Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 79:279–297
DOI 10.1007/s10551-007-9380-x
Role Morality in the Accounting Profession
– How do we Compare to Physicians
and Attorneys?
ABSTRACT. Role morality can be defined as ‘‘claim(-
ing) a moral permission to harm others in ways that, if not
for the role, would be wrong’’ (A. Applbaum: 1999, Ethics
for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional
Life (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) p. 3).
Adversarial situations resulting in role morality occur most
frequently in the fields of law, business, and government.
Within the realm of accounting, professional obligations
may place the accountant in a situation where he/she is
susceptible to the pressures of role morality. If the
accountant engages in acts consistent with role morality,
significant harm to others may result.The current study
represents an initial investigation into role morality in
accounting and includes survey data from three samples of
professionals: accountants, physicians, and attorneys. Re-
sults suggest that accountants generally do not agree that
role morality is acceptable. Additionally, when compared
to the groups of physicians and attorneys, physicians agree
the least with role morality, while attorneys agree the
most. Implications for practicing accountants and sugges-
tions for future research into the theory of role morality
are offered.
KEY WORDS: accountants compared to attorneys
and physicians, ethical behavior, role morality
Robin R. Radtke is currently an Assistant Professor at Florida
Atlantic University. Dr. Radtke earned her Ph.D., at the
University of Florida and has previously taught at the Uni-
versity of Houston, the University of Texas San Antonio,
and Texas Tech University. Dr. Radtke’s main research
interests are in the ever growing field of accounting ethics and
she has been an editorial board member of Research on Pro-
fessional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting (formerly
Research on Accounting Ethics) since 1995. She has pub-
lished in various journals including Issues in Accounting
Education, Behavioral Research in Accounting,
Accounting Horizons, Research on Professional
Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting, and others.
Ó Springer 2007
Robin R. Radtke
Introduction and motivation
Role morality can be defined as ‘‘claim(ing) a moral
permission to harm others in ways that, if not for the
role, would be wrong’’ (Applbaum, 1999, p. 3).
Applbaum (1999) advances many examples of role
morality behavior in many different types of pro-
fessional settings such as a lawyer defending a guilty
client, a political consultant engaging in a smear
campaign, an executioner executing an innocent
prisoner, a CEO engaging in a strategy of secrecy, a
general endangering innocent people, and a doctor
denying patient treatment. As Applbaum (1999)
claims, occupants of these professional roles may
engage in acts such as coercion, deception, and
violence, which are generally considered to be
morally wrong. They do so as part of their role out
of a moral obligation to follow the rules of their
professions. Thus, professionals may believe that
they have an obligation to act on behalf of their
clients in ways that would be wrong if done on their
own behalves. In a business setting this type of
behavior could have potentially negative impacts on
multiple stakeholder groups. Investigating this phe-
nomenon of role morality and investigating
accountantsÕ views on role morality is the focus of
this paper.
Businesses exist to make money. Thus, within
business it is to be expected that individuals working
for a company attempt to advance the interests of the
company in any way possible. The issue centers on the
acceptability of the methods employed. Obviously,
illegal means cannot be employed, or if they are, the
perpetrators at least face the possibility of being caught
and punished. The problem lies in the fact that not all
actions that are considered legal and acceptable within
280 Robin R. Radtke
a business setting are necessarily acceptable from a
moral viewpoint or to others outside the business.
Investigating accountantsÕ views on role morality
is of interest given the increased scrutiny placed
upon the accounting profession following the Enron
crisis and other recent failures such as WorldCom
and Tyco. Identifying whether accountants agree
with the concept of role morality and whether their
views differ from those of other professionals would
provide a potential explanation for some recent
occurrences of unethical behavior. Understanding
why one would consider this acceptable behavior
within the role, while others outside of the role find
it unacceptable, is also of interest.
The paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion presents the theoretical basis for the paper, while
the third section describes development of the
hypotheses. The fourth section describes the
research methodology and the fifth section presents
the results. Section six presents the conclusions of
the study, potential limitations of the research, and
implications in terms of the accounting profession, as
well as suggestions for future research.
Theoretical basis
Role morality
As defined above, role morality can be thought of as
‘‘claim(ing) a moral permission to harm others in
ways that, if not for the role, would be wrong’’
(Applbaum, 1999, p. 3). Permissible violation allows
the professional to engage in adversary tactics that
may be harmful to others and to act on behalf of the
client in ways that he/she would not act on his/her
own behalf (Applbaum, 1999, p. 8). Within his/her
role the professional may thus feel obligated to act in
a certain manner, regardless of the consequences.
These adversarial positions occur most frequently in
the fields of law, business, and government. Role
morality at its extremes can be seen in such examples
as Sanson, the executioner of Paris (Applbaum,
1999, p. 15) and Adolf Eichmann, a middle-level SS
officer who was responsible for the deportation of
millions of European Jews to Nazi death camps
(Applbaum, 1995, p. 470). While these two exam-
ples may clearly constitute examples of role morality,
other more ordinary examples may not fit the defi-
nition of role morality as clearly. Additionally, an
individual professional may not even realize that he/
she is engaging in role morality behavior, but may
merely feel that he/she is simply carrying out the
obligations of the professional role. The uncertainty
surrounding these everyday examples signals that this
is an area ripe for investigation.
Less extreme examples may thus be present
everyday in many professional realms. For example,
in the legal system, lawyers are permitted to argue
for what they know is false and not consider the
potentially dangerous consequences of setting a
guilty criminal free; confidentiality is generally rec-
ognized as the most unresolved issue in legal ethics
(Zalesky, 2002). In the managed-care setting of the
medical profession, such issues as cost containment,
capitation rates, and for-profit ownership may alter
the standard role of doctoring. Ritzer and Walczak
(1988, p. 1) argued many years ago that the changing
nature of the medical profession, including the ‘‘rise
of McDoctors (no-appointment, walk-in medical
facilities modeled after fast-food restaurants)’’ would
lead to some degree of deprofessionalization. Appl-
baum suggests that there may one day be two types
of medical professionals: doctors who have fiduciary
relationships with patients and are committed to the
care and healing of the sick and ‘‘schmoctors’’ who
are ‘‘contract employees of for-profit health care
providers who in turn have contractual relationships
with consenting adult customers’’ (1999, p. 51).
Within the realm of accounting, McPhail (2001,
p. 280) suggests that because accounting is technical
and mathematical in nature, it ‘‘dehumanises indi-
viduals and consequently makes it easier for some
people to treat other people cruelly.’’
Consider, for example, the well-known legal
ethics case of Spaulding v. Zimmerman (116 N.W.2d
704, 1962). In 1956 David Spaulding was a teenage
passenger in a car driven by John Zimmerman. In a
collision with another vehicle, Spaulding received
severe injuries and subsequently sought damages
from Zimmerman. During an examination by
ZimmermanÕs insurance companyÕs doctor, a life
threatening aneurysm was detected. SpauldingÕs own
doctors had not detected the aneurysm of the aorta,
which most likely was caused by the accident. No
one on ZimmermanÕs defense team, nor the doctor
discovering the condition, disclosed the information
to Spaulding himself. The parties subsequently
 Role Morality in Accounting
settled for $6,500 and Spaulding lived with the life
threatening condition for nearly 2 years until it was
discovered during a routine medical checkup, at
which time Spaulding successfully underwent sur-
gery. Spaulding eventually had the initial settlement
set aside, but in so doing the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that ZimmermanÕs lawyer had no legal
obligation to disclose this life threatening informa-
tion to Spaulding.
This case begs the question of the boundaries of
acceptable behavior within a role. While confiden-
tiality to a client is one of a lawyerÕs most sacred
duties, an exception should at least be considered if
adherence to this standard results in immoral
behavior. Cramton and Knowles (1998, p. 65) state
specifically with respect to Spaulding v. Zimmerman,
that, ‘‘the adversary role of the lawyer in litigation
arguably permits, and may sometimes require, a
lawyer to behave in an amoral or immoral way.’’
How the lawyer justifies this behavior to him/herself
may be based on the argument of constituted
description, which states that ‘‘if oneÕs actions are
aptly described using terms defined by a practice,
then one must be engaged in that practice, because
some descriptions are logically possible only within a
practice or role’’ (Applbaum, 1999, pp. 81–82). In
other words, the lawyer may simply feel that it is part
of his/her job. Thus, ‘‘if an action is aptly described
using terms defined by a social practice, the only way
to evaluate that particular action is with respect to
