Article IX

1 **Funa v. Chairman, Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the
CSC, GR 191672, Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although their respective
November 25, 2014. functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such
functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the
exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject
only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by Section 7, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members
of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the
President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a
government entity that is under the control of the President without
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.

2 **Gualberto J. Dela Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to
Llana v. The conduct pre-audit.
Chairperson,
Commission on
A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their
Audit,
consumption or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following
conditions are present:
(1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other
specific statutory authority;
(2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose;
(3) the proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the
unexpended balance of appropriations to which it will be charged is
sufficient to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and
(4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and the claim is
duly supported by authentic underlying evidence.

Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution does not require that the
COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement
is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is
mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or
equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is
inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a
temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.

Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court
may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with

1
 the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.

3 **Gaminde v. COA, Appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to
GR 140335, the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on
December 13, 2000 February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In
case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the
start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be
counted against the latter.
The term: time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another.

The tenure: the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office.
The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.

What the above quoted Transitory Provisions contemplate is tenure not

term of the incumbent Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit,
who shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this
Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new
term thereunder. The term unless imports an exception to the general rule.
Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the
Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the
ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the
discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1)
their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term
thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year
period after the effectivity of the Constitution.

However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in
Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the
first appointees under this Constitution.

4 **MWSS v. MWSS’ contractual employees filed a complaint for willful failure to pay
Hernandez –143 wage differentials, allowances and other monetary benefits in the NLRC.
SCRA 602 [1986] MWSS answered that the NLRC has no jurisdiction because it is a GOCC.
(par. 1) (GOCC’s
Labor Arbiter ruled against MWSS saying that since employees are
with charter and
created by special contractual and not regular, they are governed by the Labor Code, and
law) that the NLRC has jurisdiction over monetary claims. The court ruled that:
1. MWSS employees are governed by civil service law, rules and

2
 regulations; and controversies arising from or connected with that
employment are not cognizable by the NLRC.
2. No distinction between regular or contractual employees.
Positions in the civil service are classified into career and non-
career service. Non-career includes contractual.
3. CSL also governs monetary claims.

5 **BLISS v. Callejo – Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with

237 SCRA 271 original charter; and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does
[1994] (par. 1) not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are
(GOCC’s without
organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
charter and created
under corporation corporations under the general corporation law.
code)

6 **Grino v. CSC – Provincial attorney is primarily confidential in nature so that the services of
194 SCRA 458 those holding the said item can be terminated upon loss of confidence.
[1991] (par. 2) (test Their services are precisely categorized by law to be "trusted services.”
of confidentiality of
positions)
"primarily confidential" "denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
insures freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state.

With respect to the legal assistants or subordinates of the provincial

attorney - rule on confidentiality does not apply. Since the positions
occupied by these subordinates are remote from that of the appointing
authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.

It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in the civil service where

lawyers act as counsel in confidential and non-confidential positions by
simply looking at the proximity of the position in question in relation to
that of the appointing authority. Occupants of such positions would be
considered confidential employees if the predominant reason they were
chosen by the appointing authority is the latter's belief that he can share a
close intimate relationship with the occupant which measures freedom of
discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible
betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of state.

7 **Santiago v. CSC – We need only recall our previous ruling in Taduran vs. Civil Service
178 SRA 733 [1989] Commission (L-52051, 31 July 1984, 131 SCRA 66) stating that there is
(par. 2) (“next in "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that
rank rule” not
persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it
mandatory)
does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for
the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the

3
 same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment."

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for

promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he
and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right
to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to
promote such person to the next higher position.

The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has

a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To
apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on
the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those
qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and
prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.

8 **GSIS v. Kapisanan Unauthorized stoppage of work. The right of government employees

- 510 SCRA 622 (no to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations,
strike) without including the right to strike.

What is being prevented is the intent of effecting work stoppage or

service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions,
economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and
acts of similar nature. This is true even if work or service was not actually
stopped or disrupted. However, they may perform concerted activities
such as wearing protest bands and marching around GSIS during their
break time. Civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
government, including government - owned or con trolled corporations
(GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or those created by special
charter — as such, employees of covered GOCCs are part of the civil
service system and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and
general terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving
self - organization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions.

9 **Gloria v. CA, GR “Security extends not only to employees removed without cause but also
119903, August 15, to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal
2000 removals of tenure” is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed
feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even

without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer
is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away
from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his
service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect
circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those

4
 who are in the Civil Service.

