has registered.” 59
Note   should   be   taken   of   paragraph   5,   which
disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure
to   comply   with   election   laws   and   regulations.   These
laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that
the party­list system seeks to “enable Filipino citizens
belonging   to   marginalized   and   underrepresented
sectors,   organizations   and   parties   x   x   x   to   become
members of the House of Representatives.” A party or
an organization, therefore, that does not comply with
this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the   party   or   organization   must   not   be   an
adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded
or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of
the party­list system, the party or organization must
be   a   group   of   citizens,   organized   by   citizens   and
operated   by   citizens.   It   must   be   independent   of   the
government. The participation of the government or its
officials in the affairs, of a party­list candidate is not

only   illegal  and   unfair   to   other   parties,   but   also

60

_______________ deleterious   to   the   objective   of   the   law:   to   enable

citizens   belonging   to   marginalized   and
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589.
55
underrepresented   sectors   and   organizations   to   be
 §2 (5), Article IX (C).
56

 Christian S. Monsod.
57 elected to the House of Representatives.
 Record of the Constitutional Commission. Vol. I, p. 634.
58
Sixth, the   party   must   not   only   comply   with   the
 See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307­A.
59
requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
730
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party­List Nominees.—No person
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
shall be nominated as party­list representative unless he is
Elections a natural­born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty­five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least
be twenty­five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age   on   the   day   of   the   election.   Any   youth   sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term   shall   be   allowed   to   continue   in   office   until   the
expiration of his term.”
_______________
60
 See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261
(o), BP 881.
731
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization
must   represent   marginalized   and   underrepresented
sectors;   so   also   must   its   nominees. To   repeat,   under
Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens   “who   belong   to   marginalized   and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
Surely,   the   interests   of   the   youth   cannot   be   fully
represented   by   a   retiree;   neither   can   those   of   the
urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To
allow   otherwise   is   to   betray   the   State   policy   to   give
genuine   representation   to   the   marginalized   and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as   previously   discussed,   while   lacking   a
well­defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the   nation   as   a   whole.   Senator   Jose   Lina   explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that “the
nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to
represent a particular district x x x.” 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of
the   law:   “to   enable   Filipino   citizens   belonging   to
marginalized   and   underrepresented   sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well­defined
731 political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment  of appropriate legislation
that   will   benefit   the   nation   as   a   whole,   to   become
members of the House of Representatives.”
Crucial   to   the   resolution   of   this   case   is   the
fundamental   social   justice   principle   that   those   who
have less in life should have more in law. The party­
list system is one such tool intended to benefit those
who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people   genuine   hope   and   genuine   power.   It   is   a
message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even
to those in the underground, that change is possible. It
is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and
seize the opportunity.
_______________
61
 The   bicameral   conference   committee   on   the   disagreeing
provision of Senate Bill No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January
31, 1994, p. 4.
732
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
Clearly,   therefore,   the   Court   cannot   accept   the
submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents
that the party­list system is, without any qualification,
open   to   all.   Such   position   does   not   only   weaken   the
electoral   chances   of   the   marginalized   and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut
the   substance   of   the   party­list   system.   Instead   of
generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling   the   marginalized,   it   would   further   weaken
them and aggravate their marginalization.
In  effect, the  Comelec would have  us  believe that
the   party­list   provisions   of   the   Constitution   and   RA
7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a
mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on
the   altar   of   people   empowerment.   Surely,   this   could
not   have   been   the   intention   of   the   framers   of   the
Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE,   this   case   is   REMANDED   to   the
Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately
conduct   summary   evidentiary   hearings   on   the
qualifications of the party­list participants in the light
of   the   guidelines   enunciated   in   this   Decision.
Considering   the   extreme   urgency   of   determining   the
winners in the last partylist elections, the Comelec is
directed   to   begin   its   hearings   for   the   parties   and
organizations   that   appear   to   have   garnered   such
number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives.   The   Comelec   is   further   DIRECTED
to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30
days from notice hereof.
The   Resolution   of   this   Court   dated   May   9,   2001,
directing the Comelec “to refrain from proclaiming any
winner”   during   the   last   party­list   election,   shall
remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have
complied   and   reported   its   compliance   with   the
foregoing disposition.
This   Decision   is   immediately   executory   upon   the
Commission   on   Elections’   receipt   thereof.   No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
      Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonz
aga­Reyes, JJ., concur.
      Davide,   Jr. (C.J.) and Bellosillo,   J., In   the
result.
      Vitug, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
733
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 733
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission
on Elections
      Mendoza, J., See dissenting opinion.
       Quisumbing, De   Leon,   Jr. and Sandoval­
Gutierrez, JJ., Join the dissenting opinion of Justice V.
Mendoza.
      Ynares­Santiago,   J.,   Abroad   on   Official
Business.
SEPARATE (DISSENTING) OPINION
VITUG, J.:
The   1987   Constitution,   crafted   at   a   time   when   the
euphoria   of   the   1986   People   Power   had   barely
subsided,   recognized   the   vigor   infused   by   civilian
society in a cleansing political reform and focused itself
on   institutionalizing   civilian   participation   in   daily
governance.   A   cause   for   concern   was   the   not­too­
unlikely   perpetuation   of   a   single   party   in   power—a
convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article
VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter—
THE   PARTY­LIST   REPRESENTATIVES   SHALL
CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE
UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE
TERMS.   AFTER   THE   RATIFICATION   OF   THIS
CONSTITUTION,   ONE­HALF   OF   THE   SEATS
ALLOCATED   TO   PARTYLIST   REPRESENTATIVE
SHALL   BE   FILLED,   AS PROVIDED   BY   LAW, BY
SELECTION   OR   ELECTION   FROM   THE   LABOR,
PEASANT,   URBAN   POOR,   INDIGENOUS   CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER
SECTORS AS   MAY   BE   PROVIDED   BY   LAW, EXCEPT
THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.—
was   the   result   of   long­drawn   deliberations   and
compromises.
Immediately,   after   the   resumption   of   the   next
Congress,   then   president   Corazon   C.   Aquino,
exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned
to   the   reserved   seats   in   the   Lower   House,
representatives   of   the   labor,   peasant,   urban   poor,
indigenous   cultural   communities,   women   and   youth
sector. The assignment was made from a selected list
of   names   submitted   by   the   sectors   themselves.   The
sectors   would  continue   to  enjoy   these   reserved   seats
for the next three terms; thenceforth, they would have
to   participate   in   an   electoral   contest   to   secure   their
representation in Congress.
734
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
Article   6,   Section   5(2),   however,   not   being   self­
executing, would wait for the legislature to ordain the
enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the
terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2).—First, the
system should only apply to the election of 20% of the
total   composition   of   the   House   of
Representatives, second, it   would   prescribe   a
mandatory   proportional   representation   scheme,
and, third,it   would   allow   participating   parties   and
organizations to be represented in voter’s registration
boards,   board   of   election   inspectors,   parties   and
organizations or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known
as   “An   Act   Providing   for   the   Election   of   Party­List
Representatives  Through  the  Party­List  System,  and
Appropriating   Funds   Therefor,”   was   enacted.   The
enabling law laid the basis for COMELEC Resolution
No. 2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the “Rules
and Regulations Governing the Elections of the Party­
List Representatives through the Party­List System.”
In the May 1998 first party­list elections, the sectors
were required, to test, for the first time, their political
mettle in an open electoral contest with other parties,
groups   and   organizations   under   a   party­list   system.
While   the   elections   had   a   low­voter   turnout,   seen
largely   as   a   result   of   public   unawareness   of   an
electoral   innovation,   the   recent   2001   multiparty   list
elections, however, were different. This  time, a  huge
number   of   parties,   groups   and   coalitions   applied   for
registration   with,   and   subsequently   obtained
accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six of these groups
were   established   political   parties,   namely   PARTIDO
NG   MASANG   PILIPINO,   LAKAS   NUCD­UMDP,
NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION, LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG   PILIPINO,   AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO,   LIBERAL   PARTY,
NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP­LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these
major   parties   on   the   ground   that   their   participation
does not level the playing field for less known and less
organized sectoral groups still in dire need of election
logistics   and   machinery.   Arguing   that   the   system   is
open   to   the   underrepresented   and   marginalized
sectors,   as   well   as   other   parties   but   only   on   the
condition   that   the   latter   field   sectoral   candidates
themselves,   herein   petitioner   sought   the
disqualification of the large major political parties and
groups which do not represent any “genuine” sectoral
interest.
735
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 735
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
A   perusal   of   the   novel   electoral   engineering,
introduced   by   the   Constitution   into   the   electoral
system,   would   show   the   pertinent   provisions   to   be
stoically quiet on the qualifications of a party, group or
coalition   to   participate   under   the   party­list   system.
Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory
enactment to provide for the system’s focal particulars,
which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2
of R.A. 7941 reads—
“The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party­list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which   will   enable   the   Filipino   citizens   belonging   to   the
marginalized   and   underrepresented   sectors,   organizations
and   parties,   and   who   lacked   well­defined   political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of  appropriate  legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of recognized this concern when it banned the first five
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop major political parties on the basis of party
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to 736
attain   the   broadest   possible   representation   of   party, 736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in Elections
the   legislature,   and   shall   provide   the   simplest   scheme representation  in   the  House  of   Representatives   from
possible.”
participating   in   the   party­list   system   for   the   first
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI,
party­list   elections   held   in   1998   (and   to   be
Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections).
off   from   two   staunch   positions—the   first   headed   by
The   advocates   for   permanent   seats   for   sectoral
Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per
representatives made an effort towards a compromise
centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to
—that   the   party­list   system   be   open   only   to
party­list representatives half were to be reserved to
underrepresented   and   marginalized   sectors.   This
appointees   from   the   marginalized   and
proposal was further whittled down by allocating only
underrepresented   sectors.   The   proposal   was   opposed
half   of   the   seats   under   the   party­list   system   to
by   some   Commissioners.   Mr.   Monsod   expressed   the
candidates   from   the   sectors   which   would   garner   the
difficulty   in   delimiting   the   sectors   that   needed
required   number   of   votes.   The   majority   was
representation.   He   was   of   the   view   that   reserving
unyielding. Voting 19­22, the proposal for permanent
seats   for   the   marginalized   and   underrepresented
seats,   and   in   the   alternative   the   reservation   of   the
sectors   would   stunt   their   development   into   full­
party­list   system   to   the   sectoral   groups,   was   voted
pledged   parties   equipped   with   electoral   machinery
down.   The   only   concession   the   Villacorta   group   was
potent  enough  to further  the sectoral  interests  to be
able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for
represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand,
selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the
was   apprehensive   that   pitting   the   unorganized   and
enactment   of   the   1987   Constitution,   by   which   time
less­moneyed   sectoral   groups   in   an   electoral   contest
they   would   be   expected   to   gather   and   solidify   their
would   be   like   placing   babes   in   the   lion’s   den,   so   to
electoral base and brace themselves in the multi­party
speak, with the bigger and more established political
electoral   contest   with   the   more   veteran   political
parties   ultimately   gobbling   them   up.   R.A.   7941
groups.
 The   system,   designed   to   accommodate   as   many presupposes   that   every   underrepresented   sector   be
groups   as   possible,   abhors   the   monopoly   of represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral­
representation   in   the   Lower   House.   This   intent   is based   representation   stems   from   the   provisions   of
evident   in   the   statutory   imposition   of   the   three­seat Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as
cap, which prescribes the limit to the number of seats R.A.   7941,   in   enumerating   specific   sectors   to   be
that may be gained by a party or organization.  Votes 1
represented.  In holding that  the party  list  system  is
garnered in excess of 6% of the total votes cast do not open   only   to   the  underrepresented   and   marginalized
entitle the party to more than three seats. sectors, the ponenciaplaces much reliance on Section 5
There is no express provision of the Constitution or of R.A. 7941:
in   the   enabling   law   that   disallows   major   political
“SEC.   5. Registration.—Any   organized   group   of   persons
parties from participating in the party­list system and, may   register   as   a   party,   organization   or   coalition   for
at   the   same   time,   from   fielding   candidates   for
purposes   of   the   party­list   system   by   filing   with   the
legislative district representatives. COMELEC   not   later   than   ninety   (90)   days   before   the
election   a   petition   verified   by   its   president   or   secretary
Perhaps   the   present   controversy   stems   from   a
stating its desire to participate in the party­list system as a
confusion   of   the   actual   character   of   the   party­list
system. At first glance, it gives the impression of beingnational,   regional   or   sectoral   party   or   organization   or   a
a combination of proportional representation for non­ coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its   constitution,   bylaws,   platform   or   program   of
traditional   parties   and   sectoral   representation.   The
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
first,   proportional   representation,   on   one   end,   is
relevant   information   as   the   COMELEC   may
intended   for   no   other   reason   than   to   open   up   the
require: Provided,That   the   sectors   shall   include labor
electoral   process   for   broader   participation   and
peasant,   fisherfolk,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
representation. Sectoral representation on the other,
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
_______________ overseas workers, and professionals.
“The   COMELEC   shall   publish   the   petition   in   at   least
1
 Section 11(b), R.A. 7941. two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
737
“The   COMELEC   shall,   after   due   notice   and   hearing,
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 737 resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on was   submitted   for   decision   but   in  no   case   not   later   than
Elections sixty (60) days before election.”
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section
3(d)   of   the   statute,   defining   a   “sectoral   party,”   the
enumeration   was   intended   to   qualify   only   “sectoral
parties” and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political
parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither
Article   6,   Section   5(2),   nor   R.A.   7941   intended   to
guarantee representation to all sectors of society and,
let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the will of the
majority  of the Commissioners   were  to  be  respected,
was   to   introduce   the   concept   of   party­list
representation.
The party­list system is limited to four groups—1)
political   parties,   2)   sectoral   parties,   3)   sectoral
organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or
platform, principles or policies for the general conduct
of   government   and   which,   as   the   most   immediate
means of secur­
738
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
ing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of
citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those
enumerated   in   Article   6,   Section   5(2),   of   the   1987
Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and
those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly,
handicapped,   veterans,   overseas   workers   and
professionals.   A   sectoral   organization   is   a   group   of
citizens  who  share the same  or similar attributes  or
characteristics,   employment,   interests   or   concerns.
Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election
purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party­
list system is required to register with the COMELEC,
together with a list of its five nominees for party­list
representatives,   arranged   according   to   the   group’s
order of preference. In every election for the House of
Representatives,   each   voter   casts   two   votes—one   for
the district representative of his choice and another for
the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast
for   the   parties   and   organizations   are   totaled
nationwide.   In   contrast   to   the   election   of   all   other
officials where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate
with the highest number of votes wins) is adopted, the
number of seats under the party­list system depends
on the number of votes received in proportion to the
total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis of
the number of registered voters in the recent elections,
a   group   under   the   party­list   system,   should   get
approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one
seat.
At   the   center   stage   of   this   controversy   are   the
political   parties   themselves.   Undeniably,   political
parties   are   an   important   feature   in   both   democratic
and   authoritarian   regimes.   By   legitimizing   the candidates, with   the   exception   of   the   additional
3

individuals   and   institutions   that   control   political

requirement that he be nominated in one list only, and
power, parties add an important element of stability to provided, further, that  he is not a candidate for any
a   political   system   and   also   help   organize   the
elective office or has lost his bid for an elective office in
government   and   electorate   by   recruiting   candidates,
the   immediately   preceding   election.  A   nominee  must 4

conducting   campaigns,   encouraging   partisan actually   belong   to   the   sector   which   they   purport   to
attachments   and   generally   educating   the   public,represent,   otherwise,   there   can   be   no   true
stimulating voter participation and providing varying representation.  A   nominee   of   the   youth   sector   is
5

degrees   of   policy   direction   to   government.   The   idea

further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30
could  also be  seen  as  a   good training  and recruiting
years   of   age   on   the   day   of   the   election.  Should   he, 6

ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend the however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he is
multi­party allowed to continue until the expiration thereof.  Once 7

739 elected, party­list representatives also enjoy the same
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 739 term,   rights   and   privileges   as   do   district
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on representatives, except that
Elections
as allowing the expression and the compromise of the _______________
many interests of a complex society, including a range
 Bernas, pp. 355­358.
2

of   ideological   differences,   conflicting   political   values  The   Constitutional   qualifications   for   legislative   districts
3

and philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is
explicit—“A   free   and   open   party   system   shall   be
allowed   to   evolve   according   to   the   free   choice   of   the
people.”  The   multi­party   system   of   proportional
2
representation broadens the composition of the House
of   Representatives   to   accommodate   sectors   and
representatives apply to party­list nominees—
Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the
House   of   Representatives   unless   he   is   a   natural­born   citizen   of   the
Philippines, and on the day of the election, at least twenty­five years of age,
able to read and write, and except the party­list representative, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
 Sections 8, R.A. 7941.
4

organizations   that   do   not   have   well­defined   political  Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56 (1990).