the rules internal to the practice’’ (Applbaum, 1999,
p. 82). For example, one cannot strike out or draw a
walk without playing baseball. Thus, outside of the
game of baseball, striking out or drawing a walk lose
their meaning. The problem with this argument
when viewed by those outside the profession,
however, is that even if an action is judged accept-
able from within the profession, those outside the
profession can still judge the actor as a person
(Applbaum, 1999, pp. 89–98). Thus, if an immoral
act is viewed as being acceptable within a profession,
it can still be viewed as immoral or wrong from
outside the profession.
Role morality in business and accounting
Adversarial situations abound in the business world.
In any contract negotiation, the winner is the party
281
with the more favorable outcome; the loser ends up
giving in to concessions. The issue in these situations
becomes, is it appropriate to pursue a win at any
cost?
A common example in the realm of corporate
strategy is the idea that a company makes money by
creating and sustaining market failures (Applbaum
(1999), pp. 194–195, based on Porter (1980),
(1985)). In order to perpetuate a competitive
advantage, a company may engage in anticompeti-
tive adversary tactics such as driving up competitorsÕ
costs and raising barriers to entry to create monopoly
power while destroying economic value of the
competitors. These defensive tactics include such
strategies as: tying up suppliers, raising competitorsÕ
input costs, encouraging government policies that
raise barriers, blocking channel access, and fore-
closing alternative technologies. While many of
these practices have been the topic of antitrust liti-
gation, attempting to secure monopoly power by
deterring and driving out competition within legal
bounds is certainly the goal of many companies.
The earnings management phenomenon is an
accounting specific example of potential role
morality behavior. Earnings management can be
defined as the intentional intervention of managers
in non-neutral financial reporting to produce some
private gain (Schipper, 1989). By definition, earn-
ings management is based on managerial intent, and
in some cases may be difficult to distinguish from
appropriate applications of GAAP. According to
Coffee (2001, p. 42), ‘‘auditors find earnings man-
agement to be an on-going, pervasive phenomenon,
which auditors recognize is occurring but can only
sometimes prevent, either because they are limited
by artificial auditing conventions that presuppose
managementÕs probable integrity or because they are
constrained by the conflicts of interest that the
multi-service consulting firm necessarily encoun-
ters.’’ Thus, in these cases, the auditor may often
know that management is attempting to manipulate
earnings figures, and even if the figures are in
compliance with GAAP, the auditor must determine
whether to allow the misstatement or make an
adjustment to the financial statements.
Additional examples of adversarial situations for
accountants include allowing a questionable audit
adjustment or tax treatment that has a material
impact on the financial statements or the amount of
282 Robin R. Radtke
taxes owed, due to pressure from the client. In each
of these situations, the client gains an advantage
while multiple stakeholders of the companies
involved are put at a disadvantage. In order to
engage in these activities, the accountant must
convince him/herself that it is acceptable to act in
these manners within the role of an accountant.
The natural adversaries of general accountants and
auditors include those parties from which accoun-
tants may feel some sort of accountability pressure:
the client organization which pays for services ren-
dered, the professional accounting firm which
employs the accountants, the accounting profession
itself, and the general public (who rely on the
financial statements). For the tax accountant, the first
three parties remain the same, but the general public
has less reliance on tax accountants (although it
could be argued that by reducing taxes paid by their
clients the tax base is weakened and public services
may be diminished), while at the same time tax
accountants often are seen as having an adversarial
relationship with the Internal Revenue Service. As is
suggested by Ponemon and Gabhart (1994), simul-
taneous responsibility to each of these groups may
create ethically sensitive situations for the accoun-
tant, since different constituents may have opposing
goals and interests. These situations are nearly always
adversarial in nature, and how the accountant views
the responsibilities of his/her role directly impacts
the actions taken.
What makes role morality problematic?
There are several generally agreed upon criteria in
evaluating moral reasoning or judgments. Shaw and
Barry (1998, pp. 23–24) state that moral judgments
should be logical, based on facts, and based on sound
or defensible moral principles. Velasquez (2002,
pp. 35–36) states that moral reasoning must be log-
ical, that the factual evidence supporting a judgment
must be accurate, relevant, and complete, and that
the moral standards involved must be consistent.1
Velasquez (2002, pp. 36–37) goes on to address the
potential problem of moral standards associated with
a decision being inconsistent. He gives an example
involving two moral standards, obeying your
employer and not endangering innocent people. He
states that if you were asked by your employer to
engage in an act that may endanger innocent peo-
pleÕs lives, then you must decide which of these
conflicting moral standards to set aside. If one
decides that human life is more important than the
orders of an employer, then the moral standard to
obey your employer is set aside. Another type of
consistency is related to universalism; if it is morally
justified for me to perform a certain act, then it must
be morally justified for another person to perform
the same or similar act in any similar circumstances.
Both of these arguments of consistency are par-
ticularly relevant in evaluating role morality from an
ethical standpoint. The inconsistency of two moral
standards (as in the example presented above) is part
of the definition of role morality, in that an em-
ployee ‘‘claim(s) a moral permission to harm others
in ways that, if not for the role, would be wrong’’
(Applbaum, 1999, p. 3). The argument of univer-
salism is also critical in that if it is morally permissible
for me to perform a certain act as a function of my
role, then it must be morally permissible for another
person to perform the same or similar act in any
similar circumstances, which could include those
outside of the role. The argument of universalism
fails with respect to role morality, in that actions
performed within and outside of the role are eval-
uated differently. Thus, based on these basic con-
cepts of moral reasoning, role morality fails both tests
of consistency.
Additionally, RawlsÕs requirements, or moral rules
that govern the conduct of individuals, are made up
in part of natural duties that do not depend on any
actual practice, agreement, convention, or institu-
tion (Applbaum, 1999; Garrett, 2003). These natural
duties include the duty not to be cruel, the duty not
to injure, the duty not to harm the innocent, the
duty to help one another, the duty of justice and the
duty of mutual respect (Garrett, 2003, p. 2). Appl-
baum (1999, p. 136) argues that role morality actions
would require us to act in ways that violate our
natural duties to one another. He suggests that
‘‘Institutions and the roles they create ordinarily
cannot mint moral permissions to do what otherwise
would be morally prohibited’’ (Applbaum, 1999,
p. 3).
In addition to citing Rawls, Applbaum (1999)
cites the work of many different philosophy scholars
in attempts to investigate whether they can lend
support to or validate the theory of role morality. In
 Role Morality in Accounting
nearly every chapter of his book he argues that ‘‘the
claims of adversary institutions are weaker than
supposed and do not justify much of the harm that
professional adversaries inflict’’ (Applbaum, 1999,
p. 3). Thus, several arguments based on theories of
ethics and morality suggests that role morality is at
the very least problematic.
Who is responsible for role morality?
Many acts labeled as consistent with role morality
result in harm to the general public. Examples
include a lawyer winning release of a potentially
harmful criminal, the corporate strategy of creating
and sustaining market failures, and the CEOÕs
strategy of secrecy with respect to a failing com-
pany. Yet many of these institutions, including the
professions of accounting, medicine, and law, are
defined by a service motive that includes
upholding the public interest (Preston et al.,
1995). At the same time, it is the public or
society who defines what a professional role
should be. Thus, are acts of role morality the
responsibility of the individual who perpetrates the
act or of society as a whole who defines the act as
part of the role?
The previous discussion of role morality and tests
of consistency focuses on the individualÕs responsi-
bility for acts performed. ApplbaumÕs previously
mentioned examples of Sanson, the executioner of
Paris (Applbaum, 1999, p. 15) and Adolf Eichmann
(Applbaum, 1995, p. 470) also focus on the indi-
vidual. At the same time, Andre (1991, p. 79) sug-
gests that some scholars ‘‘... conclude that an
individual within a role faces no conflicts; the
responsibility belongs to society.’’ Luban (1988,
p. 131) presents a four-step analysis of the respon-
sibilities of professionals that mirrors this view:
The agent (1) justifies the institution by demon-
strating its moral goodness; (2) justifies the role by
appealing to the structure of the institution; (3)
justifies the role obligations by showing that they
are essential to the role; and (4) justifies the role
act by showing that the obligations require
it... Each link is justified by appeal to the one
preceding it; [only the first] is justified by direct
argument.
283
Thus, once the individual justifies the necessity of
the institution, justification of the act of role
morality logically follows. This argument suggests
