[G.R. No. 137136.
November 3, 1999] Hence, on August 6, 1993, PR filed a complaint against
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. CAMILLE T. CRUZ
and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts:
PR Camille T. Cruz, then a teenage girl who would be travelling
alone for the first time, purchased from P Northwest Airlines a round-
trip ticket for a flight from Manila to Boston via Tokyo and back. The
scheduled departure date from Manila to Boston was August 27,
1992 at 8:40 a.m. in economy class while the scheduled return flight
from Boston to Manila in business class was on December 22, 1992
at 10:25 a.m.
On November 25, 1992, PR re-scheduled her return flight from
Boston to Manila to December 17, 1992 at 10:05 a.m. Accordingly, P
booked her on a Northwest flight with route as follows: Boston to
Chicago; Chicago to Tokyo; and, Tokyo to Manila.
P reconfirmed the flight from Boston, U.S.A. to Manila
scheduled on December 17, 1992 at least 72 hours prior to the said
scheduled flight.
However, barely a day before the scheduled date of departure,
P called PR and informed her that instead of following her original
itinerary, PR should instead board the TWA flight from Boston to
Kennedy International Airport in New York and she was further
instructed by P to proceed to the latter’s counter at the Logan Airport
in Boston before boarding the TWA flight on the scheduled date of
departure.
On December 17, 1992, PR proceeded early to the P’s counter
at Logan Airport in Boston but was referred to the TWA counter
where she was informed that she may not be able to take the TWA
flight because it was cancelled.
Due to the unexplained and belated cancellation of the TWA
flight, PR had to rush back from the International Gate to P’s counter
in Logan Airport in Boston where she was again told to proceed
immediately to the Delta Airlines terminal to catch the Delta Airlines
flight to La Guardia Airport in New York where she’ll take a service
car to Kennedy Airport in New York.
In her haste to catch the said flight, PR tripped and fell down
on her way from petitioner’s counter to the Delta Airlines counter in
Logan Airport in Boston thereby suffering slight physical injuries and
embarrassment.
When PR reached La Guardia Airport in New York, she again
had to rush to the service car. In her haste and anxiety to catch her
flight, PR again tripped and fell down thereby suffering more
physical injuries, embarrassment and great inconvenience.
Upon arrival, she was informed at P’s counter in Kennedy
International Airport that she was issued the wrong ticket to Seoul
instead of Tokyo. Although the error was rectified by P, PR was by
then extremely nervous, worried, stressed out, and exhausted.
To make matters worse, P downgraded PR from business
class to economy class on two legs of her flight without notice nor
apology. Neither did P offer to refund the excess fare PR paid for a
business class seat.
petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. for breach of contract of
carriage. PR claimed to have suffered actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
P filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim alleging therein
that the flight on which PR was originally booked was cancelled due
to maintenance problems and bad weather, and that the airline had
done its best to re-book private respondent on the next available
flights.
Trial progressed until 1995 when it was P’s turn to present its
witness on three scheduled dates. Two of the settings were
cancelled when P’s counsel filed notice for oral deposition of one
Mario Garza, witness for P, in New York. PR filed her opposition and
suggested written interrogatories instead. In an Order dated July 26,
1995, the trial court denied PR’s opposition, thus allowing the
deposition to proceed. The oral deposition took place in New York
on July 24, 1995 or notably two days before the issuance of the
trial court’s order allowing the deposition to proceed.
The records show that although it was the Honorable Consul
Milagros R. Perez who swore in the deponent, she thereafter
designated one “Attorney Gonzalez” as Deposition Officer.
On November 9, 1995, at the hearing of the instant case, P
presented the deposition record of its witness while PR reserved her
right to cross-examine and present rebuttal evidence.
PR, likewise, questioned the conduct of the oral deposition as
irregular and moved for suppression of the same on the following
grounds:
1. The deposition has been improperly and irregularly taken and
returned in that:
(a) The deposition was taken on July 24, 1995 despite the
fact that this Honorable Court only ruled on the matter on
July 26, 1995.
(b) There is no certification given by the officer taking the
deposition that the same is a true record of the testimony
given by the deponent in violation of Rule 24, Section 20 of
the Rules of Court.
(c) The deposition was not securely sealed in an envelope
indorsed with the title of the action and marked “Deposition
of (here insert the name of witness)” in violation of Rule 24,
Section 20 of the Rules of Court.
(d) The officer taking the deposition did not give any notice
to the plaintiff of the filing of the deposition in violation of
Rule 24, Section 21 of the Rules of Court.
