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Affective Morality: The Role of Emotions in the Ethical Decision-Making Process

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 THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS

AFFECTIVE MORALITY: THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN THE ETHICAL

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

By

VIRGINIA K. BRATTON

A dissertation submitted to the

Department of Management
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Summer Semester, 2004
The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of Virginia K. Bratton defended
on May 19, 2004.

____________________________
K. Michele Kacmar
Professor Directing Dissertation

____________________________
John Corrigan
Outside Committee Member

____________________________
Monica Hurdal
Committee Member

____________________________
Dave Ketchen
Committee Member

____________________________
Pamela Perrewé
Committee Member

Approved:

_________________________________________
Bill Anthony, Chair, Management Department

_________________________________________
Melvin T. Stith, Dean, College of Business

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee
members.

ii
 This dissertation is dedicated to my family.
They have provided a never-ending supply of support, inspiration, and love, without
which I would never have been able to start or finish
this or any other project.
Thanks to you all: Mom, Dad, Laura, & Andy
– I love you very much.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my dissertation chair and mentor, Micki Kacmar, for guiding me
through this dissertation process, helping me get a job, motivating me when I got a little
“sluggish,” and providing me with peace of mind when I needed it most. You have taught me so
much, and I am eternally grateful and proud to be your student.
I would also like to thank Dave Ketchen for his constant support and encouragement
throughout my doctoral program. I have thoroughly enjoyed your seminars, your research
projects that you shared with me, and your presence and guidance on my dissertation
committee.
Thanks as well to the other members of my dissertation committee. Through conversations
with Monica Hurdal, I was able to focus the topic of my dissertation on emotions. Thank you
Monica for you help on this project and your advice on life in Australia! My first business
class ever was with Pam Perrewé. You taught me what organizational behavior is and supported
me all the way through to the completion of my dissertation. Thank you for the opportunity to
research with you and for your help throughout this program. Finally, thank you to John Corrigan,
my outside committee member who braved renegade frisbee enthusiasts to attend my proposal
defense and provided me with insights from his extensive knowledge of emotion in spite of being
injured!
Lastly, I want to thank a vast support network of family, friends and professors without
whom I would never have embarked upon this journey or seen its completion. Through work
and study with George Riordan, Bill Byrnes, Diane Greer, Maxine Stern, Ed Huttlin, Max
Richardson, and Per Anderson, my future as a management professor first opened up to me. And
a final thanks to my peers at Florida State- thank you for the laughs, the talks, the ideas, and the
drinks. Because of you this process, while challenging, has been an absolute pleasure. This is
just the beginning- I know that good things are in store for all of us… much love and thanks to
you all!

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ................................................................................................ vi

List of Figures ................................................................................................ vii
Abstract ............................................................................................................... ix

1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 1

2. Literature Review ........................................................................................... 10

3. Methods ................................................................................................ 57

4. Results ................................................................................................ 67

5. Discussion ................................................................................................ 90

APPENDICES ................................................................................................ 105

A Human Subjects Application ................................................................ 104

B Human Subjects Approval .................................................................... 112
C Complete Pre-experiment Survey ......................................................... 113
D Reading Excerpt.................................................................................... 128
E Quiz ................................................................................................ 131
F Post-Experiment Survey ....................................................................... 136
G Control Variables .................................................................................. 137
H Abbreviated Positive and Negative Affect Schedule............................ 138
I Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness Scales................... 139
J Emotional Intelligence Scale ................................................................ 142
K Machiavellianism Scale ........................................................................ 144
L Multidimensional Ethics Scale ............................................................. 146
M Locus of Control Scale ......................................................................... 149
N Strength of Religious Beliefs Scale ...................................................... 152
O Self-Monitoring Scale........................................................................... 153
P Hypothesis 7 Results............................................................................. 155

REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 158

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .............................................................................. 173

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 LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Kohlberg’s Six Stages of Cognitive Moral Development .................. 12

Table 2.2: Rest’s Four Component Model of Morality ....................................... 15
Table 2.3: Reidenbach & Robin’s (1998, 1990) Three-Dimensional
Measure of Moral Judgment [Multidimensional Ethics Scale] .......... 30
Table 2.4: Proposed Hypotheses.......................................................................... 57
Table 4.01: Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................ 68
Table 4.02: Correlation Matrix ............................................................................ 70
Table 4.03: Proposed Hypotheses........................................................................ 77
Table 4.04: Mean Values for Hypothesis 1 – Tables 4.05 and 4.06 ................... 79
Table 4.05: Anova Results for Positive Affect (Hypothesis 1) ........................... 79
Table 4.06: Anova Results for Negative Affect (Hypothesis 1).......................... 79
Table 4.07: Mean Values for Hypothesis 2 – Tables 4.08 and 4.09.................... 81
Table 4.08: Anova Results for Positive Affect (Hypothesis 2) ........................... 81
Table 4.09: Anova Results for Negative Affect (Hypothesis 2).......................... 81
Table 4.10: Hierarchical Regression Results for Positive Affect
(Hypothesis 3a) ................................................................................. 83
Table 4.11: Hierarchical Regression Results for Negative Affect
(Hypothesis 3b)................................................................................. 83
Table 4.12: Hierarchical Regression Results for Ethical Behavior
(Hypothesis 4a and 4b) ..................................................................... 85
Table 4.13: Mean Values for Hypothesis 5 ......................................................... 85
Table 4.14: Anova Results for Ethical Behavior (Hypothesis 5) ........................ 86
Table 4.15: Hierarchical Regression Results for Ethical Behavior
(Hypothesis 6).................................................................................. 86
Table 4.15: Summary of Significant Relationships ............................................. 89
Table 5.1: Summary of Hypothesis and Findings................................................ 91
Table P1: Summary of Regression Results for the Mediating Effect
of Positive Affect on the Relationship Between Peer Influence
and Ethical Behavior (Hypothesis 7a-1).............................................. 155
Table P2: Summary of Regression Results for the Mediating Effect
of Positive Affect on the Relationship Between Trait Affect
and Ethical Behavior (Hypothesis 7b-1).............................................. 155
Table P3: Summary of Regression Results for the Mediating Effect
of Positive Affect on the Relationship Between Gender
and Ethical Behavior (Hypothesis 7c-1).............................................. 156
Table P4: Summary of Regression Results for the Mediating Effect
of Negative Affect on the Relationship Between Peer Influence
and Ethical Behavior (Hypothesis 7a-1).............................................. 156
Table P5: Summary of Regression Results for the Mediating Effect
of Negative Affect on the Relationship Between Trait Affect
and Ethical Behavior (Hypothesis 7b-1).............................................. 157

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Table P6: Summary of Regression Results for the Mediating Effect
of Negative Affect on the Relationship Between Gender
and Ethical Behavior (Hypothesis 7c-1).............................................. 157

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 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Affective Events Theory Applied to Moral Reasoning .................... 4

Figure 1.2: Moral Deliberation – Rest’s (1986, 1994) Four-Component
Conceptualization of Morality ......................................................... 6
Figure 1.3: Affective Influence on Moral Deliberation ...................................... 7
Figure 2.1: Ferrell & Gresham’s (1985) Contingency Framework
of Ethical Decision Making In Marketing ......................................... 18
Figure 2.2: Hunt & Vitell’s (1986, 1992) General Theory of
Marketing Ethics .............................................................................. 20
Figure 2.3: Dubinsky & Loken’s (1989) Framework for Analyzing
Ethical Decision Making in Marketing ............................................. 22
Figure 2.4: Trevino’s (1986) Interactional Model of Ethical Decision
Making in Organizations ................................................................... 24
Figure 2.5: Jones’ (1991) Issue-Contingent Model of Ethical Decision
Making .............................................................................................. 26
Figure 2.6: Larsen’s (2000) Model of the Role of Personality in
Moderating & Mediating Affective Responses ................................ 42
Figure 2.7: Proposed Conceptual Model of Affective Morality ......................... 45
Figure 2.8: Proposed Testable Model of Affective Morality .............................. 47
Figure 4.1: Depiction of Hypotheses 1, 2, & 3 ................................................... 74
Figure 4.2: Depiction of Hypotheses 4, 5, & 6 ................................................... 75
Figure 4.3: Depiction of Hypothesis 7 ................................................................ 76
Figure 5.1: Future Research on Business Ethics ................................................. 100

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 ABSTRACT

This dissertation integrated the role of emotions into the ethical decision-making process,
which traditionally has been conceptualized as an exclusively logical process. The study
examined the process by which the arousal of emotion impacts individual moral deliberation and
ultimately moral behavior. Although most existing research emphasizes the cognitive elements
of ethical decision-making, this study provides evidence to support a new conceptualization of
moral deliberation -- one in which emotion is a necessary component leading to ethical decisions
and ethical behavior.
Theory and research in the areas of ethical decision-making and affective events offer
insights into how emotion specifically impacts moral deliberation and behavior. Based on these
insights, a model of affective morality is developed and tested. The model suggests that ethical
decisions and behavioral outcomes depend upon the content and degree of individual affective
reactions in response to ethical situations.
The sample used to examine the proposed model consisted of 227 college students from 5
different disciplines at a large 4-year public research university. The results provided empirical
evidence, which suggests that peer influence is a stronger determinant of ethical behavior than
individual affective reactions. Specifically, an individual seems to be more likely to engage in
ethical behavior when his/her peers also behave ethically.
Although, affective reactions were not a significant antecedent to ethical behavior, the
form of the relationship observed does suggest that moral deliberation may be shaped by
individual affective reactions and future study is warranted. Furthermore, the results suggest that
previous conceptualizations of moral deliberation have been incomplete in their neglect to
include the role of affect or emotion. Both theoretical and practical implications of these
research findings are discussed.

ix
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The topic of ethics (or morality) has attracted a great deal of interest in business practice
and research over the past three decades. In spite of an accumulation of research on the subject, a
steady stream of corporate ethical scandals continues to produce indignation among both
shareholders and the general public. The business community rightly feels pressure to respond to
public outrage regarding corporate unethical behavior, as these incidents can be quite costly.
Corporate ethics and its deficiency of public and shareholder confidence poses a threat to the
stability of the American dollar and raises the world’s interest in promoting the appearance of
corporate integrity as well as the incidence of ethical behavior.
Highly publicized incidents of unethical behavior in a broad range of contexts (from
government to retail to corporate trade) have prompted research into the determinants of and
processes leading to ethical behavior. This requires a better understanding of ethical decision-
making processes. An ethical decision is defined by Jones (1991) as a decision that is consistent
with the law as well as the overarching moral norms of the community at large. It is the cognitive
nature of ethical deliberation that has been especially problematic for researchers who seek to
empirically examine these processes. Ethical deliberation is one of the more elusive
“unobservables” in organizational research. In effect, one of the greatest criticisms of ethical or
moral research to date is that it suffers in terms of method (Collins, 2000; Loe, Ferrell, &
Mansfield, 2000), and relies primarily on scenario-based measures that are difficult, if not
impossible, to validate.
While many criticize ethics research for its methodological shortcomings, few have
offered viable solutions for this problem. The root of this methodological problem, however,
may lie in the improper theoretical specification of moral deliberation. Recently, researchers
from management (Folger, Cropanzano, & Van De Boss, 2002; Gaudine & Thorne, 2001) as
well as social neuroscience (Damasio, 1994; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen,

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2001; Moll, Eslinger, Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Vogel, 1997) suggest that emotion is an important
and underemphasized component in the ethical decision-making process. For the purposes of
this discussion, emotion is defined as a feeling and its associated thoughts, encompassing
psychological as well as physiological states and subsequent behaviors (Goleman, 1995), that
arise in reaction to an object or event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).
Studies in social neuroscience, a multi-disciplinary field that examines the neural
foundations of social cognition and behavior, have provided evidence to suggest that it is
insufficient to conceptualize ethical decision-making as an exclusively logical process in which
emotion is controlled as a biasing factor. These studies (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2001;
Vogel, 1997) have revealed that emotion plays an important role particularly in the recognition
of an ethical dilemma. This coincides with scarce but recent conceptual work in management
literature (Folger et al., 2002; Gaudine & Thorne, 2001) that also acknowledges the role of
emotion in the ethical decision-making process. While this recent work in management suggests
that there is some kind of relationship between emotion and ethical behavior, researchers up to
this point have not specified the actual process delineating how emotion affects ethical decisions
and behavior.
In this vein, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the process by which
individuals make ethical decisions and engage in ethical behavior. By incorporating the role of
emotion in this process, this research provides greater insight into how and why some individuals
behave ethically while others do not. Where past research has predominantly approached the
study of ethics from a rational cognitive point of view (Dubinsky & Loken, 1989; Ferrell &
Gresham, 1994; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Rest, 1986; Trevino, 1986), it is suggested here that
subsequent empirical validation is best accomplished by incorporating emotion into the ethical
process model. More specifically, this research suggests that it is individual affective reactions
that differentiate ethical individuals from unethical individuals in business. This study further
makes a first effort in delineating the actual process by which affect influences moral
deliberation.
Toward this goal, the present research is designed to explore whether individuals who
become emotionally aroused upon perceiving a moral dilemma are more likely to make an
ethical decision and engage in ethical behavior. Research into the areas of affective events
theory and moral reasoning will be used to develop a model of affective morality to be applied to

2
business ethics. An investigation will be conducted into subject affective and moral responses to
generic ethical scenarios, recalled ethical incidents, and an actual ethical situation.
Theoretical Background
Affective Events Theory
Affective events theory (AET) was developed by Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) in an
effort to differentiate affect and emotions from the specific work attitude of job satisfaction.
Although research on AET is still in its infancy, its key tenets have been largely supported thus
far (Ashkanasy, Härtel, & Daus, 2002). AET asserts that emotion and affect underlie much of
how individuals think and act at work (Fisher & Ashkanasy, 2000; O’Shea, Ashkanasy, Gallois,
& Härtel, 1999; Weiss, Nicholas, & Daus, 1999). Specifically, it suggests that workplace
conditions lead to distinct “affective events” that cause a worker to have affective responses such
as moods or emotions. In the short term, these affective responses lead to impulsive actions, but
in the long-term they influence employee work attitudes, behavior, and ultimately performance.
The process by which emotion impacts an individual’s ethical deliberation may be
explained by affective events theory (AET). As Figure 1.1 illustrates, most individuals have
some type of emotional reaction upon perceiving an ethical situation in the form of an
environmental stimulus. Depending upon the actual nature of this stimulus as well as individual
dispositional differences, it is likely that some individuals will respond with higher levels of
emotional arousal than others, which will impact an individual’s perception of a given ethical
situation. An example may facilitate the illustration of this idea. If a female employee has
struggled with issues of gender discrimination in the past, upon perceiving a work event where
her co-worker is the subject of sexual harassment this employee will be more likely to have
intense affective reactions to this event. As a result, she also will be more inclined to perceive
this event as an ethical situation and engage in some sort of moral deliberation to decide how
best to respond to the situation. In effect, this employee’s moral behavior is largely driven by
her affective responses to the triggering work event (sexual harassment of co-worker).
The utility of AET when analyzing ethical behavior lies specifically in its constitution of
emotion as an essential link between an employee’s work environment and subsequent behavior.
While AET can explain how emotion can impact one’s moral reasoning and formulation of
behavioral intentions, it cannot stand alone as an explanation for moral behavior. Recently,

3
Work Environment Judgment Driven
Features Behaviors

Work Events Moral Deliberation

(Ethical Dilemma) Affective Reactions

Affect Driven
Dispositions Behaviors

FIGURE 1.1
AFFECTIVE EVENTS THEORY APPLIED TO MORAL REASONING

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Folger and colleagues (2002) further developed the basic tenets of AET to conceptualize how an
individual’s emotions can impact not only his/her own moral behavior but also the moral
behavior of others. Their work takes a theoretical look at the impact of specific emotions (i.e.,
guilt, shame, embarrassment, anger, contempt, disgust) on subsequent propensities to commit
moral behavior. However at this time, there has not been any empirical research linking emotion
to ethical behavior in the field of management.
Moral Reasoning
Both morality and ethics generally refer to a set of principles that distinguish right
behavior from wrong behavior. While some researchers have attempted to better differentiate
the two terms, their efforts have not resulted in any commonly accepted distinction (Rest &
Narváez, 1994). Thus, following the lead of prior researchers, morality and ethics will be used
interchangeably throughout this dissertation.
Early conceptions of morality have centered upon moral reasoning or judgment (i.e.,
Kohlberg, 1984). In the past 20 years, however, a more complex conceptualization of morality
has dominated organizational research (Jones, 1991). Rest (1986) proposed a four-component
model (see Figure 1.2) where morality is presented as a multidimensional construct that includes:
moral sensitivity (recognizing a moral dilemma), moral judgment (judging which action is right
or wrong), moral motivation (prioritizing moral values compared to other values to develop
moral intentions), and moral character (having courage to behave consistent with moral
intentions). As such, workplace events are perceived by an employee and cause affective
reactions of varying content and intensity. These affective reactions will then feed into Rest’s
(1986, 1994) four-component model of morality.
Although Rest contended that these four components need not occur sequentially, they
are loosely conceptualized as a sequential process and form the basis of the ethical decision-
making model in this research. Here, it is theorized that affective reactions directly impact the
level of an employee’s moral sensitivity and later indirectly influence the other three components
(see Figure 1.3). In effect, Rest’s four-component model of morality becomes a four-stage
model of the moral process. However, staying true to Rest’s original holistic picture of morality
and acknowledging the conceptual overlap that exists between these four components, they are
grouped together in this study. Although a sequential conceptualization of moral deliberation is

5
 Moral Moral Moral Moral
Sensitivity Judgment Motivation Character

6
--Moral Deliberation--

FIGURE 1.2
MORAL DELIBERATION- REST’S (1986, 1994) FOUR-
COMPONENT CONCEPTUALIZATION OF MORALITY.
 Moral Moral
Affective Judgment Motivation
Moral Moral
Reactions Character
Sensitivity

7
--Moral Deliberation--

FIGURE 1.3
AFFECTIVE INFLUENCE ON MORAL DELIBERATION
not inconsistent with its treatment in the literature, the primary theoretical emphasis in past
research has been on the relationship between moral judgment and subsequent behavior (Jones,
1991; Rest & Narváez, 1994), and the empirical relationship between these stages are less clear.
Recognizing a moral dilemma. The first component or stage of Rest’s model is moral
sensitivity. In order for an individual to make an ethical decision, s/he must first recognize that
an ethical situation exists which requires that such a decision be made (Rest & Narváez, 1994).
A moral dilemma (or ethical situation) is a situation that has consequences for other people and
requires that a choice be made by the actors or decision makers (Jones, 1991). Moral sensitivity
is one of the most researched topics in business ethics (Collins, 2000). It has been described as a
personal characteristic that enables individuals to recognize the presence of an ethical issue
(Hunt & Vitell, 1992), and further implies that the individual ascribes importance to that issue
(Sparks & Hunt, 1998).
Making a moral judgment. The second stage of Rest’s model is moral judgment. This
dimension involves deciding which potential responses to the recognized ethical dilemma are
morally right and/or justifiable (Rest & Narváez, 1994). While this is a subjective process,
research indicates that moral judgments tend to adhere to social or cultural norms (Hegarty &
Sims, 1978; Vitell, Rallapalli, & Singhapakdi, 1993; Zey-Ferrell & Ferrell, 1982). Additionally,
several dispositional traits (e.g., self-efficacy, Big Five) have been linked to the general decision-
making process. Thus, it is expected that dispositional traits also will impact moral judgment.
Forming moral intentions. The third stage of Rest’s model is moral motivation. This
dimension involves prioritizing the level of importance of moral values in comparison with other
values (Rest & Narváez, 1994). Through this consideration of values, an individual develops
his/her behavioral intentions regarding the ethical dilemma. Thus, after deciding which actions
are morally right and justifiable, an individual then must consider whether behaving morally
(moral value) is as important as behaving in such a way as to keep his/her job (instrumental
value).
Implementing moral behavior. The final stage of Rest’s model is moral character, which
enables individuals to behave in a manner consistent with the moral intentions they developed in
stage three (Rest & Narváez, 1994). This may be the most difficult stage in moral behavior, for
many pressures from an individual’s environment can push him/her to behave unethically. For
example, in a resource-scarce and highly competitive work environment, the operant norms of an

8
organizational culture may cause an individual to behave unethically in spite of his/her
knowledge of and desire to engage in moral behavior.
In this research, moral sensitivity is conceptualized as being issue-contingent. In other
words, an individual’s moral sensitivity will vary from situation to situation. For example,
consider a young man’s ability to recognize a moral dilemma that involves the administration of
experimental medical treatment to the elderly in contrast to a dilemma that involves a co-
worker’s personal use of a company credit card. It is not hard to fathom that the young man will
be more likely to recognize the moral dilemma involving the medical well being of an elderly
person than the abuse of a company credit card. As this example illustrates, moral sensitivity can
and will be considered an issue-contingent construct, not a personal characteristic.
Summary of Present Research
The purpose of this research is to incorporate the influence of emotion into moral
reasoning by integrating affective events theory with Rest’s four-stage model of the moral
process. In particular, this dissertation will investigate the differences among individuals’
affective responses to ethical work events and the process by which such differences ultimately
lead to varying moral behavioral responses to these work events. Specifically, this study will
examine whether affective intensity causes increased moral sensitivity and whether increased
moral sensitivity ultimately results in the increased incidence of moral behavior. Thus, the key
relationship to be studied is the linkage between affective reactions and moral sensitivity, as the
occurrence of the three other components is contingent upon the recognition of a moral issue.
In what follows, Chapter Two provides a selective review of the literature on ethical
decision-making, social neuroscience, and emotions (which will include but not be limited to
AET). This literature provides the theoretical foundation for the proposed model of affective
morality. The model, presented in Chapter Two, will be used as a guide in selecting testable
variables and developing specific hypotheses respective to those variables. Chapter Three
discusses the method used to test the proposed model, and Chapter Four presents the results.
Discussion and areas for future research follow in Chapter Five.

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 CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is comprised of three major sections: a comprehensive review of research on

ethical decision-making, a review of relevant emotion literature, and the introduction of the
model and its hypotheses.
Ethical Decision-Making
Most ethical decision making research in the past 20-30 years builds upon the work of
Kohlberg (1969, 1971, 1976). Research interest in ethics aroused originally in the fields of
philosophy and political science (i.e., Kant and Aristotle) as well as psychology (i.e., Kohlberg,
1969, 1971; Piaget, 1965). However, as incidents of unethical behavior in the business sector
became more common, the topic of ethics gained interest by researchers in marketing,
accounting, and management. Devising explanations for unethical behavior and formulating
models to better describe the ethical decision making process has been a daunting task. Several
ethical decision making theories have been proposed across a variety of disciplines, and while
some researchers have made valiant efforts to integrate existing models of ethical decision-
making behavior, there is a scarcity of good empirical development to test these models. As will
become evident during the course of this review of literature, the primary challenge in ethics
literature has been to accurately conceptualize the full domain of ethics while devising tests that
capture this domain. The key proposition of this dissertation is that previous conceptualizations
and tests of ethical decision-making and behavioral processes are incomplete in their omission of
emotional components in this process. Early Theoretical Work in Ethics
Prior to Kohlberg’s renowned work in the 1950s, research in ethics primarily centered on
the socialization view of moral development (Rest & Narváez, 1994). Most of these approaches
reflected the dominance of behaviorism in psychology (Pittel & Mendelsohn, 1966). This
approach suggested that individuals develop morality by learning the operant norms of their

10
culture, accepting and internalizing these norms, and behaving in a manner to conform to these
norms (Rest & Narváez, 1994). From this perspective, individuals, who behave in accordance
with the dominant social norms of their cultures, are in fact behaving morally. For example, if
the norms of a culture sanction polygamy, then it is moral for an individual in this culture to take
on several wives. Similarly, if the norms of a culture allow for executive perks to be built into
the company budget, then it is moral for individual executives to spend a portion of their
company budgets to secure such benefits. In other words, society dictates morality.
What is lacking from this socialization perspective on moral development is the element
of cognition on the part of the individual actor. Although Piaget first introduced the concept of
moral judgment in 1932, it was the research efforts of Kohlberg that caused the academic world
to notice this construct in the 50s and 60s (Rest, 1979). He pointed out that conformity with
some social norms does not necessarily lead to moral behavior and may sometimes lead to
immoral behavior. Kohlberg asserted that it is the individual, not society, who differentiates
between right and wrong through the process of making moral judgments (Kohlberg, 1964).
Cognitive Moral Development
Much of the foundation of Kohlberg’s work resonates the earlier research of Piaget. For
instance, both Kohlberg and Piaget emphasize the role of cognition in their study of morality.
The researchers also shared the assumption that there are stages in the development of an
individual’s moral judgment (Rest & Narváez, 1994). Kohlberg especially focused his research
on describing the stages of moral development and developing methods to assess an individual’s
stage.
According to Kohlberg’s theory of cognitive moral development (1969, 1971, 1976),
there are six stages of moral development that individuals advance through sequentially and one
by one as they develop more sophisticated structures for managing ethical information. These
stages can be distinguished into three levels according to the social perspective base from which
individual actors function. In level one, the lowest level (stages one and two), individuals base
moral reasoning on their personal interests. In level two (stages three and four), individuals
develop their moral judgments from the perspective that they are part of a group whose members
share common interests. At level three (stages five and six) individuals function rationally and
morally in an effort to maintain the ethical standards upon which a just society is built

11
(Kohlberg, 1976). These stages are displayed in Table 2.1. In this table, the stages emphasize
morality in relation to cooperative behavior (Rest & Narváez, 1994).
In stage one, individuals behave morally in an effort to avoid punishment or
consequences for immoral behavior. Individuals at stage two base their moral judgments on a
type of cost-benefit analysis, primarily reflecting their personal interests and occasionally the
interests of others. Moral reasoning at stage three involves individuals who behave morally in
order to satisfy the interests of significant others, where individuals at stage four base their moral
judgments on whether the behavior maintains social order or reflects their obligations to society.
Finally, individuals at stage five base moral judgments on upholding the inalienable rights of all
members of society, and at stage six, moral behavior is based on maintaining universal principles
of justice and ethics (Kohlberg, 1969; Carlson & Kacmar, 1997).

TABLE 2.1
KOHLBERG’S SIX STAGES OF COGNITIVE MORAL DEVELOPMENT
1st Stage The morality of obedience - Do what you're told.
2nd Stage The morality of instrumental egoism and simple exchange - Let's
make a deal.
3rd Stage The morality of interpersonal concordance - Be considerate, nice,
and kind: you'll make friends.
4th Stage The morality of law and duty to the social order - Everyone in
society is obligated to and protected by the law.
5th Stage The morality of consensus-building procedures - You are
obligated by the arrangements that are agreed to by due process
procedures.
6th Stage The morality of nonarbitrary social cooperation - Morality is
defined by how rational and impartial people would ideally
organize cooperation.
Content based on Rest, J. R., & Narváez, D. (1994).

12
 Kohlberg’s research has provided the central ideas for several decades of moral research
in psychology as well as business (Jones, 1991; Rest, Narváez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). Yet,
this work is not without criticisms, some more valid then others. Rest and others (1999)
reviewed and synthesized these criticisms, identifying four key limitations to Kohlberg’s
approach.
The first limitation is the exclusive focus on moral judgment as the primary determinant
of moral behavior. Critics assert that cognition is merely one part of the ethical process, and
other constructs such as emotion are neglected (Gilligan, 1982). The second limitation is that
Kohlberg’s theory is too abstract to provide useful guidance for day-to-day moral behavior
(Strike, 1982). Rather, the emphasis is on the development of high-level, abstract principles of
moral judgment, and these abstract levels cannot sufficiently represent all levels of cognition that
can be involved in ethical decision-making (Rest et al., 1999).
A third limitation addresses Kohlberg’s conceptualization of morality in that it is
confined to the concept of justice. Critics assert that not all moral behavior necessarily reflects
justice. For example some moral behavior may be motivated by “care” (Pritchard, 1991).
Consider the story from Les Misérables, where a young man, who steals a loaf of bread to feed
his loved ones, is arrested for this crime. His behavior was motivated not by concerns for
maintaining universal principles of justice, but rather by concerns to provide care for his family.
From Kohlberg’s perspective, this behavior is not very moral; however, others (i.e., Gilligan,
1982; Pritchard, 1991; Rest et al., 1999) would assert that this young man indeed behaved in a
moral manner.
The final limitation identified by Rest and colleagues (1999) deals with the assessment
techniques used with the cognitive moral development theory. This is related to the criticism
discussed in the previous paragraph, for if Kohlberg’s concept of morality is weighted toward the
concept of justice, it follows that the assessments developed to gauge to which stage individuals
have evolved when making moral judgments are also weighted toward this limited view of
morality. Several critics point out that the moral dilemmas devised by Kohlberg as assessments
do not provide an adequate test of the full moral domain. While this criticism rings true, no other
technique has been developed that does provide such a test (Rest et al., 1999). Continued
research effort is needed to develop new methods, refine existing methods, and ultimately
improve the overall assessment of morality.

