Consolidated Rural Bank of Cagayan Valley v. CA, GR No.

13216
FACTS: The Madrid brothers were the registered owners of Lot A situated in Isabela.
Said lot was subdivided into several lots. Rizal Madrid sold part of his share identified lot A-7 to Gamiao
and Dayag by virtue of a Deed of Sale, to which his brothers offered no objection as evidenced by
their Joint Affidavit .The deed of sale was not registered with the ORD of Isabela. However, Gamiao and
Dayag declared the property in their names on a Tax Declaration.
Gamiao and Dayag sold the subject southern half of lot to Teodoro dela Cruz, and the northern half to
Hernandez.Thereupon, Teodoro dela Cruz and Hernandez took possession of and cultivated the portions
of the property respectively sold to them (Later Restituto Hernandez donated the northern half to his
daughter. The children of Teodoro dela Cruz continued possession of the southern half after their
father’s death.)
In a Deed of Sale the Madrid brothers conveyed all their rights and interests over lot A-7 to Marquez
which the former confirmed. The deed of sale was registered with the ORD of Isabela.
Subsequently, Marquez subdivided lot A-7 into eight (8) lots. On the same date, Marquez and his
spouse, Mercedita Mariana, mortgaged 4 lots to the Consolidated Rural Bank, Inc. of Cagayan Valley
(hereafter, CRB) to secure a loan. These deeds of real estate mortgage were registered with the ORD.

As Marquez defaulted in the payment of his loan, CRB caused the foreclosure of the mortgages in its
favor and the lots were sold to it as the highest bidder.

The Heirs-now respondents filed a case for reconveyance and damages for the southern portion of Lot
No. 7036-A (hereafter, the subject property) against Marquez and CRB.

The RTC handed down a decision in favor of Marquez. The Heirs interposed an appeal with the CA,
which upheld the claim of the Heirs. Hence, the instant CRB petition.

ISSUE: WON Art. 1544 of the Civil Code (double sale) applicable in this case

HELD: NO. The petition is denied, and the decision as modified is affirmed. Like the lower court, the
appellate court resolved the present controversy by applying the rule on double sale provided in Article
1544 of the Civil Code. They, however, arrived at different conclusions. The RTC made CRB and the other
defendants win, while the Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of the Heirs.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code reads, thus:

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.

The provision is not applicable in the present case. It contemplates a case of double or multiple sales by
a single vendor. It cannot be invoked where the two different contracts of sale are made by two
different persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold. And even if the sale was made
by the same person, if the second sale was made when such person was no longer the owner of the
property, because it had been acquired by the first purchaser in full dominion, the second purchaser
cannot acquire any right.

In the case at bar, the subject property was not transferred to several purchasers by a single vendor. In
the first deed of sale, the vendors were Gamiao and Dayag whose right to the subject property
originated from their acquisition thereof from Rizal Madrid with the conformity of all the other Madrid
brothers. On the other hand, the vendors in the other or later deed were the Madrid brothers but at
that time they were no longer the owners since they had long before disposed of the property in favor
of Gamiao and Dayag.

In a situation where not all the requisites are present which would warrant the application of Art. 1544,
the principle ofprior tempore, potior jure or simply “he who is first in time is preferred in right, should
apply.” The only essential requisite of this rule is priority in time; in other words, the only one who can
invoke this is the first vendee. Undisputedly, he is a purchaser in good faith because at the time he
bought the real property, there was still no sale to a second vendee. In the instant case, the sale to the
Heirs by Gamiao and Dayag, who first bought it from Rizal Madrid, was anterior to the sale by the
Madrid brothers to Marquez. The Heirs also had possessed the subject property first in time. Thus,
applying the principle, the Heirs, without a scintilla of doubt, have a superior right to the subject
property.
Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have¾nemo dat quod
non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can
acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally.53 In this case, since the Madrid brothers were
no longer the owners of the subject property at the time of the sale to Marquez, the latter did not
acquire any right to it.

Martinez v. CA, GR No. 123547

Fudot v. Cattleya Land Inc., GR No. 175942

Facts: Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as respondent) asked someone
to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it intended to buy from
the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on the titles, respondent purchased the
nine lots through a Deed of Conditional Sale on 6 November 1992. Subsequently, on 30 August 1993,
respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties. The Deed of
Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were registered with the Register of Deeds on 06
November 1992 and 04 October 1993, respectively. The Register of Deeds refused to actually annotate
the deed of sale on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol. The attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement
between the Tecsons and their attaching creditor which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of
the nine (9) lots were issued, but the Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3)
lots , because the titles covering the same were still unaccounted for.
Later, respondent learned that the Register of Deeds had already registered the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner and issued a new title herein.
The respondent filed its Complaintfor Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership, Cancellation Of
Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.

Issue: Is the issuance of Deed of Sale valid?

Held: On 31 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision: (i) quieting the title or ownership of the
subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and spouses
Tecson invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent; (iv) dismissing
respondent’s claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence; (v)
dismissing Asuncion’s claim for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi) dismissing
petitioner’s counterclaim for lack of the required preponderance of evidence.

