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Related Cases

(Quo warranto related cases) // Recommendation


Cuevas v. Bacal G.R. No. 139382
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
We first consider petitioners contention that respondents quo warranto suit should have
been dismissed for failure of respondent to exhaust administrative remedies by
appealing to the Office of the President.
The contention has no merit. If, as has been held, no appeal need be taken to the Office
of the President from the decision of a department head because the latter is in theory
the alter ego of the former,[4] there is greater reason for not requiring prior resort to the
Office of the President in this case since the administrative decision sought to be
reviewed is that of the President himself. Indeed, we have granted review in other cases
involving the removal of the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration[5] and the Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office[6] without
requiring the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies considering that the
administrative actions in question were those of the President.
In any event, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when
the question raised is purely legal.

Carillo v. Court of Appeals, 77 SCRA 170 (1977). Accord, Santiago v. Guingona,


298 SCRA 756 (1998)
On the other hand, as respondent herself does not have the requisite qualification for
the position of Chief Public Attorney, she cannot raise the lack of qualification of
petitioner. As held in Carillo v. Court of Appeals,[22] in a quo warranto proceeding the
person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully
by another. Absent that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed
usurper is immaterial. (Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756 (1998) Id. at 177.)

Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, 298 SCRA 756 (1998)


Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of
power[52] by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto.[53] A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.[54] The action may be
brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor[55] or any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.[56] The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly usurped,
intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.[57]
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions
of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.[58] In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of
the Senate minority leader.
[52] 91 CJS 551, citing State ex rel Danielson v. Village of Mound, 48 NW2d, 855, 863.
[53] 67 CJS 317, citing Wheat v Smith, 7 SW 161.
[54] Lota v. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 715, 718, June 30, 1961.
[55] 2, Rule 66, Rules of Court.
[56] 5, Ibid. See also Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA
11, 18, December 6m 1994; Tarrosa v. Singson, 232 SCRA 553, 557, May 25, 1994.

In this regard, the Court notes that Petitioner Santiago has no standing to bring the
instant petition for quo warranto, for she does not claim to be rightfully entitled to the
position of Senate minority leader. We have ruled in the past: Nothing is better settled
than that a petitioner, in a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public office, must be
able to show that he is entitled to said office. Absent such an element, the petition must
be dismissed. This is a principle that goes back to Acosta v. Flor [5 Phil 18, 22], a 1905
decision.

Acosta v. Flor, G.R. No. 2122, 5 Phil. 22, September 13, 1905.
The right to maintain such an action is especially and expressly governed by the
provisions of sections 197 to 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The code, after enumerating in sections 197 and 198 the cases in which such an action
may be brought and the persons against whom they may be brought, goes on to
determine with careful distinction those who have the right to maintain such action.

Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the fiscal of any
province, when directed by the Chief Executive of the Islands, must commence any
such action; and when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the two preceding sections can be established by proof, he must
commence such action."

Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a
province, may, at his own instance, bring such an action, or he may, on leave of the
court in which the action is to be commenced, or a judge thereof in vacation, bring the
action upon the relation of and at the request of another person; but, if the action is
brought at the request of and upon the relation of another person, the officer bringing it
may require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action, to be given to him by the
party at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought, before
commencing it."

Finally, section 201, under the heading "An individual may commence such action,"
provides as follows: "A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held
and exercised by another, may bring an action therefor."

(Permanent v. Temporary appointments cases)


195 SCRA 235, 239-240 (1991) Achacoso v. Macaraig
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in
turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence
of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated. . . .

Part. III, Chap. I, Art. IV, par. 5(c) (emphasis added)


Appointments, assignments, reassignments, and transfers in the Career Executive
Service are based on rank. On this point, the Integrated Reorganization Plan cannot be
any clearer. It provides:[11]
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service
shall be made by the President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended by
the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that
appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to assignments as
undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shall be with
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in
exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible;
provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive
Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he
qualifies in such examination.
At the initial implementation of this Plan, an incumbent who holds a permanent
appointment to a position embraced in the Career Executive Service shall continue to
hold his position, but may not advance to a higher class of position in the Career
Executive Service unless or until he qualifies for membership in the Career Executive
Service.