13
Four Component Conceptualization of Morality
Building upon Kohlberg’s work and primarily addressing the first mentioned limitation
(moral judgment is merely one part of the moral decision-making process), Rest (1979)
developed a four component model of morality as a result of conducting a comprehensive review
of ethics literature. He found that not all literature in ethics pertained to moral judgment. As a
result, he needed to either consider such research to be outside of the domain of ethics or
acknowledge that such research covered other facets of morality (outside of moral judgment).
Accordingly, he formulated a broader, multidimensional conceptualization of morality where
each dimension represents a psychological process that must occur in order for individuals to
behave morally (Rest, 1986). In effect, the four component model of morality was developed as
a structure for understanding disparate research in ethics as well as a theory of the determinants
of moral behavior (Rest, 1979; Rest & Narváez, 1994).
The four components of this model, summarized in Table 2.2, do not represent a
sequential moral progression. They are conceptually distinct, and each must be satisfied in order
for moral behavior to result. If any component is not satisfied, a moral failure will result (Rest,
1986).
The first component, moral sensitivity, requires that individuals imagine what types of
actions are possible and how these actions will ultimately affect everyone involved. It is not
necessary for individuals to label the situation as constituting a moral problem. However, actors
must realize that their potential actions will affect the interests, well-being, and expectations of
others.
Rest (1986) acknowledges three key findings from psychology that are related to moral
sensitivity. First, not all individuals are capable of interpreting situations with the same skill due
to individual differences in cognitive ability (Staub, 1978). Second, individuals differ greatly in
their concern for the needs and interests of others (Schwartz, 1977). Some individuals may be
very empathetic with others who may suffer minor consequences in a moral situation, where
other individuals may not recognize that welfare of others is at stake unless they see that physical
harm has been suffered. Finally, some situations result in very strong emotions that occur before
cognitive encoding. These strong feelings may immediately result in a type of affect toward or
empathy with a participant in the situation, and this occurs before the individuals have time to

14
think about the actual situation (Zajonc, 1980). Thus, a strong relationship between emotion and
cognition is inherent in this first component.
The second component, moral judgment, involves deciding which possible action
(identified in component one) is morally right. Drawing from the cognitive developmental
research, Rest (1986) asserts that individuals who make moral judgments have: accrued
substantial social experience and developed complex structures to organize this experience,
developed a clear sense of fairness in relation to themselves and others that is derived from these
complex structures, and are driven in their moral judgments by this sense of fairness. The link
between cognition and affect is presupposed in this component (Rest, 1986). The impact of
affect has already shaped the cognitions individuals form throughout their acquisition of social
experience. While most of Rest’s conceptualization is based on Kohlberg’s cognitive moral
development, other aspects of moral judgment may include care and love in addition to the
justice approach of Kohlberg (Rest, 1986; Rest & Narváez, 1994).

TABLE 2.2
REST’S FOUR COMPONENT MODEL OF MORALITY
Component One The actor must interpret the situation to
Moral Sensitivity understand what actions were possible,
who would be affected by each possible
action, and how concerned participants
would interpret these effects in terms of
their welfare.
Component Two The actor must judge which action is right
Moral Judgment or wrong. In this process, actors can
identify a moral (right) action as what
should be done in a given situation.
Component Three The actor must prioritize ethical principles
Moral Motivation over his/her own personal values so that a
decision results where the actor pursues an
action that is morally right.
Component Four The actor must have ample determination,
Moral Character strength of personality, and implementation
abilities in order to carry out intentions to
behave morally and overcome any
obstacles along the way.
* Content based on Rest (1986) and Rest and Narváez (1994).

15
 The third component, moral motivation, involves the individual prioritization of moral
values in relation to other personal values. Having identified the morally right action to pursue
in component two, individuals have to decide whether the moral value of this action is
meaningful to them relative to other potential value that can be derived from alternative courses
of action. An individual’s motivation to behave morally, even at their own expense, can stem
from a number of things including shame, social norms, commitment to a higher good, empathy,
care and affection, and self-integrity (Rest, 1986). The interconnections between affect and
cognition are present in moral motivation. For example, individuals must be motivated to
perform an action (moral or immoral) in order to achieve a particular outcome, and they must
feel affect towards this outcome. Furthermore, some research (Isen, 1970) has found that
individuals tend to behave more cooperatively when they are simply in a good mood.
The final component, moral character, is where individuals convert their behavioral
intentions into actual behavior. Individuals who carry out their intentions must keep the goal or
outcome of their actions in mind while they plan a sequence of actions and overcome internal
and external obstacles. Such individuals must have “perseverance, resoluteness, competence,
and character” (Rest, 1986, p. 15). Individuals with strong character compositions and who are
able to regulate their own actions are more likely to behave morally.
Although these components seem to imply a sequential process, the process resulting in
moral behavior is much more complex. It is possible that upon considering components two and
three, individuals realize that they stand to lose too much in order to behave morally. Thus, such
individuals may defensively go back to the first component and reassess the situation in order to
avoid labeling it as a moral situation (Rest, 1986).
Other Influential Models
Since the leading work of Kohlberg and Rest, several researchers have sought to develop
theoretical explanations for ethical behavior specifically in the context of business. The common
theme underlying the earlier models of ethical decision-making is the emphasis of the individual.
However in the realm of business, influential work has sought to incorporate both the influence
of the individual as well as environment in the study of ethics. Five key models are briefly
reviewed in the following paragraphs. Marketing researchers contributed the first three models,
and researchers in management developed the final two models.

16
 Several models have been developed to better understand ethical decisions specifically in
the area of marketing (Dubinsky & Loken, 1989; Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Hunt & Vitell,
1986). This research springs from a recurring debate in ethics literature – that is, do normative
standards, resulting in ethical decisions, reflect a teleological or deontological philosophical
base? Teleological theories suggest that individuals, who behave ethically, first determine the
consequences of the potential behavioral paths in a given situation and evaluate the inherent
good or bad of these consequences. On the other hand, deontological theories assert that the
ethical behavior of individuals is driven by their internalized moral principles, a universal sense
of what is right and what is wrong (Frankena, 1963; Hunt & Vitell, 1986). Kohlberg and Rest
both acknowledged the existence of this debate in their work. In fact, Kohlberg attempted to
settle this debate by suggesting that stage six of moral development (the highest stage of moral
development) reflected deontological principles whereas the lesser stages in moral development
were derived more from teleological lines of reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984; Rest & Narváez, 1994).
In spite of Kohlberg’s efforts, this debate is unresolved and continues to stimulate critical
thought and dialogue on the ethical decision-making process.
Incorporating teleological as well as deontological philosophies, Ferrell and Gresham
(1985) developed a contingency framework (see Figure 2.1) to synthesize existing research and
better understand the determinants of ethical decision-making in marketing. Their framework
includes both individual variables (knowledge, values, attitude, intentions) and context variables
(significant others, opportunity) that impact individual ethical behavior in organizations.
Individual variables are shaped by the dominant moral philosophy (teleological v.
deontological) operant in the decision-maker, and these variables in turn impact the actual
decision-making process. Significant others from the decision-maker’s professional and private
life also will shape an ethical decision. Finally, the opportunity to engage in unethical behavior,
which relates to codes of ethics as well as rewards and punishments for unethical behavior, will
impact the ethical decision process.
Thus, the authors propose that three categories of variables should interactively shape the
ethical decisions of individuals in this contingency model. These decisions then result in various
behaviors and an evaluation of these behaviors. Ultimately, these evaluations feed back to shape
the individual and context factors at the beginning of this process (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985;
Jones, 1991). This model differs from Kohlberg’s moral theory, which is a normative approach

17
 Individual
Factors

Social and Individual Evaluation

Cultural Ethical Issue Decision Behavior of
Environment Making Behavior

18
Significant
Opportunity
Others

FIGURE 2.1

FERRELL & GRESHAM’S (1985) CONTINGENCY

FRAMEWORK OF ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
MARKETING
that postulates how individuals should make ethical decisions. In contrast, this contingent
model, as well as a model developed by Hunt and Vitell (1986), takes an alternative approach,
focusing how individuals actually make ethical decisions – on what is rather than what ought to
be in the ethical decision-making process.
Hunt and Vitell’s (1986) general theory of marketing ethics, a simplified version of
which is pictured in Figure 2.2, is somewhat reminiscent of Rest’s 4-component model of
morality. Separating Rest’s first component, moral recognition, into two separate steps, these
researchers assert that the moral process begins with individuals perceiving an ethical situation
and envisioning the possible behavioral responses to this issue. At this point, the individual
evaluates the outcomes of each behavioral alternative via a deontological and/or a teleological
philosophical lens. Most individuals draw upon both philosophical bases when considering these
alternatives. From a deontological perspective, individuals attempt to determine the intrinsic
rightness or wrongness of each behavior. From a teleological perspective, individuals attempt to
assess the relative good or bad that will result from each behavior. Similar to the final three
components of Rest’s model, these evaluations of inherent and relative right and wrong then feed
into ethical judgments, which lead to the formation of moral intentions and ultimately result in
behavior.
However, not all ethical judgments translate into moral intentions or moral behavior.
Moral intentions are directly shaped by teleological evaluations of behavioral alternatives in
addition to ethical judgments. Thus, individuals may make moral decisions, but not follow
through with moral intentions or behavior because their teleological evaluations inform them that
more can be gained by implementing a different behavior. Furthermore, situational constraints
may impede the ability of individuals to implement their behavioral intentions. For example an
individual, who decides that her boss’s sexual harassment is immoral and intends to report this
behavior to the human resources department, may discover that her organization does not
condone such “whistleblowing” behavior. In this case, it is conceivable that this individual
would not follow through with her moral intentions.

19
 Culture
Perceived Moral
Problem
Situational
Constraints
Industry
Perceived Deontological
Alternatives Evaluation

Ethical Behavioral Behavior

Judgments Intentions

20
Organization

Perceived Teleological
Consequences Evaluation
Personal
Experiences
Actual
Consequences

FIGURE 2.2

HUNT & VITELL’S (1986, 1992) GENERAL THEORY OF

MARKETING ETHICS
 Finally, afterwards individuals evaluate the results of their selected behaviors. These
evaluations link back to inform and shape their personal experiences. Personal experiences in
combination with cultural, industry, and organizational norms, influence the processes of ethical
perception and evaluation at the beginning of the model. Hunt and Vitell (1992) subsequently
revised this model to better define what variables should be examined when considering these
contextual norms and personal experiences.
The third influential perspective of ethical decision-making in marketing research was
developed by Dubinsky and Loken (1989) in order to address several shortcomings of the
comprehensive and complex frameworks previously discussed. While, the models proposed by
Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Hunt and Vitell (1986) are thorough, they do not necessarily
offer parsimonious explanations for ethical behavior in organizations, and as a result they have
been difficult to operationalize and validate. Furthermore, both marketing frameworks, as well
as Rest’s model of moral behavior, depend on the assumption that individuals perceive a given
situation to pose an ethical dilemma (Dubinsky & Loken, 1989).
Dubinsky and Loken (1989) offer a more focused, rational view of ethical behavior
drawing upon the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
This theory suggests that individuals will behave rationally when deciding to engage in a
particular behavior so long as they feel they are ultimately in control of making the final
behavioral decision. Dubinsky and Loken apply this theory (see Figure 2.3) to the realm of
business ethics as a parsimonious way of explaining how individuals arrive at both ethical and
unethical decisions. Ethical behavior results from intentions to commit ethical behavior. These
intentions are shaped by both individual attitudes and subjective norms regarding the behavior.
Attitudes are influenced by individual beliefs about the potential results of a particular behavior
as well as the evaluations of these results. Finally, subjective norms are shaped by how
individuals perceive relevant others feel about the behavior and motivating factors to ensure
individuals act in accordance with the beliefs of these relevant others.
Trevino (1986) developed an interactionist model of ethical decision making in the field
of management. Similar to the marketing ethics perspectives discussed above, Trevino felt that
ethical behavior in organizations cannot be adequately explained by moral philosophies alone.
More likely, such behavior results from an interaction of individual and situational influences.

21
 Behavioral
Beliefs
Attitude for
Behavior
(ethical or
Outcome unethical)
Evaluation
Intent to
Commit Behavior
Behavior (ethical or
(ethical or unethical)
Normative unethical)
Beliefs
Subjective
Norm for
Behavior (ethical
Motivation or unethical)
to Comply

FIGURE 2.3

DUBINSKY & LOKEN’S (1989) FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING ETHICAL DECISION

MAKING IN MARKETING

22
 Trevino’s (1986) model of ethical decision-making claims that individuals have cognitive
reactions to ethical situations that depended largely upon where they were in Kohlberg’s stages
of moral development. In these cognitive reactions, individuals determine what components of
the situation are right or wrong. The relationship between cognitive activity and subsequent
behavior is moderated by both individual and situational influences. Trevino proposed that three
key individual factors will interact with cognitive activity to influence behavior: ego strength,
field dependence, and locus of control. Additionally, several situational factors are proposed to
moderate the relationship between cognitive activity and ethical behavior. These situational
factors arise from the actor’s: job context, organizational culture, and characteristics of the job
itself. Finally, the actor’s organizational culture and job characteristics also will influence
his/her cognitive moral development. Trevino’s interactionist theory of ethical decision making
is displayed in Figure 2.4. Later work further developed the situational influences in this model,
adding emphasis to the role of operant social norms in an actor’s work context (Trevino &
Youngblood, 1990).
Jones (1991) contributed what is perhaps the most influential and comprehensive work in
business ethics theory (Loe et al., 2000). Jones first noted the existence of the several theoretical
descriptions of ethical decision-making discussed above. He did not contradict what these earlier
models proposed. Rather, he synthesized these models and identified an overlooked component
in this body of theory: the moral intensity of the ethical issue. Jones agreed with his
predecessors that moral philosophies as well as other individual and contextual factors influence
the ethical decisions and subsequent behavior of individuals. However, he further believed that
the actual content of the moral issue itself will affect this ethical decision making process,
especially the perception of a moral issue. In other words, Jones proposed that ethical decision-
making is issue-contingent. In this vein, he proposed a new construct, moral intensity, to
characterize a moral issue.
Moral intensity is a multidimensional construct that describes the actual characteristics of
a moral issue that can lead to differing responses by the individual decision maker. Jones (1991)
suggested that every moral issue can be described in terms of moral intensity. There are six
components of this construct: magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect,
temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect. Building upon Rest’s (1986) four
component model of morality, Jones proposed that issues high in moral intensity are more likely

23
 Individual Moderators
(Ego Strength, Field
Dependence, Locus of Control)

Cognitions Ethical/
Ethical (Stage of
Unethical
Dilemma Cognitive Moral
Development) Behavior

Situational Moderators
(Job Context, Organizational
Culture, Job Characteristics)

FIGURE 2.4

TREVINO’S(1986) INTERACTIONAL MODEL OF ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN

ORGANIZATIONS

24
to be recognized as moral issues, to stimulate more sophisticated moral judgments, to lead to the
formation of moral intentions, and to result in ethical behavior.
The following example illustrates Jones’ (1991) propositions, pictured in Figure 2.5. Let
us assume that illegal waste disposal at a nuclear power plant is an issue high in moral intensity.
An employee who discovers that this illegal waste is being dumped behind his children’s
playground will be more likely to recognize the moral implications inherent in this issue and
ultimately engage in a decision-making process that will result in ethical behavior. On the other
hand, an issue of less moral intensity, such as a coworker’s theft of office supplies, may be less
likely to elicit such moral behavior.
Jones (1991), however, did acknowledge that organizational factors temper the impact of
moral intensity upon the formation of moral intent and actual behavior. In other words, in
especially strong organizational environments individuals may recognize a moral issue and
subsequently make a moral judgment; yet, because of organizational norms and pressures, these
individuals can conceivably not follow through on their moral judgments.
Empirical Approaches
The overwhelming challenge in empirical research in ethics is the difficulty in
realistically assessing and explaining the variance in the ethical decision making process. Earlier
work tends to focus on the relationship between various demographic variables and ethical
decisions in individuals (Ford & Richardson, 1994; Loe et al., 2000). As the research stream has
gradually progressed, studies have shifted their focus and examined more sophisticated
individual and contextual influences on this process. However, a preponderance of these studies
relies on questionnaire and survey methods. Thus, the state of research in business ethics is
limited, as this research stream appears to be unbalanced in terms of methodology. It seems that
Platt’s (1964) caution to researchers is especially relevant to today’s business ethics researchers,
“… [b]eware of the man of one method or one instrument, either experimental or theoretical. He
tends to become method-oriented rather than problem-oriented” (p. 351).
The inception of the Journal of Business Ethics in 1982 reflected and stimulated an
increased interest in the topic of ethics as well as more conceptual and empirical research in this
area. Although a majority of the research in business ethics has been conceptual (Collins, 2000;
Trevino, 1986), the past two decades of empirical research in ethics have led researchers to

25
 Moral Intensity

Recognize Make Moral Establish Engage in

Moral Issue Judgment Moral Intent Moral
Behavior

26
Organizational
Factors

FIGURE 2.5

JONES’ (1991) ISSUE-CONTINGENT MODEL OF ETHICAL

DECISION MAKING
critically examine the quantitative methods employed in this area (e.g., Ford & Richardson,
1994; Loe et al., 2000; Randall & Gibson, 1990).
One of the earlier assessments of methodology in ethics research was conducted by
Randall and Gibson (1990). The primary purpose of this review seemed to be twofold: to
summarize the quantitative research in ethics and to critically evaluate the quality of this research
in an effort to improve future empirical investigations. Their assessment included 94 articles
from the early 1960s through the late 1980s, 34% of which were published in the Journal of
Business Ethics.
The findings of this review painted a rather bleak picture of the state of empirical
research in ethics in the late 1980s. Less than half of the articles reviewed included a detailed
description of methods, two thirds of the surveyed articles did not include any theory nor did
they offer hypotheses, and over one third of the research used samples of convenience.
Furthermore, only 20% of the surveyed research used instruments that were pretested in their
analyses. Finally, the research designs employed were largely sample surveys (81%), with
predominantly simplistic analytic techniques (univariate or bivariate). The primary
recommendations of the authors were that future researchers carefully specify and explain their
methods, and that journals more critically evaluate the methodologies of research in their review
processes.
Since Randall and Gibson’s (1990) critique, there have been two additional analyses of
empirical research (Ford & Richardson, 1994; Loe et al., 2000). Both of these analyses took
similar approaches to their assessments of quantitative work in ethics research. They separated
quantitative work into general categories of variables and summarized the research that examines
each variable under each category. Overall, not much has changed in the past 10 years: there
continues to be more qualitative than quantitative studies in ethics, and survey methods remain
dominant in this research.
Ford and Richardson (1994) concentrated on empirical work associated with ethical
beliefs and ethical decision-making processes. They looked at just under 50 studies, over 67% of
which used questionnaires to collect their data. A majority of the surveyed studies focused on
personal and demographic factors. Few studies examined attitudinal factors or contextual
variables. Acknowledging the dominance of survey methods in ethics research, Ford and

27
Richardson called for increased lab experiments to better delineate ethical decision making
processes.
Loe and colleagues (2000) updated the work of Ford and Richardson, focusing on
empirical work in organizational settings and linking this work to Jones’ (1991) issue-contingent
model of ethical decision-making. Of the research examined by Loe and colleagues,
approximately 90% of this empirical work used survey methods (either questionnaire
instruments or some combination of questions and scenarios or vignettes). Of the remaining
10% of this work, only two studies used open-ended questions and/or interview methods, and six
studies used experimental methods. Longitudinal studies in business ethics are virtually non-
existent- the only exception is Tyson (1992) who looked at the age differences in ethical
perceptions (students v. accountants). Most of these studies tested models on student samples,
indicating a need to shift to industry samples in this research in order to establish face validity
and demonstrate relevance to practitioners. By and large, Loe and colleagues assert their
analysis reveals a need for increased consideration of methodological issues in ethics research.
These reviews of empirical research in ethics indicate both an overuse of questionnaires
and scenarios/vignettes as well as an abundance of instruments that have not been well
developed or validated. In spite of this trend, there are three empirical techniques that stand out
from others, as they have been well tested across contexts and samples: the Defining Issues Test
(Rest, 1979), the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (Reidenbach & Robin, 1988, 1990) and
Trevino’s (1986) In-Basket Exercise.
Defining Issues Test. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is derived from the earlier work of
Kohlberg and Piaget as a method to assess moral judgment. Its development is based on the
assumption that moral judgment is a “fundamental structure by which people perceive and make
decisions about their rights and responsibilities,” (Rest, 1979, p. 76) rather than trivial
phenomena that differs randomly between individuals. In other words, individuals interpret
moral dilemmas differently based on where they are in their cognitive moral development.
These differences are considered to be indications of the underlying tendencies of individuals to
organize social events (Rest, 1979, 1986). This test was designed to gather information on how
individuals interpret a dilemma more so than how they rationalize a course of action (Rest,
1979).

28
 In the DIT, subjects are first presented with a moral dilemma. Then they are provided
with a list of “issues” or questions that might be considered when making decisions about what
should be done in response to the given dilemma. The task of subjects is to deliberate on each
issue and identify which are important in making a decision as to what one ought to do. The DIT
is comprised of six dilemmas that are borrowed from Kohlberg (1964, 1969, 1976) and
Lockwood (1970). Each dilemma is supplemented with a series of 12 items, which amounts to
72 items for the whole test.
In a period of 13 years from the time that Rest initially developed this measure (1979),
over 500 studies employed the DIT to elicit meaningful results in their research in ethics (Rest,
1986). More recently however, there has been growing interest in modifying the DIT and
developing new instruments altogether. This interest primarily stems from two lines of
reasoning: the dilemmas used in the DIT are somewhat antiquated and not specific to any given
profession; and the DIT is based on Kohlberg’s limited conceptualization of moral judgment and
thus may not adequately assess an individual’s ethical decision-making processes.
Multidimensional Ethics Scale. Acknowledging the complex nature of ethical judgment,
Reidenbach and Robin developed the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (1988, 1990) based on a
three-dimensional conceptualization of the construct. They used normative moral philosophies
as a basis for this measure, meaning they focused on what is done rather than what should be
done in business ethics. Modeling their procedure for scale development on the work of
Nunnally (1969), Churchill (1979), and Campbell and Fiske (1959), Reidenbach and Robin
(1988) produced a pool of 33 items derived from contemporary normative moral philosophies.
The development and refinement of this scale (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990) included tests of the
original scale and refined versions thereof on several samples including 218 business students,
108 retail managers, 105 small business managers, and 152 managers in a business association.
The results from these iterations yielded the final three-dimensional, 8-item ethics scale. These
dimensions, described in Table 2.3, are broad moral equity, relativism, and contractualism.
The Multidimensional Ethics Scale has stimulated much subsequent research and
discussion (e.g., Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993; Hansen, 1992; Robin, Gordon, Jordan, &
Reidenbach, 1996; Skipper & Hyman, 1993). Although the number of items in this scale varies
somewhat across studies, they are always accompanied with at least 3 business scenarios as
stimulus for subject responses. Comparing the predictive performance of this scale with the

29
Defining Issues Test, Robin and colleagues (1996) provided evidence in favor of the utility of the
Multidimensional Ethics Scale particularly when examining ethical/unethical behavior. While
substantial evidence exists to support the validity and reliability of this measure across a variety
of business contexts (retail, marketing, management, accounting), it shares a weakness with the
DIT and other survey approaches in its reliance on scenarios. The use of scenarios as stimulus
for subject responses presumes that subjects interpret these scenarios as realistic and meaningful.

