35. EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, VS.
COURT OF Corporation that employed petitioner), which
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 109870, December 01, 1995
FACTS: After his petition for review of the Court
of Appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for
violation of the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential
Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a
Resolution dated February 9, 1994, petitioner
filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled
"SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL"[3] setting forth, in relation to the motion
for new trial:
"6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded
on newly discovered evidence and excusible
(sic) negligence, and shall be supported by
affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation
who will exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former
officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation (the
actually exercised control over the affairs of
Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert
innocence for the first time and explain why he
was unable to do so earlier."
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, among
other things, granted the substitution but denied
the motion for leave to file motion for new trial,
"the petition having been already denied on
February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994
filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL", and a
"MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO
ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. The Court
thereafter required the Solicitor General to
comment on said motion and manifestation
within ten (10) days from notice, in a Resolution
dated September 7, 1994.
RECOMMENDATION: In the Comment filed
after three (3) extensions of time were given by
the Court,[8] the Solicitor General himself
recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new
trial, proceeding from the same impression that a
certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother)
sworn statement is an admission against interest
which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from
criminal liability.
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
"Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a
new trial.
"However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo
Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests
under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his
brother Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence,
the alleged confession of guilt should be given a
hard look by the Court.
"The People is inclined to allow petitioner to
establish the genuineness and due execution of
his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and
fair play.
ISSUE: WON NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE
GRANTED
HELD: "The above duty is well founded on the
instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that
prosecutors represent a sovereign `whose
obligation to govern impartially is compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done
(Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce
Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review,
July 31, 1994). (Italics supplied.)"
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282
[1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this
Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial
predicated on allegedly newly discovered
evidence the rationale of which being:
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in
an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for
new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, for only questions of fact are involved
therein",
the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not
abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth,
Jr. v. People" and "People v. Amparado".
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside
technicalities and despite the opposition of the
Solicitor General, granted new trial to the
convicted accused concerned on the basis of
proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons
which the Court considered as newly discovered
and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the
judgment of conviction. Being similarly
circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why
herein petitioner should be denied the same
benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under
the circumstances considering that the "People"
does not raise any objection to a new trial, for
which reason the Solicitor General ought to be
specially commended for displaying once again
such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The
Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.
DOCTRINE: "Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors
who represent the People of the Philippines in a
criminal case are not duty bound to seek
conviction of the accused but to see that justice
is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
`Canon 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers
in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
`Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer
engaged in public prosecution is not to convict
but to see that justice is done. The suppression
of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable
of establishing the innocence of the accused is
highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action.'
36. ALI v. ATTY. BUBONG
A.C. No. 4018, Mar. 8, 2005
FACTS: This is a verified petition for disbarment
filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having
been found guilty of grave misconduct while
holding the position of Register of Deeds of
Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment
proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative
case earlier filed by complainant against
respondent, which was initially investigated by
the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal
exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating the
criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad
Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law. It appears from the records that
the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in
favor of respondent, absolved respondent of all
the charges brought against him. The case was
then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then SoJ
Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the
charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the
custody of documents, but held guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT
and manipulating the criminal case for violation
of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-accused.
As a result of this finding, former President FVR
issued AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion
reached by Secretary Drilon. Respondent
questioned said AO before this Court through a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition
claiming that the Office of the President did not
have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him
from office and insisted that respondents violated
the laws on security of tenure and that
respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of
Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his
authority to resolve the administrative complaint
against him (herein respondent), but was
dismissed for failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned order. Respondent MR was
denied with finality. On the disbarment
proceeding, complainant claims that it has
become obvious that respondent had proven
himself unfit to be further entrusted with the
duties of an attorney and that he poses a serious
threat to the integrity of the legal profession.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing
irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in
the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him,
both law and jurisprudence support his stance
that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for
land registration on the basis only of the
documents presented by the applicants. In the
case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the
documents they presented to his office warranted
suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue
TCT No. T-2821 in their favor. Respondent also
insists that he had nothing to do with the
dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his
participation in said case was a result of the two
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the
investigating prosecutor who required him to
produce the various land titles involved in said
dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation of
this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the
order relative to the transfer of venue of this case
and penalized with dismissal from the service, as
Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
RECOMMENDATION/FINDING: The finding of
Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by
the Office of the President was fully supported by
evidence and as such carries a very strong
weight in considering the professional
misconduct of respondent in the present case.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, which pertained
solely to the period of suspension from the
practice of law from a five-year suspension to a
two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied
as by that time, the matter had already been
endorsed to this Court.
ISSUE: WON respondent may be disbarred for
grave misconduct committed while he was in the
employ of the government.
RULING: We resolve this question in the
affirmative.
In the case at bar, respondents grave
misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this
Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By
taking advantage of his office as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City and employing his
knowledge of the rules governing land
registrationfor the benefit of his relatives,
respondent had clearly demonstrated his
unfitness not only to perform the functions of a
civil servant but also to retain his membership in
the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is explicit on this matter.
It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the
people’s confidence in the public office he used
to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the
legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his
knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for
nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege
to practice law. As for the letter sent by Bainar
Ali, the deceased complainants daughter,
requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we
cannot possibly favorably act on the same as
proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted
or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal
of the charges or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same. As we have previously
explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v.
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:
A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been duly proven. This rule is premised on
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is
a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer
to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A.
Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.
DOCTRINE: The Code of Professional
Responsibility does not cease to apply to a
lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express
provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing
the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their
official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct
as a government official is of such nature as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as
a member of the bar on such grounds. Although
the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he committed
as a government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
constitutes a violation of his oath a member of
the legal profession.
37. Olazo vs. Justice Tinga
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010
Facts: Complainant filed a sales application
covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig,
previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was
segregated and declared open for disposition. A
Committee on Awards whose duty was to study,
evaluate, and make a recommendation on the
applications to purchase the lands declared open
for disposition. The Committee on Awards was
headed by the Director of Lands and the
respondent was one of the Committee members,
in his official capacity as the Congressman of
Taguig and Pateros.
Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
The complainant claimed that the respondent
abused his position as Congressman and as a
member of the Committee on Awards when he
unduly interfered with the complainants sales
application because of his personal interest over
the subject land. The complainant alleged that
the respondent exerted undue pressure and
influence over the complainants father, Miguel P.
Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants
sales application and claim the subject land for
himself. The complainant also alleged that the
respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to
accept, on various dates, sums of money as
payment of the latters alleged rights over the
subject land. The complainant further claimed
that the respondent brokered the transfer of
rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the
nephew of the respondents deceased wife.
As a result of the respondents abuse of his
official functions, the complainants sales
application was denied. The conveyance of rights
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales
application were subsequently given due course
by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of
land within the proclaimed areas belonging to
Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The
complainant alleged that the respondent
persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to
convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents
promptings, the rights to the land were
transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May
1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the
purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights
over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
complainant claimed that the respondent wanted
the rights over the land transferred to one
Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of
Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard
executed an Assurance where he stated that he
was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent
engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was
not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum
No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of
the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an
award. Thus, the approval of his sales
application by the Committee on Awards
amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No.
119.
The complainant also alleged that the
respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of
law, within the one-year prohibition period, when
he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee
on Awards.
Issues:
Whether the respondents actions constitute a
breach of the standard ethical conduct first, while
the respondent was still an elective public official
and a member of the Committee on Awards;
and second, when he was no longer a public
official, but a private lawyer who represented a
client before the office he was previously
connected with.
Held: First, the records do not clearly show if the
complainants sales application was ever brought
before the Committee on Awards.
These circumstances do not show that the
respondent did in any way promote, advance or
use his private interests in the discharge of his
official duties. To repeat, since the sales
application was not brought before the
Committee on Awards when the respondent was
still a member, no sufficient basis exists to
conclude that he used his position to obtain
personal benefits. We note in this regard that the
denial of the complainants sales application over
the subject land was made by the DENR, not by
the Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainants allegation that the
respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the
subject land does not specify how the
orchestration was undertaken. What appears
clear in the records is the uncorroborated
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated
May 25, 2003,[20] categorically stating that the
respondent had no interest in the subject land,
and neither was he a contracting party in the
transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the
absence of any specific charge, Olazos
disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on
the respondents alleged participation, and we
find it to be in the respondents favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel
Olazo, that the complainant presented to support
his claim that the respondent exerted undue
pressure and influence over his father (namely:
the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR
Regional Director-NCR;[21] the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;[22] and the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996[23]),
do not contain any reference to the alleged
pressure or force exerted by the respondent over
Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed
that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in
having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed
areas) surveyed. They also showed that the
respondent merely acted as a witness in the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To
our mind, there are neutral acts that may be
rendered by one relative to another, and do not
show how the respondent could have influenced
the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the
complainants sales application. At the same
time, we cannot give any credit to the
Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are
contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the
record. We note that Manuel had no personal
knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told
him, of the force allegedly exerted by the
respondent against Miguel Olazo.
Second Issue:
As the records show, no evidence exists showing
that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuels land when
the former was still a member of the Committee
on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to
sufficiently establish that the respondent was
engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the
legal service rendered by the respondent was
limited only in the preparation of a single
document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,[32] we
specifically described private practice of law as
one that contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding
ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondents act
fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to
show that the legal representation was made
before the Committee on Awards, or that the
Assurance was intended to be presented before
it. These are matters for the complainant to prove
and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this
regard against the respondents favor.
Penalty: DISMISSED
38. Gisela Huyssen vs. Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez
A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006
FACTS: Complainant alleged that in 1995, while
respondent was still connected with the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and
her three sons, who are all American citizens,
applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g]
of the Immigration Law. Respondent told
complainant that in order that their visa
applications will be favorably acted upon by the
BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of
money for a period of one year which could be
withdrawn after one year. Believing respondent,
complainant deposited with respondent on six
different occasions the total amount of
US$20,000. Respondent prepared
receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the
amounts deposited by the complainant but
refused to give her copies of official receipts
despite her demands. After one year,
complainant demanded from respondent the
return of US$20,000 who assured her that said
amount would be returned. When respondent
failed to return the sum deposited, the World
Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a
member) sent a demand letter to respondent for
the immediate return of the money. In a letter
dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to
release the amount not later than 9 March 1999.
Failing to comply, the World Mission for Jesus
sent another demand letter. Respondent sent
complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999
explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in
the release of deposited amount. He enclosed
two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20
April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in
the amounts. When complainant deposited the
postdated checks on their due dates, the same
were dishonored because respondent had
stopped payment on the same. Thereafter,
respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25
April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping
payment on the checks, and gave complainant
five postdated checks with the assurance that
said checks would be honored. Complainant
deposited the five postdated checks on their due
dates but they were all dishonored for having
been drawn against insufficient funds or payment
thereon was ordered stopped by respondent.
After respondent made several unfulfilled
promises, complainant referred the matter to a
lawyer who sent two demand letters to
respondent. The demand letters remained
unheeded. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was
filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline,
required respondent to submit his answer within
15 days from receipt thereof.
Respondent denied the allegations in the
complaint claiming that having never physically
received the money mentioned in the complaint,
he could not have appropriated or pocketed the
same. He said the amount was used as payment
for services rendered for obtaining the
permanent visas in the Philippines. He alleged
that through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a
Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant,
the latter was introduced to him at his office at
the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines. Their
problem was the fact that since they have been
staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10)
years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they
could no longer extend their said status as under
the law and related policies of the government.