(Power of the CSC to ensure that only qualified... // Disapproval of appointments of


those appointments whose appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications)
De Tavera v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92595, May 28, 1992
The Court granted the petition in this case ruling that the Civil Service Commission
acted with grave abuse of discretion in directing the appointment of private respondent
to the position of Regional Director notwithstanding the fact that he clearly lacked the
requisite educational qualification and that record of his public service raises serious
questions about his moral fitness to remain in office. In this case, the private respondent
being only a third year college student, it was evident that he does not meet the
minimum academic qualification for the position of Regional Director.
“For the respondent Civil Service Commission then to direct that private respondent be
appointed to a position for which he does not possess the required educational
qualifications is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, being at
cross-purposes with its (CSC's) bounden duty to ensure that only the qualified are
admitted to the public service, hence to "disapprove those (appointments) whose
appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.” (Section
9, (h), P.D. No. 807)

Dela Cruz v. Civil Service Commision, G.R. No. 88333, December 2, 1991
The issue in this case is whether it was erroneous for the Civil Service Commission to
reverse and set aside the appointment extended to petitioner by the Department of
Science and Technology, petitioner being more qualified than the private respondent.
The Court in this case ruled in the affirmative stating that well-settled is the rule that the
“authority of the Civil Service Commission is limited to reviewing appointments on the
basis of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law.”
Thus, in Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986], this Court held:
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or
nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to
the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
In fine, the exact nature of the power of the Civil Service Commission to approve or
disapprove appointments has already been succinctly defined in the Luego case (supra.),
to wit:
All the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualification. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the
Commission when it acts on, or as the decree (P.D. 807, as amended) says,
"approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper
authorities. . . . To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said appointment
simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified
for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested
solely (in the appointing authority). [p. 333]
There is no question that the Civil Service Commission is tasked to ensure that
promotions and appointments in the government service shall be based on merit and
fitness. However, it cannot lawfully perform such duty if, as an incident thereto, the
authority of the appointing power is subverted Time and again, the power of the
Commission in this regard has been defined and delimited by the Supreme Court.
Neither in the Constitution nor in the Civil Service Law is there a provision which
empowers the Civil Service Commission to substitute its judgment for that of the
appointing authority in the guise of promoting the merit system in the civil service.
Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, G.R. No. L-69137, August 5,
1986
The appointment of the petitioner in this case was deemed to be permanent as it was
given to him by his appointing authority. The appointing authority in this case indicated
that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was, according to the Court,
not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
“The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving
or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance
with the Civil Service Laws. ”
Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that
the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we have
repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely
as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.9
[8] In Re: Elvira C. Arcega, 89 SCRA 318, 322.
[9] Ibid. Villanueva vs. Bellalo, 9 SCRA 407-41 1; Said Benzar Ali vs. Teehankee, 46
SCRA 728, 730-731; Santos vs. Chico, 25 SCRA 343; City of Manila vs. Subido, 17
SCRA 231.

(COAppointments as a body without its confirmation, does not make a Presidential


appointment valid and enforceable)

[11] Lacson vs. Romero, 84 SCRA 740, 745.


It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval
of another officer or body, like the Commission on Appointments under 1935
Constitution. 10 Appointments made by the President of the Philippines had to be
confirmed by that body and could not be issued or were invalidated without such
confirmation. In fact, confirmation by the Commission on Appointments was then
considered part of the appointing process, which was held complete only after such
confirmation. 11

Moreover, the Commission on Appointments could review the wisdom of the appointment
and had the power to refuse to concur with it even if the President's choice possessed all
the qualifications prescribed by law. No similar arrangement is provided for in the Civil
Service Decree. On the contrary, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-
discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the
required conditions laid down by the law.
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of Article
V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission has the power to "approve"
and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided therein that the Commission shag
have inter alia the power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional to
positions in the civil service, except those presidential appointees, members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and
jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. (emphasis supplied)
There are apparently no political overtones in this case, which looks to be an honest
contention between two public functionaries who each sincerely claims to be entitled to
the position in dispute. This is gratifying for politics should never be permitted to
interfere in the apolitical organization of the Civil Service, which is supposed to serve all
the people regardless of partisan considerations. This political detachment will be
impaired if the security of tenure clause in the Constitution is emasculated and
appointments in the Civil Service are revoked and changed at will to suit the motivations
and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power.