TABLE 2.3
REIDENBACH AND ROBIN’S (1988, 1990) THREE-DIMENSIONAL MEASURE OF
MORAL JUDGMENT [MULTIDIMENSIONAL ETHICS SCALE]

Dimension One Based on intrinsic fairness, Measured by Four Items:

Broad-Based justice, goodness, and
Moral Equity rightness, as well as family
acceptance. Includes a basic
decision rule for the
evaluation of moral content
in business settings.
Dimension Two Concerned with guidelines,
Relativism requirements, and parameters
that are intrinsic parts of
social/cultural context.
Individual beliefs vary
relative to the beliefs of
society and culture.
Dimension Three Derived from implied
Contractualism obligation, contracts, duties,
or rules. Relates to idea that
a “social contract” exists
between business and
society.
* Content based on Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990).
Fair/unfair
Just/unjust
Acceptable/Unacceptable to
my family
Morally/not morally right
Measured by Two Items:
Traditionally
acceptable/unacceptable
Culturally
acceptable/unacceptable
Measured by Two Items:
Violates/does not violate an
unspoken promise
Violates/does not violate an
unwritten contract

30
In-Basket Exercise. The in-basket exercise was introduced to business ethics in management by
Trevino (1986). This exercise was developed to provide a realistic and precise test of the actual
ethical behavior of subjects. While the details of each exercise may vary from study to study, the
in-basket exercise generally contains a number of items in the form of memos, letters, and phone
messages to be sorted by subjects. Within these items, a couple of ethical dilemmas are hidden.
Subjects prioritize these items and receive reward, punishment, or neither based on their
prioritization.
Trevino and Youngblood (1990) employed this exercise to examine the influences of
cognitive moral development, locus of control, and social learning on ethical decision-making.
The exercise required a 2-hour time commitment from their subjects. Here, the in-basket
included 15 items, which included an organization chart, a company newsletter, and a
combination of 13 letters, memos, or phone messages. The experimental manipulation employed
was advanced notice as to whether ethical behavior is rewarded or punished. The control group
received no indication or feedback either way. After this exercise was completed, subjects
completed postexercise questionnaires to clarify subjects’ positions on the ethical issues at hand
and check for manipulation effectiveness.
There are several potential weaknesses to this measure. For instance, subjects may
perceive the sensitive ethical content in this exercise and thus, influenced by social desirability,
respond in a way contrary to what they would normally do (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Trevino &
Youngblood, 1990). Furthermore, the large time requirements for this exercise causes difficulty
in gathering subjects for these studies. As a result, this exercise seems to be tested primarily on
students, which raises questions of external validity. This also may explain why it appears so
infrequently in ethics research. However, the strengths of this procedure nicely complement the
strengths of survey methods, and as the field disproportionately relies on surveys and
questionnaires, there is need for additional studies that use this exercise or an alternative
experimental method.
Summary of Empirical Approaches. As in any discipline, the overriding goal in ethics
research is to advance scientific knowledge. Such knowledge, however, is bound by time and
method. As evidenced in the earlier discussion of theories of business ethics, there has been
improvement in the explanation of ethical decision making due to developments that have
occurred over time. The apparent imbalance in methods employed to test these theories,

31
however may be limiting the advancement of this field due to the inherent weaknesses of any
given method. Although there is no single correct research method or group of methodological
choices (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, McGrath, 1982), each method brings both strengths and
weaknesses to research conclusions. Thus, the consistent use of a limited array of methods (e.g.,
surveys and questionnaires) not only threatens the progress of the research in ethics, but also the
validity of existing conclusions in the field.
To be fair, the imbalance of research method in business ethics seems to be consistent
with a research stream that is at a relatively early stage in its development. As McGrath (1964)
outlined in his “theory of method,” specific stages within the development of a research stream
call for certain methods. For example, in an earlier, exploratory stage within a research area, a
sample survey would be appropriate to draw out information and start to shape hypotheses and
theories. At a later stage however, a researcher may want to refine and test these hypotheses in a
controlled environment and would employ a laboratory experiment. If business ethics is indeed
at an earlier developmental stage in its research stream, the current state of empirical research
here is not necessarily disheartening. Yet, it does indicate the need for increased use of
experimental methodologies (i.e., in-basket exercises) in this research.
Current Knowledge of Ethical Decision-Making Process
Given the difficulty of assessing ethical decision processes, the question becomes- what
do we know now? The bulk of empirical work in business ethics has sought to identify key
influences in ethics, focusing particularly on the characteristics of the moral actor and the
situation in which the actor behaves ethically. The following discussion summarizes current
knowledge of the ethical decision-making process under two general categories (individual and
situational variables) and is centered upon the variables that will be examined in this dissertation.
Individual variables. As noted in earlier reviews of ethics research, demographic
variables are most commonly included in ethics studies in business (Ford & Richardson, 1994;
Loe et al., 2000). One demographic variable in particular, gender, is the most researched area in
ethics, often as a control variable. Loe and colleagues (2000) surveyed 26 studies that examine
gender in ethics. The results of these studies are mixed, indicating either that gender is not a
significant influence in ethical decision-making or that females are more ethical than males. Loe
and colleagues suggest more attention to methodology in these studies is necessary to clear up
the ambiguity in this area. Furthermore, Collins (2000) points to a need for a theoretical

32
explanation for the gender differences in ethical behavior. In other words, while there appears to
be a trend in research indicating that females behave more ethically than males, no study thus far
has offered an explanation for this gender-based difference in behavior.
Other demographic variables such as education, work experience, and age have also
yielded mixed findings in relation to ethical decision-making. While some studies did find a
relationship between higher educational levels and ethical decision-making in organizations
(Browning & Zabriskie, 1983; Jones & Gautschi 1988; Lane, Schaupp, & Parsons, 1988), the
bulk of research produced no significant differences (Loe et al., 2000). Similarly, type of
education, work experience, and age generated mixed findings. However, older workers and/or
students generally tend to be more ethical than those who are younger (Barnett & Karson, 1987;
Brady & Wheeler, 1996; Kelley, Ferrell, & Skinner, 1990; Muncy & Vitell 1992; Ruegger &
King, 1992; Serwinek, 1992; Stevens, Harris, & Williamson, 1993).
Next to gender, moral philosophy has been most frequently included in ethics studies.
Moral philosophy has most commonly been studied in terms of deontological versus teleological
perspectives underlying ethical decisions. Research has generally established a link between
moral philosophy and ethics where deontological perspectives tend to result in ethical decisions
more so than teleological perspectives (Barnett & Karson, 1987; DeConinck & Lewis, 1997;
Fraedrich, 1993; Mayo & Marks, 1990). Interestingly, an alternative view of moral philosophy
was uncovered by Peachment, McNeil, Soutar, and Moister (1995) where individuals who
behaved appropriately in response to ethical dilemmas drew upon both deontological and
teleological bases. However overall, moral philosophy has not been systematically linked to the
level of ethical behavior that results from these decision processes which is another opportunity
for future research (Loe et al., 2000).
Machiavellianism is another individual variable that has been studied in relation to
business ethics. This trait has been treated as both a moral philosophy and a personality variable
in ethics research (Loe et al., 2000). To be consistent with the preponderance of management
research, Machiavellianism is treated here as a personality trait. Individuals who are
Machiavellians (Machs) will consider nearly any alternative that may advance their personal
interests (Christie & Geis, 1970). High Machs are likely to participate in manipulative and
opportunistic behaviors. Past research in ethics has demonstrated that Machiavellianism is

33
negatively related to ethical perceptions, decisions, and/or behavior (Cyriac & Dharmaraj, 1994;
Hegarty & Sims, 1978; Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1990; Verbeke, Ouwerkerk, & Peelen, 1996).
Cognitive moral development (Kohlberg, 1969, 1971, 1976) also has been linked to
ethical decision processes in business research. Moral development is typically measured in
business research by Rest’s Defining Issues Test. As would be expected, individuals with higher
levels of moral development tend to make more ethical decisions and behave more ethically in
business (Everett, Thorne, & Danehower, 1996; Goolsby & Hunt, 1992; Mason & Mudrack,
1997; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). These results are consistent with past research on moral
development in psychology (McGeorge, 1975; Rest, 1974; Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg 1969;
Walker, deVries, & Bichard, 1984).
There is evidence that in more competitive settings, moral development declines (Reall,
Bailey, & Stoll, 1998). This would indicate that even though individuals are capable of
functioning at a more advanced stage of moral reasoning, they might not choose to do so
depending on the situation. This research finding contradicts past research in psychology. Rest
and Narváez (1994) reviewed empirical work in psychology to provide support for Kohlberg’s
implication that higher levels of cognitive moral development are “better.” In other words,
individuals who are capable of moral reasoning at higher levels have rejected lower levels of
reasoning as being simplistic and flawed. Upon reaching a higher level of moral development,
individuals prefer this stage of moral thinking to their previous (lower) levels of reasoning.
However, it may be that for individuals in a competitive business setting this preference for
complex moral reasoning (reflecting higher cognitive moral development) does not apply.
Although studied less frequently, locus of control is a personality trait that also has been
linked to the ethical decision process. Individuals with an internal locus of control feel that they
can alter their environment (Bandura, 1977). They believe that they can have a differential
impact on the process of their circumstances and can take actions to bring about more favorable
outcomes (Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989). Of the four studies that have examined the relationship
between locus of control and ethical decision processes, two have produced evidence indicating
that individuals with internal loci of control are more sensitive to ethical issues (Trevino &
Youngblood, 1990; Zahra, 1989), while the others yielded no significant results (Hegarty &
Sims, 1978; Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1990). More research is warranted in this area to add
clarification to these mixed findings.

34
 One final individual variable that is frequently linked to ethical behavior is religion. This
variable is more frequently related to ethics on an intuitive level than empirical or theoretical
(Weaver & Agle, 2002). It scarcely has been studied in business ethics and is often
operationalized in different ways. Hegarty and Sims (1978, 1979) looked at religious value
orientation and ethical decision-making, finding no significant results. Kidwell, Stevens, and
Bethke (1987) examined religion in terms of frequency of church attendance, but did not find
significant results. McNichols and Zimmerer (1985) examined strength of religious belief and
found that strong beliefs were related to ethical behavior. Others have supported this positive
relationship between religious beliefs and ethics (Agle & Van Buren, 1999; Kennedy & Lawton,
1998). However, Clark and Dawson (1996) provided evidence suggesting that religion is
negatively related to ethical behavior. From these mixed findings, it is clear that more research
is needed to explore the relationship between religion and ethics. Furthermore, there is a need to
better define the construct of religion in future studies. Weaver and Agle (2002) suggest that
religion can be more accurately conceptualized as religious role identities, the salience of which
is likely to impact individual ethical decision processes.
Situational variables. Situational variables have been examined less frequently in ethics
research in business. In fact, out of the 188 studies surveyed by Loe and colleagues (2000), 64
studies examined situational factors, compared to the 107 studies that analyzed individual
variables. These situational factors include codes of ethics, rewards and sanctions, culture and
climate, and significant others.
Codes of ethics are a key component of corporate ethics programs. They are meant to
articulate an organization’s risk areas and reflect the ethical values of the top management. Most
companies in the United States have ethics codes (Collins, 2000; Murphy, 1995; Ruhnka &
Boerstler, 1998). This is, in part, the result of institutional pressures from the government,
media, and business community (Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran; 1999). Although several of the
studies reviewed by Loe and colleagues indicated that codes of ethics increase the awareness of
ethical issues and the incidence of ethical behavior in business (e.g., Barnett, 1992; McCabe,
Trevino, & Butterfield, 1996; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990; Weaver & Ferrell, 1977), several
studies found no significant relationship between these codes and ethical behavior (Ferrell &
Weaver, 1978; Glenn & Van Loo, 1993; Kohut & Corriher, 1994). Recently, Weaver and
colleagues (1999) conducted a study that suggests ethics policies alone do not necessarily result

35
in ethical behavior. These codes must be backed by management commitment in order to be
more effective. Similarly, Allen and Davis (1993) found that codes of ethics must be enforced in
order to significantly shape ethical behavior.
Another situational variable that has been investigated concerns rewards and sanctions.
Rewards and sanctions are the primary components of opportunity. Studies tend to reveal a
linkage between rewarding unethical behavior and the persistence of such behavior (Loe et al.,
2000). If unethical behaviors were rewarded, they occurred more frequently and vice versa (e.g.,
Baumhart, 1961; Hegarty & Sims, 1978; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990; Barnett, Cochran, &
Taylor, 1993). On the other hand, sanctions and the enforcement thereof, can minimize the
opportunity to commit unethical behaviors (e.g., Callahan & Collins, 1992; DeConinck, 1992).
One additional study from management research, not reported by Loe and collegues, also
investigated rewards and sanctions in relation to ethics. Tenbrunsel (1998) investigated the role
of incentives in negotiation from the perspective of a focal actor. Testing proposed relationships
previously offered by Trevino (1986) and Jansen and Von Glinow (1985), she found that
incentives impacted the level of the focal actor’s misrepresentation to his/her opponent as well as
the actor’s expectation of his/her opponent’s misrepresentation in negotiation.
Organizational culture and work climate also have been studied as key influences on
ethical decision processes and behavior in business. A work climate can generally be defined as
observations that “are psychologically meaningful molar descriptions that people can agree
characterize a system’s practices and procedures” (Schneider, 1975, p. 474). When individuals
are faced with the task of making an ethical decision in their work environments, a reasonable
source of information to support them through this process stems from the elements of work
climate that indicate what constitutes ethical behavior in a given organization or job (Victor &
Cullen, 1988). In contrast to formally stated codes of ethics that are in part produced as a
response to institutional pressures, ethical work climate or culture imply that organizational
norms regarding ethical behavior have been institutionalized within a given organization (Victor
& Cullen, 1988). Research has found that culture and climate are key influences on ethical
decision processes (Baumhart, 1961; Jones & Hiltebeitel, 1995; Soutar, McNeil, & Molster,
1994; Verbek et al., 1996; Weaver & Ferrell, 1977). However, there is some evidence again to
suggest otherwise. Elm and Nichols (1993) surveyed 243 managers and found that in this case,

36
ethical climate was unrelated to moral reasoning. Here again, it appears that there are mixed
research findings on the influence of organizational culture and climate on ethical processes.
Another key situational influence in ethics is the impact of significant others on an
individual’s perceptions and behavior. This variable is derived from Bandura’s (1977) social
learning theory as well as Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) theory of reasoned action. One of the
earliest investigations of this relationship was conducted by Ferrell and Gresham (1985) where
they proposed that significant others affect ethical decision making depending on the amount of
personal contact they have with an actor, their relative authority compared to the actor, and
organizational distance from the actor. There has been substantial empirical support for this
proposition (Baumhart, 1961; Brenner & Molander, 1977; Bruce, 1994; Dubinsky & Loken,
1988; Grover & Hui, 1994; Morgan, 1993; Soutar et al., 1994; Tyson, 1992; Wahn, 1993; Zabid
& Alsagoff, 1993; Zey-Ferrell, Weaver, & Ferrell, 1979; Zey-Ferrell & Ferrell, 1982). Thus, it
appears that influential others are an important consideration in ethical decision processes. There
is a need for additional research, however, to better delineate the context and limitations of this
influence. Trevino and Victor (1992) moved in this direction examining the social context of
peer reports of unethical behavior.
One additional situational variable, not directly examined by Loe and colleagues, is
environmental resource scarcity. When organizations are embedded in scarce environments,
organizational actors tend to focus more on financial goals and exclude social goals (Dess &
Origer, 1987). Several studies have produced evidence to support this proposition. Staw and
Szwajkowski (1975) found that more illegal acts are committed in organizations characterized by
resource scarcity. Similarly, Miles (1982, 1987) found that resource scarcity in both the U.S.
tobacco and domestic insurance industries resulted in decreased corporate social performance.
Judge (1994) also found that a negative relationship existed between resource scarcity and social
performance in the hospital industry. This relationship has been examined primarily at the
organizational level, however it makes intuitive sense that it also will apply at the individual
level. More research is needed to explore the impact of resource scarcity on individual ethical
decision processes.
Gaps in Current Research
Given the limitations of empirical methods in ethics research, it should not be surprising
that the literature yields conflicting findings on key variables in the ethical decision process.

37
Much of the research cited above employs survey methods with unvalidated scenario approaches
to measure a general construct that combines ethical sensitivity and judgment (Collins, 2000).
Thus, any summary regarding the current state of knowledge in business ethics must be limited
to general statements of relationship (e.g., gender is generally related to ethical decision making,
locus of control is generally related to ethical decision making, codes of ethics are generally
related to ethical decision making). The common theme that resonates throughout the above
review of individual and situational influences is that more research is needed to clarify mixed
findings in these areas. However, keeping in mind the methodological shortcomings of ethics
research in general, careful consideration of study design and method is necessary in order to
make a significant contribution to this literature. For the time being, we generally know the type
of person who tends to behave ethically and the type of situation that tends to stimulate ethical
behavior.
An alternative explanation for the conflicting findings of ethics research may lie in the
neglect of certain variables in the ethical process. More specifically, there are research gaps in
ethics regarding Rest’s (1979) four component model of morality. The bulk of research in ethics
has centered on moral judgment and moral sensitivity (Collins, 2000; Loe et al., 2000; Rest,
1986). Moral intent and character are less frequently examined. This may be because of
methodological challenges in operationalizing these concepts.
Additionally, the ethical decision-making process almost always has been examined as an
exclusively logical process, although some theoretical work has acknowledged that affect may be
an important factor here. One of the key criticisms of Kohlberg’s influential work in morality is
that it is “too cerebral, that it misses the ‘heart’ of morality” (Rest et al., 1999, p. 10). In fact,
Rest (1986) asserted that a key part of moral judgment involves individuals interpreting their
feelings that arise in response to a moral situation. Jones’ (1991) construct of moral intensity
also suggests that individuals experience some type of issue-contingent emotion as they progress
through the process of moral reasoning. However, moral intensity is an under-researched
construct at this point (Loe et al., 2000), as it seems that researchers tend to shy away from
researching the emotional components of the ethical process. Indeed, it may be that the root of
the methodological difficulties in ethics research lies in the theoretical and empirical neglect of
these emotional components.

38
 Emotions and Ethics
Although Rest (1986) did not intend the four component model of morality to represent a
wholly cognitive process, researchers in business who have adopted this model have treated it as
such. This also may be due to measurement challenges. Furthermore, empirical research in
emotions is at a relatively early stage in its development, even compared to ethics. Recently,
however, some research has started to examine the linkages between emotion and ethical
decision-making (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Folger et al., 2002; Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; Greene et
al., 2001; Harlos & Pinder, 2000; Moll et al., 2001). Before examining this research in more
detail, a brief review of literature on emotions is provided below.
Emotion is a feeling and its associated thoughts; it encompasses psychological and
physiological states as well as subsequent behaviors (Goleman, 1995) and arises in reaction to an
object or event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Emotions are characterized by the central
component of experience (e.g., the experience of joy, anger, or sadness). Other components of
emotion include: expression, behavior, cognition, and physiology (Larsen, Diener, & Lucas,
2002). The experiential component of emotion materializes as tendencies toward action, biasing
factors on perceptions, or feeling states (Izard, 1993). Although emotional experiences can be
activated by neural, sensorimotor, motivational, and cognitive systems, cognition is not a
necessary precursor to such experiences (Izard, 1993). Emotions are vital in human reactions to
many types of stimuli, influencing behavior either directly or indirectly through physiological,
cognitive, or social processes (Lord & Kanfer, 2002).
The study of emotions can be organized under three categories: evolutionary approaches,
cognitive approaches, and physiological approaches (Plutchik, 1994; Weiss, 2002). The
evolutionary approach treats emotions as computational programs that have developed over the
course of human evolution in order to help them address problems relating to adaptation and
survival (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000; Izard, 1993). Cognitive
approaches to the study of emotions tend to emphasize interpretive processes as a key generative
force of certain emotions (Lazarus, 1991), but also include examination of the cognitive
outcomes of emotions (Weiss, 2002). The physiological approach to emotions research
represents the bulk of the emotions literature. This final approach emphasizes two types of
studies relating to: biophysical feedback of emotion and mapping the emotion areas of the brain.

39
 Of particular interest in this dissertation are the cognitive and physiological approaches to
emotions research. Interestingly, cognitive research indicates that negative emotions,
particularly strong negative emotions, are more likely to lead to specific behavioral outcomes
that are accompanied by a very limited amount of cognitive processing, because they tend to
occur much more quickly than positive emotion responses (Fossum & Barrett, 2000;
Fredrickson, 1998). Furthermore, individual emotional responses to an event depend upon
whether the event is perceived as being relevant to personal goals and concerns thereof (Lord &
Kanfer, 2002). Another recent study (Forgas, 2001) suggests that individuals who experience
positive emotions are more likely to respond to a given situation with a cognitive over “gut-
feeling” (a “top-down) processing style where individuals who experience negative emotions
have processing styles more defined by their “gut-feelings” (a “bottom-up” style). In an earlier
work, Forgas (1995) theorized that judgments, which require substantive or heuristic processing,
are more influenced by affective states than judgments requiring the direct access of information.
The physiological approach to emotion from a feedback perspective can be traced back to
James (1884). James suggested that emotions are not resultant from cognitive interpretation of
events but that emotional stimulus causes autonomic responses, and it is the perception of these
responses that actually causes emotions. Although subsequent research has not provided support
for emotion-specific autonomic activity (Cacioppo et al., 2000), this approach has been very
influential in contemporary physiological as well as cognitive studies of emotion. Physiological
approaches also include research that is primarily conducted to locate the central emotion areas
of the brain (Weiss, 2002). Methods for this research approach have historically been
challenging (ranging from the dissection of primates to the examination of emotion deficiencies
in brain-damaged subjects). However, recent technologies (e.g., positron emission tomography
and magnetic resonance imaging) allow researchers to view the activation of subjects’ brain
areas in response to emotional stimuli. Apparently, this research indicates that the concept of
“brain centers” for emotional activity is not likely. Rather, emotional activity seems to occur
across several areas of the brain, functioning more like a “system” (LeDoux, 1996; Weiss, 2002).
Emotions are typically thought of as a temporary state in response to a set of stimulus.
However, emotions also can be considered as having an enduring trait-like quality (George,
1996). Depending on the research question at hand, researchers can focus either on the trait or
state components of emotions in terms of conceptualization and measurement (Larsen et al.,

40
2002). The predominant approach to measure emotions is through the use of self-report
measures (Larsen et al., 2002). To date, substantial research exists confirming the existence of
trait emotional differences among individuals (Larsen & Ketelarr, 1991; Watson, 2000).
Using a cognitive model of trait emotions (see Figure 2.6), Larsen (2000) illustrates that
emotions affect an individual’s sensitivity to and responses to a given stimulus. The personality
traits of extroversion and neuroticism moderate an individual’s sensitivity to emotional stimulus.
Similar to positive affectivity, extroversion causes individuals to be especially responsive to cues
pertaining to rewards and pleasure (Gray, 1990; 1994). On the other hand, neuroticism (like
negative affectivity) causes individuals to be more sensitive to cues relating to punishment and
frustration. Four personality processes help individuals to control their emotional responses:
cognitive (mental behaviors that cause differences among individuals in how they process
emotional stimuli), situational selection (the type of situation that individuals select themselves
into shapes and is shaped by their experience emotions), evocation (individuals shape the
situations in which they find themselves), and direct regulation (individuals draw upon different
coping mechanisms to directly regulate their emotional responses). The personality trait,
emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; 1998), also can influence the regulation of emotional
responses. Emotional intelligence is comprised of five aspects, two of which refer to the
regulation of emotions in others. However, three aspects of emotional intelligence are
instrumental in the self-regulation of emotional responses: “self-awareness of feelings and
preferences, self-regulation of emotions, and self-motivation to engage in appropriate behaviors”
(Larsen et al., 2002).
Affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) has provided management scholars
with a useful framework upon which to base their theoretical and empirical work in emotions
(Ashkanasy et al., 2002). This theory asserts that reactive behavior in organizations occurs in
response to specific events as opposed to the general organizational environment. Furthermore,
affective reactions mediate the impact of these events on actual behavioral responses (Ashkanasy
et al., 2002; Lord & Kanfer, 2002; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Workplace conditions give rise
to distinct affective events, which cause a worker to have affective responses such as moods or
emotions. In the short term, these affective responses lead to impulsive actions, but in the long-
term they influence employee work attitudes, behavior, and ultimately performance. In other
words, affective reactions function as the critical link between workplace events and behaviors.

41
 Emotional
Stimulus Organism
Response

Stimulus Response Regulation

Sensitivity Emotional
Extroversion Intelligence
Neuroticism Or…
Cognitive processes
Situation selection
Evocation processes
Regulation processes

FIGURE 2.6

LARSEN’S (2000) MODEL OF THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN MODERATING &

MEDIATING AFFECTIVE RESPONSES

42
The impact of these affective events, echoing Larsen’s (2000) propositions, depend on an
individual’s sensitivity to the events and his/her ability to regulate affective reactions to these
events. Thus, behavioral outcomes may be more of a function of affective regulatory processes
than actual event stimulus.
Affective events theory has been used to empirically examine workplace aggression
(Glomb, Steel, & Arvey, 2002), emotional labor (Grandey & Brauburger, 2002), socialization
(Ashforth & Saks, 2002), and the work-family interface (MacDermid, Seery, & Weiss, 2002).
To date, however, this theory has not been used to explore the role of emotion or affect in the
ethical decision-making process.
The Role of Emotion in Moral Reasoning
There are two primary justifications for incorporating emotion into the investigation of
the ethical decision-making process. The first justification is based on existing physiological
research that has established a link between emotional engagement and ethical behavior in
individuals. The second justification is based on cognitive approaches in existing theoretical
work in both business ethics (e.g., Rest, 1986; Jones, 1991) and emotions.
Examining autonomic (physiological) responses of subjects to ethical scenarios, Damasio
(1994) found that individuals who make ethical judgments tend to have more intense emotional
reactions to ethical stimulus. Along these lines, two additional studies used functional magnetic
resonance imaging to observe the emotional activity (in the brain) of individuals, who read
ethical scenarios (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002). Both studies found that individuals
who formulated ethical judgments in response to these scenarios engaged the emotion areas of
their brain to formulate such judgments.
One of the earliest cognitive theoretical works (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001) to explicitly
link emotion and business ethics, proposed that individuals who are likely to respond in an
ethical manner to moral dilemmas differ from others in terms of positive (versus negative)
feeling state as well as intensity of this feeling state (aroused versus quiet). This work has not
been empirically tested to date. However, Folger and colleagues (2002) have theoretically
looked at intense, negative affective states and their potential impact on ethical behavior and the
processes thereof, specifically in reaction to organizational injustice. These authors base their
discussion on affective events theory, and focus specifically on the mediating impact of emotion
processes as regulatory influences on affective behavioral responses. Although the specific

43
framework used by Folger has not been tested empirically, Harlos and Pinder (2000)
qualitatively examined the role of emotion in responding to organizational injustice. They found
that emotions precede, accompany, and are a consequence of experiences of injustice. In
particular, the emotion states of anger and fear were found to be widely and intensely held
among their subjects.
Thus, in spite of the scarcity of research linking emotion and ethics, there is strong
evidence (physiological and qualitative) to justify the examination of emotion as a key
component in the ethical decision-making process. Furthermore, affective events theory has
emerged as a logical tool through which to map how emotion specifically impacts the ethical
response of individuals in business.
PROPOSED MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
In this section of the dissertation, a series of hypotheses are presented that are designed to
articulate the role of emotion in the ethical decision-making process. These hypotheses reflect
the overall premise of this dissertation, which is that individuals who experience higher levels of
emotion in response to ethical stimulus are more likely to make moral decisions and engage in
moral behavior. The first five hypotheses are concerned with the direct effects of several
personal characteristics as well as the situational factor of peer influence within the process of
moral deliberation (or moral reasoning). These hypothesized relationships are illustrated in the
conceptual model pictured in Figure 2.7.
Work environmental features and work events combine to form ethical situations that
function as a stimulus evoking affective reactions from decision makers. The gender and
personality type (neuroticism and extraversion) of the decision maker influence the type and
strength of these affective reactions. Depending on the type and strength of affective reactions,
they will feed into the decision makers’ processes of moral deliberation.
As displayed in Figure 2.7, moral deliberation is comprised of Rest’s (1979) four
components; however because of the complex interrelationships between these components, they
were operationalized as a single comprehensive construct in this study. Several additional
variables theoretically will impact the internal components of moral deliberation. Because of
measurement limitations, these relationships are indicated in the model with dashed lines and
will not be tested in this study. Still, these variables are expected to have an important effect on
moral deliberation as a whole. Specifically, emotional intelligence, Machiavellianism, previous

44
Ethical Stimulus

Work
Environment
Features
(peer influence)

Work
Events

--Moral Deliberation--

Moral Moral Moral

Affective Behavior
Sensitivity Judgment Motivation
Reactions
● Type (+/-)
● Strength
(strong/weak)

Gender

Emotional ● Machiavellianism ● Conscientiousness

Intelligence ● Previous Ethical ● Self-Monitoring
● Neuroticism Judgments ● Locus of Control
● Extroversion ● Locus of Control
● Strength of
Religious Beliefs

FIGURE 2.7

PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF AFFECTIVE MORALITY

45
ethical decisions, locus of control, strength of religious beliefs, conscientiousness, self-
monitoring, and the behavior of peers will all shape the moral deliberation processes of decision
makers. While, the testable model from which the specific hypotheses are generated in this
dissertation is provided in Figure 2.8, the nature of these expected relationships between the
individual variables mentioned above and the individual components of moral deliberation are
provided as the theoretical justification for Hypothesis 6.
Ethical Stimulus and Affective Reactions
Affective reactions are emotions that arise in response to specific events (Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996). Affective reactions can be broken down further into content and degree of
arousal (Weiss, 2002). In other words, all affective reactions can be classified by their type (i.e.,
positive or negative) and strength (i.e., strong or weak). There are three sources of support for
the notion that individual affective reactions are influential in moral deliberation when
individuals are presented with the ethical stimulus that arises from their work environments.
First, this relationship has been implied by ethics researchers in the past (e.g. Gilligan, 1982;
Rest, 1979, 1986). These researchers acknowledged that an exclusively cerebral
conceptualization of ethical decision-making is inaccurate, and that it is more likely that
emotions play a role in this process. Rest (1986) also recognized that some situations potentially
result in very strong emotions that occur before cognitive encoding, which led him to conclude
that there is a strong relationship between emotion and moral sensitivity. Furthermore, research
in organizational justice, where injustice can be equated to ethical stimulus, has demonstrated
that such stimulus leads to emotional responses in individuals (Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano,
1999).
Research in psychology offers a second source of support for the importance of affect in
individual responses to ethical stimulus. Zajonc (1984) provided evidence supporting the claim
that affective reactions are independent from cognitions and precede cognition when responding
to various triggering stimulus. Building upon Zajonc’s argument as well as work by Lazarus
(1991), Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) developed affective events theory, which also implies that
affect provides the link between work events and an individual’s subsequent attitudes and
behaviors. Several other researchers (e.g., Izard, 1984; Scherer, 1994) also have provided
support for the importance of affect, asserting that emotions are an automatically occurring
interface between environmental stimulus and behavioral reactions. In other words, when

46
Ethical Stimulus

Work
Environment
Features
(peer influence)

H5

Work
Events

H1
H4
Affective --Moral Deliberation--
Reactions (+/-)

H2
H6
Gender ● Emotional Intelligence
● Machiavellianism
H3 ● Previous Ethical Judgments
● Strength of Religious Beliefs
● Neuroticism ● Locus of Control
● Extroversion ● Conscientiousness
● Self-Monitoring

FIGURE 2.8

PROPOSED TESTABLE MODEL OF AFFECTIVE MORALITY

47
individuals are presented with the stimuli of an ethical situation, their first response will be
affective or emotional.
The final source of support for the key role of affect in the ethical decision-making
process is based on the physiological evidence that was discussed earlier in this dissertation.
Recent work in neuroscience has identified emotional arousal as the key individual difference
between those who respond ethically to moral dilemmas and those who do not (Damasio, 1994;
Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al, 2001). Specifically, this research has shown that the emotion-
areas of the brain are engaged in individuals who behave ethically. Thus, as emotion has been
empirically linked to the ethical decision-making process and emotion has primacy over
cognition, it is reasonable to expect that individuals will respond to an ethical stimulus with
emotion. These arguments provide the foundation for the central premise in this dissertation as
reflected in the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive correlation between the unethical behavior of peers
and individual affective reactions.
In the present study, ethical stimulus is comprised from 2 components of peer behavior:
cheating by peers and the presence of authority figure. Specifically, individuals who are exposed
to the ethical stimulus of cheating by their peers will have stronger negative reactions than those
who are not.
Gender and Emotional Sensitivity to Stimulus
As cited previously, gender is the single most researched individual trait in ethics
research (Ford & Richardson, 1994; Loe et al., 2000). While some findings suggest mixed
results, the general consensus is that females tend to be more ethical than males (Collins, 2000).
However, no theoretical explanation has been offered for this relationship. This may be because
previous research in ethics also has not considered the impact of emotion. It is proposed here
that females will tend to have more intense affective reactions to ethical stimulus than will males.
Past research supports this contention, citing primarily socio-cultural over biological
justifications for this difference. For example, Heppner and Gonzales (1987) assert that men
have been conditioned to feel less. The second hypothesis summarizes this research.
Hypothesis 2: Females will experience stronger affective reactions than males regardless
of the situation.