(e) The person designated as deposition officer is not
among those persons authorized to take deposition in
foreign countries in violation of Rule 24, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court.
(f) There is no showing on record that the deponent read
and signed the deposition in violation of Rule 24, Section
19 of the Rules of Court.
2. These irregularities or defects were discovered by the plaintiff
during the hearing on November 9, 1995 and plaintiff has acted with
reasonable promptness after having ascertained the existence of the
aforesaid irregularities and defects.
However, PR’s motion was denied by the trial court. In its
Order, dated July 23, 1996, the trial court admitted P’s formal offer of
evidence with supplement thereto and gave PR three days from
receipt within which to signify her intention to present rebuttal
evidence.
On August 2, 1996, PR filed a manifestation and motion stating
that the court failed to rule on its motion to suppress deposition and
to grant her the right to cross-examine P’s deponent. PR also
manifested her intention to present rebuttal evidence.
In its Order, dated September 5, 1996, the trial court denied
PR’s manifestation and motion. Said court, likewise, denied PR’s
motion for reconsideration of the above order.
Hence, PR filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on
April 7, 1998.
CA- set aside RTC judgment and ordered RTC to disallow the
deposition
P Northwest, thereafter, filed this instant petition for review
Issue/Held:
WoN the oral deposition should be admitted into evidence-YES
Ratio:
Section 16 of Rule 24 (now Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 1997)
provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon
motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an
order that the deposition shall not be taken. The rest of the same section allows the
taking of the deposition subject to certain conditions specified therein.
The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order
that the deposition shall not be taken connotes the authority to
exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion
conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not
arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law. The courts should always see
to it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and
deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Moran:
xxx. “Any discovery involves a prying into another person’s affairs – prying that is
quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be
such an aid.” For this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which
is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either
the deponent or the adverse party, or both.
Respondent court correctly observed that the deposition
in this case was not used for discovery purposes, as the
examinee was the employee of P, but rather to accommodate the
former who was in Massachusetts, U.S.A. Such being the case, the
general rules on examination of witnesses under Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court requiring said examination to be done in court
following the order set therein, should be observed.
We note with approval respondent court’s ruling disallowing the
depositions and upholding PR’s right to cross-examine:
xxx [The] deposition was not a mode of discovery but rather a direct
testimony by respondent’s witness and there appears a strategy by
respondent to exclude P’s participation from the proceedings.
While a month’s notice would ordinarily be sufficient, the
circumstances in this case are different. Two days of trial were
cancelled and notice for oral deposition was given in lieu of the third
date. The locus of oral deposition is not easily within reach of
ordinary citizens for it requires time to get a travel visa to the United
States, book a flight in July to the United States, and more
importantly substantial travel fare is needed to obtain a round trip
ticket by place (sic) from Manila to New York and back to Manila.
As an international carrier, Northwest could very conveniently send
its counsel to New York. However, the ends of justice would have
been better served if the witness were instead brought to the
Philippines. Written interrogatories was (sic) requested to balance
this inconvenience which was nonetheless also objected to and
denied for simply being time consuming.
The objections raised by P [PR], in the light of the above
considerations, take on a greater weight.
Section 11 of Rule 24 provides: “In a foreign state or country, depositions shall be
taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such
person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.”
The deposition document clearly indicates that while the consul
swore in the witness and the stenographer, it was another officer in
the Philippine Consulate who undertook the entire proceedings
thereafter. Respondent Northwest argues on the presumption of
regularity of official functions and even obtained a certification to this
effect plus an assertion that none of the participants in the Consulate
were in any way related to the respondent or their counsel. But
presumptions should fail when the record itself bears out the
irregularity.
The Rules (Rule 24, Sec. 29) indicate that objections to the oral
deposition will be waived unless the objections are made with
reasonable promptness. In this case, the objections have been
prompt and vehement, yet they were disregarded as not material
such that the deposition and the exhibits related thereto were
admitted.
In Fortune Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court set
aside upon review by certiorari the order of the trial court allowing
deposition because the order did not conform to the essential
requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the
adverse party:
The rule is that certiorari will generally not lie to review a
discretionary action of any tribunal. Also, as a general proposition, a
writ of certiorari is available only to review final judgment or
decrees. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not
lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. This is
because, like other discovery orders, orders made under
Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable
considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or
of any independent offshoot of it.
However, such rules are subject to the exception that
discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an
interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law
and may reasonably cause material injury throughout the subsequent
proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or
where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion.