Marcos-Araneta v CA (Venue)  The RTC eventually entertained an amended

The Facts complaint filed by Irene, dispositively

stating: (1) Irene may opt to file, as a matter
 Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador
of right, an amended complaint. (2) The
Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his
inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of
business associates (Benedicto Group)
whom was a Batac, an Ilocos Norte resident,
organized Far East Managers and Investors,
in the amended complaint setting out the
Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity
same cause of action cured the defect of
Corporation (UEC), respectively.
improper venue. (3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3
 Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege,
in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 allow the
both corporations were organized pursuant
filing of the amended complaint in question
to a contract whereby Benedicto, as trustor,
in the place of residence of any of Irene’s
placed in his name and in the name of his
co-plaintiffs.
associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of
 The Benedictos filed on April 10, 2001 their
FEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold
Answer to the amended complaint but also
those shares and their fruits in trust and for
went the CA via a petition for certiorari,
the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of
seeking to nullify the following RTC
such shares. Several years after, Irene
orders. The CA rendered a Decision, setting
demanded the reconveyance of said 65%
aside the assailed RTC orders and
stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group
dismissing the amended complaints in Civil
refused to oblige.
Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17.
 In March 2000, Irene filed before the
RTC two similar complaints for conveyance Issue/s on Venue
of shares of stock, accounting and (4) Did the respondents (Benedictos) waive
receivership against the Benedicto improper venue by their subsequent acts of filing
Group with prayer for the issuance of a numerous pleadings; and (5) Was Irene a resident
temporary restraining order (TRO). of Batac, Ilocos Norte and if any of the principal
 In a consolidated opposition, Benedicto, parties are residents of Ilocos Norte?
moved to dismiss on 5 grounds, among Held: SC affirms, but not for all the reasons set out
which were: (2) venue was improperly laid in, the CA’s decision.
 During the preliminary proceedings on their Fourth Issue: Private Respondents did not
motions to dismiss, Benedicto presented the Waive Improper Venue
Joint Affidavit of Gilmia B. Valdez,
Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure
Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco
which, in personal actions, is fixed for the greatest
who all attested being employed as
convenience possible of the plaintiff and his
household staff at the Marcos’ Mansion in
witnesses. The ground of improperly laid venue
Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that
must be raised seasonably, else it is deemed waived.
Irene did not maintain residence in said
Where the defendant failed to either file a motion to
place as she in fact only visited the mansion
dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include
twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac
the same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to
in the 1998 national elections; and that she
have waived his right to object to improper venue.
was staying at her husband’s house
In the case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised
in Makati City.
at the earliest time possible, meaning “within the
 Irene presented her community tax
time for but before filing the answer to the
certificateissued on “11/07/99” in Curimao,
complaint,” the matter of improper venue. They
Ilocos Norte to support her claimed
would thereafter reiterate and pursue their objection
residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
on venue, first, in their answer to the amended
 RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that
complaints and then in their petition for certiorari
these partly constituted “real action,” and
before the CA. Any suggestion, therefore, that
that Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos
Francisca and Benedicto or his substitutes
Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly
abandoned along the way improper venue as ground
laid.
to defeat Irene’s claim before the RTC has to be
rejected.
Fifth Issue: The RTC Has No Jurisdiction on
the Ground of Improper Venue
Subject Civil Cases are Personal Actions
According to the Benedictos, venue was in this case
improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of
a real action involving real properties located
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in
Batac.
This contention is not well-taken. In a personal
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
property, the enforcement of a contract, or the
recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other
hand, are those affecting title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein. In accordance
with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the venue of
real actions shall be the proper court which has
territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated. The venue of personal actions is the court
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust
arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. The
amended complaint is an action in personam, it
being a suit against Francisca and the late
Benedicto (now represented by Julita and
Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal
liability to Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in
1968 and/or 1972. They are not actions in
rem where the actions are against the real properties
instead of against persons.
Interpretation of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and
Sec. 2 of Rule 4
SC: Irene, as categorically and peremptorily found
by the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of
Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. Accordingly,
Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt
for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint.
As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as the place
“where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides” at the time she filed her amended
complaint. That Irene holds CTC No.
17019451[41] issued sometime in June 2000 in
Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her
address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no
moment since it can easily be procured from the
BIR with the necessary desired information.
Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC
in Batac, Ilocos Norte is the proper court venue,
asseverate that Batac, Ilocos Norte is where the
principal parties reside. Pivotal to the resolution of
the venue issue is a determination of the status of
Irene’s co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3
of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4,
Venue is Improperly Laid
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-
in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled
beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to be
benefited or entitled to the avails of the present
suit. It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel
Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all
from Ilocos Norte, were included as co-plaintiffs in
the amended complaint as Irene’s new designated
trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere
representatives of Irene.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when
there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action
case, the residences of the principal parties should
be the basis for determining proper venue. Before
the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and
3342-17, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal
plaintiff, the real party-in-interest. Following Sec. 2
of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be
commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene
resides.
Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue of
Action
As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac
declared Irene as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos
Norte. Withal, that court was an improper venue for
her conveyance action. The Court can concede that
Irene’s three co-plaintiffs are all residents of Batac,
Ilocos Norte. But it ought to be stressed in this
regard that not one of the three can be considered as
principal party-plaintiffs . In the final analysis, the
residences of Irene’s co-plaintiffs cannot be made
the basis in determining the venue of the subject
suit. Irene was a resident during the period material
of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident
of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although
jurisprudence[44] has it that one can have several
residences, if such were the established fact. The
Court will not speculate on the reason why
petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and
expenses she and her adversaries would have to
endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her case be
heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On the
heels of the dismissal of the original complaints on
the ground of improper venue, three new
personalities were added to the complaint doubtless
to insure, but in vain as it turned out, that the case
stays with the RTC in Batac.
Reyes v Heirs of Daez
 Plaintiffs are the heirs of the deceased
EUDOSIA D. DAEZ, who owned a lot and
apartment units situated at 654 McArthur
Highway, Bonifacio, Caloocan City, while
Defendants (Reyes et al) are the tenants and
actual occupants of the aforesaid apartment
units on a verbal lease agreement on a
[month-to-month] basis. The apartment units
consisting of two (2) buildings were erected
way back in [1950s];
 Sometime in 1996 the buildings were
inspected by the City Engineer. Pursuant to a
letter dated January 21, 1997 sent to
plaintiffs by the City Engineer, plaintiffs sent
formal notice to vacate upon defendants
terminating the verbal lease contract on a
[month-to-month] basis for the purpose of
effecting the necessary restructuring of the
buildings;
 Defendants despite receipt of the letter failed
[and] refused to vacate thereby endangering
not only their lives and properties but that of
the public as well
 Under Sec. 5(e) of the B.P. 877[,] otherwise
known as [the] Rent Control Law, need of
the lessor to make the necessary repairs of
the leased premises which is the subject of
an existing order of condemnation by proper
authorities concerned to make said premises
safe and habitable is a ground for ejectment,
hence this case for ejectment on September
23, 1997;
 On September 30, 1999, the MeTC rendered
its Decision in favor of the Heirs of Daez,
ordering Reyes et al to vacate, to pay Cecilia
D. Daez, the reasonable compensation for
their use of the premises at the rate of
P500.00 per month per unit from April 1997
until the premises is fully vacated; and To
reimburse the Heirs of Daez the amount of
P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and for
costs and litigation expenses.
 Defendants appealed to the RTC. Defendants
posited that the proper legal recourse should
have been an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, either of which is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC ruled that
the allegation in Paragraph 4 of the
Complaint points out the fact that
defendants' possession of the subject
property is by virtue of a verbal lease
contract they entered into with the late
Eudosia Daez, and that upon her death,
respondents, as heirs, merely step into the
shoes of their predecessor-in-interest.
 The case was elevated to the Court of
Appeals, where Reyes et al argued, for the
first time, that the Position Paper submitted
by Heirs of Daez in the MTC was not
verified and that they failed to submit direct
testimony, in violation of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure; thereby, making the
decisions of the MTC and RTC based on
hearsay evidence.
 Heirs of Daez asserted that the issue on their
failure to sign the verification in the Position
Paper was never raised before the RTC;
hence, could not be assigned as an error
before the appellate court. And even if the
Position Paper was not verified, they
contended that the documentary evidence
adduced was of public nature which may be
presented and admitted without reference to
any affidavit. Moreover, the omission is not
fatal because all the allegations in the
Position Paper were mere reiterations of
those stated in the Complaint, which was
verified. Respondents averred that
petitioners had the opportunity to contradict
their allegations by submitting and marking
countervailing evidence but they did
not. Lastly, they noted that petitioners'
pleadings before the lower and appellate
courts were not also verified by all the
original defendants yet these were still
considered. The principle of in pari
delicto and estoppel should, therefore,
operate against them.
 CA affirmed RTC.
Issue: Does Sec. 9 in relation to Sec. 3 (B) of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure absolutely
require the submission of affidavit/s of
witnesses and verified Position Paper?
Held: The petition has no merit.
Considering the allegations, issues and
arguments adduced, this Court resolves to deny
this petition for failure of petitioners to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in the assailed
decision and resolution as to warrant the
 exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.
Moreover, a careful consideration of this
petition indicates the failure of petitioners to
show any cogent reason why the actions of the
three (3) courts which have passed upon the
same issues should be reversed. They failed to
show that the courts' factual findings are not
based on substantial evidence or that their
decisions are contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence.
Espino vs. Legarda 485 SCRA 74 (SIH)
Facts: Carmita Legarda (respondent), a landowner
in Sta Mesa, filed with the RTC against Benjamin
and Rosenda Espino, petitioners, and Jaime Abeja,
an a complaint for accion publiciana. Respondent
claims that petitioners clandestinely entered the
premises and constructed houses w/out her late
father’s knowledge. Despite demand, the petitioners
did not vacate. The lower court rendered a decision
in favor of the landowner and against petitioners
and ordered the petitioners to vacate the lot.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, claiming that the
case did not undergo conciliation proceedings as
required by PD 1508, and that the certification even
though presented, was not identified or makre,d nor
offered. Respondents maintain that it was deemed
admitted by petitioners. since the certification was
not denied under oath. CA found that Respondent
was able to present a barangay certification to file
action as evidence. Issue: WoN respondent
complied with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
providing for a conciliation as a condition precedent
to any complaint, petition, action or proceeding.
Held: Petition dismissed. As correctly observed by
the CA, petitioners did not object to the presentation
of the Certification to File Action during the
hearing. Furthermore, in the Answer of the
petitioner, they allege that the corporation was the
real owner, which brings it out of the ambvit of
barangay conciliation.
EVEN ASSUMING that respondent did not refer
the dispute to the barangay for conciliation, still, the
trial court could take cognizance of the case
considering that petitioners here did not object to
such lack of conciliation during the hearing. In
Junson v. Martinez, we ruled that non-compliance
with the condition precedent under PD 1508 does
not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over a case
where the defendants fail to object to such exercise
of jurisdiction. But such objection should be
seasonably made before the court first taking
cognizance of the complaint, and must be raised in
the Answer, or in such other pleading allowed under
the Rules of Court.
ANG v. ANG GR No. 186993 – August 22, 2012
FACTS:
 Spouses Alan & Em Ang (respondents)
obtained a loan ($300k) from Theodore &
Nancy Ang (petitioners), also, a promissory
note was executed in favor of the petitioners
wherein they promised to pay the latter the
said amount, with interest at the rate of 10%
per year, upon demand.
 However, despite repeated demands, the
respondents failed to pay the petitioners.
 Since the loan already amounted to almost
$720k, inclusive of interest, petitioner, who
were then resident in LA, executed their SPA
in favor of Atty. Aceron for the purpose of
filing an action in court against the
respondents.
 A complaint for collection of sum of money
was then filed with the RTC-QC.
 Respondent moved for the dismissal of the
complaint in the grounds of improper venue
and prescription asserting that the complaint
against them may only be filed in the court of
the place where either they or the petitioners
reside. Respondent reside in Bacolod while
petitioner reside in LA.
RTC: denied respondent’s motion to dismiss. Since
Atty. Aceron is the duly appointed attorney-in-fact of
petitioners, venue of the action may lie where re
resides as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 4, of the 1997
RoC.
 Respondents claim that Atty. Aceron, being
merely a representative of the petitioners, is
not a real party in interest in the case; hence,
his residence should not be considered in
determining the proper venue of the said
complaint.
CA: Complaint should have been filed in Bacolod
City.
ISSUE: WON the complaint must be dismissed on
the ground that venue was not proper.
HELD: Yes.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of
personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the
plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled,
however, is the principle that choosing the venue of
an action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter
is regulated by the Rules of Court. The petitioners’
complaint for collection of sum of money against the
respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks
the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the
plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his
complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he
himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be
residents of the place where the action has been
instituted at the time the action is commenced.
If the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the
complaint in such case may only be filed in the court
of the place where the defendant resides. In Cohen
and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil.
526 (1916), this Court held that there can be no
election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint
when the plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines.
In such case, the complaint may only be filed in the
court of the place where the defendant resides.
nterest within the meaning of the Rules of Court
means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by
the substantive law, has the right sought to be
enforced.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the rules on
venue, like the other procedural rules, are designed
to insure a just and orderly administration of justice
or the impartial and even-handed determination of
every action and proceeding. Obviously, this
objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given
unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he
may file his complaint or petition. The choice of
venue should not be left to the plaintiff's whim or
caprice. He may be impelled by some ulterior
motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular
court even if not allowed by the rules on venue.
JIMMY T. GO, petitioner,
vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
ANGELO V. MANAHAN, FRANCISCO C.
ZARATE, PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY.
EDWARD MARTIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 156187 November 11, 2004
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Petition for
Certiorari
DOCTRINE: Personal action is one brought for the
recovery of personal property, for the enforcement
of some contract or recovery of damages for its
breach, or for the recovery of damages for the
commission of an injury to the person or property.
The venue for personal actions is likewise the same
for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the
court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of
Rule 4.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and and Alberto
T. Looyuko applied for an Omnibus Line
Accomodation with responded UCPB in
the amount of Php 900,000 secured by
Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of
land, which was favorably acted upon by
the latter.
2. In July 12, 1997, the approved Omnibus
Line Accomodation was subsequently
cancelled by the bank. Thereafter, Jimmy
Go, asked for the return of the two TCTs
from the bank which refused to return the
same and caused the registration thereof
with the Registry of Deeds on September
2, 1997
3. On June 15, 1999, the bank filed with the
Office of the Clerk of Court of
Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage for
nonpayment of obligation secured by
such mortgage. The public auction was
then set.
4. Jimmy Go filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage
and damages with a prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction with the RTC of
Pasig City.
5. The respondent bank filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds: 1) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the case
due to nonpayment of the proper filing
and docket fees; 2) that the complaint
was filed in the wrong venue; 3) an
indispensable party/real party in interest
was not impleaded and, therefore, the
complaint states no cause of action; 4)
that the complaint was improperly
verified; and 5) that petitioner is guilty of
forum shopping and submitted an
insufficient and false certification of non-
forum shopping.
 6. The RTC granted the petitioner’s
application for writ of preliminary
injunction and denied bank’s motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
7. The bank questioned the RTC decision
before the CA via a petition for
certiorari.
8. In July 2002, the CA set aside the orders
of the RTC and directed it to dismiss the
case on the ground of improper venue.
Further, the motion for reconsideration
by the petitioner was denied.
9. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s complaint for
cancellation of real estate mortgage is a
personal of real action for the purpose of
determining venue.
HELD:
1. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property, or as provided
for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is
an action affecting title to or possession
of real property, or interest therein. These
include partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property. The venue for real actions is
the same for regional trial courts and
municipal trial courts -- the court which
has territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the real property or any part
thereof lies.
2. Personal action is one brought for the
recovery of personal property, for the
enforcement of some contract or
recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the
commission of an injury to the person or
property. The venue for personal actions
is likewise the same for the regional and
municipal trial courts -- the court of the
place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of
Rule 4.
3. It is quite clear then that the controlling
factor in determining venue for cases of
the above nature is the primary objective
for which said cases are filed.
4. Petitioner in this case contends that a
case for cancellation of mortgage is a
personal action and since he resides at
Pasig City, venue was properly laid
therein which is clearly misplaced. In
the case at bar, the action for cancellation
of real estate mortgage filed by herein
petitioner was primarily an action to
compel private respondent bank to return
to him the properties covered by TCTs
No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the
bank had already initiated foreclosure
proceedings because of the cancellation
by the said respondent bank of the
omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997. The
prime objective is to recover said real
properties. Here, and as correctly pointed
out by the appellate court, respondent
bank had already initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, and were it not
for the timely issuance of a restraining
order secured by petitioner Go in the
lower court, the same would have already
been sold at a public auction.
5. In sum, the cancellation of the real estate
mortgage, subject of the instant petition,
is a real action, considering that a real
estate mortgage is a real right and a real
property by itself.35 An action for
cancellation of real estate mortgage is
necessarily an action affecting the title to
the property. It is, therefore, a real action,
which should be commenced and tried in
Mandaluyong City, the place where the
subject property lies.
6. The petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
HOECHST PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. TORRES
G.R. No. L-44351 May 18, 1978
FACTS:
Francisco Torres filed a complaint with CFI
Isabela alleging breach of a distributorship contract
on the part of Hoechst Philippines, Inc.
Hoechst filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that venue has been improperly laid because
the contract provides that "(I)n case of any litigation
arising out of this agreement, the venue of any
action shall be in the competent courts of the
Province of Rizal”.
CFI Isabela denied the motion to dismiss.
Judge Donato opined that since the subject contract
was a prepared standard form for Hoechst wherein
blanks were merely filled up all stipulations were
standard and pre-made by the company, Torres was
given no option whatsoever except 'to take it or
leave it. Furthermore, the terms of the contract
provides that it would be Hoechst who would have
to sue Torres, and, therefore, the stipulation as to
venue was meant to apply only to suits to be filed
by Hoechst. It was also maintained that there are no
words in the contract expressly restricting the venue
to the courts of Rizal.
ISSUE: W/N the venue was improperly laid?
RULING: YES. The settled rule of
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written
agreement of the parties as to venue, as authorized
by Section 3, Rule 4, is not only binding between
the parties but also enforceable by the courts. 1 It is
only after the action has been filed already that
change or transfer of venue by agreement of the
parties is understandably controllable in the
discretion of the court.
The agreement in this case was entered into
long before the Torres’ action was filed. It is clear
and unequivocal. The parties therein stipulated that
"(I)n case of any litigation arising out of this
agreement, the venue of any action shall be in the
competent courts of the Province of Rizal." No
further stipulations are necessary to elicit the
thought that both parties agreed that any action by
either of them would be filed only in the competent
courts of Rizal province exclusively.
EXCEPTION: There may be instances
when an agreement as to venue may be so
oppressive as to effectively deny to the party
concerned access to the courts by reason of poverty.
The difficulties pictured by respondents that a poor
plaintiff from a distant province may have to
encounter in filing suit in a particular place ran
indeed happen. In such an eventuality and
depending on the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the Court may declare the agreement as to
venue to be in effect contrary to public policy, —
despite that in general, changes and transfers of
venue by written agreement of the parties is
allowable — whenever it is shown that a stipulation
as to venue works injustice by practically denying
to the party concerned a fair opportunity to file suit
in the place designated by the rules.
There is no showing that Torres is really in
no position to carry on a litigation in the Province of
Rizal, because of his residence or place of business
being in Isabela province. His economic condition
does not warrant non-enforcement of the stipulation
as to venue that he has agreed to. Both parties
agreed to the venue in controversy with eyes wide
open.
PHIL BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v LIM
Facts:
Philippine Bank of Communications filed a
complaint against Elena Lim, Ramon Calderon, and
Trio-Oro International Trading and Manufacturing
Corp with the RTC Manila for the collection of
deficiency of a loan. PBC alleged that the pr obtained
a loan from PBC and executed a continuing surety
agreement for all loans, credits, etc that were
extended or may be extended in the future to them;
that the most recent loan was evidenced by a
promissory note (which has a stipulation that the
venue for any legal action that may arise out of said
PN shall be Makati City, to the exclusion of all other
courts); that for pr’s failure to pay, PBC foreclosed
the REM; and that the same left a deficiency balance.
Pr moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue, invoking the stipulation
contained in the PN with respect to the
restrictive/exclusive venue.
RTC - denied pr’s MD; PBC has separate
causes of action (PN and surety agreement); venue
was properly laid in Manila
CA - pr’s alleged debt was based on the PN;
PN provided an exclusionary stipulation on venue to
the exclusion of all other courts; SA (though silent as
to venue) was an accessory contract that should have
been interpreted in consonance with the PN
Issue: W/N the venue was properly laid at RTC
Manila? - NO.
Ruling: Sec 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
provides that personal actions must be commenced
and tried (1) in the place where the plaintiff resides,
or (2) where the defendant resides, or (3) in case of
non-resident defendants, where they may be found,
at the choice of the plaintiff. This rule on venue does
not apply when (1) the law specifically provides
otherwise, or when (2) before the filing of the action,
the contracting parties agree in writing on the
exclusive venue thereof. Venue is not jurisdictional
and may be waived by the parties. A stipulation as to
venue does not preclude the filing of the action in
other places, unless qualifying or restrictive words
are used in the agreement.
In the instant case, the stipulation on the
exclusivity of the venue as stated in the PN is not at
issue. What petitioner claims is that there was no
restriction on the venue, because none was stipulated
in the SA on which petitioner had allegedly based its
suit. Accordingly, the action on the SA may be filed
in Manila, petitioner’s place of residence.
Suretyship arises upon the solidary binding of
a person, deemed the surety, with the principal
debtor, for the purpose of fulfilling an obligation.
The prestation is not an original and direct obligation
for the performance of the surety’s own act, but
merely accessory or collateral to the obligation
contracted by the principal. Although the surety
contract is secondary to the principal obligation, the
surety assumes liability as a regular party to the
undertaking.
In enforcing a surety contract, the
complementary-contracts-construed-together
doctrine finds application. According to this
principle, an accessory contract must be read in its
entirety and together with the principal agreement.
This principle is used in construing contractual
stipulations in order to arrive at their true meaning;
certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then
made to control.
The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to
the present case. Incapable of standing by itself, the
SA can be enforced only in conjunction with the PN.
The latter documents the debt that is sought to be
collected in the action against the sureties. The
circumstances that related to the issuance of the PN
and the SA are so intertwined that neither one could
be separated from the other. It makes no sense to
argue that the parties to the SA were not bound by
the stipulations in the PN.
Young Auto Supply vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 104175, 25 June 1993]
Facts: On 28 October 1987, Young Auto Supply Co.
Inc. (YASCO) represented by Nemesio Garcia, its
president, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy, sold all of
their shares of stock in Consolidated Marketing &
Development Corporation (CMDC) to George C.
Roxas. The purchase price was P8,000,000.00
payable as follows: a down payment of
P4,000,000.00 and the balance of P4,000,000.00 in
four postdated checks of P1,000,000.00 each.
Immediately after the execution of the agreement,
Roxas took full control of the four markets of
CMDC. However, the vendors held on to the stock
certificates of CMDC as security pending full
payment of the balance of the purchase price. The
first check of P4,000,000.00, representing the down
payment, was honored by the drawee bank but the
four other checks representing the balance of
P4,000,000.00 were dishonored. In the meantime,
Roxas sold one of the markets to a third party. Out of
the proceeds of the sale, YASCO received
P600,000.00, leaving a balance of P3,400,000.00.
Subsequently, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy
assigned all their rights and title to the proceeds of
the sale of the CMDC shares to Nemesio Garcia. On
10 June 1988, YASCO and Garcia filed a complaint
against Roxas in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Cebu City, praying that Roxas be ordered to pay
them the sum of P3,400,000.00 or that full control of
the three markets be turned over to YASCO and
Garcia. The complaint also prayed for the forfeiture
of the partial payment of P4,600,000.00 and the
payment of attorney's fees and costs. Failing to
submit his answer, and on 19 August 1988, the trial
court declared Roxas in default. The order of default
was, however, lifted upon motion of Roxas. On 22
August 1988, Roxas filed a motion to dismiss. After
a hearing, wherein testimonial and documentary
evidence were presented by both parties, the trial
court in an Order dated 8 February 1991 denied
Roxas' motion to dismiss. After receiving said order,
Roxas filed another motion for extension of time to
submit his answer. He also filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its
Order dated 10 April 1991 for being pro-forma.
Roxas was again declared in default, on the ground
that his motion for reconsideration did not toll the
running of the period to file his answer. On 3 May
1991, Roxas filed an unverified Motion to Lift the
Order of Default which was not accompanied with
the required affidavit of merit. But without waiting
for the resolution of the motion, he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
improper venue. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration by YASCO was to no avail. YASCO
and Garcia filed the petition.
Issue: Whether the venue for the case against
YASCO and Garcia in Cebu City was improperly
laid.
Held: A corporation has no residence in the same
sense in which this term is applied to a natural
person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in
a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles of
incorporation. The Corporation Code precisely
requires each corporation to specify in its articles of
incorporation the "place where the principal office of
the corporation is to be located which must be within
the Philippines." The purpose of this requirement is
to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite
place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory.
Actions cannot be filed against a corporation in any
place where the corporation maintains its branch
offices. The Court ruled that to allow an action to be
instituted in any place where the corporation has
branch offices, would create confusion and work
untold inconvenience to said entity. By the same
token, a corporation cannot be allowed to file
personal actions in a place other than its principal
place of business unless such a place is also the
residence of a co-plaintiff or a defendant. With the
finding that the residence of YASCO for purposes of
venue is in Cebu City, where its principal place of
business is located, it becomes unnecessary to decide
whether Garcia is also a resident of Cebu City and
whether Roxas was in estoppel from questioning the
choice of Cebu City as the venue. The decision of the
Court of Appeals was set aside.
G.R. No. 159507. April 19, 2006.*
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., petitioner, vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, respondents.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner’s counsel: Carla Paz B. Manto and
Ronette O. Franco
Respondents’ counsel: Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez
and Gatmaitan Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J.
EMERGENCY: Congressman SALUDO filed a
complaint for damages against AMEX and its
officers Fish (VP and Country Manager), and
Mascrinas (Head of Operations) with the RTC of
Maasin City, Southern Leyte. SALUDO alleges that
he is a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern
Leyte. The complaint’s cause of action stemmed
from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner
Saludo’s AMEX credit card and the supplementary
card issued to his daughter
The 1st dishonor happened when petitioner
Saludo’s daughter used her supplementary
credit card to pay her purchases in the United
States.
The 2nd dishonor occurred when petitioner
Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his
account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan
while he was there with other delegates from the
Philippines to attend the Congressional
Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
SALUDO says the acts of dishonor were
unjustified. He says that AMEX ET AL unilaterally
suspended his account for failure to pay its balance
covering the period of March 2000 when he did not
received the corresponding statement of
account.Because of the great inconvenience,
wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment,
humiliation and besmirched political and
professional standing as a result of AMEX ET AL’s
acts which were committed in gross and evident bad
faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner, he prays that AMEX ET AL be adjudged to
pay him actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees. AMEX ET AL, in its answer, as
affirmative defense says that the complaint should
be dismissed on the ground that venue was
improperly laid because none of the parties was a
resident of Leyte, alleging that even SALUDO
himself is not a resident of Leyte. As proof:
SALUDO’s community tax certificate, which
was presented when he executed the complaint’s
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, was issued at Pasay City
Saludo’s complaint was prepared in Pasay City and
signed by a lawyer of the said city
RTC-MAASIN: Favors SALUDO. DENIED
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF AMEX ET AL.
Says that venue was proper since a man can have but
one domicile, but he may have numerous places of
residence. Here RTC says that although SALUDO is
domiciled in Leyte, he has residence both in Pasay
AND Leyte. Moreover, RTC says that as congressman
of the province, his residence there can be taken
judicial notice of.
AMEX ET AL’s MR DENIED. Hence, AMEX ET
AL files petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with CA.
CA: Reverses RTC. Favors AMEX ET AL. VENUE
IMPROPERLY LAID. Declared that petitioner
Saludo was not a resident of Leyte. CA referred to his
community tax certificate which was issued at Pasay
City. CA says that under RA 7160, the community
tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of
the individual. CA also pointed out that petitioner
Saludo’s law office, which was also representing him
in the present case, is in Pasay City. CA said it was
wrong for the RTC to take judicial notice of
SALUDO’s residence.
ISSUE: WON venue was improperly laid in RTC
because not one of the parties, including petitioner
Saludo, as plaintiff, was a resident of Southern
Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
VENUE IS PROPER.
Petitioner Saludo’s complaint for damages is a
personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2,
Rule 4 of ROC1.
The term “residence” as employed in the rule on
venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first
instance means the place of abode whether permanent
or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as
distinguished from “domicile” which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has
the intention of returning.
The definition of “residence” for purposes of election
law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term
“domicile”; When analyzed, the term “residence”
requires two elements—(1) intention to reside in the
particular place, and (2) personal or physical presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
For purposes of venue, the less technical definition
of “residence” is adopted; Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile; Since a congressman, or
the lone representative of a
particular district, has his residence (or domicile)
therein as the term is construed in relation to
election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have
had his residence therein for purposes of venue for
filing personal actions.
Following the definition of the term “residence” for
purposes of election law, a congressman for a
particular locality not only has the intention to reside
therein but also the personal presence therein, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. The fact
that a party’s community tax certificate was issued in
a place other than where he claims to be a resident of
is of no moment because the same does not preclude
his having a residence in another locality for purposes
of venue.
Courts are allowed “to take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions”; The concept of “facts of common
knowledge” in the context of judicial notice has
been explained as those facts that are “so commonly
known in the community as to make it unprofitable
to require proof, and so certainly known to as to
make it indisputable among reasonable men”; The
fact of a congressman being duly elected could be
properly taken judicial notice of by a trial court, the
same being a matter of common knowledge in the
community where it sits. A congressman’s
residence in his province where he was elected
could be properly taken judicial notice of by the
trial court.
San Luis v San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, FEB. 6,
2007
Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages.
 1st marriage: Virginia Sulit in 1942 had 6
children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo
 2nd marriage: Merry Lee Corwin in 1968
had 1 son. However, in 1973 they had a
divorce.
 3rd marriage: Felicidad Sagalongos
(respondent) in 1974 had no children.
Married in USA but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to
his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. In 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration before the RTC
Makati City. She alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing in Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son
by his second marriage.
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
among others that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province
of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. The same was denied.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to
dismiss, respondent filed her opposition thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office
in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
Alabang, Metro Manila.
The trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was
without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo
was bigamous.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision.
Edgar San Luis appealed to SC via instant
petition for review on certiorari which was adopted
by Rodolfo. They both insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Issue: W/N venue was properly laid,
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death."
The term "resides" connotes "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
There is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention
of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence
or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible
that a person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners
established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property, bills addressed to his residence in Alabang
and proof of membership in the Village Assoc. and
calling cards stating that his home/city address is in
Alabang while his office/provincial address is in
Laguna.
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed
in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that
time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3.
Title: United Overseas Bank Phils. v. Rosemoore
Mining & Development Corp.
Issue: The venue of the filing of the cases resulted to
forum shopping.
Facts: Rosemoore Mining & Development
Corporation (Hereon Rosemoor) in order to secure a
credit facility amounting to 80Million executed a
mortgage agreement with United Overseas Bank
Phils. (Hereon Bank) which covered six (6) parcels of
land all registered under Rosemoor.
Rosemoor defaulted which caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. The bank
was the highest bidder in all of the properties. Hence
the filing of the case by Rosemoor before the Manila
RTC and Malolos RTC. (The issue of the case, filing
of 2 actions in 2 different courts)
Manila RTC: (Personal Action)
Rosemoor filed an action to receive the
remaining proceeds of the loan. However, the bank
filed a motion to dismiss the case because it contends
Rosemoor is violating forum shopping, having
initiated a case in Malolos RTC. However the motion
to dismiss was denied, likewise it was dismissed by
the CA holding that there was no forum shopping.
Malolos RTC: (Real Action)
Rosemoor second action was filed her to
restrain the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to
secure the loan which was not due yet. As it here, the
bank filed a motion to dismiss the case due to
violation of forum shopping but the likewise it was
denied by the RTC and CA.
Hence the two petitions were consolidated by
the Supreme Court. Hence the case.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Rosemoor, and affirming the ruling of the lower
courts that there was no violation of forum shopping
Ratio: The Malolos case was filed for the purpose of
restraining the Bank from proceeding with the
consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan
properties because the loan secured by the mortgage
had not yet become due and demandable. While the
right asserted in the Manila case is to receive the
proceeds of the loan, the right sought in the Malolos
case is to restrain the foreclosure of the properties
mortgaged to secure a loan that was not yet due.
Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to
annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action
affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a
real action which should be commenced and tried in
the province where the property or part thereof
lies. The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal
action involving as it does the enforcement of a
contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in
Quezon City, and the Bank, whose principal office is
in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendants or
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election
of the plaintiff.
It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila
case that Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual saw the need to
secure a writ of injunction because the consolidation
of the titles to the mortgaged properties in favor of the
Bank was in the offing. But then, this action can only
be commenced where the properties, or a portion
thereof, is located. Otherwise, the petition for
injunction would be dismissed for improper venue.
Rosemoor, therefore, was warranted in filing the
Malolos case and cannot in turn be accused of forum-
shopping.
BRIONES v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015
FACTS: Virgilio C. Briones filed a Complaint
for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note,
Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage,
Cancellation of TCT, and Damages against Cash Asia
before the RTC Manila.