He advised them that they better secure a
permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine
Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota.
Complainant further requested him to refer to her
to a lawyer to work for their application, which he
did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the
complainant and her family. The application was
filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty.
Mendoza until the same was finished and the
corresponding permanent visa were obtained by
the complainant and her family. He became the
intermediary between complainant and their
counsel so much that every amount that the
latter would request for whatever purpose was
coursed through him which request were then
transmitted to the complainant and every amount
of money given by the complainant to their
counsel were coursed thru him which is the very
reason why his signature appears in the
vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit. On
several occasions, the complaint was set for
reception of respondent’s evidence but the
scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at
the instance of the respondent who was allegedly
out of the country to attend to his client’s needs.
Reception of respondent’s evidence was
scheduled for the last time on 28 September
2004 and again respondent failed to appear,
despite due notice and without just cause.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTIGATING
COMMISSIONER: Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report5
recommending the disbarment of respondent.
There is no question that respondent received
the amount of US$20,000 from complainant, as
respondent himself admitted that he signed the
vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant)
showing his receipt of said amount from
complainant. Respondent however claims that he
did not appropriate the same for himself but that
he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty.
Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is
untenable considering the documentary evidence
submitted by complainant. respondent makes it
appear that the US$20,000 was officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. However, if this is true, how come
only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of
the said sum and official receipts therefore were
never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why
would respondent issue his personal checks to
cover the return of the money to complainant if
said amount was really officially deposited with
the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable conclusion
that respondent received the money from
complainant and appropriated the same for his
personal use. It is submitted that respondent has
violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING OF THE IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS: Approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s report with modification. Atty.
Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law and ordered to return the
amount with legal interest from receipt of the
money until payment. This case shall be referred
to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution
for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Acts and to the Department of Justice for
appropriate administrative action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent should be
disbarred.
RULING: It is undisputed that respondent
admitted having received the US$20,000 from
complainant as shown by his signatures in the
petty cash vouchers and receipts he prepared,
on the false representation that that it was
needed in complainant’s application for visa with
the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated
the said amount and interposed the defense that
he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who
assisted complainant and children in their
application for visa in the BID. Such defense
remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit
evidence on the matter. While he claims that
Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present
the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza.
Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the
blame to someone who has been naturally
silenced by fate, is not only impudent but
downright ignominious. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that he deny the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. Records show that even though he
was given the opportunity to answer the charges
and controvert the evidence against him in a
formal investigation, he failed, without any
plausible reason, to appear several times
whenever the case was set for reception of his
evidence despite due notice. The defense of
denial proffered by respondent is, thus, not
convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a
weak defense. When respondent issued the
postdated checks as his moral obligation, he
indirectly admitted the charge. In a desperate
attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his
misdeed, he went on committing another by
issuing several worthless checks, thereby
compounding his case. In a recent case, we
have held that the issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect
"transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large.
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct;
and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith
of the public in the legal profession, respondent
deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Atty. Fred
L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law.
39. Olazo vs. Justice Tinga
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010
40. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael Mejia
Facts: Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his
retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the
following administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his
personal use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him
for payment of real estate taxes on property
belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision
known as Valle Verde I; and
b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted
to him for payment of taxes and expenses in
connection with the registration of title of
Bernardo to another property in a subdivision
known as Valle Verde V;
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
a) a special power of attorney dated March 16,
1985, purportedly executed in his favor by
Bernardo;
b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982; and
c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by
the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in
Bernardos favor; and
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without
funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained
from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and
thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded. The SC
rendered an en banc decision declaring his
disbarment, and Mejia filed a petition to
reengage in the practice of law which was denied
by the court, and filed the present petition for
review of the administrative case with plea for
reinstatement to the practice of law.
Issue: Whether or not he should be reinstated to
the practice of law?
Held: Yes, In the petition, Mejia acknowledged
his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen
years had already elapsed since Mejia’s name
was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the
age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness
and pleading for reinstatement. According to him,
he has long repented and he has suffered
enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to
leave a legacy to his children and redeem the
indignity that they have suffered due to his
disbarment. After his disbarment, he put up the
Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his
religious and social writings. He also organized a
religious organization and named it El Cristo
Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and
Mind. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the
ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure
in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia.
Since his disbarment in 1992, no other
transgression has been attributed to him, and he
has shown remorse.Obviously, he has learned
his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while
the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline
its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has
already served its purpose. After all, penalties,
such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish
but to correct offenders.
Penalty: REINSTATED IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS
41. Conrado Que vs. Atty. Revilla, Jr.
Facts: Dec 4, 2009 – Atty. Revilla was disbarred
from the practice of law on the following grounds:
abuse of court procedures and processes; filing
of multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful,
intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and
deception before the courts; maligning the name
of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and
unauthorized appearances in court. (violation of
CPR and Rule 138)
CA - filing petition for certiorari
RTC - two petitions for annulment of title
a petition for annulment of judgment in the RTC
and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before
the RTC (collectively, subject cases)to assail and
overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) and RTC in the unlawful
detainer case rendered against the respondent
clients.
The respondent also committed forum –
shopping by filing the subject cases in order to
obstruct, impede, and frustrate the efficient
administration of justice for his own personal gain
and to defeat the right of the complainant and his
siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC
judgments in the unlawful detainer case.
Appeared in petition for annulment of 15 litigants,
3 of whom already dead. Appeared in 2nd
Petition for annulment as counsel for Republic of
the Philippines without authority to do so. He also
represented 52 litigants, whom he has no
authority to do so.
Findings of Investigating Commissioner:
- all with merit except the representation of 52
litigants (pro bono daw)
Board of Governors – adopted and approved the
report of the Commissioner and recommended
disbarment for 2 yrs. Subsequently reduced to 1
year.
Disbarment is merited because this is not the
respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same
nature. Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla. The court
showed leniency then by reducing his penalty of
disbarment to suspension for six (6) months.
2010 - respondent filed a Petition for Judicial
Clemency and Compassion praying that his
license to practice law be restored based on
humanitarian considerations; denied
Jan. 2011- an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy asking the Court to take a second look at
the penalty imposed upon him. He also
attempted to pass the blame on another
individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General
Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation)
to free himself from liability by claiming that one
of the charges leading to his disbarment was not
of his own doing; denied
July 13, 2011- reiterating his pleas, He sought
the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has
learned his lesson; but at the same time,
questioning the Court’s finding for lack of factual
support; denied
August 30, 2012 - the respondent once more
prayed for his reinstatement professing
repentance and remorse for what he did. He
pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed
that he will no longer misuse the rules of
procedure but instead, devote his time and
energy for its proper observance and
implementation. He also stated that for almost
three years of being disbarred from the practice
of law, he has never been involved in any
unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He
promised to maintain at all times a high degree of
legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair
dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal
profession in accordance with the values and
morals embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility; denied
March 27, 2013- the respondent filed a letter
pleading the Court to revisit his previous
requests for reinstatement. (considered an MR of
the last denial) Court denied with finality.
July 18, 2014 - the respondent filed a Profound
Appeal for Judicial Clemency reiterating his
apologies to the Court. He stressed that the
penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll
on his health; he has now become most frail and
weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic
kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing
dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in
the years that he had been excluded from the
practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian
and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a
Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal
Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon
City. The respondent also pleads for clemency,
not because he intends to practice law again, but
to be made whole, to recover from being
shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. He
expressed his sincere repentance and deep
remorse by taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. He also prayed that his
disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as
a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his
petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract
evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney
disease, and a certification from St. Peter Paris,
proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.
Issue: Whether or Not Atty. Revilla should be
reinstated.
Held: Denied. The basic inquiry in a petition for
reinstatement to the practice of law is whether
the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or
herself in conduct and character. The lawyer has
to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again
worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will
take into consideration his or her character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he or she was
disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in
between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.
Petitioner was already engaged in similar
activities before disbarment. In his present
appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent
acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to
have taken full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the
respondent no longer questioned the Court’s
decision. According to him, he has long
expressed deep remorse and genuine
repentance. Although the Court believes that the
respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber
as shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment,
it is not convinced that he had sufficiently
achieved moral reformation. The Court does not
believe that the passage of more than four (4)
years is sufficient to enable the respondent to
reflect and to realize his professional
transgressions. Considering the respondent’s
earlier disbarment case (and subsequent
reduction of the penalty imposed as an act of
clemency), and another disbarment case against
him still pending review by the Court, the court is
not fully and convincingly satisfied that the
respondent has already reformed.
The period of five (5) years is likewise not
considerably long considering the nature and
perversity of the respondent’s misdeeds. The
Court believes that it is still early to consider the
respondent’s reinstatement.
Furthermore, it is not persuaded by the
respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.
While he expressly stated in his appeal that he
had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor,
his previous inclination to pass the blame to
other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to
make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his
assertion. The respondent also failed to submit
proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He
failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that he is again worthy of membership
in the legal profession. The Court thus entertain
serious doubts that the respondent had
completely reformed.
Court sympathizes with the respondent's
unfortunate physical condition, it stress that in
considering his application for reinstatement to
the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to
determine whether he has established moral
reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its
feeling of sympathy or pity. This requirement was
not met. Until such time when the respondent
can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to
resume his membership in the Bar, disbarment
stands.
Doctrine: Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
or consent to the doing of any in court,
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT
HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF LAW
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his clients.
Rule 138- sec. 21 and 27
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is
not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or
a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such.
42. PP vs. Hon. Maceda
Facts: This case stems from denial by the SC of
the People’s motion seeking reconsideration of
its August 13, 1990 decision holding that
respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
committed no grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving
custody over private respondent Avelino T.
Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique
RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At
that time, sufficient reason was shown why
Javellana should not be detained at the Antique
Provincial Jail. The trial court’s order specifically
provided for private respondent’s detention at the
residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam
around but was to be held as detention prisoner
in said residence. It was however found that the
order was not strictly complied with because
Javellana was not detained in the residence of
Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal
activities as if he were a free man, including
engaging in the practice of law.
Issue: Whether of Not Atty. Javellana , a
convict, is allowed to practice law.
Held: Private respondent Javellana has been
arrested based on the filing of criminal cases
against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be
under the custody of the law. The trial court gave
Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of
private respondent Javellana with the obligation
“to hold and detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s
residence in his official capacity as the clerk of
court of the regional trial court. Hence, when
Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he
ceased to be the personal custodian of accused
Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must
be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a
detention prisoner private respondent Javellana
is not allowed to practice his profession as a
necessary consequence of his status as a
detention prisoner. The trial court’s order was
clear that private respondent "is not to be
allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held
as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to
practice law referred not only to Criminal Case
No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in
cases where private respondent would appear in
court to defend himself.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an
offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual
restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound
to answer for the commission of the offense. He
must be detained in jail during the pendency of
the case against him, unless he is authorized by
the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving
final sentence can not practice their profession
nor engage in any business or occupation, or
hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of
arrest and detention.
He was ordered to be detained in Provincial Jail
of Antique.
