Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No.

159374, July 12, 2007 Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors which provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of
(Special Proceedings – Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The
jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors)
writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with
left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to
any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Philippines.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2
minor sons on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived
them of their mother’s care.

Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of
their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that
Garcia vs. Drilon G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013 Jurisdiction of Family
under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
Courts
hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
JANUARY 29, 2018
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance
and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the
minors.
FACTS:
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition
for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family
courts under RA 8369.
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
custody of minors. psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of
Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. effective for thirty (30) days.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family
courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to
faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her
and their children, private respondent filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte.
The RTC issued a TPO, effective for thirty (30) days.
Petitioner filed before the CA challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for
being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of
an invalid law.”
The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue
in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with
jurisdiction to resolve the same.
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is “inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Court has jurisdiction on the issue of constitutionality of a
statute.
RULING:
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same
level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family
Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with
said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.
To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense
was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds
of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, “plainly the Constitution contemplates
that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of
any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts
in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A.

9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the
petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to
determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.

[G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003]

EVELYN TOLOSA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, QWANA KAIUN (through its resident-agent, FUMIO
NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS. INC., PEDRO GARATE and
MARIO ASIS, respondents.

FACTS
Evelyn Tolosa, was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by
Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the master of the Vessel
named M/V Lady Dona. CAPT. TOLOSA had a monthly compensation of US$1700,
plus US$400.00 monthly overtime allowance. His contract officially began on
November 1, 1992, as supported by his contract of employment when he assumed
command of the vessel in Yokohama, Japan. The vessel departed for Long Beach
California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage. At the time of
embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be in good health.
“During ‘channeling activities’ upon the vessel’s departure from Yokohama sometime
on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The following
day, November 7, 1992, he had a slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days,
his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in his death on November 18, 1992. It was
alleged that the request for emergency evacuation of Capt Tolosa was too late.
Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner, filed a
Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA against Qwana-Kaiun, thru its
resident-agent, Mr. Fumio Nakagawa, ASIA BULK, Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, as
respondents. The case was however transferred to the NLRC, when the amendatory
legislation expanding its jurisdiction, and removing overseas employment related
claims from the ambit of POEA jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi delict or tort,
but on the failure of private respondents -- as employers of her husband (Captain
Tolosa) -- to provide him with timely, adequate and competent medical services
under Article 161 of the Labor Code.
Respondents aver that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
since her cause did not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi
delict or tort. Further, there is no reasonable causal connection between her suit for
damages and her claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which allows an
award of damages incident to an employer-employee relation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
HELD
The SC held that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s
claim for damages, because that ruling was based on a quasi delict or tort per Article
2176 of the Civil Code.
After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are
convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on a
quasidelict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis for gross
negligence. Petitioner’s complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses
the negligent acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-employee
relation with Captain Tolosa. The SC stressed that the case does not involve the
adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a quasi delict.
The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from
employer-employee relations.
Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only
labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article
217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee
relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor
statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.”
While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only
reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, these
reliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with
the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements. The
central issue is determined essentially from the relief sought in the complaint.

“Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable
by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the
claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.” In
the present case, petitioner’s claim for damages is not related to any other claim
under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code,
which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and
health standard under Book IV of the same Code. The enforcement of this labor
standard rests with the labor secretary. Thus, claims for an employer’s violation
thereof are beyond the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. In other words, petitioner
cannot enforce the labor standard provided for in Article 161 by suing for damages
before the labor arbiter.

It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for
damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which
the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. Since
petitioner’s claim for damages is predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has no
reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, other
labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies
with the regular courts -- not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.