Briones alleged that he was informed by his
sister that his property had been foreclosed and a writ
of possession had already been issued in favor of Cash
Asia. He discovered that: (a) he purportedly executed
a promissory note, loan agreement, and deed of real
estate mortgage covering the subject property in order
to obtain a loan from Cash Asia (3.5 Million); and (b)
since the said loan was left unpaid, Cash Asia
proceeded to foreclose his property. Briones denied
execution of the said document as he never contracted
any loans from Cash Asia because he has been living
and working in Vietnam.
Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper venue. It pointed out the venue
stipulation in the subject contracts stating that “all
legal actions arising out of this notice in connection
with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall
only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of
the proper court of Makati City.”
ISSUE: W/N the venue was improperly laid?
RULING: NO. Written stipulations as to venue
may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be
filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely
permissive in that the parties may file their suit not
only in the place agreed upon but also in the places
fixed by law. As regards restrictive stipulations on
venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown
that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, such as
“exclusively,” “waiving for this purpose any other
venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of
venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words
of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as
merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place. In this case, the
venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is
indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it
effectively limits the venue of the actions arising
therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it
must be emphasized that Briones’s complaint directly
assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming
forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance,
Briones cannot be expected to comply with the
aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance
therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their
validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on
venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a
court in the City of Manila where the subject property
is located.
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE v NOLASCO
Facts: Romeo Nolasco and Reynaldo Nolasco secured
a loan from Radiowealth Finance Co. To secure the
payment of the loan, Nolasco’s constituted a chattel
mortgage. Nolasco’s defaulted in the payment of the
installments; however, despite Radiowealth’s repeated
demand for the payment of the balance of the loan, the
same remained unheeded. Nolasco’s also refused to
surrender the motor vehicle (subject of the CM). As
such, Radiowealth filed a complaint for sum of money
and damages with application for writ of replevin with
the RTC San Mateo, Rizal.
The RTC initially directed the issuance of the
writ of replevin. However, it issued an amended order
dismissing motu proprio the case for lack of
jurisdiction. It ruled that neither Radiowealth nor
Nolasco’s reside within the jurisdiction of the tc.
On its MR, Radiowealth argued that the tc has
juridisction over the case. It pointed out that the venue
is proper, considering that there is a provision in the
promissory note which states that any action to enforce
payment of any sums due shall exclusively be brought
in the proper court within the National Capital Judicial
Region or in any place where the petitioner has a
branch or office at its sole option.
Issue:
1. W/N the venue was properly laid at RTC San
Mateo Rizal? - YES
2. W/N the tc is correct in motu proprio dismissing
the case for improper venue? - NO
Ruling:
1. Venue pertains to the place where the case may
be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, venue may be waived and
subjected to the agreement of the parties provided that
it does not cause them inconvenience.
Stipulation on venue is permitted and must be
recognized for as long as it does not defeat the purpose
of the Rules which primarily aims for the convenience
of the parties to the dispute. Parties may by stipulation
waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and
effective being merely a personal privilege, which is
not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third
persons. It is a general principle that a person may
renounce any right which the law gives unless such
renunciation would be against public policy.
There is, therefore, nothing that prohibits the
parties to decide on a different venue for any dispute or
action that may arise from their agreement. In this case,
in the promissory note executed and signed by the
parties, there is a provision which states that “Any
action to enforce payment of any sums due under this
Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court
within the National Capital Judicial Region or in any
place where [the petitioner] has a branch/office, at its
sole option.” Thus, the petitioner’s filing of the case in
San Mateo, Rizal, where it maintains a branch is proper
and should have been respected by the RTC especially
when there appears no objection on the part of the
respondents.
2. The RTC may not motu proprio dismiss the
case on the ground of improper venue. It is a matter
personal to the parties and without their objection at the
earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, it is deemed waived.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of
improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course
of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as
venue, in inferior courts as well as in the RTC, may be
waived expressly or impliedly. Thus, unless and
until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been
improperly laid, as for all practical intents and
purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be
acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the
rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case.
224 SCRA 557 (1993) BAYUBAY VS CA
FACTS:
 Proceeding at bar traces its origin to an action
for ejectment filed by petitioner Bayubay in
the MTC of Los Baños, Laguna on the ground
of expiration of lease.
 In his answer, private respondent argued that it
had the option to renew the term of the lease
contract “under such conditions as may be
agreed upon by the parties” and set up the
defense of estoppel.
 MTC rendered a decision holding that the
contract of lease had expired because no
extension had been agreed upon by the parties
as required by the agreement.
 Private respondent appealed to the RTC of
Calamba, Laguna on the ground that "the MTC
violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure by rendering judgment without
ordering the parties to submit their
respective position papers and affidavits of
their respective witnesses, as a consequence of
which, defendant's right to due process was
violated."
 RTC affirmed the appealed decision. However,
it was reversed by the CA, which ordered the
remand of the case to the MTC for further
proceedings.
 Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling
that:
(1) the failure of the MTC to give the private
respondent the opportunity to submit its
position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses
constituted a denial of due process;
(2) the questions raised were not only
questions of law because the answer contained
a counterclaim for reimbursement of
improvements allegedly made by the lessee on
the premises, and damages; and
(3) there was still a necessity for the MTC to
issue an order following the close of the pre-
trial conference
ISSUE: Whether CA’s decision to remand the case to
the MTC was proper
RULING:
 Yes, it was proper. The Court was merely
enforcing the mandatory provisions of the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
 The record shows that the Municipal Trial
Court failed to take into account the pertinent
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure
that require the immediate issuance by the
Municipal Trial Court of an order which
clearly and distinctly sets forth the issues of
the case and the other matters taken up
during the preliminary conference.
 The order is an important part of the summary
procedure because it is its receipt by the parties
that begins the ten-day period to submit the
affidavits and other evidence mentioned in Sec.
7, which reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits. —
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the
order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of witnesses and other
evidences on the factual issues defined
therein, together with a brief statement
of their petitions setting forth the law
and the facts relied upon by them.
 There was no order issued to that effect nor was
there any indication of when the position papers
were to be submitted for the purpose of
discussing the factual questioning raised.
 Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the
orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and
extra-judicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and adjective law
are contradictory to each other. Observance of
both substantive and procedural rights is
equally guaranteed by due process, whatever
the source of such rights, be it the Constitution
itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
Lucas vs. Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226, Jan. 31,
2000
FACTS:Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge
Amelia A. Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 9, Manila, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Discretion relative to Civil Case No.
151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by
Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment". J
Lucas was the defendant in
Ejectment case, alleged that Judge
Amelia A. Fabros issued an Order
granting the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration of the her previous
order which dismissed the case for
failure of plaintiff and her counsel to
appear at the Preliminary
Conference.
Lucas averred that it is elementary,
under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of
Summary Procedure, that MR is
prohibited, but respondent judge, in
violation of the rule, granted. She
added that, notwithstanding the fact
that the respondent herself had
pointed out in open court that the
case is governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure,the judge
ordered the revival of the case out of
malice, partiality and with intent to
cause an injury to complainant.
JUDGE FABROS admitted that she
granted the motion for
reconsideration even if the same is a
prohibited motion in an ejectment
case in the interest of justice.
The Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that
respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P2,000.00 for grave
abuse of discretion.
RULLING: As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The
following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule. (c) Motion
for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or
for reopening of trial.
This rule, however, applies only where the
judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered
on the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case
involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991:
"The motion prohibited by this Section is that which
seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by
the court after trial on the merits of the case”. Here,
the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due
to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary
conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits
after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited
pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the
present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is
she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course
to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present
complaint. Esmsc
Facts : Complainant Lucas was the defendant in an
ejectment case pending before respondent judge. She
alleges that Judge Fabros granted the plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration after the case had been dismissed
the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear
at the Preliminary Conference. She averred that it is
elementary, under Section 19(c) of the Rules of
Summary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration
is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the
rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. She added
that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent
herself had pointed out in open court that the case is
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice,
partiality and with intent to cause an injury to
complainant. Thus, the instant complaint, charging
respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Discretion
Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that respondent
judge not guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of discretion.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however,
applies only where the judgment sought to be
reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. Here, the
order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to
failure of a party to appear during the preliminary
conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits
after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited
pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the
present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is
she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course
to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present
Bongato v Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, Aug. 14, 2002
[G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002]
TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. Spouses
SEVERO A. MALVAR and TRINIDAD
MALVAR, respondents.
FACTS:
 MTCC
 The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed
a complaint for forcible entry against
petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that
petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel
 of land belonging to the said spouses and
erected thereon a house of light materials.
 Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time
to file an answer which the MTCC denied -
being proscribed under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and likewise containing
no notice of hearing.
 Petitioner filed an answer -disregarded having
been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary
period.
 Petitoner’s motion to dismiss - denied as being
contrary to the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
 Ordered petitioner to vacate the land in
question, and to pay rentals, attorney’s fees, and
the costs of the suit.
 RTC
 The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC
judge.
 Petitioner’s MFR - GRANTED ‘only insofar as
to determine the location of the houses involved
in this civil case so that the Court will know
whether they are located on one and the same
lot or a lot different from that involved in the
criminal case for Anti-Squatting.’ In the same
order, respondent Judge disallowed any
extension and warned that if the survey is not
made, the court might consider the same
abandoned and the writ of execution would be
issued.
The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No.
4659) was filed by private respondents Malvar against
petitioner Bongato. The case is still pending with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City.
 Petitioner filed a motion for extension of the
March 29, 1994 deadline for the submission
of the relocation survey and to move the
deadline to April 15, 1994, as the engineer
concerned could not conduct his survey
during the Holy Week (*take note)
 Respondent Judge noted that no survey report
was submitted and ordered the record of the
case returned to the court of origin for
disposal.”
 CA
 Lot referred to in the present controversy was
different from that involved in the anti-
squatting case.
 It ruled that MTCC had jurisdiction, and that it
did not err in rejecting petitioner’s Motion
to Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned that
the MTCC had passed upon the issue of
ownership of the property merely to determine
possession -- an action that did not oust the
latter of its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON CA gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that the Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited
pleading
 SC - Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45
 The Petition is meritorious.
Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the
restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the
summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-
year period within which to bring an action for forcible
entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry
to the land. However, when entry is made through
stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the
time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the
one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of
land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a
plenary action to recover the right of possession; or
an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that
the cause of action for forcible entry filed by
respondents had already prescribed when they filed the
Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence, even
if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land,
possession thereof cannot be wrested through
a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had
been occupying it for more than one (1)
year. Respondents should have presented their suit
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in
summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their
cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed
already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.
A motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is NOT a
prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a)
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated
specifically to achieve “an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases.” The speedy resolution of
unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public
policy, and the Rule should equally apply with full
force to forcible entry cases, in which possession of
the premises is already illegal from the start. For this
reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits
altogether the filing of motions for extension of
time. Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the
trial court the power to render judgment, even motu
proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an
answer within the reglementary period. However,
as forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in
nature and involve disturbances of the social order,
procedural technicalities should be carefully
avoided and should not be allowed to override
substantial justice.
Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court on June 16,
1983, promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in
Special Cases. Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or
quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception
to the rule on prohibited pleadings:
“SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The
following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the
complaint or to quash the
complaint or
information except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or
failure to comply with the
preceding section;
A court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their
silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party
may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action
at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise
held in Bayog v. Natino:
“The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as
its predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed after
the reglementary period should be expunged from the
records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an
entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It must
likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO’s defense
of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised in
a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on
prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed
under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.”