that all individuals within various professions may
view role morality in similar ways, as is dictated by
society.
Based on the previous discussion, there is sup-
port for both arguments, that acts of role morality
are the responsibility of the individual who per-
petrates the act or of society as a whole who de-
fines the act as part of the role. Applbaum (1999,
pp. 89–98) shows that the argument of constituted
description, which has been previously discussed,
fails in that even if an action is judged acceptable
from within the profession, those outside of the
profession can still judge the actor as a person.
Additionally, the aforementioned arguments of
consistency and universalism suggest that if any
person is held responsible for his/her actions, then
all people must be held responsible. Thus, it is
proposed that even though certain roles are dictated
by society, individuals within those roles may still
be held responsible for the results of their actions
within the roles.
Research hypotheses
Several research hypotheses are presented in order to
examine the phenomenon of role morality in the
field of accounting. First, whether practicing
accountants agree that role morality is acceptable is
investigated through the use of hypothetical situa-
tions in various settings. Based on the previous dis-
cussion, it is anticipated that accountants will
disagree with role morality behavior, thus, the first
hypothesis is:
H1: Accountants, disagree that role morality is ac-
ceptable.
Theories on the nature of professions suggest that
professions may be somewhat homogeneous in
terms of their public service orientation and the
related moral obligations (Osiel, 1984; Parker, 1994;
Preston et al., 1995). According to Osiel (1984,
p. 44), ‘‘a sensitivity to the ethical ramifications of its
activities allows a profession to display its commit-
ment to public service, thereby setting itself apart
284 Robin R. Radtke
from the unabashed self-interestedness of the busi-
ness firm.’’ On the other hand, the nature of services
rendered may constitute a basis for significant dif-
ferences in some aspects of ethical behavior among
various professions.
The medical and legal professions were chosen for
comparison to the accounting profession primarily
because each has an established code of ethics or
conduct that each member of the respective
professional association is expected to adhere
to. Comparisons across professions are particularly
relevant, given that there is no established standard
for role morality behavior against which to measure
the results of the current study. Established measures
exist for different types of sample populations for
measures such as risk attitudes, moral development,
and personality factors, for example. In the current
study, comparison of accountantsÕ responses to those
of other professional groups will show whether
accountantsÕ responses are consistent with those of
other groups of professionals.
The accounting, medical, and legal professions
all have long histories with respect to development
and evolution of their respective codes (Backof and
Martin, 1991) and each has ongoing concerns
about its ethical conduct, as is evidenced by
continuing efforts to improve the ethics education
of future practitioners (Gunz and McCutcheon,
1998; Li, 2000; Martinez, 2002; McPhail, 2001;
Thorne, 2001; Weisberg and Duffin, 1995).
Comparisons of the AICPA Code of Professional
Conduct, the AMA Code of Medical Ethics, and
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
show similarities in terms of basic scope, as is
shown by the following excerpts from their
preambles or prefaces:
These Principles of the Code of Professional
Conduct of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants express the professionÕs rec-
ognition of its responsibilities to the public, the
clients, and to colleagues. They guide members in
the performance of their professional responsi-
bilities and express the basic tenets of ethical and
professional conduct. The Principles call for an
unswerving commitment to honorable behavior,
even at the sacrifice of personal advantage.
(American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants, 2003, Code of Professional Conduct, Pre-
amble, .02).
Medical ethics involve the professional responsi-
bilities and obligations of physicians. Behavior
relating to medical etiquette or custom is not
addressed in the Code. The Opinions, which
follow, are intended as guides to responsible
professional behavior. (American Medical Asso-
ciation, 2003, Code of Medical Ethics, Preface).
A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice. (American
Bar Association, 2003, Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Preamble: A LawyerÕs Respon-
sibilities, [1]).
Further analysis certainly suggests, however, differ-
ent emphases with respect to coverage topics based
on professional field. Appendix 1 shows excerpts
from each of the codes in terms of the major topic
headings discussed. Given the common bases of the
codes and the differences in topical coverage, it is
difficult to predict whether there will be differences
among the three groups with respect to role
morality. Thus,
H2: Views of whether role morality is acceptable
are similar among accountants, physicians, and
attorneys.
The last area of investigation of this study deals with
whether members of the three groups feel personal
responsibility for their actions within their profes-
sional roles. As was previously discussed, even though
conflicting arguments suggest that it is either the
individual or society who is responsible for acts
consistent with role morality, Applbaum (1999,
pp. 89–98) argues that even if an action is judged
acceptable from within the profession, those outside
of the profession can still judge the actor as a person.
Thus, at least some level of recognition of individual
responsibility for actions is expected. Since partici-
pants cannot be directly asked whether they view acts
consistent with role morality as the responsibility of
the individual, they are instead asked about individual
responsibility for workplace actions. It can then be
inferred that if individuals feel responsible for work-
 Role Morality in Accounting
place actions, that they would also feel responsible for
acts consistent with role morality. Thus,
H3: Accountants, physicians, and attorneys agree
that an individual is responsible for the conse-
quences of his/her actions in the workplace.
H4: Views about responsibility for consequences of
actions in the workplace are similar among
accountants, physicians, and attorneys.
How each individual views this responsibility for
workplace actions should be directly related to
whether he/she feels role morality is acceptable.
Someone who agrees with role morality, for exam-
ple, most likely does not feel personally responsible
for the consequences of the actions of his/her role.
That professional may feel that following the rules of
his/her profession without concern for the conse-
quences is simply part of his/her job. He/she may
feel a personal responsibility to follow his/her pro-
fessional code of conduct, but this is not the same
thing as feeling a personal responsibility for the
consequences of workplace actions. As was argued
previously, since Applbaum (1999, pp. 89–98) shows
that the argument of constituted description fails,
even if a professional is merely following the rules of
his/her professional code of conduct, he/she may
still have a concern that those outside of the pro-
fession can nonetheless judge him/her as a person.
Thus,
H5: Accountants, physicians, and attorneys who
agree that role morality is acceptable are more
likely to disagree that individuals are responsi-
ble for the consequences of their actions in the
workplace.
Research methodology
Participants
Individuals from the three different groups of
accountants, physicians, and attorneys were identi-
fied as potential participants for the study. Various
sources, such as on line yellow pages listings of a
285
large southwestern city and on line state association
listings were used to compile a random sample. A
total of 1,500 questionnaires were sent out, with 500
going to each group. The number of questionnaires
returned and response rates for each group were 189
(37.8%) for accountants, 124 (24.8%) for physicians,
and 121 (24.2%) for attorneys. Sample demographics
are shown in Table I. As shown in Table I, the
majority of the participants in each group were
Caucasian, with physicians showing the most
diversity. In each group there were more male
participants than female participants, with the
accountants having the largest female representation
(41%). There were significant differences across the
samples with respect to both gender (p = 0.0002)
and age (p < 0.0001), with physicians averaging
58.73 years old and accountants averaging
46.50 years old, at the extremes. Consistent with
these age differences, physicians averaged the longest
years with current firm (19.84) and years of work
experience (30.68), while accountants averaged the
least, (10.03 and 23.08, respectively). For the sample
of accountants, analysis of company type showed the
majority of the participants worked in public
accounting (84, 45% of the 185 reporting company
type), with the majority of the remaining partici-
pants indicating ‘‘other’’ (60, 32%). The company
type variable was not significantly correlated with
accountantsÕ responses. Analysis of early versus late
responses across each group of participants revealed
significant differences only for the group of physi-
cians, with late respondents being more likely to
disagree with situations consistent with role moral-
ity. Since this is the general finding for the group of
physicians, it can be assumed that this result would
extend to the remaining sample of non-respondents.
Inclusion of the non-respondents would thus only
strengthen the existing result for the group of phy-
sicians. Thus, results are not affected by sample non-
response bias.
Research questionnaire
The questionnaire survey consisted of three main
sections. The first section included examples of role
morality in various realms such as the law and pol-
itics. In this section participants were asked whether
286 Robin R. Radtke

TABLE I
Sample demographics

Variable Accountants (n = 189) Physicians (n = 124) Attorneys (n = 121)

Gender
Male 112 (59%) 93 (79%) 85 (72%)
Female 77 (41%) 25 (21%) 33 (28%)
Age
Mean 46.50 58.73 50.76
Median 46 57 50
SD 10.98 14.67 10.59
Years with current firm
Mean 10.03 19.84 14.42
Median 7 20 12
SD 8.54 14.03 10.57
Years work experience
Mean 23.08 30.68 24.85
Median 23 30 23
SD 10.49 15.42 11.63
Ethnic Origin
Caucasian 163 (87%) 82 (69%) 93 (79%)
Hispanic 19 (10%) 24 (20%) 21 (18%)
African-American 1 (1%) 3 (2%) 2 (2%)
Native American
Indian or American Eskimo 0 1 (1%) 1 (1%)
Asian or Pacific
Islander 3 (2%) 7 (6%) 0
Other 0 2 (2%) 0

Please note that total responses to each question are not all equal to the total number of participants for each group, as
some participants did not answer all questions.

they personally agreed with the given behaviors that
were consistent with role morality.2 Each of the six
examples of role morality included in this section
was taken specifically from Applbaum (1999).3
Section two asked participants to rate their
agreement with 10 statements based on either con-
cepts associated with role morality or general ethical
concepts. The third section gathered demographic
data. A copy of the questionnaire survey can be
found in Appendix 2.
The questionnaire survey was pre-tested with a
group of 255 undergraduate business students and
their responses are shown in Table II. For data
analysis purposes, responses to the examples of role
morality in section one were coded as either a 1 or
0, with 1 representing agreement with the actions
consistent with role morality and 0 representing
disagreement. The percentage of subjects agreeing
with each situation ranged from a low of 6% for
situation number two dealing with a political
consultant (16 agree and 239 disagree) to a high of
55% for situation number five dealing with a
general (139 agree and 113 disagree). The average
percentage for all six situations was 27%, which is
consistent with general disagreement with the
examples of role morality. The range of responses
across participants varied from at least one partici-
pant disagreeing with all six situations and another
agreeing with all six.
The second section of the questionnaire consisted
of only six questions for pre-testing purposes (instead
of the 10 questions in the final version). Those six
were numbers one, two, four, five, six, and eight
from the final version of the questionnaire. The
 Role Morality in Accounting 287

TABLE II
ParticipantsÕ responses to role morality scenarios

Situation Accountants (n = 189) Physicians (n = 124) Attorneys (n = 121) Students (n = 255)

1. Lawyer – defending a guilty client

Agree 63 (34%) 25 (20%) 94 (78%) 77 (30%)
Disagree 122 (66%) 98 (80%) 26 (22%) 178 (70%)
2. Political consultant – smear campaign
Agree 8 (4%) 5 (4%) 2 (2%) 16 (6%)
Disagree 181 (96%) 119 (96%) 119 (98%) 239 (94%)
3. Executioner – execution of an innocent
Agree 137 (73%) 61 (50%) 81 (68%) 121 (48%)
Disagree 50 (27%) 62 (50%) 38 (32%) 132 (52%)
4. CEO – strategy of secrecy
Agree 17 (9%) 2 (2%) 17 (15%) 22 (9%)
Disagree 170 (91%) 120 (98%) 100 (85%) 233 (91%)
5. General – endangering innocent people
Agree 142 (76%) 80 (65%) 86 (74%) 139 (55%)
Disagree 45 (24%) 43 (35%) 31 (26%) 113 (45%)
6. Doctor – denying patient treatment
Agree 18 (10%) 26 (21%) 11 (9%) 43 (17%)
Disagree 169 (90%) 96 (79%) 106 (91%) 212 (83%)
Total responses
Agree 385 (34%) 199 (27%) 291 (41%) 418 (27%)
Disagree 737 (66%) 538 (73%) 420 (59%) 1107 (73%)

Please note that total responses to each question are not all equal to the total number of participants for each group, as
some participants did not answer all questions.

additional four statements in this section were added
as additional consistency checks and are primarily
repetitive or negative statements of the original six.
Data was coded based on the endpoints of strongly
agree equaling one and strongly disagree equaling
five, as is shown in the survey questionnaire.
Statement five (from the final document) was reverse
coded and the average score for the six items was
calculated. The average score had a possible range of
one to five, with a higher score being more consistent
with role morality. The average total score for the six
items was 1.99, which represents a view relatively
inconsistent with role morality. This score was sig-
nificantly positively correlated with subjectsÕ
responses to the role morality examples at p < 0.0001.
Thus, the correlation between these two measures
indicates consistency in participantsÕ responses across
sections one and two of the survey; participantsÕ
responses to both sections were either consistent or
inconsistent with role morality.
Important for pre-testing purposes are tests of the
reliability of the questionnaire. When designing the
questionnaire, the length of the survey in terms of the
number of examples of role morality was considered to
be critically important in order to garner participation.
The six examples included, however, is too few to
calculate a reliable measure of CronbachÕs alpha. Thus,
the validity of the questionnaire stems from the source
of the examples of role morality (Applbaum, 1999) and
the correlation between the total score for each par-
ticipant for the six examples of role morality discussed
above and the total score from section two. Therefore,
in situations where CronbachÕs alpha is low, or in this
case, not able to be calculated, significant correlations
with other measures can be used to validate the research
questionnaire.
288 Robin R. Radtke

Results TABLE III

2
v analysis of participantsÕ responses to role morality
Table II shows all participantsÕ responses to the role scenarios (v2 and p value)
morality scenarios. Responses to three of the cases
show extreme results of disagreement with role Situation Accountants Accountants,
morality actions, situation two dealing with a political and students physicians, and
consultant and a smear campaign, situation four attorneys
dealing with a CEO adopting a strategy of secrecy, and
1. Lawyer – defending a 0.7356 93.1884
situation six dealing with a doctor denying a patient
guilty client 0.3911 < 0.0001
treatment. Another two situations, situation three
2. Political consultant – 0.8849 1.6442
dealing with an executioner executing an innocent smear campaign 0.3469 0.4395
prisoner and situation five dealing with a general 3. Executioner – 28.6827 18.9446
endangering innocent people, show general agree- execution of an innocent < 0.0001 < 0.0001
ment with actions consistent with role morality. Sit- 4. CEO – strategy of 0.0288 13.0041
uation one, dealing with a lawyer defending a guilty secrecy 0.8652 0.0015
client, shows varying results across the three groups of 5. General – endangering 20.1147 4.5325
accountants, physicians, and attorneys. innocent people < 0.0001 0.1037
6. Doctor – denying 4.7498 10.7334
patient treatment 0.0293 0.0047
Hypothesis testing Total responses 14.5790 31.3216
0.0001 < 0.0001
The first hypothesis of the study asked whether Total for general 28.4377 11.9893
accountants agree that role morality is acceptable. situations (2, 3 & 5) < 0.0001 0.0025
Based on sample responses shown in Table II, the
evidence is varied and apparently dependent on the consistent with role morality than students. Further
type of situation. At the extremes, accountants analysis of individual questions shows this result to
strongly disagreed with the three scenarios men- be driven by questions three and five, dealing with
tioned above dealing with the political consultant the executioner and the general. Results for question
(96%), the CEO (91%), and the doctor (90%), while six are in the opposite direction, indicating that
the vast majority agreed with the general (76%) and accountants agree less than students that a doctor
the executioner (73%). The greatest dispersion of should deny a patient treatment. Thus, on an abso-
responses was in the situation of a lawyer defending a lute basis, there are several situations of role morality
guilty client, with 34% agreeing with the action and that accountants strongly disagree with (situations 2,
66% disagreeing. Overall, accountants agreed that 4 & 6), yet at the same time, accountants agree with
role morality was acceptable across the six situations role morality significantly more than students in the
34% of the time. situations of the executioner and the general (3 & 5).
In order to test hypothesis one, that accountants These mixed results neither support nor reject H1.
disagree that role morality is acceptable, accountantsÕ Hypothesis two investigates differences across the
responses to each situation are compared to responses three groups of accountants, physicians, and attor-
from the pre-test sample of undergraduate business neys.4 Table III shows the results of v2 analyses of
students. The pre-test sample is considered to be a the differences across the three groups. The total
surrogate for the general population of non-profes- responses for all six situations show significant dif-
sionals who do not occupy a role within a profession. ferences, with attorneys agreeing the most with role
This comparison is appropriate since there is no morality and physicians the least. Significant differ-
established standard for role morality behavior against ences also exist at p = 0.01 across the three groups
which to measure the results of the current study. for all situations except the second and fifth, dealing
v2 analyses from Table III shows that the total with a political consultant and a smear campaign and
responses are significantly different between the two a general endangering innocent people. Specifically,
groups, with accountants agreeing more with acts physicians agreed the least with role morality in all
 Role Morality in Accounting
remaining situations except number six, dealing with
a doctor denying a patient treatment. The most
obvious result for all situations is in the first, with
respect to a lawyer defending a guilty client. In this
situation both accountants and physicians primarily
disagreed with this action, while the majority of
lawyers agreed that this action was acceptable. The
last measure shown in Table III is the total responses
for the three general situations, numbers two, three,
and five, which do not deal specifically with the
fields of business, medicine, or law. This measure
was included in the analysis as a baseline value, since
the three situations dealing with the political con-
sultant, the executioner, and the general can be
considered general situations, versus the three spe-
cific situations that relate to the fields of business,
medicine, and law. This measure also shows signif-
icant results, with physicians still agreeing the least
with role morality and accountants now agreeing
with role morality the most.
As mentioned previously, there were significant
differences across the three groups with respect to age
and gender. To control for these variables and further
investigate the differences across groups, logistic
regression analyses with dummy variables represent-
ing membership in either the group of physicians or
attorneys were run for each situation and the two total
response measures.5 Additionally, to address the pos-
sibility that responses to situations of role morality are
simply not another measure of an individualÕs ethical
attitudes, an ethics score made up of the ethics ques-
tions (2, 4, 6 & 8) from section two of the question-
naire was also included in the logistic regression
analyses. Table IV shows the logistic regression results
and is generally consistent with Table III.
Specifically, situation one and the total responses
show significant differences across the three groups
at p = 0.05, with physicians agreeing the least with
role morality and attorneys agreeing the most with
role morality. The total responses for the three
general situations also shows significant differences
across the three groups at p = 0.05, with physicians
still agreeing the least with role morality, but for
these three situations, dealing with the political
consultant, the executioner, and the general,
accountants instead of attorneys agreeing the most
with role morality. As mentioned above, physicians
were less likely than both accountants and attorneys
to agree with actions endangering human life, as is
289
shown by results to situations three and five, dealing
with the executioner and the general. On the other
hand, physicians were more likely to agree with
denying a patient treatment within the context of a
clinical trial, as is shown by situation six. Within
these regressions, the ethical score is also significant
in situations three and six, as well as both total
measures. In these situations, participants who
agreed more with the four ethics questions discussed
above disagreed more with role morality. This sug-
gests that in addition to group membership, partic-
ipantsÕ ethical attitudes may also impact how they
view the acceptability of role morality. Thus, based
on the results of Tables III and IV, H2 is rejected;
significant differences exist in terms of views on the
acceptability of role morality among the groups of
accountants, physicians, and attorneys.6
In order to test hypotheses three and four, dealing
with who bears responsibility for workplace actions
and acts consistent with role morality, the role
morality concept questions in section two of the
survey questionnaire were analyzed. Responses for
these questions are shown in Table V. Questions
three, five, and seven specifically ask whether the
participants agree that a person is responsible for or
should worry about consequences of his/her actions
in the workplace. The mean scores across all three
groups for questions three, five, and seven were
1.42, 2.02, and 1.57, respectively. These values are
significantly different from the middle of the scale
score of three at p < 0.0001, which suggests that all
groups agree that workplace actions and acts con-
sistent with role morality are the responsibility of the
individual, in support of H3.
Hypothesis four investigates whether differences
exist among the three groups with respect to
responsibility for workplace actions and acts consis-
tent with role morality. Analysis of questions three,
five, and seven across the three groups shows only
question three to be significantly different across the
three groups at p = 0.0177, with attorneys agreeing
less with the statement ‘‘A person is responsible for
the consequences of his/her actions in the work-
place.’’ Thus, H4 is neither supported nor rejected.
The fifth hypothesis asks whether accountants,
physicians, and attorneys who agree that role
morality is acceptable are more likely to disagree that
workplace actions and acts consistent with role
morality are the responsibility of the individual.
 TABLE IV
290
Logistic regression analysis of participantsÕ responses to role morality scenarios