Petition is denied.
 respondent bank or some aspect or incident of such relationship. The respondent
bank opposed the motion, claiming that its action for damages was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court. Although its claims for damages incidentally
involved an employer-employee relationship, the said claims are actually predicated
on the petitioner’s acts and omissions which are separately, specifically and distinctly
governed by the New Civil Code.
EVIOTA vs CA Case Digest

ISSUE
FACTS

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bank and
petitioner Eduardo G. Eviota executed a contract of employment under which the
petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as Compensation and Benefits HELD
Manager, VP (M21). Petitioner came up with many proposals which the bank
approved and made preparations of. He was also given privileges like car, renovation
of the office, and even a trip to Singapore at the company’s expense. However, the The SC held that the RTC has jurisdiction. Case law has it that the nature of an action
petitioner abruptly resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after his and the subject matter thereof, as well as which court has jurisdiction over the same,
employment and rejoined his former employer. On June 19, 1998, the respondent are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for
bank filed a complaint against the petitioner with the RTC of Makati City for damages in relation to the law involved. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee
brought about his abrupt resignation. against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter. A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the
Though petitioner reimbursed part of the amount demanded by Standard, he was not
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a “reasonable causal
able to pay it full.
connection” between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent
Standard alleged that assuming arguendo that Eviota had the right to terminate his such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice.
employment with the Bank for no reason, the manner in and circumstances under
which he exercised the same are clearly abusive and contrary to the rules governing
human relations, governed by the Civil Code. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different
Further, Standard alleged that petitioner also violated the Labor Code when he
source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. The
terminated his employment without one (1) notice in advance. This stipulation was
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, is
also provided in the employment contract of Eviota with Standard, which would also
limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be
constitute breach of contract.
resolved by reference to the Labor Code of the Philippines, other labor laws or their
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action collective bargaining agreements.
for damages of the respondent bank was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter under paragraph 4, Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The petitioner averred that the respondent bank’s claim for damages Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of
arose out of or were in connection with his employer-employee relationship with the Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a Petition is denied.
connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising
from employer-employee relations.

In this case, the private respondent’s first cause of action for damages is anchored on
the petitioner’s employment of deceit and of making the private respondent believe
that he would fulfill his obligation under the employment contract with assiduousness
and earnestness. The petitioner volte face when, without the requisite thirty-day
notice under the contract and the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, he
abandoned his office and rejoined his former employer; thus, forcing the private
respondent to hire a replacement. The private respondent was left in a lurch, and its
corporate plans and program in jeopardy and disarray. Moreover, the petitioner
took off with the private respondent’s computer diskette, papers and documents
containing confidential information on employee compensation and other bank
matters. On its second cause of action, the petitioner simply walked away from his
employment with the private respondent sans any written notice, to the prejudice of
the private respondent, its banking operations and the conduct of its
business. Anent its third cause of action, the petitioner made false and derogatory
statements that the private respondent reneged on its obligations under their
contract of employment; thus, depicting the private respondent as unworthy of trust.

The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual
obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers
generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime
compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences
flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.

It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the petitioner
do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines and other labor laws
but the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of action are intrinsically civil. There
is no causal relationship between the causes of action of the private respondent’s
causes of action against the petitioner and their employer-employee
relationship. The fact that the private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the
petitioner under an existing employment contract before the latter abandoned his
employment is merely incidental.
 Whether or not there is jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter to settle the dispute.

Ruling: NO.

In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners

and respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief
under the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners’
alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled
that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. In the
alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of
civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.
Pioneer Concrete Philippines Inc v. Antonio D. Todaro (G.R. No. 154830)

Date: December 10, 2016

This Court has consistently held that where no employer-employee relationship
exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining
Facts: agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction.

Pioneer International Limited (PIL), an Australian company engaged in the ready-mix