In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely
ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously
holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule
on Summary Procedure Because the Complaint for
forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable.
-----
Facts: Respondent, spouses Malvar filed a complaint
for forcible entry against petitioner Teresita Bongato,
alleging that the latter unlawfully entered their parcel
of land and built a house thereon.
MTCC ruled in favor of Malvar and ordered the
petitioner to vacate the land in question, and to pay
rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit. The
decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
RTC Judge granted the motion for
reconsideration only insofar as to determine the
location of the houses involved in this civil case so that
the Court will know whether they are located on one
and the same lot or a lot different from that involved in
the criminal case for Anti-Squatting.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss claiming
that MTCC has no jurisdiction since the complaint was
filed beyond the one-year period from date of the
alleged entry. (Illegally entered 1987, filed the case
1992)
It appears that there was a criminal case for
anti-squatting filed by Malvar against Bongato that is
still pending with the RTC Butuan City.
On appeal to CA of the civil case, CA ruled that
the subject lot was different from that involved in the
anti-squatting case. It also upheld the jurisdiction of the
MTCC and ruled that motion to dismiss was a
prohibited pleading.
Issue: W/N motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
Ruling: No. A motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a prohibited
pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was
promulgated specifically to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases. The speedy
resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of
public policy, and the Rule should equally apply with
full force to forcible entry cases, in which possession
of the premises is already illegal from the start. For this
reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits
altogether the filing of motions for extension of time.
Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the trial court
the power to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon
the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the
reglementary period. However, as forcible entry and
detainer cases are summary in nature and involve
disturbances of the social order, procedural
technicalities should be carefully avoided and should
not be allowed to override substantial justice. Pursuant
to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court on June 16, 1983,
promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in
Special Cases. Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or
quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited
pleadings:
Further, a courts lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured
by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent.
A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the
action at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
even if an answer has been belatedly filed.
In the case at bar, the MTCC should have
squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of
erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because the
Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992,
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was
applicable. Finally, the MTCC should have taken into
account petitioners Answer, in which she averred that
she had been in constant occupation on said land in
question since birth in 1941 up to the present, being an
heir of the late Emiliana Eva-Bongato, who inherited
said property from her father Raymundo Eva with
considerable improvements thereon. It should have
heard and received the evidence adduced by the parties
for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it
possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter. And
after such hearing, it could have dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. In this way, the long, drawn out
proceedings that took place in this case could have been
avoided.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429. October 4, 2002.*
FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL, complainant, vs. Judge
EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Alcala, Pangasinan, respondent.
Facts ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme
Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law, Bias and Partiality,
Abuse of Discretion and Neglect of Duty.
Complainant filed a complaint for forcible entry
against a certain Lorenzo L. Manaois. The complaint
was dismissed without prejudice for being insufficient
in some material allegations, so she filed a corrected
complaint.
Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to
Strike Out arguing that the new allegations in the
complaint are false. After the period to answer lapsed
and no answer was submitted, complainant filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant opposed
the motion.
Defendant’s motion to strike out was granted by
respondent Judge. Complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order.
Based on the foregoing, complainant accused
respondent Judge of Neglect of Duty anchored on the
following grounds:
Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a
Motion to Strike Out. Inspite thereof, respondent Judge
granted the motion 120 days after its filing, thus
defeating the summary nature of the case;
The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of
any findings of fact because no hearing was conducted
relative thereon;
Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in
favor of the defendant in his Order granting the motion
to strike out when he pointed out ‘x x x that the
complaint in this case is virtually a rehash of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 730 x x x’. Complainant
asserts that the same is to be expected because the
defects or insufficiency in the first complaint were just
being rectified in the later one;
Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the
present, unacted upon.’
Defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the
proceedings, started the construction of a one-storey
building on the subject land.
To protect her interest, complainant filed an
Application for Preliminary Injunction. Acting thereon,
respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining
Order and set the hearing on the Injunction. On said
date, complainant was able to present evidence in
support of her application while defendant chose not to
present controverting evidence and to just submit a
memorandum.
On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO,
complainant filed an Extremely Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to grant her application for injunction.
Defendant filed his memorandum. However, until the
present, respondent Judge has not ruled on her
application on preliminary injunction.
Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with
the construction of the building and even started with a
new one.
Hence, a contempt charge was filed by herein
complainant.
Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt
charge
on the ground that it was filed in the same
proceedings and the filing fee was not paid.
The court motu proprio docketed the complaint
for contempt as Civil Case No. 744
the required docket and other fees were paid
by defendant.
On same date, the court issued an Order
furnishing anew the defendants/respondents
with a copy of the contempt charge.
These, complainant claims, cured the defect
cited by defendants/respondents in their
motion to dismiss.
Respondent Judge still has not resolved the
aforesaid motion to the prejudice of herein
complainant.
In his Comment, respondent denied the allegations in
the Complaint he said:
Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino, complainant’s
counsel in the forcible entry case, of having a
penchant for filing administrative cases against
him instead of appealing decisions before the
proper court.
 None of the charges had any factual or legal
bases.
His Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been
rendered with utmost good faith, honesty and
sound discretion.
The OCA’s Recommendation
After investigation of this case, the OCA found that:
Respondent failed to apply the Rule on
Summary Procedure, which he ought to have
been very conversant with, because it was a
common procedure in municipal courts.
Accordingly, it recommended that respondent
“be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 and
warned that the commission of a similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely.”
Ruling We agree with the findings of the OCA, but
increase the penalty, taking note that this is
respondent’s second infraction.
The Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated
precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases. Failure to observe the period
within which to render a judgment subjects the
defaulting judge to administrative sanctions. For this
reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and expressly
prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for
extension.
In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks
awareness of the relevant provisions on ejectment. He
has evidently been remiss in resolving the forcible
entry case, pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
judgment should have been rendered based on the
allegations of the Complaint and the evidence
presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to
file his answer after the lapse of ten (10) days from the
service of the summons.
Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon failure of the
defendant to file an answer within the reglementary
period.
under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-
bound to render his decision within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers,
or the expiration of the period for filing them.
This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed in accordance
with Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary
Procedure reflects a serious degree of incompetence.
When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be
aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A
member of the bench must be constantly abreast of
legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing in
mind that this learning process never ceases. It is
indispensable to the correct dispensation of justice.
Respondent claimed that if there was any delay on his
part in resolving the incidents, it was not intentional but
merely brought about by pressure from work.
In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondent’s
sala, though unfortunate, cannot excuse him from due
observance of the rules.
Judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads that prevent
them from deciding cases within the reglementary
period, may ask for additional time from this Court.
Respondent has failed to do so. He ought to know that
the speedy resolution of forcible entry cases is a matter
of public policy.
His inaction for almost three years on complainants’
Motion for Summary Judgment practically rendered
nugatory the whole purpose of summary proceedings—
to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases.
By tarrying too long in deciding this forcible entry case,
he failed to live up to the mandate of the Code of
Judicial Conduct to “maintain professional
competence.”
WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is
FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000). He is further warned that a repetition of this
or similar offenses will be dealt with even more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
LUNA v MIRAFUENTE
A. M. No. MTJ-05-1610 September 26, 2005
FACTS:
Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Florencio Sadiwa and Alex Sadiwa. Sadiwas
filed an unverified answer to the complaint, seven (7)
days beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) days
from the service of the summons on them. Judge
Mirafuente (MTC Buenavista, Marinduque) gave due
course to the belatedly filed and unverified answer.
Hence, Dr.Luna charged Judge Mirafuente with Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, Violation of the Rules on
Summary Procedure in Special Cases and Gross
Ignorance of the Law.
Dr. Luna alleged that Judge Mirafuente should
have motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs
rendered judgment as warranted by the facts alleged in
the complaint (Section 6 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure).
In his answer, Judge Mirafuente argued that the
admission was proper because the delay was
negligible; that Sadiwas might have believed that the
period to file answer was 15 days, which is the usual or
common period to file an answer; and that the delay
was also excusable as Sadiwas acted pro se, without
the benefit of legal assistance.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Mirafuente violated the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure?
RULING: YES. Section 6 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure provide:
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the
defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or
on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and
attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or
otherwise unconscionable.
The word "shall" underscores their mandatory
character. To admit a late answer is to put a premium
on dilatory maneuvers – the very mischief that the Rule
seeks to redress.
Judge Mirafuente’s act of admitting the belated
answer violated Section 6 of the above-quoted Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, however, which violation
is classified as less serious charge. After considering
the appreciation of the fact that the Sadiwas filed a
belated and unverified answer without the assistance of
counsel, and the lack of showing of malice, corrupt
motives or the like on his part, this Court finds that the
penalty may be as it is hereby mitigated to severe
reprimand.
DR. JOSE S. LUNA, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE EDUARDO H. MIRAFUENTE, Municipal
Trial Court, Buenavista, Marinduque, Respondent.
RULING: RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE BELATED ANSWER
OF THE DEFENDANTS, SHOULD HAVE
BEEN FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM
THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS.
FACTS:
 ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
AGAINST RESPONDENT JUDGE FOR
VIOLATION OF RRSP.
 MTC BUENAVISTA MARINDUQUE:
PETITIONER: UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
o In May 2003, Dr. Luna filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer, against Florencio
Sadiwa and Alex Sadiwa (the
defendants) with the Municipal Trial
Court of Buenavista, Marinduque
presided by respondent.
o The defendants filed an unverified
answer to the complaint, seven (7) days
beyond the reglementary period of ten
(10) days from the service of the
summons on them.
 PETITIONER: MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT.
 GROUND: SECTION 6 OF RRSP.
 DENIED.
 M.R. ALSO DENIED.
o Dr. Luna’s counsel filed a Motion for
Judgment, invoking Section 6 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
to which motion the defendants did not
file any opposition.
o By Order of August 28, 2003
respondent denied the motion.
 Hence, arose the present administrative
complaint against respondent, Dr. Luna
asserting that as the defendants’ answer was
unverified and belatedly filed, respondent
should have motu proprio or on motion of the
plaintiffs rendered judgment as warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint,
following Section 6 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
 In his Comment respondent explains that his
admission of the defendants’ unverified,
belatedly filed answer was premised on "the
spirit of justice and fair play, which underlie[s]
every court litigation and serves as the bedrock
to preserve the trust and faith of parties litigants
in the judicial system;"
 That the admission was proper because the
delay was negligible, it involving only four (4)
days as June 13 to 15, 2003 were non-working
holidays (per presidential proclamation in
connection with the Independence Day
celebration);
 That the defendants might have believed that
the period to file answer was 15 days, which is
the usual or common period to file an answer;
and that the delay was also excusable as
defendants acted pro se, without the benefit of
legal assistance, and not dilatory.
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGE
ERRED IN ADMITTING THE BELATED
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS.
HELD: YES.
 Delay in the disposition of cases undermines
the people’s faith and confidence in the
judiciary.
 Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch.
 Such a requirement is especially demanded in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.
 For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
involve perturbation of social order, which
must be restored as promptly as possible, such
 that technicalities or details of procedure which
may cause unnecessary delays should carefully
be avoided.
 That explains why the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure which governs ejectment,
among other cases, lays down procedural
safeguards to guarantee expediency and speedy
resolution.
Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure provide:
Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the
defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or
on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein:
Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion
reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s fees
claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, if there are two or more defendants.
 The word "shall" in the above-quoted sections
of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure underscores their mandatory
character.
 Giving the provisions a directory application
would subvert the nature of the Rule and defeat
its objective of expediting the adjudication of
the suits covered thereby.
 To admit a late answer is to put a premium
on dilatory maneuvers – the very mischief
that the Rule seeks to redress.
 In the present case, respondent gave a liberal
interpretation of the above-said Rule.
 Liberal interpretation or construction of the law
or rules, however, is not a free commodity that
may be availed of in all instances under the
cloak of rendering justice.
 Liberality in the interpretation and application
of Rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice
GO v CA
Facts:
Star Group Resources and Development Inc
filed with the MTCC Iloilo an ejectment case against
Azucena Go and Regina Gloria Siong. Upon motion of
pt, MTCC issued an order holding in abeyance the
preliminary conference for the ejectment case until
after the case for specific performance involving the
same parties shall have been finally decided by the
RTC Iloilo.
Star Group appealed on the MTCC order before
the RTC Iloilo. The pt filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the appealed order is
interlocutory and therefore not appealable. The md
filed by pt was denied by the RTC. Upon Star Group’s
motion to resume proceedings, the RTC then issued an
order directing the remand of the records of the case to
the MTCC.
On pt’s appeal before the CA, the CA sustained
the proprietary of appeal as a remedy to challenge the
suspension of the ejectment suit, recognizing the
existence of a procedural void in the Rules of Summary
Procedure.
Issue: W/N the RTC is correct in entertaining the
appeal from an interlocutory order of the MTCC?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
Indisputably, the appealed order is
interlocutory, for it does not dispose of the case but
leaves something else to be done by the trial court on
the merits of the case. It is axiomatic that an
interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal.
Thus, it has been held that the proper remedy in such
cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment
on the merits, incorporating in said appeal the grounds
for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals
from interlocutory orders would result in the sorry
spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive
pingpong to and from the appellate court as often as a
trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of
its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress.
The purpose of the Rules on Summary
Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical
rules.
In this case, however, private respondent
challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment
suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the
Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein
a summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a
petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary
circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in
fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary
Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the
disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the
said Rules.
Private respondent herein filed an appeal to
question the interlocutory order. This recourse was
upheld by the RTC and the CA in order to fill a
procedural void. We affirm the ruling of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals
Azucena Go and Regena Gloria Siong
vs. Court of Appeals and Star Group Resources and
Development Inc.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set
aside and reverse the consolidated decision of the CA,
which disallowed the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings.
(An appeal was entertained by the RTC and CA despite
the fact that it is not allowed by the Rules of Court and
Summary Procedure. In the defense of the RTC and CA,
there was a “procedural void” wherein walang
magiging remedy si respondent at baka tumagal ng
tumagal ang kaso niya. Sabi ni SC, sige okay lang,
because if strict compliance with rules will result in
injustice then the rules may be relaxed. Kawawa
naman kasi si respondent kapag suspended yung case
niya tapos di niya alam kung kalian matutuloy ito.)
FACTS: (Malabo itong kaso na ito, I’m trying my
best to deliver the best digest possible)
 Respondent filed with the MTCC of Iloilo an
ejectment case against the petitioners.
o Upon motion of the petitioners, Court
issued an order holding in abeyance
the preliminary conference of the
ejectment case until after the case for
specific performance, involving the
same parties shall be decided upon by
the RTC of Iloilo. In short, the case for
Ejectment will be indefinitely be
suspended. (Before the ejectment case
kasi, there was a specific performance
case filed by the same parties, ito naman
sa RTC, yung ejectment sa MTCC.)
o An appeal was filed by respondents
questioning the order of the court. The
appeal was assigned to the RTC.
o Petitioners filed with the RTC a
motion to dismiss the appeal of
respondents, on the ground that the
order was not yet final and that it is
not appealable. DENIED. MR was
also denied.
 Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari,
alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion on denying their motion to dismiss
the appeal. (Kasi yung respondents nag file ng
motion to appeal dun sa pag suspend ng
ejectment case.)
 Respondent filed with the RTC a motion to
resume proceedings in the ejectment case.
o RTC granted this motion and directed
the remand of the records of the case to
the MTCC.
o Petitioners filed MR and Clarification.
DENIED.
 Petitioners filed a petition for review in the CA.
Alleged therein was the issue that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the motion to resume proceedings in the
MTCC. (Badtrip yung petitioners kasi natuloy
yung ejectment case, diba nga sila yung
nagpatawag ng suspension nun?)
o CA issued a TRO, enjoining RTC from
further proceeding with the case. After
the TRO lapsed, the RTC remanded the
records to the MTCC.
 Petitioners filed a motion to hold in abeyance
further proceedings, with the MTCC. DENIED.
MR also DENIED.
 Petitioners filed a motion for an injunction and
ordered respondents to refrain from continuing
the ejectment case in the MTCC until the
specific performance case has been disposed of.
(MTCC = Ejectment Case; RTC = Specific
Performance)
 Court of Appeals: Recognizing that there is a
procedural void in the Rules on Summary
Procedure, CA sustained the correctness of
an appeal as a remedy to challenge the
suspension of the Ejectment Suit by the
MTCC.
o Purpose of the Rules on Summary
Procedure is to achieve expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases with
regard to technical rules.
o The prohibition against petitions for
certiorari involving interlocutory orders
was included to forestall useless
petitions and to avoid delays.
o The inaction on the MTCC’s order of
suspension due to the procedural void
will defeat rather than promote the
speedy disposition of cases.
 While technicalities have their
uses, resort to them should not
be encouraged when they serve
only to impere the speedy and
just resolution of the case.
 Petitioners elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in allowing the
appeal of an interlocutory order?
RULING: The petition is devoid of merit.
In affirming the ruling of the RTC, the CA noted that
there was a “procedural void” in the summary
proceedings in the MTCC. (Respondent will not have
a remedy based from the procedural rules.)
(Summary ng facts na napakalabo) MTCC suspended
the preliminary conference of the Ejectment suit, upon
motion of the petitioners, until the termination of the
pending Specific Performance suit involving the same
parties. Respondents appealed to the RTC. Petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that
it was an interlocutory order and not subject to an
appeal.
Court said, the order that was subjected to the appeal
was interlocutory, because it does not dispose of the
case but leaves something else to be done by the trial
court on the merits of the case. It is obvious that an
interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal.
The proper remedy is an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
Clearly private respondent cannot appeal the order. But
neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because the
ejectment suit falls under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, Section 19 (g), which considers
petitions for certiorari as a prohibited pleading.
Under an extraordinary circumstance of having to
suffer a procedural void, the court is forced to provide
a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy
resolution of cases.
As held by the CA, the purpose of the Rules on
Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases without regard to
technical rules. In this case, however respondent
challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit
to avoid mischief that may emanate therefrom.
SC hold that in situation where summary proceeding is
indefinitely suspended, a petition for certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion may be allowed.
Respondents, herein, filed an appeal questioning the
interlocutory order. This move of the respondents was
upheld by the CA and RTC to fill a “procedural void”.
SC affirms this ruling. The said appeal should be
treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The court said that whenever a “procedural void”
exists, no remedy is sanctioned by law. The court is
empowered to promulgate rules according to Section 5,
Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution, categorically rules
of procedure. The courts are even onligated to suspend
the operation of the rules when a rule “deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice that it frustrates rather than
promote substantial justice. The power of the court to
suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from
their operations whenever the purposes of justice
require it, cannot be questioned.
TITLE: Republic of the Philippines and National
Power Corporation vs. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation
G.R. NO.: 194880 DATE: June 30, 2012
PONENTE: Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno
DOCTRINE: The mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg.
129 is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases subject of summary
procedure. To achieve this, rules like Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure were created to
bar petitions for relief from judgment, or petitions for
certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court in order to avoid
what former Chief Justice Panganiban calls a “sorry
spectacle” of a “counterproductive ping pong” every
time a party is aggrieved by an interlocutory order.
FACTS: Petitioners Republic and NAPOCOR are
registered co-owners of a parcel of land which they
leased to the Technology Resource Center Foundation,
Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years ending on
December 31, 2002. The TRCFI was given the right to
sublease this land, which it did, to Sunvar, through
sublease agreements with the common provision that
their sublease agreements were going to expire on
December 31, 2002, the date that the TRCFI’s lease
agreements with the petitioners would expire.
In 1987, when the government was reorganized, the
TCFRI was replaced with the Philippine Development
Alternatives Foundation (PDAF). Before the expiration
date, Sunvar wrote to PDAF and expressed its desire to
renew the sublease over the subject property and
proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period
of another 25 years. PDAF forwarded the letter to
petitioners. By June 25, 2002, PDAF had informed
Sunvar of petitioners’ decisions not to renew the lease.
When the lease contract and the sublease
agreements expired, petitioners recovered all the rights
over the subject property. Nevertheless, respondent
Sunvar continued to occupy the property.
Six years after the expiry date, petitioner Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
advised respondent Sunvar to vacate the subject
property. Although Sunvar duly received the Notice, it
did not vacate the property. Almost a year after the first
notice, respondent Sunvar received from respondent
OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days. When the
period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to
vacate the property.
Petitioners then filed a Complaint for unlawful
detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City. Sunvar moved to dismiss the complaint,
questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC as the action
was supposed to an accion publiciana rather than one
for unlawful detainer. The MeTC denied respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration and required Sunvar to submit their
Answer.
Despite filing an Answer, Sunvar still filed a Rule
65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City
to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss. To answer this petition, petitioner’s
questioned the RTC’s jurisdiction and prayed for the
outright dismissal of the petition. The RTC denied the
motion for dismissal and granted the Rule 65 Petition,
directing the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for
unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Did the RTC violate the Rules on Summary
Procedure when it took cognizance and granted the
certiorari petition filed by Sunvar?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
The RTC should have dismissed Sunvar’s
petition outright for being a prohibited
pleading.
 Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a
certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an
interlocutory order issued by the court in a
summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.
 According to former Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban, the proper remedy in such cases is
an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment
on the merits incorporating in said appeal the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders
would result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case
being subject of a counterproductive ping pong
to and from the appellate court as often as a trial
court is perceived to have made an error in any
of its interlocutory rulings.
 The Court mentioned only two cases in which
they allowed exceptions to this rule1 and since
Sunvar could not substantiate its claims of
extraordinary circumstances that would allow
those same exceptions to apply to his case, the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 remains,
for him, a prohibited pleading.
 If the Court were to relax the interpretation of
the prohibition against the filing of certiorari
petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with
similar prayers from adversely affected parties
questioning every order of the lower court and
completely dispensing with the goal of
summary proceedings in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer suits.
De Lima v. Gatdula
Short Version:
The judge in this case required an Answer (instead of a
Return) from De Lima et al and did not follow the
correct procedure in issuing the writ and privilege of
Writ of Amparo.
1
Bayog vs. Natino where the Court gave due course to an appeal from an
interlocutory order lest “grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him
through no fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated” and Go vs.