Same ruling as with:


Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R.
Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989

Maximo Gabriel vs. Hon, Eufemio Domingo, et al., etc., G.R. No. 87420, September
17, 1990

[9]Villanueva vs. Bellalo, 9 SCRA 407-41 1


Said Benzar Ali vs. Teehankee, 46 SCRA 728, 730-731
Santos vs. Chico, 25 SCRA 343
City of Manila vs. Subido, 17 SCRA 231

Gaspar vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 774, G.R. No. 90799, October 18, 1990
Protest with the Merit Systems Board before appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best
qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing
authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in an office calls
for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of
academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are
such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition,
prospects for the future, and best interests of the service. Given the demands of a
certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of the office concerned
provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied. The Civil Service
Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard.

******CESB vs. CSC, 819 SCRA, 482, March 7, 2017

Torio vs. CSC, G.R. No. 99336, 100178, June 9, 1992


- CSC on revoking the appointment of herein petitioners on the ground that they
lacked the necessary civil service eligibility at the time of the issuance of their
appointments. Petitions granted.
- Melanio Torio was the Chief of the Production Staff of the Printing Division, PIA,
while the petitioner Espanola was a Bindery Foreman at the PIA. They continued
their functions in a hold-over capacity after the PIA was merged with the GSA.
- Torio was temporarily appointed as Assistant Operations Superintendent of
Printing while Espanola was appointed as Temporary Supervising Book-binder
because of the new staffing pattern of the NPO. After the expiration of their
appointments, Torio’s temporary appointment was renewed, while Espanola’s
temporary appointment became permanent. On the same date, Espanola was
granted a testimonial eligibility. Consequently, Torio’s temporary appointment
has also been upgraded to permanent.
- Prior their appointments, protests were filed by respondents. CSC was
constrained to resolve the protests and issued a resolution revoking he
appointment of Torio and ordering those qualified respondents to be evaluated
for the position.
However, it must be noted that under Section 25 Presidential Decree 807 otherwise known as
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, an appointee with a temporary status need not
possess the civil service eligibility required by the position provided he meets the following
qualifications: (1) it is necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy; (2) there are no
appropriate eligibles; (3) the temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months; and (4) he
may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

A permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment—these are two distinct
acts of the appointing authority. The fact that the appointees in the two appointments are one and
the same person is purely incidental. Any irregularities in the former appointment are not to be
automatically carried over to the latter. If the protest is directed against the temporary appointment, it
would be illogical to carry-over the merits of the protest to the subsequent permanent appointment.

The preceding ruling should not be construed to mean, however, that by the mere expedient of
appointing the temporary appointee to a permanent status, the appointing authority can deprive the
protestant of an opportunity to question the appointment. First, the protestant is not precluded from
filing another protest directed against the permanent appointment. Second, if it can be shown that
the appointment was purposely done to moot the protest or is characterized by malice, then
corrective action can be taken and, moreover, the erring officials can be proceeded against
administratively.

It must be emphasized that if a protest filed against a temporary appointment is carried over to the
subsequent permanent appointment to the same position of the same person, an anomalous
situation will arise wherein the permanent appointee’s security to his position would be jeopardized
by considerations outside of his permanent appointment.