48
Personality Influences on Emotional Sensitivity to Stimulus
Several researchers have postulated that the trait emotions of individuals will lead to
differential emotional responses to various stimulus (Larsen, 2000; Watson, 2000; Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996). Referring back to Figure 2.6, Larsen proposed that the personality traits of
extroversion and neuroticism can serve as the source of difference among individuals in their
sensitivity to a given stimulus. Specifically, individuals who have high levels of extroversion are
more likely to experience positive affective responses where those with high levels of
neuroticism are more likely to experience negative affect. As extroversion and neuroticism have
been found to have empirical overlap with measures for trait positive affectivity and negative
affectivity, it makes sense to expect that these “Big Five” personality traits would be related
similarly to individual affective reactions. Based on this research, a third hypothesis is offered:
Hypothesis 3a: Individuals who have high levels of neuroticism are more likely to
experience a negative affective reaction than those who have low levels of neuroticism.
Hypothesis 3b: Individuals who have high levels of extraversion are more likely to
experience a positive affective reaction than those who have low levels of extraversion.
As mentioned previously, extroverted individuals are particularly responsive to cues that
relate to rewards and pleasure, and neurotic individuals are more receptive to cues that pertain to
punishment and frustration. As ethical stimuli often requires that a decision be made that will
impact others, the personality types of decision-makers stand to have an important influence on
their perception of moral dilemmas and subsequent processes of moral deliberation. In fact,
Larsen and colleagues (2002) pointed out that understanding the differential effects of these
personality traits on emotional sensitivity hold important implications for several issues in the
workplace including the impact on emotional responses to “unpleasant events at work” (p. 77)
which can certainly include ethical dilemmas. The implications of this will be further explored in
the paragraphs that follow.
Affective Reactions and Moral Deliberation
The strength of emotion may be an important influence on moral deliberation. As
suggested by Gaudine and Thorne (2001), the arousal elements of emotion may stimulate the
cognitive activity that is necessary in order to recognize that an ethical dilemma exists. Rest’s
conceptualization of moral sensitivity, the first component of moral deliberation, depicts it as a
cognitively demanding process: individuals must interpret their situation to imagine the types of

49
actions possible as well as how these actions can affect everyone involved in the situation.
Higher levels of emotional arousal can facilitate the undertaking of this complex process. On the
other hand, individuals who have lesser levels of emotional arousal may not have the energy
needed to identify the existence of an ethical dilemma.
An individual’s moral sensitivity depends on the type as well as strength of his/her
affective reactions. As discussed earlier, individuals who experience positive emotions are more
likely to employ cognitive processing of a stimulus event (Forgas, 2001). This suggests that
such individuals have a greater likelihood of engaging in the process of moral deliberation in
developing behavioral responses to ethical stimuli, especially when experiencing positive
emotion at a high level of arousal (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001). This reasoning leads to the
Hypothesis 4b:
Hypothesis 4a: Individuals with strong positive affective reactions will be more likely to
engage in moral deliberation.
However, individuals who experience negative emotions are more likely to respond with
a “bottom-up” style of processing – that is, such individuals are driven by their “gut-feelings”
when formulating behavioral reactions to stimulus events (Forgas, 2001). This is consistent with
the theoretical explanation offered by Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) for affect-driven behavior.
In other words, affect-driven behavior tends to take place when individuals respond to stimuli
with negative emotions. Furthermore, this type of behavior typically takes place during a short
time period, such that there is not enough time for the cognitive processing, inherent in moral
deliberation, to take place (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Finally, it is more likely that intensely
held negative emotions would result in affect-driven behaviors than negative emotions
characterized by lower levels of arousal. These ideas are reflected in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4b: Individuals who experience strong negative affective reactions will be
less likely to engage in moral deliberation.
The Influence of Peers on Moral Deliberation
Consistent with Azjen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior, which is an extension of the
theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Azjen, 1975; Azjen & Fishbein, 1977), and Rest’s (1979,
1986) model of morality; individuals are more likely to act out their behavioral intentions if they
believe they have the ability to do so. Azjen (1991) conceptualizes this moderating influence as
“perceived behavioral control” (p. 182), where Rest uses the term “moral character.” There are

50
both internal (e.g. value conflicts) and external (e.g. organizational norms) obstacles that can
prevent an individual from carrying out his/her moral behavioral intentions, which would lead to
a moral failure.
There are several factors from one’s work environment that may impact formulation of
behavioral intentions, which is represented in Figure 2.7 as the component of moral motivation.
An especially influential factor that is expected to shape one’s development of behavioral
intentions is the behavior of an actor’s peers. Social learning theory (Bandura, 1977) suggests
that individuals look to others to form a base upon which to model their own behaviors. In this
case, individuals who seek to develop behavioral intentions to respond to a moral dilemma
would look to their work colleagues for behavioral cues. Past research has demonstrated that
significant others do indeed shape the ethical decision-making and behavioral processes of
individuals (e.g., Baumhart, 1961; Brenner & Molander, 1977; Dubinsky & Loken, 1988; Ferrell
& Gresham, 1985; Trevino & Victor, 1992). In keeping with past research, it is expected that
when their peers engage in unethical behavior, individuals will be less motivated to engage in
ethical behavior, and thus less likely to successfully engage in moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative correlation between the unethical behavior of peers and
moral deliberation.
The Impact of Personality Factors on Moral Deliberation
Several personality characteristics have been linked specifically to moral sensitivity,
moral judgment, and moral character and generally to moral deliberation. Emotional intelligence
(Goleman, 1995, 1998) includes elements of awareness, control, and behavior motivations; it is
likely to have an effect on moral sensitivity. For example, individuals with high levels of
emotional intelligence will be conscious of the type and strength of their emotions; they will be
able to regulate their subsequent cognitive and behavioral actions; and they will be motivated to
employ situationally appropriate behaviors in response to the ethical dilemma.
Hypothesis 6a: There is a positive correlation between emotional intelligence and moral
deliberation.
Individuals who are high Machiavellians seek personal advancement at almost any price
(Christie & Geis, 1970). Thus such individuals are likely to behave opportunistically and are
less likely to make moral judgments, which would constitute a moral failure (Rest, 1979, 1986).
Past research in business ethics supports this claim, demonstrating that Machiavellianism is

51
negatively related to ethical decisions (Hegarty & Sims, 1978; Cyriac & Dhrmaraj, 1994;
Singhapakdi, & Vitell, 1990; Verbeke, et al., 1996). Past moral judgments are expected to be
positively related to such judgments in the future, as well. As mentioned earlier, cognitive moral
development was developed primarily to help explain moral judgment (Rest, 1979, 1986).
Individuals with higher levels of moral development have been shown in research to make more
moral judgments than individuals with lower levels of moral development (Everett et al., 1996;
Goolsby & Hunt, 1992; Mason & Mudrack, 1997; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). Reidenbach
and Robin’s alternative conceptualization of moral judgment has been shown to outperform
cognitive moral development in the context of business ethics and will be used in this study
(Robin et al., 1996). Another individual variable that is likely to impact moral deliberation is
locus of control. Individuals with internal loci of control feel that they can change their
environment in a meaningful way (Bandura, 1977). It seems likely that individuals with internal
loci of control will be more likely to make moral decisions as they have more confidence in their
abilities to really make a difference. While past research has produced mixed findings regarding
this relationship, this research has provided substantial justification to continue investigation of
locus of control on moral deliberation (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990; Zahra, 1989). Finally, the
strength of an individual’s religious convictions is expected to impact his/her processes of moral
deliberation. Individuals with strong religious beliefs are likely to refer to these beliefs as they
determine which behavioral response is morally appropriate for a given situation. While the
specifics of religious denominations may vary, there are general commonalities underlying most
denominations, which include such ideals as “the golden rule.” The previous discussion links
several individual variables to differing components within moral deliberation (moral sensitivity
and moral judgment). However, because of the fuzziness inherent among the components that
comprise moral deliberation, the following hypotheses are written in reference to the general
construct of moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 6b: There is a negative correlation between Machiavellianism and moral
deliberation.
Hypothesis 6c: There is a positive correlation between an individual’s prior ethical
judgments and moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 6d: There is a positive correlation between internal locus of control and moral
deliberation.

52
 Hypothesis 6e: There is a positive correlation between strong religious beliefs and moral
deliberation.
As discussed for Hypothesis 5, both internal and external factors can shape an
individual’s behavioral intentions in ethical dilemmas. In order to successfully engage in moral
deliberation, it takes individuals with strong characters who are able to regulate their own actions
to formulate and execute their moral behavioral intentions (Rest, 1986). Three specific
personality characteristics are expected to impact moral deliberation: conscientiousness, self-
monitoring, and locus of control. As illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 2.7, these
personality traits are theorized to moderate the relationship between the final two components of
moral deliberation. However, because of the ambiguity of these components, the hypotheses
proposed are in relation to the more general construct of moral deliberation. Because locus of
control is also hypothesized to have an impact on moral judgment (Hypothesis 6d), the
hypotheses below address only conscientiousness and self-monitoring.
The first personality characteristic postulated to impact moral deliberation is
conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is one component of the five-factor model of personality
(Mount & Barrick, 1995; Perrewe & Spector, 2002). It represents the tendency in individuals to
be reliable, disciplined, determined, systematic, and oriented toward achievement (Perrewe &
Spector, 2002). Conscientiousness is one of the most frequently researched personality traits,
and has been found to be a valid predictor of job performance (Mount & Barrick, 1995). It also
has been shown to act as a buffer against the negative effects of perceptions of politics on job
performance (Hochwarter, Witt, & Kacmar, 2000). Given this research it is logical to expect that
conscientiousness has some effect on the behavioral outcomes of the ethical decision-making
process. Extending the research of Hochwarter and colleagues (2002), high levels of
conscientiousness may in fact serve as a buffer against the effect of external obstacles that
obstruct the link between moral intentions and behavior.
Hypothesis 6f: There is a positive correlation between conscientiousness and moral
deliberation.
In addition to having strength of character, individuals who are successful in moral
deliberation also must be able to regulate their behavioral processes (Rest, 1986). Self-
monitoring is a personality trait that may play an important role. Those who are high self-
monitors are able to evaluate as well as regulate their behaviors (Snyder, 1987). High self-

53
monitors interpret their environments and modify their actions accordingly. In the context of
ethical behavior, high self-monitors have greater awareness of and can better anticipate both
internal and external obstacles in the way of executing moral intentions. Furthermore, they can
package their actions appear more consistent with their work environments, increasing the
likelihood of acting out their moral intentions and thereby successfully engaging in moral
deliberation.
Hypothesis 6g: There is a positive correlation between self-monitoring and moral
deliberation.
Affect as a Mediator in the Moral Deliberation Process
The discussion up to this point has provided evidence supporting the existence of the
direct effect of affective reactions on moral deliberation as well as several individual and
situational factors. This dissertation has emphasized the central role of affective reactions in the
overall process of moral deliberation, and has displayed affect in this central role in both the
proposed conceptual model and testable model (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). As is illustrated in these
models, affect has been conceptualized as a mediating influence between peer influence, trait
affect (extraversion and neuroticism), and gender.
Specifically, affect is expected to have a partial mediating effect in the peer influence-moral
deliberation relationship and full mediating effects for trait affect and gender. For example,
when individuals experience high levels of negative affective reactions, the impact of peer
influence on their moral deliberation processes may be augmented; yet as is proposed in
Hypothesis 5, peer influence is also expected to have a direct effect within the process of moral
deliberation. Furthermore, trait affect and gender are not depicted in direct relationships with
moral deliberation, but are expected to impact the process through the vehicle of affective
reactions. That is to say, the effect of these variables on the process of moral deliberation largely
depends on the affective reactions of individuals. Thus, the following hypotheses are included to
test for the mediating influence of affect.
Hypothesis 7a: Affect partially mediates the relationship between moral deliberation and
peer influence.
Hypothesis 7b: Affect mediates the relationship between moral deliberation and trait
affect.
Hypothesis 7c: Affect mediates the relationship between moral deliberation and gender.

54
 Summary
The present chapter selectively reviewed the research on ethical decision-making and
emotions. In addition, this chapter developed a model of affective morality to analyze the
behavior of individuals in response to ethical stimuli. This model was then used to construct
seven research hypotheses to be tested in current study. These hypotheses are summarized in
Table 2.4.

55
 TABLE 2.4
PROPOSED HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1- There is a positive correlation between ethical stimulus and individual
affective reactions of varying types and strengths.
Hypothesis 2- Females will experience stronger affective reactions than males.
Hypothesis 3- (a) Individuals who have high levels of neuroticism are more likely to
experience a negative affective reaction than those who have low levels of neuroticism. (b)
Individuals who have high levels of extraversion are more likely to experience a positive
affective reaction than those who have low levels of extraversion.
Hypothesis 4- (a) Individuals with strong positive affective reactions will be more likely to
engage in moral deliberation. (b) Individuals with strong negative affective reactions will
be less likely to engage in moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 5- There is a negative correlation between the unethical behavior of key
colleagues and moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 6- (a) There is a positive correlation between emotional intelligence and moral
deliberation. (b) There is a negative correlation between Machiavellianism and moral
deliberation. (c) There is a positive correlation between an individual’s prior ethical
judgments and moral deliberation. (d) There is a positive correlation between internal locus
of control and moral deliberation. (e) There is a positive correlation between strong
religious beliefs and moral deliberation. (f) There is a positive correlation between
conscientiousness and moral deliberation. (g) There is a positive correlation between self-
monitoring and moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 7-Affect mediates the relationships between moral deliberation and (a) peer
influence (partial), (b) trait affect (full), and (c) gender (full).

56
 CHAPTER 3

METHOD

In order to test the proposed model and hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, an

experimental study was designed and executed such that the questions of interest in the model
could be tested. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the experimental study that was
performed to examine the role of emotion in the ethical decision-making process, in particular as
applied to students engaged in scenario exercises as well as an experimental simulation. More
specifically, this study explored ethical decision-making behavior of students as they considered
and responded to an experimentally contrived ethical stimulus. This chapter is comprised of two
major sections. The first section gives an overview of the study and a rationale for why it was
performed. The second section describes the methods used, including the subjects, procedure,
measures, and statistical analyses. The underlying aim of this research is to build theory about
the role of emotion in the ethical decision-making process.
Procedure
Classroom Introduction
Students enrolled in organizational behavior, strategy, human resources, mathematics,
and sociology classes were asked to participate in a laboratory experiment examining different
factors that affect human reading comprehension and memory recall processes. In an effort to
encourage commitment to the experimental tasks, students were informed that they would
receive bonus points depending on their performance during the experiment. Specifically, bonus
points were said to be contingent on quiz scores. In actuality, all students who participated
received extra class credit, however they were not informed of this until the debriefing session
that was conducted after the completion of the experiment. Students were recruited for this
experiment on the first day of class at which time they completed a packet of information
including a survey as well as Human Subjects Informed Consent Form (Appendix C), and

57
approximately one week later, they received a sign-up sheet specifying the various times
available for participating in the experiment.
Pre-Experiment Orientation
The experiment was conducted in a meeting room in the College of Business. Students
were tested in groups of five, each containing a male confederate, who alternated between ethical
and unethical behavior (cheating and not cheating) for each group. As gender was a key variable
of interest in this study, effort was made to recruit an equal number of males and females for
each group. The students were told that they were in competition with the other group members
such that the student who achieved the highest score on the task would receive the maximum
bonus points while the others in the group would receive a minimum of extra credit points.
Experiment Description
The groups were tested one session at a time during a five-week period. For most of the
sessions, the same male confederate was used in each group session to avoid creating any
experimental effects outside the key interests of this study. However, when scheduling conflicts
could not be overcome two additional male confederates were called upon as substitutes. The
data was later analyzed to determine whether a confederate effect existed, and the results were
insignificant. In the first portion of the experiment, subjects were provided with a packet of
information containing an excerpt from a method section of a psychological journal article (See
Appendix D), followed by a quiz (See Appendix E) with very specific questions regarding this
excerpt. The reading excerpt was intentionally designed to be challenging for the subjects. The
quiz was designed to be difficult. The difficulty of these tasks was meant to create a situation
where subjects realize their bonus points were at risk. The final component of the information
packet was an abbreviated version of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
The ethical stimulus from Figure 2.8 was comprised of both the controlled experimental
setting and a trigger event. Specifically, the stimulus that triggered the relationships observed in
this study was created in the treatment group when the confederate cheated on the experimental
task. An additional component of the stimulus was whether the researcher was present. Thus,
the “work environment” was operationalized as the experimental environment that subsumes the
recruitment of subjects, the instructions they received, the tasks they are assigned to perform, and
the setting in which the experiment takes place. The “work event,” as described in the previous

58
paragraphs, occurred when the confederate behaved in a manner so that it would be obvious to
the study participants that he was cheating, and when the researcher was not present. This work
event, which was constant for all experimental groups, created an ethical situation, which is
defined by Jones (1991) to be a situation wherein specific decisions and/or behavior have
consequences for others and entails that the decision maker or actor make a choice.
Subjects were first instructed to carefully read the excerpt within a timed period of five
minutes. A timer was set in plain view to make the time constriction apparent for the study
participants. After all subjects had completed their readings of the excerpt, they were told to
continue and take the quiz during which they were instructed to not refer back to the excerpt in
the front of their packets. They were informed that the quiz was meant to measure their memory
and reading comprehension abilities. For a portion of the groups at this point, the researcher’s
cell phone rang. The researcher announced to the study participants that she had to take the call,
stated that she would return shortly, and exited the room.
The confederate then proceeded to turn back to the excerpt in such a manner that it would
appear obvious to the other subjects that he was cheating. This experimental manipulation was
meant to produce a social influence on subjects to cheat. The confederate then observed whether
subjects cheated themselves, recording their behaviors on a coding sheet hidden in his packet.
For groups that were exposed to the “absent researcher treatment,” the researcher
returned to the room after approximately five minutes, collected the quizzes, and appeared to
grade the quizzes on site. For sessions when the researcher was continually present throughout
the experimental task, she simply collected the quizzes at the end of the time period allotted and
proceeded to “grade” the quizzes. While the researcher graded the quizzes, subjects were given
10 minutes to complete the PANAS scale (see Appendix F). Regardless of actual quiz scores,
the researcher then announced that the confederate had the highest score and therefore was
awarded the full amount of bonus points. At this point, the confederate recorded if any subjects
voluntarily informed the researcher of the “cheating incidents” during the experiment. In this
situation, the researcher responded that she would review the individual quiz results, and then
asked to meet with each subject individually to record their names and check their information
for the purposes of recording bonus points. If no subjects protested the results, the researcher
still asked to meet with each subject individually to collect their packets and again check their
information for the purposes of recording bonus points.

59
 During this time with the researcher, subjects were given the opportunity to privately
inform her that cheating had occurred. The researcher kept track of the subjects that informed
her of cheating. In meeting with each subject individually, the researcher checked the subjects’
names and social security numbers, thanked them for their participation, and informed them that
their bonus points would be reported to their classroom instructors and added to their grades.
Post-Experiment Debriefing
Approximately one week after the post experimental surveys were collected, the
researcher met with subjects at their regular class times to debrief them about the experiment.
The researcher informed subjects of the actual experimental research question and explained that
all participants would obtain the maximum number of extra credit points for their participation in
the experiment, not considering their actual performance. It also was explained that this
deception was necessary to cause students to take the experimental task seriously and put forth
their best effort throughout the experiment. At this time, participants were asked whether they
noticed that cheating had taken place, how they felt if they did notice cheating, why they did not
report this cheating, and if they would have been more likely to report cheating if a cash prize
had been awarded in addition to extra credit points. The researcher recorded their verbal
responses to these questions.
Measures
Control Variables
Because past research has indicated the potential effects of several demographic variables
on individual ethical decision and behavior processes, a series of questions were included in the
introductory survey that was administered when recruiting subjects. Specifically, information
was collected regarding subjects’ degree, year in school, years employed, age, nationality, and
ethnicity. These questions are illustrated in Appendix G.
Independent Variables
Affective reactions. As discussed previously, affective reactions are the moods or
emotions that individuals have in response to various events in their surroundings (Weis &
Cropanzano, 1996). In the current study, the emphasis is on affective reactions comprised of
emotions, which are typically conceived of as temporary states in response to a given stimulus.
The prevalent method to assess emotions is through self-report measures (Larsen et al., 2002).
The dominant and distinct dimensions that characterize affective structure are positive and

60
negative affect (Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 1985; Tellegen, 1985). Where positive
affect (PA) represents an individual’s feelings of enthusiasm, energy, and alertness, negative
affect (NA) reflects an individual’s displeasure and distress (Watson et al., 1988).
Early attempts at measuring these dimensions of affect treated PA and NA as enduring
traits. However, researchers have pointed out that these traits are also indicative of positive and
negative emotional reactivity (Tellegen, 1985; Watson & Clark, 1984). Thus, in an attempt to
capture individual differences in their emotional reactions to ethical stimulus, the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), developed by Watson and colleagues (1988) was used in
this study. The scale, shown in Appendix H, consists of 20 words that represent 10 positive and
10 negative feelings and emotions. Subjects indicate to what level they identify with the items
using a Likert response format with anchor points of 1 = “very slightly or not at all” and 5 =
“extremely.” Thus, this scale captures not only the content of the affective reaction but its
intensity as well. Separate scores are calculated for both PA and NA for each subject. Averages
were calculated for each type of affect, where the highest possible average is 10 and the lowest
possible average is 1. In the initial development of this scale, Watson and colleagues
administered PANAS to 660 students and reported an alpha coefficient of .89 for PA and .85 for
NA. In the current study, an alpha coefficient of .71 was found for PA and .65 for NA.
Gender. As previously discussed, gender has proven to be a key variable in past ethics
research. This demographic variable is also measured in the current study. Subjects were asked
to indicate their gender in the survey administered during recruitment as well as in the quiz
during the experiment. Males were coded “0,” and females were coded “1.”
Extraversion and neuroticism. Past research (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989, 1991; Rusting &
Larsen, 1997; Zelenski & Larsen, 1999) has found that the personality traits of extraversion and
neuroticism relate to different patterns of affective reactions in individuals. Similar to positive
and negative affect, extraversion relates to the elements of ambition and sociability in individuals
(Hogan, 1991), where neuroticism relates to the more negative feelings in individuals. The
primary difference here is that in this research, the PA and NA scales measure the immediate
affective responses to a given stimulus. However, extraversion and neuroticism deal with the
more stable, enduring, personality constructs within individuals that are expected to dictate these
reactions. To measure these personality traits, the subscales from NEO Five-Factor Inventory
(Costa & McCrae, 1978) were used. Each scale, illustrated in Appendix I, contains 12 items that

61
are measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly
agree”). Averages were calculated for each subject where the maximum possible score on either
scale is 5 points, indicating high levels on the personality trait. Sample items from the
extraversion scale include “I like to have a lot of people around me” and “I am not a cheerful
optimist” (reverse coded). The neuroticism scale includes items such as “Too often, when things
go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up” and “I often feel inferior to others.” In a
recent study (Cellar, Miller, Doverspike, & Klawsky, 1996), the scales were tested on 359 flight
attendant trainees yielding reliabilities of .72 (extraversion) and .84 (neuroticism). Here, an
alpha coefficient of .80 was found for extraversion and .84 for neuroticism.
Peer influence. Peer influence is an experimental variable. Approximately one half of
the treatment groups were exposed to unethical peer influence in the form of cheating by the
confederate. It is possible, however, that unethical peer influence took place in groups regardless
of whether the confederate cheated. Thus, the confederate monitored and recorded whether other
subjects cheated at each experimental session. Each group was coded based on the number of
cheating peers including the confederate. For example, if three out of the four subjects in a
particular group cheated, the group would be coded “3” to indicate a high level of unethical peer
influence, whereas lower numbers would indicate low levels of unethical peer influence.
Additionally, researcher location was another component of peer influence. Nearly one
third of the experimental sessions were completed in the absence of the researcher. All groups
were coded based on whether the researcher was present (1= absent, 2= present).
Emotional intelligence. According to Goleman, (1997) emotional intelligence involves,
“knowing what you are feeling and being able to handle those feelings without having them
swamp you; being able to motivate yourself to get jobs done, being creative and performing at
your peak; and sensing what others are feeling and handling relationships effectively.” This
construct is expected to moderate the relationship between affective reactions and moral
deliberation. A 33-item emotional intelligence scale (Schutte et al., 1998), displayed in
Appendix J, was used to measure individual levels of emotional intelligence. The scale items
were measured on a 5-point Likert scale where “1” represented “strongly disagree” and “5”
represented “strongly agree.” Sample items include, “I know why my emotions change” and “I
arrange events others enjoy.” During the initial development and testing of this scale, Schutte

62
and colleagues (1998) conducted an internal consistency analysis which yielded a coefficient
alpha of .90. In this research, a reliability of .87 was found for emotional intelligence.
Machiavellianism. As discussed in Chapter Two, individuals with a Machiavellianism
personality trait tend to engage in manipulative and opportunistic behavior (Christie & Geis,
1970). To measure the level of Machiavellianism, the Mach IV scale was used in this study.
This scale was originally developed by Christie and Geis (1970) and is illustrated in Appendix K.
Its twenty items were scored on a 5-point Likert scale (“strongly disagree” = 1 and “strongly
agree” = 5). Sample items include “Anyone who completely trusts anyone is asking for trouble”
and “The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.” This measure was
recently employed on a sample of 260, yielding a reliability of .76 (Valle & Perrewe, 2000).
Previous ethical judgments. An individual’s previous ethical judgments were measured
using Reidenbach and Robin’s (1988, 1990) multidimensional ethics scale (Appendix L). This
scale presents two business-related scenarios adapted from Dornoff and Tankersley (1975),
which are followed by eight items that measure the ethical judgments of respondents. The items
were scored on a 5-point Likert scale (“strongly disagree” = 1 and “strongly agree” = 5). Sample
items include “The distribution of good and bad as a result of this action is culturally acceptable”
(reverse coded) and “This action violates an unspoken promise.” For each scenario, the
maximum possible score of 40 points indicates highly moral judgments. Reidenbach and Robin
(1990) tested this scale on a sample of 152 managers in a business association and found that the
coefficient alphas for each of three scenarios ranged from .71 to .92 with an average reliability of
.80. In this research an alpha coefficient of .64 was found for the first scenario and .86 for the
second scenario.
Locus of control. Rotter’s (1966) 29-item Internal-External Locus of Control Scale was
used to measure this dispositional variable. Individuals with internal loci of control feel they can
effect meaningful change in their environments, whereas individuals with external loci of control
feel that the outcomes in their environments are beyond their influence. As illustrated in
Appendix M, this scale is comprised of 29 pairs of sentences. For each pair, the subject was
forced to choose which statement most accurately represented their beliefs. One point was
assigned for each external answer and zero points were assigned for internal answers. Thus, the
maximum possible score of 29 points is indicative of an external locus of control whereas, a
score of 0 points indicates a strong internal locus of control. A sample item pair is “It is hard to