5

constituencies   and   to   facilitate   access   to   minority   or  Section 9, R.A. 7941.

6

 Ibid.
small parties.
7

740
A party­list nominee is subject to basically the same
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
qualifications   applicable   to   legislative   districts
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
 Elections construction.   Courts   are   bound   to   suppose   that   any
they are not entitled to the Country­wide Development inconveniences   involved   in   the   application   of
Fund (CDF). 8 constitutional provisions according to their plain terms
A  feature  of the party­list   system   is   that  political and   import   have   been   considered   in   advance   and
parties,   sectoral   groups   and   organizations,   coalitions accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as
and aggrupation acquire the status of “candidates” and compensated   by   countervailing
their   nominees   relegated   to   mere   agents.   Thus,   if   a advantages.  The ponenciaitself,   in   ruling   as   it   does,
12

party­list   representative   dies,   becomes   physically may   unwittingly,   be   crossing   the   limits   of   judicial
incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the review and
organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified
during his term, his party can send another person to _______________

take his place for the remaining period, provided the  See   the   plenary   deliberations   (2nd   reading)   of   House   Bill   No.
8

replacement   is   next   in   succession   in   the   list   of 3043.

nominees   submitted   to   the   COMELEC   upon  Section 15, R.A. 7941.
9

registration.  Furthermore,  a  party­list  representative  Ibid.

10

 Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank, 176 US 559, 44 L. Ed. 587,
11

who switches party affiliations during his term forfeits 20 Set. 477.
his   seat.  So,   also,   if   a   person   changes   his   sectoral
9
 People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal. 289 St. 126, 110
12

affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will NE 485.
not   be   eligible   for   nomination   in   party­list 741

representative under his new party or organization.
The   argument   raised   by   petitioners   could   not   be
said to have been overlooked as they precisely were the
same   points   subjected   to   intense   and   prolonged
deliberations   by   the   members   of   the   Constitutional
Commission.
And,   the   polestar   in   the   constructions   of
constitutions always remains—“effect must be given to
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it.” The law, in its  clear formulation
11
cannot   give   this   tribunal   the   elbow­room   for
10
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 741
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation,
and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment.
While,   the   lament   of   herein   petitioners   is
understandable,  the   remedy  lies   not   with   this  Court
but   with   the   people   themselves   through   an
amendment of their work as and when better counsel
prevails.
 WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),
my   colleagues   in   their   judgment.   I   am   thus Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),
constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions. Nationalist Peoples’ Coalition (NPC),
SEPARATE OPINION Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
MENDOZA, J., dissenting: Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan
(PDP-LABAN),
I   vote   to   dismiss   the   petitions   in   these   cases.   I   will 742
presently explain my vote, but before I do so it seems 742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to   me   necessary   to   state   briefly   the   facts   and   the Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
issues. Elections
The Facts Liberal Party (LP),
Nacionalista Party (NP),
Petitioner   Ang   Bagong   Bayani­OFW   Labor   Party Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong
(OFW for short) is the political agency of the Overseas
Filipino   Workers   Movement,   a   non­stock   and   non­ Organizations/Coalitions:
profit   organization.   On   the   other   hand,   petitioner
Bayan Muna is a political party representing peasants, Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG
workers,   women,   the   youth,   and   other   marginalized WATCH),
sectors.   Both   were   accredited   by   the   Commission   on
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO
Elections in connection with the election for party­list
PHILIPPINES),
representatives on May 14, 2001.
The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS
Petitioners   brought   these   suits—in G.R.   No.
LOYALIST),
147589,   for   certiorari   and,   in   G.R.   No.   147613,   for
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc.
certiorari,   prohibition,   and   mandamus—for   the (PLAM),
purpose of seeking the annulment of the registration of Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy
the   following   parties   classified   as   “political   parties” Environment and Peace
and   “organizations/coalitions”   by   the   Commission   on
Elections: (JEEP),

Political Parties: Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association