43. Zeta vs. Malinao
Facts: Administrative complaint against
Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court
of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging
as follows:
l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. —
MR. Malinao has been appearing in the
municipal court of this town for parties like
attorney when he is not an attorney. He makes it
his means of livelihood as he collects fees from
his clients. He competes with attorneys but does
not pay anything. We believe that his doing so
should be stopped for a good government. These
facts can be checked with records of those
municipal courts.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. —
Being employed in the Court of First Instance he
would instigate persons, especially in his barrio
to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases
in the municipal court in this town involving
himself and his men. He incite them telling them
not to be afraid as he is a court employee and
has influence over the judges. Those persons
being ignorant would believe him and so would
commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is
contrary to good order and peace as he is using
his supposed influences to urge persons to
commit crimes.
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information
has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record
in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in
the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his
time record as present. He receives salary for
those absent days. This can be checked with
time record he has submitted and if he has any
application for leave. He may try to cure it by
submitting application for leave but this should
not be allowed as he has already committed
crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND
CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-
WE have reliable information it is prohibited for a
civil service employee to engage in private
practice any profession or business without
permission from the Department Head. Mr.
Malinao we are sure has not secured that
permission because he should not be allowed to
practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so,
he violated that Executive Order and Civil
Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly
requesting the Commissioner of Civil Service to
investigate him on this. If warranted he should be
given the corresponding penalty as dismissal
because we believe he deserve it.
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to
subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is
said to be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the
same had failed because the said Julio Zeta
appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear
in the investigation in connection with his
complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court
nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case
against him by calling the Judges of the different
municipalities where he appeared to which all of
them confirmed. He also offered no explanations
to his discrepancies in timekeeping than that of
record and appearances.
Findings of Investigator:
(The Court adopted the findings) It is clear to Us
that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel
in various municipal courts without prior
permission of his superiors in violation of civil
service rules and regulations, falsified his time
record of service by making it appear therein that
he was present in his office on occasions when
in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing
as counsel, without being a member of the bar,
which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of
law.
The defense of respondent that "his participation
for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they
could not engage the services of counsel by
reason of poverty and the absence of one in the
locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for
him, considering that in appearing as counsel in
court, he did so without permission from his
superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record
of service to conceal his absence from his office
on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of
times that respondent acted as counsel under
the above circumstances would indicate that he
was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
considerations other than pure love of justice.
Judge Zosa recommended reprimand, The Court
ordered his dismissal as Court interpreter of CFI,
Samar.
44. ROGELIO A. TAN VS. BENEDICTO M.
BALAJADIA
G.R. NO. 169517, March 14, 2006
Facts: An original petition for contempt
against respondent Benedicto Balajadia was filed
by Rogelio Tan, et. al.
Petitioners’ Allegation: Petitioners allege that
on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case
against them with the Office of the City of
Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of
authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax
ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of
parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In
paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit,
respondent asserted that he is a "practicing
lawyer based in Baguio City with office address
at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
Road, Baguio City.” However, certifications
issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that
respondent has never been admitted to the
Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that
respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
Respondent’s Defense: Respondent avers that
the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an
honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of
Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject
complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquino's complaint-affidavit, who had
previously filed a complaint-affidavit against
petitioners involving the same subject matter.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino's secretary,
executed an affidavit admitting the mistake in the
preparation of the complaint- affidavit.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Balajadia
is liable for direct Contempt.
Held: NO, he is not liable for indirect contempt. In
determining liability for criminal contempt, well-
settled is the rule that intent is a necessary
element, and no one can be punished unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to
commit it. In the case at bar, a review of the
records supports respondent's claim that he
never intended to project himself as a lawyer to
the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part
of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of
Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that
gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the
complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary
evidence on record. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the allegation in
paragraph 5 of respondent's complaint-affidavit
was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.
SC: CASE DISMISSED. Respondent is
WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in
his future actions.
NO RULING FROM LOWER COURT BECAUSE
THIS IS AN ORIGINAL PETITION WITH THE
SC.
45. LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO VS. ATTY.
ROGELIO P. TERRADO
A.C. NO. 6317, August 31, 2006
Facts: An administrative complaint was filed
by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against
respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross
misconduct, malpractice and conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite
receipt of payment representing attorney's fees.
Complainant’s Allegation: She engaged the
services of respondent sometime in January
2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her
deposit with Planters Development Bank,
Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed
house and lot. Complainant alleged that
respondent failed to appear before the trial court
in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession and did not protect her interests in
the Compromise Agreement which she
subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No.
B-2610.
Respondent’s Defense: He averred that the
P70,000.00 he received from complainant was
payment for legal services for the recovery of the
deposit with Planters Development Bank and did
not include LRC Case No. B-2610.
Investigating Commissioner of IBP: Found
respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and
9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate
to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with
a partner or associate that, upon the latter's
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable
period of time to his estate or to the persons
specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete
unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer;
or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-
lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if
the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-
sharing arrangement.
Penalty recommended by Investigating
Commissioner of IBP: Six (6) months with a
stern warning that similar acts in the future will be
severely dealt with.
IBP Board of Governors: Adopted the
recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.
Issues: Whether or not respondent is guilty of
Neglect of legal matter entrusted to him.
Held: Respondent's disregard for his client's
interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in
the compromise agreement where the
complainant conceded the validity of the
foreclosure of her property; that the redemption
period has already expired thus consolidating
ownership in the bank, and that she releases her
claims against it.As found by the Investigating
Commissioner, complainant agreed to these
concessions because respondent misled her to
believe that she could still redeem the property
after three years from the foreclosure. The duty
of a lawyer to safeguard his client's interests
commences from his retainer until his discharge
from the case or the final disposition of the
subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to
the client's cause. The canons of the legal
profession require that once an attorney agrees
to handle a case, he should undertake the task
with zeal, care and utmost devotion.
Respondent's admission that he divided the legal
fees with two other people as a referral fee does
not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not
divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except in certain cases. By openly admitting
he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals
as commission/referral fees respondent violated
Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice
law.
Penalty imposed by SC: He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED
that any similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely. He is further ordered to RETURN,
within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of
P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C.
Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his
compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
46. PLUS BUILDERS INC. VS. REVILLA, JR.
FACTS: This administrative case originated from
a verified petition for disbarment filed by Plus
Builders Inc. and Edgardo Garcia before the IBP.
Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,
Jr. with committing a willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court
procedure and processes to delay the execution
of a judgment; and collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial
Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, the
Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD)
rendered a consolidated Decision in favor of
petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and
against [tenants/farmers]. Tenants/farmers filed
several verified pleadings as part of the records
of DARAB cases above-mentioned alleging
under oath that they were 'MAGSASAKANG
NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject
properties, acknowledging the rights of the
registered owners at that time, even before the
ownership and title were transferred to Petitioner/
Complainant Plus Builders, Inc.
On December 17, 1999, counsel for
TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty.
Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma Motion
for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a
result, PARAD did not give due course to the
same. Another counsel for
TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy
G. Roxas, who represented himself as counsel
for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation
stating that he is representing
TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were
'bona fide' members of the Kalayaan
Development Cooperative (KDC). Thereafter, he
filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2000
stating that they received the Decision on March
14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is against
the law and jurisprudence. On May 31, 2001,
Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that
there was a monetary judgment by way of
Disturbance Compensation granted to
Tenants/Farmers, filed a 'Motion for Leave of
Court to Allow Correction of Caption and
Amendment of Judgment'.
After realizing that his motion failed to give him
beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD
judgment, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction
with prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of
Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated
July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent before
the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City,
notwithstanding the fact that this instant case
was appealed by another lawyer (Atty. Roxas).
On the basis of the petition, a Temporary
Restraining Order was issued. The case was
appealed to the CA and the assailed orders
issued by DARAB are declared null and void. It
was further elevated to SC and dismissed the
case with finality.
Enraged by his defeat, respondent filed a verified
action to quiet title before the RTC praying for a
TRO to deliberately stop the enforcement of the
decisions of the higher courts. He signed his
pleading under a signed his pleading under a
group of non-lawyers joining him in the practice
of law as KDC LEGAL SERVICES, LAW
OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which included
KDC as law partners in violation of the Rules on
the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter
of fact, under the Retainership Contract
submitted by Respondent before the PARAD of
Cavite, it was specifically mentioned that legal
fees were to be collected as counsel on record
for the cooperative and respondent. Therefore,
this contract was effectively used [for] unlawful
solicitation of clients in the practice of law with
non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to
become "counsel on record”.
Respondent denied the charges against him. He
averred that by filing the action to quiet title, he
had merely wanted to protect the rights and
interests of his clients. According to him, they
sincerely and honestly believed that their
possession of the litigated land had already
ripened into ownership.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
Investigating Commissioner Espina found
respondent guilty of violating the attorney's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously
concealed the defeat of his clients in the case
before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher
courts," in order to secure a temporary
restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
As a result, he was able to delay the execution of
the provincial adjudicator's Decision dated
November 15, 1999. Moreover, Commissioner
Espina opined that the charge that respondent
had been engaged in the unlawful practice of law
was neither satisfactorily explained nor
specifically denied by the latter. The failure of
respondent to do so led to the presumption that
the allegation was true. Thus, the investigating
officer recommended a suspension from the
practice of law for 2 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Revilla, Jr.
committed gross misconduct.
HELD: Yes. Lawyers are officers of the court,
called upon to assist in the administration of
justice. They act as vanguards of our legal
system, protecting and upholding truth and the
rule of law. They are expected to act with
honesty in all their dealings, especially with the
courts. Verily, the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or
consenting to any falsehood in court or from
allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.
Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules
of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the
essence of membership in the legal profession.
Thus, while lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of
their client, they must never abuse their right of
recourse to the courts by arguing a case that has
repeatedly been rejected.
In the present case, respondent claims good faith
in pursuing the cause of his clients. The records
show, however, that his course of legal action
was obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay
unduly the execution of the provincial
adjudicator's Decision dated November 15, 1999.
It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals
and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent
resorted to a different forum to pursue his clients'
lost cause. In the disturbance compensation
case, he represented his clients as tenants and
acknowledged that complainants were the
owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet
title, however, he conveniently repudiated his
previous admission by falsely alleging that his
clients were adverse possessors claiming bona
fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to
obtain a temporary restraining order preventing
the execution of the provincial adjudicator's
Decision. Clearly, he was shielding his clients
from the Order of execution. Contrary to his later
claim of ownership of the land, he cannot feign
ignorance of his previous admission of a tenancy
relationship existing between his clients and
complainants, as correctly observed by IBP
Commissioner Espina.
Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP
Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure
of respondent to challenge the allegation that he
allowed non-lawyers to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an
admission of the truth of the accusation. His
silence on this accusation is deemed an
admission, especially because he had every
chance to deny it.
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide thus:
"Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law. 'Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to
any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.'"
PENALTY IMPOSED: Guilty of Gross
Misconduct. He is suspended for 2 years from
the practice of law effective upon his receipt of
the decision.
47. PANGAN VS. RAMOS
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is not authorized to use a
name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law.
FACTS: In 1979, a pending administrative case
filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio
Ramos was delayed because Atty. Ramos
allegedly appeared before a court in Manila.
When the records of the said case was checked
(one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was
found that he used the name “Atty. Pedro D.D.
Ramos”. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has
the right to use such name because in his birth
certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio
Ramos. “D.D.” stands for Dionisio Dayaw with
Dayaw being his mother’s surname. However, in
the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio
D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did
was correct.