The chances of the occurrence of the previously described situation would be minimized if the CSC
promptly acts upon the protest. After giving the department or agency to which the protest is referred
as reasonable deadline to act, its inaction may be a basis for the CSC to give positive relief. It is
worthy of note that the CSC has recognized the importance of the speedy disposition of cases in its
resolution No. 89-779, which provided for the Rules on Protest Cases requiring the disposition of
cases within 60 days from filing thereof.
The situation in the present petitions could have been prevented if the CSC did not wait for two
years before taking the appropriate action on the protests filed.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussions, it is established that the questioned resolutions of the
CSC should be declared inapplicable to the petitioners because they refer to the temporary
appointments which had already lapsed when they were issued.

THE PERMANENT APPOINTMENTS OF PETITIONERS ESPANOLA AND TORIO

The Qualification Standard (QS) for the position of Bookbinder IV provides the following minimumn
requirements:

EDUCATION : Completion of Secondary School Course

EXPERIENCE : Two years of experience in bindery work

ELIGIBILITY : Bookbinder

Supervising Bookbinder

As to the QS for the position of Assistant Superintendent of Printing, the following minimum
requirements are prescribed:

EDUCATION: Bachelor’s degree preferably in Commerce or Business Administration

EXPERIENCE: 4 years of progressive responsible experience in different technical activities of


printing operations or other related work

ELIGIBILITY: Career service

Sub-professional

The appointing authority should, thus, appoint persons to the contested positions possessing the
aforementioned minimum qualifications so as to be within ambits of the law. For even if the
appointing authority is given a wide latitude in the exercise of its discretion in personnel actions, the
appointee must first possess the minimum qualifications prescribed by law (Cortez v. The Civil
Service Commission, 195 SCRA 216 [1991]).

IMPORTANT: The QS established for the contested positions do not only prescribed the eligibility
but also the minimum education and experience required of the position. Even if the petitioners
possess the required civil service eligibility, there would still be abuse of discretion by the appointing
authority if the other qualifications are not satisfied.

- On the QS: It would be appropriate to state at the outset that when necessary, education,
experience or training may be used interchangeably to offset deficiencies (in fact, the CSC
issued Memorandum Circular No. 23 series of 1991 expressly allowing the offsetting of
deficiencies except the required eligibility). The necessity exists if the appointee’s training or
experience is of such a level that the same would more than supplement the deficiency in
education considering the demands of the position in question. The converse holds true if the
appointee’s deficiency is in the required training or experience. The decision as to when the
conditions give rise to a necessity to interchange education with experience and vice-versa
upon the sound discretion of the appointing authority. This is not to be viewed as an
unbridled license given to the appointing authority to appoint whomsoever he desires. This is
rather a recognition of the fact that the appointing authority is in the best position to
determine the needs of his department or agency and how to satisfy those needs. Moreover,
it is precisely the province of the QS to provide the gauge by which the appointing authority
shall exercise his discretion. The QS has been defined in Section 20, PD 807 as expressing
the minimum requirements for a class of position in terms of education, training and
experience, civil service eligibility, physical fitness and other qualities required for successful
performance. It is, thus, the QS which provides for the considerations upon which the
appointing authority decides when the levels of education of experience may be sufficient to
offset each other.
- From the foregoing, it is established that petitioners Espanola and Torio are qualified for the
positions to which they were appointed. The appointing authority’s exercise of discretion in
the choice of appointees must be respected even if there are other persons who are likewise
qualified for the position such as private respondents Cangayda and Camacho. In fact, the
CSC does not have the power to overrule such discretion even if its finds that there are other
persons more qualified to the contested position. (italics supplied) [De la Cruz v. The Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 88333, December 2, 1991; Cortez v. The Civil Service
Commission, supra; Gaspar v. Court of Appeals 190 SCRA 774 [1990]).
- As has been held in Español v. The Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 85479, March 3,
1992, "every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications.
Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars
attended and so forth, may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team
spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the
service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of
the Office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied."
- Violation on reorganization (abolition of an office), security of tenure for
permanent appointments

Cortez vs. CSC, G.R. No. 92673, 195 SCRA 216, (1991)
- Conrado C. Cortez was appointed by resolution of the board of directors of the
PNR to the position of Chief Engine Crew Dispatcher. The appointment was
approved as temporary by the respondent Civil Service Commission effective
May 15, 1987. Respondent filed a protest with the Merit Systems Protection
Board on the ground that he was better qualified for the position, and is entitled
to preference in promotion under the next-in-rank rule. After such protest, the
Board revoked the petitioner’s appointment. CSC affirmed such decision through
a resolution.
- As long as the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by
law or regulations, here is no question that his appointment must be respected by
the CSC even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials.
- Invoking decisions of this Court, the petitioner stresses that as long as the appointee
possesses the minimum requirements, the discretion of the appointing authority in selecting
him must be respected by the Civil Service Commission. The Commission cannot
countermand that discretion and direct the appointment of another person who in its own
belief is better qualified.
- The respondents also argue that, as Engine Crew Dispatcher In-Charge, Tuazon is next-in-
rank to the position of Chief Engine Crew Dispatcher. While it is true that the next-in-rank
rule is not absolute, it should always be taken into consideration in filling up vacancies in the
Civil Service, for the promotion of the quality and morale of its personnel.
- The Court has studied the records of this case and agrees with the respondents that the
petitioner does not meet the minimum qualifications prescribed for the position in question.
The civil service eligibility he claims under R.A. 6850 qualifies him for appointment to
his present position only, not for promotion to the another position. Neither does he have the
prescribed 10-year experience nor has he prove that he is a college graduate, as also
required.
- We agree that many factors are taken into account in evaluating the qualifications of
prospective appointees and the formal examinations, work experience and educational
attainment are only some of them. Such abstract criteria as loyalty, cordiality, initiative,
resourcefulness, discipline, and other personality traits are also properly considered. When
making this evaluation, the appointing authority should be given the widest possible leeway
and cannot be controlled by the Commission. The Commission cannot, even for the best of
motives, substitute its own discretion for that of the appointing authority in derogation of the
latter's prerogative.4 As we said categorically in Luego vs. Civil Service Commission 5 and
have repeated in many other subsequent cases:
- Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualification required by the law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.
- As long as the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by law or
regulations, there is no question that his appointment must be respected by the Civil Service
Commission even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials. However,
this rule does not cover those cases where it is found by the Commission, after examining
the appointment papers, that the appointee does not satisfy the minimum qualifications for
the position in question. In these cases, the Commission would be well within its right—and
responsibility—in refusing to approve the appointment.
- IMPORTANT: As it has been shown in the case at bar that the petitioner does not possess
the minimum qualifications for the position to be filled, that was reason enough for the
Commission to revoke his appointment pursuant to the Civil Service Degree and the
Constitution. The Commission would have been less than vigilant, and in fact would have
been remiss and its constitutional duty, if it had allowed the appointment to pass.
- IMPORTANT: A careful perusal of the challenged resolution shows that it does not direct
the appointment of Tuazon but merely concludes that he should be appointed. We interpret
this as a mere suggestion and not a directive. If it was in fact intended as an order addressed
to the PNR, we hereby reversed it as inofficious and unlawful. It bears repeating that the Civil
Service Commission has no right to dictate the exercise by the appointing authority of the
discretion conferred upon it by law in the choice of the appointee.
- Interpreting the afore-quoted Section 9(h) in Luego, the Court made the following
observations:
- However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the under scored parts, will make it
clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be
employed by the Commission when it acts on—or as the Degree says, "approves" or
"disapproves"— an appointment made by the proper authorities.
- Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the petitioner and
private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone
rendered in functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to
affirm the validity of the petitioners appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the
said appointment simply because it believe that the private respondent was better qualified
for that would have constituted an encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the city
mayor.
- IMPORTANT: When it disapproves an appointment because the appointee does not
possess the minimum qualifications for the position, the Civil Service Commission is properly
performing its constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the Civil Service. As long as
it confines itself to this task and does not encroach on the prerogatives of the appointing
authority by controlling its discretion, the Commission has the full support and
encouragement of this Court.

Espanol vs. CSC, G.R. No. 85479, March , 1992


- Formal and informal qualifications… xxx (provided the legal requirements for the
office are satisfied)
-

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