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XI. Hearsay Rule

McCormick:
 Historical background of the rule…
 Factors upon which the credibility of the testimony depends are:
1) Perception: Did the witness perceive what he describes and did he perceive it accurately?
2) Memory: Has the witness retained an accurate impression of his perception?
3) Narration: Does his language convey that impression accurately?
 Some writers divide “narration” into “ambiguity” and “sincerity”
 McCormick’s view: ambiguity, insincerity and honest mistake are just manifestations of inaccurate narration
 Three conditions under which witness ordinarily will be required to testify:
1) Oath
2) Personal presence at the trial
3) Cross-examination
 RATIONALE FOR THE RULE: Designed to insure compliance with the aforementioned ideal conditions, and when one of them is absent
and hearsay objection becomes pertinent.
 WHAT EXACTLY IS HEARSAY SITUATION? There are two witnesses are involved.
1) First witness: complies with all the ideal conditions for the giving of the testimony, BUT his testimony consists of reporting
what the second witness said.
2) Second witness: out-of-court declarant, ergo, his statement was not given in compliance with the ideal conditions, YET it
contains the information that is of concern in the case

Oath
 Out-of-court declarant who made the hearsay statement commonly speaks or writes without the solemnity of the oath administered to
witnesses in a court of law.
 RATIONALE: As a ceremonial and religious symbol, it may induce in the witness a feeling of special obligation to speak the truth and also,
it may impress upon the witness the danger of criminal punishment for perjury, to which the judicial oath or an equivalent solemn
affirmation would be a prerequisite condition.
 Wigmore: “objection for want of oath”  incidental and not essential and suggests that this is demonstrated by the fact that a hearsay
statement, even if under oath, is still rejected.
 Not the only requirement ≠ not important requirement

Personal Presence at the Trial

 Lack of opportunity for observation of his demeanor, with the light that this may shed on his credibility that would be afforded if he were
a witness on the stand.
 RATIONALE:
1) The solemnity of the occasion and possibility of public disgrace can scarcely fail to impress the witness.
2) Falsehood no doubt becomes more difficult if the person against whom it is directed is present.
3) Personal presence eliminates the danger that in the oral reporting of an out-of-court statement the witness reporting the
statement may do so inaccurately.
 Wigmore: “not all hearsay statements is subject to the danger of inaccuracy”  in the case of written statements which can be produced
in court and can be tested with reasonable accuracy for genuineness and freedom from alteration.
 Morgan: Reporting in court of spoken words for non-hearsay purposes (e.g. proving the making of an oral contract OR the utterance of
slander, is subject to the same risk of misreporting.
 HOWEVER, no distinction in general is made between WRITTEN and SPOKEN hearsay.

Cross-Examination
 Main justification for the rule in the modern world
 RATIONALE: Lack of opportunity for the adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is reported by
the witness.
 Bentham: Cross-examination was a distinctive feature of the English trial system. One which most contributed to the prestige of the
institution of jury trial. He called it a “security for the correctness and completeness of testimony”

DEFINITION OF HEARSAY
From Federal Rules of Evidence 801:
 “Statement” [1] oral or written assertion OR [2] non-verbal conduct of a person, IF it is intended by the person as an assertion
 “Declarant” - a person who makes a statement
 “Hearsay” - a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.

Out-of-court utterances which are not hearsay

1. Verbal acts
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2. Verbal part of acts

3. Utterances and writings offered to show effect on hearer or reader
4. Indirect versions of hearsay statements and group statements
5. Reputation – hearsay only when offered to prove the truth of the fact reputed and hence depending for its value on the veracity of the
collective asserters
6. Prior statements of witnesses and admissions of party opponents

Conduct as hearsay
1. Non-verbal conduct
2. So-called “implied assertions”
3. Silence as hearsay

Prior statements of witnesses as substantive evidence

Laurence Tribe’s Triangulating Hearsay:



RAV says:
 What makes hearsay hearsay? If it is offered “for the truth of the matter asserted therein” aka FOTOMAT

A. Testimonial Knowledge

Rule 130, Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge. – A witness can testify ONLY to those facts which he knows of his
“personal knowledge”; that is, which are derived from his own perception, EXCEPT as otherwise provided in these rules.

Regalado:
 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its PROBATIVE VALUE is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness
but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand.
 RATIONALE: Party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the persons to whom the
statements or writings are attributed.
 If a party does not object to the hearsay evidence, the same is admissible, as a party can waive his right to cross-examine
 REPEATED FAILURE OF A PARTY TO CROSS-EXAMINE: implied waiver of such right and the testimony of said witness who died thereafter
should not be excluded from the record.
 Standing alone, hearsay evidence is insufficient to establish a fact in issue BUT when no objection is interposed thereto, it is, like any
other evidence to be considered and given the importance it deserves. (Manliclic v Calaunan)
 Hearsay not objected to may be admissible BUT whether objected to or not, it has no probative value and as opposed to direct primary
evidence, the latter always prevails.
 SPECIAL EXCEPTION: Sec. 28 of Rule on Examination of Child Witness – Hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act
of sexual abuse is admissible in any criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the
adverse party.  Admissibility of the statements shall be determined by courts in light of specified subjective and objective
considerations which provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the witness.

People v. Brioso
(1971; JBL Reyes, J.)
People v. Cusi
(1965; Dizon, J.)
Murder; Silverio Daria was gunned by appellants Brioso and
Taeza. Suspected motive was the spouses’ disapproval of
Taeza for their daughter. Niece of wife (and neighbor)
witnessed the incident. Mario Taeza’s alibi was alleged
corroborated by Silverio’s son, Antonio’s affidavit. Court
rejected the affidavit.
ISSUE: WON Antonio’s affidavit is admissible? NO
Robbery in band with homicide; Sgt. Bano testified in court
about the extrajudicial confession of one of the accused
(Puesca) as to the names of his other co-conspirators. Defense
objected on the ground of hearsay. Judge directed the witness
to answer the question but without mentioning or giving the
names of the accused who had interposed the objection. In
other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question
and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the
objection.
ISSUE: WON the sergeant’s testimony is hearsay? NO
Affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants
themselves but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiants' statements, which may thus be either
committed or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this
reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants,
affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as
hearsay, UNLESS the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon
- While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement
made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of
the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
Chi’s interp: Not hearsay because he is testifying on what he
heard from the declarant, ergo testimony is based on personal
knowledge.
- The purpose of the prosecuting officer is nothing more than
to establish the fact that the accused had mentioned to Sgt.
Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit
the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement
or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent
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People v. Gaddi Murder; Witness de Guzman saw Gaddi and victim on a gin
(1989; Cortes, J.) drinking session. The following morning Gaddi allegedly told
witness that he killed victim and dumped him in a toilet pit.
ISSUE: WON Gaddi’s confession to de Guzman is hearsay? NO
Leake v. Hagert Damages; Hagert’s car collided with Allen Leake’s tractor and
(1970; Judge Paulson) plow causing damage to the latter. Investigator talked to
Leake’s son who said that the red lights on the rear were
missing some time prior to the accident.
Relevance of the red lights: it’s a material question of fact,
determinative as to the contributory negligence by Leake, and
compliance with the statutory standards requiring tractors to
operate with red lights at any time from ½ hour after sunset
to ½ before sunrise.
ISSUE: WON investigator’s report as to the son’s testimony is
hearsay? YES
U.S. v. Zenni While government agents were searching accused’s
(1980; Judge Bertelsman) apartment pursuant to a valid search warrant, they answered
many phone calls which asked them to place bets on sporting
events.  Prosecution wanted to introduce to evidence as
implied assertion that callers believed that accused’s place
was used for betting.  Defendant objects and argues that
these phone calls are hearsay.
ISSUE: Are the implied assertions admissible? YES
MR Estrada v Arroyo ISSUE: Assuming the Angara diaries were an out-of-court
(2001; Puno, J.) statement, WON it is in violation of the hearsay rule? NO
and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named
really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, the
question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter
should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the
understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken
as competent evidence to show that the persons named really
and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the
commission of the offense.
- A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is
supported by the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
- Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime
can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay
rule which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those
facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as
to those facts which he "knows of his own knowledge: that is,
which are derived from his own perception."
- Citing Pp v Cusi: While the testimony of a witness regarding
the statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the
fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement.
- When Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably
was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him,
there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was
testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal
knowledge; i.e. he was testifying to the fact that the Gaddi
told him that he stabbed Esguerra and NOT to the truth of
Gaddi's statement.
- The hearsay rule prohibits use of a person’s assertion, as
equivalent to testimony of the fact asserted, unless the
assertor is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he
may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his
assertion and his qualifications to make it.
- Leake’s son did not testify in the present action; he was not a
party to the action; his statement was not made under oath;
his statement was not subject to cross-examination; and he
was not available as a witness at the time of trial because he
was in the Army and overseas.
- It was error on the part of the trial court to permit the
admission of such hearsay evidence, but because other
competent testimony as to the same fact was admitted by
other evidence, the error would not be prejudicial unless the
admission of all of the field notes was deemed prejudicial and
constituted reversible error.
Even though under common law, implied assertions were
excluded, under Federal Rules, the matter is different.  Rule
801 excludes out-of-court statements and a statement is an
oral or written assertion or a nonverbal conduct of a person
intended by him as an assertion.  But here, the callers conduct
was not intended to make any assertions.  Therefore, these
calls don’t fall under the hearsay rule and are admissible.
Under the federal rules, implied assertions are treated as
hearsay and expressly abolished. Some nonverbal conduct is
clearly the equivalent of words, assertive in nature and to be
regarded as a statement. However, other non-verbal conduct
may be offered as evidence that the person acted as he did
because of his belief in the existence of the condition may be
inferred. The likelihood that evidence will be falsified is less
with nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct. Therefore,
801(a)(2) removes implied assertions from the definition of
statement and consequently from the operating of the
hearsay rule.
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends,
in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay
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evidence:
(1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor
evidence, and (3) absence of the oath.