HELD: No. The attorney’s roll or register is the
official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to
practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a
name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath
obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he
will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple
of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations
of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In
representing himself to the court as “Pedro D.D.
Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D. Ramos”,
respondent has violated his solemn oath and has
resorted to deception.
PENALTY IMPOSED: The Supreme Court
hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and
warned that a similar infraction will warrant
suspension or disbarment.
48. ARTIAGA v. VILLANUEVA
A.C. No. 1892, Jul. 29, 1988
FACTS: The disbarment case arose from 4 civil
actions involving the same property. Juliano
Estolano, client of complainant Atty. Artiaga, Jr.
and Glicerio Aquino and/or Florentina Guanzon,
clients of respondent Atty. Villanueva
Three parcels of land in Laguna were involved
herein. Petitioner Juliano Estolano was issued
original Certificate of Title in his name over the
first parcel. Paciano Malabayabas and Canuto
Suyo sold and transferred their rights over the
second and third parcels of land to petitioner,
respectively.
Glicerio Aquino, private respondent, filed his
Revocable Permit Application over an area of
8,000 square meters, which cover a part of the
first and third parcel. Also, private respondent
Florentina Guanzon, Aquino's sister-in-law, also
filed Revocable Permit Application over the
second parcel. Eventually, the conflicts were
taken cognizance of by the Bureau of Lands.
Director of Lands - rendered a Decision
against private respondents; permit
application is hereby rejected; amount paid
forfeited in favor of the Gov’t; Guanzon and
Aquino shall vacate the land.On MR,
Director amended his previous decision
granting Aquino preferential right to that
area actually occupied and cultivated by
him.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resource – Denied the appeal of both
parties. Denied the latter and affirmed the
prior ruling of the Director. MR was denied.
Office of the President of the Philippines
– Denied appeal of respondent.
The Decision of the Director of Lands
having become final, an order of Execution
thereof was issued; however, private
respondents remained in possession of the
subject property. Thus, petitioner filed
principal case for Recovery of Possession.
The restraining order issued in Civil Case No.
183-C on October 27, 1976 enjoining the Director
of Lands from enforcing the Order of Execution
was set aside by the Court of Appeals and the
writ of prohibition prayed for by petitioner
Estolano was granted.
MTC – Complaint for Forcible entry filed by
Aquino and Guanzon was dismissed. On appeal,
affirmed the order of dismissal.
CFI - Annulment of Estolano's title over the same
land was filed by respondent's client, Aquino
which was thereafter dismissed. The CA on
appeal affirmed the dismissal. the case was
remanded to the trial court for execution.
Finally, while their petition for certiorari and
prohibition over Civil Case was pending before
the Court of Appeals, respondent's clients,
Aquino, filed a complaint with the Court of
Agrarian Relations (CAR) against Estolano and
the Director of Lands
CAR - issued an order requiring Estolano to
respect Aquino's possession and dismissed the
case.
Respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva is
charged with the following unethical practices: (1)
That respondent had caused his client to perjure
himself; (2) That he lacks candor and respect
toward his adversary and the courts; and (3) That
he had been abusive of the right of recourse to
the courts.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of alleged
unethical practices
HELD: We find respondent Atty. Villanueva guilty
as above charged.
(
1) In the original complaint, respondent's client
alleged that he was dispossessed of the subject
land in 1960, while in the amended complaint, he
alleged it was in June, 1973. Clearly, this was a
ploy concocted by respondent to enable the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the case since a
forcible entry case must be filed within one year
from the accrual of the cause of action under
Rule 70, Section 1.
(DOCTRINE: Lawyer as a Disciple of Truth)
The duty of an attorney to the courts to
employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are
consistent with truth and honor cannot be
overemphasized. 5 His high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and
the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusions.
He violated his oath of office when he resorted to
deception. Worse, he had caused his client to
perjure himself thus subjecting the latter to
criminal prosecution for perjury brought before
the Municipal Court of Los Banos,
7
Laguna. Instead of safeguarding the interests of
his client as his responsibility dictates, he did
exactly the opposite by causing his client to
commit a felony. From the foregoing, the lack of
candor of respondent counsel towards the court
is evident.
(2) An examination of the records shows that
respondent did not disclose before the Court of
Agrarian Relations (CAR) prior law suits and
decisions rendered relative to the subject land.
As a result, respondent was able to secure ex-
parte from the CAR a restraining order against
the Director of Lands and Estolano.
Respondent was aware of this fact so he
resorted to forum shopping, continuously seeking
the court where he may possibly obtain favorable
judgment, thereby adding to the already clogged
dockets of the courts with the unmeritorious
cases he filed. He grossly abused his right of
recourse to the courts by filing multiple petitions
or complaints for a cause that had been
previously rejected in the false hope of getting
some favorable action, somehow, thus,
obstructing the administration of justice. He was
derelict in his duty as counsel to maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appears to him to
be just, and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law. He had
thus prostituted his office at the expense of
justice.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice
of law until such time that he can demonstrate to
the court that he has rehabilitated himself and
deserves to resume the practice of law.
Canon 10 – Duty of Candor to the Courts
Rule 10.01 – Duty of Fidelity to the Courts
49. GARVODA v. SALES, JR.
G.R. No. 124893, Apr. 18, 1997
FACTS: Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to
annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996
of respondent COMELEC en banc suspending
her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of
the SK of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for
registration as member and voter of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo. The Board of Election Tellers, however,
denied her application on the ground that she
being then twenty-one years and ten (10) months
old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan.
MTC – On Petition for Inclusion as Registered
Kabataang Member and Voter” the court found
petitioner qualified and ordered her registration
as member and voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers
appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
however, inhibited himself from acting on the
appeal due to his close association with
petitioner.
Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the
position of SK Chairman. In a letter, Election
Officer Rios, per advice of Provincial Election
Supervisor, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner,
however, appealed to COMELEC Regional
Director Asperin who set aside the order of
respondent Rios and allowed petitioner to run.
Private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival
candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a
“Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy” against petitioner
Garvida for falsely representing her age
qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The
petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail
on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections
National Office, Manila.
On the same day acting on the facsimile,
respondent Rios issued the memorandum to
petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an
order directing the Board of Election Tellers and
Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo
to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the
event she won in the election.
On election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as
against private respondent’s votes of 76. In
accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the
COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election
Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed
on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election
Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the
position of SK chairman. The proclamation was
“without prejudice to any further action by the
Commission on Elections or any other interested
party.”
On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang
Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for
the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won
as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the
elected officials of the Pederasyon.
ISSUES: 1) WON the COMELEC en banc has
jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or
cancel her certificate of candidacy;
2) WON cancellation of her certificate of
candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded
the age requirement to run as an elective official
of the SK is valid
HELD: (1) Section 532 (a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides that the
conduct of the SK elections is under the
supervision of the COMELEC and shall be
governed by the Omnibus Election Code. Under
the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a
petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies
with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en
banc. Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the
required number of votes to reach a decision,
resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the
Division.
Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
Division are resolved by the COMELEC en
banc. 16 It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in
Divisions that can hear and decide election
cases.
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did
not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon
receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
when it entertained the petition and issued the
order of May 2, 1996.
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed
to note that the petition itself did not comply with
the formal requirements of pleadings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every
pleading, motion and other papers must be
filed in ten (10) legible copies. However,
when there is more than one respondent or
protestee, the petitioner or protestant must
file additional number of copies of the
petition or protest as there are additional
respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents
referred to in the immediately preceding
section must be filed directly with the proper
Clerk of Court of the Commission
personally, or, unless otherwise provided in
these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter
case, the date of mailing is the date of filing
and the requirement as to the number of
copies must be complied with.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All
pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be
printed, mimeographed or typewritten on
legal size bond paper and shall be in
English or Filipino.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in
proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition
were filed with the COMELEC. Also, the
COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the
basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not
by registered mail.
(2) In the case at bar, petitioner was born on
June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK
elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years
and nine (9) months old. On the day of the
elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5
days old. When she assumed office on June 1,
1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days
old and was merely ten (10) days away from
turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have
qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the
age limit for elective SK officials set by Section
428 of the Local Government Code and Sections
3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She
was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6,
1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
Canon 10 – Duty of Candor to the Courts
Rule 10.03 – Duty of Fidelity to the Rules of
Procedure
DOCTRINE: The rules of procedure are
instruments in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should be
used to achieve such end and not to derail it.
50. RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ADM. CASE
No. 7006 ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
Facts: Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally
raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser,
RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order
dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the
Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused,
declaring that the evidence thus presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of
homicide and not the charge of murder.
Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond.
Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then
Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized
prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly
on the ground that the original charge of murder,
punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not
subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the
RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose
Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12,
2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion
to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the
amount of the bond at P40,000. Respondent field
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Hence, respondent appealed from the Order to
the CA. Instead of availing himself only of
judicial remedies, respondent caused the
publication of an article regarding the Order
granting bail to the accused in the August
18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily . The article, entitled murder suspect to
bail out read as follows:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a
judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder
suspect to go out on bail. Senior state
prosecutor Roge lio Bagabuyo lambasted
Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao
City for ruling on a motion that sought a
bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged
with murdering a policeman . . . . Plaza
reportedly posted a P 40 thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is
a nonbailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted
that a judge could still opt to allow a murder
suspect to bail out in cases when the
evidence of the prosecution is weak. But in
this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge
who previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas
B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be
strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an
unclear reason. x x x Bagabuyo said he would
contest Tans decision bef ore the Court of
Appeals and would file criminal and
administrative charges of certiorari against the
judge. Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of
being cited in contempt by Judge Tan. This is
the only way that the public would know that
there are judges displaying judicial arrogance.
He said.
The RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29,
directed respondent and the writer of the
article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily, to appear in court on September
20, 2003 to explain why they should not be
cited for indirect contempt of court for the
publication of the article which degraded the
court and its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the
statements in the article, Judge Buyser
described the evidence for the prosecution as
not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it
was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited
himself f rom the case for an unclear reason.
Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30,
2002, declared in open court in the presence
of respondent that he was inhibiting himself
from the case due to the harsh insinuation
of respondent that he lacked the cold neutra
lity of an impartial judge. On the scheduled
hearing of the contempt charge, Mark
Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily caused the publication of the
article. He disclosed that respondent, in a
press conference, stated that the crime of
murder is non-bailable. When asked by the
trial court why he printed such lies, Mr.
Francisco answered that his only source was
respondent.
Respondent admitted that he caused the
holding of the press conference, but refused
to answer whether he made the statements
in the article until after he shall have filed a
motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer,
the trial court declared him in contempt.
In an Order, Mr. Mark Francisco was ordered to
pay a fine of P 10,000 for publishing the
article.Prosecutor Bagabuyo is adjudged to
have committed indirect contempt of Court
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court and he is ordered to suffer
the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is
hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P
100,000.00.
Respondent posted the required bond and was
released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt,
respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again
attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial
courts disposition in the proceedings of Crim.
Case No. 5144.
The RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required
respondent to explain and to show cause within
five days from receipt thereof why he should not
be held in contempt for his media interviews. He
was also interviewed by Tony Consing in his
radio program. In those radio interviews,
respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge
who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator
who does not accord due process to the people.
When the hearing for the second contempt was
scheduled, respondent did not appear. The trial
court received respondents Answer denying the
charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio
station DXK.