63
know whether or not a person really likes you” (external) and “How many friends you have
depends on how nice a person you are.” Rotter (1966) tested this scale on 400 college students
and reported a reliability coefficient of .70. Similarly, Trevino and Youngblood (1990) reported
a coefficient of .74 from a sample of 94 MBA students. The current study yielded a reliability of
.68.
Strength of religious beliefs. Acknowledging the concerns of Weaver and Agle (2002)
with previously lacking operationalizations of religiosity, a four-dimensional measure of
religious beliefs (Wilkes, Burnett, & Howell, 1986) was employed in this study. Originally
developed in marketing, this scale measures church attendance, the importance of religious
values, confidence in religious values, and levels of “self-perceived righteousness.” Pictured in
Appendix N, the items in this scale were scored on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree”
and 5 = “strongly agree”). Sample items include “I go to church regularly” and “Spiritual values
are more important than material things.” In this study, an alpha coefficient of .82 was found for
this scale.
Conscientiousness. Individuals who are conscientious are considered to be dependable,
organized, hardworking, and persevering (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Similar to extraversion and
neuroticism, conscientiousness (see Appendix I) is another dimension of the NEO Five Factor
Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Its 12 items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale (1=
“strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree”). Sample items include “I work hard to accomplish
my goals” and “I keep my belongings clean and neat.” Cellar and colleagues tested this scale on
362 flight attendant trainees and found a reliability coefficient of .85. In this dissertation, the
sample yielded a reliability of .83 for conscientiousness.
Self-monitoring. Self-monitoring deals with how individuals differ in their tendencies to
manage their public images (Snyder, 1987). In this study, the 13-item Revised Self-Monitoring
Scale (Lennox & Wolf, 1984) was used to measure this trait (see Appendix O). Although there
are alternative, longer scales (Snyder, 1974; Gangestad & Snyder, 1985) to measure this trait, a
recent meta-analysis (Day, Schleicher, Unckless, & Hiller, 2002) found that the 13-item scale
exhibited higher average reliabilities (α= .80) than the other existing scales (α = .71, .73).
Consistent with the research by Day and others (2002), the reliability for self-monitoring in this
study was .79. Sample items include, “I am often able to read people’s true emotions correctly
through their eyes” and “I can usually tell when I’ve said something inappropriate by reading it

64
in the listener’s eyes” where the responses were anchored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
between 1“strongly disagree” and 5 “strongly agree.”
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, moral deliberation, was measured based on the subjects’ choice
behavior during the experimental task. Subjects were presented with 2 opportunities to engage
in ethical behavior. The first opportunity to engage in ethical behavior was when subjects had
to decide whether to cheat during the experimental task. Subjects were coded “1” if they cheated
and “2” if they did not cheat. The second decision opportunity involved whether subjects chose
to report incidents of cheating during the task. Subjects were coded “1” if they did not report
unethical behavior and “2” if they did report such behavior. Based on the average of the coded
behavioral responses to each decision opportunity, a moral deliberation index score was
calculated for each subject. The maximum possible index score of 4 points is indicative of
ethical decision-making behavior or successful moral deliberation, while the lowest possible
score of 1 point indicates unethical decision-making behavior.
Sample
The sample for this study consisted of 378 undergraduate students from a large, state
university in the southeastern United States. Students were recruited for this experiment from
two mathematics classes, one sociology class, and three business management classes. Students
from outside of the business school were recruited to help diversify mix of student subjects
obtained. Although 378 students were initially recruited and participated in the first part of this
study, only 227 students actually participated in the experimental task. According to Hair,
Anderson, Tatham and Black (1998), this sample size is sufficient to detect R2 values as small as
132percent with an alpha level of .01 and a statistical power of .80. Because subjects signed up
for session times at their discretion, groups were not randomly assigned. Thus, the researcher
controlled for the groups effects on the variables of interest. However, the sign-up times were
limited such that an equal number of men and women would attend each experimental session.
Also, to the greatest extent possible, sign-up times were constricted so that groups would be
formed by students from different classes. This was done to decrease the likelihood that the
subjects in the experimental groups would already know each other.

65
 Data Analysis
Basic descriptive statistics were conducted for each scaled variable included in this study.
Two analyses were run to test the proposed hypotheses in this study. Univariate analyses of
variance (ANOVA) and a multiple regression analysis were used to test Hypotheses 1-3 where
the dependent variable was individual affective reactions. Two moderated hierarchical regression
analyses also were conducted to test Hypotheses 4 and 6, and an additional ANOVA tested
Hypothesis 5. Finally, the proposed mediating influence of affect (Hypothesis 7) was tested with
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) test for mediation.

66
 CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

This chapter is comprised of two sections: an examination of the descriptive statistics and
correlation matrix for the variables in this research and a descriptive presentation of the results of
the analyses for this research as they pertain to the various hypotheses presented in this
dissertation.
Descriptive Statistics
Because the data in this study were collected at two different times, the sample size
ranges from 227-378. More responses (N=378) were collected during the first portion of the
study when potential subjects were solicited to participate in the experimental sessions and
completed surveys in this process. Understandably, several of the recruits failed to sign up for
and/or attend the second portion of the study, the experimental session (N=227). For the purpose
of providing a fuller picture of the descriptive statistics of the study variables, I have included the
additional respondents from recruitment when possible. However, when testing the hypotheses I
am limited to examining the smaller data set from the experimental session, for it is this sample
that provided the data on the study’s dependent variables.
Table 4.01 presents means, standard deviations and the range (minimum and maximum
values) of the variables collected from the research sample. Most of the data presented here are
relatively clear. However, to provide some perspective, a brief discussion of a few of the
variables in Table 4.01 is necessary.
For the variable DV Ethical Behavior, respondents are classified as ethical, unethical, or
average, with scores below the scale midpoint constituting unethical ratings (minimum possible
score = 1) and scores above the midpoint signifying high ethicality (maximum possible score =
2). The data in this table indicate that the average score on this variable (mean = 1.44) for this
sample was slightly below the scale midpoint of 1.5.

67
 TABLE 4.01
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
DV Ethical Behavior 1.44 0.21 1.00 2.00
T1 (confederate beh) 1.50 0.50 1.00 2.00
T2 (experimenter lctn) 1.25 0.43 1.00 2.00
Peer Influence 1.56 0.50 1.00 2.00
Group Sex 49.00 12.18 10.00 76.66
Sex 1.47 0.50 1.00 2.00
Neuroticism 2.65 0.65 1.00 4.92
Extroversion 3.58 0.55 2.00 4.83
PA 1.98 0.77 1.00 7.80
NA 1.68 0.66 1.00 7.90
Emotional Intelligence 3.76 0.37 1.52 4.88
Machiavellianism 2.75 0.38 1.50 3.90
Prv. Ethical Judgment 3.36 0.50 1.94 4.75
Religiosity 3.21 0.98 1.00 5.00
Locus of Control 11.90 3.62 3.00 21.00
Conscientiousness 3.77 0.56 1.50 5.00
Self-Monitoring 3.60 0.44 2.00 4.92
Course Subject 4.16 2.71 1.00 11.00
Group# 33.95 19.48 1.00 68.00
Group Individual ID 2.48 1.11 1.00 4.00
Confederate ID 1.24 0.51 1.00 3.00
Ethnicity 1.37 0.76 1.00 4.00
Year 3.37 0.80 1.00 5.00
Job 1.63 0.52 1.00 4.00
Tenure 1.85 0.74 1.00 5.00
Grade 2.04 0.82 1.00 4.00

68
 The variable Peer Influence is a group variable where groups are classified as ethical,
unethical, or average. The lower the score, the greater the incidence of unethical behavior in the
given group (minimum possible score = 10) and higher scores indicate ethical behavior by group
members (maximum possible score = 110). For the purposes of analysis, the data for this
variable were categorized into a two-level variable where “1” represented unethical groups and
“2” represented ethical groups. The data in this table show that the average score for this
variable (mean = 1.56) for these subjects.
For the variable Previous Ethical Judgments, individuals are classified as making either
highly moral or immoral judgments, with scores above the scale midpoint constituting moral
judgment (maximum possible score = 5) and scores below the scale midpoint indicating immoral
judgment (minimum possible score = 1). Table 4.01 reveals that the average score on this
variable (3.36) for this sample was slightly above the scale midpoint of 3.
Table 4.02 consists of the correlation matrix for the sample data. Examination of these
data indicate that there appears to be a strong negative correlation between confederate behavior
and peer influence or group ethical behavior (-.883, p<.01). This high correlation exists in part
because of the scoring of these variables, as confederate behavior is factored into the calculation
of overall group ethical behavior. Additionally, this high correlation may indicate that
individuals felt more comfortable behaving unethically when following the confederate’s
example.
There were also instances of high correlations between some of the personality traits used
in this study. Specifically, Extroversion was strongly related to Emotional Intelligence (.451,
p<.01) and Conscientiousness (.402, p<.01) and Emotional Intelligence was strongly related to
Conscientiousness (.449, p<.01) and Self-Monitoring (.465, p<.01). These relationships make
sense as the personality constructs that these instruments measure are similar and related,
however these higher correlations are not expected to detract from the key questions in this
study.
Finally, there are instances of high correlations between some control variables and other
study variables of interest. In these cases, the values of the control variables (e.g., Group
Individual ID) are nominal, not continuous. Thus, the correlations do not represent actual
relationships between these variables.

69
 TABLE 4.02
CORRELATION MATRIX (N=227)
VARIABLE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1. DV Ethical Behavior 1.000
2. T1 (confederate beh) 0.136* 1.000
3. T2 (experimenter lctn) 0.175** -0.020 1.000
4. Peer Influence -0.231** -0.883** 0.011 1.000
5. Group Sex -0.045 -0.112 0.011 0.141* 1.000
6. Sex -0.010 -0.044 0.000 0.045 0.293** 1.000
7. Neuroticism -0.042 -0.054 -0.138* 0.079 0.039 0.224** 1.000
8. Extroversion 0.102 -0.079 0.147* 0.101 0.248** 0.135** -0.308** 1.000
9. PA 0.026 0.021 0.151* -0.053 0.008 -0.090 -0.197** 0.219** 1.000
10. NA 0.036 -0.118 0.011 0.120 0.070 -0.020 0.118 0.136* 0.207** 1.000
11. Emotional Intelligence 0.021 0.065 0.015 -0.018 -0.016 0.116* -0.292** 0.451** 0.171** 0.101
12. Machiavellianism -0.026 0.049 0.001 -0.030 -0.143* -0.243** 0.168** -0.262** -0.122 0.075
13. Prv. Ethical Judgment 0.051 -0.017 0.031 -0.013 0.124 0.277** 0.003 0.141** -0.062 -0.077
14. Religiosity 0.073 -0.047 0.138* 0.017 0.030 0.168** -0.047 0.155** 0.005 -0.032
15. Locus of Control 0.008 0.027 0.010 -0.070 0.078 -0.036 -0.367** 0.235** 0.171* 0.042
16. Conscientiousness 0.110 0.017 0.107 -0.032 0.097 0.208** -0.358** 0.402** 0.175** -0.001
17. Self-Monitoring 0.100 -0.040 0.073 0.070 0.039 -0.023 -0.158** 0.236** 0.093 0.082
18. Course Subject -0.157 -0.041 -0.235** -0.040 -0.349** 0.008 0.106* -0.188** -0.100 -0.107
19. Group# -0.294* 0.005 -0.484** 0.010 -0.196** -0.054 0.123 -0.137* -0.067 0.005
20. Group Individual ID 0.018 0.008 -0.016 -0.006 -0.209** -0.845** -0.204** -0.074 0.056 0.019
21. Confederate ID 0.023 0.009 0.028 -0.069 -0.066 0.009 0.009 0.023 0.013 -0.068
22. Ethnicity 0.013 0.077 -0.049 -0.106 0.017 0.166** 0.100 -0.075 0.077 -0.007
23. Year 0.078 0.000 0.063 0.027 0.216** -0.062 -0.001 0.080 0.024 0.109
24. Job 0.027 0.019 0.124 -0.081 -0.027 -0.027 0.104* -0.123* -0.006 0.080
25. Tenure -0.126 -0.108 -0.191 0.061 0.223* 0.104 -0.015 -0.030 0.040 0.056
26. Grade 0.083 -0.062 -0.017 0.033 0.103 0.017 0.057 0.076 0.063 0.170
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

70
 TABLE 4.02 (continued)
CORRELATION MATRIX (N=227)
VARIABLE 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
11. Emotional Intelligence 1.000
12. Machiavellianism -0.242** 1.000
13. Prv. Ethical Judgment 0.210** -0.229** 1.000
14. Religiosity 0.101 -0.272** 0.122* 1.000
15. Locus of Control 0.141** -0.210** 0.007 0.032 1.000
16. Conscientiousness 0.449** -0.350** 0.138** 0.206** 0.221** 1.000
17. Self-Monitoring 0.465** 0.006 0.155** 0.042 0.133* 0.193** 1.000
18. Course Subject -0.030 0.026 -0.045 0.013 0.012 -0.142** 0.005 1.000
19. Group# 0.052 -0.021 0.019 -0.118 -0.044 -0.171** 0.069 0.564** 1.000
20. Group Individual ID -0.097 0.178** -0.304** -0.088 0.051 -0.143* 0.027 -0.004 0.044 1.000
21. Confederate ID 0.018 -0.139** 0.022 0.032 0.088 0.029 0.033 0.174** 0.061 -0.026
22. Ethnicity 0.051 -0.026 0.042 0.175** -0.036 0.096 0.006 0.096 0.008 -0.060
23. Year 0.067 0.005 0.059 -0.089 0.021 -0.048 0.080 -0.359** -0.094 0.049
24. Job -0.075 0.003 0.019 -0.023 -0.057 -0.140** -0.135** 0.076 0.008 -0.029
25. Tenure -0.067 -0.074 -0.009 -0.020 0.081 0.165* 0.011 -0.004 0.197 -0.137
26. Grade -0.061 0.023 0.004 0.034 -0.114 -0.100 0.050 -0.190** -0.103 -0.012
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

71
 TABLE 4.02 (continued)
CORRELATION MATRIX (N=227)
VARIABLE 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
21. Confederate ID 1.000
22. Ethnicity -0.022 1.000
23. Year -0.111 -0.161** 1.000
24. Job -0.025 0.085 -0.072 1.000
25. Tenure -0.217 0.006 0.089 0.125 1.000
26. Grade -0.139** 0.044 0.068 0.047 0.231* 1.000
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

72
 Apart from these instances, no other variables of interest exhibited signs of
multicollinearity to cast doubts on discriminant validity in this study. In fact, due to the design
of this study where several variables were collected in a different time and setting, some
variables exhibited lower correlations than were expected.
Hypothesis Testing
Because of the complexity of the proposed research model in this study, both mean
comparison and regression analyses were conducted to predict two different outcome variables,
affect and ethical behavior, in effect testing the research model one half at a time. This section is
divided into three discussions where the results of each analysis are examined for both of these
outcome variables. In the first discussion, affective reactions is the outcome variable, and
Hypothesis 1 (positive correlation between ethical stimulus and affect), Hypothesis 2 (females
experience stronger affect than males), Hypothesis 3a (positive correlation between neuroticism
and NA), and Hypothesis 3b (positive correlation between extroversion and PA) are examined
here (see Figure 4.1). In the second discussion (see Figure 4.2), ethical behavior is the outcome
variable, and Hypothesis 4 (positive correlation between affect and moral deliberation),
Hypothesis 5 (negative correlation between peer influence and moral deliberation), Hypothesis 6
(positive correlation between moral deliberation and each of the following factors: emotional
intelligence, previous ethical judgment, locus of control, religious beliefs, conscientiousness, and
self monitoring; and a negative correlation between moral deliberation and Machiavellianism)
are tested. Finally, a third discussion (see Figure 4.3) examines the mediating relationship
predicted by Hypothesis 7 (affective reactions fully mediates the relationship between gender
and moral deliberation, and trait affect and moral deliberation; and partially mediates the
relationship between ethical stimulus and moral deliberation). Table 4.03 displays the proposed
hypotheses in this research.
Outcome Variable: Affective Reactions
Two univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to compare affective
reactions, positive affect (PA), and negative affect (NA) for four populations defined by their
exposure to confederate behavior (T1 – cheating or no cheating) and experimenter location (T2-
present or not present). The decision to run two separate ANOVAs and skip a preliminary
MANOVA may appear to run the risk of inflating the family-wise error rate (Hair et al., 1998).

73
Ethical Stimulus

WORK
ENVIRONMENT

Work Events

H1
Affective Reactions
(+/-)
H2
H3
Gender

• Neuroticism
• Extroversion

FIGURE 4.1
DEPICTION OF HYPOTHESES 1, 2, AND 3.

74
 Ethical Stimulus
H5

Affective H4 -Moral Deliberation-

Reactions (~ethical behavior)
(+/-)

H6

• Emotional Intelligence
• Machiavellianism
• Previous Ethical Judgments
• Locus of Control
• Strength of Religious Beliefs
• Conscientiousness
• Self-Monitoring

FIGURE 4.2
DEPICTION OF HYPOTHESES 4, 5, AND 6.

75
Ethical Stimulus

Affective -Moral Deliberation-

Gender Reactions
(~ethical behavior)
(+/-)

• Neuroticism
• Extroversion

FIGURE 4.3
DEPICTION OF HYPOTHESIS 7.

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 TABLE 4.03
PROPOSED HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1- There is a positive correlation between the unethical behavior of peers and
individual affective reactions of varying types and strengths.
Hypothesis 2- Females will experience stronger affective reactions than males.
Hypothesis 3- (a) Individuals who have high levels of neuroticism are more likely to
experience a negative affective reaction than those who have low levels of neuroticism. (b)
Individuals who have high levels of extraversion are more likely to experience a positive
affective reaction than those who have low levels of extraversion.
Hypothesis 4- (a) Individuals with strong positive affective reactions will be more likely to
engage in moral deliberation. (b) Individuals strong negative affective reactions will be less
likely to engage in moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 5- There is a negative correlation between the unethical behavior of key
colleagues and moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 6- (a) There is a positive correlation between emotional intelligence and moral
deliberation. (b) There is a negative correlation between Machiavellianism and moral
deliberation. (c) There is a positive correlation between an individual’s prior ethical
judgments and moral deliberation. (d) There is a positive correlation between internal locus
of control and moral deliberation. (e) There is a positive correlation between strong
religious beliefs and moral deliberation. (f) There is a positive correlation between
conscientiousness and moral deliberation. (g) There is a positive correlation between self-
monitoring and moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 7- Affect mediates the relationship between moral deliberation and (a) peer
influence, (b) trait affect, and (c) gender.

77
However, this decision is consistent with the conclusion of Huberty and Morris (1989) that “to
require MANOVA as a prerequisite of multiple ANOVAs is illogical, and the comfort of
statistical protection is an illusion” (307).
Before running the analyses, the data were inspected to ensure that the assumptions of
ANOVA were not violated. Stem and leaf plots were visually inspected; and although this
inspection suggested some possible departures from normality, none were severe. The Levene’s
test for the assumption of homogeneity of covariance matrices in the four groups resulted in a
fail to reject decision for both PA and NA, signifying that the data is consistent with this
assumption. Finally, covariates (course subject, confederate ID, year in school, and perceived
course grade) were incorporated into the analyses to block any potential factors that could violate
the independence assumption of ANOVA.
Table 4.04 presents the mean values for the two ANOVAs. Table 4.05 presents the
results of the ANOVA for positive affect, and Table 4.06 presents the results for negative affect.
For these analyses, the covariates were examined first. Then the components of ethical stimulus,
confederate behavior (T1) and experimenter location (T2), were examined individually for main
effects and together as an interaction term. As can be seen in Tables 4.05 and 4.06, subjects
from the differing treatment groups generally did not report significantly different levels of
positive or negative affect with one exception. Subjects did report significantly different levels
of positive affect based on the location of the experimenter during the session (F= 3.654, p=
.057, df=1). This finding lends partial support for Hypothesis 1 as ethical stimulus was defined
by the interaction term (T1 X T2), yet only T2 proved to have a significant relationship with only
positive affect (not negative affect). Also worth noting is the significant relationship between
one of the covariates, perceived course grade, and negative affect (F= 3.815, p=.052, df=1),
which suggests that individuals who perceive that they have lower grades are more likely to
respond with negative affect to the ethical situation in this study.
Two additional ANOVAs were conducted to compare affective reactions, positive affect
(PA) and negative affect (NA) for two populations, males and females (Hypothesis 2). As was
discussed above, the decision to run two separate ANOVAs and skip a preliminary MANOVA
was based on the conclusion of Huberty and Morris (1989). Again, the data were inspected to
ensure that the assumptions of ANOVA were not violated. Visual inspections of stem and leaf

78
 TABLE 4.04
MEAN VALUES FOR HYPOTHESIS 1 - TABLES 4.05 AND 4.06
Confederate Behavior Experimenter Location
Cheat No Cheat Present Absent
Positive Affect 1.95 1.99 2.18 1.91
Negative Affect 1.76 1.60 1.69 1.67

TABLE 4.05
ANOVA RESULTS FOR POSITIVE AFFECT (Hypothesis 1)
Source of Variance Mean Sum of df Mean F p
Values Squares Square
Corrected Model - 3.586 7 0.512 0.871 0.538
Intercept - 16.086 1 16.086 27.031 0.000
Course Subject - 0.098 1 0.098 0.165 0.685
Confederate ID - 0.076 1 0.076 0.128 0.721
Year in School 3.37 0.023 1 0.023 0.039 0.844
Perceived Grade 2.04 0.406 1 0.406 0.683 0.410
Confederate Bhvr (T1) 1.50 0.025 1 0.024 0.038 0.846
Experimentr Lctn (T2) 1.25 2.174 1 2.174 3.654 0.057
T1 * T2 - 0.152 1 0.152 0.255 0.614
Error - 114.852 193 0.595
Total - 118.438 200

TABLE 4.06
ANOVA RESULTS FOR NEGATIVE AFFECT (Hypothesis 1)
Source of Variance Mean Sum of Df Mean F p
Values Squares Square
Corrected Model - 5.100 7 0.729 1.625 0.130
Intercept - 3.414 1 6.414 14.309 0.000
Course Subject - 0.020 1 0.020 0.044 0.833
Confederate ID - 0.155 1 0.155 0.645 0.558
Year in School 3.37 0.795 1 0.795 1.774 0.184
Perceived Grade 2.04 1.710 1 1.710 3.815 0.052
Confederate Bhvr (T1) 1.50 0.246 1 0.246 0.549 0.460
Experimentr Lctn (T2) 1.25 0.010 1 0.010 0.023 0.879
T1 * T2 - 0.608 1 0.608 1.357 0.245
Error - 86.510 193 0.448
Total - 91.610 200

79
plots generally supported the assumption of normality. Further the Levene’s test for the
assumption of homogeneity of covariance matrices in the two gender populations resulted in a
fail to reject decision for both PA and NA, showing that the data is consistent with this
assumption. Finally, similar to the previous ANOVAs covariates (course subject, confederate
ID, year in school, and perceived course grade) were incorporated into the analyses to block any
potential factors that could violate the independence assumption of ANOVA. The mean values
for these analyses are displayed in Table 4.07.
Table 4.08 presents the results of the ANOVA for positive affect, and Table 4.09 presents
the results for negative affect. The covariates were examined first, and then the effect of gender
was examined for these analyses. As can be seen in Tables 4.08 and 4.09, subjects from the
differing gender groups did not report significantly different levels of positive or negative affect.
Thus, the data here indicate that there is no significant difference in positive or negative affect
for males and females in this sample providing no support for Hypothesis 2. However, the
covariate, perceived grade, again has a significant effect on negative affect for subjects in this
experiment (F= 1.738, p=.051, df=1). Thus, it appears that subjects who perceive that they are
earning higher grades tend to experience higher levels of negative affect during this research
experiment.
Finally, two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to compare positive and
negative affective reactions for individuals based on two personality variables, neuroticism and
extraversion (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). Prior to running the regression analyses, preliminary
inspections of the data were conducted in order to ensure that the assumptions for regression
were met. This was principally accomplished through visual inspections of histograms and
frequency distributions of the data. These preliminary analyses lent support to the assumptions
of linearity, constant variance and independence of error terms, and normality of the distribution
of error terms (Hair et al., 1998).
Table 4.10 displays the results for the first hierarchical regression analysis where positive
affect is the dependent variable. In step one, emotional intelligence, conscientiousness, self-
monitoring, and ethnicity were entered as control variables. In step two, neuroticism and
extraversion were entered. Although the control variables individually did not yield a significant
effect with positive affect, the combined effect of these variables was significant (∆R2= .054,

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 TABLE 4.07
MEAN VALUES FOR HYPOTHESIS 2- TABLES 4.08 AND 4.09
Gender
Male Female
Positive Affect 2.05 1.91
Negative Affect 1.69 1.67

TABLE 4.08
ANOVA RESULTS FOR POSITIVE AFFECT (Hypothesis 2)
Source of Variance Mean Sum of df Mean F p
Values Squares Square
Corrected Model - 1.869 5 0.374 0.625 0.681
Intercept - 16.475 1 16.475 27.560 0.000
Course Subject - 0.531 1 0.531 0.888 0.347
Confederate ID - 0.107 1 0.107 0.179 0.673
Year in School 3.37 0.063 1 0.063 0.105 0.746
Perceived Grade 1.86 0.329 1 0.329 0.550 0.459
Sex 1.47 0.832 1 0.832 1.393 0.239
Error - 116.569 195 0.598
Total - 118.438 200

TABLE 4.09
ANOVA RESULTS FOR NEGATIVE AFFECT (Hypothesis 2)
Source of Variance Mean Sum of df Mean F p
Values Squares Square
Corrected Model - 3.389 5 0.678 1.498 0.192
Intercept - 6.655 1 6.655 14.710 0.000
Course Subject - 0.027 1 0.027 0.059 0.808
Confederate ID - 0.107 1 0.107 0.238 0.626
Year in School 3.37 0.644 1 0.644 1.423 0.234
Perceived Grade 1.86 1.738 1 1.738 3.842 0.051
Sex 1.47 0.000 1 0.058 0.001 0.971
Error - 88.221 195 0.452
Total - 91.610 200

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p=.018). Neuroticism was not significantly related to positive affect; however, extraversion did
explain a significant amount of variance in the predicted direction (B=.149, p=.044).
Additionally, the combined effect (or additive effect for step 2) of neuroticism and extraversion
had a significant relationship with positive affect.
Table 4.11 presents the results for the second hierarchical regression analysis where
negative affect is the dependent variable. As with the prior regression analysis, emotional
intelligence, conscientiousness, self-monitoring, and ethnicity were entered as control variables
in step one. In step two, neuroticism and extraversion were entered. The control variables had
no significant effect on negative affect. In this case, both neuroticism (B=.183, p=.014) and
extraversion (B=.164, p=.029) were significantly related to negative affect. Extraversion yielded
a relationship opposite of that which would be intuitively expected, as it was positively related to
negative affect. However, neuroticism was related to NA in the predicted direction. The
combined effect of these variables also had a significant relationship with negative affect (∆R2=
.042, p=.010). Thus, the results displayed in Tables 4.08 and 4.09 provided support for
Hypotheses 3a and 3b (trait affect predicts individual affective reactions).
Outcome Variable: Ethical Behavior
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to examine the impact of individual
affective reactions (PA and NA) on ethical behavior (Hypotheses 4a and 4b). Before running the
regression analysis, preliminary inspections of the data were conducted in order to ensure that
the assumptions for regression were met. This was accomplished primarily through visual
inspections of histograms and frequency distributions of the data (Hair et al., 1998). The
preliminary analyses lent support to the assumptions of linearity, constant variance,
independence of error terms, and normality of the distribution of error terms.
Table 4.12 displays the results for this analysis. In step one, neuroticism, extraversion,
previous ethical judgment, locus of control, conscientiousness, and self-monitoring were entered
as control variables. In step two, positive affect and negative affect were entered. The control
variables did not have any significant effect on ethical behavior. Similarly, neither positive
affect nor negative affect predicted a significant amount of variance in ethical behavior. Finally
the combined effect of the control variables failed to have a significant impact on ethical

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 TABLE 4.10
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR POSTIVE AFFECT
(Hypothesis 3a)

B1 R2 ∆R2
Step 1: Control Variables
Emotional Intelligence .066
Conscientiousness .055
Self-Monitoring .017
Ethnicity .101
F(4,214)= 3.053, p<.05 .054 .054*
Step 2: Independent Variables
Neuroticism -.135
Extraversion .149*
F(6,212)=3.618, p<.01 .093 .039**
1
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. standardized regression coefficients from the final
step. N=227.