 (CREBA),
Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc.
(SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers
(OCW),
Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG
BAYANI),
National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)
R.A.   No.   7941,   §5   provides   that   any   party,
organization, or coalition desiring to participate in the
party­list   system   must   apply   to   the   COMELEC   for
registration not later than 90 days before the election.
On the other hand, §4 of the same law requires that
any party, organization, or coalition which is already
registered   with   the   COMELEC   should   declare   its
intention   to   participate   in   the   party­list   system   90
days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001,
the   COMELEC   passed   upon   the   applications   for
registration   or   manifestations   of   intention   of   several
parties,   organizations,   and   coalitions.   On   March   28,
2001, it issued a certified list of parties, organizations,
or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001
elections.   All   in   all,   148   parties,   organizations,   and
“coalitions   were   accredited,   including   private
respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the
party­list  system  is  exclusively  for the  “marginalized
and underrepresented” sectors of the Philippine society
and that there is no way by which other sectors not so
identified,   much   less   the   major   political   parties,   can
participate in the party­list elections. Petitioner Bayan
Muna   in   particular   calls   attention   to   the   fact   that
seven of the respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas
NUCD­UMDP,   NPC,   LDP,   AKSYON,   PDP­LABAN,
and LP) are actually the major po­
743
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 743
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
litical parties in the country today as determined  by
the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May
3,   2001,   and   charges   that   the   rest   of   private
respondents   are   “pseudo   party­list   organizations”
which   are   actually   satellites   of   the   major   political
parties and of big businesses.
Bayan   Muna   argues   that   the   party­list   system   is
intended   to   address   the   problem   of   ineffective
representation   of   underprivileged   sectors   of   society
and enhance direct people’s action and participation in
the   decision­making   process   to   counter­balance   the
territorial   representation   of   80%   of   the   House   of
Representatives, and that to allow participation in the
party­list   system   of   respondent   political   parties   and
parties/coalitions   would   be   to   defeat   this   purpose
because these parties do not represent “marginalized
and underrepresented” sectors. For this reason, Bayan
1
Muna prays that R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared
unconstitutional   on  the  ground   that,   by  banning  the
five   major   political   parties   from   participating   in   the
party­list   system   only   in   the   May   1998   elections,   it
leaves them free to participate in subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth   the   Constitution   and   the   Party­List   System   Act
clearly allow, and they do not prohibit, the participation of
“registered   national,   regional,   and   sectoral   parties   or
organizations”   to   participate   in   the   party­list   system,
whether or not said parties or organizations represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. 2
It cites the proviso of Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution
that
For   three   consecutive   terms   after   the   ratification   of   this
Constitution,   one­half   of   the   seats   allocated   to   party­list
representatives   shall   be   filled,   as   provided   by   law,   by
selection   or   election   from   the   labor   peasant,   urban   poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other   sectors   as   may   be   provided   by   law,   except   the
religious sector,
as proof that ““marginalized” sectors are not entitled to
permanent seats in the House of Representatives. In
any event, it is contended
_______________
 Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna, 17­18.
1
 Memorandum for the COMELEC, 23­24.
2
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744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
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that petitioners’ recourse is not to this Court but to the
COMELEC because whether a party, organization, or
coalition   represents   “marginalized   and
underrepresented”   sectors   is   a   question   of   fact,   and
this Court is not a trier of facts. The COMELEC states
that, as a matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has
pending petitions to disqualify, based on this ground,
respondents NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD­UMDP,
LP,   MAD,   CREBA,   NFSP,   JEEP,   and   BAGONG
BAYANI.
The Issues
The issues in these cases actually come down to the
following:
1. (1)Whether the petitions filed in these cases should
be   dismissed   for   failure   of   petitioners   to   exhaust
administrative remedies in the COMELEC; and
2. (2)Whether   the   party­list   system   is   exclusively   for
“marginalized   and   underrepresented”   sectors   of
society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are
stated.
Discussion
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed
petitions   for   the   disqualification   of   respondents,   the
fact is that when the petitions in these cases were filed
on   April   16   and   17,   2001,   the   elections   were   just   a
month   away,   and   there   was   doubt   whether   a
resolution   of   the   petitions   for   disqualifications   was sectors   is   answered   in   the   affirmative   will   it   be
forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the elections on necessary to determine the status of respondents.
May   14,   2001,   the   cases   were   still   unresolved. II.
Petitioners, therefore, had no other “plain, speedy, and At   the   core   of   the   controversy   in   these   cases   is   the
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” within following provision of the Constitution:
the   meaning   of   Rule   65,   §§1­2   of   the   Code   of   Civil
ART.   VI,   §5(1)   The   House   of   Representatives   shall   be
Procedure   and   were   justified   in   resorting   to   the
composed   of   not   more   than   two   hundred   fifty   members,
extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and unless  Otherwise fixed by law,  who shall be elected from
mandamus. legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
From   another   point   of   view,   there   is   no   need   for
petitioners to await formal resolution of their petitions number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
as   the   COMELEC   had   already   indicated   in   press
by   law,   shall   be   elected   through   a   party­list   system   of
statements   its   stand   that   parties,   organizations,   or
registered   national,   regional,   and   sectoral   parties   or
coalitions, whether or not representing “marginalized organizations.
and underrepresented” sectors, could participate in the (2)   The   party­list   representatives   shall   constitute
elec­ twenty per   centum of   the   total   number   of   representatives
745
including those under the party­list. For three consecutive
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 745 terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one­half of
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on the   seats   allocated   to   party­list   representatives   shall   be
Elections filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
tion for the party­list system—a fact confirmed by it in labor,   peasant,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
its comment and memorandum in these cases. There is communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
thus no basis for insisting that petitioners should have be provided by law except the religious sector.
exhausted   administrative   remedies   before   coming   to To   carry   out   this   provision   of   the   Constitution,
this Court. Congress enacted the Party­List System Act (R.A. No.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as 7941), the pertinent provisions of which read:
the statement of the second issue above plainly shows. SEC.   2. Declaration   of   Party.—The   State   shall   promote
It is only if the question whether the party­list system proportional   representation   in   the   election   of
is   limited   to,   “marginalized   and   underrepresented” representatives to the House of Representatives through a
party­list   system   of   registered   national,   regional   and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipinp citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented   sectors,   organizations   and   parties,   and
who lack well­defined po­
746
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
litical   constituencies   but   who   could   contribute   to   the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall   develop   and   guarantee   a   full,   free   and   open   party
system   in   order   to   attain   the   broadest   possible
representation of party, bsectoral or group interests in the
House   of   Representatives   by   enhancing   their   chances   to
compete   for   and   win   seats   in   the   legislature,   and   shall
provide the simplest scheme possible.
SEC.   11. Number   of   Party­List   Representatives.—The
party­list   representatives   shall   constitute   twenty per
centum (20%)   of   the   total   number   of   the   members   of   the
House of Representatives including those under the party­
list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5)
major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress   of   the   Philippines   shall   not   be   entitled   to
participate in the party­list system.
In   determining   the   allocation   of   seats   for   the   second
vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. (a)The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. (b)The   parties,   organizations,   and   coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast   for   the   party­list   system   shall   be   entitled   to
one seat each; Provided,That those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled
to   additional   seats   in   proportion   to   their   total
number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization,   or   coalition   shall   be   entitled   to
not more than three (3) seats.
The most  important  single factor  in  determining  the
intention   of   the   people   from   whom   the   Constitution
emanated   is   the   language   in   which   it   is
expressed.”  The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear.
3
It   provides   for   a   party­list   system   of   “registered,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations,” not for
sectoral   representation.   Only   for   three   consecutive
terms following the ratification of the Constitution and
only   with   respect   to   one­half  of   the  seats   allotted   to
party­list   representatives   does   it   allow   sectoral
representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1X2) provides no
basis for
_______________
 Roman   Catholic   Apostolic   Administrator   of   Davao   v.   Land
3
Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
747
 VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 747 party­list   system   enables   marginalized   and
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to,
Elections the   labor,   peasant,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
petitioners’   contention   that   whether   it   is   sectoral
representation  or  party­list   system   the  purpose  is   to
provide   exclusive   representation   for   “marginalized
sectors,”   by   which   term   petitioners   mean   the   labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not
identical.   Party­list   representation   is   a   type   of
proportional representation designed to give those who
otherwise   cannot   win   a   seat   in   the   House   of
Representatives in district elections a chance to win if
they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In
this sense, these groups are considered “marginalized
and underrepresented.”) Under the party­list system,
representatives are elected from multi­seat districts in
proportion to the number of votes received in contrast
to  the   “winner­take­all”  single­seat   district   in   which,
even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets
no seat.
Thus,   under   the   party­list   system,   a   party   or
candidate need not come in first in order to win seats
in the legislature. On the other hand, in the “winner­
take­all” single­seat district, the votes cast for a losing
candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the
winner   are   represented.   To   the   extent   then   that   it
assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in
the legislature that  reflects  their public  support,  the
communities,   women,   and   youth   sectors)   to   obtain
seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the
party­list system does not guarantee to these sectors
seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the
Constitution   as   answer   to   the   problem   of
underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party­list system is exclusively
for  the  “marginalized   and   underrepresented  sectors,”
petitioner Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional
intent   in   adopting   the   party­list   system   must   be
searched for in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
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748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
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The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been
stated   by   this   Court   in Civil   Liberties   Union   v.
Executive Secretary,  as follows:
4
While   it   is   permissible   in   this   jurisdiction   to   consult   the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution,   resort   thereto   may   be   had   only   when   other
guides   fail   as   said  proceedings   are  powerless   to  vary   the
terms   of   the   Constitution   when   the   meaning   is   clear.
Debates   in   the   constitutional   convention   “are   of   value   as
showing   the   views   of   the   individual   members,   and   as
indicating the reason for their votes, but they give Us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at
the   polls   gave   that   instrument   the   force   of   fundamental
law.   We   think   it   safer   to   construe   the   constitution   from
what   appears   upon   its   face.”   The   proper   interpretation
therefore depends more on how  it  was understood by the
people   adopting   it   than   in   the   framers’   understanding
thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles
P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of history  in  constitutional
exegesis:
The   intention   of   the   framers   of   the   Constitution,   even
assuming   we   could   discover   what   it   was,   when   it   is   not
adequately   expressed   in   the   Constitution,   that   is   to   say,
what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has
no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what
they set down in the document, prying into what else they
wrote   and   what   they   said,   anything   we  may   find  is   only
advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason
why we should eavesdrop on theirs. 5 than two hundred thousand, or each province, shall have at
Be   that   as   it   may,   the   Record   of   the   Constitutional
Commission speaks clearly against petitioners’ reading
of   Art.   VI,   §5(1)(2).   It   shows   clearly   that   the
Constitutional   Commission   rejected   sectoral
representation   in   preference   to   proportional
representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the
Legislative Department read:
_______________
4
 194   SCRA   317,   337­338   (1991),   quoting Commonwealth   v.
Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220 (1886).
5
 LIONS   UNDER   THE   THRONE   2   (1947)   (emphasis   in   the
original).
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 749
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
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SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members who shall be
elected   from   legislative   districts   apportioned   among   the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be   elected from  the   sectors  and  party  list.   The   sectoral   or
party   list   representatives   shall   in   no   case   exceed   twenty
percent   of   the   entire   membership   of   the   House   of
Representatives.
Each   legislative   district   shall   comprise,   as   far   as
practicable,   contiguous,   compact   and   adjacent   territory,
provided, however, that each city with a population of more
least one representative.
Within three years following the return of every census,
the  Congress   shall   make  a  reapportionment   of   legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
As   petitioner   Bayan   Muna   states,   two   proposals   for
additional   representation   in   the   House   of
Representatives were submitted by the Committee on
Legislative   Department:   one   for   sectoral
representation, advocated by Commissioner Villacorta,
and   another   one   for   party­list   system,   advocated   by
Commissioner Monsod. The two are not the same. As
Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I   would  like  to  make   a  distinction  from   the  beginning
that   the   proposal   for   the   party   list   system   is   not
synonymous   with   that   of   the   sectoral   representation.
Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma
of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the
sectors.   .   .   .   In   effect,   a   sectoral   representation   in   the
Assembly   would   mean   that   certain   sectors   would   have
reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who
would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the
problem   of   which   sector   because   as   we   will   notice   in
Proclamation   No.   9,   the   sectors   cited   were   the   farmers,
fishermen,   workers,   students,   professionals,   business,
military,   academic,   ethnic   and   other   similar   groups.   So
these   are   the   nine   sectors   that   were   identified   here   as
“sectoral   representatives”   to   be   represented   in   this
Commission. The problem we had in
_______________
 Committee   on   Legislative   Power,   Committee   Report   No.   22
6
(emphasis added).
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trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly
was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors . . . . Second, we had the problem of who comprise
the farmers. . . . A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may
also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the
person to say “I am a farmer” so he would be included in
that sector.
.   .   .Under   the   party­list   system,   there   are   no   reserved
seats for sectors . . . .This can be a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional
party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he
wants the farmers’ party to be represented in the Assembly.
Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day,
the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been
garnered by each party or each organization—one does not
have   to   be   a   political   party   and   register   in   order   to
participate as a party—and count the votes and from there
derive   the   percentage   of   the   votes   that   had   been   cast   in
favor of a party, organization or coalition.
. . . .
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of
sectoral representation while at the same time making sure
that   those   who   really   have   a   national   constituency   or
sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not
have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district
basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis
but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups  or
parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about
1,000,000  or   1,500,000   votes.  But  they  were always  third
place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have
no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have
five   or   six   representatives   in   the   Assembly   even   if   they
would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that
is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of
the party list system.
Commissioner  Monsod,  therefore,  proposed to amend
the phrase “shall be elected from the sectors and party
list” in §5 by replacing it with the following
_______________
7
 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85­86,
session of Tuesday, July 22, 1986 (emphasis added).
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THROUGH   A   PARTY   LIST   SYSTEM   OF   REGISTERED
NATIONAL,   REGIONAL   OR   SECTORAL   PARTIES   OR
ORGANIZATIONS. 8
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with
slight modification it later became the basis of the present
Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The   following   exchange   took   place   on   the   Monsod
amendment:
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, before accepting the
proposed amendment, the Committee would like to
get some clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of “OR SECTORAL PARTIES
OR ORGANIZATIONS,” is he referring to any sector which
the law may subsequently define?
MR. MONSOD: . . . The party list system that is being
advocated   by   this   amendment   is   a   system   that
opens   up   the   list   to   any   regional,   national   or
sectoral party. . . .
. . . .
MS.   AQUINO: The   Committee   would   like   to   be
clarified on this. Do we understand the proponent
correctly   that   this   party   list   system   is   not
necessarily synonymous to sectoral representation?
MR. MONSOD: No, it is not necessarily synonymous,
but it does include the right of sectoral parties or
organizations to register, but it is not exclusive to
sectoral parties or organizations.
751 MS.   AQUINO: And   that   it   does   not   likewise   reserve
any   institutional   seat   for   any   sector?   In   other
words, it only enables it to be a part of the party list
if it has the capacity to do so, but it does not reserve
any seat for the sectors.
MR.   MONSOD: Yes,   Madam   President,   this   is   not   a
reserve seat system. 9
The   proposed   amendment   was   opposed   by   a   group
headed   by   Commissioner   Villacorta,   which   included
Commissioners   Tadeo,   Lerum,   and   Bernas.   Lerum
said:
MR.   LERUM. Madam   President,   in   view   of   the
explanation,   I   am   objecting   to   this   amendment
because it is possible that the la
_______________
 Id. at 252­253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.
8
 Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
9
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752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
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bor sector will not be represented considering that
those   who   will   vote   are   all   the   voters   of   the
Philippines. In other words, the representative of labor
will   be   chosen­by   all   the   electors   of   the   Philippines,
and   that   is   not   correct.   My   contention   is   that   the
sectoral   representative   must   be   selected   by   his   own
constituents, and for that reason, I am objecting to this
amendment. 10
On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that
if allowed to participate in the party­list system, the
major   political   parties   could   gobble   up   the   sectoral
parties. He said:
MR. TADEO. . . . .Kapag inilagay natin ang party list,
papasukin   ng   political   parties.   Mangigibabaw   at
kakainin din niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor. 11
MR.   TADEO. Ang   punto   lamang   namin,   pag
pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party,
it   will   dominate   the   party   list   at   mawawalang
saysay   din   iyong   sector.   Lalamunin   mismo   ng
political   parties   ang   party   list   system.   Gusto   ko
lamang   bigyan   ng   diin   ang   “reserve.”   Hindi   ito
reserve   seat   sa   marginalized   sectors.   Kung
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa
political parties.
Villacorta   said   he   was   objecting   to   the   party­list
system   because   it   would   not   solve   the   problem   of
ineffective   representation   of   the   underprivileged
sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self­
government at the start of this century, our legislators were
elected based on their promise that they would  represent
the  little  people  of   our  land.   With  the  exception  of  a  few
patriotic legislators, some of whom are in our Commission
today,   members   of   the   National   Assemblies,   the
Congresses,   and   the   Batasans   of   the   past   did   not   devote
themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal condition
of our country’s poor and lower classes.
. . . .
_______________
 Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.
10
 Id. at 254.
11
 Id. at 257.
12
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 753
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These   realities   convince   us   that   there   are   no   spokesmen
and   legislators   who   can   best   represent   the   poor,   the
underprivileged, the marginalized than those coming from
within their ranks.
13
To   Commissioner   Villacorta,   only   reserved   seats   for
the sectors would give them effective representation:
MR. MONSOD. My amendment merely says that it is
THROUGH   A   PARTY   LIST   SYSTEM   OF
REGISTERED   NATIONAL,   RE   GIONAL   OR
SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.
My   question   is: Does   the   Honorable   Commissioner
object to this amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, because it does not guarantee
that   the   seats   reserved   for   the   party   list
representatives will be reserved for the sectors.  14
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July
25,   1986,   on   §5   was   suspended   to   allow   the
commissioners   to   come   to   an   agreement.   After   one
week, a compromise formula was reached by the two
groups   and   presented   to   the   plenary   session   of   the
Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase
“shall be elected from the sectors and the party list,” it
was proposed that the following be inserted in §5 of the
Draft Article:
THROUGH   A   PARTY   LIST   SYSTEM   OF   REGISTERED
NATIONAL,  REGIONAL AND  SECTORAL PARTIES  OR
ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY
LIST   REPRESENTATIVES   SHALL   CONSTITUTE
TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THAT FOR
THE   FIRST   TWO   TERMS   AFTER   THE   RATIFICATION
OF   THIS   CONSTITUTION   TWENTY­FIVE   OF   THE
SEATS   ALLOCATED   TO   PARTY   LIST
REPRESENTATIVES   SHALL   BE   FILLED   BY
SELECTION   OR   ELECTION,   AS   PROVIDED   BY   LAW
FROM   THE   LABOR,   PEASANT,   URBAN   POOR   AND
YOUTH SECTORS.
However, although an agreement had apparently been
reached, the advocates of sectoral representation were
not satisfied that it
_______________
 Id. at 255.
13
 Id. at 258.
14
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would   be   allowed   only   for   two   terms   and   only   with
respect to one­half of the seats allocated for party­list
representatives.   Commissioner   Aquino   proposed
instead the following amendment of §5:
ELECTED   THROUGH   A   PARTY   LIST   SYSTEM   OF
REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL
PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED BY LAW
THE   PARTY   LIST   REPRESENTATIVES   SHALL
CONSTITUTE   TWENTY   PERCENT   OF   THE   TOTAL
MEMBERS   OF   THE   HOUSE   OF   REPRESENTATIVES.
TWENTY­FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY
LIST   REPRESENTATIVES   SHALL   BE   FILLED   BY
ELECTION,   AS   PROVIDED   BY   LAW,   FROM   THE
LABOR,   PEASANT,   URBAN   POOR,   WOMEN   AND
YOUTH SECTORS
When   put   to   vote,   however,   Aquino’s   proposal   was
defeated   with­nineteen   (19)   voting   in   favor,   and
twenty­two (22) voting against. 15
The   Commission   then   voted   on   the   proposed
amendment of Commissioner Monsod. With only a few
minor changes, it was approved by a vote of thirty­two
(32)   commissioners   against   none.  As   finally   worded,
16
the amendment reads:
SHALL   BE   FILLED   AS   PROVIDED   BY   LAW,   BY
SELECTION   OR   ELECTION,   FROM   THE   LABOR,
PEASANT,   URBAN   POOR,   INDIGENOUS   CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER
SECTORS   AS   MAY   BE   PROVIDED   BY   LAW,   EXCEPT
THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR
Thus,   the   deliberations   of   the   Constitutional
Commission   show   that   the   party­list   system   is   not
limited   to   the   “marginalized   and   underrepresented”
sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
and   the   youth,   but   that   it   is   a   type   of   proportional
representation intended to give voice to those who may
not   have   the   necessary   number   to   win   a   seat   in   a
district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a
seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on
Art. VI, §5(1) (2) to say that “Although Commissioners
Villacorta and Monsod differed in their proposals as to
the details of the
_______________
 Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.
15
 Id. at 589.
16
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
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party­list system, both proponents worked within the
framework   that   the   party­list   system   is   for   the
‘marginalized’ as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the
‘underrepresented’   as   termed   by   Comm.   Monsod,
which he defined as those which are ‘always third or
fourth place in each of the districts.’ ” 17
Indeed,   the   two   proposals   put   forth   by   them   are
basically   different,   and   they   do   not   have   the   same
basis.   What   the   advocates   of   sectoral   representation
wanted   was   permanent   reserved   seats   for
“marginalized sectors” by which they mean the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these
sectors   were   given   only   one­half   of   the   seats   in   the
House of Representatives and only for three terms. On
the   other   hand,   the   “third   or   fourth   place(rs)”   in
district elections, for whom the party­list system was
intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the
districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to
enable them to be represented in the House. They may
include   Villacorta’s   “marginalized”   or
“underprivileged” sectors, but they are not limited to
them.   There   would   have   been   no   need   to   give   the
“marginalized   sectors”   one­half   of   the   seats   for   the
party­list system for three terms if the two systems are
identical.
The   objections   raised   against   the   accreditation   of
755 private   respondents   are   the   same   ones   raised   by
Commissioners Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among
others,   to   the   Monsod   proposal   which   became   the
present Art. VI, §5(1)(2), namely, that certain sectors,
like labor, may not win seats in the House under the
party­list system; that the big parties might gobble up
the sectoral parties; that the party­list system will not
solve the problem of ineffective representation of the
“underprivileged   sectors.”   These   objections,   however,
did   not   carry   the   day,   as   the   members   of   the
Constitutional Commission voted 32­0 in favor of the
Monsod proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who
spoke   against   the   Monsod   proposal   did   not   vote
against it. To uphold these objections now would be to
overrule the Constitutional Commission and in effect
amend the Constitution.
_______________
 Memorandum for petitioner Bayan Muna 13.
17
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In   sum,   a   problem   was   placed   before   the
Constitutional Commission that the existing “winner­
take­all”   one­seat   district   system   of   election   leaves
blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of
underrepresentation   two   solutions   were   proposed:
sectoral   representation   and   party­list   system   or
proportional   representation.   The   Constitutional
Commission   chose   the   party­list   system.   This   Court
cannot hold that the party­list system is reserved for
the   labor,   peasants,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend
without   changing   entirely   the   meaning   of   the
Constitution   which   in   fact   mandates   exactly   the
opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides
in Art. IX, C, §6 that “A free and open party system
shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice
of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.”
Thus,   neither   textual   nor   historical   consideration
yields support for the view that the party­list system is
designed   exclusively   for   labor,   peasant,   urban   poor,
indigenous   cultural   communities,   women,   and   youth
sectors. As Commissioners Ople said in supporting the
Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For
example, we have the PDP­Laban and the UNIDO. I see no
reason why they should not be able to make common goals
with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these
parties   can   be   transformed   through   the   participation   of
mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration
parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan
which is now being formed. There is no question that they
will   be   attractive   to   many   mass   organizations.   In   the
opposition   parties   to   which   we   belong,   there   will   be   a
stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with
their   participation,   the   policies   of   such   parties   can   be
radically transformed because this amendment will create
conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations
and the political parties to come together. And the party list
system is certainly available, although it is open to all the
parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the
roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time,
develop   this   excellent   system   that   they   have   in   Europe
where   labor   organizations   and   cooperatives,   for   example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party
and the Christian
 757
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Democratic   Party   in   Germany,   and   their   very   presence
there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and
the leadership of those parties. 18
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered
under   the   party­list   system,   §6   of   the   Party­List
System Act provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.—The
COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing,   the   registration   of   any   national,   regional   or
sectoral   party,   organization   or   coalition   on   any   of   the
following grounds:
1. (1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization
or association organized for religious purposes;
2. (2)It advocates  violence or unlawful means  to seek
its goal;
3. (3)It is a foreign party or organization;
4. (4)It   is   receiving   support   from   any   foreign
government,   foreign   political   party,   foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers   or   members   or   indirectly   through   third
parties for partisan election purposes;
5. (5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
6. (6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7. (7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8. (8)It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections   or   fails   to   obtain   at   least   two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party­list
system   in   the   two   (2)   preceding   elections   for   the
constituency in which it has registered.
Petitioners’   allegations   that   certain   parties   or
organizations, such as private respondents MAD and
Ang   Buhay   Hayaang   Yumabong,   are   disqualified
under   this   provision   are   for   the   COMELEC   to
determine after due notice and hearing. They are unfit
for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
_______________
 II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.
18
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The   presumption   is   that   the   words   in   which   the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought   to   be   attained.   In   other   words, verba   legis still
prevails.   Only   when   the   meaning   of   the   words   used   is
unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids   of   construction   and   interpretation,   such   as   the
proceedings   of   the   Constitutional   Commission   or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true
intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
. . . .
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the
party­list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics
of   the  system   shall   be provided  by   law. Pursuant   thereto,
Congress   enacted   RA   7941.   .   .   .   Section   2   thereof
unequivocally states that the party­list system of electing
congressional   representatives   was   designed   to   “enable
underrepresented   sectors,   organizations   and   parties,   and
who lack well­defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole . . .”
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends
the   meaning   of   §2   of   R.A.   No.   7941.   The   provision
reads:
SEC.   2. Declaration   of   Party.—The   State   shall   promote
proportional   representation   in   the   election   of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a
party­list   system   of   registered   national,   regional   and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented   sectors,   organizations   and   parties,   and
who lack well­defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members   of   the   House   of   Representatives.   Towards   this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or  group interests in the
House   of   Representatives   by   enhancing   their   chances   to
compete   for   and   win   seats   in   the   legislature,   and   shall
provide the simplest scheme possible.
What this provision simply states is that the purpose
of   the   party­list   system   is   to   promote   proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end,
“a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral
or   group   interests   in   the   House   of   Representatives”
shall be guar­
759
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 759
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anteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does
not   say   that   the   party­list   system   is   intended “to
enableFilipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented   sectors,   organizations,   and   parties,
and who lack well­defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation” to win seats in the House of
Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the
law is “to promote proportional representation through
a party­list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral   parties   or   organizations   or   coalitions
thereof, which will enableFilipino citizens belonging to
marginalized   and   underrepresented   sectors,
organizations, and parties, and who lack well­defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation”
to win seats in the House. For while the representation
of   “marginalized   and   underrepresented”   sectors   is   a
basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As
already   explained,   the   aim   of   proportional
representation  is   to  enable   those  who   cannot   win   in
the   “winner­take­air   district   elections   a   chance   of
winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to
the   sectors   mentioned   in   §5, i.e., labor,   peasants,
fisherfolk,   urban   poor,   indigenous   cultural
communities,   the   elderly,   the   handicapped,   women,
the   youth,   veterans,   overseas   workers,   and
professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a “full, free and open party
system” if the election for the party list system is to be
limited to the sectors which are enumerated in §5 of
the   law, i.e., labor,   peasants,   fisherfolk,   urban   poor,
indigenous   cultural   communities,   the   elderly,
handicapped,   women,   the   youth,   veterans,   overseas
workers, and professionals? After all, what is provided
for   is   “a   party­list   system   of   registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations” each of
which is separately defined in §3 of the law.
That   the   party­list   system   is   not   limited   to   these
groups is also clear from §5 of the law:
SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of
the party­list system by filing with the COMELEC not later
than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate
in the party­list system as a national, regional or
760
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Elections
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organiza tions, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws,
platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement   and   other   relevant   information   as   the
COMELEC   may   require: Provided, That   the   sectors   shall
include   labor,   peasant,   fisherfolk,   urban   poor,   indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas work ers, and professionals.
There would be no need to provide specifically for the
sectors if the party­list system is reserved for them.
FOR   THE   FOREGOING   REASONS,   the   petitions
in these cases should be dismissed.
Case   remanded   to   COMELEC   for   further
proceedings.
Notes.—Courts   will   decide   a   question   otherwise
moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet
evading   review.”   (Alunan   III   vs.   Mirasol, 276   SCRA
501 [1997])
To   have   meaningful   representation,   the   elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number
of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the
party­list system, the result might be the proliferation
of   small   groups   which   are   incapable   of   contributing
significant   legislation,   and   which   might   even   pose   a
threat   to   the   stability   of   Congress.   (Veterans
Federation   Party   vs.   Commission   on   Elections, 342
SCRA 244 [2000])