concrete business, established herein petitioner PCPI to undertake its business in the
Philippines. PIL contacted respondent Todaro and asked if the latter is available to
join them in their intention to establish plant operations in the country to which the
latter agreed. Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the
former consented to engage the services of the latter as consultant for 2-3 months,
after which he would be employed as manager of concrete operations should PIL
decide to invest in the Philippines. PIL started its operation however it refused to
comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Respondent MATLING INDUSTRIAL VS COROS (G.R. NO. 157802 OCTOBER 13, 2010)
thus filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner. Petitioner
meanwhile contends that the case should fall with the NLRC as the damages arose
from an alleged breach of employment contract. Both the trial court and CA ruled in
Facts: After his dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for Finance and
favor of respondent.
Administration, the respondent filed on August 10, 2000 a complaint for illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling and some of its corporate officers
(petitioners) in the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The
Issue:
petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, raising the ground, among others, that
the complaint pertained to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) due to the controversy being intracorporate inasmuch as the
respondent was a member of Matlings Board of Directors aside from being its
Vice-President for Finance and Administration prior to his termination. The
respondent opposed the petitioners motion to dismiss, insisting that his status as a
member of Matlings Board of Directors was doubtful, considering that he had not
been formally elected as such; that he did not own a single share of stock in Matling,
considering that he had been made to sign in blank an undated indorsement of the
certificate of stock he had been given in 1992; that Matling had taken back and
retained the certificate of stock in its custody; and that even assuming that he had
been a Director of Matling, he had been removed as the Vice President for Finance
and Administration, not as a Director, a fact that the notice of his termination dated
April 10, 2000 showed. On October 16, 2000, the LA granted the petitioners motion
to dismiss, ruling that the respondent was a corporate officer because he was
occupying the position of Vice President for Finance and Administration and at the
same time was a Member of the Board of Directors of Matling; and that, consequently,
his removal was a corporate act of Matling and the controversy resulting from such
removal was under the jurisdiction of the SEC, pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (c)
of Presidential Decree No. 902.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is a corporate officer within the jurisdiction of
the regular courts.
Held: No. As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private
employer is properly cognizable by the LA. This is pursuant to Article 217 (a) 2 of the
Labor Code, as amended, which provides as follows:
Article 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. – (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P 5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with
a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided
by Labor Arbiters. (c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter
by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may
be provided in said agreements.
Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate officer, however, the
controversy falls under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), because the controversy arises out of intra-corporate or partnership relations
between and among stockholders, members, or associates, or between any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders,
members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or
association and the State insofar as the controversy concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity; or because the controversy involves the
election or appointment of a director, trustee, officer, or manager of such corporation,
partnership, or association. Such controversy, among others, is known as an
intra-corporate dispute.
Effective on August 8, 2000, upon the passage of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise
known as The Securities Regulation Code, the SECs jurisdiction over all
intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the RTC, pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA No.
8799.

Thus, pursuant to the above provision (Section 25 of the Corporation Code), whoever
are the corporate officers enumerated in the by-laws are the exclusive Officers of the
corporation and the Board has no power to create other Offices without amending
first the corporate By-laws. However, the Board may create appointive positions
other than the positions of corporate Officers, but the persons occupying such
positions are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning of Section 25 of
the Corporation Code and are not empowered to exercise the functions of the
corporate Officers, except those functions lawfully delegated to them. Their functions
and duties are to be determined by the Board of Directors/Trustees.

Moreover, the Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the power to
create a corporate office to the President, in light of Section 25 of the Corporation
Code requiring the Board of Directors itself to elect the corporate officers. Verily, the
power to elect the corporate officers was a discretionary power that the law
exclusively vested in the Board of Directors, and could not be delegated to
subordinate officers or agents. The office of Vice President for Finance and
Administration created by Matlings President pursuant to By Law No. V was an
ordinary, not a corporate, office.

The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers who may be ousted from
office at will, on one hand, and ordinary corporate employees who may only be
terminated for just cause, on the other hand, do not depend on the nature of the
services performed, but on the manner of creation of the office. In the respondents
case, he was supposedly at once an employee, a stockholder, and a Director of
Matling. The circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must be fully ARSENIO LOCSIN v. NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILS., INC. (NCLPI) and LUIS
considered to determine whether the dismissal constituted an intra-corporate BANSON
controversy or a labor termination dispute. We must also consider whether his status
G. R. No. 185567 October 20, 2010
as Director and stockholder had any relation at all to his appointment and subsequent
dismissal as Vice President for Finance and Administration.

LA HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY

DOCTRINE:
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the SC RULING:
NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with
YES. Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these
Nissan. A corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate
positions by the Nissan board pursuant to its By-laws. As such, he was a corporate
controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation so that RTC should
officer, not an employee. Section 25 of the Corporation Code
exercise jurisdiction based on Section 5(c) of PD 902-A.
provides that corporate officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such
other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws.