Situation Physician dummy Attorney dummy Age Gender Ethical score Psuedo v2 p > v2
Coefficient, z score, (p > | z|) R2

1. Lawyer – defending a guilty client )0.937 1.896 0.021 0.333 0.356 0.1799 99.77 0.0000
)2.97 6.66 2.04 1.29 1.48
(0.003) (0.000) (0.041) (0.196) (0.140)
2. Political consultant – smear campaign 0.088 )0.916 )0.007 0.323 )0.012 0.0166 2.14 0.8298
0.14 )1.13 )0.31 0.52 )0.02
(0.891) (0.257) (0.756) (0.602) (0.983)
3. Executioner – execution of an innocent )1.095 )0.377 0.010 0.203 0.477 0.0409 21.33 0.0007
)3.88 )1.40 1.05 0.84 1.99
(0.000) (0.160) (0.294) (0.400) (0.047)
4. CEO – strategy of secrecy )2.208 0.403 0.034 0.265 )0.182 0.0793 18.88 0.0020
)2.76 1.06 2.07 0.63 )0.46
(0.006) (0.289) (0.039) (0.532) (0.645)
5. General – endangering innocent people )0.709 )0.293 0.014 0.197 0.373 0.0206 9.86 0.0794
)2.43 )1.04 1.40 0.79 1.48
Robin R. Radtke

(0.015) (0.297) (0.162) (0.431) (0.139)

6. Doctor – denying patient treatment 0.927 )0.070 0.005 )0.609 0.816 0.0551 16.44 0.0057
2.36 )0.16 0.40 )1.78 2.62
(0.018) (0.869) (0.691) (0.075) (0.009)
Total responses )0.954 0.542 0.018 0.179 0.520 0.0333 47.56 0.0000
)4.01 2.48 2.27 0.90 2.66
(0.000) (0.013) (0.023) (0.370) (0.008)
Total for general situations (2, 3 & 5) )0.963 )0.479 0.011 )0.213 0.425 0.0221 21.14 0.0008
)3.79 )2.07 1.34 )0.99 2.02
(0.000) (0.039) (0.182) (0.324) (0.044)

Question response = b1PDUMMY + b2ADUMMY + b3AGE + b4GENDER + b5ETHICAL SCORE +n.

 Role Morality in Accounting 291

TABLE V
ParticipantsÕ responses to concept questions

Mean, Median, SD
Concept question Accountants Physicians Attorneys
(n = 189) (n = 124) (n = 121)

1. A person should complete the duties associated 1.44, 1, 0.60 1.45, 1, 0.65 1.41, 1, 0.54
with his/her job
2. A person should avoid harming others in any way 1.74, 2, 0.82 1.50, 1, 0.76 1.70, 1, 0.91
3. A person is responsible for the consequences of 1.35, 1, 0.52 1.35, 1, 0.63 1.59, 1, 0.77
his/her actions in the workplace
4. A person should do the morally right thing 1.37, 1, 0.53 1.24, 1, 0.65 1.50, 1, 0.70
5. A person should not worry about consequences 1.96, 2, 1.09 2.00, 2, 1.13 2.14, 2, 1.15
to others when performing his/her job
6. A person should treat others with respect 1.19, 1, 0.39 1.34, 1, 0.78 1.25, 1, 1.49
7. A person is not responsible for his/her actions in 1.52, 1, 0.70 1.51, 1, 0.64 1.71, 2, 0.91
the workplace, since workplace roles are defined
by society
8. A person should follow the golden rule – do unto 1.63, 1, 0.91 1.59, 1, 0.84 1.76, 2, 0.75
others as you would have them do unto you
9. A person is responsible for the consequences of 1.26, 1, 0.48 1.38, 1, 0.61 1.49, 1, 0.68
his/her actions in everyday life
10. A person should not judge what others do within 2.64, 2, 1.12 2.50, 2, 1.10 2.50, 2, 1.03
their workplace roles
Average of all 10 questions 1.61, 1.58, 0.35 1.59, 1.58, 0.40 1.71, 1.70, 0.38
Average of ethical concept questions (2, 4, 6 & 8) 1.49, 1.50, 0.45 1.43, 1.25, 0.50 1.55, 1.50, 0.47

Please note that the endpoints of the measurement scale were 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree. Since
questions 5, 7, and 10 were reverse coded, responses to all questions can be interpreted as a lower score being inconsistent
with role morality and a higher score being consistent with role morality.

Correlation analysis for the entire sample shows that
questions three, five, and seven are only highly
correlated with situation one, at p = 0.0030,
p = 0.0002, and p = 0.0224, respectively. Thus,
only with respect to the situation of a lawyer
defending a guilty client, are individuals who agree
that role morality is acceptable more likely to dis-
agree that workplace actions and acts consistent with
role morality are the responsibility of the individual.
This suggests that in the majority of the situations,
hypothesis five is rejected.
Discussion
role morality in situations dealing with a political
consultant (96%), a CEO (91%), and a doctor (90%),
while a simple majority disagrees with role morality
in a situation dealing with a lawyer (66%).
Additionally, significant differences exist in terms of
views on the acceptability of role morality among
the groups of accountants, physicians, and attorneys.
Specifically, when all six-role morality situations are
included in the analysis, physicians agree the least
with role morality, while attorneys agree the most.7
Additional analysis suggests that all three groups
generally agree that acts consistent with role morality
are the responsibility of the individual.