——o0o——

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© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 665 factional   controversies   within   a   political   party   where   a
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on controlling   statute   or   clear   legal   right   is   involved.–In   the
Elections case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to  represent
G.R. No. 161265. February 24, 2004. *
LABAN   NG   DEMOKRATIKONG   PILIPINO,
represented by its Chairman EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
petitioner, vs. THE   COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS
and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, respondents.
Election   Law; Political   Parties; Commission   on
Elections (COME­LEC); The ascertainment of the identity of
a political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that
is   well   within   the   authority   of   the   Commission   on
Elections.–The   COMELEC   correctly   stated   that   “the
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its
legitimate   officers”   is   a   matter   that   is   well   within   its
authority. The source of this authority is no other than the
fundamental   law   itself,   which   vests   upon   the   COMELEC
the power and function to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the
exercise   of   such   power   and   in   the   discharge   of   such
function,   the   Commission   is   endowed   with   ample
“wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means
and   methods   that   will   ensure   the   accomplishment   of   the
great  objectives for which  it  was created to promote  free,
orderly and honest elections.”
Same; Same; The repercussions of the question of party
identity   and   leadership   do   not   end   at   the   validity   of   the
endorsement   of   the   certificates   of   candidacy   of   persons
claiming   to   be   the   party’s   standard   bearer;   The   Supreme
Court   will   have   to   assume   jurisdiction   to   determine
the LDP, contends that under the Party Constitution only
he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary
General,   has   the   authority   to   endorse   and   sign,   party
nominations.   The   Secretary   General   vigorously   disputes
this   claim   and   maintains   his   own   authority.   Clearly,   the
question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if
the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are
legitimate party standard bearers or not. The repercussions
of the question of party identity and leadership do not end
at the validity of the endorsement of the
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
certificates of candidacy of persons claiming to be the
party’s   standard   bearer.   The   law   grants   a   registered
political   party   certain   rights   and   privileges,   which,
naturally, redound to the benefit of its candidates. It is also
for this significant dimension that Sinaca is not applicable
in   this   case.   As   conceded   in Sinacaitself,   the   Court   will
have   to   assume   jurisdiction   to   determine   factional
controversies   within   a   political   party   where   a   controlling
statute or clear legal right is involved. Verily, there is more
than one law, as well as a number of clear legal rights, that
are at stake in the case at bar.
 Same; Same; Certificates   of   Candidacy; Corollary   to
the   right   of   a   political   party   “to   identify   the   people   who
constitute   the   association   and   to  select   a   standard   bearer
who best represents the party’s ideologies and preference” is
the   right   to   exclude   persons   in   its   association   and   to   not
lend   its   name   and   prestige   to   those   which   it   deems
undeserving   to   represent   its   ideals;   A   certificate   of
candidacy makes known to the COMELEC that the person
therein mentioned has been nominated by a duly authorized
political   group   empowered   to   act   and   that   it   reflects
accurately   the   sentiment   of   the   nominating   body.–It   is,
therefore, in the interest of every political party not to allow
persons   it   had   not   chosen   to   hold   themselves   out   as
representatives   of   the   party.   Corollary   to   the   right   of   a
political   party   “to   identify   the   people   who   constitute   the
association   and   to   select   a   standard   bearer   who   best
represents   the   party’s   ideologies   and   preference”   is   the
right to exclude persons in its association and to not lend its
name and prestige to those which it deems undeserving to
represent its ideals. A certificate of candidacy makes known
to the COMELEC that  the person therein mentioned has
been   nominated   by   a   duly   authorized   political   group
empowered   to   act   and   that   it   reflects   accurately   the
sentiment   of   the   nominating  body.   A   candidate’s   political
party affiliation is also printed followed by his or her name
in   the   certified   list   of   candidates.   A   candidate
misrepresenting himself or herself to be a party’s candidate,
therefore,   not  only  misappropriates   the party’s  name  and
prestige but foists a deception upon the electorate, who may
unwittingly cast its ballot for him or her on the mistaken
belief   that   he  or  she  stands for  the  party’s  principles.  To
prevent this occurrence, the COMELEC has the power and
the duty to step in and enforce the law not only to protect
the party but, more importantly, the electorate, in line with
the  Commission’s  broad  constitutional   mandate to  ensure
orderly elections.
Same; Same; Same; To   resolve   the   simple   issue   of
determining who as between the Party Chairman and the
Secretary  General   has   the   authority  to   sign   certificates   of
candidacy   of   the   official   candidates   of   the   party,   the
COMELEC  need  only  to  turn  to  the  Party  Constitution–it
need   not   go   so   far   as   to   resolve   the   root   of   the   conflict
between the party officials.–The only issue in this case, as
defined   by   the   COMELEC   itself,   is   who   as   between   the
Party   Chairman   and   the   Secretary   General   has   the
authority to
667
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 667
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
sign certificates of candidacy of the official candidates
of   the   party.   Indeed,   the
petitioners’ Manifestation and Petition before   the
COMELEC merely asked the Commission to recognize only
those   certificates   of   candidacy   signed   by   petitioner   Sen.
Angara or his authorized representative, and no other. To
resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn
to the Party Constitution. It need not go so far as to resolve
the root of the conflict between the party officials. It need
only   resolve   such   questions   as   may   be   necessary   in   the
exercise of its enforcement powers.
 Same; Same; Same; The   COMELEC   cannot   grant   a
party   official   greater   authority   than   what   the   party   itself
grants,  lest   the same  amount  to  a violation  of   the   party’s
freedom   of   association.–Clearly,   however,   the   above
provision presupposes that the party president, chairman or
secretary­general has been “duly authorized” by the party
to sign the certificate of candidacy. COMELEC Resolution
No.   6453   cannot   grant   a   party   official   greater   authority
than   what   the   party   itself   grants,   lest   such   Resolution
amount to a violation of the party’s freedom of association.
Same; Same; Same; The   lack   of   a   political   party’s
Secretary   General   of   authority   to   sign   documents   or   to
nominate candidates for the party would not result in the
denial of due course to or the cancellation of the certificates
of candidacy he may have signed on behalf of the party–the
candidates   are   simply   deemed   as   not   nominated   by   the
party and are considered independent candidates.–The lack
of Rep. Aquino’s authority to sign documents or to nominate
candidates for the LDP would not result in the denial of due
course to or the cancellation of the certificates of candidacy
he   may  have  signed  on   behalf   of   the  LDP.   The  exclusive
ground for the denial of due course to or the cancellation of
a certificate of candidacy for any elective office is that any
material   representation   contained   therein   as   required   by
law is false. Since the signature of Rep. Aquino was affixed
either   prior   to,   or   on   the   basis   of,   the
challenged Resolution recognizing   his   authority   to   sign   on
behalf of the LDP, the same would not constitute material
representation that is false. In such case, the candidates are
simply   deemed   as   not   nominated   by   the   LDP   and   are
considered independent candidates pursuant to Section 7 of
COMELEC   Resolution   No.   6453:   SEC.   7. Effect   of   filing
certificate   of   nomination.–A   candidate   who   has   not   been
nominated   by   a   registered   political   party   or   its   duly
authorized   representative,   or   whose   nomination   has   not
been submitted by a registered political party . . . shall be
considered as an independent candidate.
Same; Same; Equity; For all its conceded merits, equity
is   available   only   in   the   absence   of   law   and   not   as   its
replacement.–From   the   foregoing,   it   is   plain   that   the
COMELEC misapplied equity in the present case. For all
its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence
of law  and not as its replacement. Equity is described as
justice without legality,
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
which simply means that it cannot supplant, although
it   may,   as   often   happens,   supplement   the   law.   The
COMELEC should have decided the case on the basis of the
party constitution and election laws. It chose not to because
of its irrational fear of treading, as respondent Aquino put
it, on “unchartered” territories. But, as shown above, these
territories have long been charted by jurisprudence and, in
any case, the COMELEC need not have sailed far from the
shore   to   arrive   at   the   correct   conclusion.   In   truth,   the
COMELEC Resolution is indecision in the guise of equity.
Same; Same; The   COMELEC,   by   dividing   a   political
party into “wings,” effectively diffused the party’s strength
and   undeniably   emasculated   its   chance   of   obtaining   the
Commission’s nod as the dominant minority party, and by
allowing   each   wing   to   nominate   different   candidates,   the election   committees,   the   COMELEC   has   eroded   the
COMELEC   planted   the   seeds   of   confusion   among   the significance of political parties and effectively  divided  the
opposition.   The   COMELEC   has   lost   sight   of   the   unique
electorate, who are apt to be confounded by two candidates
political situation of the Philippines where, to paraphrase
from   a   single   political   party.– Worse,   the   COMELEC
Justice   Perfecto’s   concurring   opinion   in Sotto,   supra, the
divided the LDP into “wings,” each of which may nominate
administration   party   has   always   been   unnecessarily   and
candidates for every elective position. Both wings are also
dangerously too big and the opposition party too small to be
entitled to representatives in the election committees that
an   effective   check   on   the   administration.   The   purpose   of
the Commission may create. In the event that the LDP is
according dominant status and representation to a minority
accorded dominant minority party election status, election
party is
returns   of   odd­numbered   precincts   shall   be   furnished   the
669
Angara   wing   and   those   of   even­numbered   precincts,   the VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 669
Aquino   wing.   By   creating   the   two   wings,   the   COMELEC
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
effectively   diffused   the   LDP’s   strength   and   undeniably
Elections
emasculated its chance of obtaining the Commission’s nod
precisely to serve as an effective check on the majority.
as the dominant minority party. By allowing each wing to
The   COMELEC   performed   a   disservice   to   the   opposition
nominate different candidates, the COMELEC planted the
and,   ultimately,   to   the   voting   public,   as
seeds of confusion among the electorate, who are apt to be
confounded by two candidates from a single political party. its Resolution facilitated,   rather   than   forestalled,   the
division   of   the   minority   party.   By   splitting   copies   of   the
In Recabo,   Jr.   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   this   Court
election returns between the two factions, the COMELEC
declared that the electoral process envisions one candidate
has   fractured   both   wings.   The   practical   purpose   of
from  a  political   party  for each  position,  and disunity and
furnishing a party with a copy of the election returns is to
discord amongst members of a political party should not be
allow it to tally the results of the elections at the precinct
allowed   to   create   a   mockery   thereof.   The   admonition
level. Ultimately, it is a guard against fraud. Thus, resort to
against   mocking   the   electoral   process   not   only   applies   to
copies   thereof   may   be  had   when   the  election  returns   are
political parties but with greater force to the COMELEC.
delayed,   lost   or   destroyed,   or   when   they   appear   to   be
Same; Same; By   according   both  wings   representatives
tampered or falsified. A split party without a complete set
in the election committees,  the COMELEC has  eroded the of   election   returns   cannot   successfully   help   preserve   the
significance  of   political   parties  and  effectively  divided  the sanctity of the ballot.
opposition,   and   by   splitting   copies   of   the   election   returns Same; Same; Political   parties   constitute   a   basic
between the two factions, the COMELEC has fractured both element   of   the   democratic   institutional   apparatus–in
wings.–By   according   both   wings   representatives   in   the modern times, the political party has become the instrument
for   the   organization   of   societies,   performing   an   essential
function in the management of succession to power, as well
as in the process of obtaining popular consent to the course
of public policy.–It bears reminding respondent Commission
of this Court’s pronouncement in Peralta v. Commission on
Elections,   which,   while   made   in   the   backdrop   of   a
parliamentary   form   of   government,   holds   equally   true
under   the   present   government   structure:   .   .   .   political
parties   constitute   a   basic   element   of   the   democratic
institutional   apparatus.   Government   derives   its   strength
from   the   support,   active   or   passive,   of   a   coalition   of
elements of society. In modern times, the political party has
become   the   instrument   for   the   organization   of   societies.
This is predicated on the doctrine that government exists
with the consent of the governed. Political parties perform
an “essential function in the management of succession to
power,   as   well   as   in   the   process   of   obtaining   popular
consent to the course of public policy. They amass sufficient
support to buttress the authority of governments; or, on the
contrary,   they   attract   or   organize   discontent   and
dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the government. In either
case   they   perform   the   function   of   the   articulation   of   the
interests   and   aspirations   of   a   substantial   segment   of   the
citizenry, usually in ways contended to be promotive of the
national weal.” The assailed COMELEC Resolution does not
advance,   but   subverts,   this   philosophy   behind   political
parties.
Same; Same; The   constitutional   policy   towards   a   free
and open party system envisions a system that shall “evolve
according to the free choice of the people,” not one molded
and whittled by the COMELEC.–As if to rationalize its folly,
the COMELEC invokes the constitutional policy towards a
free and open party system. This policy, however, envisions
a system that shall “evolve according to the free choice of
the   people,”   not   one   molded   and   whittled   by   the
COMELEC. When the Constitution speaks of a multi­party
system,   it   does   not   contemplate   the   COMELEC   splitting
parties into two. For doing just that, this pretender to the
throne
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
of   King   Solomon   acted   whimsically   and
capriciously. Certiorarilies against it, indeed.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Political Parties; It does not appear that
the matter involved in this controversy is an internal matter
that   the   political   party   itself   should   resolve–the   Supreme
Court   is   being   tasked   to   exercise   its   judicial   power   on
something   where   it   should   not   as   yet   be   asked.–It   does
appear to me that the matter involved in this controversy is
an   internal   matter   that   the   political   party   itself   should
resolve.   More   importantly,   the   petition   is   replete   with
factual   problems   which   this   Court   cannot   take   on.   The
conflicting   claims   of   the   parties,   such   as   the   alleged
intentional   inaction   of   Senator   Angara   to   convene   the
National Congress of the party, the disputed membership of
the National Executive Council which passed the resolution
supporting the questioned actions of petitioner Angara, the
determination   of   an   “extraordinary   and   emergency”
situation that would entitle the party chairman to act, the
validity   of   the   actions   taken   at   the   behest   of   respondent
Aquino in the National Congress on 04 December 2003, are
but   a   few   of   the   factual   issues   which   need   to   be   first
established before any decision can conclusively be arrived
at. The absence of factual determination by the COMELEC
on  the  matters now   being  disputed  by  the  parties   hardly
makes   it   feasible   for   this   Court   to   rightly   and   decisively
rule on the case. Once again, I submit, the Supreme Court
is being tasked to exercise its judicial power on something
where it should not as yet be asked.
SANDOVAL­GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election   Law; Political   Parties; The   issue   as   to   who
between   the   party   Chairman   and   the   Secretary   General
shall  nominate  its  official  candidates   is  a  purely internal
party concern, in the absence of statutes giving the courts
jurisdiction over the same.–The contending parties raise the
issue as who between the petitioner, as LDP Chairman, and
the respondent, as LDP Secretary General, shall nominate
its   official   candidates   in   the   coming   national   elections.
Undoubtedly, this is to me a purely internal party concern,
the   determination   of   which   rests   solely   within   the   party
itself,   in   the   absence   of   statutes   giving   the   courts
jurisdiction over the same. The party has its own machinery
to   govern   such   conflict.   Consequently,   this   Court   cannot
step into  such private  turf  and dictate  on  the LDP party
members   who   should   be   their   official   candidate   for
president.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. 
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Demaree J.B. Raval for LDP.
671
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 671
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
     Felix D. Carao, Jr. and Mendoza & Mendoza Law
Officefor private respondent.
TINGA, J.:
The Bible tells the story of how two women came to
King Solomon to decide who among them is the baby’s
true mother. King Solomon, in his legendary wisdom,
awarded the baby to the woman who gave up her claim
after he threatened to split the baby into two.
It is fortunate that the two women did not ask the
Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC)   to   decide   the
baby’s fate; otherwise, it would have cut the baby in
half.  For that  is  what  the  COMELEC  exactly  did  in
this case.
On December 8, 2003, the General Counsel of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered
political   party,   informed   the   COMELEC   by   way
of Manifestationthat only the Party Chairman, Senator
Edgardo   J.   Angara,   or   his   authorized   representative
may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s
official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that
Sen. Angara  had placed  the  LDP  Secretary  General,
Representative   Agapito   A.   Aquino,   on   “indefinite
forced leave.” In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique
A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.
The Manifestation concluded with this prayer:
1. A.The   Honorable   Commission   recognizes   [sic]   only
those   Certificates   of   Candidacy   to   which   are
attached   Certificates   of   Nomination   executed   by
LDP Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara or by such
other officers of the LDP whom he may authorize in
writing, and whose written authorizations shall be
deposited   with   the  Honorable   Commission  by   the
LDP General Counsel.
2. B.The   Honorable   Commission   declares   [sic]   as   a
nullity,  denies [sic]  due  course  or  cancels  [sic]  all
Certificates   of   Candidacy   not   endorsed   by   LDP
Party   Chairman   Angara   or   by   such   other   LDP
officials as may be authorized by him.
3. C.The Honorable Commission takes [sic] note of the
designation   of   Ambassador   Enrique   “Ike”   A.
Zaldivar as Acting Secretary General of the LDP,
and   for   the   Honorable   Commission   to   honor   and
recognize   the   official   acts,   to   the   exclusion   of
everyone, of Ambassador Zaldivar for and in behalf
of the LDP as Secretary General. 1
_______________
 Rollo, p. 58.
1
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
On   December   16,   2003,   Rep.   Aquino   filed
his Comment,   contending   that   the   Party­Chairman
does   not   have   the   authority   to   impose   disciplinary
sanctions   on   the   Secretary   General.   As
the Manifestation filed   by   the   LDP   General   Counsel
has   no   basis,   Rep.   Aquino   asked   the   COMELEC   to
disregard the same.
On December 17, 2003, the parties agreed to file a
joint   manifestation   pending   which   the   proceedings
were   deemed   suspended.   On   December   22,   2003,
however,   only   the   LDP   General   Counsel   filed
an Urgent Manifestation reiterating the contents of the
December 8, 2003 Manifestation. The COMELEC also
received   a Letter from   Rep.   Aquino   stating   that   the
parties were unable to arrive at a joint manifestation.
The   next   day,   the   LDP   General   Counsel   filed
a Second   Urgent   Manifestation disputing   newspaper
accounts that Rep. Aquino had suspended Sen. Angara
as Party Chairman.
On   December   26,   2003,   the   COMELEC   issued
an Orderrequiring the parties to file a verified petition.
It turned out that, two days before, Sen. Angara had
submitted   a   verified Petition,   in   essence,   reiterating
the contents of its previous Manifestations. Attached to
the Petition was   a   Resolution adopted   by   the   LDP
2 Choosing Mr. Fernando Poe, Jr. as the Standard Bearer of
National Executive Council, stating:
WHEREAS, on September 25, 2003, the National Executive
Council   of   the   Laban   ng   Demokratikong   Pilipino   (LDP)
convened   and   unanimously   passed   a   resolution   granting
full   authority   to   Party   Chairman   Edgardo   J.   Angara   to
enter,   negotiate   and   conclude   a   coalition   agreement   with
other   like­minded   opposition   parties,   aggrupations   and
interest groups with the sole purpose of uniting the political
opposition and fielding a unity ticket for the May 10, 2004
elections;
WHEREAS,   on   December   3,   2003,   the   LDP,   together
with   the   Puwersa   ng   Masang   Pilipino   (PMP)   and   the
Partido Demokratiko ng
_______________
2
 Resolution   Ratifying   and   Confirming   the   Covenant   of   National
Unity, the Declaration of Unity entered into by Party Chairman Edgardo
J.   Angara,   and   All   Acts   and   Decisions   taken   by   him   to   Enforce   and
Implement   the   same;   Ratifying   and   Confirming   All   other   Acts   and
Decisions of Chairman Angara and other Governing Bodies to Preserve
the Integrity, Credibility, Unity and Solidarity of the Party; and, further
Reiterating the Vote of Confidence of the National Executive Council in,
and support to, the continued efforts of Chairman Angara to Unite the
Political Opposition.
673
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
Pilipinas–LABAN (PDP­LABAN) forged a coalition to form
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP);
WHEREAS,   the   Executive   Committee   of   the   KNP
subsequently   adopted   its   resolution   entitled:   “Resolution
the   Koalisyon   ng   Nagkakaisang   Pilipino   (KNP)   for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10,
2004 National Elections”;
. . . .
WHEREAS,   the   process   of   unification   of   the   political
opposition and the actions taken in connection therewith by
Chairman   Angara   and   by   other   governing   bodies   of   the
LDP required the taking of immediate and forceful action
by them to preserve and protect the integrity, credibility,
unity and solidarity of the LDP, and ensure the attainment
of unification of the political opposition;
WHEREAS, such immediate and forceful action include
those that have to do with pre­emptive efforts to diffuse the
chaos,   confusion   and   disunity   projected   by   the
pronouncements and acts of some officers and members to
the general membership of the LDP and the electorate, such
as the one taken by the Regional Committee for Region VI
(Western Visayas) on December 6, 2003; the enforcement of
order in the LDP through the voice of a central leadership
in command in an otherwise extraordinary and emergency
situation, such as the one taken by Party Chairman Angara
on December 6, 2003; the filing of the Manifestation with
the COMELEC on the matter of the authored signatories
for the nominations and, the adoption of resolutions by the
673
regional committees affirming their trust and confidence in
Chairman   Angara,   and   authoring   him   to   choose   the
presidential standard bearer for the May 10, 2004 elections;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT
RESOLVED,   AS   IT   IS   HEREBY   RESOLVED,   By   the
National   Executive   Council,   to   ratify   and   confirm   the
Covenant   of   National   Unity,   the   Declaration   of   Unity
entered into by Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara, and all
acts and decisions taken by him to enforce and implement
the same;
RESOLVED, FURTHER, To ratify and confirm all other
acts and decisions of Chairman Angara and other governing
bodies   to   preserve   the   integrity,   credibility,   unity   and
solidarity of the LDP; and,
RESOLVED,   FINALLY,   To   reiterate   the   vote   of
confidence   of   the   National   Executive   Council   in,   and
support   to,   the   continued   efforts   of   Chairman   Angara   to
unite the political opposition. 3 its   legitimate   officers   .   .   .’   ”  In   the   same   breath,
_______________
 Rollo, pp. 63­65.
3 settle   among   themselves   and   any   unsettled
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
Rep.   Aquino   filed   his Answer to   the Petition on
December 30, 2003. The COMELEC heard the parties
on oral arguments on the same day, after which the
case was submitted for resolution.
Pending   resolution,   a Certificate   of   Nomination of
Sen.   Panfilo   Lacson   as   LDP   candidate   for   President
was   filed   with   the   COMELEC.   The Certificate   of
Nomination was   signed   by   Rep.   Aquino   as   LDP
Secretary General.
On   January   6,   2004,   the   COMELEC   came   to   a
decision.
The   Commission  identified   the  sole  issue   as   “who
among   the   [LDP]   officers   [are]   authored   to
authenticate   before   the   Commission   that   the   person
filing the certificate of candidacy as party nominee for
a certain position is the official candidate of the party
chosen in accordance with its Constitution.” 4
The   COMELEC   recognized   that   it   “has   the
authority   to   act   on   matters   pertaining   to   ‘the
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and
5
however,   it   held   that   “internal   party   matters   and
wranglings [sic] are purely for the party members to
controversy   should   be   brought   to   the   proper   forum
with jurisdiction.” The “question of who was suspended
by   whom”   was   thus   left   for   such   proper   forum   to
resolve. Noting that “the intramurals in the LDP as an
6
internal party matter seems to be irreconcilable for the
present when the filing of Certificate of Candidacy and
Certificate   of   Nomination   are   about   to   reach   the
deadline,”   the   COMELEC   disposed   of   the Petition in
the following fashion:
“WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   petition   is
GRANTED with LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and
Oppositor.   The   candidates   for   President   down   to   the   last
Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated and endorsed by
LDP   Chairman   Edgardo   J.   Angara   are   recognized   the
Commission as official candidates of LDP “Angara Wing.”
The   candidates   from   President   down   to   the   last
Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nominated and endorsed
by   LDP   Secretary   General   Agapito   “Butz”   Aquino   are
recognized as official candidates of LDP “Aquino Wing.”
“Consequently,   each   faction   or   “Wing”   is   entitled   to   a
representative to any election committee to which it may be
entitled as created by the
_______________
4
 Id., at p. 44.
5
 Id., at p. 46.
6
 Id., at p. 43.
675
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
Commission for the May 10, 2004 elections. For the copies
of the election returns, the “Angara Wing” will be entitled
to   the   copies   corresponding   to odd   number of   precincts,
that   is,   Precinct   Nos.   1,   3,   5,   etc.,   and   for   the   “Aquino
Wing”   to   the even   number of   precincts,   that   is   Precinct
Nos. 2, 4, 6, etc. This is on the assumption that the LDP or
as a party within a registered Political Coalition becomes a
recognized   and   denominated   as   a   Dormant   [sic]   Minority
Party under the Election Laws. The two LDP “Wings” are
further entitled to and be accorded the rights and privileges
with corresponding legal obligations under Election Laws.”
Commissioners   Luzviminda   G.   Tancangco,   Ralph   C.
Lantion,   Resurreccion   Z.   Borra   and   Florentino   A.
Tuason,   Jr.   concurred   in   the Resolution authored   by
Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier. Chair Benjamin S.
Abalos, Sr., joined by Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain,
submitted dissenting opinions.
Sen.   Angara   thus   filed   the   present   petition
for Certiorari  assailing   the   COMELEC Resolution for
8
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Thereafter, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment.
The   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General   submitted
a Manifestation and Motion praying for the granting of
the Petition. The   COMELEC   thus   filed   a
separate Comment to the Petition.
The   COMELEC   correctly   stated   that   “the
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and
675
its legitimate officers” is a matter that is well within
its authority. The source of this authority is no other
than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the
COMELEC   the   power   and   function   to   enforce   and
administer   all   laws   and   regulations   relative   to   the
conduct of an election.  In the 9
_______________
 Id., at pp. 47­48. Emphasis in the original.
7
 Sen.   Angara   was   authorized   to   file   the Petition pursuant   to   a
8
Resolution   of   the   LDP   National   Executive   Council   issued   adopted
and confirmed on January 8, 2004, and stating:
“RESOLVED, That Senator Edgardo J. Angara, LDP Party Chairman, be as
7
he is hereby, authorized to sign, verify, and cause the filing with the Supreme
Court, of  the  Petition  for  Certiorari  from  the  Resolution dated January  6,
2004 of the Commission on Elections in Election Matter No. 03­018 entitled:
“In   Re[:]   Certificates   of   Candidacy   of   Official   Candidates   of   the   Laban   ng
Demokratikong   Pilipino   for   the   May   10,   2004   Elections,   Laban   ng
Demokratikong Pilipino, Petitioner.” [Rollo, p. 38.]
 CONSTITUTION, art. IX­C, sec. 2 (1).
9
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
exercise   of   such   power   and   in   the   discharge   of   such
function,   the   Commission   is   endowed   with   ample
“wherewithal”   and  “considerable  latitude  in  adopting
means   and   methods   that   will   ensure   the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was
created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.” 10
Thus,   in Kalaw   v.   Commission   on   Elections which
involved the leadership fight in the Liberal Party,  this 11
Court held:
.   .   .   that   the   respondent   [COMELEC]   has   jurisdiction   to
hear and decide SP Case No. 85­021 [involving a petition to
prohibit   Eva   Estrada   Kalaw   “from   usurping   or   using   the
title or position of President of the Liberal Party”] in view of
its powers under Article IX­C, Section 2, of the Constitution
to, among others, enforce and administer all laws relative to
the   conduct   of   elections,   decide   all   questions   affecting
elections, register and regulate political parties, and insure
orderly elections. These powers include the determination
of the conflicting claims made in SP Case No. 85­021, which
are   likely   to   cause   confusion   among   the   electorate   if   not
resolved. Additionally, the COMELEC is mandated by the
Election   Code   to inter   alia require   candidates   to   specify
their   political   party   affiliation   in   their   certificates   of
candidacy, allow political parties to appoint watchers, limit
the expenditures of each political party, determine whether
or not a political party shall retain its registration on the
basis of  its showing in the preceding elections,  etc. These
matters   include   the   ascertainment   of   the   identity   of   the
political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its
acts and the resolution of such controversies as the one now
before   it   where   one   party   appears   to   be   divided   into   two
wings   under   separate   leaders   each   claiming   to   be   the
president of the entire party . . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Likewise in Palmares v. Commission on Elections,  to 12
which   the   assailed Resolution made   reference   and
which   involved   the   Nacionalista   Party,  this   Court 13
ruled:
. . . that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of
leadership in a political party. Under the Constitution, the
COMELEC is empowered to register political parties [Sec.
2(5), Article IX­C]. Necessarily, the power to act on behalf of
a party and the responsibility for the acts of such political
party must be fixed in certain persons acting as its officers.
In the
_______________
 Sanchez   v.   Commission   on   Elections, 199   Phil.   617; 114   SCRA
10
454 (1982), citing Cauton v. Commission on Elections, L­25467, April 27,
1967, 19 SCRA 911(1967).
11
 G.R. No. 80218, November 5, 1987.
12
 G.R. Nos. 86177­78, August 31, 1989.
13
 Rollo, p. 46, at note 12.
677
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 677
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
exercise   of   the   power   to   register   political   parties,   the
COMELEC   must   determine   who   these   officers   are.
Consequently, if there is any controversy as to leadership,
the   COMELEC   may,   in   a   proper   case   brought   before   it,
resolve the issue incidental to its power to register political
parties.
This   Court   then   proceeded   to   quote   from Kalaw,
supra.
The two cited decisions find support in Sumulong v.
Commission on Elections  and Sotto v. Commission on
14
Elections  where this Court, in resolving the issue as to
15
who   between   the   factions   of   a   political   party   was
entitled   to   nominate   election   inspectors,   necessarily
settled   claims   to   the   party’s   leadership.   Both   cases
were   decided   without   question   on   the   COMELEC’s
power   to   determine   such   claims.   In   conformity   with
jurisprudence,   this   Court   did   not   identify   the
COMELEC’s   jurisdiction   as   an   issue   when   this   case
was heard on oral argument.
There is no inconsistency between the above cases
on the one hand and this Court’s more recent ruling
in Sinaca v. Mula  on the other. In the latter case, this
16
Court held:
A political party  has the right to  identify the people who
constitute the association and to select a standard bearer
who best represents the party’s ideologies and preference.
Political parties are generally free to conduct their internal
affairs   free   from   judicial   supervision;   this   common   law
principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally
protected right of free association, serves the public interest
by allowing the political processes to operate without undue
interference.   Thus,   the   rule   is   that   the   determination   of
disputes as to party nominations  rests  with the party, in
the absence of statutes giving the court’s [sic] jurisdiction.
Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or
clear   legal   right   involved, the   court   will   not   assume
jurisdiction   to   determine   factional   controversies   within   a
political party, but will leave the matter for determination
by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors
at   the   polls.   Similarly,   in   the   absence   of   specific
constitutional   or   legislative   regulations   defining   how
nominations   are   to   be   made,   or   prohibiting   nominations
from   being   made   in   certain   ways,   political   parties   may
handle such affairs, including nominations, in such manner
as party rules may establish. [Emphasis supplied.]
_______________
 70 Phil. 703 (1940).
14
 76 Phil. 516 (1946).
15
 373 Phil. 896; 315 SCRA 266 (1999).
16
678
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
Sinaca, unlike   previous   cases,   did   not   involve   the
question of party identity or leadership; hence, it was
not   necessary   for   the   COMELEC   to   delve   therein.
None   of   the   candidates   involved   in   that   case   were
claiming to be the political party’s sole candidate.
In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting
to represent the LDP, contends that under the Party
Constitution   only   he   or   his   representative,   to   the
exclusion of the Secretary General, has the authority
to endorse and sign, party nominations. The Secretary
General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains
his   own   authority.   Clearly,   the   question   of   party accredited   major   political   parties   are   entitled   to
identity   or   leadership   has   to   be   resolved   if   the receive copies of the certificate of canvass. 22

COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are
_______________
legitimate party standard bearers or not.
The repercussions of the question of party identity  OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, sec. 60.
17

and   leadership   do   not   end   at   the   validity   of   the  Note 13, supra.

18

endorsement of the certificates of candidacy of persons  Rep. Act No. 7166, sec. 27, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173.
19

claiming   to   be   the   party’s   standard   bearer.   The   law  Id., sec. 26.

20

 Rep. Act No. 6646, sec. 12.
21

grants  a  registered political  party certain rights  and  Rep. Act No. 7166, sec. 29.

22

privileges,  which, naturally, redound to the benefit of
17
its candidates. It is also for this significant dimension
that Sinaca is not applicable in this case. As conceded
in Sinaca itself,   the   Court   will   have   to   assume
jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within
a   political   party  where  a   controlling  statute  or  clear
legal right is involved.  Verily, there is more than one
18
law, as well as a number of clear legal rights, that are
at stake in the case at bar.
The   law   accords   special   treatment   to   political
parties.   The   dominant   majority   party,   the   dominant
679
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 679
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
Registered political parties whose candidates obtained
at least ten percent (10%) of the total votes cast in the
next   preceding   senatorial   election   shall   each   have   a
watcher and/or representative in the procurement and
watermarking of papers to be used in the printing of
election returns and official ballots and in the printing,
numbering, storage, and distribution thereof.  Finally, 23

minority party as  determined by the COMELEC, for a candidate and his political party are authorized to

instance,   is   entitled   to   a   copy   of   the   election spend   more   per   voter   than   a   candidate   without   a
returns.  The six (6) accredited major political parties
19 political party. 24

may nominate the principal watchers to be designated It   is,   therefore,   in   the   interest   of   every   political

by   the   Commission.  The   two   principal   watchers
20
representing   the   ruling   coalition   and   the   dominant
opposition   coalition   in   a   precinct   shall,   if   available,
affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election
returns   for   that   precinct.  Three   (3)   of   the   six
21
party not to allow persons it had not chosen to hold
themselves   out   as   representatives   of   the   party.
Corollary to the right of a political party “to identify
the people who constitute the association and to select
a   standard   bearer   who   best   represents   the   party’s
ideologies   and   preference”  is   the   right   to   exclude
25
persons in its association and to not lend its name and
prestige   to   those   which   it   deems   undeserving   to
represent its ideals. A certificate of candidacy makes
known   to   the   COMELEC   that   the   person   therein
mentioned has been nominated by a duly authorized
political   group  empowered  to act  and  that  it  reflects
accurately   the   sentiment   of   the   nominating   body.  A 26
candidate’s   political   party   affiliation   is   also   printed
followed   by   his   or   her   name   in   the   certified   list   of
candidates.  A   candidate   misrepresenting   himself   or
27
herself   to  be   a   party’s   candidate,   therefore,   not   only
misappropriates   the   party’s   name   and   prestige   but
foists   a   deception   upon   the   electorate,   who   may
unwittingly   cast   its   ballot   for   him   or   her   on   the
mistaken belief that he or she stands for the party’s
principles. To prevent this occurrence, the COMELEC
has the power and the duty to step in and enforce the
law   not   only   to   protect   the   party   but,   more
importantly,   the   electorate,   in   line   with   the
Commission’s broad constitutional mandate to ensure
orderly elections.
Having   revisited   and   clarified   the   jurisdiction   of
COMELEC   to   rule   upon   questions   of   party   identity
and   leadership   as   an   incident   to   its   enforcement
powers, this Court cannot help but be baffled by the
COMELEC’s   ruling   declining   to   inquire   into   which
party officer
_______________
 Rep. Act No. 6646, sec. 8.
23
 Rep. Act No. 7166, sec. 13.
24
 Sinaca v. Mula, supra.
25
 Alialy   v.   Commission   on   Elections, L­16165,   July   31,   1961, 2
26
SCRA 957.
27 Rep. Act. No. 6646, sec. 4.
680
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
has   the   authority   to   sign   and   endorse   certificates   of
candidacy of the party’s nominees.
The   only   issue   in   this   case,   as   defined   by   the
COMELEC   itself,   is   who   as   between   the   Party
Chairman and the Secretary General has the authority
to   sign   certificates   of   candidacy   of   the   official
candidates   of   the   party.   Indeed,   the
petitioners’ Manifestation and Petition before   the
COMELEC merely asked the Commission to recognize
only   those   certificates   of   candidacy   signed   by
petitioner   Sen.   Angara   or   his   authorized
representative, and no other.
To  resolve  this   simple  issue,  the  COMELEC  need
only to turn to the Party Constitution. It need not go so
far as to resolve the root of the conflict between the
party officials. It need only resolve such questions as
may   be   necessary   in   the   exercise   of   its   enforcement
powers.
The LDP has a set of national officers composed of,
among others, the Party Chairman and the Secretary
General.  The Party Chairman is the Chief Executive
28
Officer   of   the   Party,   whose   powers   and   functions
include:
(1)   To   represent   the   Party   in   all   external   affairs   and
concerns, sign documents for and on its behalf, and call the
meetings   and   be   the   presiding   officer   of   the   National
Congress and the National Executive Council . . . . 29
The Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the
Party   Chairman   in   overseeing   the   day­to­day
operations   of   the   Party.   Among   his   powers   and
functions is:
(1) When   empowered   by   the   Party   Chairman,   to   sign
documents for and on behalf of the Party . . . . 30
The Secretary General’s authority to sign documents,
therefore, is only a delegated power, which originally
pertains to the Party Chairman.
Rep.   Aquino   claims   that   he   was   authorized   to
exercise   to   sign   the   party   candidates’   certificates   of
candidacy   in   the   previous   elections.   Indeed,   the
COMELEC found that:
_______________
28
 LDP Constitution, art. VI, sec. 1 (1) and (4).
29
 Id., sec. 5. Emphasis supplied.
30
 Id., sec. 9. Emphasis supplied.
681
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
In   fact,   during   the   May   14,   2001   elections,   oppositor
Agapito   “Butz”   Aquino,   as   LDP   Secretary   General,   was
authorized   by   the   LDP   to   sign   for   the   Certificates   of
Nomination   of   the   LDP   Senatorial   Candidates,   including
the   Certificate   of   Nomination   for   Senatorial   Candidate
Edgardo J. Angara, a copy of said Certificate of Nomination
and a copy of the Certificate for Senator Edgardo J. Angara
are   attached   as   Annexes   “A”   and   “B”,   respectively.   This
action by Secretary General Aquino is in accordance with
the Constitution and By­laws of LDP, not questioned by the
LDP signed by its Secretary General. This revocation has
not been revoked or recalled by the National Congress of
the   LDP   which   is   the   one   authorized   to   nominate
candidates for President and Vice­President, respectively. 31
Assuming   that   Rep.   Aquino   previously   had   such
authority,   this   Court   cannot   share   the   COMELEC’s
finding   that   the   same   “has   not   been   revoked   or
recalled.” No revocation of such authority can be more
explicit   that   the   totality   of   Sen.
Angara’s Manifestations and Petition before   the
COMELEC,   through   which   he   informed   the
Commission   that   Rep.   Aquino’s   had   been   placed   on
indefinite forced leave and that Ambassador Zaldivar
has   been   designated   Acting   Secretary   General,   who
“shall henceforth exercise all the powers and functions
of the Secretary General under the Constitution and
By­Laws of the LDP.”  As the prerogative to empower
32
681 Rep.   Aquino   to   sign   documents   devolves   upon   Sen.
Angara,   so   he   may   choose,   at   his   discretion,   to
withhold or revoke such power.
Both respondents Rep. Aquino and COMELEC also
cited Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6453  as 33
basis   for   the   Party   Secretary   General’s   authority   to
sign certificates of candidacy. Said Section 6 states:
SEC. 6. Certificate of  nomination of official  candidates by
political party.–The certificate of nomination of registered
political   parties   or   coalitions   of   political   parties   of   their
official candidates shall be filed not later than the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy,  which is  January 2,
2004 duly   signed   and   attested   under   oath   by   the   party
president,   chairman,   secretary­general   or   any   other duly
authorized officer and   shall   bear   the   acceptance   of   the
nominee   by   affixing   his   signature   in   the   space   provided
therein. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
_______________
 Rollo, p. 45.
31
 Id., at pp. 57, 85.
32
 Guidelines   on   the   Filing   of   Certificates   of   Candidacy   and
33
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections.
682
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
Clearly, however, the above provision presupposes that
the party president, chairman or secretary­general has
been   “duly   authorized”   by   the   party   to   sign   the
certificate   of   candidacy.   COMELEC   Resolution   No.
6453   cannot   grant   a   party   official   greater   authority
than what the party itself grants, lest such Resolution
amount   to   a   violation   of   the   party’s   freedom   of
association.
Neither does the Party Secretary General have the
power to nominate the official candidates of the LDP.
That   power   resides   in   the   governing   bodies   of   the
Party.  In particular, the National Congress, which is
34
the highest policy­making and governing body of the
Party, has the power
(6)   To   nominate   the   official   candidates   of   the   Party   for
President, Vice President, and Senators, and, whenever the
corresponding   conventions   fail   to   meet   or   to   make   the
requisite  nominations,  to  nominate  the  official  candidates
for   municipal   city,   congressional   district,   provincial   and
regional elective offices . . . . 35
Not only does Rep. Aquino insist on his power to sign
Certificates of Candidacy on behalf of the LDP but he
would also deny Sen. Angara that power on account of
the latter’s preventive suspension. It seems, however,
that respondent has abandoned this tack by the silence
of his Memorandum on the matter.
In any case, it appears that on November 28, 2003,
Representative Rolex Suplico, LDP Region VI Regional
Chairman, filed a complaint with Rep. Aquino against
Party   Chairman   Sen.   Angara   for   disloyalty   to   the
Party,   gross   violation  of  the  Party   Constitution,   and
other divisive acts inimical to the interest of the party
and its members. Rep. Aquino, as Secretary General,
created a committee composed of three (3) members of
the LDP National
_______________
  The   governing   bodies   of   the   Party   are:   (1)   the   Municipal
34
as   an   incident   thereto,   to   create   an   investigating
Committee,   (2)   the   City   Committee,   (3)   the   Congressional   District
committee, without the Party Chairman’s concurrence.
Committee,   (4)   the   Provincial   Committee,   (5)   the   Regional
Committee,  for each region, including the National Capital Region Much less does the investigating committee so created
have   the   power   to   place   the   Party   Chairman   under
and   Autonomous   Regions,   and   (6)   the   National   Congress.   [LDP
Constitution,   art.   V,   sec.   1.]   The   first   four   Committees   and   the
preventive suspension since its authority stems from a
Autonomous Region Regional Committee also act as conventions to
choose the official candidates of the Party for the elective offices in
nullity. Simply put, the spring has no source.
The   lack   of   Rep.   Aquino’s   authority   to   sign
their   corresponding   political   units.   [LDP   Constitution,   art.   V,   sec.
documents   or   to   nominate   candidates   for   the   LDP
3(7), sec. 5 in relation to sec. 3(7), sec. 7 (2), sec. 9 (5) and sec. 13.]
 LDP Constitution, art. V, sec. 1.
35
would not result in the denial of due course to or the
683
cancellation   of   the   certificates   of   candidacy   he   may
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 683
have   signed   on   behalf   of   the   LDP. The   exclusive 36