TABLE 4.11
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR NEGATIVE AFFECT
(Hypothesis 3b)
B1 R2 ∆R2
Step 1: Control Variables
Emotional Intelligence .085
Conscientiousness -.035
Self-Monitoring .029
Ethnicity -.015
F(4,214)=.724, p=.577 .116 .013
Step 2: Independent Variables
Neuroticism .183*
Extraversion .164*
F(6,212)=2.056, p=.06 .234 .042**
1
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. standardized regression coefficients from the final
step. N=227.

83
behavior, as did the combined effect of NA and PA. Based on this analysis, there is not
sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses 4a or 4b.
In order to compare ethical behavior for individuals exposed to ethical peer influence
against individuals exposed to unethical peer influence (Hypothesis 5), an ANOVA was
conducted. As delineated in Chapter 3, the independent variable unethical peer influence was
operationalized as an interaction between confederate behavior (T1) and group ethical behavior.
The mean values for this analysis are displayed in Table 4.13, and Table 4.14 displays the results
of this analysis. The covariates (course subject, experimenter location, previous ethical
judgment, confederate ID, ethnicity, and perceived grade) were first examined in this analysis.
Then the fixed effects of confederate behavior and group ethical behavior were examined
individually for main effects and together as an interaction term. As can be seen in Table 4.14,
the only control variable that had a significant impact on ethical behavior was course subject (F=
4.811, p= .029, df=1). The data indicate that subjects from the differing treatment groups
(exposed and not exposed to cheating confederate behavior) generally resulted in significantly
different levels of ethical behavior (F= 4.468, p= .036, df=1). Finally, group ethical behavior
also explained a significant amount of variance in ethical behavior of the subjects (F= 11.755, p=
.001, df=1). However, the data did not provide support for an interactive effect (T1*Group
Ethical Behavior) on the behavioral outcome. This finding lends partial support for Hypothesis
5. Although the interaction term did not significantly influence individual ethical behavior, both
confederate behavior and group ethical behavior yielded significant statistical influence on this
outcome variable.
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to simultaneously examine the impact
of several individual factors (emotional intelligence, Machiavellianism, previous ethical
judgments, religiosity, locus of control, conscientiousness, and self-monitoring) on the ethical
behavior of subjects (Hypothesis 6). In step one, the control variables (course subject,
confederate ID, ethnicity, and perceived grade) were entered. In step two, the individual factors
of interest were entered. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 4.15. With the
exception of course subject (B=.183, p=.014), neither the control variables nor the individual
factors yielded significant results. The combined effects for both steps one and two also failed to

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 TABLE 4.12
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR (Hypothesis 4a and 4b)

B1 R2 ∆R2
Step 1: Control Variables
Neuroticism .002
Extraversion .075
Previous Ethical Judgment .010
Locus of Control -.025
Conscientiousness .086
Self-monitoring .054
F(6,217)=.834, p=.544 .023 .023
Step 2: Independent Variables
PA -.019
NA .019
F(8,215)=.635, p=.748 .023 .001
1
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. standardized regression coefficients from the final
step. N=227.

TABLE 4.13
MEAN VALUES FOR HYPOTHESIS 5
Confederate Behavior Group Behavior
Cheat No Cheat Cheat No Cheat
Ethical Behavior 1.42 1.47 1.50 1.40

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 TABLE 4.14
ANOVA RESULTS FOR ETHICAL BEHAVIOR (Hypothesis 5)
Source of Variance Sum of df Mean F p
Squares Square
Corrected Model 1.104 8 .138 3.349 .001
Intercept 4.703 1 4.703 114.117 .000
Course Subject .198 1 .198 4.811 .029
T2 (experimenter location) .120 1 .120 2.901 .090
Previous Ethical Judgment .000 1 .000 .002 .967
Confederate ID .015 1 .015 .368 .545
Ethnicity .003 1 .003 .063 .802
Perceived Grade .012 1 .012 .281 .597
T1 (confederate behavior) .184 1 .184 4.468 .036
Group Ethical Behavior .484 1 .484 11.755 .001
T1*Group Ethical Behavior .000 0 . . .
Error 7.994 194 .041
Total 9.099 202

TABLE 4.15
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR (Hypothesis 6)

B1 R2 ∆R2
Step 1: Control Variables
Course Subject -.162*
Confederate ID .077
Ethnicity .047
Grade .031
F(4,198)=1.705, p=.150 .033 .033
Step 2: Independent Variables
Emotional Intelligence -.052 .
Machiavellianism .024
Previous Ethical Judgments -.002
Religiosity .033
Locus of Control -.008
Conscientiousness .051
Self-Monitoring .102
F(7,191)=.857, p=.583 .047 .014
1
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. standardized regression coefficients from the final step.
N=227.

86
significantly impact individual ethical behavior. Thus, based on this analysis Hypothesis 6 was
not supported.
A final analysis was conducted to examine the mediating influence of emotion (positive
affect and negative affect) between three predictor variables (peer influence, gender, and trait
affect [neuroticism and extraversion]) and individual ethical behavior. Baron and Kenny’s
(1986) test for mediation was used to examine emotion as a mediator for each of these
relationships (peer influence - ethical behavior, gender - ethical behavior, and trait affect - ethical
behavior). There are three steps to this analysis: 1) the mediator is regressed on the independent
variable, 2) the dependent variable is regressed on the independent variable, and 3) lastly the
dependent variable is regressed on both the mediator and independent variable. Each step must
yield significant results in order to proceed to the next step. Finally in step 3, if the independent
variable becomes insignificant when the mediator is included in the equation, and the mediator is
significant, there is evidence to support full mediation. If the independent variable loses some
statistical significance but still accounts for statistical variance in the dependent variable, partial
mediation exists.
Both positive affect and negative affect were examined individually as mediators for each
predictor variable with the outcome, ethical behavior. For positive affect, regression analysis
yielded results consistent with Baron and Kenny’s first criterion for extraversion only (B=.191,
p=.006). However, the subsequent criteria were not met in this test for mediation. Similarly for
negative affect, the analysis results met the first criterion for extraversion and neuroticism. Yet
once again, the results failed to meet the remaining criteria for mediation. Therefore, no support
was found for mediation (Hypothesis 7). These results are displayed in Appendix P.
Summary of Results
In this section, the proposed hypotheses of this research were examined closely in
reference to the data in Tables 4.04-4.15 and reported in the previous portion of this dissertation.
Also included in this section is Table 4.16, which summarizes the various significant
relationships for both outcome variables (affect and ethical behavior) examined in this research.
Specifically, in terms of control variables, the results indicate that experimenter location is
related positively to PA. That is, when the experimenter was present during the exercise,
subjects tended to respond to the experiment with higher levels of positive affect. The combined

87
effect of emotional intelligence, conscientiousness, self-monitoring, and ethnicity also was
related positively to PA. This indicates that in general, non-white individuals with higher levels
of emotional intelligence, conscientiousness, and self-monitoring were more likely to respond to
the experiment with higher levels of positive affect. Another significant control variable in this
research was perceived grade, which was positively related to NA. In other words, individuals
who perceived that they had lower grades (in the classes from which they were recruited to
participate in this study) were more likely to respond with negative affect to the experiment.
Finally, course subject was positively related to the dependent variable, ethical behavior.
Generally, individuals who were recruited from non-business classes (biology, math, and
sociology) tended to behave more ethically in the experiment than those recruited from business
classes.
Based on the results of this research, support was found for Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 5.
Hypothesis 3a predicted a positive correlation between neuroticism and NA. Regression analysis
yielded support for this relationship, indicating that individuals in this study, who had higher
levels of the trait-emotion neuroticism, were more likely to respond to experimental stimulus
with negative affective reactions that individuals with lower levels of neuroticism. Regression
analysis also yielded support for Hypothesis 3b, which predicted that individuals with higher
levels of extraversion would be more likely to have positive affective reactions during the
experiment. Finally, Hypothesis 5 predicted a negative correlation between unethical behavior
of key colleagues and ethical behavior of individuals. Regression analysis was once again
conducted and provided support for this relationship, indicating that individuals, who were
surrounded by others who behaved unethically during the experiment, were more likely to
behave unethically themselves.

88
 TABLE 4.16
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS
Direction of Relationship
Outcome Variable 1a: Positive Affect
Experimenter Location (T2) +
EI + Conscientiousness + Self-Monitoring + Ethnicity +
Extraversion +
Extraversion + Neuroticism +

Outcome Variable 1b: Negative Affect

Perceived Grade +
Neuroticism +
Extraversion +
Neuroticism + Extraversion +

Outcome Variable 2: Ethical Behavior

Course Subject +
Confederate Behavior (T1) +
Group Ethical Behavior +

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 CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the impact of emotion on ethical
behavior processes. Toward this end, seven hypotheses were developed and tested. Of these
seven predictions, at least partial support was found for Hypotheses 1, 3a, 3b, and 5. Each of
these hypotheses will be discussed below.
Hypothesis 1 states that when presented with an ethical stimulus, individuals will respond
with emotional reactions from individuals. Partial support was found for this hypothesis where
results suggest that individuals tended to have more positive affective responses during the
experiment when the researcher was present in the room than when the researcher was not. At
least two plausible explanations can account for these results. First, similar to the Hawthorne
effect (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) subjects may have responded in this manner simply
because the researcher was present and reinforced the fact that subjects were being watched and
participating in an experiment. Second, the positive affective responses of subjects may be a
result of socially desirable responding (Rosenthal, 1969). When the experimenter was present,
subjects were more likely to portray themselves in a favorable manner and abide by the
prevailing social norms and standards of their immediate environment (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987).
In this case, socially desirable responding may have caused fewer subjects to cheat in the
presence of the experimenter, which also may have resulted in raising the overall likelihood of
positive affective responses during the experiment. While the experimental manipulation was
built in to the study to control for the experimental contaminants discussed above, it also was
added to replicate the potential practical setting where an employee may be faced with an ethical
dilemma both in the presence and absence of his or her supervisor. Further study of this
relationship can benefit from the inclusion of a control measure for socially desirable responding
such as the Marlowe-Crowne scale which measures both impression management and self-

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 TABLE 5.1

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS

Hypothesis 1** There is a positive correlation between the unethical behavior of peers
and individual affective reactions of varying types and strengths.
Hypothesis 2 Females will experience stronger affective reactions than males.
Hypothesis 3a* Individuals who have high levels of neuroticism are more likely to
experience a negative affective reaction than those who have low levels
of neuroticism.
Hypothesis 3b* Individuals who have high levels of extraversion are more likely to
experience a positive affective reaction than those who have low levels
of extraversion.
Hypothesis 4a Individuals with strong positive affective reactions will be more likely
to engage in moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 4b Individuals strong negative affective reactions will be less likely to
engage in moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 5* There is a negative correlation between the unethical behavior of key
colleagues and moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 6a There is a positive correlation between emotional intelligence and
moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 6b There is a negative correlation between Machiavellianism and moral
deliberation.
Hypothesis 6c There is a positive correlation between an individual’s prior ethical
judgments and moral deliberation
Hypothesis 6d There is a positive correlation between internal locus of control and
moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 6e There is a positive correlation between strong religious beliefs and
moral deliberation.
Hypothesis 6f There is a positive correlation between conscientiousness and moral
deliberation.
Hypothesis 6g There is a positive correlation between self-monitoring and moral
deliberation.
Hypothesis 7a Affect partially mediates the relationship between moral deliberation
and peer influence.
Hypothesis 7b Affect mediates the relationship between moral deliberation and trait
affect.
Hypothesis 7c Affect mediates the relationship between moral deliberation and
gender.
*Significant Finding **Partially Significant Finding

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deception factors as part of social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Paulus, 1984; Zerbe &
Paulhus, 1987).
Hypothesis 3a states that individuals with higher levels of neuroticism would be more
likely to experience a negative affective reaction to the ethical stimulus than those with lower
levels of neuroticism. This suggests that individuals who possess high levels of the personality
trait, neuroticism, are more likely to have negative affective reactions to the ethical stimulus they
encounter in the workplace. Hypothesis 3b states that individuals with higher levels of
extraversion would be more likely to have positive affective reactions to ethical stimulus in the
experiment than those with lower levels of extraversion. Similar to Hypothesis 3a, this indicates
that individuals with high levels of positive trait affect, or extraversion, are more likely to have
immediate positive affective reactions to the stimulus they experience at work.
These findings are consistent with previous research in emotions (Larsen & Ketelaar,
1989, 1991; Rusting & Larsen, 1997; Zelenski & Larsen, 1999), and makes intuitive sense in that
individuals who have stable and enduring tendencies toward neuroticism/extraversion or
negative/positive emotional states would be more likely to have negative/positive affective
reactions to whatever they encounter on a daily basis including ethical stimulus. In this research,
I was able to obtain a more precise measurement of the variables of interest having controlled for
a number of personality variables (i.e., emotional intelligence, conscientiousness, and self-
monitoring) that could contaminate the observed relationship. In the future, however, this
relationship could be further tested by obtaining more precise measures of positive and negative
emotional reactivity. In other words, it is difficult to say that the lone driving source of
emotional reactivity for study participants was the experimentally contrived ethical stimulus.
Manipulation checks and additional follow-up such as post-experiment surveys can help to
address this issue in future research.
Support also was found for Hypothesis 5, that if an individual is surrounded by others
who are behaving unethically then the individual will be less likely to behave ethically as well.
This suggests that when individuals find themselves surrounded by co-workers who behave
unethically, they are less likely to engage in moral deliberation when confronted with an ethical
dilemma. The predominant decision factor in such settings seems to be conformity of moral
behavior with that of work peers and/or the organizational culture. This result underscores the

92
importance of establishing an ethical climate in business settings where moral behavior is not
only encouraged but also rewarded. This explanation could be tested in future experimental and
field studies by accounting for individual perceptions of peer behavior and investigating the
impact of subject perceptions of organizational or group culture on ethical behavior.
Although none of the other hypotheses were fully supported, some of the other results of
this dissertation do warrant attention. Hypotheses 1 through 4 deal with positive and negative
affect (PA and NA), both as an outcome and predictor variable. But to be more specific, in this
research I am interested in the mediating role of immediate positive and negative affective
responses between situational (ethical) stimulus introduced through experimental manipulation
and ethical behavior.
Because the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) was
used to measure these variables, positive and negative affective responses were classified as
being mutually exclusive from one another. However, there is another school of thought that
advocates that PA and NA be treated as orthogonal (Russell & Carroll, 1999). While some
researchers believe that it is possible to be happy and sad at the same time (Larsen, McGraw, &
Cacioppo, 2001; Watson et al., 1988), others postulate that when humans respond to a given
stimulus, they can be either happy or sad, but not both. Upon recoding positive and negative
affect into one comprehensive affective measure and retesting Hypotheses 1 through 4,
potentially different results can be obtained. However, after reexamining the data in this manner,
the results proved to be quite similar in this research.
The overall insignificant findings for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 may be because the PANAS
measure failed to capture the true affective reactions of the participants in this study. Subjects
tended to express stronger affective reactions verbally at the conclusion of the study; yet, their
responses on the PANAS did not mirror their verbal affective reactions. Future research can
address this problem by obtaining more concrete measures of affect either through the use of an
additional individual self-report measure (i.e., Russell, & Carroll, 1999) or through a physical
measure of emotion.
Additionally while debriefing research participants, they indicated that they may have
experienced stronger affective reactions to the experimental manipulations had the stakes of the
experiment been higher. Recall that subjects were informed that they would be awarded extra

93
credit points depending on their performance during the experimental task. Subjects indicated
during the debriefing session that they would have felt more strongly if a financial incentive had
been offered as well. Thus in this situation, subjects did not perceive that they stood to gain (or
lose) an award that was substantial enough to warrant exerting the amount of emotional energy
required to result in significant findings for these hypotheses.
Finally, in order to adequately test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, a relatively high sample size
was needed. An optimal sample size for finding a medium-sized main effect for Hypothesis 1 is
approximately 130 subjects per group (Hair et al., 1998), and in this test there are four groups.
There was a significant reduction in sample size from the time of initial recruitment (N=378),
when the first half of the data was collected, to the time of the actual experiment (N=227). Also,
because of the inevitable “no shows,” unequal group sizes were obtained in spite of careful
planning and scheduling ahead of time, which also decreased the power in this research. Thus
this dissertation is underpowered, and considering this constraint it is evident that this study
provides a very conservative test of the research model. Bearing this in mind, the results that are
not conclusive in this study can be viewed as encouraging for research in the years to come.
Hypotheses 1a and 1b were that ethical stimulus (composed of both confederate ethical
behavior and researcher location) would have a positive correlation with positive and negative
affect. The form of the relationship suggests that subjects tended to respond with lower levels of
positive affect when exposed to the experimental treatments, which is the opposite of what was
expected. Interestingly, the observed relationship for negative affect indicates that subjects who
were exposed to unethical confederate behavior did experience higher levels of negative affect
than those who were not. However, there did not appear to be any difference in negative affect
for subjects as a result of researcher location. These findings imply that a relationship between
ethical stimulus and affective reactions may very well exist, however the power to detect this
relationship is inadequate.
Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 (females will experience stronger affective reactions than
males) did not yield significant results, but the form of the relationship alludes to a link between
gender and affect that is somewhat consistent with this prediction. The form of the relationship
suggests that females tend to experience stronger negative affect than males; however, the
opposite was observed for positive affect.

94
 Additionally, Hypothesis 4a and 4b (a positive correlation between PA and ethical
behavior, and a negative correlation between NA and ethical behavior) were not significant.
However, the observed relationship is consistent with these predictions. The form of the
relationship suggests that subjects who experienced higher negative affective reactions were less
likely to engage in ethical behavior than those who experienced lower levels of negative affect.
On the other hand, subjects who experienced higher levels of positive affect seemed more likely
to engage in ethical behavior than those who felt lower levels of positive affect. Once again, this
alludes to the existence of a relationship between affect and ethical behavior, but with an
inadequate amount of power to detect it.
Hypotheses 6a-g and 7a-c were not supported. Hypothesis 6 proposed that several
individual factors (emotional intelligence, Machiavellianism, prior ethical judgments, internal
locus of control, religious beliefs, conscientiousness, and self-monitoring) would impact ethical
behavior. The failure to confirm this relationship may have occurred for several reasons. As
mentioned previously, the power for this dissertation was very low. Furthermore, it may be that
subjects failed to perceive the experimental manipulation or that subjects who did notice the
manipulation failed to classify it as ethical stimuli. As was discussed in Chapter 2, Rest (1986)
emphasized that individuals essentially must recognize a moral situation before they can
successfully engage in moral behavior. Moral behavior, as defined in this research, is comprised
of not cheating on a reading comprehension quiz and reporting incidents of cheating by others.
Here, subjects may not have recognized that their behavior in the experimental setting impacted
the well-being of others or they may not have found the stakes compelling enough. Thus, the
behavioral outcome in this experiment may not have been substantial enough to accurately
examine the relationships proposed in Hypothesis 6. As was recommended earlier, future
research in this area might benefit by increasing the stakes involved so that subjects may be more
likely to perceive that their potential actions will impact the interests, well-being, and
expectations of others.
Hypotheses 7a-c proposed that affect at least partially mediated the relationships between
peer influence (7a), trait affect (7b), gender (7c) and ethical behavior. As affect was not found to
be significantly related to peer influence, gender, or ethical behavior; these hypotheses were not
supported. Again, the lack of power may have contributed to these insignificant results.

95
Additionally, it may be that for subjects in this particular setting, affect was simply not a factor
in determining their ethical behavior. In earlier research linking affect to ethical behavior (e.g.,
Greene et al., 2001), subjects were required to make behavioral decisions that resulted in life or
death for others. In such settings, affect was a critical component of their decision and
behavioral processes. Once again, in this research, the stakes may not have been severe enough
to stimulate such emotion in subjects. Future studies should include higher stakes with
manipulation checks to better examine these mediating relationships. Finally as discussed
earlier, the PANAS measure may not have accurately captured the affective responses of the
study participants. The incorporation of additional or alternative measures of affect in future
research may help address this problem.
One last finding of interest relates to the relationship between course subject and ethical
behavior. This was a control variable in Hypotheses 5 and 6. Although no specific hypothesis
was proposed for this relationship, several earlier studies have examined the link between course
studied or major and ethical behavior. In a past meta-analysis, Borkowski and Ugras (1998)
reported that 20% of 30 studies examining this relationship found significant differences in
ethical behavior based on major. In this research, business students tended to behave less
ethically than math and sociology students. This finding supports research that has found that
business students tend to adhere to the philosophy that “winning is everything” (Lane et al.,
1988).
Weaknesses and Strengths
This dissertation has both weaknesses and strengths that should be acknowledged. First,
it is a test of a rather complicated model, which may have been a factor leading to the lack of
significant results. Because of its complexity, it was not possible to simultaneously test the full
model. However, the theory-based research model explores an area that is still at an early stage
in its development in the business literature. Therefore, the complexity of the model may hold
the promise of furthering thinking in the area of business ethics and the role of emotion therein,
and offer a theoretical approach upon which the literature can build.
Secondly, unlike the preponderance of ethics research, this dissertation examines ethical
behavior in a controlled experimental setting. Thus, the outcome variable here is actual ethical
behavior as opposed to behavioral intentions and produces a stronger test as a result. However,

96
this study is not without its design flaws. As mentioned previously, the stakes of this experiment
may have been insufficient to compel subjects to respond emotionally to ethical stimulus and/or
behave in a manner where subjects are cognizant of the potential impact of their actions on
others. An important oversight in this research design that could have addressed this issue was
the exclusion of a manipulation check during data collection. While informal manipulation
checks were conducted during the debriefing of subjects, this cannot be considered as a valid
substitute, and it is critical that future studies incorporate this design element. Additionally,
several subjects failed to attend the experiment as scheduled in spite of several reminders that
were emailed by the researcher. This problem could have been minimized by over scheduling
for each experimental session in anticipation of the occasional “no-show,” experiment
participant. Finally, the use of additional measures for affect would have enabled me to conduct
a more refined, accurate, and perhaps fruitful investigation of the role of affect in the ethical
decision-making process.
Thirdly, this dissertation is underpowered. As mentioned before, the optimal sample size
for finding a main effect for Hypothesis 1 is approximately 130 subjects per group (Hair, et al.,
1998), which necessitates 520 subjects (4 groups) to test the first hypothesis in this dissertation.
With only 227 experiment participants, it is unlikely that any results would have been significant.
However, the fact that 3 relationships were supported and that numerous others yielded some
interesting results, in spite of their lack of significance, is an evident strength. The findings
detailed here indicate several opportunities for future research that may be quite prolific,
especially if the limitations of this study are remedied.
Future Research
There are several fundamental challenges in the study of business ethics. There seems to
be no end to the essays and editorials about business ethics and the practical implications of this
topic. However, there is a large gap between this discussion and a well-developed research
stream in this area. Based on my experience with this dissertation, I have ascertained several
specific challenges (theoretical, methodological, and measurement) that need to be addressed in
order to establish business ethics as a legitimate, stable stream of research.
The first major challenge for researchers in this area is to stretch traditional theoretical
approaches to ethical decision and behavioral processes and incorporate “non-rational” elements

97
such as emotion into the model. As discussed in earlier chapters, a handful of researchers are
starting to move in this direction, however at this point the theoretical depiction of the
relationship between emotion and ethics is rather simplistic. Thus, at present there appears to be
a “black box” between these 2 constructs.
Much theoretical work is needed in order to better define the intermediate processes
through which emotion impacts ethical decisions and behavior, as well as other key influences of
ethics. Affective events theory is one guiding theoretical base that may be of use, but it is
certainly not the only one. Developing and examining other theoretical perspectives will greatly
enhance this area. Additionally, promoting a vigorous scholarly dialogue of this issue in formal
venues is a step that ethics researchers may want to consider. By encouraging researchers to
work collectively and partake in public scholarly debate, this area may have a better chance of
developing than it would if work continues to be incoherent and unsystematic in nature.
Furthermore, this area of research is wrought with methodological challenges. As was
discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 2), most of the empirical research in ethics
employed survey methods, which effectively measures ethical behavior intentions but not
behavior itself. Very few studies have employed experimental methods to examine business
ethics, and thus an imbalance exists in the current research stream. This may be because
experiments in this area require deception of the participants to avoid shaping their behavior.
Furthermore, the ethical dilemmas that are presented in these experiments may cue subjects to
the underlying purpose of the study and prevent them from participating honestly and fully.
With this in mind, it is advisable for experimental researchers to clearly distinguish themselves
as operating outside of the organization from which participants are recruited, communicate with
subjects tactfully and candidly in order to increase trust, and ensure the anonymity of
participants. Field experiments would especially help to develop this research stream.
Beyond the methodological difficulties inherent in business ethics research, there are also
measurement challenges in ethics research, which are compounded by similar difficulties in
emotions research. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, survey methods in business ethics
research capture behavioral intentions, rather than behavior, that may or may not be telling of
what we can expect in actual business settings. A preponderance of ethics research employs
scenario-based ethics measures, many of which have not been validated. Furthermore, many of

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these scenario-based measures contrive settings that have very little to do with business. Thus,
subjects may respond ethically to these measures and score highly on overall ethics measures,
yet this does not reflect how they will behave in terms of business ethics. As discussed earlier in
this dissertation, many scholars assert that general ethics is very different from business ethics,
yet the measures that are employed in business ethics often do not reflect this difference. The
major challenge for future researchers is to devise measures that accurately capture actual ethical
behavior, not just intentions, and to do so by placing subjects in realistic settings that they may
face in their day to day activities in the world of business practice.
Moreover, when investigating the role of emotions in business ethics, the problems of
measurement are further exacerbated. In order to accurately capture the emotional responses of
subjects to ethical stimulus, individual response measures may not be appropriate. In the future,
business researchers should employ more than one pen and paper measure of emotion in their
research. Additionally, they can form collaborations with scientists who have access to EEGs,
EKGs, and FMRIs in order to get more concrete, physical measures of emotion.
This study has introduced a guiding theoretical framework that has the potential to help
shape the literature base in an area that has historically been difficult to pursue. This study also
provided an alternative empirical method to the commonly-employed survey approach in
business ethics research. However, this is merely a preliminary step in a long stream of
investigations that must be conducted before we can better understand business ethics, in
general, and particularly the role of emotion within business ethics. In the paragraphs below, I
outline several additional directions for future research (see Figure 5.1).
Incorporating moral intensity, which is a multidimensional construct that characterizes a moral
issue (Jones 1991), is an important addition to the model used in this research. An actor’s
perception of, as well as emotional and behavioral response to, a moral issue depends on its
intensity. As described in the literature review, Jones (1991) outlined 6 components to moral
intensity, which are listed in Figure 5.1. In order to draw any concrete conclusions about
individual ethical tendencies, information must be recorded about the moral issues that are faced.
For example, in this particular research emotion did not prove to be a significant
antecedent of ethical behavior, while past studies (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2001) have
shown that emotion is an important influence of ethical decision processes. However, in