Results of this preliminary analysis suggest that

Implications
accountants generally do not agree with role
morality in the majority of the situations investi-
This evidence implies that while accountants generally
gated. In particular, the vast majority disagrees with
do not agree with many situations of role morality, they
292 Robin R. Radtke
still exhibit views that are more lenient than both the
pre-test sample of students and the sample of physicians
in many cases. Results of the current study represent a
new avenue of investigation into analyzing accountantsÕ
ethical decision making. While many previous studies
have focused on the Defining Issues Test and its rela-
tionship to various types of decisions and behavior (see
Louwers et al. (1997), for a review of these studies), this
study is the first to incorporate the theory of role
morality. Results of this study suggest that accountants
generally do not agree with role morality and, consis-
tent with this result, agree that individuals are respon-
sible for their actions in the workplace.
In comparing responses across the three groups,
it is interesting to analyze the three situations
specific to the areas of business, medicine, and
law. Specifically, physicians agree with actions
consistent with role morality significantly more
than the other two groups in situation six, dealing
with a physician, and attorneys agree with actions
consistent with role morality significantly more
than the other two groups in situation one, deal-
ing with an attorney. In situation four, dealing
with a CEO, however, accountants were in be-
tween the responses of physicians and attorneys,
with physicians agreeing less and attorneys agree-
ing more with the actions consistent with role
morality. Another interesting result is that in two
of the more general situations (three and five,
dealing with the executioner and the general,
respectively), physicians disagreed significantly
more than both accountants and attorneys with
actions consistent with role morality that resulted
in physical harm or death to others.
These findings suggest that members of each
profession may be somewhat sensitized in terms of
certain specific issues related to their roles. The
definition of role morality suggests that this type of
behavior is to be expected; individuals may feel it is
acceptable to act a certain way that results in harm to
others within their role that is considered to be
unacceptable outside of the role. Given these results,
it seems that each profession may need to focus on
understanding why they as a group feel that certain
behavior is acceptable, while others outside of the
group view the behavior as unacceptable. This is
particularly relevant since all groups agreed that it is
the individual who is responsible for his/her actions
in the workplace. As mentioned previously, each
group is concerned with continuing efforts to pro-
mote ethics education within their profession, which
may be beneficial in addressing this issue.
Future studies could attempt to investigate in
more detail the reasons for justification of actions
within oneÕs profession or role. One possibility is
the theory of self-selection bias, wherein individuals
self select into certain professions on the basis of
personal characteristics. For example, previous re-
search (Lampe, 1994; Lampe and Finn, 1992)
suggests that accountants may self-select into a rule-
based profession in which deviation from the rules
is discouraged. Presumably, this bias may apply to
other professions as well and may also explain why
individuals choose not to enter certain fields. As
one accountant wrote in on the survey next to the
first question dealing with a lawyer, ‘‘The lawyer
did correctly and I could not practice law due to
required actions.’’ It may be that certain individuals
are predisposed to be able to tolerate the general
undesirable stigma associated with certain profes-
sions. Correlations with personality variables (such
as measures of personality type or measures of
ethical or risk attitudes, for example) may add in-
sight into understanding this potential explanation
of the phenomenon of role morality.
Another avenue of investigation could incorpo-
rate more accounting specific examples of role
morality. The current study specifically used exam-
ples from Applbaum (1999). All of these examples
were relatively general in nature and could be easily
understood by all survey participants. Use of more
accounting specific examples could lend more in-
sights into types of accounting situations in which an
accountant may be susceptible to the pressures of
role morality, such as the earnings management
example discussed previously. Future studies could
also attempt to identify any cross cultural differences
with respect to views on role morality or could use
experimental settings to more closely evaluate par-
ticipantsÕ responses under a more controlled setting.
Concluding remarks
Results of this study should be interpreted with
caution due to several limitations. First, the survey
elicited responses to six specific situations of role
morality. Responses to these specific situations may
 Role Morality in Accounting
not be representative of responses to other types of
situations involving role morality. Second, partici-
pants may not have perceived that the situations
dealt with role morality. Although the situations
met the definition of role morality advanced earlier
in the paper quite specifically, it is difficult to
predict how participants may have interpreted the
situations. Third, the sample was drawn from one
large southwestern metropolitan area, which limits
the generalizability of the results. Additionally,
limitations typically associated with exploratory
research and survey questionnaires apply to this
study as well.
Notwithstanding these limitations, results of this
study support the premise that while accountants
generally do not agree with role morality, they still
exhibit views that are more lenient than both the
pre-test sample of students and the sample of phy-
sicians in many cases. Future investigation of more
accounting specific examples of role morality may
aid in understanding the types of situations under
which an accountant may feel susceptible to the
pressures of role morality.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge the helpful
comments of Jim Groff, Marshall Pitman, workshop
participants at the University of Central Florida, the
University of North Carolina Greensboro, the Univer-
sity of Texas at San Antonio, Villanova University,
York University, and conference participants at the
2003 ABO Research Conference. The capable research
assistance of Brian Daugherty is also recognized.
Appendix 1
Excerpts from professionals codes
The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA,
2003) includes:
Principles of Professional Conduct
Rules: Applicability and Definitions
Independence, Integrity, and Objectivity
General Standards Accounting Principles
Responsibilities to Clients
Responsibilities to Colleagues
Other Responsibilities and Practices
293
ET Appendices
ET Topical Index (where ET stands for ethics)
The AMA Code of Medical Ethics (AMA, 2003)
lists as itÕs major topic headings:
Opinions on Social Policy Issues
Opinions on Interprofessional Relations
Opinions on Hospital Relations
Opinions on Confidentiality, Advertising,
and Communications Media Relations
Opinions on Fees and Charges
Opinions on Physician Records
Opinions on Practice Matters
Opinions on Professional Rights and Responsi-
bilities, and
Opinions on the Patient-Physician Relationship
Clarification of Opinion 8.032, ‘‘Conflicts of Inter-
est: Health Facility Ownership by a Physician.’’
Clarification of Opinion 8.061, ‘‘Gifts to Physi-
cians from Industry.’’
Clarification of Opinions 8.062, ‘‘Sale of Non-
Health-Related Goods from PhysiciansÕ Offi-
ces,’’ and 8.063, ‘‘Sale of Health-Related Goods
from PhysiciansÕ Offices.’’
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(ABA, 2003) lists rules and comments on:
The Client-Lawyer Relationship
Addressing issues of competence, diligence,
communication, fees, confidentiality, conflict of
interest, safekeeping property, declining repre-
sentation, sale of a law practice
The Lawyer as Counsel
The LawyerÕs role as advisor and intermediary
The Lawyer as Advocate
On meritorious claims, expediting litigation, fair-
ness and impartiality, trial publicity, the lawyer as
witness, special responsibilities of a prosecutor
Transactions with Persons Other than Clients
Dealing and communicating with third parties
and unrepresented persons
Law Firms and Associations
Examining the right to practice and your
responsibilities towards partners, associates, and
nonlawyer assistants, unauthorized practice of
law, restrictions on right to practice
Public Services
294 Robin R. Radtke