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on

ground   for   the   denial   of   due   course   to   or   the
Elections
cancellation   of   a   certificate   of   candidacy   for   any
Executive   Council   to   investigate   the   complaint   and
elective   office   is   that   any   material   representation
recommend appropriate action thereon. On December
contained   therein   as   required   by   law   is   false.  Since 37

12,   2003,   the   investigating   committee   issued   a

resolution   placing   Sen.   Angara   under   preventive
suspension effective immediately and directing him to
refrain   from   performing   acts   in   behalf   of   the   party
until   the   committee   finishes   its   investigation   and
submits its final recommendations.
The authority to create the investigating committee
supposedly rests on Section 9 (4), Article VI of the LDP
Constitution,   which   enumerates   the   powers   and
functions of the Secretary General:
(4) With the concurrence of the Party Chairman, to enforce
Party discipline . . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Evidently, just  as Rep. Aquino has  no power to sign
the signature of Rep. Aquino was affixed either prior
to,   or   on   the   basis   of,   the
challenged Resolution recognizing his authority to sign
on behalf of the LDP, the same would not constitute
material representation that is false. In such case, the
candidates are simply deemed as not nominated by the
LDP   and   are   considered   independent   candidates
pursuant   to   Section   7   of   COMELEC   Resolution   No.
6453:
_______________
 See Alialy v. Commission on Elections, supra.
36

and nominate candidates in behalf of the LDP, neither  OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, sec. 78.
37

684
does he have the power to enforce Party discipline or,
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
SEC.   7. Effect   of   filing   certificate   of   nomination.–A
candidate   who   has   not   been   nominated   by   a   registered
political   party   or   its   duly   authorized   representative,   or
whose nomination has not been submitted by a registered
political party . . . shall be considered as an independent
candidate.
COMELEC   Commissioner   Sadain   referred   to   the
above   provision   in   his Dissenting   Opinion,   and   this
Court   finds   refreshing   wisdom–so   sorely   wanting   in
the majority opinion–in his suggestion that:
All   other   party   members   representing   themselves   to   be
candidates of the party shall not be deprived of their right
to file their respective certificates of candidacy and run for
office, if so qualified, but that they shall not be accorded the
rights and  privileges reserved by election laws for official
nominees of registered political parties. Instead, they shall
be treated as independent candidates. 38
From   the   foregoing,   it   is   plain   that   the   COMELEC
misapplied   equity   in   the   present   case.   For   all   its
conceded   merits,   equity   is   available   only   in   the
absence of law and not as its replacement.  Equity is 39
described   as   justice   without   legality,   which   simply
means   that   it   cannot   supplant,   although   it   may,   as
often   happens,   supplement   the   law.  The   COMELEC
40
should have decided the case on the basis of the party
constitution and election laws. It chose not to because
of its irrational fear of treading, as respondent Aquino
put   it,   on   “unchartered”   territories. But,   as   shown
41
above,   these   territories   have   long   been charted by
jurisprudence and, in any case, the COMELEC need
not   have   sailed   far   from   the   shore   to   arrive   at   the
correct   conclusion.   In   truth,   the
COMELEC Resolution is   indecision   in   the   guise   of
equity.
Worse,   the   COMELEC   divided   the   LDP   into
“wings,”   each   of   which   may   nominate   candidates   for
every elective position. Both wings are also entitled to
representatives   in   the   election   committees   that   the
Commission may create. In the event that the LDP is
accorded   dominant   minority   party   election   status,
election returns
_______________
 Rollo, p. 50.
38
 Tankiko   v.   Cezar, G.R.   No.   131277, 362   Phil.   184; 302   SCRA
39
559(1999).
 Ibid.
40
 Comment, p. 20.
41
685
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 685
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
of   odd­numbered   precincts   shall   be   furnished   the
Angara   wing   and   those   of   even­numbered   precincts,
the Aquino wing.
By   creating   the   two   wings,   the   COMELEC
effectively diffused the LDP’s strength and undeniably
emasculated its chance of obtaining the Commission’s
nod as the dominant minority party.
By   allowing   each   wing   to   nominate   different
candidates,   the   COMELEC   planted   the   seeds   of
confusion   among   the   electorate,   who   are   apt   to   be
confounded by two candidates  from  a single political
party. In Recabo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,  this 42
Court declared that the electoral process envisions one
candidate from a political party for each position, and
disunity  and discord  amongst   members  of a  political
party   should   not   be   allowed   to   create   a   mockery
thereof. The admonition against mocking the electoral
process   not   only  applies   to  political   parties   but   with
greater force to the COMELEC.
By   according   both   wings   representatives   in   the
election   committees,   the   COMELEC   has   eroded   the
significance of political parties and effectively divided
the   opposition.   The   COMELEC   has   lost   sight   of   the
unique political situation of the Philippines where, to
paraphrase   Justice   Perfecto’s   concurring   opinion
in Sotto,   supra, the   administration   party   has   always
been   unnecessarily   and   dangerously   too   big   and   the
opposition party too small to be an effective check on
the administration. The purpose of according dominant
status   and   representation   to   a   minority   party   is
precisely to serve as an effective check on the majority.
The   COMELEC   performed   a   disservice   to   the
opposition   and,   ultimately,   to   the   voting   public,   as
its Resolutionfacilitated,   rather   than   forestalled,   the
division of the minority party.
By splitting copies of the election returns between
the   two   factions,   the   COMELEC   has   fractured   both
wings. The practical purpose of furnishing a party with
a copy of the election returns is to allow it to tally the
results   of   the   elections   at   the   precinct   level.
Ultimately, it is a guard against fraud. Thus, resort to
copies thereof may be had when the election returns
are delayed, lost or destroyed, or when they appear to
43
be tampered or falsified.  A 44
_______________
 G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999, 308 SCRA 793.
42
 Omnibus Election Code, sec. 233.
43
 Id., sec. 235.
44
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
split party without a complete set of election returns
cannot   successfully  help   preserve  the   sanctity   of  the
ballot.
It bears reminding respondent Commission of this
Court’s   pronouncement   in Peralta   v.   Commission   on
Elections,  which,   while   made   in   the   backdrop   of   a
45
parliamentary form of government, holds equally true
under the present government structure:
.   .   .   political   parties   constitute   a   basic   element   of   the
democratic institutional apparatus. Government derives its
strength from the support, active or passive, of a coalition of
elements of society. In modern times the political party has
become   the   instrument   for   the   organization   of   societies.
This is predicated on the doctrine that government exists
with the consent of the governed. Political parties perform
an “essential function in the management of succession to
power,   as   well   as   in   the   process   of   obtaining   popular
consent to the course of public policy. They amass sufficient
support to buttress the authority of governments; or, on the
contrary,   they   attract   or   organize   discontent   and
the Petition is   GRANTED   IN   PART.   Respondent
Commission   on   Elections   is   directed   to   recognize   as
official   candidates   of   the   Laban   ng   Demokratikong
Pilipino only those whose Certificates of Candidacy are
signed   by   LDP   Party   Chairman   Senator   Edgardo   J.
Angara or his duly authorized representative/s.
_______________
 L­47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30.
45

dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the government. In either  Comment, p. 6.
46

case,   they  perform   the   function   of   the  articulation   of   the  CONSTITUTION, art. IX­C, sec. 6.

47

interests   and   aspirations   of   a   substantial   segment   of   the 687

citizenry, usually in ways contended to be promotive of the VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 687
national weal.” Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
The assailed COMELEC Resolution does not advance, Elections
but subverts, this philosophy behind political parties. SO ORDERED.
As if to rationalize its folly, the COMELEC invokes      Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares­Santiago, C
the constitutional policy towards a free and open party arpio, Austria­Martinez, Carpio­Morales, Callejo,
system.  This policy, however, envisions a system that
46
Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
shall   “evolve   according   to   the   free   choice   of   the      Davide, Jr. (C.J.), In the result.
people,” not   one   molded   and   whittled   by   the
47