Facts:
 On February 27, 2012, respondent Magtanggol
B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila (In the
Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP
No. 12-127405) The case was raffled to Judge
Pampilo, Jr. on the same day
 The Amparo was directed against petitioners De
Lima et al. Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al “to
cease and desist from framing him up for the
fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of
Frusrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to
the alleged ambush incident”
 Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ
of Amparo, the judge issued summons and
ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He
also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012.
The hearing was held allegedly for determining
whether a temporary protection order may be
issued. During that hearing, counsel for De
Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an
Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases
 In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge
Pampilo insisted that “[s]ince no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading
but answer.” The judge noted that the Rules of
Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He
opined that
 Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing
on the main case on 7 March 2012.10 Even
without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the
parties to file their respective memoranda
within five (5) working days after that hearing.
Since the period to file an Answer had not yet
lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the
memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed
in lieu of their Answer
 On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a
“Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim
reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary
protection, production and inspection orders.
The production and inspection orders were in
relation to the evidence and reports involving
an on-going investigation of the attempted
assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It
is not clear from the records how these pieces
of evidence may be related to the alleged threat
to the life, liberty or security of the respondent
Gatdula.
 RTC denied MR filed by De Lima, et al
 De Lima, et al thus came to the SC assailing
the March 20 RTC Decision via Rule 45.
Court of Appeals where the Court was confronted with a “procedural void” in the
Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a Rule 65
Petition in the RTC. Details in the full text.
ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Amparo can be executed
and reviewed – No. RTC committed several procedural
errors on issuing the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
RATIO:
 Writ of Amparo (See Notes)
 The Decision dated 20 March could not be the
judgment ro ginal order that is appealable under
Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amapro. This
Decision pertained to the issuance of the writ,
not the judgment.
 Irregularities in the RTC procedues:
1. The insistence on filing of an Answer
was inappropriate. It is the Return that
serves as the responsive pleading for
petitions for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo.
 The requirement to file an Answer is
contrary to the intention of the Court
to provide a speedy remedy to those
whose right to life, liberty and
security are violated or are
threatened to be violated.
 A writ of Amparo is a special
proceeding. It is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a
right or particular fact. It is not a
civil nor a criminal action, hence,
the application of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure is seriously
misplaced.
2. The holding of a hearing on the main
case prior to the issuance of the writ and
the filing of a Return. Without a Return,
the issues could not have been properly
joined.
3. The court required a memorandum in
lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer)
of De Lima, et al
 The Return in Amparo cases allows
the respondents to frame the issues
subject to a hearing. Hence, it
should be done prior to the hearing,
not after.
 A memorandum, on the other hand,
is a synthesis of the claims of the
party litigants and is a final pleading
usually required before the case is
submitted for decision.
 One cannot substitute for the other
since these submissions have
different functions in facilitating the
suit.
 A memorandum is a prohibited
pleading under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo
 The privilege of the Writ of Amparo is
different from the actual order called the Writ
of Amparo
 The privilege includes availment of
the entire procedure outline in the
Rule on the Writ of Mparo
 After examining the petition and its
attached affidavits, the Return and
the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment
should detail the required acts from
the respondents that will mitigate, if
not totally eradicate, the violation of
or the threat to the petitioner’s life,
liberty or security.
 A judgment which simply grants the
“privilege of the writ” cannot be
executed.
 Petition for Review – not the proper remedy.
Petition for Certitorari is prohibited. However,
simply dismissing the present petition will
cause grave injustice to the parties involved.
 The rules can be suspended on the
following grounds: (1) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property, (2)
the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (3) the
merits of the case, (4) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules, (5) a
lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (6) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a
prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the trial
court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article
VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court
RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this
Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after
respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-
eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution
whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper
on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal
service of this Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo,
Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that
further deviation or improvisation from the procedure
set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted with severe
consequences.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
NATURE OF THE REMEDY OF AMPARO
 The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an
equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution
 It was issued as an exercise of the Supreme
Court’s power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights
 Aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances
PROCESS:
 Initiated through a petition to be filed in RTC,
Sandiganbayan, CA, or the SC
o The judge or justice then makes an
“immediate evaluation” of the facts as
alleged in the petition and affidavits
submitted “with the attendant
circumstances detailed.”
 After evaluation, the judge has the option to
issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately
dismiss the case.
o Dismissal if the petition and the
supporting affidavits do not show that
the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or
security is under threat or the acts
complained of are not unlawful
o The issuance of the writ itself sets in
motion presumptive judicial protection
for the petitioner. The court compels the
respondents to appear before a court of
law to show whether the grounds for
more permanent protection and interim
reliefs are necessary.
 The respondents are required to file a Return
after the issuance of the writ through the clerk
of court.
o The Return serves as the responsive
pleading to the petition.
o Unlike an Answer, the Return has other
purposes aside from identifying the
issues in the case. Respondents are also
required to detail the actions they had
taken to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party
o If the respondents are public officials or
employees, they are also required to
state the actions they had taken to: (i)
verify the identity of the aggrieved
party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence
related to the death or disappearance of
the person identified in the petition; (iii)
identify witnesses and obtain statements
concerning the death or disappearance;
(iv) determine the cause, manner,
location, and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about
the death or disappearance; and (v)
bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court . These information are
important, so that the judge can
calibrate the means and methods that
will be required to further the
protections, if any, that will be due to
the petitioner.
 There will be a summary hearing only after
the Return is filed to determine the merits of the
petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing
will be done ex parte
 After the hearing, the court will render the
judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision.
o If the allegations are proven with
substantial evidence, the court shall
grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate.
o The judgment should contain measures
which the judge views as essential for
the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case. These
measures must be detailed enough so
that the judge may be able to verify and
monitor the actions taken by the
respondents.
o It is this judgment that could be subject
to appeal to the SC via Rule 45.
 After measures have served their purpose, the
judgment will be satisfied.
o In Amparo cases, this is when the threats
to the petitioner’s life, liberty and
security cease to exist as evaluated by
the court that renders the judgment
o The case may also be terminated
through consolidation should a
subsequent case be filed – either
criminal or civil.
PRUDENTIAL BANK AS DULY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF ESTATE OF JULIANA
DIEZ VDA. DE GABRIEL v. AMADOR A.
MAGDAMIT, GR No. 183795, 2014-11-12
Facts:
This is a case of unlawful detainer filed by petitioner
Prudential Bank, now Bank of the Philippine Islands
(petitioner), in its capacity as administrator of the
Estate of Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel (Estate). It is
based on the ground of respondents' failure to pay...
rentals and refusal to vacate the subject property, which
is allegedly part of the Estate
In the Original Complaint[4] filed before the MeTC,
Branch 15 of Manila, petitioner impleaded Amador A.
Magdamit, Jr. (Magdamit, Jr.), as respondent.
Instead of filing an Answer, Magdamit, Jr. filed a
Notice of Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss.
In an Order[5] dated 26 June 2003, the MeTC granted
petitioner's Motion to Strike Out Magdamit, Jr.'s Notice
of Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss and
ordered Magdamit, Jr. to file an Answer
In response to the Amended Complaint, both
Magdamit, Jr. and Magdamit, Sr. filed their Answers
separately. On 9 July 2003, Magdamit, Jr., filed his
Answer with Counterclaim[7] (In a Special
Appearance Capacity). On the other hand, Magdamit,
Sr. filed... his Answer[8] on 13 November 2003.
Magdamit, Sr. argued that the MeTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person because the summons was
not properly served as the summons was received by
Madel Magalona, who is not authorized to receive
summons being a... mere housemaid of Magdamit, Sr.'s
daughter, Arleen Marie Cabug. Also, Magdamit, Sr.
After trial, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
According to the MeTC, "[t]he fact that the person who
received the summons was a 13-year old girl does not
make the service of summons invalid. That she was of
sufficient age and discretion is shown by the fact that
she was... intelligent enough to immediately bring to
the attention of defendant Atty. Amador Magdamit, Jr.
the summons and copy of the complaint she
received."[10] The MeTC went on further, stating that
Magdamit Sr.'s claim of ownership is beyond its
jurisdiction... because the only issue in an ejectment
case is "possession defacto"... the RTC set aside the
decision of the MeTC and dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents.[12]
According to the RTC, amending the original
complaint to implead Magdamit, Sr. to cure a defect in
the complaint... and introduce a non-existing cause of
action, which petitioner did not possess at the outset,
and to confer jurisdiction upon the court that never
acquired jurisdiction in the first place renders the
complaint dismissible. The RTC further stated that
because the Return did not... clearly indicate the
impossibility of service of summons within a
reasonable time upon the respondents, the process
server's resort to substituted service of summons was
unjustified. The decision of the RTC reads:
Issues: whether or not the MeTC acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the respondents.
Ruling: Filing an Answer does not amount to...
voluntary appearance
The petitioner asserted that assuming arguendo that the
service of summons was defective, respondents' filing
of their respective Answers and participation in the
proceedings in the MeTC, such as attending the pre-
trial and presenting evidence, amount to voluntary...
appearance which vested the MeTC jurisdiction over
their persons.
Indeed, despite lack of valid service of summons, the
court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance.
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court clearly states:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary...
appearance.
However, such is not the case at bar. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, respondents are not deemed to
have voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction by
virtue of filing an Answer or other appropriate
responsive pleadings and by participating in the case.
The mandate under the Rules on Summary Proceedings
that govern ejectment cases, is expeditious
administration of justice such that the filing of an
Answer is mandatory. To give effect to the mandatory
character and speedy disposition of cases, the
defendant is required to file... an answer within ten (10)
days from service of summons, otherwise, the court,
motu proprio, or upon motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint, limited to the relief prayed for
by the petitioner.[32] Through this rule, the parties are
precluded from resorting to dilatory maneuvers.
Compliantly, respondents filed their respective
Answers. In the MeTC, at first, Magdamit, Jr. filed a
Notice of Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss,
where he seasonably raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, which the MeTC later ordered to be
stricken out. In lieu... thereof, Magdamit, Jr. filed an
Answer with Counterclaim (In a Special Appearance
Capacity). Again, Magdamit, Jr. reiterated the lack of
jurisdiction over his person and the subject matter. On
the other hand, Magdamit, Sr. filed an Answer with an
allegation by special defense... that the original
complaint should be dismissed outright because the
MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and
the subject matter. In sum, both respondents filed their
Answers via special appearance.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy,[33] we
held that filing of an answer in a special appearance
cannot be construed as voluntary appearance or
submission to the court's jurisdiction:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil
case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have...
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason
of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that
the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for...
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to
the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by
the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party
who makes a special appearance to challenge, among
others, the court's jurisdiction over his... person cannot
be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1)
Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2)
Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant must be explicitly
made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3)
Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where
a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed
and submitted to the court for resolution.[34]
(Emphasis supplied and underscoring supplied)
Parallel to our ruling in Philippine Commercial
International Bank, the respondents' act of filing their
respective Answers with express reservation should not
be construed as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of
the MeTC over their person because of... non-
service/defective/improper service of summons and for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, sans
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction, filing
an answer in compliance with the rules on summary
procedure in lieu of obtaining an adverse summary...
judgment does not amount to voluntary submission. As
we already held, a party who makes a special
appearance in court, challenging the jurisdiction of said
court, is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.[35] It should not be...
construed as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 93368, which upheld the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court that the Metropolitan Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 174798 did not acquire jurisdiction
over... the person of the respondents due to invalid
service of summons, are AFFIRMED.
“x x x.
Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction over a
defendant in a civil case is acquired either through
service of summons or through voluntary appearance
in court and submission to its authority. In the absence
or when the service of summons upon the person of the
defendant is defective, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered
against him is null and void.19
In actions in personam such as ejectment, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
through personal or substituted service of summons.
However, because substituted service is in derogation
of the usual method of service and personal service of
summons is preferred over substituted service, parties
do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted
service of summons.20 Before substituted service of
summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate
the impossibility of personal service of summons
within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted
to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons
was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in
charge of the office or regular place of business of the
defendant.21
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,22 we have succinctly
discussed a valid resort to substituted service of
summons:
We can break down this section into the following
requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff
must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or
there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule
14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a
"reasonable time" to serve the summons to the
defendant in person, but no specific time frame is
mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much
time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that
should be done, having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any, to the other party." Under the
Rules, the service of summons has no set period.
However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff
asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and
the latter submits the return of summons, then the
validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then
ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has
failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to
effect a personal service in order to demonstrate
impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff,
"reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days
since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what
a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time"
means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it
is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the
sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to
the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides
data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office
of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days
of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the
issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable
time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the
service of summons with due care, utmost diligence,
and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to
prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus,
they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish
personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since
the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade
service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process
on the defendant. For substituted service of summons
to be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period [of one month] which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In
addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of
service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons
the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant
and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of
the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to
locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other
acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of
Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the
Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine
Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the fact of
failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5
dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the failure of
such efforts," which should be made in the proof of
service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s
house or residence, it should be left with a person of
"suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A
person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and
is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion"
is defined as "the ability to make decisions which
represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such
person must know how to read and understand English
to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully
realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint
to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the
person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person
must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant,
ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be
notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of
the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters
must be clearly and specifically described in the Return
of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s
office or regular place of business, then it should be
served on a competent person in charge of the place.
Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will
be made must be the one managing the office or
business of defendant, such as the president or
manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the
defendant in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. Again, these details must be contained in the
Return.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
The service of summons on Magdamit, Sr. failed to
comply with the rule laid down in Manotoc. The resort
to substituted service after just two (2) attempts to
personally serve the summons on Magdamit, Sr., is
premature under our pronouncement that:
What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect
a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility
of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable
time"means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a
plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means
15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to require the
sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to
the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides
data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office
of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days
of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the
issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable
time" with regard to personal service on the
defendant.24
Then too, the proof of service failed to specify the
details of the attendant circumstances. The Return
merely expressed a general statement that because the
Sheriff failed to reach Magdamit, Sr., he elected
substituted service of summons. The Return failed to
state the impossibility to serve summons within a
reasonable time. And the further defect in the service
was that the summons was served on a person not of
sufficient discretion, an incompetent person, Madel
Magalona, a housemaid of Magdamit Sr.’s daughter,
Arleen Marie Cabug.

Similar to the case of Magdamit, Sr., the service of
summons on Magdamit, Jr. also failed to comply with
the rules laid down in Manotoc. The summons was
served at 1163 Int., J. Nakpil St., Paco, Manila,
Magdamit, Jr.’s former residence when at the time,
Magdamit, Jr. was residing at 0369 Jupiter St.,
Progressive Village 20 and 21, Molino I, Bacoor,
Cavite. In Keister v. Navarro,25 we have defined
"dwelling house" or "residence" to refer to a place
where the person named in the summons is living at the
time when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time to the time of
service. Therefore, it is not sufficient for the Sheriff "to
leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling house,
residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after
his removal therefrom".26
Worse, the Return did not make mention of any attempt
to serve the summons at the actual residence of
Magdamit, Jr. The Return merely expressed a general
statement that the sheriff exerted efforts to serve the
summons and that the same was futile, "[t]hat on
several occasions despite deligent (sic) efforts exerted
to serve the said processes personally to defendant/s
herein the same proved futile," without any statement
on the impossibility of service of summons within a
reasonable time. Further, the summons was served on
a certain Dara Cabug, a person not of suitable age and
discretion, who is unauthorized to receive the same.
Notably, the requirement additionally is that:
Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must
know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully
realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint
to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the
person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person
must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant,
ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be
notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of
the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it tothe defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters
must be clearly and specifically described in the Return
of Summons.27
The readily acceptable conclusion in this case is that
the process server at once resorted to substituted
service of summons without exerting enough effort to
personally serve summons on respondents. In Sps. Jose
v. Sps. Boyon,28 we discussed the effect of failure to
specify the details of the effort exerted by the process
server to personally serve summons upon the
defendants:
The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually
exerted and no positive step taken by either the process
server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons
personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely
states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without
indicating that such information was verified from a
person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without
specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or
of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general
statement that such efforts were made will not suffice
for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted
service of summons.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the case at bar, the Returns contained mere general
statements that efforts at personal service were made.
Not having specified the details of the attendant
circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the
summons,30 there was a failure to comply strictly with
all the requirements of substituted service, and as a
result the service of summons is rendered
ineffective.31
Filing an Answer does not amount to voluntary
appearance
The petitioner asserted that assuming arguendo that the
service of summons was defective, respondents’ filing
of their respective Answers and participation in the
proceedings in the MeTC, such as attending the pre-
trial and presenting evidence, amount to voluntary
appearance which vested the MeTC jurisdiction over
their persons.
Indeed, despite lack of valid service of summons, the
court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary
appearance. Section 20, Rule14 of the Rules of Court
clearly states:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
However, such is not the case at bar. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, respondents are not deemed to
have voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by
virtue of filing an Answer or other appropriate
responsive pleadings and by participating in the case.
The mandate under the Rules on Summary Proceedings
that govern ejectment cases, is expeditious
administration of justice such that the filing of an
Answer is mandatory. To give effect to the mandatory
character and speedy disposition of cases, the
defendant is required to file an answer within ten (10)
days from service of summons, otherwise, the court,
motu proprio, or upon motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint, limited to the relief prayed for
by the petitioner.32 Through this rule, the parties are
precluded from resorting to dilatory maneuvers.
Compliantly, respondents filed their respective
Answers. In the MeTC, at first, Magdamit, Jr. filed a
Notice of Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss,
where he seasonably raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, which the MeTC later ordered to be
stricken out. In lieu thereof, Magdamit, Jr. filed an
Answer with Counterclaim (In a Special Appearance
Capacity). Again, Magdamit, Jr. reiterated the lack of
jurisdiction over his person and the subject matter. On
the other hand, Magdamit, Sr. filed an Answer with an
allegation by special defense that the original
complaint should be dismissed outright because the
MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and
the subject matter. In sum, both respondents filed their
Answers via special appearance.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy,33 we held
that filing of an answer in a special appearance cannot
be construed as voluntary appearance or submission to
the court’s jurisdiction:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil
case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this
rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing
of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration,
is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept
of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes
a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant must be
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and
1.
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
2.
where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief
is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.34
(Emphasis supplied and underscoring supplied)
Parallel to our ruling in Philippine Commercial
Held:
International Bank, the respondents’ act of filing their
1. Yes. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
respective Answers with express reservation should not
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
be construed as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of
the MeTC over their person because of non-
service/defective/improper service of summons and for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, sans
voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction, filing
an answer in compliance with the rules on summary
procedure in lieu of obtaining an adverse summary
judgment does not amount to voluntary submission. As
we already held, a party who makes a special
appearance in court, challenging the jurisdiction of said
court, is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.35 It should not be construed
as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Fairland Knitcraft Corporation v. Arturo Loo Po
G.R. No. 217694 January 27, 2016
Unlawful Detainer
Facts:
 Fairland alleged it was the owner of a condominium
unit in Cedar Mansion II in Pasig City. The said
unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal
agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000 a month.
 Po continuously failed to pay rent. Thus, Fairland
opted not to renew the lease agreement anymore.
 Fairland sent a formal letter to Po demanding he
pay P220,000, representing the rental arrears, and
that he vacate the leased premises within 15 days
from receipt of the letter.
 Despite receipt and the lapse of the said 15-day
period, Po neither tendered payment nor vacated
the premises. Thus, Fairland filed the complaint
for unlawful detainer before the MeTC.
 Po failed to file an answer within the
reglementary period (within 10 days from
service of summons). Thus, Fairland filed a
motion to render judgment and the MeTC
considered the case submitted for decision.
 The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit due to Fairland’s failure to prove its claim
by preponderance of evidence.
 Fairland appealed, claiming that an unlawful
detainer case was a special civil action governed by
summary procedure. Thus, in cases where a
defendant failed to file his answer, judgment
should be based on the facts alleged in the
complaint, and there was no requirement that
judgment must be based on facts proved by
preponderance of evidence.
 The RTC and CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not Fairland’s complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer – Yes.
Whether or not the MeTC correctly rendered judgment,
upon Po’s failure to file an answer on time, based solely
on the complaint without the need to consider the
weight of evidence – Yes.
 following: (1) initially, possession of the property by
the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became
illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of
the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and (4) within 1 year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.
There is no question that the complaint filed by
Fairland adequately alleged a cause of action for
unlawful detainer.2
The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently
alleged that Fairland was the owner of the subject
property being leased to Po by virtue of an oral
agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po
to pay rent and vacate before the complaint for
unlawful detainer was instituted. The complaint
was seasonably filed within the one-year period
prescribed by law. With all the elements present,
there was clearly a cause of action in the complaint
for unlawful detainer.
2. Yes. Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the
weight of evidence is not considered when a
judgment is rendered based on the complaint.
Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the
defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the court,
motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited
to what is prayed for therein. x x x
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to
file his answer, the court shall render judgment,
either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based
solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the
defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert the
claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every
allegation stated in the complaint.
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70, if the defendant
fails to answer the complaint within the period
provided, the court has no authority to declare the
defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu
2 The pertinent portion of the complaint reads:
xxx
3. Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the defendant, the premises
mentioned above as the residence of the latter;
4. There is no current written lease contract between plaintiff and the defendant,
but the latter agreed to pay the former the amount of P20,000 as rent at the
beginning of each month. Thus, the term of the lease agreement is renewable
on a month-to-month basis;
proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint
despite proper service of summons. He also failed to
provide a sufficient justification to excuse his lapses.
Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be
rendered by the court as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint.
To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time,
judgment shall be rendered based only on the complaint
of Fairland without the need to consider the weight of
evidence. Consequently, there is no more need to
present evidence to establish the allegation of Fairland
of its ownership and superior right of possession over
the subject property. Po’s failure to file an answer
constitutes an admission of his illegal occupation due
to his non-payment of rentals, and of Fairland’s rightful
claim of material possession. Thus, judgment must be
rendered finding that Fairland has the right to eject Po
from the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO VACATE
Condominium Unit No. 205 located in Cedar Mansion
II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.
Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the
rentals-in-arrears, as well as the rentals accruing in the
interim until he vacates the property.
5. Since March 2011, defendant has not been paying the aforesaid rent despite
plaintiff’s repeated demands;
6. Due to defendant’s continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff reached a decision
not to renew the lease agreement. It sent a formal letter, x x x demanding
defendant to pay the amount of Php220,000.00, representing defendant’s twelve
month rental arrears beginning January 2011, and to vacate the leased
premises, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said letter;
7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of the fifteen day
period given to comply with plaintiff’s demand, defendant neither tendered
payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the leased premises. Worse, defendant
has not been paying rent up to now;