B. Exceptions

 RATIONALE FOR EXCEPTIONS: Necessity for such evidence and/or the assumption that, in the ordinary course of events, the same are
trustworthy.
 NOT COVERED: Statements/writings of person not on the witness stand are being offered NOT to prove the TRUTH of facts stated therein
but only to prove that those statements were ACTUALLY MADE or those writings were EXECUTED.
1) RATIONALE: Because he heard the same or saw the execution of document, as these are matters of fact derived from his own
perception and the purpose is only to prove either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof.
 “Doctrine of independently relevant statements” – Independent of whether the facts stated are true or not, they are RELEVANT since
they are facts in issue OR are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.
 E.g. of “fact in issue”: A witness may testify to the statements made by a person if, for instance, the fact that such statements were made
by the latter would indicate the latter’s mental state or physical condition.
 E.g. of “circumstantial evidence of fact in issue”: (Resolution on MR Estrada v Desierto) Statements made by a person…
1) Showing his state of mind i.e. mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotion
2) Which show his physical condition e.g. illness
3) From which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another i.e. knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith
4) Which may identify the date, place and person in question
5) Showing the lack of the credibility of a witness
 Newspaper clippings or facts published in newspapers are hearsay and have no evidentiary value UNLESS substantiated by persons with
personal knowledge of said facts (People v Arguel)

1. Dying Declaration

Rule 130, Section 37. Dying declaration. – The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

Regalado:
 Also known as “ante mortem” statement or a statement in “articulo mortis”
 REQUISITES FOR THE ANTE MORTEM DECLARATION EXCEPTION TO APPLY:
1. Death is imminent
2. Declarant is conscious of the fact of imminent death
 It is the belief in impending death at the time the statement was made and not the rapid succession of death that
renders the dying declaration admissible. (Pp v Sabio)
 How do you know that the declarant is “conscious” of his imminent death? Consider…
a. words or statements of the declarant on the same occasion
b. conduct at the time the declaration was made
c. serious nature of his wounds as would necessarily engender a belief on his part that would not survive
therefrom, especially when he died an hour thereafter
 “I’d die if not treated” + died 1 hour later = Indicates awareness of death, ergo ante mortem statement (Pp v Antonio)
 “I cannot ascertain” + died the following day = Res gestae and ante mortem statement
 “It all depends” + progressively improved = Not ante mortem (Pp v Lanza)
3. The declaration refers to the CAUSE and SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES of such death
4. Declaration relates to the facts which the victim is competent to testify to
5. Declarant would have been competent witness had he survived
6. Declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of the inquiry
7. Declarant should have died
a. The intervening time from the making of the declaration up to the actual death is immaterial.
b. He should not have retracted his statement before he died
 After dying declaration is proved and admitted, credibility and weight should be determined by the courts under the same rules in testing
the weight and credibility of any other testimonial evidence. E.g. Dying declaration could have been blurred by the disorder and rapidity
of events
 Therefore, dying declaration must be accepted with utmost care and should be considered in light of all the facts proved in the case.
 Statements not admissible even if dying declaration:
1) Statements referring to antecedents of the fatal encounter
2) Opinions, impressions or conclusions of the declarant
 Form of dying declaration: may be oral, written OR made by signs which could be interpreted and testified to by a witness thereto
 How to rebut dying declaration?
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1) Any of the requisites for its admissibility are not present

2) Impeach in the same manner as the testimony of other witness on the stand

McCormick:


People v. Laquinon
(1985; Concepcion, Jr., J)
People v. Sabio
(1981; Melencio-Herrera, J.)
People v. Salison
(1996; Regalado, J.)
Murder; Ante mortem statement of Pablo Remonde, made to
barrio captain, that he was allegedly shot by KM members
because he was suspected as an informer.
ISSUE: WON victim’s statement is admissible as ante mortem
statement? NO, but admissible as res gestae
Robbery with homicide; Victim was a single octogenarian sari-
sari store owner. He identified to the police that Sabio was his
attacker and then died three days later at the hospital.
Defense’s argument: No evidence showing that when the
declaration was uttered the declarant was under a
consciousness of an impending death; that, in fact, the victim
had hopes of recovery or his first word to his rescuing
grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police.
ISSUE: WON the ante mortem statement is admissible? YES
Murder; Victim and his parents sought the help of the purok
leader who wrote down the statements of the victim before
he died the following day.
Defense:
- The written statement, which was reduced into writing by
witness Patricia Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying
declaration, is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the
Cebuano regional language and was not accompanied with a
translation in English or Pilipino.
- It was not made by the deceased “under the consciousness
of an impending death.”
ISSUE: WON the written agreement is admissible as ante
mortem statement? YES
“Where the victim, when asked as to whether he thought he
would die, replied “I don’t know” his declaration was NOT
MADE under the consciousness of his imminent death and
DOES NOT QUALIFY as an ante mortem statement, although
the same was admitted as part of the res gestae since it was
made immediately after the incident.”
- The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is
NOT ADMISSIBLE as an ante-mortem declaration since the
deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not.
The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed
himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope
of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this
kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." 
“It is the belief in impending death at the time the statement
was made and not the rapid succession of death that renders
the dying declaration admissible.”
- The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which
had affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the
victim's inability to speak until his head was raised; the
spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is
responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise from
the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen
the conclusion that the victim must have known that his end
was inevitable.
- That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration
was made will not alter its probative force since it is not
indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter.
- The fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo to
fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of
hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the
realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to
the authorities.
- The mere failure of the police to confront the accused with
the ante mortem declaration the first time the latter was
arrested and incarcerated from October 5 to October 6, 1965,
neither militates against the fact of its execution considering
that it was evidence that the police was under no compulsion
to disclose.
- SC agrees with SolGen’s position: “The records do not
disclose that the defense offered any objection to the
admission of the declaration. Thus, the defense waived
whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its
submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into
English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and
forms part of the record.”
- At the time the deceased made the declaration he was in
great pain. He expressed a belief on his imminent death and
the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence
regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say
so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify
against his assailants.
- At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a
dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae,
since it was made shortly after the startling incident and,
under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to
contrive.
- While such statement was given, as in the nature of things
they are generally in oral form, they are not thereby rendered
inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of
signs. If the declarations have thereafter been reduced to
writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is generally
held to be the best evidence, and it must be produced.
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2. Declaration Against Interest

Rule 130, Section 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased OR unable to testify, AGAINST the INTEREST of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the declaration UNLESS he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself OR his successors
in interest AND against third persons.

Regalado:
 Distinguish between “admissions against interest” AND “declarations against interest”
ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
Made by a party to a litigation OR by one in privity with or Made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a
identified in legal interest with such a party party to the suit
Admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a Admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness
witness
Used only against person admitting and those identified with Used even against third persons
him in legal interest

 REQUISITES FOR THE DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST EXCEPTION TO APPLY:

1. Declarant is dead OR unable to testify
2. Relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant  covers all kinds of interests
3. At the time he made said declaration, the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest
4. Declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true
 Opposite of a “self-serving declaration” i.e. statement favorable to or intended to advance the interests of the declarant; inadmissible as
being hearsay IF declarant is unavailable as witness

McCormick:
 Two main requirements
1) Declaration must state facts that are against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant OR the making of the
declaration itself must create evidence that would harm such interest
2) The declarant must be unavailable at the time of trial
3) MINOR QUALIFICATION: interest involved must not be too indirect or remote
 Rationale?
1) People generally do not lightly make statements that are damaging to their interest  safeguard of special trustworthiness
justifying most of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
2) Historical development
 Difference between “admissions against interest” and “declarations against interest”
ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
Not necessary that it be against the interest of the party Must be against the interest of the declarant (as opposed to
making the admission; may be self-serving “self-serving”)
Person admitting is dead OR alive Declarant must be dead or unable to testify
Personal knowledge NOT required Personal knowledge required
 What kind of interest?
1)
 Determining what is against interest; confrontation problems
1) Time aspect – harm must exist at the time the statement is made; otherwise it can exert no influence on declarant to speak
accurately and truthfully
2) Nature of statement
3) Factual setting
4) Motive: Actual state of mind of declarant

People v. Majuri Parricide; Muslim fugitive stabbed his infidel wife and admitted
(1980; Aquino, J.) the commission of the crime to Sgt. Majuri pleaded guilty. On
automatic review at the SC.
Defense’s argument: Marriage was not indubitably proven.
ISSUE: WON the defense’s argument stands in view of the
adverse declarations made by the defendant? NO
People v. Toledo Homicide; Duel between Holgado and Toledo over a land
(1928; Malcolm, J.) dispute. Morales died right away but Holgado died only a month
later. Toledo, Holgado’s servant, intervened in the fight and
- The testimony of the accused that he was married to the
deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was a
confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and
the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage"
- He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his
testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the deceased
was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her
infidelity, her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of
their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their
marital status.
Reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary to
their penal interest.
 Page 7 of 28

delivered the fatal blow to Morales. Holgado executed an

affidavit admitting his participation in the duel.
Fuentes v. CA Murder; Victim was stabbed in a dance, before he died he was
(1996; Bellosillo, J.) able to utter his attacker’s name, i.e. Fuentes. Fuentes’ cousin
Zoilo admitted that he was the one who attacked the victim.
However he was able to flee before he got arrested.
ISSUE: WON Zoilo’s confession is an admission against penal
interest? NO
- Toledo ruling on declaration of third parties is not in point.
- EXCEPTION does not apply. Declarant Zoilo is not “unable to
testify.” There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38
obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction
does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule.

3. Pedigree

Rule 130, Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. – The act or declaration of a person deceased, OR unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, AND the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word “pedigree” includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives. It embraces also fact
of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

Regalado:
 REQUISITES FOR THE ACT/DECLARATION ON PEDIGREE EXCEPTION TO APPLY:
1. Actor/declarant is dead OR unable to testify
2. Act/declaration is made by a person related to subject by birth or marriage
- Rules does not require any specific degree of relationship, but the WEIGHT to which such act/declaration is entitled may
be affected by the degree of relationship
3. The relationship between the declarant/actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act/declaration
4. Act/declaration was made ante litem motam i.e. prior to the controversy
 Such statements prevail over the mere opinion of the judge (US v Agadas)
 BUT cannot generally prevail over the secondary statement of the father (US v Evangelista)

McCormick:
 Traditional rule: Declarations of the person whose family situation is at issue are admissible, as are declarations by other members of the
family.
 Liberal view: Declarations by non-family members with a close relationship (“intimate associates”) to the family are also admitted.
 Conditions for admissibility:
1) Only upon showing that declarant is unavailable
2) Statement was made before the origin of the controversy giving rise to the litigation in which the statement is offered
3) There was no apparent motive for the declarant to misrepresent the facts

Gravador v. Mamigo
(1967; Castro, J.)
People v. Alegado
(1991; Gutierrez, Jr., J.)
Gravador was separated (forced retirement) from his work as
elementary school principal based on pre-war records (i.e.
Insular Teacher’s Card and Employee’s Record) showing him
to be 66 years old already (Nov. 26, 1897). In response, he
showed affidavit of his neighbors and other post-ward records
showing him to be younger by three years (Dec. 11, 1901).
Both baptismal cert and birth cert were destroyed by the war.
TC ruled in favor of Gravador – basis: [1] post war were
correct, [2] his brother’s declaration in cadastral proceeding
were Gravador was co-owner to the effect that he was 23
years old in 1924.
ISSUE: Between post-war and pre-war records, what is
controlling as to Gravador’s age? Post war records
Statutory rape; Alegado argues that the actual age (12 years
old) of the offended party at the time of the alleged incidents
of rape was not established with certainty.
The date of birth of the rape victim is being put in issue;
The declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition
“A person’s statement as to his date of birth and age, as he
learned of these from his parents or relatives, is an ante litem
motam declaration of a family tradition.”
Court gave three reasons:
1. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the
date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it
from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is
an assertion of a family tradition.
2. The import of the declaration of the his brother, contained in
a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the
effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be
ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this
statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the
intendment and meaning of Sec 33 of Rule 130.
- Thus, Dec. 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth not only
by evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante
litem motam of a deceased relative.
3. Parties are agreed that the Gravador has a brother,
Constantino, born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10,
1963 with full retirement pay. Gravador then could not have
been born earlier than Constantino, in 1897 as pre-war records
indicate, bec Constantino is admittedly older than he.
- The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended
party herself and her maternal grandfather, as to the fact that
the victim was born on Sep. 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay
evidence as claimed by Alegado but rather fall under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39
and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
 Page 8 of 28
(sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven)
existed long before the rape case was filed;
That the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal
grandfather of the rape victim.
Tison v. CA Action for reconveyance of land and apartment thereon; Niece
(1997; Regalado, J.) and nephew wanted to inherit from their childless aunt by
right of representation. Aunt’s husband sold the land. To
prove their filiation, petitioners presented the ff docu evid:
[1] family picture;
[2] baptismal certificates of their dad and aunt;
[3] certificates of destroyed records of birth of dad and aunt;
[4] death certificates of dad and aunt; [4] certification of
destroyed records of live birth of petitioners
[5] joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting
to the parents, date and place of birth of petitioner;
[6] joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between aunt and her
husband;
[7] marriage certificate of aunt and husband
Both CA and RTC granted demurrer to evidence
EVIDENCE in issue: Aunt Teodora’s declaration that they were
her niece and nephew
ISSUE: WON petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof
required by Article 172 FC to establish legitimacy and filiation?
NO
- The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of
niece to the effect that Aunt Teodora in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora’s niece.
4. Family Tradition
Rule 130, Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. – The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to a controversy,
in respect to the pedigree of any one of their members, may be received in evidence IF the witness testifying thereon is also a member of their
family, either by consanguinity OR affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings in rings, family portraits and the like,
may be received as evidence of pedigree.
Regalado:
 REQUISITES FOR THE FAMILY TRADITION EXCEPTION TO APPLY:
1. Witness testifying thereto must be a member, by consanguinity or affinity, of the same family as the subject
2. Such reputation or tradition must have existed in that family ante litem motam
- Citing Lazatin v Campos: Declarations in regard to pedigree,
although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are
natural expressions of persons who must know the truth.
- Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the
nature of the case admits AND because greater evil might arise
from the rejection of such proof than from its admission.
- 3 requisites for its admissibility were met in this case:
(1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of
the members of a family;
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person
concerned existed previous to the controversy; and
(3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the
family of said person.
- Citing Gravador v Mamigo: Testimony of a person as to his age
is admissible although hearsay and though a person can have no
personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge
a person has of his age is acquired from what he is told by his
parents – he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from
his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of family tradition.
- Niece’s testimony that aunt recognized her as the niece 
Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under
Section 39, Rule 130, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is
the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not
only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject
matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.
- There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth
elements.  What remains for analysis is the third element, that
is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence
sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to
present evidence other than such declaration.
- American jurisprudence: Distinction must be made as to when
the “relationship of the declarant” may be proved by the very
declaration itself/by other declarations of said declarant, AND
when it must be supported by evidence aliunde.
GENERAL RULE: Where the party claiming seeks recovery against
a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from
the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship
of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by
the declaration itself.  There must be some independent proof
of this fact.
EXCEPTION: The requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not
apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant
himself and not merely to establish a right through his
declarations to the property of some other member of the
family.
 Page 9 of 28