     Puno, J., On Leave.
COMELEC. When the Constitution speaks of a multi­
party system, it does not contemplate the COMELEC      Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
splitting   parties   into   two.   For   doing   just   that,   this      Sandoval­Gutierrez,   J., Please   see
pretender   to   the   throne   of   King   Solomon   acted my dissenting opinion.
whimsically and capriciously. Certiorari lies against it,      Corona,   J., I   join   in   the dissenting   opinion of
indeed. Justice Gutierrez.
WHEREFORE,   the   assailed SEPARATE OPINION
COMELEC Resolution is   ANNULLED   and
VITUG, J.:
The instant petition fundamentally calls on the Court
to determine who between Senator Edgardo J. Angara,
the Chairman and Representative Agapito A. Aquino,
the Secretary General, of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), has the power and the authority under
the LDP Constitution to nominate official candidates
of the party and to correspondingly sign and endorse
the  certificate of  nomination.  The  contending  parties
have performed acts which they, respectively, claim to
be within the mandate of the LDP Constitution.
Petitioner   Angara   asserts   that   long­standing   LDP
practice, as well as the provision of Section 5.5, Article
VI,   of   the   LDP   Constitution,  empowers   him   as   the
1
party Chairman to nominate the official candidates of
the LDP for president and vice­president in the event
that its LDP National Congress does not, or fails to,
convene.   He   states   that   the   National   Executive
Council has met on 22 December 2003, where thirty­
six   (36)   cut   of   forty   (40)   members   of   the   Council
attended, during which a resolution “ratifying and
_______________
1
 To act on such extraordinary or emergency matters, especially
those not envisioned or foreseen by this Constitution, which cannot
await the call and holding of a meeting of the National Congress or
the   National   Executive   Council,   upon   consultation,   whenever
practicable   with   other   Party   leaders;   Provided,   that   he   shall
thereafter report any such action taken by him to the Congress or the
Council, whichever meets first.
688
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
confirming   the   covenant   of   national   unity,   the
declaration  of  unity  entered   into  by  party  Chairman
Edgardo J. Angara, and all acts and decisions taken by
him to enforce and implement the same; ratifying and
confirming   likewise   all   other   acts   and   decisions   of
Chairman   Angara,   and   other   governing   bodies   to
preserve the integrity, credibility, unity and solidarity
of   the   party;   and,   further   reiterating   the   vote   of
confidence   of   the   national   executive   council   in,   and
support to, the continued efforts of Chairman Angara
to unite the political opposition,” has been adopted.
Respondent   Aquino   assails   the   resolution   of   the
National   Executive   Council   in   that,   allegedly,   no
proper  notices   have  been  sent   for  the  holding  of  the
meeting held on 22 December 2003 and that, on the
basis of LDP records, only thirteen (13) members of the
council  have signed  and  approved  the resolution. He
claims that Senator Angara has deliberately refused to
call a National Congress of the party. Representative
Aquino relies on his authority in past elections to sign
certificates of nomination of official candidates of LDP
which,   according   to   him,   has   not   been   revoked   or
recalled by the National Congress of the LDP. He also
asseverates   that   on   04   December   2003,   during   the
national   meeting   at   Club   Filipino   attended   by
hundreds   of   members   of   the   LDP,   Senator   Panfilo
Lacson   has   been   nominated   unanimously   as   the
party’s   candidate   for   president   in   the   national
elections scheduled on 10 May 2004, and that it has Once again, I submit, the Supreme Court is being
become   ministerial   for   him,   being   the   authorized tasked   to   exercise   its   judicial   power   on   something
signatory   of   the   party,   to   issue   the   certificate   of where it should not as yet be asked.
nomination in favor of Senator Lacson. To   the   above   extent,   I   therefore,   take   exceptions
It   does   appear   to   me   that   the   matter   involved   in from the ruling of the majority.
this controversy is an internal matter that the political DISSENTING OPINION
party   itself   should   resolve.   More   importantly,   the
petition   is   replete   with   factual   problems   which   this SANDOVAL­GUTIERREZ, J.:
Court   cannot   take   on.   The   conflicting   claims   of   the
parties,   such   as   the   alleged   intentional   inaction   of The   instant   case   arose   from   an   internal   squabble
Senator Angara to convene the National Congress of between   two   (2)   factions   of   the Laban   ng
the   party,   the   disputed   membership   of   the   National Demokratikong   Pilipino(LDP),   a   registered   national
Executive   Council   which   passed   the   resolution political   party,   which   put   up   their   respective
supporting   the   questioned   actions   of   petitioner presidential   candidates   in   the   May   2004   national
Angara,   the   determination   of   an   “extraordinary   and elections.
emergency”   situation   that   would   entitle   the   party I find it necessary to state the following important
chairman to act, the validity of the actions taken at the antecedent   facts   culled   from   the   parties’   pleadings,
behest of respondent Aquino in the National Congress some of which were not mentioned in the ponencia of
on   04   December   2003,   are   but   a   few   of   the   factual
Justice Dante O. Tinga.
issues   which   need   to   be   first   established   before   any On   November   28,   2003,   Representative   Rolex
decision can conclusively be arrived at. The absence of Suplico (5th District, Iloilo), LDP Region VI Chairman,
factual determination by the COMELEC on the filed   with   the   Office   of   Representative   Agapito   A.
689
Aquino,   LDP   Secretary   General,   herein   respondent,
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 689
a complaint1 against Senator Edgardo J. Angara, LDP
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections Chairman,   herein   petitioner.   The   complaint   charges
matters   now   being   disputed   by   the   parties   hardly petitioner with “acts of disloyalty to the party, culpable
makes   it   feasible   for   this   Court   to   rightly   and violation   of   the   LDP   Constitution   and   By­Laws,
decisively rule on the case. disregard   of   duly   approved   Resolution   of   the   LDP
Executive Council, and other divisive acts inimical to
the interest of the party.”
On   December   4,   2003,   a   National   Consultative
Meeting   of   the   LDP   was   held   at   the   Club   Filipino,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila wherein Senator
Panfilo   Lacson   was   unanimously   nominated   as   the
party’s official candidate for president in the May 10,
2004 national elections. 2 December   6,   2003”   by   virtue   of   an   Advisory  dated
On   December   8,   2003,   LDP   General   Counsel
Demaree   J.B.   Raval   filed   with   the   Commission   on
Elections (COMELEC) a Manifes­
_______________
1
 Annex   “A”   of   respondent   Aquino’s Answer (to Petition of
petitioner Angara) filed with the COMELEC.
2
 Paragraph 3 of respondent Aquino’s Answer.
690
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
tation  stating   that   “only   its   Party   Chairman
3
(petitioner   Sen.   Edgardo   J.   Angara)   and   only   those
whomsoever   he   may   authorize   in   writing   x   x   x   are
authorized   to   endorse,   by   way   of   a   Certificate   of
Nomination,   the   Certificate   of   Candidacy   of   an   LDP
candidate.”   The Manifestation prays   that   the
COMELEC: (a)   recognize only   those   Certificates   of
Candidacy   endorsed   by   petitioner   Angara   or   his
authorized   representative; (b)   deny   due   course all
Certificates   of   Candidacy   not   endorsed   by   petitioner
Angara   or   his   representative;   and (c)   note the
designation   of   Ambassador   Enrique   A.   Zaldivar   as
LDP   Acting   Secretary   General,   “in   place   of   Rep.
Agapito   A.   Aquino”   who   was   “placed   on   indefinite
forced   leave   as   LDP   Secretary   General   effective
4
December 7, 2003 issued by petitioner.
Going   back   to   the   Suplico complaint,   respondent
Aquino,   claiming   to   have   authority   as   Secretary
General   under   the   LDP   Constitution   and   By­Laws,
issued an Order  dated December 10, 2003, creating a
5
committee   composed   of   three   (3)   members   of   the
National Executive Council (the LDP governing body)
to   investigate   and   recommend   appropriate   action
thereon. He likewise sent petitioner Angara a letter of 6
even   date   informing   him   of   the complaint and
requesting him to respond thereto within five (5) days
from receipt.
On December 12, 2003, the 3­member Investigating
Committee of the National Executive Council issued a
Resolution  placing petitioner on preventive suspension
7
as party Chairman effective immediately and directing
him to refrain from exercising official acts in behalf of
the   party   until   and   after   the   Committee   finishes   its
investigation and submits its final recommendation to
the   National   Executive   Council   and/or   National
Congress. The Resolution states that such suspension Resolution  entitled, “A   Resolution   Ratifying   and
10

is   deemed   necessary   to   forestall   further   dissention Confirming   the   Covenant   of   National   Unity,   the
within the party members detrimental to the party’s Declaration of Unity Entered Into by Party Chairman
image and interest.
Edgardo J. Angara, and All Acts and Decisions Taken
_______________ by Him to Enforce and Implement the Same; Ratifying
and Confirming All His Other Acts and Decisions and
3
 Annex “B” of Petition.
4
 Annex “A” of Manifestation. Other   Governing   Bodies   to   Preserve   the   Integrity,
5
 Annex   “B”   of   respondent   Aquino’s Answer (to Petition of Credibility,   Unity   and   Solidarity   of   the   Party;   and,
petitioner Angara) filed with the COMELEC.
Further   Reiterating   the   Vote   of   Confidence   of   the
6
 Annex “C,” Id.
7
 Annex   “D”   of   respondent   Aquino’s Comment (on   the   present
National   Executive   Council   in   Support   of   the
Petition). Continued   Efforts   of   Chairman   Angara   to   Unite   the
691
Political Opposition.”
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004 691
Among   the   actions/decisions   of   petitioner   Angara
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
which   were   allegedly   ratified   and   confirmed   by   the
Elections
LDP   National   Executive   Council   in
On December 16, 2003, respondent Aquino submitted
said Resolution were: (a) the creation of an opposition
his Comment  on   the Manifestation,   claiming   that he
8

coalition Koalisyon   ng   Nagkakaisang   Filipino

was   not   given   prior   notice when   petitioner   Angara
(KNP) which   later   adopted   a Resolution entitled,
“unilaterallyplaced   him   on   indefinite   forced   leave.”
“Resolution   Choosing   Mr.   Fernando   Poe,   Jr.   as   the
Thus,   the Advisory,upon   which   the Manifestation was
based, “is a total nullity and must “be disregarded” by Standard   Bearer   of   the   KNP   for   President   of   the
the COMELEC. Republic   of   the   Philippines   in   the   May   10,   2004
Subsequently,   petitioner   Angara   converted National Elections;” (b)the decision to place respondent
the Manifestation into   a   verified Petition,  docketed   as
9
Aquino on indefinite forced leave; and (c) the filing of
E.M.   03­018.   The Petition further   alleges that   on the   aforementioned   LDP Manifestation before   the
December 22, 2003, the National Executive Council met COMELEC.
and,   36   out   of   its   40   members,   adopted   a
 In   his Answer  to   the Petition,   respondent   Aquino
11
assailed   the   “so­called Resolution of   the   National
Executive Council allegedly adopted during a meeting
on   December   22,   2003,”   claiming   that it
is “unauthorized and illegal” because no proper notices
have   been   sent   for   the   holding   of   such
meeting. Moreover, based   on   LDP   records,   only   13
members of the Council have signed and approved the
_______________
 Annex “C” of Petition.
8 Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated and endorsed by
 Annex “G,” Id.
9 LDP   Chairman  Edgardo  J.   Angara   are  recognized  by  the
 Annex “D,” Id.
10
 Annex “H,” Id.
11
692
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
supposed   Resolution. Which   means   that   it was   not
approved   by   a   majority   of   those   present,   taking   into
account   petitioner   Angara’s   claim   that   36   Council
members   attended   the   meeting.   Thus,   the
supposed Resolution is void and cannot  ratify/confirm
any act of petitioner Angara.
Respondent   Aquino   further   asserted   in
his Answer that since the 2001 national elections, he,
as   LDP   Secretary   General,   was   the sole officer   who
endorsed the Certificates of Nomination of the party’s
national candidates and who delegated such authority
to duly authorized representatives.
The   COMELEC   then   heard   the   parties   on   oral
arguments,   after   which   the   case   was   submitted   for
resolution.
On January 6, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued
the   assailed Resolution,  the   dispositive   portion   of
12
which reads:
“WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   petition
is GRANTEDwith LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and
Oppositor.   The   candidates   for   President   down   to   the   last
Commission as official candidates of LDP ‘Angara Wing.’
The   candidates   from   President   down   to   the   last
Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nominated and endorsed
by   LDP   Secretary   General   Agapito   ‘Butz’   Aquino   are
recognized as official candidates of LDP ‘Aquino Wing.’
“Consequently,   each   faction   or   ‘Wing’   is   entitled   to   a
representative to any election committee to which it may be
entitled as created by the Commission for the May 10, 2004
elections.   For   the   copies   of   the   election   returns,
the ‘Angara   Wing’ will   be   entitled   to   the   copies
corresponding to odd number of precincts, that is, Precinct
Nos.   1,  3,  5,  etc.,  and  for  the ‘Aquino Wing’ to the even
number of precincts, that is, Precinct Nos. 2, 4, 6, etc. This
is on the assumption that the LDP or as a party within a
registered   Political   Coalition   becomes   a   recognized   and
denominated   as   a   Dormant   Minority   Party   under   the
Election Laws. The two LDP ‘Wings’ are further entitled to
and   be   accorded   the   rights   and   privileges   with
corresponding legal obligations under Election Laws.
“SO ORDERED.”
Claiming   that   the Resolution was   issued   with   grave
abuse   of   discretion,   petitioner   Angara   filed   the
instant Petition for Certiorari.
_______________
 Annex “A,” Id.
12
693
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 24, 2004
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on
Elections
The contending parties raise the issue as who between
the petitioner, as LDP Chairman, and the respondent,
as LDP Secretary General, shall nominate its official
candidates in the coming national elections.
Undoubtedly, this is to me a purely internal party
concern, the determination of which rests solely within
the party itself, in the absence of statutes giving the
courts   jurisdiction   over   the   same.   The   party   has   its
own machinery to govern such conflict. Consequently,
this   Court   cannot   step   into   such   private   turf   and
dictate on the LDP party members who should be their
official   candidate   for   president.   In Sinaca   vs.
Mula,  this   Court en   banc,through   Chief   Justice
13
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., ruled:
“We   also   agree   with   the   contention   of   EMMANUEL
(Sinaca) that the decision as to which member a party shall
nominate as its candidate is a party concern which is not
cognizable by the courts.
“A political party has the right to identify the people who
constitute the association and to select a standard bearer
who  best   represents   the  party’s   ideologies   and  preference
(see 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Elections Sec. 255, 67). Political parties
are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from
judicial supervision; this common­law principle of judicial
restraint,   rooted   in   the   constitutionally   protected   right   of
free  association, serves the  public  interest by allowing the
693 political   processes   to   operate   without   undue   interference
(Nielsen v. Kezer, 232 Conn. 65, 652 A2d 1013). Thus, the
rule   is   that   the   determination   of   disputes   as   to   party
nominations rests with the party, in the absence of statutes
giving   the   courts   jurisdiction   (Hunt   v.   Superior   Court, 64
Ariz. 325, 170 P2d 293. See also O’niel v. O’Connell, 300 Ky
707, 189 Sw2d 965, 169 ALR 1271, holding that courts have
no power in the absence of a statute conferring jurisdiction
to interfere with operations of a political party).
“Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or
clear   legal   right   involved,   the   court   will   not   assume
jurisdiction   to   determine   factional   controversies   within   a
political party, but will leave the matter for determination
by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors at
the   polls (25   Am.   Jur.   2d,   Elections   Sec.   205,   982).
Similarly,   in   the   absence   of   specific   constitutional   or
legislative regulations defining how nominations are to be
made,   or   prohibiting   nominations   from   being   made   in
certain   ways,   political   parties   may   handle   party   affairs,
including nominations, in such manner as party rules may
establish (Tucker v. State Board of Alcoholic Control, 240
NC 177, 81 SE 2d 399; Brewster v. Massey [Tex Civ. App.]
232 SW2d 678).” (Italics ours)
_______________
 G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266.
13
(Recabo,   Jr.   vs.   Commission   on   Elections, 308   SCRA
793 [1999])
The   reason   behind   the   right   given   to   a   political
party to nominate a replacement where a permanent
vacancy  occurs   in the Sanggunian is  to maintain  the
party   representation   as   willed   by   the   people   in   the
election.   (Navarro   vs.   Court   of   Appeals, 355   SCRA

694
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 672 [2001])
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on ––o0o––
Elections
In   fine,   we   should   not   assume   jurisdiction   over © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
the petition,the   issue   here   being   purely   an   internal
party matter not cognizable by this Court.
ACCORDINGLY,   I   vote   to   DISMISS   the   instant
petition.
COMELEC Resolution annulled, petition granted in
part.
Notes.–History would also show that the “majority”
in either house of Congress has referred to the political
party   to   which   the   most   number   of   lawmakers
belonged, while the “minority” normally referred to a
party with a lesser number of members. (Santiago vs.
Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756 [1998])
Disunity   and   discord   amongst   members   of   a
political   party   should   not   be   allowed   to   create   a
mockery of the electoral process, which envisions one
candidate   from   a   political   party   for   each   position.