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 Moral Issue
- Moral Intensity
(magnitude of
consequences, social
consensus, probability
of effect, temporal
immediacy, proximity,
& concentration of
effect)

Moral Actor
- Moral Sensitivity
(affective responses, EI)
- Moral Judgment
(Mach, ethical
Ethical (or Unethical)
judgments, equity
Behavioral Outcomes
sensitivity, LOC, &
Religious Beliefs)
- Moral Motivation
(Conscientiousness,
self-monitoring, LOC)

Moral
Environment
- Code of ethics
- Rewards & Sanctions
- Culture & Climate
- Significant Others
(Peer Behavior,
Supervisor Behavior)
- Accountability
- Resource Scarcity

FIGURE 5.1
FUTURE RESEARCH ON BUSINESS ETHICS

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research where emotion has proven to be a significant antecedent the magnitude of
consequences, a component of moral intensity, of the moral issue was much higher (life or death)
than in this dissertation (extra credit points). In order to fully explain the process of ethical
behavior, it is not sufficient to only collect information on the characteristics of the moral
actorand the moral environment. As this example illustrates, the varying intensity of a moral
issue may account for variance in business ethics. Thus, in order to advance research in this
area, scholars must take care to characterize moral issues in terms of moral intensity.
This can be pursued in a several different ways. For example, researchers could have a
panel of experts rate a moral issue, described in a scenario, on its moral intensity and then report
it in their research. Also, after having experts rate several moral issues, a researcher could
present issues of varying degrees of intensity (high, medium, and low) and compare individual
affective and behavioral responses to them.
In this dissertation, the additive effect of several characteristics of the moral actor on
ethical behavior was examined in one large block. However, as is depicted in the proposed
conceptual model (Figure 2.7), the actual form of the relationship for these characteristics is
more sophisticated than this. Until more methodological progress is made in this field, a single
omnibus test of the several individual factors that impact moral deliberation cannot be
conducted. The immediate future calls for studies that examine portions of the process of moral
deliberation. For example, a good follow-up to this dissertation would be a study examining
moral sensitivity, where several moral issues of varying levels of intensity could be presented to
subjects, and their subsequent affective reactions could be recorded. Other studies may
concentrate solely on moral judgment or moral motivation and the individual factors linked to
these processes.
Finally, the strongest influence of ethical behavior in this study was peer influence, an
environmental factor. In this dissertation, the role of significant others was examined as an
environmental variable. However there are other variables, studied in past ethics research (Loe
et al., 2000), that may have just as powerful an influence on individual ethical behavior such as
whether ethical behavior is rewarded by the organization, whether a code of ethics exists,
whether accountability exists, or various features of the organization’s culture or climate. One

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environmental variable that has not been examined as an influence on ethics in the past is
resource scarcity.
When organizations are embedded in scarce environments, organizational actors tend to
focus more on financial goals and exclude social goals (Dess & Origer, 1987). Several studies
have produced evidence to support this proposition. Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) found that
more illegal acts are committed in organizations characterized by resource scarcity. Similarly,
Miles (1982, 1987) found that resource scarcity in both the U.S. tobacco and domestic insurance
industries resulted in decreased corporate social performance. Judge (1994) also found that a
negative relationship existed between resource scarcity and social performance in the hospital
industry. This relationship has been examined primarily at the organizational level, however it
makes intuitive sense that it also will apply at the individual level. More research is needed to
explore the impact of resource scarcity on individual ethical decision processes.
Future research in this area may have several practical implications for managers. As the
behavior of significant others is such an important influence on individual ethical behavior,
managers need to be aware of the overall behavioral tendencies of their employees and take steps
to serve as examples of ethical behavior to their subordinates. Additionally managers need to be
proactive in structuring an organizational culture that values ethical behavior, developing and
clearly articulating an organizational code of ethics, as well as recognizing and rewarding ethical
behavior among employees.
Beyond shaping the ethical environment of employees, once managers are made aware of
key individual factors that influence moral deliberation, they can take steps to nourish such
factors among employees. For example, if emotion does become an established antecedent of
ethical behavior, managers may want to structure an organization in such a way as to encourage
the awareness and expression of emotions by employees. However, more research is necessary
in order to confirm or disconfirm this particular recommendation for practicing managers.
In conclusion, business ethics is a complex topic that has both academics and
practitioners struggling to understand. Toward the goal of advancing the research stream, this
dissertation has important implications for research and practice. Understanding and applying
this model will help us to focus on the types of individuals who are more likely to behave
ethically and the types of environments that are more likely to elicit such ethical behavior. In

102
particular, by examining the affective reactions of individuals in moral situations researchers and
managers alike will have a better idea of how to anticipate and control the behavioral outcomes
of ethical dilemmas.

103
 APPENDIX A
Human Subjects Application

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY Application No.:

Human Subjects Application
to the INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
for RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

The Federal Government and University policy require that the use of human subjects in research be
monitored by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The following information must be provided when
humans are used in research studies, whether internally funded, extramurally funded or unfunded.
Research in which humans are used may not be performed in the absence of IRB approval.

PLEASE COMPLETE AND SUBMIT PAGES 1 AND 2 plus YOUR ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS
(on page 3) IN TYPEWRITTEN FORM TO: HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE, Mail Code 2763, or
2035 E. Paul Dirac Drive, Box 15

100 Sliger Bldg., Innovation Park

Tallahassee, FL 32310

Researcher:_ Virginia K. Bratton_________________________________ Date:

_7/18/2003_______________________

Project Title: The Role of Emotions in the Decision-Making Process _____

Project Period (starting/ending dates): _8/25/2003-12/12/2003

__________________________________________________

Position in University (faculty, etc.) If student, please indicate FSU Faculty Advisor:

__Doctoral Candidate under advisement of Dr. K. Michele

Kacmar_______________________________________________________

Department: _Management , College of

Business_________________________________________________________________

Telephone: _850/521-0372 (home), 850/644-1861 (office)_______ E-Mail Address:

vkb2633@garnet.acns.fsu.edu___
(where you can be reached in case of a problem with your application)

Mailing Address (where your approval will be mailed):

1608 Eagles Landing Blvd. #63; Tallahassee, FL 32308

______________________________________________

Project is (please check one): _X__ dissertation _____ teaching ______ thesis _____ other

Project is: ____X ____unfunded _________ funded (if funded, please complete the following):

104
 Funding Agency (actual/potential): 1. ____________________________ 2.
____________________________

Contract/Grant No. (if applicable): __________________________________________

FOR EVALUATION OF YOUR PROJECT, PLEASE CHECK THE FOLLOWING WHICH

APPLY:

Mentally or Physically Challenged a Subjects studied at FSU

Subjects
Children or Minor Subjects (under 18 years Subjects studied at non-FSU location(s)
old)
Prisoners, Parolees or Incarcerated a Students as Subjects
Subjects
Filming, Video or Audio Recording of Employees as Subjects
Subjects
a Questionnaires or Survey(s) to be Pregnant Subjects
administered
Review of Data Banks, Archives or Medical Fetal, placental or surgical pathology tissue(s)
Records
Oral History Involves Blood Samples (fingerpricks/venipuncture,
etc.)
Subjects’ major language is not English Subjects to be paid
a Involves Deception (if yes, fully describe at
Question No. 7)
Exclusion of Women or Children Subjects
(must explain why they are being excluded)

This document is available in alternative format upon request by calling (904) 644-8633

Survey Techniques: Check applicable category if the only involvement of human subjects
will be in one or more of the following categories:

Research on normal educational practices in commonly accepted educational settings

Research involving educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement)

___a_____ Research involving survey or interview procedures (if checked, please see below)

__________ Research involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records,
specimens

If research involves use of survey or interview procedures to be performed, indicate:

1. Responses will be recorded in such a manner that human subjects

105
 cannot be identified, by persons other than the researcher, either directly or
through identifiers linked to the subjects.

a yes ___ no

2. Would subject’s responses, if they became known outside the research,

reasonably place the subject at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to
the subject’s financial standing or employability.

___yes a no

3. The research deals with sensitive aspects of the subject’s own behavior, such as
illegal conduct, drug use, sexual behavior, or use of alcohol.

___yes ano

Does Research Involve Greater Than Minimal Risk to Human Subjects?

________ Yes a No
(If yes, explain in full at Question No. 2)

“Minimal Risk” means that the risks of harm anticipated in the proposed research
are not greater, considering probability and magnitude, than those ordinarily
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or
psychological examinations or tests.

I HAVE READ THE FLORIDA STATE LETTER OF ASSURANCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY IT. I ALSO AGREE TO REPORT ANY
SIGNIFICANT AND RELEVANT CHANGES IN PROCEDURES AND INSTRUMENTS AS THEY RELATE
TO SUBJECTS TO THE CHAIR, HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF RESEARCH.

RESEARCHER (signature) (Date)

FSU FACULTY ADVISOR (signature) (Date)

(Application will not be processed without Advisor’s signature)

106
 Questions
FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS FOR ANSWERING THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS

PLEASE SUBMIT YOUR ANSWERS IN TYPEWRITTEN FORM

1. GIVE A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF YOUR RESEARCH PROCEDURES

AS THEY RELATE TO THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS. This description
should include the subjects themselves (number of participants, sex, ages),
instructions given to participants, activities in which subjects will participate or
engage in, special incentives and experimental procedures. Please avoid the
use of abbreviations or scientific terms, unless those items are defined in your
procedures. If tests, questionnaires or surveys are to be used, copies
should be attached and submitted with this application. If your proposed
research involves humans in physical exercise, please review the committee’s
guidelines on the subject (available upon request).

2. HAVE THE RISKS INVOLVED BEEN MINIMIZED AND ARE THEY

REASONABLE IN RELATION TO ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF THE
RESEARCH, IF ANY, TO THE SUBJECTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
KNOWLEDGE THAT MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO RESULT?

WHAT PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO INSURE THAT APPROPRIATE

FACILITIES AND PROFESSIONAL ATTENTION NECESSARY FOR THE
HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE SUBJECTS ARE AVAILABLE AND WILL BE
UTILIZED?

3. DESCRIBE PROCEDURES TO BE USED TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT.

(See attached sample and tips on Informed Consent attached to this application.)
Attach a copy of the informed consent you will use when submitting this
application. ALSO, PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:

(A) WHO WILL BE OBTAINING INFORMED CONSENT?

(B) WHEN WILL THE SUBJECTS BE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE AND SIGN THE
CONSENT FORM?

(C) IN USING CHILDREN, HOW WILL THEIR ASSENT BE OBTAINED? (“Assent”

is an additional requirement. Please see attached sample regarding this
procedure.)

4. DESCRIBE HOW POTENTIAL SUBJECTS FOR THE RESEARCH PROJECT WILL BE

RECRUITED.

5. WILL CONFIDENTIALITY OF ALL SUBJECTS BE MAINTAINED? HOW WILL

THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED? PLEASE ALSO SPECIFY WHAT WILL BE DONE
WITH ALL AUDIO AND/OR VISUAL RECORDINGS, IF APPLICABLE,
PICTURES AND PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION OF SUBJECTS BOTH
DURING AND AFTER COMPLETION OF THE RESEARCH.
107
6. IS THE RESEARCH AREA CONTROVERSIAL AND IS THERE A
POSSIBILITY YOUR PROJECT WILL GENERATE PUBLIC CONCERN? if
SO, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

7. DESCRIBE THE PROCEDURE TO BE USED FOR SUBJECT DEBRIEFING AT

THE END OF THE PROJECT. IF YOU DO NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE
DEBRIEFING, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

108
 Answers to Questions
1. Description of Research Procedures As They Relate to the Use of Human Subjects.

This study examines the process by which the arousal of emotion impacts individual moral behavior in the context
of an out-of-class student extra credit exercise. The sample for this study will consist of approximately 250
undergraduate students to be recruited from two mathematics classes, one sociology class, and three business
management classes with the consent of their instructors and should range in age from 18-22 years.

Students will be asked to participate in a laboratory experiment examining different factors that affect human
reading comprehension and memory recall processes. In an effort to encourage commitment to the experimental
tasks, students will be informed that they will receive bonus points depending on their performance during the
experiment, and arrangements for this extra credit will be made with professors in advance. Students will be told
that the bonus points are contingent on quiz scores. In actuality, all students who participate will receive extra class
credit, however they will not be informed of this until the debriefing session that will be conducted after the
completion of the experiment.

Prior to the experiment, participants will complete a survey that will be distributed at the time of recruitment. This
survey (provided in Attachment #1) is meant to ascertain subject personality types and value-belief systems. This
information will be used to predict subject behavioral responses to the experimental stimulus during the
experimental task. All results from this survey will be kept confidential during the course of the experiment.

The experiment will be conducted in a large office in the College of Business. Students will be tested in groups of
five, each containing a cheating (unethical) male confederate. The students will be told that they are in competition
with the other group members such that the student who achieves the highest score on the task will receive the
maximum bonus points while the others in the group will receive a minimum of extra credit points.

The groups will tested one session at a time during a six-week period or until all subjects can be tested. In the first
portion of the experiment, subjects will be provided with a packet of information containing an excerpt from a
method section of a psychological journal article (See Attachment #2), followed by a quiz (See Attachment #3) with
very specific questions regarding this excerpt. The final component of the information packet is an abbreviated
version of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale [PANAS] (Attachment #4) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
The reading excerpt is intentionally designed to be challenging for the subjects. The quiz is also designed to be
difficult. The difficulty of these tasks is meant to create a situation where subjects realize their bonus points are at
risk.

Subjects will be first instructed to carefully read the excerpt within a timed period of five minutes. A timer will be
set in plain view to make the time constriction apparent for the study participants. After all subjects complete their
readings of the excerpt, they will be told to continue and take the quiz during which they will be instructed to not
refer back to the excerpt in the front of their packets. They will be informed that the quiz was meant to measure
their memory and reading comprehension abilities.

The first experimental treatment involves whether or not the confederate cheats on this task. In approximately 50%
of the sessions, the confederate will turn back to the excerpt in such a manner that it would appear obvious to the
other subjects that he was cheating on the quiz. This experimental manipulation was meant to produce a social
influence on subjects to cheat. The confederate then observed whether subjects cheated themselves, recording their
behaviors on a coding sheet hidden in his packet.

109
The second experimental treatment involves whether or not the research assistant is present in the room. For
approximately 50% of the sessions, the research assistant’s cell phone will ring while subjects are taking the quiz.
After approximately five minutes, the author will return to the room, collected the quizzes, and appear to grade the
quizzes on site.

Regardless of actual quiz scores or assigned treatment, the author will announce that the confederate has the highest
score and therefore will be awarded the full amount of bonus points. The subjects will then be given the post-
experimental survey to record their emotions as a result of their participation in the experiment. The confederate
will record if any subjects voluntarily inform the author of any “cheating incidents” during the experiment. In this
situation, the research assistant will respond that she will review the individual quiz results, and then ask to meet
with each subject individually to record their names and check their information for the purposes of recording bonus
points. If no subjects protest the results, the research assistant still will ask to meet with each subject individually to
collect their packets and surveys and again check their information for the purposes of recording bonus points.

During this time with the research assistant, subjects will be given the opportunity to privately inform the author that
cheating has occurred. The research assistant will keep track of the subjects that inform her of cheating. In meeting
with each subject individually, the research assistant will check the subjects’ names and social security numbers,
thank them for their participation, and inform them that their bonus points would be reported to their classroom
instructors and added to their grades.

2. Minimization of risks involved and their reasonableness in relation to anticipated benefits of the research,
if any, to the subjects.

There are no risks to the student at all.

Provisions made to insure that appropriate facilities and professional attention necessary for the health
and safety of the subjects are available and will be utilized.

As there are no threats to health or safety, no special provisions have been made.

3. Procedures to be used to obtain informed consent (who & when).

Students will be asked to read and sign the attached consent form (Attachment #5) at the beginning of the exercise
by the research assistant who greets them.

4. How will potential subjects be recruited?

Students will be recruited from two mathematics classes, one sociology class, and three business management
classes. Class instructors have been contacted in advance to arrange for their students’ potential participation in this
experiment, the experiment’s bonus-point incentive, and time during class for the research assistant to recruit study
participants. Students from outside of the business school will be recruited to help diversify mix of student subjects
obtained. Because subjects will sign up for session times at their discretion, groups will not be randomly assigned.
However, the sign-up times will be limited such that an equal number of men and women would attend each
experimental session. Also, sign-up times will be constricted so that groups will be formed by students from
different classes. This will be done to decrease the likelihood that the subjects in the experimental groups would
already know each other.

110
Students will be recruited for this experiment in the beginning of the semester at which time they will
complete a packet of information including a survey and a sign-up sheet specifying the various times available for
participating in the experiment. Instructors will be warned that this experiment involves deception and prior to the
debriefing session, students may register complaints about this exercise. Instructors will be advised to placate
students by stating, “I will contact the researcher, let her know of your concerns, and get back to you.”

5. How will confidentiality be maintained?

The identity of subjects will be indiscernible from the group transcripts and questionnaires. The researcher will
assign a code to students who sign up for the experiment. All data derived from these materials and from their
analysis will not include any identifying information either. After submitting extra credit information to the
instructors, the only identifying information of subjects will be their arbitrarily-assigned code number . Further,
results from this data analysis will only be reported in the aggregate.

6. Is the research controversial and will it generate public concern?

As this research involves deception and deals with the larger topic of ethics, it could be seen as controversial in
some areas. It is necessary to hide the true purpose of the experiment from students so as to not sway their behavior
during the experiment. Furthermore, in order to observe their ethical behavior, it is necessary to create a situation of
ethical content (cheating confederate) to provoke such thought processes and behavioral responses. As incidents of
business and government scandals continue to raise public awareness of ethical shortcomings in society, many are
turning to researchers for answers. Researching this issue potentially benefits the public by better delineating the
processes one undergoes when deciding whether or not to behave ethically.

7. Describe the procedure used for subject debriefing.

Approximately one week after the post experimental surveys are collected, the research assistant will meet with
subjects at their regular class times to debrief them about the experiment. At this time subjects will be informed of
the actual experimental research question and explained that all participants will obtain the maximum number of
extra credit points for their participation in the experiment, not considering their actual performance. It also will be
explained that this deception is necessary to cause students to take the experimental task seriously and put forth their
best effort throughout the experiment.

111
 APPENDIX B
Human Subjects Approval

112
 APPENDIX C
Complete Pre-experiment Survey

INFORMED CONSENT

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

I freely and voluntarily and without element of force or coercion, consent to be a participant in the research
project entitled “The Role of Emotion in the Decision Making Process.” I am over 18 years of age.

This research is being conducted by Virginia Bratton, who is a doctoral student in the Management
department at Florida State University. I understand the purpose of the research project is to better understand how
individual emotion affects various cognitive processes. I understand that if I participate in the project, I will be
asked to read an excerpt and take a quiz on the excerpt, and that I will be asked to complete short questionnaires that
ask me about my attitudes and feelings about the session.

I understand that my total time commitment would be about 100 minutes. If I participate in the experiment,
I will receive extra credit in my MAN/MAR/MAT/SOC course.

I understand my participation is totally voluntary and I may stop participation at any time. If I decide to
stop participation, I will still be entitled to extra credit in my MAN/MAR/MAT/SOC course. All my answers to the
questions will be kept confidential to the extent required by law and will be identified by a subject code number.
My name will not appear with any of the results. No individual responses will be reported. Only group findings
will be reported.

I understand that this consent may be withdrawn at any time without prejudice, penalty or loss of benefits
to which I am otherwise entitled. I have been given the right to ask and have answered any inquiry concerning the
study. Questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfaction.

I understand that I may contact Supervising Professor K. Michele Kacmar, at 850-644-7881 or

mkacmar@cob.fsu.edu, for answers to questions about this research or my rights. Group results will be sent to me
upon my request. If I have any further questions about this research, I may contact the Florida State IRB at:

Human Subjects Committee

2035 E. Paul Dirac Drive, Box 15
100 Sliger Building, Innovation Park
Tallahassee FL 32310

I have read and understand this consent form.

_____________________________________ _________________________
(Subject) (Date)

113
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment! Your help is very much appreciated.
You are probably aware that you will be earning bonus points toward your final grade this
semester by participating in this task. Your bonus points are contingent upon your participation
in an experimental task. A sign-up sheet is circulating through the classroom. Please carefully
fill out the attached survey. Remember that all information about your participation and
performance in this experiment will be kept strictly confidential. Your instructor will be told
only whether you get the maximum or minimum number of bonus points after you participate in
this experiment. Again, thanks for your help and participation.

Name: What is your major area of study?

_________________________________
_________________________________
Course Number and Section:
In which of the following classes are you
_________________________________ currently enrolled? _______
a. Math
Social Security Number: b. HR
c. Sociology
_________________________________ d. Geography
e. OB
Email address: f. Strategy
_________________________________ What is your current year of study? _______
a. 1st year
Age: _________ b. 2nd year
c. 3rd year
Nationality:____________________
d. 4th year
Gender: _______ e. 5 + years
a. Male f. special student
b. Female
Do you now or have you previously held a
Ethnicity: _______ professional job? _______
a. Caucasion a. Yes
b. African-American b. No
c. Hispanic
If yes, for how long have you worked
d. Asian/Pacific Islander
professionally? _______
e. Native American
a. less than 1 year
Other: ____________________
b. 1-5 years
c. 5-10 years
d. more than 10 years

114
Listed below are a several statements. We are interested in the extent to which you agree or
disagree with these items. There is no right or wrong answer. It is usually best to go with your
first impression when choosing your response. If you find that the numbers in the scale(s) below
do not sufficiently represent your views, please select the one closest to the way you feel. Please
respond to every item by marking the appropriate response on your scantron response
sheet.

For statements 1-93, please read each statement carefully and indicate to what extent each
item describes you by writing the corresponding on the response sheet using the scale below.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

1. I know when to speak about my personal problems to others.

2. When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles and
overcame them.
3. I expect that I will do well on most things I try.

4. Other people find it easy to confide in me.

5. I find it hard to understand the non-verbal messages of other people.

6. Some of the major events of my life have led me to re-evaluate what is important and not
important.

7. When my mood changes, I see new possibilities.

8. Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living.

9. I am aware of my emotions as I experience them.

10. I expect good things to happen.

11. I like to share my emotions with others.

12. When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last.

13. I arrange events others enjoy.

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1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

14. I seek out activities that make me happy.

15. I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send others.

16. I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others.

17. When I am in a positive mood, solving problems are easy for me.

18. By looking at their facial expressions, I recognize the emotions people are experiencing.

19. I know why my emotions change.

20. When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas.

21. I have control over my emotions.

22. I easily recognize my emotions as I experience them.

23. I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome for tasks I take on.

24. I compliment others when they have done something well.

25. I am aware of the non-verbal messages other people send.

26. When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I almost feel as
though I have experienced this event myself.

27. When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas.

28. When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail.

29. I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them.

30. I help other people feel better when they are down.

31. I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles.

116
1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

32. I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice.

33. It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do.

34. I am not a worrier.

35. I often feel inferior to others.

36. When I’m under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I’m going to pieces.

37. I rarely feel lonely or blue.

38. I often feel tense and jittery.

39. Sometimes I feel completely worthless.

40. I rarely feel fearful or anxious.

41. I often get angry at the way people treat me.

42. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up.

43. I am seldom sad or depressed.

44. I often feel helpless and want someone else to solve my problems.

45. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide.

46. I like to have a lot of people around me.

47. I laugh easily.

48. I don’t consider myself especially “light-hearted.”

49. I really enjoy talking to people.

117
1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

50. I like to be where the action is.

51. I usually prefer to do things alone.

52. I often feel as if I’m bursting with energy.

53. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person.

54. I am not a cheerful optimist.

55. My life is fast-paced.

56. I am a very active person.

57. I would rather go my own way than be a leader of others.

58. I keep my belongings clean and neat.

59. I’m pretty good about pacing myself so as to get things done on time.

60. I am not a very methodical person.

61. I try to perform all the tasks assigned to me conscientiously.

62. I have a clear set of goals and work toward them in an orderly fashion.

63. I waste a lot of time before settling down to work.

64. I work hard to accomplish my goals.

65. When I make a commitment, I can always be counted on to follow through.

66. Sometimes I’m not as dependable or reliable as I should be.

67. I am a productive person who always gets the job done.

118
1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

68. I never seem to be able to get organized.

69. I strive for excellence in everything I do.

70. I go to church regularly.

71. If Americans were more religious, this would be a better country.

72. Spiritual values are more important than material things.

For item #73, please choose the item that best represents your beliefs.

73. Indicate whether you are

a. anti-relgious
b. not religious at all
c. slightly religious
d. moderately religious
e. very religious

For items 74-93, please indicate to what extent you agree with each item. Read each item and
then mark the appropriate answer on the response sheet. Use the following scale to record
your answers.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

74. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.

75. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.

119
1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

76. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.

77. Most people are basically good and kind.

78. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when it is
given a chance.

79. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.

80. There is no excuse for lying to someone.

81. Generally speaking, individuals won’t work hard unless they are forced to do so.

82. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.

83. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for
wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight.

84. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.

85. Anyone who completely trusts anyone is asking for trouble.

86. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that the criminals are
stupid enough to get caught.

87. Most individuals are brave.

88. It is wise to flatter important people.

89. It is possible to be good in all respects.

90. Barnum was very wrong when he said there is a sucker born every minute.

120
1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

91. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.

92. People suffering from incurable diseased should have the choice of being put painlessly
to death.

93. Most individuals forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their
property.

Please read each scenario and give your beliefs about the actions described in the questions
below.

A retail grocery chain operates several stores throughout the local area including one in the city’s
ghetto area. Independent studies have shown that prices do tend to be higher and there is less of
a selection of products in this particular store than in the other locations.

Action:
On the day welfare checks are received in the area of the city, the retailer increases prices on all
of his merchandise.

For items 94-101, please read each statement carefully and indicate your views by referring to
the scale provided at the top of this page and writing the corresponding number on the
response sheet.

94. Raising prices when welfare checks are distributed was fair.

95. The distribution of good and bad as a result of raising prices is culturally acceptable.

96. Raising prices when welfare checks are distributed violates an “unspoken promise.”

97. The retailer was not morally right.

98. The distribution of good and bad as a result of the retailer’s action is traditionally
unacceptable.

121
1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

99. The retailer did not violate an unwritten contract.

100. Raising prices when welfare checks are distributed was unjust.

101. The retailer’s behavior would be unacceptable to my family.

Please read each scenario and give your beliefs about the actions described in the questions
below.

John Ward is manager of product development for an auto parts contractor. Ward’s firm
received a large contract last summer to manufacture transaxles for use in a new line of front-
wheel-drive cars. The contract is very important to Ward’s firm because prior to obtaining it,
half of the firm’s employees, including many in Ward’s department, had been scheduled for an
indefinite layoff. Final testing of the assemblies ended last Friday, and the first shipments are
scheduled for three weeks from today. As Ward was examining the test reports, he discovered
that the transaxle tended to fail when loaded at more than 120% of rated capacity and subjected
to strong torsion forces. Ward notifies his supervisors, but they seem uninterested.

Action:
Ward thinks about notifying the company that is purchasing the transaxles, but decides against it
so his company does not lose the contract.

For items 102-109, please read each statement carefully and indicate your views by referring
to the scale provided at the top of this page and marking the corresponding number on the
response sheet.

102. The action Ward took in this scenario was fair.

103. The distribution of good and bad as a result of Ward’s action is culturally acceptable.

104. Ward’s action violated an “unspoken promise.”

105. Ward was not morally right.

122
1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

106. The distribution of good and bad as a result of Ward’s action is traditionally
unacceptable.

107. Ward did not violate an unwritten contract.

108. Ward’s action was unjust.

109. Ward’s behavior would be unacceptable to my family.

For items 110-122, please read each statement carefully and indicate your views by referring
to the scale provided at the top of this page and writing the corresponding number on the
response sheet.

110. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is
called for.

111. I am often able to read people’s true emotions correctly through their eyes.

112. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression
I wish to give them.

113. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the
person I’m conversing with.

114. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others emotions
and motives.

115. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may
laugh convincingly.

116. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn’t working, I can readily change it to
something that does.

117. I can usually tell when I’ve said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener’s
eyes.

123
1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

118. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.

119. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I
find myself in.

120. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person’s manner of
expression.

121. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.

122. Once I know what the situation calls for, it’s easy for me to regulate my actions
accordingly.

124
For items 123-152, please read each statement carefully and indicate which statement you
most agree with by marking the corresponding letter on the response sheet.

123. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with
them.

124. a. Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck.
b. People’s misfortunes results from the mistakes they make.

125. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don’t take enough
interest in politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.

126. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognized no matter how
hard he tries.

127. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.

b. Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by
accidental happenings.

129. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.

b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of
their opportunities.

130. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don’t like you.
b. People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get along with
others.

131. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one’s personality.

b. It is one’s experiences in life which determine what one is like.

132. a. I have found that what is going to happen will happen.

b. Trusting fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a
definite course of action.

133. a. In the case of the well-prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an
unfair test.
b. Many times exams questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying
is really useless.

125
134. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with
it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

135. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.

b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy
can do about it.

136. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a
matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.

137. a. There are certain people who are just no good.

b. There is some good in everybody.

138. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.

139. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right
place first.
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing
to do with it.

140. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can
neither understand nor control.
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can control
world events.

141. a. Most people don’t realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by
accidental happenings.
b. There really is no such thing as “luck.”

142. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.

b. It is usual to cover up one’s mistakes.

143. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.

b. How many friends you have depends on how nice a person you are.

126
144. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.

145 a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.

b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in
office.

146. a. Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.

147. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

148. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in
my life.

149. a. People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly.

b. There’s not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they
like you.

150. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.

b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.

151. a. What happens to me is my own doing.

b. Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life is
taking.

152. a. Most of the time I can’t understand why politicians behave the way they do.
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as
well as on a local level.

127
 APPENDIX D
Reading Excerpt

Abstract
The authors investigated the efficacy of 2 child witness preparation programs: task demand
training (TDT) and comprehension-monitoring training (CMT) with task demand training (CMT
+ TDT). Preschool ( M = 60.8 months), kindergarten ( M = 76.0 months) and 2nd-grade ( M =
98.1 months) children participated. All children participated in either TDT ( n = 56), or TDT +
CMT ( n = 43). After training, participants were interviewed about a video they watched.
Questions contained either simple or complex language. Results suggest TDT + CMT better
prepares witnesses of all ages for complex-language questions. When faced with complex-
language questions, the TDT + CMT group averaged more requests for rephrasings than the TDT
group. These data suggest even the very young children in this investigation benefited from the
court preparation protocol including TDT and CMT.

Results
We used a 2 (Training) × 3 (Grade) × 2 (Question Type) analysis of variance (ANOVA) to
examine the correct responses. The three-way interaction between question type, grade, and
training group was not significant, F (2, 93) = 1.11, p > .30. As predicted, we found a main
effect for question type, with complex language being more difficult for the child witnesses to
answer correctly than the simple questions, F (1, 95) = 365.44, p < .001, η 2 = .78. Also, there
was a main effect for grade, F (1, 95) = 5.37, p < .005, η 2 = .10. Post hoc comparisons indicated
the preschool children made fewer correct responses than the second-grade children. The main
effect for grade was not present for the remaining dependent variables.

Concerning requests for rephrased questions, the three-way interaction between question type,
grade, and training group was not significant, F (2, 93) = .77, p > .4. However, as predicted, the
Training × Question Type interaction was present, F (1, 93) = 32.46, p < .001, η 2 = .14. The
CMT + TDT group requested rephrasings more often than the TDT group, F (1, 95) = 25.85, p <
.001, η 2 = .21, and complex language elicited more requests for rephrased questions than simple
questions, F (1, 95) = 103.01, p < .001, η 2 = .44. Examination of the simple effects revealed
both training groups requested few rephrasings for the simple questions. For the complex-
language questions, however, the children in the CMT + TDT group made significantly more
requests for rephrased questions than the TDT group, F (1, 98) = 28.80, p < .001, η 2 = .23. It is
noteworthy that only 9.3% of the CMT + TDT did not request at least one complex-language
question be rephrased, whereas 48.2% of the children in the TDT group did not request a
rephrasing of even one complex-language question. A Fisher exact test revealed differences
among these percentages, p < .001. The percentage of children requesting at least one complex-
language question to be rephrased was significantly greater in the CMT + TDT group than the
TDT group.

128
As discussed earlier, we also thought participants would more often correctly answer rephrased
complex-language questions than nonrephrased complex-language questions. The mean
percentages of correctly answered rephrased complex-language questions ( M = 82%, SD = 23%)
was significantly higher than the percentage of correctly answered nonrephrased complex-
language questions ( M = 54%, SD = 14%), t (62) = 9.70, p < .001, d = 1.52. This analysis
supported the hypothesis that learning to request rephrasings (the goal of CMT) helps child
witnesses correctly answer the questions. We also hypothesized that a rephrasing rather than
repetition of the complex-language questions would help child witnesses correctly answer
questions. We found this also to be true, as participants were more likely to answer a rephrased
complex-language question correctly ( M = 82%, SD = 23%) than a repeated complex-language
question ( M = 44%, SD = 12%), t (98) = 18.46, p < .001, d = 2.11.

Post hoc analysis. Although children in the CMT + TDT group were significantly more likely
than the TDT group to request rephrasings, this effect was modest (i.e., they did so only 25% of
the time). We speculated that the additional CMT might have helped children to recognize their
confusion with some types of complex language and not others. The CMT protocol focused
almost exclusively on dealing with questions that contained difficult vocabulary, and children
may have become proficient at recognizing those types of questions. The children may not have
generalized to the other forms of complex language outlined in the Appendix (e.g., complex
syntax) [appendix omitted]. Thus, we examined the median number of requests for rephrasings
for each of the five subcategories of complex language. For the children in the TDT group, the
median number of requests for rephrasings was zero for all forms of complex language. The
CMT + TDT group also had a median number of zero requests for rephrasings for all complex
language except the difficult vocabulary questions. The median number of requests for
rephrasings for difficult vocabulary questions was three. Children in the CMT + TDT group were
much more likely to request rephrasings for difficult vocabulary questions than any other form of
complex language.

Finally, we had hypothesized that the value of CMT is in teaching children to request a
rephrasing of complex-language questions. We made this hypothesis because children have an
easier time answering simpler, rephrased versions of the questions. We therefore expected those
in the CMT + TDT group to be more likely to ask for rephrasings, which in turn should lead to
more correct responses. In order to examine this assumption, we examined this hypothesized
relationship in accordance with Baron and Kenny's (1986) recommendations. First, the
relationship between the independent variable (training group) and the mediating variable
(requests for rephrasings) was examined. Second, we correlated the independent variable
(training group) with the dependent variable (correct responses to complex-language questions).
Finally, we looked at the relationship between the mediating variable (requests for rephrasings)
and the dependent measure (correct responses to complex-language questions). This analysis
supported our hypothesis. When

129
the effect of requests for rephrasings was partialed out, the significant relationship between
training and recall was greatly reduced.

Excerpt taken from Peters, W. W. & Nunez, N. (1999). Complex language and comprehension
monitoring: Teaching child witnesses to recognize linguistic confusion. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 84, 661-669.

130
 APPENDIX E
Quiz (key)

1. What is the title of the article?

a. Complex language and comprehension monitoring: Teaching child witnesses to
recognize linguistic confusion.*
b. Tough love: what do you really know about your children?
c. The comprehension skills of 2002 NFL draftees: Does their IQ really hold water?
d. Language and comprehension skills in teenage witnesses.
e. Linguistic confusion and its impact on court testimonies of child witnesses.

2. What are the authors’ names?

a. O’Cass, A.
b. Kassarjian, H. & Sheffet, M.
c. Peters, W. & Nunez, N.*
d. Paulson, J. & Nelson, J.
e. Wilson, P. & Santez, S.

3. What is the journal and volume number for this article?

a. Journal of Psychology, 48
b. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 82
c. Journal of Legal Issues, 54
d. Reading Comprehension and Social Applications, 92
e. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84*

4. What type of analysis was conducted?

a. Multiple Regression
b. ANCOVA
c. MANCOVA
d. ANOVA*
e. Moderated Regression

5. What was the structure of the analysis?

a. 2 x 4 x 3
b. 3 x 2 x 2
c. 2 x 3 x 2*
d. 2 x 2 x 3
e. 4 x 3 x 2

131
6. What was the p value for the interaction between question type, grade and training
group?
a. .30*
b. .10
c. .03
d. .05
e. .50

7. What kind of effect did “question type” have in the first analysis?
a. interaction
b. weak
c. main*
d. strong
e. moderate

8. What two training programs were examined in this analysis?

a. trial durability training & child memory training
b. task demand training & comprehension-monitoring training*
c. witness memory training & response behavior training
d. question rephrasing training & complex-language response training
e. verbal comprehension training & memory-recall training

9. What was the η2 value for the effect referenced in question 7?

a. 365.44
b. 1.11
c. 95
d. 1
e. .78*

10. What was the F statistic for the first interaction effect?
a. 1.11*
b. 95
c. 1
d. .78
e. 365.44

11. What was the sample size for this interaction?

a. 95
b. 98
c. 111
d. 2
e. 93*

132
12. What percentage of subjects in the TDT group requested a rephrasing of at least one
complex-language question?
a. 9.3
b. 48.2*
c. 82
d. 23
e. 44

13. What recommendations were used to test the final hypothesis?

a. Kelly & Buron
b. Phrese & Taylor
c. Baron & Kenny*
d. Kassarjian & Sheffet
e. Wilson & Santez

14. What variables were examined in the final hypothesis?

a. training group, witness performance, & memory recall
b. witness performance, & memory recall
c. correct responses to complex-language questions & requests for rephrasings
d. training group, requests for rephrasings, & correct responses to complex-language
questions*
e. witness performance & requests for rephrasings

15. What is the goal of CMT?

a. to improve the memory recall of witnesses
b. to provide child witnesses with emotional stability during questioning in trials
c. to train children to request rephrasing of questions during questioning in trials*
d. to increase the vocabulary of child witnesses
e. to lead to more successful prosecutions in cases depending on testimony by child
witnesses.

16. Which group requested more rephrasings of complex questions?

a. CMT
b. TDT
c. CMT+TDT*
d. SD
e. SD+M

133
17. What was the sample size used to produce the result discussed in Question 16?
a. 93
b. 95
c. 62
d. 98*
e. 82

18. What was the F statistic for the result discussed in Question 16?
a. 28.80*
b. 18.46
c. 2.11
d. .77
e. 32.46

19. In the post-hoc analysis, what reduced the significance of the relationship between
training and recall?
a. moderating the effect of training group
b. partially out the effect of requests for rephrasings*
c. altering the assumptions in the CMT group
d. including the mediating effect of repetition
e. none of the above

20. The questions tested in this study were tested a group of children from 3 classes. What
grade levels did these children come from?
a. third grade, fourth grade, & fifth grade
b. fourth grade, fifth grade, & sixth grade
c. kindergarten, first grade, & second grade
d. preschool, kindergarten, & second grade*
e. kindergarten, second grade, & third grade

21. What was the median number for requests for rephrasings for difficult vocabulary
questions?
a. 6
b. 5
c. 4
d. 3*
e. 2

134
 22. What test was conducted to determine if the percentages of requests for rephrasings were
significantly different for each group?
a. Baron & Kenny Test
b. ANCOVA
c. regression
d. Fisher Exact Test*
e. none of the above

23. What hypothesis was tested in the post-hoc analysis?

a. The value of CMT is in teaching children to request a rephrasing of complex-
language questions.*
b. The value of TDT is in improving the memory skills of children
c. There is no real difference between CMT and TDT
d. CMT and TDT alone do not contribute any benefit in child witness preparation
e. There is no value in CMT

24. The data in this study suggests

a. only the older children in this study benefited from the training protocol
b. even the very young children in this investigation benefited from the court
preparation protocol including TDT and CMT*
c. children who receive court preparation that includes both TDT and CMT will lead to
more successful prosecutions in court
d. children who request that questions be repeated are better witnesses
e. there is no practical benefit from TDT and CMT

25. Study participants were more likely to

a. answer a repeated question correctly than a rephrased complex-language question
b. answer a rephrased question correctly than a repeated complex-language question*
c. answer a repeated question correctly after receiving TDT
d. answer all questions correctly after expanding their vocabulary regardless of training
e. answer a rephrased question correctly if they were older and in a more advanced
grade

Note: correct answers are marked with *.

135
 APPENDIX F
Post-Experiment Survey

Items 1-20 are a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each
item and then mark the appropriate answer on the scantron response sheet. Indicate to what
extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the following scale to
record your answers.

1 – very slightly 2 – a little 3- moderately 4- quite a bit 5- extremely

1. interested 11. irritable

2. distressed 12. alert
3. excited 13. ashamed
4. upset 14. inspired
5. strong 15. nervous
6. guilty 16. determined
7. scared 17. attentive
8. hostile 18. jittery
9. enthusiastic 19. active
10. proud 20. afraid

21. What grade do you think you have in the class through which you are participating in this
experiment?
a. A/A-
b. B+/B
c. B-/C+/C
d. C-/D+/D
e. D-/F

136
 APPENDIX G
Control Variables

Name: What is your major area of study?

_________________________________
_________________________________
Course Number and Section:
In which of the following classes are you
_________________________________ currently enrolled? _______
g. Math
Social Security Number: h. HR
i. Sociology
_________________________________ j. Geography
k. OB
Email address: l. Strategy
_________________________________ What is your current year of study? _______
g. 1st year
Age: _________ h. 2nd year
i. 3rd year
Nationality:____________________
j. 4th year
Gender: _______ k. 5 + years
c. Male l. special student
d. Female
Do you now or have you previously held a
Ethnicity: _______ professional job? _______
f. Caucasion c. Yes
g. African-American d. No
h. Hispanic
If yes, for how long have you worked
i. Asian/Pacific Islander
professionally? _______
j. Native American
e. less than 1 year
Other: ____________________
f. 1-5 years
g. 5-10 years
h. more than 10 years

137
 APPENDIX H
Abbreviated Positive and Negative Affect Schedule

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then mark the appropriate answer on the response sheet. Indicate to what
extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the following scale to
record your answers.

1 – very slightly 2 – a little 3- moderately 4- quite a bit 5- extremely.

1. interested 11. irritable

2. distressed 12. alert
3. excited 13. ashamed
4. upset 14. inspired
5. strong 15. nervous
6. guilty 16. determined
7. scared 17. attentive
8. hostile 18. jittery
9. enthusiastic 19. active
10. proud 20. afraid
Note: Reverse-coded items marked are marked with *.

138
 APPENDIX I
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness Scales

Please read each statement carefully and indicate to what extent each item describes you by
writing the corresponding number on the response sheet using the scale below.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5 strongly agree

(Neuroticism)

1. I am not a worrier.*

2. I often feel inferior to others.

3. When I’m under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I’m going to pieces.

4. I rarely feel lonely or blue.*

5. I often feel tense and jittery.

6. Sometimes I feel completely worthless.

7. I rarely feel fearful or anxious.*

8. I often get angry at the way people treat me.

9. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up.

10. I am seldom sad or depressed.*

11. I often feel helpless and want someone else to solve my problems.

12. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide.

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1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

Extraversion)

13. I like to have a lot of people around me.

14. I laugh easily.

15. I don’t consider myself especially “light-hearted.”*

16. I really enjoy talking to people.

17. I like to be where the action is.

18. I usually prefer to do things alone.*

19. I often feel as if I’m bursting with energy.

20. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person.

21. I am not a cheerful optimist.*

22. My life is fast-paced.

23. I am a very active person.

24. I would rather go my own way than be a leader of others.*

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1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

(Conscientiousness)

25. I keep my belongings clean and neat.

26. I’m pretty good about pacing myself so as to get things done on time.

27. I am not a very methodical person.*

28. I try to perform all the tasks assigned to me conscientiously.

29. I have a clear set of goals and work toward them in an orderly fashion.

30. I waste a lot of time before settling down to work.*

31. I work hard to accomplish my goals.

32. When I make a commitment, I can always be counted on to follow through.

33. Sometimes I’m not as dependable or reliable as I should be.*

34. I am a productive person who always gets the job done.

35. I never seem to be able to get organized.*

36. I strive for excellence in everything I do.

Note: Reverse-coded items marked are marked with *.

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 APPENDIX J
Emotional Intelligence Scale

On the following items, please indicate to what extent each item describes you. Read each
item and then mark the appropriate answer on the response sheet. Use the following scale to
record your answers.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

1. I know when to speak about my personal problems to others.

2. When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles and
overcame them.
3. I expect that I will do well on most things I try.

4. Other people find it easy to confide in me.

5.* I find it hard to understand the non-verbal messages of other people.

6. Some of the major events of my life have led me to re-evaluate what is important and not
important.

7. When my mood changes, I see new possibilities.

8. Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living.

9. I am aware of my emotions as I experience them.

10. I expect good things to happen.

11. I like to share my emotions with others.

12. When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last.

13. I arrange events others enjoy.

14. I seek out activities that make me happy.

15. I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send others.

16. I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others.

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17. When I am in a positive mood, solving problems are easy for me.

18. By looking at their facial expressions, I recognize the emotions people are experiencing.

19. I know why my emotions change.

20. When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas.

21. I have control over my emotions.

22. I easily recognize my emotions as I experience them.

23. I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome for tasks I take on.

24. I compliment others when they have done something well.

25. I am aware of the non-verbal messages other people send.

26. When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I almost feel as
though I have experienced this event myself.

27. When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas.

28.* When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail.

29. I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them.

30. I help other people feel better when they are down.

31. I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles.

32. I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice.

33.* It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do.

Note: Reverse-coded items marked are marked with *.

143
 APPENDIX K
Machiavellianism Scale

On the following items, please indicate to what extent you agree with each item. Read each
item and then mark the appropriate answer on the response sheet. Use the following scale to
record your answers.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.

2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.

3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.*

4. Most people are basically good and kind.*

5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when it is
given a chance.

6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.*

7. There is no excuse for lying to someone.*

8. Generally speaking, individuals won’t work hard unless they are forced to do so.

9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.*

10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for
wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight.*

11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.

12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone is asking for trouble.

13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that the criminals are
stupid enough to get caught.

144
14. Most individuals are brave.*

15. It is wise to flatter important people.

16. It is possible to be good in all respects.*

17. Barnum was very wrong when he said there is a sucker born every minute.*

18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.

19. People suffering from incurable diseased should have the choice of being put painlessly
to death.

20. Most individuals forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their
property.

Note: Reverse-coded items marked are marked with *.

145
 APPENDIX L
Multidimensional Ethics Scale

Please read each scenario and give your beliefs about the actions described in the questions
below.

A retail grocery chain operates several stores throughout the local area including one in the city’s
ghetto area. Independent studies have shown that prices do tend to be higher and there is less of
a selection of products in this particular store than in the other locations.

Action:
On the day welfare checks are received in the area of the city, the retailer increases prices on all
of his merchandise.

Now, please read each statement carefully and indicate your views by referring to the scale
provided below and writing the corresponding number on the response sheet.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

1.* Raising prices when welfare checks are distributed was fair.

2.* The distribution of good and bad as a result of raising prices is culturally acceptable.

3. Raising prices when welfare checks are distributed violates an “unspoken promise.”

4. The retailer was not morally right.

5. The distribution of good and bad as a result of the retailer’s action is traditionally
unacceptable.

6.* The retailer did not violate an unwritten contract.

7. Raising prices when welfare checks are distributed was unjust.

8. The retailer’s behavior would be unacceptable to my family.

146
Please read each scenario and give your beliefs about the actions described in the questions
below.

John Ward is manager of product development for an auto parts contractor. Ward’s firm
received a large contract last summer to manufacture transaxles for use in a new line of front-
wheel-drive cars. The contract is very important to Ward’s firm because prior to obtaining it,
half of the firm’s employees, including many in Ward’s department, had been scheduled for an
indefinite layoff. Final testing of the assemblies ended last Friday, and the first shipments are
scheduled for three weeks from today. As Ward was examining the test reports, he discovered
that the transaxle tended to fail when loaded at more than 120% of rated capacity and subjected
to strong torsion forces. Ward notifies his supervisors, but they seem uninterested.

Action:
Ward thinks about notifying the company that is purchasing the transaxles, but decides against it
so his company does not lose the contract.

Now, please read each statement carefully and indicate your views by referring to the scale
provided below and writing the corresponding number on the response sheet.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

1.* The action Ward took in this scenario was fair.

2.* The distribution of good and bad as a result of Ward’s action is culturally acceptable.

3. Ward’s action violated an unspoken promise”

4. Ward was not morally right.

5. The distribution of good and bad as a result of Ward’s action is traditionally

unacceptable.

6.* Ward did not violate an unwritten contract.

147
7. Ward’s action was unjust.

8. Ward’s behavior would be unacceptable to my family.

Note: Reverse-coded items marked are marked with *.

148
 APPENDIX M
Locus of Control Scale (KEY)

F1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much. FILLER
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with
them.

2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck.
b. People’s misfortunes results from the mistakes they make.

3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don’t take enough
interest in politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.

4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognized no matter how
hard he tries.

5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.

b. Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by
accidental happenings.

6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.

b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their
opportunities.

7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don’t like you.
b. People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get along with
others.

F8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one’s personality. FILLER
b. It is one’s experiences in life which determine what one is like.

9. a. I have found that what is going to happen will happen.

b. Trusting fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a
definite course of action.

10. a. In the case of the well-prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an
unfair test.
b. Many times exams questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying
is really useless.

149
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with
it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.

b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy
can do about it.

13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a
matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.

F14. a. There are certain people who are just no good.

b. There is some good in everybody. FILLER

15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.

16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right
place first.
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing
to do with it.

17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can
neither understand nor control.
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can control
world events.

18. a. Most people don’t realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by
accidental happenings.
b. There really is no such thing as “luck.”

F19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.

b. It is usual to cover up one’s mistakes. FILLER

20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.

b. How many friends you have depends on how nice a person you are.

150
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.

22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.

b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in
office.

23. a. Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.

F24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are. FILLER

25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in
my life.

26. a. People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly.

b. There’s not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they
like you.

F27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.

b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character. FILLER

28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.

b. Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life is
taking.
29. a. Most of the time I can’t understand why politicians behave the way they do.
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as
well as on a local level.

151
 APPENDIX N
Strength of Religious Beliefs Scale

Indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following three statements. Use the
following scale to record your answers.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

1. I go to church regularly.

2. If Americans were more religious, this would be a better country.

3. Spiritual values are more important than material things.

On the following item, please choose the item that best represents your beliefs.

4. Indicate whether you are

a. anti-religious
b. not religious at all
c. slightly religious
d. moderately religious
e. very religious

152
 APPENDIX O
Self-Monitoring Scale

Indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following statements. Use the following
scale to record your answers.

1 – strongly disagree 2 – disagree 3- neutral 4- agree 5- strongly agree

1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is
called for.

2. I am often able to read people’s true emotions correctly through their eyes.

3. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression
I wish to give them.

4. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the
person I’m conversing with.

5. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others emotions
and motives.

6. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may
laugh convincingly.

7. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn’t working, I can readily change it to
something that does.

8. I can usually tell when I’ve said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener’s
eyes.

9. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.*

10. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I
find myself in.

11. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person’s manner of
expression.

153
12. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.*

13. Once I know what the situation calls for, it’s easy for me to regulate my actions
accordingly.

Note: Reverse-coded items marked are marked with *.

154
 APPENDIX P
Hypothesis 7 Results

TABLE P1
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF POSITIVE
AFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEER INFLUENCE AND
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
(Hypothesis 7a-1)
Equation Dependent Independent Variables ß1 t R2adj
Variables
1. Positive Affect Confederate Behavior .055 .604**
-.007
Group Ethical Behavior .051 .555**
2. Ethical Behavior Confederate Behavior -.466 -6.769**
.430
Group Ethical Behavior -.883 -12.835**
3. Ethical Behavior Confederate Behavior -.468 -6.799**
Group Ethical Behavior -.885 -12.857** .430
Positive Affect .047 .932**
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. 1 standardized regression coefficients. N=227.

TABLE P2
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF POSITIVE
AFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRAIT AFFECT AND
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
(Hypothesis 7b-1)

Equation Dependent Independent Variables ß1 t R2adj

Variables
1. Positive Affect Neuroticism -.145 -2.147
.059
Extraversion .177 2.620
2. Ethical Behavior Neuroticism -.013 -.192
.002
Extraversion .098 1.407
3. Ethical Behavior Neuroticism -.013 -.186
Extraversion .098 1.379 -.003
Positive Affect .002 .024
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. 1 standardized regression coefficients. N=227.

155
 TABLE P3
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF POSITIVE
AFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENDER AND
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
(Hypothesis 7c-1)
Equation Dependent Independent Variables ß1 t R2adj
Variables
1. Positive Affect Gender -.090 -1.357 .004
2. Ethical Behavior Gender -.010 -.157 -.004
3. Ethical Behavior Gender -.008 -.123
-.008
Positive Affect .025 .371
1
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. standardized regression coefficients. N=227.

TABLE P4
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF NEGATIVE
AFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEER INFLUENCE AND
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
(Hypothesis 7a-2)
Equation Dependent Independent Variables ß1 t R2adj
Variables
1. Negative Affect Confederate Behavior -.126 -1.384**
.005
Group Ethical Behavior -.011 -.120**
2. Ethical Behavior Confederate Behavior -.466 -6.769**
.430
Group Ethical Behavior -.883 -12.835**
3. Ethical Behavior Confederate Behavior -.460 -6.652**
Group Ethical Behavior -.882 -12.823** .430
Negative Affect .047 .932**
1
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. standardized regression coefficients. N=227.

156
 TABLE P5
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF NEGATIVE
AFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRAIT AFFECT AND
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
(Hypothesis 7b-2)
Equation Dependent Independent Variables ß1 t R2adj
Variables
1. Negative Affect Neuroticism .172 2.518**
.037
Extraversion .186 2.721**
2. Ethical Behavior Neuroticism -.013 -.192**
.002
Extraversion .098 1.407**
3. Ethical Behavior Neuroticism -.018 -.250**
Extraversion .093 1.316** -.002
Negative Affect .025 .366**
1
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. standardized regression coefficients. N=227.

TABLE P6
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF NEGATIVE
AFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENDER AND
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
(Hypothesis 7c-2)
Equation Dependent Independent Variables ß1 t R2adj
Variables
1. Negative Affect Gender .088 -.301 -.004
2. Ethical Behavior Gender -.010 -.157 -.004
3. Ethical Behavior Gender -.018 -.146
-.008
Negative Affect .035 .529
1
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. standardized regression coefficients. N=227.

157
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 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Virginia K. Bratton was raised in Montana before earning a bachelor’s degree in Music

and Political Science from Concordia College in Moorhead, MN. While at Concordia, Virginia

was active in concert band, orchestra, and trombone and brass ensembles. After completing her

undergraduate work, she taught English as a Second Language in Seoul, South Korea. She then

attended graduate school and completed her master’s degree in Arts Administration from the

Florida State University School of Music in 1999. She worked as an arts advocacy and

government affairs intern for the American Symphony Orchestra League before assuming a

position as the assistant director for the inaugural season of Florida State University’s

interdisciplinary arts festival, Tallahassee: Seven Days of Opening Nights.

Virginia began her doctoral coursework following the second season of the arts festival

and has researched in several areas including impression management, institutional theory,

organizational identity, and business ethics. She recently coauthored a paper that was awarded

best paper of the Human Resources Division at the 2003 Academy of Management Conference

in Seattle, Washington. Virginia is a lecturer at the University of Melbourne Management

Department in Melbourne, Australia.

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