Ferrer v. de Inchausti
(1918; Torres, J.)
Petitioner’s mother’s right to succeed to the inheritance of
grandmother; Grandmother’s second husband partitioned the
grandmother’s property into four parts (three children from
second marriage and the son from the first marriage) to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs’ mother.
- Page 9 of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte’s (alleged brother)
daybook which he kept during his lifetime, a memorandum
appears: “On Sep. 1, 1852, at 7:00 PM, a child 3-days old,
named Rosa Matilde Robles, according to the baptismal
certificate issued by the acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of
the Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to my mother;
this child was baptized by the priest Don Remigio Rodriguez
with the authority of said rector, and according to the baptismal
certificate, it was a child of unknown parents." This
memorandum agrees with the above-mentioned baptismal
certificate of Rosa Matilde Robles.
- Joaquin Jose de Inchausti stated that one day he was assured
by his half-brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa
Matilde was not his sister, but that she was only a mere
protégée and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles, and
that on that occasion the said brother showed him the
certificate of birth taken from the parochial church.
- Ramon (brother) is now dead.
ISSUES:
1. WON Joaquin’s aforementioned testimony is hearsay? NO
2. WON it is necessary to prove that the entries in said book
were made at the same time that those events occurred? NO
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now
dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the
said deceased is admissible, for they are members of the same
family, in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act
No. 190, and consequently, the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde
is the same Rosa Matilde Robles which is mentioned in Exhibit
6; and because she was born in 1852, in no manner could she be
a legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel
Gonzalez, whose marriage was dissolved in 1836 by the death of
the husband.
- The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet
be made at the same time as the occurrence of those events;
hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to
the defect attributed to it. The witness Joaquin Jose de Inchausti
declared affirmatively that the memorandum under
consideration has been written in the handwriting of his brother
Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, whose handwriting he was
familiar with, and the testimony of this witness contains some
reference to a member of the family, now dead, and concerning
the family genealogy of the same.

5. Common Reputation

Rule 130, Section 41. Common reputation. – Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting [1] facts of public or general
interest more than 30 years old OR [2] respecting fact of marriage OR moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in
public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.

Regalado:
 “Common reputation” – definite opinion of the community in which the fact to be proved is known or exists; general or substantially
undivided reputation as distinguished from a partial or qualified one, although it need not be unanimous.
- How is common reputation established?
1) By testimonial evidence of competent witness
2) By monuments and inscriptions in public inscriptions
3) By documents containing statements of reputation
 “Character” refers to inherent qualities of a person, WHILE “reputation” is the opinion of him by others. However under this section,
character is permitted to be established by his common reputation.
 “Matters of public interest” – are those of national interest
 “Matters of general interest” – are those affecting inhabitants of a particular region or community

Ferrer v. de Inchausti
(1918; Torres, J.)
City of Manila v. Del
Rosario
(1905; Mapa, J.)
See preceding case
Action to recover possession of two lands occupied by Del
Rosario. Witness Juan Villegas testified that the land in question
was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land
included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his
testimony is at variance with that of the preceding witness, who
testified that the land belonged to the Central Government.
Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and
inscriptions in public places as evidence of common reputation;
and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts;
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of
pedigree.
Villegas’ testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he
had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of
the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff
apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was
generally considered the owner of the land. Such testimony,
however, does NOT constitute the “common reputation”
referred to in the section mentioned.
“Common reputation” is equivalent to universal reputation. The
testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the
presumption referred to.

6. Res Gestae

Rule 130, Section 42. Part of the res gestae. – Statements made by a person [1] while a “startling occurrence” is taking place OR [2] immediately
prior OR subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the rest gestae. So, also, statements
 Page 10 of 28

accompanying an “equivocal act” material to the issue AND giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

Regalado:
What is the “rule of res gestae”?
 Literally “things done”
 There are two types:
a. Spontaneous statements in connection with a startling occurrence relating to that fact and in effect forming part thereof
b. Statement accompanying equivocal act, otherwise known as “verbal acts” on the theory that they are the verbal parts of the act
to be explained
 REQUISITES FOR THE FIRST TYPE OF RES GESTAE EXCEPTION TO APPLY:
1. Principal act (res gestae) must be a startling occurrence
2. Statements forming part thereof were made before the declarant had the opportunity to contrive
3. Statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending circumstances
 REQUISITES FOR THE SECOND TYPE (“verbal acts”) OF RES GESTAE EXCEPTION TO APPLY:
1. Principal act (res gestae) to be characterized must be equivocal
2. Such act must be material to the issue
3. Statements must accompany the equivocal act
4. Statements must give a legal significance to the equivocal act

McCormick:
 Convenient vehicle for escape from the hearsay rule in two primary situations
1) Explain the admissibility of statements that were not hearsay at all
2) Justify the admissibility of statements which today come within the exceptions i.e.
a. Statements of present tense impressions
b. Excited utterances
c. Statements of present bodily conditions
d. Statements of present mental states and conditions
 Two main policies or motives are discernible in recognition of res gestae
1) Desire to permit each witness to tell his story in a natural way by telling all that happened at the time of the narrated incident,
including those details that give life and color to the story
2) Recognition of spontaneity as the source of special trustworthiness

People v. Lungayan
(1988; Gancayco, J.)
People v. Putian
(1976; Aquino, J.)
RAV says:
- Take note of the time
interval
- The statements were in
response to the police’s
questions. Is that a correct
application? Hindi naman
excited utterance yan di ba!
Rape; 48 year old barrio captain allegedly raped a 52 year old
widow thrice married in the muddy floor of the market one
sultry night. She had muddy clothes and bruised bodies.
ISSUE: WON Agripina was raped? NOooooo. “They must have
succumbed to the temptation of the flesh. One thing led to the
other until they had sexual intercourse. Perhaps the
complainant did not initiate or motivate the sexual interlude. In
the least, she must have abetted it if not willingly submitted to
the advances of the appellant. Indeed, they were in ecstasy for
almost one hour. Such mutual and passionate lovemaking can
certainly not be characterized as involuntary. It was free and
without any compulsion.”  I just had to quote it hahahaha.
Murder; Putian allegedly stabbed Panimdim was in the groin
during a barrio dance. Pat. Arturo Yap arrested Putian (after he
was seen possessing a dagger and scabbard) and surrendered
him to the guard at the municipal hall. Yap went to the victim in
the clinic and there he wrote on a paper victim’s declaration.
Putian’s appeal:
[1] Panimdim's statement was not spontaneous as it was “made
several hours after the incident.”
[2] The requisite that the declarant gave the statement before
he had time to devise or contrive was not present in this case.
[3] Because the statement is in narrative form, it is not the
statement contemplated in the rule.
SolGen:
[1] Statement was in question-and-answer form and that
Panimdim's answers were spontaneous, candid,
straightforward, direct, brief, concise, natural and devoid of any
design or deliberation.
[2] The fact that Patrolman Yap added the surname Putian to
the name "Guirmo", which was mentioned by the victim, did
not destroy the probative value of the statement because the
- TC considered the revelation of the complainant to her
daughter Silveria of what happened to her when she returned
home as part of the res gestae. It is important to stress that her
statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made
at a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or
develop her own story.
- As the Court observed, the complainant did not immediately
go home after the sexual encounter. She took a walk. She spent
some time thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She
had some bruises on her body and back because she was lying
down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their
passionate interlude. She had enough time to make a decision
on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot
thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.
ISSUE: WON Panimdim’s ante mortem statement was part of
the res gestae? YES
- The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations
and (b) verbal acts. TC admitted Panimdim's statement as a
spontaneous statement made after the commission of a felony
- TC did not err in characterizing Panimdim's statement as a part
of the res gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that
Putian inflicted upon him the stab wound that caused his death
five days later in the hospital.
- “Although a declaration does not appear to have been made
by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending
death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying
declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of,
or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time
when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still
continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of
the res gestae”
- Panimdim's statement was given sometime after the stabbing
while he was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic. He had
 Page 11 of 28

People v. Tolentino
(1993; Nocon, J.)
appellant could have shown that there were other persons in
the locality named Guirmo but he failed to do so.
[3] A declaration made by a person immediately after being
wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be
considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in
evidence
Robbery with homicide; Mother who went to uncle’s wake
came back to three dead children and OFW husband’s salaries
gone 
Evidence in issue: Geraldine’s (one of the dead daughters)
mention of the names of their attackers
no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a malicious
charge against Putian. No motive has been shown as to why he
would frame up Putian.
The trial court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae,
namely:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence;
(2) that the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and
(3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances 
which are all present in the case at bar as Geraldine had named
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators in the commission
of the crime immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing
incident.

5. Entries in the Course of Business

Rule 130, Section 42. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at or near the time of the transaction to which they refer, by a person
deceased or otherwise unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity OR in the performance of duty AND in the ordinary or regular course of business.

Palmer v. Hoffman Negligence; Railroad engineer made a signed statement (accident report), upon being interviewed by asst. superintendent of railroad
(1943; Douglas, J.) company and representative of Public Service Commission.