Pro bono service and other community activities
Information about Legal Services
Advertising and other communications with
prospective clients
Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession
Disciplinary and misconduct matters, including
information on political contributions to obtain le-
gal engagements or appointments by judges
Appendices include tables correlating the Rules
with the Code, and an updated subject index.
Appendix 2
Questionnaire
Part I
Please indicate your personal agreement or disagree-
ment with the actions taken in each of the following
situations.
1. A lawyer knows his client is guilty – the client
confessed to him. The client is potentially
dangerous if released back into public life. The
lawyer ardently defends his client and wins his
release from jail._____ I agree with the law-
yerÕs actions._____ I disagree with the law-
yerÕs actions.
2. A political consultant knowingly runs a
smear campaign against her candidateÕs
political opponent in which she willfully
distorts the opponentÕs record in order
to smear the opponentÕs reputation in
the eyes of the voters. Her candidate is
victorious in the election._____ I agree
with the political consultantÕs ac-
tions._____ I disagree with the political
consultantÕs actions.
3. A prisoner has been found guilty and
sentenced to death. The prisoner has main-
tained his innocence and the executioner
personally has his doubts as to whether the
prisoner actually committed the crime. At
the designated time, he executes the pris-
oner._____ I agree with the executionerÕs
actions._____ I disagree with the execu-
tionerÕs actions.
4. A company is on the verge of filing for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.
The CEO engages in a strategy of secrecy so
that creditors, customers, workers, and stock-
holders believe the company may continue
to be a viable entity. The company subse-
quently files for bankruptcy._____ I agree
with the CEOÕs actions._____ I disagree
with the CEOÕs actions.

Strongly Strongly
Agree Agree Unsure Disagree Disagree

1. A person should complete the 1 2 3 4 5

duties associated with his/her job
2. A person should avoid harming others in any way 1 2 3 4 5
3. A person is responsible for the consequences 1 2 3 4 5
of his/her actions in the workplace
4. A person should do the morally right thing 1 2 3 4 5
5. A person should not worry about consequences 1 2 3 4 5
to others when performing his/her job
6. A person should treat others with respect 1 2 3 4 5
7. A person is not responsible for his/her actions 1 2 3 4 5
in the workplace, since workplace roles are defined by society
8. A person should follow the golden rule – do 1 2 3 4 5
unto others as you would have them do unto you
9. A person is responsible for the consequences of 1 2 3 4 5
his/her actions in everyday life
10. A person should not judge what others 1 2 3 4 5
do within their workplace roles
 Role Morality in Accounting
5. A country is at war and a general is or-
dered to commence an attack on a village
where suspected rebels may be in hiding.
The general is aware that many innocent
men, women, and children may also be in-
jured or killed in the attack. The general
carries out the attack as ordered._____ I
agree with the generalÕs actions._____ I
disagree with the generalÕs actions.
6. A doctor at a research clinic is in the process of
conducting a clinical trial. During the course of
the clinical trial the doctor realizes that one of
the patients involved would benefit from an
alternative course of treatment. The patient has
been involved in the trial for quite some time,
however, and losing this patient may jeopardize
the results of the trial. The doctor continues
treating the patient in the method prescribed
by the clinical trial._____ I agree with the doc-
torÕs actions._____ I disagree with the doc-
torÕs actions.
Part II
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with
each of the following statements on the 5 point scale
provided, where 1 is strongly agree, 2 is agree, 3 is
unsure, 4 is disagree, and 5 is strongly disagree.
Part III
Position/Title:
______________________________________
Number of years with current firm:
_____________
Number of years work experience:
_______________
Age: __________
Gender: _____ Female _____ Male
Company type: (Only for Accountants)
Public Accounting _____
Oil and Gas_____
Government or
Not for Profit_____
Banking_____
Manufacturing_____
Other (please specify)
_____________________________
295
Ethnic origin:
Caucasian (non Hispanic)_____
Hispanic _____
African-American_____
Native American Indian
or American Eskimo_____
Asian or Pacific Islander_____
Other (please specify)
______________________________
Please write any comments you have with respect to
this questionnaire. Thank you for your participation
in this study!
Notes
1
According to Velasquez (2002, p. 11) moral standards
are those ‘‘that deal with matters that we think are of serious
consequence, are based on good reasons and not on author-
ity, override self-interest, are based on impartial consider-
ations, and whose transgression is associated with feelings of
guilt and shame and with a special moral vocabulary.’’
2
Participants were asked whether they personally agreed
with the actions taken that are consistent with role moral-
ity. This emphasis in wording was added as a result of
pretesting wherein some participants asked whether they
should respond from their own point of view or from the
point of view of the person described in the situation.
3
Each of the six examples of role morality was taken
specifically from Applbaum (1999) to ensure that each
met the definition he proposed. Specifically, examples
one and two about a lawyer and a political consultant
are on page 3, example three about an executioner is
on page 15, example four about a CEO is on page 183,
example five about a general is on page 65, and exam-
ple six about a doctor is on page 48.
4
Please note that for all subsequent data analyses, the
group of students is no longer included, since hypothe-
ses two through five only deal with the groups of
accountants, physicians, and attorneys.
5
Ordinary least squares regressions were also run for
each regression in Table IV. Results are qualitatively the
same and are omitted from the paper for the sake of
brevity.
6
It is interesting to note that responses to concept questions
number 3 and 9 in Table V support this result. The means of
the two questions were compared for each of the three
groups using a univariate test. The mean for each difference
was significantly different from zero for each group; how-
ever, these differences were not all in the same direction. For
physicians, they agreed significantly more with the statement,
296 Robin R. Radtke
that, ‘‘A person is responsible for the consequences of his/her
actions in the workplace’’, while for accountants and attor-
neys, they agreed significantly more with the statement, that,
‘‘A person is responsible for the consequences of his/her ac-
tions in everyday life.’’ This is consistent with physicians
agreeing the least with role morality. Responses to concept
question 10 are somewhat inconsistent with this result, how-
ever, in that all three groups were not as convinced as they
were on the other nine concept questions that they should
disagree with the statement ‘‘A person should not judge what
others do within their workplace roles.’’ Finally, even though
all three groups were in overall disagreement with the six role
morality statements (66% for accountants, 73% for physicians,
and 59% for attorneys), they were in general agreement with
concept question number 1, which states, ‘‘ A person should
complete the duties associated with his/her job.’’
7
One attorney mirrored this result with his written
comment on the survey, ‘‘Lawyers generally have the
unique ability to rationalize their work related actions
in order to appease their moral conscience.’’
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Department of Accounting,
Barry Kaye College of Business,
Florida Atlantic University,
500 N.W. California Blvd,
Port St. Lucie,
FL, 34986,
U.S.A.