The trial court found that Prosecutor Bagabuyo
has grossly violated the Canons of the legal
profession and [is] guilty of grave professional
misconduct. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law. Likewise, he is also found
guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he
is ordered to suffer the penalty of
IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be
served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the
maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00).
RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to
the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of
Facts of respondents suspension from the
practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together
with the order of suspension and other relevant
documents.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE OFFICE OF BAR
CONFIDANT: The Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended the implementation of the trial
courts order of suspension dated February 8,
2004, and that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year.
Issue: WON there is violation of Canon 11 of
CPR
Held: Yes. The Court approves the
recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to
observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and [he] should
insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit
grievances against a judge to the proper
authorities only. Respondent violated Rule
11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused
the holding of a press conference where he
made statements against the Order dated
November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in
Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he
indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the
August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily. Respondents statements in the article,
which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144
was still pending in court, also violated Rule
13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony
Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances
against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated
Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its
officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado,
he was studying mahjong instead of studying the
law, and that he was a liar. Respondent also
violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the
best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his]
clients. As a senior state prosecutor and officer
of the court, respondent should have set the
example of observing and maintaining the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
PENALTY IMPOSED: Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11
and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and of violating the
Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year effective
upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.
51. THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO AND
LETICIA M. TIONGCO VS. HON. SEVERIANO
C. AGUILAR, JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 35,
ILOILO CITY, AND THE SPOUSES
WILFREDO AND LORENA AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 115932, January 25, 1995
Facts: In the resolution of 26 September
1994, the Supreme Court required ATTY.
JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the
petitioners, to show cause why he should not
be dealt with administratively for the violation
of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, counsel insinuated
the petitioners that the SC did not read the
petition and made the following statement:
x x x Truly, it is hard to imagine that this
Honorable Court had read the petition end
the annexes attached thereto and hold that
the same has "failed to sufficiently show that
the respondent Court had committed a grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the
questioned judgment" ...'
which, is unfounded and malicious, and
considering further his use of intemperate
language in the petition, as exemplified by his
characterization of the decision of the
respondent Judge as having been 'crafted in
order to fool the winning party'; as a
'hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor'; one
'you could have sworn it was the Devil who
dictated it'; or one with 'perfidious
character,'In fact, His Honor, Respondent
Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had
not owned any real property until March 5,
1974 when his Honor was already either
Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge; and his
charge that the respondent Judge has 'joined
the defendants and their counsel in a
scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of
the possession and fruits of their property for
the duration of the appeal'; and with respect
to the Order of 30 May 1994, by describing
the respondent Judge as a 'liar,' 'perjurer,' or
'blasphemer.' "
In his 2 page compliance, Atty. Tiongco did not
at all show cause why he should not be
dealt with administratively for violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his
descriptions of the respondent judge as "liar,"
"thief," "perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did
not offer any excuse for his use of the rest
of the intemperate words enumerated in the
resolution. Worse, feeling obviously frustrated
at the incompleteness of the Court's
enumeration of the intemperate words or
phrases, he volunteered to point out that in
addition to those so enumerated, he also
called the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten
manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption,
and "cross-eyed."
Issue: WON there is violation of Canon 11 of the
CPR
Held: Yes. Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is
unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for
the following reasons: first, he impliedly
admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this
Court did not read the petition; second,
except as to the words "liar," "thief,"
"perfidious," and "blasphemer," he failed to
address squarely the other intemperate words
and phrases enumerated in the resolution of
26 September 1994, which failure amounts to
an admission of their intemperateness; third,
he did not indicate the circumstances upon
which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth,
he miserably failed to show the relevance of
the harsh words and phrases to his petition.
We do not then hesitate to rule that by
falsely and maliciously insinuating that this
Court did not at all read the petition in this
case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his
gross disrespect to and contempt for this
Court and exposed his plot to discredit the
Members of the First Division of the Court
and put them to public contempt or ridicule;
he, as well, charged them with the violation
of their solemn duty to render justice, thereby
creating or promoting distrust in judicial
administration which could have the effect of
"encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation on which rests
the bulwark called judicial power to which
those who are aggrieved turn for protection
and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez)
In using in the petition in this case
intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases
against the respondent judge which are
obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant
to the petition and whose glaring falsity is
easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's
decision in favor of Atty. Tiongco and his
wife in their case for recovery of possession
and damages, and by the dismissal of the
instant petition for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty.
Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to
and contempt for the respondent judge,
thereby diminishing public confidence in the
latter and, eventually, in the judiciary, or
sowing mistrust in the administration of
justice. Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made
out a strong case for a serious violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads as follows:
"CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS."
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in
the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a
lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his
duty under Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers"; and his duty under the first
canon of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds
of decency and propriety in making the false
and malicious insinuation against this Court,
particularly the Members of the First Division,
and the scurrilous characterizations of the
respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious.
Such could only come from anger, if not
hate, after he was not given what he
wanted. When such anger or hate is coupled
with haughtiness or arrogance as when he
even pointed out other intemperate words in
his petition which this Court failed to
incorporate in the resolution of 26 September
1994, and with seething sarcasm as when he
prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning
... [him] into a martyr to his principles" and
ends up his Compliance with the
"RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES - AND UNDYING
LOVE" (Constitution - Preamble, 66th word),"
nothing more can extenuate his liability for
gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of his other
duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted
to.
PENALTY IMPOSED: ATTY. JOSE B.
TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and
WARNED that the commission of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
52. Banogon vs Zerna
Facts: The original decision in this case was
rendered by the cadastral court way back on
February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A
motion to amend that decision was filed on
March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This
was followed by an amended petition for
review of the judgment on March 18, 1957,
and an opposition thereto on March 26,
1957. On October 11, 1971, or after
fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the
petition was filed. The petition was
dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the
motion for reconsideration was denied on
February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came
to us on certiorari to question the orders of
the respondent judge. The respondent court
dismissed the petition for review of the
decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that
it had been filed The petitioners contend that
the said judgment had not yet become final
and executory because the land in dispute
had not yet been registered in favor of the private
respondents. The said judgment would
become so only after one year from the
issuance of the decree of registration. For
their part, the private respondents argue that
the decision of February 9, 1926, became
final and executory after 30 days, same not
having been appealed by the petitioners
during that period. They slept on their rights
for thirty one years before it occurred to
them to question the judgment of the
cadastral court.
Issue: WON the action has prescribed.
Held: Yes. Statutes must be given a filing pointless petitions that only add to the
reasonable construction and there can be no workload of the judiciary, especially this
possible reason for requiring the complaining Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
party to wait until the final decree is entered judicious study of the facts and the law
before urging his claim of fraud. We should advise them when a case, such as
therefore hold that a petition for review under this, should not be permitted to be filed to
section 38, supra, may be filed at any time merely clutter the already congested judicial
after the rendition of the court's decision and dockets. They do not advance the cause of
before the expiration of one year from the law or their clients by commencing litigations
entry of the final decree of registration." This that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve
Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and the attention of the courts.
lawyers alike: "'Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is 53. Medina vs. Yan
essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a Facts: Medina, a Filipino Citizen, was arrested
judgment has become final, the winning party and apprehended by the South Vietnman Police
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived and some members of the PHILCAG. Medina
of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must was transferred to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon
therefore guard against any scheme City, where he was kept until the morning of the
calculated to bring about that following day. Medina was then again transferred
result. Constituted as they are to put an to Arayat, Pampanga. Medina's counsel filed a
end to controversies, courts should frown upon petition for habeas corpus. The trial court ruled in
any attempt to prolong them. As officers of favor of the release of Medina. The OSG
the court, lawyers have a responsibility to appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. Atty.
assist in the proper administration of Mutuc motioned for Certification to the Supreme
justice. They do not discharge this duty by Court. Atty. Mutuc denied his motion. Atty. Mutuc
insisted that the case was originally filed before
the Supreme Court therefore it was a returnable
writ. Being a returnable writ, the appeal should
be directly to the Supreme Court. When this
argumentation did not work. Atty. Mutuc advised
his client to escape jail because he is being
illegally detained.
On September 4, 1969, this Court adopted a
resolution restraining the respondent Court of
Appeals from proceeding further with case
No. CA-G.R. No. 42658-R, entitled "Fortunato
Medina, petitioner-appellee vs. Gen. Manuel
T. Yan and Brig. Gen. Vicente Raval,
respondents-appellants", more particularly with
the enforcement of its resolution of June 21,
1969, re: "Contempt and Suspension of Atty.
Amelito R. Mutuc.
Issue: Whether or not the case is appealable to
the Supreme Court.
Held: It is clear, therefore, that when this
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus
making the same returnable before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
branch, said court acquired the power and
authority to determine the merits of the case,
and not merely to act as a referee, in the
same manner as We would have if the writ
had been returnable before this Court Mr.
Justice Castro correctly observed during the
deliberation of the Court in this case, that
there is no valid reason why a habeas
corpus case originally filed in the Court of
First Instance should be appealed to the
Court of Appeals, while one filed originally
with the Supreme Court and made returnable
to the Court of First Instance should be
appealable directly to Us, when a review of
the findings of facts of the Court of First
Instance is necessary. The view that the
appeal should be made direct to this Court
because when a petitioner files the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with Us he wants
his case to be decided as expeditiously as
possible, is clearly untenable; otherwise, We
would be unduly hampered in the exercise of
Our discretion when to hear and decide
directly a habeas corpus as We did in the
habeas corpus cases under Martial Law, and
when We should make the writ returnable to
a Court of First Instance so that the case
may not unduly clog the already over-
burdened docket of this Court.
54. JAVELLANA v. LUTERO
G.R. No. L-23956 ; July 21, 1967
FACTS: On March 1963, the Roman Archbishop
in Jaro, Iloilo filed a Detainer Complaint against
Elpidio Javellana in the municipal court which
was presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The
hearing was reset four times, all at the behest of
Elpidio Javellana’s lawyer (Atty. Jose Hautea)
who gave reasons as flimsy as a painful right toe,
and unfinished business transactions in Manila.
This last postponement was granted by the
municipal court, with a warning that no further
postponements shall be allowed. When the case
was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither
the defendant nor his counsel appeared. One
Atty. Romy Peña was present in court –who
verbally moved for the postponement of the trial
on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila
attending to a business transaction. The
plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the
ground that the defendant and his counsel were
well aware of the court's previous admonition
that no further postponement of the case would
be granted, and then manifested that the
witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff were
ready for presentation on that date. Thus, the
verbal motion was denied, and plaintiff was
directed to adduce his evidence. During the
hearing, a telegram arrived from Atty. Hautea
asking for a postponement of the hearing.
However, the hearing still continued. The court
on the same date rendered judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
About 50 days later, the defendant thru his same
counsel filed a PETITION FOR RELIEF (from the
judgment of the municipal court) with the CFI of
Iloilo, praying that the decision in question be set
aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on
the merits, and, pending determination of the
petition, that an injunction issue restraining the
enforcement of the decision. Counsel for the
petitioner averred that his absence on the date of
the trial was excusable as he attended to a very
urgent business transaction in Manila; that before
his departure for the latter city, he verbally
informed the respondent judge that his return to
Iloilo might be delayed and that he might not
arrive on time for the trial of the case as set; that
he called at both the law office and the residence
of the counsel for the private respondent to
inform him of the desired postponement and the
reason therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at
the time; that he exercised utmost diligence and
precaution in the sense that while in Manila he
sent a telegram to the respondent judge, asking
for postponement; and that notwithstanding all
the foregoing, the municipal court nevertheless
proceeded with the trial in his absence and that
of his client, allowed the private respondent to
present his evidence ex parte, and rendered a
decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the
latter of his day in court.