ISSUE: WON TC properly excluded that statement on the ground that it was not “made "in the regular course" of business”? YES

HELD: The engineer's statement which was held inadmissible in this case falls into quite a different category. It is not a record made for the
systematic conduct of the business as a business. An accident report may affect that business in the sense that it affords information on
which the management may act. It is not, however, typical of entries made systematically or as a matter of routine to record events or
occurrences, to reflect transactions with others, or to provide internal controls. The conduct of a business commonly entails the payment of
tort claims incurred by the negligence of its employees. But the fact that a company makes a business out of recording its employees’
versions of their accidents does not put those statements in the class of records made "in the regular course" of the business within the
meaning of the Act. If it did, then any law office in the land could follow the same course, since business, as defined in the Act, includes the
professions. We would then have a real perversion of a rule designed to facilitate admission of records which experience has shown to be
quite trustworthy. Any business, by installing a regular system for recording and preserving its version of accidents for which it was
potentially liable, could qualify those reports under the Act. The result would be that the Act would cover any system of recording events or
occurrences provided it was "regular," and though it had little or nothing to do with the management or operation of the business as such.
Preparation of cases for trial, by virtue of being a "business" or incidental thereto, would obtain the benefits of this liberalized version of
the early shop book rule. The probability of trustworthiness of records because they were routine reflections of the day to day operations
of a business would be forgotten as the basis of the rule. Regularity of preparation would become the test, rather than the character of the
records and their earmarks of reliability acquired from their source and origin and the nature of their compilation. We cannot so completely
empty the words of the Act of their historic meaning. If the Act is to be extended to apply not only to a "regular course" of a business, but
also to any "regular course" of conduct which may have some relationship to business, Congress, not this Court, must extend it. Such a
major change which opens wide the door to avoidance of cross-examination should not be left to implication. Nor is it any answer to say
that Congress has provided in the Act that the various circumstances of the making of the record should affect its weight, not its
admissibility. That provision comes into play only in case the other requirements of the Act are met. reports are not for the systematic
conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business. Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading, and the like, these
reports are calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business. Their primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading.
Philamlife v. Principal were Galang spouses. Capital Assurance, on spouses’ behalf Philamlife. Witness must have personal knowledge of the
Capital Assurance entered into a MOA with Philamlife. Later on, Philamlife discovered transactions to which the entries refer
Corp. additional account by way of unreported premium collections and now
(No. 40001-R; Mar 7, demands payment therefor. Bacani chief of accounts control office no
1975) personal knowledge of the account; merely computed on debit memos
Statement of accounts, memorandum of agreement

6. Official Records

Rule 130, Section 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines
OR by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Caltex v. Africa Damages; Fire broke out at the Caltex Service Station and HELD: There are three requisites for admissibility under Rule
(1966; Makalintal, J.) spread to neighboring houses. 130, Sec. 44:
Both TC and CA ruled out the 3 reports as “double hearsay” (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another
 The material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and person specially enjoined by law to do so;
 Page 12 of 28
circumstances of the fire were not within the personal
knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through
official information? As to some facts the sources thereof are
not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo
Medina(employee at the gas station); to Leandro Flores (driver
of the tank truck); and to Mateo Boquiren (could not give any
reason as to the origin of the fire).
ISSUE: WON reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police,
Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the AFP (re
history of gas station) are admissible as exception from the
hearsay rule? NO
People v. Leones Rape; Pillow humping sales lady Irene Dulay cries rape against
(1982; Guerrero, J.) the 4th year civil engineering son of her employer (despite the
fact that she was having her menstrual period then) assisted by
the latter’s sister while everyone else in the house were at the
beach. However, medical report shows that the lasceration
were already healing only three hours after her alleged
defloration.
ISSUE: WON evidence prove Leones’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt? NO
Manalo v. Robles Trans. Civil aspect of a homicide through reckless imprudence; Taxi
Co., Inc. owned by company collided with a truck killing a young boy.
(1956; Montemayor, J.) Driver imprisoned, parents claim indemnity from company
through its subsidiary liability.
Evidence in question: copy of the decision in the criminal case
convicting Hernandez of homicide through reckless imprudence,
the writs of execution to enforce the civil liability, and the
returns of the sheriff showing that the two writs of execution
were not satisfied because of the insolvency of Hernandez, the
sheriff being unable to locate any property in his name.
ISSUE: WON defendants should be allowed to cross examine the
sheriff? NO
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
presumes they will discharge their several trust with accuracy
and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge
of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken
of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken
to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and
circumstances of each a case may appear to require.
People v. Cabuang Robbery with rape and homicide; Two 19 yr old cousins were
(1993; Feliciano, J.) coming home late from a common friend’s house when the
accused (their barriomates) accosted them in an uninhabited
place. The unfriendly cousin was able to run and hide while the
friendly one (who chatted with the accused) was found dead the
following morning. Anyway, cousin 1 was in a state of shock that
she could not give a coherent statement in the morning so the
police officer deferred obtaining her sworn statement til the
afternoon.
ISSUE: Accused points out to the first entry in the police blotter
which stated that the assailants were “still unidentified”
People v. San Gabriel Murder; Fistfight in North Harbor. Advance Information Sheet
(1996; Bellosillo, J.) prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at
all and named only “Ramon Doe” as the principal suspect
- The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible.  The public
officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and
personal knowledge of the stabbing incident.  Any information
possessed by him was acquired from Camba which therefore
could not be categorized as official information because in
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of
his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law;
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information
- Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be
considered here. To qualify their statements as “official
information” acquired by the officers who prepared the reports,
the persons who made the statements not only must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty
to give such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the
reporting officers through official information, not having been
given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
The written entries in the clinical case record showing the date
of her admission in the hospital, her complaint of vaginal
bleeding and the diagnosis of “Healing lacerated wide at 2
o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in
official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the
performance of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is
that of a physician in a government hospital.
- A sheriff’s return is an official statement made by a public
official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the
law and forming part of official records, and is prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The sheriff's making
the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his
entry.
- Citing Prof. Wigmore: “To the foregoing rules with reference to
the method of proving private documents an exception is made
with reference to the method of proving public documents
executed before and certified to, under the land of seal of
certain public officials. The courts and the legislature have
recognized the valid reason for such an exception. The litigation
is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed, the
occasion in which the officials would be summoned from his
ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The
public officers are few in whose daily work something is not
done in which testimony is not needed from official statements,
host of official would be found devoting the greater part of their
time to attending as witness in court or delivering their
depositions before an officer. The work of Administration of
government and the interest of the public having business with
officials would alike suffer in consequence.”
- Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course
of performance of official duty are not conclusive proof of the
truth of such entries.
- Citing People v. Santito, Jr: Entries in official records like a
police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein
set out, since the entries in the police blotter could well be
incomplete or inaccurate.
- Testimony given in open court during the trial is commonly
much more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in
the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on
a police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other
evidence gathered in the course of the police investigation and
presented in court.
Entries in official records cannot defeat the positive and candid
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Police blotters are
only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated and not
conclusive.  The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily
entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of
suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness
may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to
 Page 13 of 28
order to be classified as such the persons who made the
statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts
stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the
record. In the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to
give such statements
9. Commercial Lists
Rule 130, Section 45. Entries in commercial lists. – Text here.
State v. Lungsford Knowing possession of stolen vehicle; Vehicle identification
(1979; King, J. A. D.) number and National Automobile Theft Bureau to factory trace
the 1968 Road Runner, factory order number in the stamped on
the radiator brace; packing slip also came from another vehicle
Relied on the NATB factory trace information saying that it was
already stolen at the time the defendant bought it .
PNOC Shipping v. CA Price quotation from general manager
(1999)
Estrada v. Noble [C.A.] Conventional redemption; transaction between father and son
(Year) absolute sale right of repurchase because father afraid he
might dispose fo the property
10. Learned Treatises
Rule 130, Section 46. Learned treatises. – Text here.
11. Prior Testimony
Rule 130, Section 47. Prior testimony. – Text here.
the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the
trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters
stated in the police blotter.
- Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
- To be admissible in evidence 3 requisites must concur: (a) The
entry was made by a police officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c)
The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
No record of probable reliability of NATB: court found the ff
data on NATB  Nonprofit corporation, national in scope,
financed by over 500 automobile insurance company; purpose
of the organization: prevent and reduce theft losses of
automobile; repository for all vehicle information and
indentification number on all American and some foreign made
cars; essentially an informational warehouse, a registry for the
industry
Process of tracing the nformation: without the use of the natb
process, no potential nexus between wilton’s car and
defensantds car. No proof of any reliability of the procedure
Judge must be convinced the compilation is published for use
the persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
considered
Ratio: too difficult to call to the witness tsand those who have
participated in their preparation or compilation
Modus operandi of NATB
BS submitted by Dr. Ballantine as the economic adviser of the
President of the Phil.
Ballantine Scale: official document whose publication
constituted a leading event of general interest and whose
provisions are widely known and have played an important part
in the contemporary political history of the country of which
courts of justice could take judicial notice.
No evidence of the rate of exchange between Japanese
occupation currency and Philippine currency at the time said
transaction took place having been presented the case is one
which calls for the application of the said conversion table.
 Page 14 of 28

Tan v. CA Petition for support

(1967)
Ohio v. Roberts Checks
(1980)

XII. Opinion Rule

A. Rule 130, Sections 48-50

Rule 130, Sec. 48. General Rule. – The opinion of a witness not admissible, EXCEPT as indicated in the following sections.

Rule 130, Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience OR training
which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

Rule 130, Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witness. – The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding –
(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge
(b) The handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, appearance OR condition of a person.

B. Cases:

Dilag & Co. v. Merced
(1949)
U.S. v. Trono
(1904; Mapa, J.)
People v. Adoviso
(1999; Kapunan, J.)
Stolen truck entrusted to secretary-treasurer; motor number
and certain features of its stolen truck (e..g general appearance,
paint of the hood, wooden running board on the left side, two
iron bars supporting the glass windshield, welded tie rod,
welded propeller shaft and half inch screw on the cylinder head
and hole in the radiator cause by a blow from the fan belt 
found in the ocular inspection; corroborated by the mechanic
Murder; 3 people were arrested in connection with theft of a
revolver and were ill-treated by butt of a gun. Municipal
president discharged them, and mother of deceased reported
the beating incident to justice of peace. Deceased suffered great
pain esp in urinary area, he peed droplets of blood. The two
other arrested persons testified that they heard (not see) the
groans and supplications of the deceased.
Evidence in issue: Certificate and testimony of the physician, Dr.
Icasiano that death of Perez was not due to the wounds
inflicted, which were not serious, but to hepatic colic brought
on by hypertrophic cirrhosis, from which the deceased had been
suffering for a long time
Murder; CAFGU member shot 88 year old Emeterio and his 35
year old grandson Rufino. Allegedly hired killers by Galicia family
who lost in a land dispute. Shooting incident were witnessed by
the family members of the victims.
Evidence in issue: On the premise that the TC rendered the
judgment of conviction on the basis of “mere conjectures and
speculations,” appellant argues that the negative result of the
Witness was Jose Aguilar who has been working with the
Bureau of Public Works having occupied as the position of
inspector in charge of weighing and measuring trucks and
verifying their motor numbers; chief of registration division for
8 years
- We cannot give any credit to the testimony of this physician
because the facts which would serve as a foundation to his
conclusion are manifestly inexact.
- There is nothing in the case to show that the deceased had
ever suffered from hypertrophic cirrhosis. The ailment which
the deceased had at the time referred to by the physician was
cholera, according to the mother of the deceased who testified,
besides, referring to the time to which this case refers, that her
son was of a robust constitution and suffered no ailments
whatever.
- When the death had taken place, the family of the deceased
repeatedly requested the physician, Icasiano, to examine the
body, which the latter flatly refused to do, and warned them, on
the other hand, to bury him quickly, under the pretext that he
had died of cholera.
- It appears from the testimony of Raymunda Perez that said
physician is an intimate friend of the accused.
- Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of
meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on questions of
a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not
bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony;
they are free to weight them, and they can give or refuse to give
them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such
evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have
been adduced during the trial.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that
simultaneously measures and records certain physiological
changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily
caused by an examinee’s conscious attempt to deceive the
questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test
is that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood
pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be
recorded on the graph.
 Page 15 of 28

polygraph test should be given weight to tilt the scales of justice
in his favor.
State v. Garver - Murder in the course of attempted assault and robbery;
(1950; Lusk, J.) Garver’s mother (Mitchell) testified on the issue of her son’s
insanity and related history from infancy to the day of the
alleged crime, including his illnesses, both mental and physical,
his moral delinquencies, his crimes and “whatever else might
throw light on his mental condition.”
- Court struck from the record her statements “such a terrible
shape” and “mentally and physically ill”
However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results
of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of
establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime,
whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction,
for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific
acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining
truth or deception.
The rule is no different in this jurisdiction.  Thus, in People v.
Daniel, stating that much faith and credit should not be vested
upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive.  Appellant, in this
case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should not
apply to him.
GR: A lay witness may testify only as to facts and not to opinions
or conclusions.
EXCEPTION: Witnesses may be permitted to use shorthand
descriptions which are, in reality, opinions, in presenting to the
court their impressions of the general conditions of a person.

ISSUE: May witnesses be permitted to use shorthand

U.S. v. Stifel
(1970; Edwards, Circuit Judge)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals
(1993; Blackmun, J.)
descriptions, which are, in reality, opinions, in presenting to the
court their impressions of the general conditions of a person?
YES
Murder; Stifel killed Ronec through a bomb (infernal machine,
i.e. explodes upon opening) send via US mail. Motive:
relationship with the lady Cheryl engaged with Ronec to whom
Stifel sent two love/threat letters.
Stifel was especially fond of pyrotechnics and rockets. He also
worked for P&G where the materials for the mail tube bomb are
available.
Neutron activation analysis and atomic absorption tests
conducted by chemist and microanalyst (expert): fragments in
the crime scene were indistinguishable and identical with
samples from P&G lab.
ISSUE: Appellant contends vigorously that the neutron
activation analysis test results and Scott's opinion testimony
derived therefrom were inadmissible because the test is too
new and unreliable and has not yet been generally accepted by
scientists in its particular field
- Summary judgment; Affidavit of Dr. Lamm who stated that he
had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and human birth
defects. No study had found Bendectin to be a human teratogen
(i.e., a substance capable of causing malformations in fetuses).
His conclusion: Maternal use of Bendectin during the 1st
trimester of pregnancy has not been shown to be a risk factor
for human birth defects.
- Petitioner’s rebuttal through 8 experts who said that
Bendectin can cause birth defects. Basis: “in vitro” (test tube)
and “in vivo” (live) animal studies that found a link between
Bendectin and malformations; pharmacological studies of the
chemical structure of Bendectin that purported to show
similarities between the structure of the drug and that of other
substances known to cause birth defects; and the “reanalysis”
- In determining admissibility of evidence based on this process,
appellate courts recognize a considerable area of discretion on
the part of the trial judge in admitting or refusing to admit
proffered expert testimony.
- Whether a witness is shown to be qualified or not as an expert
is a preliminary question to be determined in the first place by
the court; and the rule is, that if the court admits the testimony,
then it is for the jury to decide whether any, and if any what,
weight is to be given to the testimony. Cases arise where it is
very much a matter of discretion with the court whether to
receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate court will not
reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous
- Citing Frye v US: Just when a scientific principle or discovery
crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.
- Neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty in a test suffices
to render it inadmissible in court. Every useful new
development must have its first day in court. And court records
are full of the conflicting opinions of doctors, engineers and
accountants, to name just a few of the legions of expert
witnesses.
- Disputes about scientific techniques used OR the accuracy of
the results generated go to weight, NOT the admissibility of the
scientific evidence.
- Court also gave an example of the problem arising from use
and abuse of modern scientific techniques.
- Under the Federal Rules, the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.
- “General acceptance” is not a necessary precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence (Rule 702) do assign to the
trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at
hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
will satisfy those demands.
- Scientifically valid  capable of being validated through
empirical tests
- Relevant to the case at hand
1. Scientific knowledge - testimony must be scientific in nature,
 Page 16 of 28

United States v. Bonds
(1993; Batchelder, Circuit
Judge)
of previously published epidemiological (human statistical)
studies.
- CA applied the Frye test (systolic BP deception test): Standard
for expert testimony - Technique must be “generally accepted”
as reliable in the relevant scientific community.
ISSUE: Does the Frye standard still stand in view of the
enactment of Federal Rule 702? NO
Murder; Hell’s Angels shot Hartlaub in his van who they
mistaken as a member of the rival gang Outlaws. Mr. Bond’s
sample was extracted because he had ricochet wound and it
was identified he had a rare enzyme found only in 1% of male
Caucasians.
Evidence in issue: DNA
and that the testimony must be grounded in "knowledge."
2. Assist the trier of fact
3. Judge’s threshold determination if it will indeed assist the
trier of fact - This entails a preliminary assessment of whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." This
preliminary assessment can turn on whether something has
been tested, whether an idea has been subjected to scientific
peer review or published in scientific journals, the rate of error
involved in the technique, and even general acceptance, among
other things. It focuses on methodology and principles, not the
ultimate conclusions generated.
The Supreme Court explained that "a rigid 'general acceptance'
requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the
Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony.' The "austere"
general acceptance standard, "absent from and incompatible
with the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in
federal trials."

XIII. Burden of Proof and Presumptions

A. Rule 131, Sections 1-4.

Rule 131, Section 1. Burden of Proof. – “Burden of proof” is the duty of the party to present evidence on a fact in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount required by law.

Regalado:
 “BURDEN OF PROOF” or “ONUS PROBANDI” is the obligation imposed upon a party who alleges the existence of facts necessary for the
prosecution of his action or defense to establish the same by the requisite quantum of evidence.
 Quantum of evidence:
1) Civil cases – preponderance of evidence
2) Criminal cases
 Issuance of warrant of arrest after PI – probable cause
 Filing of an information – probable cause
 Sustain a conviction – evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
3) Charges of misconduct against judge – clear and convincing evidence
4) Ground for removal of judges – beyond reasonable doubt
5) Administrative cases e.g. Agrarian cases – substantial evidence
 Who carries the burden of proof?
1) Civil – party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side
2) Criminal – always on the prosecution
 “Burden of proof” vs. “burden of evidence”

BURDEN OF PROOF BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

Does not shift as it remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom
it is imposed
Generally determined by the pleadings of the party
Shifts from party to party, depending upon the exigencies of the case in the
course of the trial
Generally determined by the developments at the trial OR by the provisions
of the substantive law or procedural rules which may relieve the party from
presenting evidence on the fact alleged i.e. presumptions, judicial notice
and admissions
BOTH CIV AND CRIM: Lies with the party who asserts an affirmative
allegations in the complaint/counterclaim
Crim: prosecution has to prove its affirmative allegations in the indictment
regarding elements of the crime, attendant circumstances; defense has to
prove affirmative allegations regarding existence of justifying OR exempting
circumstances, absolutory causes or mitigating circumstances.

 Negative allegations do NOT have to be proved,

1) EXCEPT where such negative allegations are essential parts of the cause of action or defense in a civil case OR are essential ingredients of the
offense in a criminal case or defenses thereto.
2) E.g. In crimes of omission: prosecution has to prove the non-performance by the accused of the required act, although it is a negative
allegation.
 Page 17 of 28

3) In civil cases, even if negative allegation is an essential part of the cause of action or defense, such negative allegation DOES NOT have to be
proved, if it is only for the purpose of denying the existence of a document which should properly be in the custody of the adverse party.
 GENERAL RULE: If criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation OR negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the charge.
 EXCEPTION: Where the negative of the issue does not permit of direct proof, OR where the facts are more immediately within the
knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests on him.
 E.g. if the charge is that he does not have license, the burden of proof that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarly within his
knowledge and must establish that fact or suffer conviction (Pp v Macalaba).

McCormick (Chapter 36, Sections 335-341):

 “Proof” is the end result of conviction or persuasion produced by the evidence.
 “Burden of proof” encompasses two separate “burdens of proofs”
1) Burden of producing the evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particular issue
2) Burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true

BURDEN OF PROOF (PERSUASION) BURDEN OF EVIDENCE (PRODUCTION; GOING FORWARD)

Limited only to those in which the trier of fact is ACTUALLY in doubt. Party
plaintiff usually seeks to change this status quo, so he should be convincing
and persuasive to sway the trier of fact to believe his theory.
Does not shift from party to party during the course of trial SIMPLY BECAUSE
it need not be allocated until it is time for a decision
Becomes crucial only if the parties have sustained their burdens of producing
evidence and only when all of the evidence has been introduced.
Liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if
evidence on the issue has not been produced
Usually cast first upon the party who has pleaded the existence of the fact,
BUT it may shift to the adversary when the pleader has discharged its initial
duty
Critical mechanism in jury trial as it empowers the judge to decide the case
without jury consideration when a party fails to sustain the burden

 In most cases, party who has the burden of pleading a fact will have the burdens of producing evidence and persuading the jury of its
existence as well.
*Chi: it is one thing to show them something and another thing to convince them that to believe it as true.
 ALLOCATION OF BURDENS – burden of proof does not always follow burden of pleading.
o Negative averments/allegations: Where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party
has the burden of proving the issue. E.g. payment, discharge in bankruptcy and license
o Risk of failure of proof may be placed upon the party who contends that the more unusual event has occurred. E.g. business
relationship exists, it’s unlikely that the services are performed gratuitously
 Burdens of producing evidence and of persuasion with regard to any given issue are both generally allocated to the same party. Usually,
each is assigned but once in the course of the litigation and a safe prediction of that assignment can be made at the pleading stage.
 However, initial allocation of the burden of producing evidence may not always be final. The shifting nature of that burden may cause
both parties to have the burden with regard to the same issue at different points in the trial.
 Similarly, although burden of persuasion is assigned only once—when it is time for a decision—a prediction of the allocation of that
burden, based upon the pleadings may have to be revised when evidence is introduced at trial.
 No key principle governing the apportionment of the burdens of proof. Allocation will depend upon the weight that is given to any one or
more of several factors:
1) Natural tendency to place the burdens on the party desiring change
2) Special policy considerations such as those disfavoring certain defenses
3) Convenience
4) Fairness
5) Judicial estimate of probabilities

SATISFYING BURDEN OF PERSUASION:

a. Measure of persuasion in civil cases generally
 “Proof by a preponderance of evidence” – when it is more convincing to the trier than the opposing evidence
b. Requirement of clear and convincing proof
c. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt

B. Cases:

1. Civil Cases

Pornellosa v. LTA
(1986; Padilla, J.)
Compel Director of Lands to execute deed of sale of residential
lot and annul sale to Guzman; Santa Clara Estate was acquired by
the government under CA 539. Pornellosa thought they were
buying 200 sqm from San Jose but the truth is the latter split the
lot into two and sold the other half to Guzman.
- A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove
his claim by competent evidence. A plaintiff is duty bound to
prove his allegations in the complaint. He must rely on the
strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his
opponent.
- CA found that in the deed of sale executed by San Jose in favor
of Pornellosa, “the area of the lot on which San Jose's house

IFC v. Tobias
(1977; Martin, J.)
2. Criminal Cases
People v. Pajenado
(1977; Concepcion, J.)
Page 18 of 28
Action to recover unpaid balance of PN; Tobias bought a Dodge
truck from Leelin Motors and executed PN & chattel mortgage
on truck. Leelin indorsed PN & assigned the chattel to IFC. Tobias
paid directly to IFC but defaulted so IFC demanded the surrender
of truck. Tobias willingly and voluntarily surrendered truck
because it met an accident and is in the custody of Leelin
already. IFC naturally refused the useless truck and instead
collected cash. Tobias contends that IFC is estopped.
ISSUE: WON IFC is estopped by their demand for the surrender of
the truck? NO
Negative allegations do NOT have to be proved,
EXCEPT where such negative allegations are essential parts of
the cause of action or defense in a civil case OR are essential
ingredients of the offense in a criminal case or defenses thereto.
Murder and illegal possession; Carlito P. killed Carlos Tapong
with a gun. Homicide lang dapat. Treachery was not proved and
illegal possession.
- It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an
essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a
firearm. The information filed against appellant in Criminal Case
No. 3558 of the lower court specifically alleged that he had no
"license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned
therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty
not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it.
- Citing U.S. vs. Tria: The accused was charged with having
criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none
of the qualifications required to be a voter. It was there held
that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was
an essential element of the crime charged and should be proved
by the prosecution.
- Citing People vs. Quebral: Accused was charged with illegal
practice of medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and
prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients from
whom he received monetary compensation, without having
previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from
the Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of
the Administrative Code, this Court held that if the subject of
the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting
without the qualifications provided by law is an essential
ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of
proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such
circumstance, need only establish a  prima facie case from the
best evidence obtainable.
In the case at bar: Both appellant and the Solicitor General
agree that there was not even a  prima facie case upon which to
stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof
been mentioned;” and that there is no showing of the extent of
the alleged vendor's holding or interest. Besides, petitioners
have not presented any document or evidence showing that the
Rural Progress Administration had agreed to sell to them the
residential lot in litigation. Granting that the Guzman is not
entitled to acquire by purchase the said residential lot, still that
fact does not relieve the petitioners from the duty of proving by
competent evidence the allegations of their complaint.
- Sales aspect: seller of personal property bought on installment
has 3 options under A1484 in case of purchaser’s default
(demand payment, cancel, foreclose). Foreclosure must be more
than mere demand to surrender possession of chattel.
- To hold the IFC in estoppel, it must be shown that when it gave
the respondent the choice of either paying the balance of the
purchase price or of surrendering the truck, it had already
knowledge of the accident and the consequent damage to the
truck. Here, IFC claims no knowledge of the accident when it
gave Tobias the choice of either paying the balance of the
promissory note or of surrendering the truck. - Absurd that IFC
would make such offer either to pay the balance on the PN or to
surrender the truck in question if it knew that the truck has had
an accident. The more plausible thing it would have asked Tobias
is to ask for the balance on the promissory note.
- Besides the allegation of IFC that it had “NO KNOWLEDGE OF
THE ACCIDENT” is a negative allegation and needs no evidence
to support it, not being an essential part of the statement of the
right on which the cause of action is founded.
- It is therefore Tobias who has the burden of disproving the
claim of petitioner that he has no knowledge of the accident
when it made the offer to respondent either to pay the balance
on the promissory note or to surrender the truck. Respondent
failed in this.
- In a criminal case for illegal possession of firearms, the
prosecution has to prove the absence of license therefor.
- It is true that People vs. Lubo and People vs. Ramos could be
invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person
charged with illegal possession of a firearm, to prove the
issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm, but We are,
of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section
2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which, provide that in criminal
cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the
prosecution and that a “negative fact alleged by the
prosecution” must be proven if “it is an essential ingredient of
the offense charged", the burden of proof was with the
prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by
appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly
licensed.
- The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the
better means of proof of the fact alleged, should not relieve
the party making the averment of the burden of proving it. This
is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to
have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not
have alleged it.
- Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for
doing an act or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of liquor
without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a
license if it had acquired no knowledge of that fact?
- Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-existence
of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by the
defendant, it is, nevertheless, incumbent upon the party
alleging the want of the license to prove the allegation.
Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which
lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the
accused  prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the
prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him.
 Page 19 of 28

hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm.

U.S. v. Dube
(1975; McEntee, Cir Judge)
People v. Verzola
(1977; Antonio, J.)
Patterson v. New York
(1977; White, J.)
Robbery of federally insured bank; Dube did not deny
commission of crime but plead insanity (schiz) and offered
testimony of psychologist and psychiatrist. Prosecutor only
relied on cross and testimony of 2 bank tellers.
Dube moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the
prosecution had failed as a matter of law to sustain its burden
of proving his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but the motion
was denied.
Murder; In his sleep, Molina was killed by Verzola in the
presence of the former’s wife. After the clubbing incident,
Verzola changed clothes and reported the “accident” to the
police. Mrs. Molina in her extrajudicial statement that she tried
to say that there was an attempted rape by Verzola. However,
in Verzola’s extra-judicial confession, he stated that he was the
paramour of Mrs. Molina and the deceased intended to kill him.
He interposed self-defense (thought there was an intruder in his
neighbor’s house; vulva of your mother).
Murder; Patterson saw from a window his estranged wife semi-
undress in front of her ex-lover. He barged into the room and
shot the ex-lover twice in the head. He confessed the crime but
defense of extreme emotional disturbance (qualifies for
manslaughter).
ISSUE: Whether NY’s allocation to the defendant of proving the
mitigating circumstances of severe emotional disturbance is
consistent with due process? This defense is a considerably
expanded version of the common law defense of heat of
passion on sudden provocation, and that, at common law, the
burden of proving the latter, as well as other affirmative
defenses -- indeed, "all . . . circumstances of justification, excuse
or alleviation" -- rested on the defendant
McCormick: Court upheld a NY procedure under which an
accused is guilty of murder in the 2nd degree if he is found,
beyond reasonable doubt, to have intentionally killed another
person. The crime may be reduced to manslaughter if def
proves by a preponderance of evidence that he had acted under
the influence of “extreme emotional disturbance”
- Constitutionality of the allocation of the burden of proof by a
formalistic analysis of state law; due process was not violated
because defendant did not have the burden of proof on any fact
that state law had identified as an element of the offense.
- Courts have had no trouble with an affirmative defense which
simply requires the defendant to bear a burden of production.
- The nature and quantum of rebuttal evidence sufficient to
present a jury question is to some extent determined by the
strength of the case for insanity. 
- There is no general principle that the prosecution must
counter defendant's expert medical evidence with expert
testimony of its own.
- The expert testimony is not conclusive even where
uncontradicted; its weight and credibility are for the jury to
determine, and it may be rebutted in various ways apart from
the introduction of countervailing expert opinion.
- Once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being,
the burden is on him to establish the existence of any
circumstance which may justify the killing or at least attenuate
the offense committed.
- To establish his exculpation, or the justification for the act, he
must prove such affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution
for even if that were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself had admitted the killing. It is evident that no
such proof was adduced by appellant Verzola.
Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant of a mitigating
circumstance affirmative defense does NOT violate the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
- Such affirmative defense does NOT serve to negative any facts
of the crime which the State must prove in order to convict, but
constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required
to carry the burden of persuasion.
- We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative,
operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative
defenses related to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally,
due process has required that only the most basic procedural
safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's
interests against those of the accused have been left to the
legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance
struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of
which the defendant is charged.
- Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never
been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to
fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory
defense at issue here.

3. Presumptions

Rule 131, Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to belief a particular thing is
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
(b) The tenant is not permitted deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.

Rule 131, Section 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory IF uncontradicted, BUT may be contradicted AND
overcome by other evidence:

Rule 131, Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. – There is no presumption of illegitimacy or legitimacy of a child born after 300
days following the [1] dissolution of marriage OR [2] separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the illegitimacy or legitimacy of such child must
prove his allegation.

Regalado:

WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED?

 Page 20 of 28

1. Facts which are presumed (Rule 131)

2. Facts which are of judicial notice (Rule 129)
3. Facts which are judicially admitted (Rule 129)

FACTS WHICH ARE PRESUMED

 PRESUMPTION is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from the proof of other
facts.
 Distinguished from “judicial notice” and “judicial admission”: in presumptions, proponent still has to introduce evidence of the basis of
the presumption, such is not required in judicial notice and judicial admission.
 Kinds of presumptions:
1) Presumptions of law (praesumptiones juris) –
 certain inference must be made whenever the facts appear which furnish the basis of the inference
 reduced to fixed rules and form part of the system of jurisprudence
2) Presumptions of facts (praesumptiones hominis) –
 discretion is vested in the tribunal as to drawing the inference
 derived wholly from the circumstances of the particular case by means of the common experience of mankind

a) Conclusive/absolute/juris et de jure (Rule 131, Sec. 2)

- Based upon the doctrine of estoppel in pais (equitable estoppel) i.e. a bar which precludes a person
from denying OR asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been
established as the truth by ACTS OF JUDICIAL/LEGISLATIVE OFFICERS OR by his OWN DEED OR
REPRESENTATIONS, either express or implied

Elements of estoppel in pais re party claiming:
1. lack of knowledge and means of acquiring such knowledge
2. reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped
3. action based thereon of such character as to change his position
prejudicially
Elements of estoppel in pais re party estopped:
1. conduct which amounts to false representation or concealment
2. intention OR at least, expectation (on the part of doer) that the other
party shall act upon such conduct
3. knowledge of real facts

b) Disputable/rebuttable/juris tantum/prima facie (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

- There’s no constitutional objection to a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be
overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct and declaring
what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence.
- Legislature may provide for prima facie evidence of guilty PROVIDED there be a RATIONAL
CONNECTION between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed.

Rule 131, Sec 4

 Exact copy of the Art. 261 CC; substantially reproduced in Art. 169 of FC
 Separation: may be legal or de facto

McCormick (Chapter 36, Sections 342):

 Presumption is one of the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin “burden of proof.”
 Definition: A standardized practice/rational inference, under which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment which respect to
their effect as proof of other facts.
 True presumption should not only shift the burden of producing evidence (chi: overturn the presumption through rebuttal), but also
require that the party denying the existence of the presumed fact assume the burden of persuasion as well.
 At a minimum, presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence.
 CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS: E.g. res ipsa loquitur, presumption of innocence (which is better called “assumption”)
 Reasons for creating the presumptions
1) Similar with allocation of burden of proof on the ground of FAIRNESS i.e. correct an imbalance resulting from one party’s
superior access to the proof.
2) Social and economic policy: handicap the disfavored adversary (e.g. presumption of ownership from possession – for purposes
of stability of estates)
3) Avoid an impasse, to reach some result, even if arbitrary one (e.g. survivorship of persons who died in a common disaster)
4) Judicial estimate of probabilities
5) Convenience i.e. inherent difficulty of proving that the more probable event in fact occurred; time saving qualities
 EFFECT OF PRESUMPTION
o Bursting bubble theory: “like bats of the law flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in sunshine of actual facts”
 less poetically put by Thayer: only effect of presumption is to SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE with regard to
the presumed fact. If that evidence is produced by the adversary, the presumption is spent and disappears.
o The theory means that although a presumption is available to permit the party relying upon it to survive a motion for directed
verdict at the close of its own case, it has no other value in the trial.
 Page 21 of 28

o Deviations from bursting bubble theory aka Criticisms by Professor Morgan: It gives to presumptions an effect that is too slight
and evanescent when viewed in the light of the reasons for the creation of the rules. These presumptions were based on some
policy considerations which remain to stand even after the presumption had been rebutted.
o Conflicting presumptions: E.g. in case of double marriages (bigamy?): presumption of validity of marriage vs. presumption of
continuance of lives and marriage relationships.
 Thayer wants to disregard both presumptions
 Courts don’t agree with Thayer: Weightier presumption prevails, where one of the presumptions is grounded in a
predominant social policy (chi: look at the rationale behind the presumption)
 Another alternative: Create new presumption

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
 Permissive Presumption – one that will permit the jury to find the presumed facts, but neither compels the acceptance of such facts nor
allocates a burden of persuasion to the defendant with regard to those facts. Regardless of how the state characterizes the presumption,
the courts will analyze the jury instructions to determine their possible effect on the jury.
 CONSTITUTIONALITY ACCEPTABLE: considering all of the evidence in the case, there is a rational connection between the basic facts
proved by the prosecution and the ultimate fact presumed and the latter is more likely than not to flow from the former.
 Mandatory Presumption – one that shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the defendant.
 Dictum in Allen: Presumption that clearly shifts nothing other than burden of production will be scrutinized in the same wy as a
permissive presumption and pass constitutional muster if it meets a rational connection test.

Pascual v. Angeles
(1905; Torres, J.)
Ormachea v. Trillana
(1909; Torres, J.)
Recovery of possession of certain lands; Pascual inherited land
from his sister and the land was occupied by Angeles who hasn’t
paid rent for two years and even claims the land as his own.
Trillana bought merchandise worth P4,000 from Ormachea; did
not pay in two years so complaint to recover money using 135
documents/vales as evidence of indebtedness. Trillana says he
paid periodically in tuba, remaining balance should be paid in
kind not money.
This action arises out of the contract of lease and presupposes
in the lessor a right to the ownership or possession of the
property. For this reason he cannot be compelled to prove his
title thereto. The tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.
Since the vales existed, and were in the possession of the
creditor, it was because the amounts they called for had not yet
been paid, inasmuch as an obligation can only be presumed to
have been fulfilled when the proofs of its existence have been
returned to the debtor. 

People v. Padiernos
(1976; Concepcion, J.)
Yee Hem v. United States
(1925; Sutherland, J.)
ISSUE: WON the vales raises the presumption that Trillana still
had unsettled accounts with Ormachea? YES
Husband was a big guy employed at Bureau of Customs and
issued with a gun kept under his mattress. Accused wife stabbed
husband allegedly because he was unfaithful, she later plead
self-defense (husband beat her for stealing P1K to give to her
brother)
Evidence in issue: Statement of Letty Basa, deceased’s cousin
ISSUE: Non-presentation of the written statement of this
witness to the police which she allegedly did not sign, gave rise
to the presumption that it “contained declarations disastrous to
the prosecution case”?
Concealment of quantity of smoking opium; Yee Hem was guilty
of violating statute that creates a disputable presumption that
smoking opium imported after April 1 (hence illegal).
ISSUE: WON Congress has power to enact the provisions in
respect of the presumptions arising from the unexplained
possession of such opium and from its presence in this country
after the time fixed by the statute? YES
- Compel witness against himself? No. It does no more than to
make possession of the prohibited article prima facie evidence
of guilt. It leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not as he
chooses. If the accused happens to be the only repository of the
facts necessary to negative the presumption arising from his
possession, that is a misfortune which the statute under review
does not create, but which is inherent in the case.
- The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable
does NOT apply where the evidence was at the disposal of
both the defense and the prosecution. In the case at bar, the
alleged statement of prosecution witness Letty Basa was in the
possession of the police authorities. Hence, the defense could
have requested the court below to issue a subpoena requiring
the police to produce such statement, but as the defense failed
to do that, they cannot now argue that said statement if
produced would have been adverse to the prosecution.
- The law of evidence is full of presumptions either of fact or
law. The former are, of course, disputable, and the strength of
any inference of one fact from proof of another depends upon
the generality of the experience upon which it is founded.
- Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is but
to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power
of government. Statutes, national and state, dealing with such
methods of proof in both civil and criminal cases abound, and
the decisions upholding them are numerous.
- Requisites so that a legislative presumption of one fact from
evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process
of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law:
1. it is only essential that there shall be some rational
connection between the fact provided and the ultimate fact
presumed, and
2. that the “inference of one fact from proof of another” shall
not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.
3. it must not, under a guise of regulating the presentation of
evidence, operate to preclude the party from the right to
present his defense to the main fact thus presumed.
- Every accused person, of course, enters upon his trial clothed
with the presumption of innocence. But that presumption may
 Page 22 of 28

be overcome not only by direct proof, but, in many cases, when

County Court of Ulster City
v. Allen
(1979; Stevens, J.)
Sandstrom v. Montana
(1979; Brennan, J)
Illegal possession of 2 loaded hand guns in handbag of teen girl,
machine guns and heroin; 4 persons (3 adult males and 16 yr
old girl tried jointly) New York statute provides that that the
presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence
of its illegal possession by all persons then occupying the
vehicle, EXCEPT when, inter alia, the firearm is found “upon the
person” of one of the occupants. Challenge facial
constitutionality i.e. applicability of the exception “upon the
person”
At the close of the trial, the judge instructed the jurors that they
were entitled to infer possession from the defendants'
presence in the car. He did not make any reference to the
"upon the person" exception in his explanation of the statutory
presumption, nor did any of the defendants object to this
omission or request alternative or additional instructions on the
subject.
Deliberate homicide which under Montana law would consist of
purposely and knowingly causing the death of another; David
Sanstrom confessed to the killing of Annie Jensen. He claimed
the degree of the offense should be reduced in that he suffered
from multiple personality disorder aggravated by alcohol
consumption. He introduced two court-appointed mental health
experts.
- Jury was instructed in accordance with Montana Law that “law
presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts.”
the facts standing alone are not enough, by the additional
weight of a countervailing legislative presumption. If the effect
of the legislative act is to give to the facts from which the
presumption is drawn, artificial value to some extent, it is no
more than happens in respect of a great variety of
presumptions not resting upon statute. 
Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary
system of factfinding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to
determine the existence of an element of the crime -- that is, an
"ultimate" or "elemental" fact -- from the existence of one or
more "evidentiary" or "basic" facts. 
The value of these evidentiary devices, and their validity under
the Due Process Clause, vary from case to case, however,
depending on the strength of the connection between the
particular basic and elemental facts involved and on the degree
to which the device curtails the fact finder's freedom to assess
the evidence independently.
In criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device’s constitutional
validity is that it not undermine the fact finder’s responsibility at
the trial, based on evidence adduced by the state, to find the
ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mandatory and permissive presumptions are to be analyzed
differently.
- Mandatory – on their face  based upon the presumption
alone as the result of the failure of the accused to introduce
proof to the contrary. Presumption would be unconstitutional
UNLESS the basic facts, standing alone, are sufficient to support
the inference of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Permissive – as applied  jury is told only that it may, but
need not, find the defendant guilty based upon the basic facts.
Thus the validity of the presumption must be tested, not at all in
the abstract, but rather in connection with all of the evidence in
the case
“Trier of fact free to credit/reject inference and does not shift
the burden of proof, it affects the application of beyond a
reasonable doubt standard only if under the facts of the case,
there is no rational way the trier could make the connection
permitted by the inference.
Mandatory presumption is prohibited.
The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis
applicable to this kind of jury instruction is to determine the
nature of the presumption it describes.
Def was acquitted. Jury could have interpreted the instruction
with regard to presumption of intention of the ordinary
consequences of voluntary acts as creating either a conclusive
presumption OR shifting the burden of persuasion with regard
to the question of intent to the defendant.
Citing Mullaney, Patterson and Ulster: Such shift of burden is
impermissible. Instruction could also have been interpreted as
imposing heavier burdens on the defendant.

RAV says:
 Let’s take note of common presumptions.

XIV. Presentation of Evidence

A. Examination of Witnesses
Rule 132, Sections 1-18

B. Rule on Examination of a Child Witness

C. REE, Rule 10

1. Examination in Open Court

 Page 23 of 28

People v. Estenzo
(1976)
Galman v. Pamaran
(1985)

2. Leading Questions

State v. Scott (1944)

3. Impeaching One's Own Witness

Becker v. Eisenstodt 158 A.2d 706 (1960)

4. Cross-Examination

Dela Paz v.IAC (1987)

Fulgado v. CA (1982)
Capital Subdivision v. Negros Occidental (1956)
U.S. v. Mercado (1913)
U.S. v. Marshall (1985)

5. Impeachment by Bias

U.S. v. Abel (1984)

U.S. v. Harvey (1976)

6. Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement

Villalon v. IAC (1986)

People v. Resabal (1927)
U.S. v. Webster (1984)

7. Impeachment by Other Means

U.S. v. Mercado (1913)

Mosley v. Commonwealth (1967)
Coles v. Harsh 276 P. 248 (1929)
U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services (1978)
Newton v. State (1924)
State v. Oswalt (1963)

8. Refreshing Recollection

State v. Peoples (1984)

9. Recalling Witnesses

People v. Del Castillo (1968)

Victorias Milling Co., Inc. Ong (1977)
People v. Rivera (1991)

10. Exclusion of Witnesses

People v. Sandal (1930)

State v. Bishop (1972)