Amancio, et al. v CA, GR No. 152627

Mercado v. Allied Bank, GR No. 171460

Facts:
Perla executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of her husband, Julian D. Mercado (Julian)
over several pieces of real property registered under her name, authorizing the latter to perform the
following acts: 1. To act in my behalf, to sell, alienate, mortgage, lease and deal otherwise over the
different parcels of land described hereinafter x x x 2. To sign for and in my behalf any act of strict
dominion or ownership any sale, disposition, mortgage, lease or any other transactions including quit-
claims, waiver and relinquishment of rights x x x 3. To exercise any or all acts of strict dominion or
ownership over the above-mentioned properties, rights and interest therein. On the strength of the
aforesaid SPA, Julian obtained a loan from the respondent. Still using the subject property as security,
Julian obtained an additional loan from the respondent. It appears, however, that there was no property
identified in the SPA and registered with the Registry of Deeds. What was identified in the SPA instead
was the property different from the one used as security for loan. Julian defaulted on the payment of his
loan obligations. Thus, respondent initiated extra- judicial foreclosure proceedings over the
subject property which was subsequently sold at public auction wherein the respondent was declared as
the highest bidder. Petitioners initiated an action for the annulment of REM constituted over the subject
property on the ground that the same was not covered by the SPA and that the said SPA, at the time the
loan obligations were contracted, no longer had force and effect since it was previously revoked by
Perla. In the absence of authority to do so, the REM constituted by Julian over the subject property was
null and void; thus, petitioners likewise prayed that the subsequent extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings and the auction sale of the subject property be also nullified.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there was a valid mortgage constituted over subject property.
Rulings:
(1) In the case at bar, it was Julian who obtained the loan obligations from respondent which he secured
with the mortgage of the subject property. The property mortgaged was owned by his wife, Perla,
considered a third party to the loan obligations between Julian and respondent. It was, thus, a situation
recognized by the last paragraph of Article 2085 of the Civil Code that third persons who are not parties
to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. There is
no question therefore that Julian was vested with the power to mortgage the pieces of property
identified in the SPA, however, the
subject property was not among those enumerated therein. Julian was not conferred by Perla with thea
uthority to mortgage the subject property under the terms of the SPA, the real estate mortgages Julian
executed over the said property are therefore unenforceable.

Gabriel v. Mabanta, GR No. 142403

FACTS:
On October 25, 1975 spouses Mabanta mortgaged 2 parcels of land with the DBP as collateral for a
P14,000 loan. In 1980, they sold the lots to Susana Soriano with the right to repurchase the property
within 2 years. They failed to do repurchase. In 1984, they convinced petitioner Alejandro Gabriel to
purchase the lot from Soriano as a result, DBP had to restructure the loan making Gabriel as the
mortgagor. In 1982 however, one lot was sold to Zenaida Tan-Reyes by the spouses Mabanta who in
turn filed an intervention to the case after not being a party in the instant case. As a result, the
petitioners filed for damages, and specific performance which the trial court ruled in their favor holding
that the sale between the spouses Mabanta and Tan-Reyes null and void. On appeal, the CA modified
the trial court’s decision holding that the second sale was indeed valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second sale in 1982 to Tan-Reyes is valid.
HELD:
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that should immovable property be sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall belong to the first person in good faith to record it in the registry of property.
Unfortunately, the registration made by Zenaida Tan-Reyes of her deed of sale was not in good faith,
and for this reason in accordance with the same Article 1544, the land shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in possession. There is no question that it is the Gabriels who are in possession of
the land.

Lichauco v. Berenguer, GR No. L-5933

Paragas v. Heirs of Dominador Balacano, 468 SCRA 717

Facts: Gregorio Balacano was married to Lorenza Sumigcay and owned two parcels of land located in
Santiago City, Isabela. They had three children, namely, Domingo, Catalino and Alfredo. Gregorio, who
was the seriously ill, was admitted at the hospital for liver cirrhosis, and was confined therein until his
death on July 19, 1996. Lorenza died on December 1991. Prior to his death, Gregorio purportedly sold a
portion of Lot 1175-E and the whole Lot 1175-F to spouses Paragas for a total consideration of
P500,000. The spouses Paragas then sold a portion of Lot 1175-E to Catalino for P60,000. Domingo’s
children, herein respondents Dominic, Rodolfo, Nanette and Cyric, filed a complaint for the annulment
of the sale and partition against Catalino and spouses Paragas. They claimed that their grandfather
Gregorio could not have appeared before the notary public on July 22, 1996 at Santiago City because he
was confined at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City and at the same time, seriously ill and dying.

Issue: WoN the deed of sale purportedly executed by the petitioners and the late Gregorio was null and
void

Held: Yes. The irregular and invalid notarization of the deed is a falsity that raises doubts on the
regularity of the transaction itself. While the deed was indeed signed on July 18, 1996, the deed states
otherwise, as it shows that the deed was executed on July 22, 1996 at Santiago City. Why such falsity
was committed, and the circumstances under which this falsity was committed, speaks of volume about
the regularity and the validity of the sale. Article 24 of the Civil Code tells us that in all contractual,
property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be
vigilant for his protection. Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Gregorios
consent to the sale of the lots was absent, making the contract null and void. Consequently, the spouses
Paragas could not have made a subsequent transfer of the property to Catalino Balacano. Indeed, nemo
dat quod non habet. Nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.

Macarandang v. Marinez, 450 SCRA 363

Premier Development Bank v. CA, 453 SCRA 630