RULING OF CFI: After due hearing, CFI
dismissed the petition for relief. Thus, the present
appeal.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Hautea was negligent in his
duties as a lawyer.
HELD: A counsel for any party in a judicial
controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal
ethics, and with due regard for the elementary
standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare
for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This
norm of conduct is no less applicable in a
detainer case, such as the one at bar, even if the
issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated.
It is obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-
appellant has been remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was
postponed at the behest of the said counsel. The
last postponement was granted with the
unequivocal admonition by the judgment that no
further postponement would be countenanced.
The case was reset in a date when the
complainant’s counsel had more than a month's
time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to
obviate a conflict between his business
transactions and his calendar of hearings. His
absence on the date last resetting was not
occasioned by illness or some other supervening
occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably
prevented him from appearing in court.
PENALTY IMPOSED: As this appeal is patently
frivolous and dilatory, this Court, under the
authority of section 3 of Rule 142 of the Rules of
Court, hereby assesses treble costs against the
petitioner-appellant Elpidio Javellana, said costs
to be paid by his counsel, Atty. Jose Hautea.
DOCTRINE: A counsel is duty bound under the
circumstances to give preferential attention to the
case and not to make the court wait at his
pleasure.
  the reply, viz, March 29, 1973 counsel again
55. ACHACOSO v. CA
G.R. No. L-35867 June 28, 1973
FACTS: Upon the filing of the petition at bar for
review of the CA decision (which dismissed
petitioner's petition for mandamus), respondents
filed on an extensive eighteen page comment.
Meanwhile, petitioner's counsel, Rodrigo M.
Nera, filed a motion for leave to file reply within
15 days from notice alleging that there was need
for such reply "in order that this Honorable Court
may be fully and completely informed of the
nature of the controversy which gave rise to the
instant petition.", to which the CA granted.
On the last day for filing of the reply, counsel
asked for an additional 15 days averring that
"due to the pressure of urgent professional work
and daily trial engagements of the undersigned
counsel during the original period granted, he
has not had sufficient material time to complete
the preparation of petitioner's reply." The Court
granted the requested extension.
On the last day of the extended period for filing of
asked for still another 15-day extension stating
that "due to the pressure of urgent professional
work and daily trial engagements of the
undersigned counsel, he has not had sufficient
material time to complete the preparation of
petitioners reply. The undersigned counsel
humbly apologizes that in view of his crowded
schedule, he has been constrained to ask for this
extension, but respectfully assures the
Honorable Court that this will be the last one
requested.' The CA granted counsel's motion for
such third and last extension.
The period for the filing of petitioner's reply
lapsed on April 13, 1973 without counsel having
filed any reply manifestation explaining his failure
to do so.
Accordingly, the CA denied the petition for review
for lack of merit, further required petitioner's
counsel to show cause why discipline action
should not be taken against him for failure to file
the reply after having obtained such leave and
three extensions time within which to do so.
Counsel explained that he was retained in the
ease "on a piece-work basis on the verbal
understanding that all expenses for the
preparation of pleadings and the cost of services
of stenographer-typist shall be furnished in
advance by petition upon being notified thereof,"
that when he asked for a third extension, he so
informed petitioner and requested him to remit
the expenses (P500.00) for the preparation of
reply as per agreement" and that he tried to
contact petitioner before the expiration of the
extended period but failed to do as petitioner
"was then most of the time out of his office."
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s counsel properly relied
on the ground of non-payment of his fees as his
basis for not submitting his reply
HELD: No, if indeed he was not in a financial
position to advance the necessary expenses for
preparing and submitting the reply, then he could
have filed timely the necessary manifestation that
he was foregoing the filing of such reply on
petitioner's behalf. His inaction unduly delayed
the Court's prompt disposition of the case after
the filing by respondents of their comments on
the petition showing its lack of merit.
Verily, the counsel's conduct as an officer of the
Court that after assuring the Court that the third
extension requested by him "in view of his
crowded schedule" and "of urgent professional
work and daily trial engagements" would be the
last within which period he would at last file the
awaited reply within which he thereafter to let the
period simply lapse without any explanation
whatsoever does not reflect any good on him.
PENALTY: Considering, however, that counsel's
record shows no previous infractions on his part
since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1953,
the Court is disposed to be lenient in this
instance. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby
administers a reprimand on Atty. Rodrigo M.
Nera, with the warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this resolution be filed in
his personal record.
DOCTRINE: The Court censures the practice of
counsels who secure repeated extensions of
time to file their pleadings and thereafter simply
let the period lapse without submitting the
pleading or even an explanation or manifestation
of their failure to do so. The Court herein
reprimands petitioner's counsel for such
misconduct with the warning that a repetition
thereof will be dealt with more severely.
56. SAMBAJON vs ATTY. SUING
Sept. 26, 2006
FACTS: The complainants sought the
disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent)
on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The complainants were among the complainants
in NLRC Case entitled Microplast, Inc. Workers
Union v. Microplast, Incorporated for Unfair
Labor Practice (ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while
Atty. Suing was the counsel for the therein
respondents. Said case was consolidated with
NLRC Case entitled "Microplast Incorporated v.
Vilma Ardan," a case for Illegal Strike.
Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed
the Illegal Strike case, but found the Microplast,
Inc. guilty of ULP. The LA also declared that the
9 complainants were illegally dismissed. The LA
directed to reinstate all the complainants to their
former position with full backwages, and
subsequently issued a writ of execution.
In the meantime, on the basis of individual
Release Waiver and Quitclaims purportedly
signed and sworn to by 7 of the complainants in
the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case, in the
presence of the respondent Atty. Suing, the LA
dismissed said case insofar as the 7
complainants were concerned.
Herein complainants, 4 of the 7 complainants
who purportedly executed the Release Waiver
and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn
to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or
having received the considerations therefor.
Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at
bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion
with his clients, “frustrated” the implementation of
the Writ of Execution by presenting before the
Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.
Complainants also filed a criminal complaint for
Falsification against respondent together with his
clients.
IBP Commissioner Hababag’s Report and
Recommendation:
-­‐ recommended that respondent be faulted
for negligence and that he be reprimanded
therefor with warning
-­‐ “In the case at bar, the question of whether
or not respondent actually committed the
despicable act would seem to be fairly
debatable under the circumstances.”
Board of Governors of the IBP:
-­‐ approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation of IBP Commissioner
One of the complainants, Sambajon, filed a
petition before the OBC assailing the IBP Board
Resolution. On the other hand, atty. Suing filed a
Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution,
wherein he does not deny that those whom he
met face to face before Commissioner Hababag
were not the same persons whom he saw before
Labor Arbiter Santos, explaining that he was not
familiar with the complainants as they were not
attending the hearings before the LA.
During the administrative hearings before the IBP
Commissioner, it was apparent that Atty. Suing
was coaching his client to prevent himself from
being incriminated. It was also revealed that the
Release Waiver and Quitclaims allegedly signed
were not the same documents originally
presented to the employees to be signed.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Suing may be disbarred for
his alleged manipulation of 4 alleged Release
Waiver and Quitclaim by herein complainants
who claimed that the same were falsified?
HELD: No. Disbarment is not reasonable.
However, the respondent is found guilty of
negligence and gross misconduct. The Court
says that a lawyer serves his client with diligence
by adopting that norm of practice expected of
men of good intentions.
Diligence is the attention and care required
of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence. A lawyer serves
his client with diligence by adopting that norm of
practice expected of men of good intentions. He
thus owes entire devotion to the interest of
his client, warm zeal in the defense and
maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that
nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save
by the rules of law legally applied.
It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price
of success is eternal diligence to the cause of
the client.
The practice of law does not require
extraordinary diligence or that "extreme measure
of care and caution which persons of unusual
prudence and circumspection use for securing
and preserving their rights. All that is required is
ordinary diligence or that degree of vigilance
expected of a bonus pater familias.
The Court also noted the attempt of respondent
to influence the answers of his client Manuel
Rodil when the latter testified before
Commissioner Hababag
Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his
client or influence him to answer questions in an
apparent attempt not to incriminate him
(respondent). His client contradicted
respondent's claim that the Release Waiver and
Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was
not the one presented at the Arbiter's Office, as
well as his implied claim that he was not involved
in releasing to the complainants the money for
and in consideration of the execution of the
documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon
to assist in the administration of justice. He is an
instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his
part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes
the administration of justice constitutes
misconduct. While the Commission on Bar
Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein
are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a
disciplinary action being in reality an investigation
by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or
an examination into his character.
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of Six (6) Months, with
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE: The practice of law does not require
extraordinary diligence or that "extreme measure
of care and caution which persons of unusual
prudence and circumspection use for securing
and preserving their rights. All that is required is
ordinary diligence or that degree of vigilance
expected of a bonus pater familias. .
57. VILLAFUERTE v. CORTEZ
A.C. No. 3455, April 14, 1998
FACTS: Complainant Arsenio A. Villafuerte
seeks the disbarment of Atty. Dante H. Cortez,
for neglect in the handling of his cases, despite
the latter's receipt of P1,750.00 acceptance and
retainer fees.
Sometime in January 1987, complainant went to
the office of respondent lawyer to discuss his
case for "reconveyance." During their initial
meeting, complainant tried to reconstruct before
respondent the incidents of the case merely from
memory prompting the latter to ask complainant
to instead return at another time with the records
of the case. Complainant returned but still
without the records. He requested respondent to
accept the case, paying to the latter P1,750.00
representing the acceptance fee of P1,500.00
and P250.00 retainer fee from January 1987.
The respondent averred that he accepted the
money with much reluctance and only upon the
condition that complainant would get the records
of the case from, as well as secure the
withdrawal of appearance of, Atty. Jose Dizon,
the former counsel of complainant.
The complainant allegedly never showed up
thereafter until November 1989 when he went to
the office of respondent but only to leave a copy
of a writ of execution in a case for ejectment,
which, according to respondent, was never
mentioned to him by complainant. Indeed, said
respondent, he had never entered his
appearance in the said ejectment case.
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
(CBD):
-­‐ concluded that the facts established would
indicate sufficiently a case of neglect of
duty on the part of respondent. It
recommended to the IBP Board of
Governors the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law for three months.
IBP Board of Governors:
-­‐ adopted and approved the CBD’s
recommendation
ISSUE: WON respondent should be disbarred.
HELD: No. Although there is neglect in duties,
the Court only suspended the respondent. the
Court reduced the recommended period of
suspension of the IBP from three months to one
month.
The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD in its
findings and conclusion that respondent lawyer
has somehow been remiss in his responsibilities.
A lawyer-client relationship has arisen between
respondent and complainant. His acceptance of
the payment effectively bars him from altogether
disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between them. It would seem that
respondent hardly has exerted any effort to find
out what might have happened to his client's
cases.
A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client
requires him to be ever mindful of the
responsibilities that should be expected of him.
He is mandated to exert his best efforts to
protect, within the bounds of the law, the
interests of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its dictum
than when it has stated that a "lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence,"
decreeing further that he "shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him."
Penalty: SUSPENSION for a period of one
month from notice hereof, with a warning that a
repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
DOCTRINE: The Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its dictum
than when it has stated that a "lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence,"
decreeing further that he "shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him."
58. Artemio Endaya v. Atty. Wilfredo Oca
A.C. No. 3967, Sept. 3, 2003
FACTS: Atty. Oca was assigned by the PAO in
Batangas City to handle the unlawful detainer
case where Artemio Endaya and his spouse
were defendants. During the preliminary
conference of the case, Oca already appeared
as counsel for the spouses and his first act was
to move for the amendment of the answer
previously filed by his clients. His motion was
denied by the judge and was ordered to submit
affidavits and position papers within 10 days from
receipt of the order.
Oca failed to submit the required affidavits and
position paper but the judge dismissed the case
on the ground that the plaintiffs were not the real
parties-in-interest. The losing party appealed the
case to the RTC and again, Oca failed to file the
memoranda that the court ordered the parties to
file. This resulted in the reversal of the earlier
decision made by the lower court.
Endaya complained to Oca about the adverse
decision but the latter denied receiving a copy
thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of
Court, however, complainant found out that
respondent received his copy back on
September 14, 1992.
RECOMMENDATION/S of Appropriate Bodies
Office of the Bar Confidant: Oca was negligent in
handing the case and recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for ONE
MONTH.
IBP: Commissioner Fernandez concurred with
the findings and recommendation of the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
IBP Board of Governors: They adopted the report
of Commissioner Fernandez in their Resolution.

RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS OR
BODIES (IF ANY)
In re: Unlawful Detainer case against
Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez,
Santiago Hernandez and Dominador
Hernandez
MCTC: Case dismissed because the plaintiffs
(Hornilla et al.) were not the real parties-in-
interest
RTC: Decision reversed, RTC held that plaintiffs
were the co-owners of the property in dispute
and as such are parties-in-interest.
ISSUE: WON Oca neglected his duties as a
lawyer when he stubbornly failed to comply with
court orders in the submission of pleadings
HELD: Yes. The lawyer has a duty to protect and
safeguard the interest of his client. Once a
lawyer takes on a client's case, he owes it to his
client to see the case to the end. Whatever the
lawyer's reason is for accepting a case, he is
duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or
defending it. Moreover, a lawyer continues to be
a counsel of record until the lawyer-client
relationship is terminated either by the act of his
client or his own act, with permission of the court.
Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his
best for the interest of his client.
Oca was directed by the MCTC to file affidavits
and position paper by the MCTC, and appeal
memorandum by the RTC. He obviously had no
choice but to comply. However, he did not do so.
The Court believes such acts show lack of
diligence and commitment and evinces absence
of respect for the authority of this Court and the
other courts involved. The above acts constituted
negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule
18.03 of the CPR.
PENALTY IMPOSED IN DISPOSITIVE
PORTION: Suspension from the practice of law
for 2 months from notice
DOCTRINE: When a lawyer violates his duties to
his client, the courts, the legal profession and the
public, he engages in conduct, which is both
unethical and unprofessional.
59. Simon Paz v. Atty. Pepito Sanchez
A.C. no. 6125, Sept. 19, 2006
FACTS: Paz and his partners engaged the
services of Atty. Sanchez to assist them in the
purchase and documentation of such purchase
of several parcels of land from tenant farmers in
Pampanga as well as defend Paz’s claim on the
properties against the claim of George Lizares.
On May 2000 after the termination of their
lawyer-client relationship, Sanchez filed a
complaint before the DARAB on behalf of Isidro
Dizon for annulment of TCT No. 420127-R in the
name of Paz and his partners. Paz then
explained that the subject property was among
the properties purchased by them with Sanchez’s
assistance. Later on June 23, 2003, Sanchez
filed a civil case against Paz and Sycamore
Venture Corp. before the RTC, San Fernando,
Pampanga for annulment of TCT No. 483629-R
while the DARAB case was pending.
With that, Paz filed the administrative complaint
alleging conflict of interests and use of malicious
machination in the filing of the DARAB CASE.
RECOMMENDATION/S of Appropriate Bodies
IBP: Comm. San Juan found Sanchez guilty of
violating the prohibition against representing
conflicting interests.
IBP Board of Governors: Adopted findings of
Comm. San Juan and recommended imposition
of ONE YEAR SUSPENSION from the practice
of law as a penalty.
ISSUE: WON Sanchez represented conflicting
interests when he later represented Isidro Dizon
in the DARAB Case
HELD: Yes. Lawyers are deemed to represent
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
it is their duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires them to oppose.
The Court noted that by Sanchez’s own
admission, Paz and Dizon were both his clients
at the time when he filed the DARAB case on
behalf of Dizon. Likewise, Sanchez did not
specifically deny that he represendted conflicting
interests, that he merely offered to justify his
actuations by stating that he felt it was his “duty
and responsibility” to file the case.
Good faith and honest intentions do not excuse
the violation of this prohibition. In representing
both complainant and Dizon, respondent's duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was
placed under a cloud of doubt. In the eyes of the
Court, Sanchez should have inhibited himself
from representing Dizon against Paz in the
DARAB and RTC cases to avoid conflict of
interest.
PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION: Suspension from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR and a warning that commission of
a similar act in the future will merit a more severe
penalty
DOCTRINE: Conflict of interest applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action; Good faith and honest intentions do not
excuse any violation of the prohibition.
60. GAMILLA V. MARIÑO, JR.
FACTS: This disbarment case emanated from an
intra-union leadership dispute some seventeen
(17) years ago that spilled over to the instant
complaint alleging impropriety and double-
dealing in the disbursement of sums of money
entrusted by the University of Sto. Tomas to
respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. as
president of the UST Faculty Union and his core
of officers and directors for distribution among
faculty members of the university.
On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mario
accusing him of
(a) compromising their entitlements under
the 1986 collective bargaining agreement without
the knowledge, consent or ratification of the
union members, and worse, for only
P2,000,000.00 when they could have received
more than P9,000,000.00;
 (b) failing to account for the P7,000,000.00
received by him and other officers and directors
in the UST Faculty Union under the 1990
compromise agreement;
(c) lack of transparency in the
administration and distribution of the remaining
balance of the P42,000,000.00 package under
the 1992 memorandum of agreement;
(d) refusal to remit and account for the
P4,200,000.00 in favor of the faculty members
although the amount was denominated as
attorneys fees. Complainants asserted that
respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
Canon 1; Rule 15.08 of Canon 15; Rules 16.01,
16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16; and Rule 20.04 of
Canon 20, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Report of IBP Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro: found the complaint meritorious and
suspended respondent Atty. Mario from the
practice of law until such time that the required
detailed accounting of the questioned
remittances made by UST to the UST [Faculty
Union] during his incumbency as President and
Legal Counsel has been officially submitted and
reported to the UST [Faculty Union] and to the
IBP
IBP Board of Governors: adopted and
approved the report of IBP Commissioner.
In the meantime, the Regional Director found
merit in the two (2) complaints before the BLR
and ordered the expulsion of respondent and the
other officers and directors of the union led by
respondent Atty. Mario because of their failure to
account for the balance of the P42,000,000.00
that had been delivered to them by the
management of UST, and their collection of
exorbitant and illegal attorneys fees amounting to
P4,200,000.00.
On 9 March 2000 the Bureau of Labor
Relations in the appeal set aside the Order of
the Regional Director. It found that the balance of
the P42,000,000.00 which UST delivered to the
UST Faculty Union had been fully and
adequately accounted for by respondent and the
other officers and directors of the union.
Nonetheless, the Bureau of Labor Relations
ordered respondent and the other officers and
directors of the union to distribute the attorneys
fees of P4,200,000.00 among the faculty
members and to immediately hold the elections
for union officers and directors in view of the
expiration of their respective terms of office.
On 16 March 2001 the Decision of the Bureau of
Labor Relations was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals was elevated to this Court, docketed
G.R. No. 149763, where the case is allegedly still
pending resolution.
On 25 September 2002 we received the detailed
Report and Recommendation of IBP
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro and the IBP
Resolution of 3 August 2002 of the Board of
Governors adopting and approving the Report
which recommended the lifting of Atty. Marios
suspension from law practice since he had
sufficiently accounted for the funds in question.
ISSUES: (1) WON respondent failed to avoid
conflict of interests; (2) Whether respondent
violated Canon 15 of the CPR.
RULING: (1) YES. In fine, there are ethical
lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J.
Mariño, Jr. in the manner by which he secured
the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise
agreement and the P4,200,000.00 attorney’s
fees under the memorandum of agreement.
Although the record shows that the Bureau of
Labor Relations found respondent as having
adequately accounted for the disbursement of
the funds which the UST Faculty Union received
through the series of agreements with the
management of UST, this Court believes that
Atty. Mariño failed to avoid conflict of interests,
first, when he negotiated for the compromise
agreement wherein he played the diverse roles
of union president, union attorney and interested
party being one of the dismissed employees
seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when
he obtained the attorney’s fees of P4,200,000.00
without full prior disclosure of the circumstances
justifying such claim to the members of the UST
Faculty Union. As one of the sixteen (16) union
officers and directors seeking compensation from
the University of Santo Tomas for their illegal
dismissal, respondent was involved in obvious
conflict of interests when in addition he chose to
act as concurrent lawyer and president of the
UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise
agreement. The test of conflict of interest among
lawyers is “whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance thereof.” In the same manner, it is
undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney
to put himself in a position where self-interest
tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less
than his best for his client.
(2) YES. Regardless of the motivations of
respondent in perfecting the compromise
agreement or demanding the inexplicable
attorney’s fees, his actions were not transparent
enough to allow the bargaining unit ample
information to decide freely and intelligently.
Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requiring every
lawyer to “observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with his clients.”
Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion of justice
so they are without doubt expected to have a
bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a
little less of self-interest. As indispensable part of
the system of administering justice, attorneys
must comply strictly with the oath of office and
the canons of professional ethics—a duty more
than imperative during these critical times when
strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the
practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical
standards can begin with the simple act of
openness and candor in dealing with clients,
which would progress thereafter towards the
ideal that a lawyer’s vocation is not synonymous
with an ordinary business proposition but a
serious matter of public interest.
PENALTY: Responded is reprimanded for his
misconduct with a warning that a more drastic
punishment will be imposed on him upon a
repetition of the same act.
61. PASAY LAW AND CONSCIENCE UNION,
INC. v. PAZ
FACTS: The Pasay Law and Conscience Union,
Inc. (PLACU) filed a disbarment case against
Atty. David Paz. The complainant charged
respondent with malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, gross immoral conduct and/or disloyalty to
the RP.
In the course of the investigation then being
conducted by the “Charlie Division” of the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations, otherwise known as the
PARGO, on the complaint of Dr. Irineo P. Sia for
antigraft against the then ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta
of Pasay City, the respondent, David D.C. Paz,
was then PARGO’s Legal Officer and Chief
Prosecutor, as well as the head of the aforesaid
“Charlie Division”. The respondent enlisted the
help of Dr. Irineo P. Sia and Atty. Galileo P.Brion
in the gathering of evidence which included
PLACU’s copies of the records of Civil Case No.