FACTS: Even as EVP/Treasurer, Locsin already acted as a corporate officer because such
position is provided for in Nissans By-Laws. An office is created by the charter of the
Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and Treasurer (EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI.
corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other
Locsin held this position for 13 years until he was nominated and elected Chairman.
hand, an employee usually occupies no office and generally is employed by the
A few months thereafter, an election was held and Locsin was neither re-elected
Chairman nor reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer. Locsin filed a managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid
to such employee. Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with the
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI. NCLPI filed a Amended By-Laws of the corporation.
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over
the case since the issue of Locsins removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an
intra-corporate dispute. Locsin maintained that he is an employee of NCPI.
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the
NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with
Nissan. A corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate
LA RULING: LA denied the Motion to Dismiss, holding that its office-acquired
controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation so that RTC should
jurisdiction to arbitrate and/or decide the instant complaint finding extant in the case
an employer-employee relationship. Article 280 of the Labor Code, the receipt of exercise jurisdiction based on Section 5(c) of PD 902-A.
salaries by Locsin, SSS deductions on that salary, and the element of control in the
performance of work duties were used by LA to conclude that Locsin was a regular
employee.

CA RULING: NCLPI elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA ruled that Locsin was a corporate officer; hence the
issue of his removal as EVP/Treasurer is an intracorporate dispute under the RTCs
jurisdiction. The fact that the position of EVP/Treasurer is specifically enumerated as
an office in the corporations by-laws makes him a corporate officer.

ISSUE: Whether Locsin’s position as EVP/Treasurer makes him a corporate officer

thereby excluding him from the coverage of the Labor Code?

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy.
Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of
execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution
against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied,
appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of
1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding
2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to
SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI
Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES
RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this
plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred
from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches,
in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have
granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued
without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in
the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is,
rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least
possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings"
(Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to
appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose
a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case
at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the
date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's
counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request
that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet
he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety
cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

BPI vs ALS Management & Dev’t Corp.

Facts:

 YES
 On July 29, 1985, petitioner BPI Investment Corp. filed a complaint for a
sum of money against respondent ALS Management and Dev’t Corp, alleging
that both executed a Deed of Sale for one condominium unit
o Petitioner advanced payment for the expenses in causing the issuance
and registration of the CCT
o Under the Deed, it is stipulated that the respondent shall pay all the
expenses for the preparation and registration of this Deed of Sale
  After petitioner complied with its obligations under the Deed of Sale,
respondent refused to pay petitioner its legitimate advances for the said
expenses
 In respondent’s Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent averred
the ff:
o PD 957 provides that no fee except those required for the registration of
the deed of sale in the RD shall be collected for the issuance of such
title
o But the petitioner has increased the amount of its alleged advances for
the issuance and registration of the CCT by including therein charges
which should not be collected from buyers of condo units
o That the condo unit suffered from defects and deficiencies in
contravention of petitioner’s warranties
o Thus respondent prays that petitioner be ordered to correct the
defects/deficiencies
 On Feb. 6, 1990, the trial court issued its judgment:
o Ordering respondent to pay the cost for the registration of the title
o Ordering petitioner to correct the defects/deficiencies of the condo unit
o Ordering petitioner to pay for:
a. Reimbursement for expenses incurred by respondent in
materials/labor in fixing some of the defects
b. Unearned income
 The CA sustained the trial courts findings, hence the current petition
 Petitioner argues that:
o It was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the
RTC, that had jurisdiction over respondent’s counterclaim
Issue:
Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
Conclusion: YES
Ruling:
 Promulgated on July 12, 1976, PD No. 957 -- otherwise known as “The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree” -- provides that the
National Housing Authority (NHA) shall have “exclusive authority to
regulate the real estate trade and business”
 Meanwhile, PD No. 1344 entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority
to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under
Presidential Decree No. 957” expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA to include
“claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, broker or salesman.”
 By virtue of Executive Order No. 648, the regulatory functions of the NHA
were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC)
 Pursuant to Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the functions
of the HSRC were transferred to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board
 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in Section
1 of PD No. 1344 is exclusive
 Thus, the SC has ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of
specific performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a
subdivision lot; for claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected
or not, and for determining whether there is a perfected contract of sale.
Clearly then, respondent’s counterclaim being one for specific performance
(correction of defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit) and damages
falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB as provided by Section 1 of PD No.
1344
 The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, provided that such
action would not result in the mockery of the tenets of fair play
 As an exception to the rule, however, the issue may not be raised if
the party is barred by estoppel
 In the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only
after a judgment unfavorable to it did it raise the issue of jurisdiction
 Thus, it may no longer deny the trial court’s jurisdiction, for estoppel
bars it from doing so
 The SC cannot countenance the inconsistent postures petitioner has
adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular court to which it
has voluntarily submitted
 The undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for decision, and
then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction if it is not is frowned upon by the Court
 Petitioner was found guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise
the question of jurisdiction earlier

Application:

 From the time that respondent filed its counterclaim on November 8, 1985,
the former could have raised such issue, but failed or neglected to do so
 It was only upon filing its appellant’s brief with the CA on May 27, 1991, that
petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time
 A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons
 Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches
 Laches, in general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it
 The doctrine of laches or of ‘stale demands’ is based upon grounds of public METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale GOKONGWIE-PE, Petitioners, v. Johnny Pastorin, Respondent.
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or FACTS:
claim to be enforced or asserted Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by Metromedia Times Corporation
(Petitioner) on 10 December 1990 as a Field Representative/Collector. His task
entailed the periodic collection of receivables from dealers of petitioner's
newspapers.
Respondent, because of tardiness was supposedly terminated by the
petitioner company, but because of the timely intervention of the union, the
dismissal was not effected.
However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a
magazine dealer and when he was not able to pay the loan, he stopped
collecting the outstanding dues of the dealer/creditor. After requiring him to
explain, respondent admitted his failure to pay the loan but gave no definitive
explanation for the same.
Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed to do
field work, and was transferred to a new position. Despite the completion of his
suspension, respondent stopped reporting for work and sent a letter communicating
his refusal to accept the transfer. He then filed a complaint for constructive dismissal,
non-payment of backwages and other money claims with the labor arbiter.
 The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. Petitioner lodged an
appeal with the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
over respondent’s complaint. Significally, this issue was not raised by petitioner in
the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA has no
jurisdiction over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the
voluntary arbitrator. However, the CA reinstated the ruling of the CA. The CA held
that the active participation of the party against whom the action was brought,
coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body
where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on
impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA
during appeal.
HELD:
The SC held that petitioner is not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the LA during appeal.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent
or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been
applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed
ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If
it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory
that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and may not
be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. However, if the lower
court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such,
for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies.
The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the
parties, has no bearing thereon.
Applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction,
petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
before the NLRC on appeal.
Decision of the CA is set aside.
Lourdes Eristngcol vs CA, G.R. No. 167702. March 20, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner, owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village, Makati City started
constructing a house on her lot but for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and
Regulations, respondent UVAI, an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village,
imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors
from entering the village and working on her property. This prompted petitioner to
file the subject complaint before the RTC. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that it is the Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate
disputes involving homeowners associations. Petitioner argues that the subject
matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular courts and need not be
filed before a specialized body or commission.
ISSUE: Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)*** which has jurisdiction?
HELD: HLURB has jurisdiction. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in
determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the
status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the
subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of an action and which court
has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and
the essence of the relief prayed for. Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint, designated as
one for declaration of nullity, falls within the regular courts’ jurisdiction. However, we
have, on more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action. A scrutiny of the allegations contained in
Eristingcol’s complaint reveals that the nature of the question subject of this
controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s Construction Rules.
The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of UVAI’s
by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between the
parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt
from the application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction
Rules. ***(E.O. No. 535, which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the HIGC,
transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions over
homeowners’ associations originally vested with the SEC as well as controversies
arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations. Thereafter, with Republic Act
No. 8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect
to homeowners’ associations, were transferred to the HLURB.