D. Authentication and Proof of Documents

1. Rule 132, Sections 19-33;

E-Commerce Act, Section 6-15;
REE, Rules 5, 6, 9, and 11

2. Cases:
Buniag v. CA
(1988; Cortes, J.)
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA
(1991; Padilla, J.)
Bartolome v. IAC
(1990; Fernan, C.J.)
Pacific Asia Overseas
Shipping Corp. v. NLRC
(1988; Feliciano, J.)
Zalamea v. Court of
Appeals
(1993; Nocon, J.)
People v. Monleon
(1976; Aquino, J.)
Salison v. People
(1996; Regalado, J.)
People v. Lazaro
(1999; Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)
Page 24 of 28
Apolonio Buniag only put his thumbmark on the deed of sale
(written in English) over his typewritten name. The document
was also not notarized.
TC: Vacate the property, Bautista! CA reversed and deed of
sale was validly executed; relying on the testimony of
Bautista’s sister for the due exec and authen of the deed of
sale.
ISSUE: WON the deed of sale is admissible in evidence? NO,
due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale not having
been satisfactorily proven.
Enforcement of the Dubai court decision translated from
Arabic to English
Action for damages; Although confirmed tickets, it is not an
assurance of accommodation as overbooking of flights allowed
by US laws.
TWA’s sole evidence: statement of Ms. Lather, a customer
service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal
Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking.
No official publication of said code was presented as evidence.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in relying on TWA’s proof? No
Parricide; Accused, who had too much tuba, got mad because
his carabao was hungry and killed his nagger wife of 26 years
in his rage. He was made to sign an affidavit of confession
written in Cebuano dialect.
ISSUE: WON the affidavit unaccompanied by Filipino
translation was admissible? YES
Murder; Valmoria’s dying declaration was reduced to writing
by the witness.
ISSUE: WON the Certification issued by the Commanding
Officer of the PNP-Firearm and Explosives Office is admissible?
- The deed of sale is not notarized and is, therefore, a private
writing, whose due execution and authenticity must be proved
before it can be received in evidence.
- How to prove due exec and authen of private writing?
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the
maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness.
- No showing also that the contents were explained to
Apolonio so he could understand it. TC made a finding that he
was illiterate because he only printed his thumbmark.
- Brigida did not furnish details surrounding the execution.
- First two requirements were met, but the third (no
alteration/ circumstance of suspicion) was not.
The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of
an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country, and
therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
How to prove a public of official record of a foreign country?
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking
has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves
nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. 
The trial court erred in admitting that affidavit over the
objection of appellant's counsel because section 34, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court provides that documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English, Spanish or the
national language “To avoid interruption of proceedings,
parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation
prepared before trial” (See. 34).
- Documents written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied by
the required translation but which had been admitted in
evidence without objection by the accused. In those
instances, the Court merely ordered official translations to be
made. It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the revised Rules
of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an
unofficial language but we believe that in the interest of
justice, such injunction should not be taken literally here,
especially since no objection thereto was interposed by
appellant, aside from the fact that appellant, the concerned
parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned
appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in
which the document was written.
- Written declaration was duly presented during the trial and
the person who reduced the victim's declaration into writing
was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor,
and cross-examined by the defense counsel. The witness was
able to explain and discuss what was written in the declaration
and how she came to prepare the same. Significantly,
everything written in that declaration of the victim was
confirmed by the Government's eyewitnesses.
- The argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration
on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of
evidence that could yield the true facts and give retributive
justice in the murder of Valmoria.
- Either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove
 Page 25 of 28
YES
People v. Burgos Violation of RA 1700 against 9 respondents; Judge Burgos
(1991; Feliciano, J.) issued an order fixing the bail for respondents at P30,000.
Prosecution filed certiorari because the issuance of the order
was premature as it has not finished presenting all its evidence
(which was necessary for the judge to determine WON
evidence of guilt was strong) specifically the print out of
contents of a diskette. Judge disallowed a prosecution witness
from holding an actual demonstration in court by printing out
the contents of the seized diskettes using the very same
computer seized from the accused on the ground that they
could be “manipulated.”
ISSUE: WON Judge erred in admitting the print out of
documents contained in diskette possessed by prosecution?
YES
- Judge's asserted apprehension that the witness brought in by
the prosecution to undertake the printing out of the diskettes'
contents could himself "manipulate" said diskettes during the
actual printing out in court may very easily relieved by
designating a competent person agreeable to both parties,
and especially to respondent Judge, who can perform the task
of printing out the contents of the diskettes. Respondent
Judge's ostensible lack of confidence in the prosecution
witness should not in any way affect the integrity of the
diskettes themselves or the right of the prosecution to show
the contents of the diskettes subject, of course, to applicable
rights of the accused.
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC Israel worked for 16 years as an multi-awarded employee of
(1999; Mendoza, J.) IBM. He was terminated on grounds of habitual tardiness and
absenteeism; then filed complaint illegal dismissal because no
due process.
IBM’s defense: He constantly told of his poor attendance
record and inefficiency through the company’s internal
electronic mail (e-mail) system. IBM offered copies of print-
outs of alleged computer entries/messages sent by Reyes to
Israel through IBM’s internal computer system.   Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to
LA dismissed Israel’s complaint
NLRC reversed LA because Israel showed his DTR
ISSUE: WON the unsigned printouts need to be identified or
authenticated considering that technical rules of evidence do
not apply to admin cases? YES, it still needs to be
authenticated.
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of
illegal firearms.
- The rule on hearsay evidence admits of several exceptions.
One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130,
Section 44 of the Rules of Court which states that entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Relative to this
provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the
admission of the said document.
- Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP-
Firearm and Explosives Office, which is the repository of all
records regarding firearms in the Philippines, is competent and
admissible evidence to prove that accused-appellant is not a
licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or
caliber.  Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has
diligently searched for a document or an entry of a specified
tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be as satisfactory
an evidence of its non-existence in his office as his testimony
on the stand to this effect would be
- Judge's insinuation or speculation that the prosecution,
considering the fact that it had the diskettes in its possession
prior to the hearing, may have tampered with them appears
absolutely baseless and quite unfair to the prosecution. Such
statement had in fact no basis in the evidence before the
respondent Judge. There was neither testimonial evidence nor
any physical evidence on the diskettes themselves which
might indicate they had actually been tampered or their
contents altered in order to secure the conviction of the
accused. Respondent Judge was in effect charging the
prosecution with fabricating evidence against the private
respondents, which constitutes serious misconduct and quite
possibly a criminal offense.
- The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the possession
of the prosecution does NOT necessarily imply that it had
altered or tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial
objectives. Indeed, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed prevails, in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary.
- Citing Uichico v NLRC: It is true that administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases.  However, this
procedural rule should NOT be construed as a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.  While the
rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are
not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence
presented before it must at least have a modicum of
admissibility for it to be given some probative value.  The
prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying signature
of a certified public accountant or audited by an independent
auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents which ought
to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative
value.
- The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence
of petitioners, afford no assurance of their authenticity
because they are unsigned.  The decisions of this Court, while
adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently

U.S. v. Russo
(1973; Lively, Circuit Judge)
U.S. v. Croft
(1984; Coffey, Circuit Judge)
U.S. v. Weatherspoon
(1978; Bauer, Circuit Judge)
Page 26 of 28
Russo (an osteopathic doctor) and his associate were indicted
with 51 counts of mail fraud. Services which are not
compensable by the Blue Shield of Michigan. Blue Shield
presented Director of Service Review (Mr. Smith) who
explained in great detail how the DSR are processed and
eventually recorded onto a magnetic tape for storage. Original
DSRs are destroyed and the microfilm are made the sole basis
of the payment check issued to doctors.
Verification procedure: 2 different key punch operators
compare each other’s output.
ISSUE: WON the computer printouts of the magnetic tape
record of the DSR admissible? YES
RE: Opportunity to prepare his defense  The underlying data
used in the analyses, programs and programming method and
all relevant computer inputs and outputs be made available to
the opposing party far in advance of trial. This procedure is
required in the interest of fairness and should facilitate the
introduction of admissible computer evidence. Such procedure
provides the adverse party and the court with an opportunity
to test and examine the inputs, the program and all outputs
prior to trial.
Croft (assistant Veterinary prof) got a study grant for
carcinogenic effects of asbestos on dairy calves from EPA
traceable to water sources (EPA project). Until he got involved
in a separate and independent asbestos research project in his
hometown caused by a broken UG water pipe made of
asbestos (Weston project). Employed a journ student to
analyze water samples after first assistant told him of too
much workload from EPA project. The asst’s salaries were paid
from EPA fund.
Defense: US v. Weatherspoon requires that the Govt establish
the accuracy of the input procedures before the computer
printout can be introduced into evidence.
Evidence in question: Laufenberg’s (University Director of
Payroll and Benefits Services) testimony re computer
generated compilations.
ISSUE: WON district court erred in admitting computer
printouts, containing the University of Wisconsin's payroll
records, into evidence and in denying Croft access to the
computer program? NO, the printouts were reliable and
trustworthy, therefore admissible.
Weatherspoon operated beauty college approved for
veterans’ vocational training by the Veterans Administration,
knowingly caused false student enrollment cards and
attendance certificates to be mailed to the Veterans
Administration in furtherance of a scheme to defraud that
agency.
Evidence in question: Series of computer printouts, which
established that she had enrolled over six times as many
veterans as students than she had been authorized to do.
required some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition
for the admission of documents.
RE: Admissibility of the computer printouts  No court could
fail to notice the extent to which businesses today depend on
computers for a myriad of functions. Perhaps the greatest
utility of a computer in the business world is its ability to store
large quantities of information which may be quickly retrieved
on a selective basis. Assuming that properly functioning
computer equipment is used, once the reliability and
trustworthiness of the information put into the computer has
been established, the computer printouts should be received
as evidence of the transactions covered by the input. No
evidence was introduced which put in question the mechanical
or electronic capabilities of the equipment and the reliability
of its output was verified. The procedures for testing the
accuracy and reliability of the information fed into the
computer were detailed at great length by the witnesses. The
district court correctly held that the trustworthiness of the
information contained in the computer printout had been
established.
RE: Not prepared at the time the acts which it purports to
describe were performed or within a reasonable time
thereafter  Since the computer printout is just a
presentation in structured and comprehensible form of a mass
of individual items, it is immaterial that the printout itself was
not prepared until 11 months after the close of the year 1967.
It would restrict the admissibility of computerized records too
severely to hold that the computer product, as well as the
input upon which it is based, must be produced at or within a
reasonable time after each act or transaction to which it
relates.
The court properly admitted computer printouts. Foundation
was properly laid  Computer-generated compilations of the
1981 payroll records were:
[1] kept in the regular course of business of the University of
Wisconsin-Madison payroll office;
[2] made contemporaneously with or near the time that the
payments were made and the payroll data became available;
[3] accurately reflected the payroll data and were maintained
under his direction and supervision;
[4] staff reviewed and audited the payroll data contained on
the computer printouts for accuracy, on a regular basis
throughout the year.
Defense: Government failed to prove that the information
entered into the computer was accurate and reliable
- Computer data compilations may constitute business records
for purposes of Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) AND may be admitted at
trial if a proper foundation is established.
- Defense thoroughly cross-examined Laufenberg concerning
the accuracy of the computer and the input procedures.
According to the uncontroverted evidence, the computer
printouts were reviewed and audited for accuracy on a regular
basis throughout the year and also relied upon by the
University of Wisconsin-Madison to complete tax forms for the
Internal Revenue Service. This evidence, when combined with
the fact that the audits performed by Laufenburg's staff should
have “picked up” any errors in the input of payroll
information, sufficiently establishes the reliability and
trustworthiness of the computer printouts.
Pursuant to the testimony of a VA supervisory employee who
was familiar with the preparation and use of the printouts, the
Government showed to the satisfaction of the trial court (1)
what the input procedures were, (2) that the input procedures
and printouts were accurate within two percent, (3) that the
computer was tested for internal programming errors on a
monthly basis, and (4) that the printouts were made,
maintained and relied on by the VA in the ordinary course of
its business activities.
All the enrollment certificate forms submitted by
Weatherspoon, which formed the data base fed into the
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ISSUE: WON Government failed to lay a proper foundation for
admission of the printouts, which were simply a computerized
compilation of information taken from the enrollment
certification forms submitted by Weatherspoon and
keypunched onto a tape fed into the computer?
Perma Research v. Singer Perma gave to Singer exclusive license to perfect, manufacture
Co. and market their patented antiskid device. All the tests were
(1976) disastrous, the device was not fail safe.
ISSUE: WON the results of computer simulation offered by
Perma to prove that the mechanism was perfective were
admissible? YES
computer, were made available to defense counsel for
inspection. Defense counsel also had adequate opportunity to
inquire into the accuracy of the input procedures and
programming used. Under the circumstances, we believe that
a sufficient showing of the reliability of the printouts was
made to warrant their admission into evidence under the
standards set out in US v. Russo.
While it might have been better practice for opposing counsel
to arrange for the delivery of all details of the underlying data
and theorems employed in these simulations in advance of
trial to both avoid unnecessarily belabored discussion of highly
technical, tangential issues at trial AND protect truly
proprietary aspects of the programs, the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in allowing the experts to testify as to this
particular basis for their ultimate conclusion that the Perma
device was indeed perfectible. On the record before us,
however, we hold that Singer has not shown that it did not
have an adequate basis on which to cross-examine plaintiff's
experts.

E. Offer and Objection

1. Rule 132, Sections 34-40

2. Cases:

People v. Cariño
(1988)
Interpacific Transit v. prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills
Aviles supposedly received by the accused for which they had not
(1990) rendered proper accounting
when the certified photocopies of the said bills formally were
offered, 3 in evidence, the defense interposed no objection
De los Reyes v. IAC
(1989)
People v. Yatco
(1955)
PHILAMGEN v. Sweet
Lines, Inc.
(1992)
Catuira v. CA
(1994)
Sheraton Palace v. Affidavit of Sheraton’s comptroller of defendant’s indebtedness
Quijano (C.A.) for unpaid hotel accommodations.

Vda. de Onate v. CA
(1995)

XV. Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

A. Rule 133, Sections 1-7

B. REE, Rule7

C. Cases:

U.S. v. Lasada
(1910)
People v. Abendan
(1948)
People v. Solayao
(1996)
People v. Lorenzo
(1995)
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