72967 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled “Vicente D. Isip vs. The Pasay City
Government, et al.” Respondent also
administered oaths to some persons who had
given written statements before the PARGO
investigators. Later on, after respondent had
resigned from the PARGO sometime in January
1970 and on the basis of the investigation
conducted by the PARGO on the aforementioned
antigraft complaint of Dr. Sia, the PARGO’s
successor, the Complaints and Investigation
Office (CIO) filed an antigraft charge and another
charge for technical malversation both against
Pablo Cuneta and others with the Pasay City
Fiscal’s Office. On November 13 and 23, 1970,
during the preliminary investigation by the Pasay
City Fiscal’s Office, the respondent entered his
appearance, participated and orally argued
therein as one of the counsels of Pablo Cuneta.
While in subsequent hearings thereof, the
respondent no longer appeared as counsel for
Cuneta, it was only after his appearance had
been questioned by Atty. Brion. Petitioner argues
that there was then a relationship of attorney and
client between respondent and the government
and that for having appeared twice, participated
and orally argued as counsel for Pablo Cuneta
during the preliminary investigation of the
charges for antigraft and technical malversation
filed by the CIO, successor of PARGO, against
said Pablo Cuneta and others before the Pasay
City Fiscal’s Office, the respondent violated
Section 6 of the Canons of Legal Ethics and
Section 20 (e) of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Respondent Paz alleged that 1) he did not
participate in the investigation of the Cuneta
antigraft case except to swear the witnesses; 2)
that it is true that respondent Paz appeared
among a battery of lawyers for Mayor Cuneta but
when his appearance was questioned by Atty.
Brion, it was withdrawn; 3) and that the antigraft
case against Mayor Cuneta was finally
dismissed.
ISSUE: WON Paz is guilty of charge of
representing clients with conflicting interests.
HELD: YES. The evidence has duly established
that the respondent, David D.C. Paz, as
PARGO’s Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor
and head of the “Charlie Division”, took part in
the investigation of the antigraft case against
exMayor Cuneta by administering oaths to
witnesses and gathering evidence. He acquired
knowledge of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the antigraft case. The respondent
obtained confidential information and learned of
the evidence of the PARGO against exMayor
Cuneta.There was undoubtedly a relationship of
attorney and client between the respondent
David D.C. Paz and the PARGO.
It is also a fact that at the early stages of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the City
Fiscal of Pasay of the antigraft case against
exMayor Pablo Cuneta,the respondent appeared
as counsel for said Cuneta. This is the same
antigraft case investigated by the PARGO when
the respondent was head of the “Charlie
Division” thereof.That the respondent later
withdrew his appearances as counsel of Cuneta
is of no moment. He had already violated the
Canons of Legal Ethics and Sec. 20 (e) of Rule
138,Revised Rules of Court which provides:“Sec.
20. Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an
attorney:x x x x(e) To maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client’s
business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval. The respondent has displayed a
lack of concern for his duties as a lawyer and an
officer of the court.
Whatever may be said as to whether or not
respondent utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional
capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from
appearing as counsel for the other side.
PENALTY: Respondent is suspended from the
practice of law for 2 months, with a warning
that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt
with more drastically.
62. RAMOS v. IMBANG
FACTS: Diana Ramos sought the assistance of
respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and
criminal actions against the spouses Roque and
Elenita Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500
as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt
for P5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled
hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the
courtroom and always told her to wait outside.
He would then come out after several hours to
inform her that the hearing had been cancelled
and rescheduled.This happened six times and for
each appearance in court, respondent charged
her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the
complainant became suspicious. She personally
inquired about the status of her cases in the trial
courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was
shocked to learn that respondent never filed any
case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in
fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO).
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE:
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help
her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses. Because he was with the PAO and
aware that the complainant was not an indigent,
he declined. Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's
refusal, the complainant allegedly remained
adamant. She insisted on suing the
Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the
cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent
to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance
of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.
A year later, the complainant requested
respondent to issue an antedated receipt
because one of her daughters asked her to
account for the P5,000 she had previously given
the respondent for safekeeping. Because the
complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued
a receipt.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP:
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP
where the complaint was filed, received evidence
from the parties. The CBD rejected respondent's
claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate
a friend's request. It found respondent guilty of
violating the prohibitions on government lawyers
from accepting private cases and receiving
lawyer's fees other than their salaries.
Respondent violated the following provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule
1.01, 16.01, 18.01 .
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension
from the practice of law for three years and
ordered him to immediately return to the
complainant the amount of P5,000 which was
substantiated by the receipt.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings of the CBD but modified
the CBD's recommendation with regard to the
restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the
legal rate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be
disbarred.
HELD: He is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
The Supreme Court adopt the findings of the IBP
with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves
with honesty and integrity. More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to
be more conscientious of their actuations as they
are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only
members of the bar but also public servants who
owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote
themselves completely to public service. For this
reason, the private practice of profession is
prohibited as Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot
handle private cases for they are expected to
devote themselves full-time to the work of their
respective offices. In this instance, respondent
received P5,000 from the complainant and
issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was
still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his
receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created
for the purpose of providing free legal assistance
to indigent litigants.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law as
provided in Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against
handling private cases and accepting attorney's
fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived
the complainant. Respondent's conduct in office
fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one
occupying a public office.
There is, however, insufficient basis to find
respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent
did not hold the money for the benefit of the
complainant but accepted it as his attorney's
fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the
complainant nor was it given to him for a specific
purpose Nevertheless, respondent should return
the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not
entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to
accept them.
63. PEÑA v. APARICIO

FACTS: Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal
counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal
dismissal case before NLRC. Complainant Pena
of MOF Company (Subic). received a notice from
the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the
NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In
the conference, respondent, submitted a claim
for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal
dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as
being baseless. Complainant sent notices to
Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and
to return to work. In reply to this return to work
notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant
reiterating his client's claim for separation pay.
The letter also contained a threat to the
company.
Believing that the letter deviated from ethical
standards, complainant filed an complaint with
the Commission on Bar Discipline of IBP.
Respondent claimed that Atty. Jocson,
complainant's counsel, played part in imputing
the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated
charges against him and he pointed out that the
complaint had no certification against forum
shopping and was motivated only to confuse the
issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter.
RECOMMENDATION:
CBD-IBP: Complainant, failed to file his position
paper and to comply with the requirement on
certificate against non-forum shopping and
recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent.
IBP Board: IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation.
Respondent filed MR claiming counterclaim
against complainant.
Complainant filed this Petition for Review
regarding the dismissal of his case against
respondent.
ISSUE: WON IBP erred when it dismissed his
complaint without considering his position paper
and without ruling on the merits
HELD: Yes. IBP erred in dismissing the
disbarment case due to lack of certificate of non
forum shopping.
The rationale for the requirement of a certification
against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of
the pendency of another action or claim involving
the same issues in another court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely
avoid the forum shopping situation. Furthermore,
the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to
promote candor and transparency among
lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their
cases before the courts to promote the orderly
administration of justice, prevent undue
inconvenience upon the other party, and save
the precious time of the courts.
It would seem that the scenario sought to be
avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the
possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens
in disbarment complaints considering that said
proceedings are either "taken by the SC motu
proprio, or by (IBP) upon the verified complaint of
any person. Thus, if the complainant in a
disbarment case fails to attach a certification
against forum shopping, the pendency of another
disciplinary action against the same respondent
may still be ascertained with ease.
With respect to the violation of Atty. Aparicio,
Respondent does not deny authorship of the
threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly
contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of
the law," reminding legal practitioners that a
lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. Under this Rule, a
lawyer should not file or threaten to file any
unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases
against the adversaries of his client designed to
secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to
yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer's client. In the case at bar, respondent did
exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe.
Through his letter, he threatened complainant
that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they
propose as settlement, he would file and claim
bigger amounts including moral damages
PENALTY IMPOSED: REPRIMAND, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE: Lawyer should not file or threaten to
file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or
cases against the adversaries of his client
64. RIVERA v. CORRAL
Facts: Rivera instituted a complaint for
disbarment charging Atty. Corral with malpractice
and conduct unbecoming a member of the
Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case
was received by Atty. Corral’s secretary on
February 23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by
Atty. Corral on March 13, 1990. Next day, he
went to the clerk of court and changed the date
February 23 to February 29 without the court’s
prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral
later on filed a reply to plaintiff’s manifestation
claiming that he received the decision on
February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb
29).
RECOMMENENDATION/S of IBP: respondent
guilty as charged and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
Issue: W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for
changing the date when he received the decision
of the court without the court’s prior knowledge of
decision
Held: No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year.
The correction of date by Atty. Corral was made
not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial
court in believing that the notice of appeal was
filed within the reglementary period. Because if
the decision was received on Feb 22, the notice
of appeal filed on March 13 is filed out of time. To
extricate himself from such predicament, Atty.
Corral altered the date he received the court’s
decision. By altering the material dates to make it
appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed,
Atty. Corral committed an act of dishonesty.
Dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct.

65. RETUYA v. GORDUIZ
FACTS: Ana F. Retuya, a widow with four minor
children, filed a claim for workmen's
compensation against Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc., the employer of her husband who died in
1968. Retuya won in that case where it included
P300 as attorney's fees of Atty. Gorduiz. The
employer appealed and proposed to compromise
the claim by paying P4,396.05 or only one-half of
the total award. Ana accepted the proposal. The
employer paid the reduced award.
Ana sent to the employer the receipt and release
signed by her with a letter wherein she explained
that her lawyer, Gorduiz, did not sign the motion
to dismiss the claim bec. he wanted twenty
percent of the award as his atty's fees.
After she had cashed the check, she was not
able to contact Gorduiz and pay his fee.
unexpectedly, she was served with a warrant of
arrest. It turned out that Atty. Gorduiz executed
an affidavit stating that Ana had misappropriated
his attorney's fees and that he had demanded
payment from her but, she refused to make
payment.
She filed a motion to quash. She explained that
she did not pay the fees of Atty. Gorduiz bec. he
was demanding one-third of the award: that
when she did not accede to his demand, he
lowered his claim to P800, and that she
bargained for P600 but he refused to accept that
amount. Ana averred that the estafa case was
filed just to harass her.
The court denied the motion to quash and
granted the motion of Atty. Gorduiz requiring Ana
to produce a copy of the decision awarding her
workmen's compensation for her husband's
death.
The estafa case was not tried. Atty. Diola, as
lawyer of Ana, offered to Atty. Gorduiz the sum of
P500 as settlement of the case. The offer was
accepted.
Retuya asked for the disbarment or suspension
of Atty. Gorduiz and disbarment case against
Gorduiz was referred to the Solicitor General.
 prescribes that "controversies with clients
The Solicitor General asked the provincial fiscal concerning compensation are to be avoided by
of Southern Leyte to investigate the case against the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his
Gorduiz. self- respect and with his right to receive
reasonable recompense for his services; and
Recommendation of Fiscal’s Office: lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to
recommended the dismissal of the case prevent injustice, imposition or fraud."

The Solicitor General disagreeing with that PENALTY IMPOSED: Suspension for a period of
recommendation, filed in this Court against six months couted from notice of this decision.
Gorduiz a complaint wherein he prayed that
Gorduiz be suspended for six months

ISSUE/S: WON there is justification for

suspending the respondent.

HELD: Respondent acted precipitately in filing a

criminal action against his client for the supposed
misappropriation of his attomey's fees. It is not
altogether clear that his client had swindled him
and, therefore, there is some basis for
concluding that, contrary to his lawyer's oath, he
had filed a suit against her and had harassed
and embarrassed her.

Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics