ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v.

CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

Facts:

The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due process
clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose,
in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated
to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in
the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional

Held: No.

Rationale:

The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power
which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."

It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.

In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties
however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is
subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in question.

*** Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery.

HON. RENATO C. CORONA VS UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997

Facts:

Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92) provides that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in
all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly
renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.

PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 whose avowed policy was to instill effective
discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services.

On Aug 12, 1992, respondent, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the
Dept of Transportation and Communication.

On December 23, 1992, the Office of the President (OP) issued an order directing the PPA to hold abeyance the implementation
of the said administrative order. PPA countered that the said order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and
supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6, Article I of P.D. 857.

On March 17, 1993, the OP, through Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona, dismissed the appeal and
lifted the restraining order issued. He concluded that the said order applied to all harbor pilots and, for all
intents and purposes, was not an act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing P.D. 857,
mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and damages before the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: WON Administrative Order No.04-92 is constitutional

Held: NO

The Court is convinced that PPA No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right against
deprivation of property without due process law. The Supreme Court said that in order to fall within the aegis
of the provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is
done without proper observance of due process.

Neither does that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative
order. As general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirement of procedural due process, are
essential only when administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an Administrative body needs to
comply with the requirement of notice and hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. It is readily apparent that
the said administrative order unduly restricts the right of harbour pilots to enjoy their profession before their right of
harbor pilots to enjoy their respective profession before their compulsory retirement.

Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of the Philippines

Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process

FACTS: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It
was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonete’s house who was then the
mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later
moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue
was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same
being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented
that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions
were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity
between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires
that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so
construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case
is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

NOTES:

Due process in criminal proceedings

(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it;

(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;

(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and

(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court

“Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:

“(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.

“(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance
of any provisional remedy in the case.

“(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of
justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

“(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs
the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.

“(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly.”

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

.R. No. 74457 – 148 SCRA 659 – Political Law – Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from one province to another but
as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate
to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred that EO 626-A was unconstitutional for it
violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot
ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down
the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other
does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940

G.R. NO. L-46496 FEBRUARY 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National
Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off
were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were
laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went
to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence
in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay
which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court
must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due
process can be complied with by observing the following:

 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Case Digest #1-8 | GR No. L-68288 | Guzman Vs NU

FACTS:

Students Diosadado Guzman, Ulyses Urbiztondo, and Ariel Ramacula seeks relief from what they describe as

their school’s ” continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol”

BACKGROUND:

August 7, 1984 Students prayed for preliminary mandatory injunction for the refusal of the National Universty to

let them enrol.

September 24, 1984 University president replied that the petitioners failure to enrol for the first semester of SY

84-85 is due to their own fault because the enrollment was already closed and that DeGuzman and

Ramacula’s academic showing was “poor” and they have failures in their records and are not of good

scholastic standing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a school or university have the right to deny acceptance of students without due process.

HELD:
The 3 students were allowed by the court to enrol. The court declared illegal the University’s act of imposing

sanctions on students without due investigation.

RULING:

Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, have the right among others “to freely choose their field of

study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course up to graduation except in case of academic

deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.”

Petitioners were being denied this right , or being disciplined without due process, in violation of the admonition

in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that ” no penalty shall be imposed upon any student

except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and

only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”

NOTES:

Minimun standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process:

1. The Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusations against them.

2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired.

3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them.

4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf.

5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school

authorities to hear and decide the case.

Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports

153 SCRA 622
Nature of Particular Acts

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The herein respondent Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other
School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to
the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the
report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an Order
authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. The
petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground that the increases were too
high. Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order
and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly.

Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed
the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department
Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any
legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing
before the said Department Order was issued.

In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate
school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase
school fees.

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that
should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner
stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fixing of school fees through department order by DECS is a valid delegation of
legislative power

RULING: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school
fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the
power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and
duties under the law.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or
rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively
to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The
assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in
the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity
of its issuance.

RATIO: Fixing rates and charges. - As regards rates prescribes by an administrative agency in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.

Case No.
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
Yap, J.
FACTS: Antonio de los Reyes filed with the Legal Panel of Presidential Security Command charges of alleged
violations of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action
was taken on said report. Five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his
resignation. Antonio de los Reyes again filed a complaint with the same charges. The Tanodbayan acted on
the complaint in April 1980 by referring the complaint to the CIS, PSC, for investigation and report. In June
1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 1982, all affidavits and
counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only in July
1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the corresponding
criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan in June 1985, all against petitioner Tatad. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably
violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged
commission of the purported offenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution’s long delay in the preliminary investigation had deprived petitioner of
his constitutional right to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
RULING: YES. We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence
to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad
umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases
as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by
the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that
"the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure
to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not
involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would
justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating
to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial
legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case. It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does
not warrant dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of a a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

People vs. Cayat

FACTS:

The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province was sentenced by the justice of the
peace of court of Baguio for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3)

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian
tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have
in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other
than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it
shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial,
municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in
the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

At the trial, cayat admitted all the facts alleged in the information that on or about the January 25, 1937, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cayat, being a member of the
non-Christian tribes, did receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one
bottle of A gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of
such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639, but pleaded not
guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial
court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him,

The case was appealed and the accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following ground:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

Issue:

Whether or not there is discriminatory and denial of equal protection of the laws
 Held:

The Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony;
to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light
that the Act must be understood and applied.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable,

(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage, but upon the degree
of civilization and culture.

"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities."

The Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional
cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their
Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-
called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make
prior to the passage of this Act.

It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience
of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the
non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply
for all times as long as those conditions exist

The Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must
go measures of protection and security.

PEOPLE VS. VERA (193 7) | EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

February 5, 2017

G.R. No. 45685, 65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937

Doctrine: Requites for a valid class legislation: (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.

Facts:
1. Private respondent (Cu-Unjieng) was convicted of a criminal charge by trial court of Manila.
2. He filed several motions for reconsideration or new trial but was denied. On 1936, the SC remanded the
case to the original court of origin for the execution of judgment.
3. While waiting for the new trial, he appealed to Insular Probation Office (IPO) for probation but was denied.
4. However, Judge Vera, upon another request by petitioner, allowed the petition to be set for hearing for
probation.
5. Petitioners then filed a case to Judge Vera for the latter has no power to place the petitioner under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221 (i.e., the grant to the provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person.)
Petitioner’s contentions:
1. Judge Vera has no power to place the petitioner under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 of the
Act 4221 because nowhere it states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
2. Assuming if includes cities, it violates equal protection clause for being an invalid classification because its
applicability is not uniform throughout the country for each provincial board has its own discretion to provide
or not to provide a probation system, allocate funds for the probation officers based on the discretion of each
provincial boards as regards their own locality, etc.
Issue: WON the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
Held:
 YES, the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
 Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.
 In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power. Each provincial board has its own discretion to provide or not to
provide a probation system, allocate funds for the probation officers based on the discretion of each
provincial boards as regards their own locality, etc. What if the other province decides not to adopt
probation system, or it decides not to have salary for the probation officer?
 it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed. Section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal
protection of the law and is on that account bad.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally
in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment,
in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to
all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the
right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations.
It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and
irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8,
1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged
"guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is
whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster
the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits." 6

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along
with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State
"to govern its citizens." 8

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the
"law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights
and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's
will." 11 It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further
private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.

As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary, the presumption logically stands.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution 15does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class. 16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor
force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few
cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers,
even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives
for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.

The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except
perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The
petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers.
The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What
the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-
treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government
acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court
accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no
evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this
Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.

As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a
republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper
cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws,
but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for
determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically
given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no
gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1
implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in
spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a
deployment ban.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino
female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina
workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as
those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal
measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive
at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it
is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it
provides:

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of Filipino workers. 19

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers.
That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been
given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all
of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or
group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair
advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A,
but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would
be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be
an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid
act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as
infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its
validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There
would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to
their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult
to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords
protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)

It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From
scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:
 5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar
skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are
exempted from the suspension.

5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and

Government;

5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government
officials; and

5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited
international organizations.

5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic]
bilateral labor agreements or understanding.

xxx xxx xxx

7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing

domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and
leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially
served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall
be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines.

xxx xxx xxx

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon

recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare

and protection of Filipino workers. 24

xxx xxx xxx

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is
subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department
Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor
Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but
as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an
authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of
Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. 28

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again,
must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.

The Constitution declares that:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
30
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the
country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs
at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have
adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has
evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and
as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not
contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the
Solicitor General.

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes
targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from
restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.

This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The
concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary
sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to
provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its
intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the
extraordinary relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and
Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.