10 **Flores v. Drilon – The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 otherwise known
223 SCRA 568 as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which
[1993] (supra, Art. 7, respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Sec. 13) (prohibition
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
against designation
of elective officer Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for
during tenure) prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to
prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way
of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office.

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for

appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained.
He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA
official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the
law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they
involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of
the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or
appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because
there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by
reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility,
want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under
color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.

11 **Cayetano v. No jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal

Monsod – 201 qualification to an appointive office.
SCRA 210 [1991]
(meaning of practice
Black’s definition:
of law)
- The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients.

A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he, for

valuable consideration, engages in the business of advising persons,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, etc, constituted

5
 by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act/s for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law.

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law
as that which lawyers do. o The practice of law is defined as the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. o Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.

12 **Atienza v.
COMELEC – 612 The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does
SCRA 761 [2010] not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving
political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their
activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may
intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the
discharge of its constitutional functions. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers andf unctions
under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, “include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts.” Moreover, the COMELEC’s power to
register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the
persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an
intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.

13 **Arroyo v. DOJ – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
681 SCRA 181 exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
[2012] punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint
within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the
office of the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with the Ministry Department of Justice
for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

o The power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the

Comelec.

o However, Comelec was given authority to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government.

o Thus, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had

been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary
investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the
Comelec.

o The reason for this delegation of authority has been explained inCommission on
Elections v. Español --- The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is

6
 necessitated by the need for prompt investigation and dispensation of election
cases as an indispensable part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. Enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude
of its workload, the petitioner does not have a sufficient number of legal officers to
conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases.

o People v. Basilla --- the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of
election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections
would simply not be possible without the assistance of
provincial and city fiscals prosecutors and their assistants and staff members, and
of the state prosecutors of the DOJ.
● As set forth above, instead of a mere delegated authority, the other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same.
● It is, therefore, not only the power but the duty of both the Comelec
and the DOJ to perform any act necessary to ensure the prompt and
fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses. Pursuant to
the above constitutional and statutory provisions, and as will be
explained further below, we find no impediment for the Comelec and the
DOJ to create the Joint Committee and Fact- Finding Team for the
purpose of conducting a thorough investigation of the alleged massive
electoral fraud and the manipulation of election results in the 2004 and
2007 national elections relating in particular to the presidential and
senatorial elections

14 **Law Firms v. The general rule is that government-owned and controlled corporations must refer
COMELEC, GR all their legal matters to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. It is only
213330, November in "extraordinary or exceptional circumstances" or "exceptional cases" that it is
19, 2015 (hiring of allowed to engage the services of private counsels.
law firm
unauthorized) The rules and regulations concerning the engagement of private counsel by
GOCCs is provided for by COA Circular and Office of the President Memorandum
Circular.

COA Circular: public funds shall not be utilized for payment of the services of a
private legal counsel or law firm to represent government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
local government units in court or to render legal services for them. In the event
that such legal services cannot be avoided or is justified under extraordinary or
exceptional circumstances for government agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, the written conformity
and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel,
as the case maybe, and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall
first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm.

OP Circular: OCCs are likewise enjoined to refrain from hiring private lawyers or
law firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But in exceptional cases, the
written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the

7
 Commission on Audit shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a
private lawyer or law firm.

Petitioner fails to understand that Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-255

requires not only the conformity and acquiescence of the Office of the Solicitor
General or Office of the Government Corporate Counsel but also the written
conformity of the Commission on Audit. The hiring of private counsel becomes
unauthorized if it is only the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel that
gives its conformity. The rules and jurisprudence expressly require that the
government-owned and controlled corporation concerned must also secure the
concurrence of respondents.

It is also erroneous for petitioner to assume that it had the conformity and
acquiescence of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel since
Government Corporate Counsel Valdez's approval of Clark Development
Corporation's request was merely conditional on its submission of the retainership
contract. Clark Development Corporation's failure to submit the retainership
contract resulted in its failure to secure a final approval.
||

Article X

15 **San Juan v. CSC 196 SCRA 69
[1991] (power of governor to
recommend)
There is a law saying that the budget officer shall be
appointed by the Department Head upon the
recommendation of the local gov’t head subject to civil
service rules. If none of those recommended are qualified,
the Department head may NOT appoint anyone he
chooses. He must return the recommendations and
explain why they are disqualified and ask for new
recommendations.

The recommendation of the local gov’t head is a condition

sine qua non of the Department’s appointing authority.
This is the only way local autonomy can be given the
recognition the Constitution wants it to have. When in
doubt, favor autonomy.

1 **Province of Negros Occidental v.
COA – 631 SCRA 431 [2010] (power
of general supervision v power of
control)
The President's power of general supervision means the
power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates
perform their functions according to law. This is
distinguished from the President's power of control which
is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate o fficer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the President
over that of the subordinate o fficer. The power of control
gives the President the power to revise or reverse the acts

8
 or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise
of discretion.
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general
supervision of the President, the President's authority is
limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed. The President may only point out that
rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay
down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to
modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits in the present case does not need the
approval of the President to be valid.

2 **Mandanas v. Executive Secretary

Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution commands
Ochoa, G.R. 199802, July 3, 2018
(computation of justshare) the allocation to the LGUs of a just share in the
national taxes.

This section embodies three mandates, namely:

(1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national
taxes;

(2) the just share shall be determined by law; and

(3) the just share shall be automatically released to the

LGUs.

To carry out the second mandate of Section 6, the

Congress enacted Section 284 which provides that
LGUs shall have a share in the national internal revenue
taxes.
Basically, Section 6, supra, mentions national taxes as
the source of the just share of the LGUs while Section
284 ordains that the share of the LGUs be taken from
national internal revenue taxes instead.

Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary

in nature, congressional lawmaking remains subject to
the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The
phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in
Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the
term national taxes written in Section 6. As such,
Congress has actually departed from the letter of the
1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be
the base from which the just share of the LGU comes.
Such departure is impermissible. Equally impermissible
is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the
guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under

9

3 **Naval v. COMELEC, GR 207851,
July 8, 2014
4 **Umali v. COMELEC, GR 203974,
April 22, 2014 (conduct of
plebiscite; Cabanatuan City as
HUC)
the 1987 Constitution.
The intent of the people in respect of Section 6 is really
that the base for reckoning the just share of the LGUs
should includes all national taxes. To read Section 6
differently as requiring that the just share of LGUs in the
national taxes shall be determined by law is tantamount
to the unauthorized revision of the 1987 Constitution.||| ||
Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation." The aim of
legislative apportionment is to equalize population and
voting power among districts. The basis for districting
shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province and not the number of registered voters therein.
The conditions for the application of the three-term limit
rule are present in the instant case as the records clearly
establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the
same government post.
While Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian
members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact
that the district which elected him for the third and fourth
time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004
and 2007.
In 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan
City passed a resolution, requesting the President to
declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a
highly urbanized city (HUC). President issued a
proclamation proclaiming the city as an HUC subject to
"ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein,
as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Sec. 10, Art. X: No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
10

5 **Francisco v. HR – GR 160261,
November 10, 2003 (to initiate
meaning)
The entire Nuva Ecija should be included in the
plebiscite as they are also directly affected when
Cabanatuan is converted into a HUC. The power to
create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is
essentially legislative in nature. The framers of the
Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of
such power as long as
1. the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and
2. the creation, division, merger, abolition or the
substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject
to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
With the twin criteria satisfied in the case at bar, the
delegation to LGUs of the power to create, divide,
merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has
become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative powers.
Article XI
t is clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with
the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious
reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once
and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings
starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-
third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does
not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under
Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."
According to Fr. Bernas, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Only the House, by a vote of one-
third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate.
However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in
the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. It takes place not in the Senate but in the
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing
of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House or
a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House; (2)
the processing by the proper Committee which may either
11
 reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the
resolution must be forwarded to the House; and (4) there
is the processing of the House of Representatives which
either affirms the resolution of the Committee or overrides
a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds
the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House
"initiates an impeachment case." Therefore, initiation
takes place by: (1) the act of filing the
impeachment/verified complaint; AND (2) Congress'
taking initial action of said complaint by its referral to the
house committee of justice. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed with the same official w/in 1 year.

6 **Gutierrez v. House of “Initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action
Representatives – GR 193459, on it. The initiation starts with the ling of the complaint
February 15, 2011 (one-year bar) which must be accompanied with an action to set the
complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking
initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by
the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint
to the Committee on Justice.

Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate"

beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated in ux of
successive complaints, each having their own respective
60-session- day period of disposition from referral.

the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent

undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the
legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation," with
main reference to the records of the Constitutional
Commission,

7 **Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan – 160 Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as
SCRA 843 [1988] (powers) distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged
with the duty to:

Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any

act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or commission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

12
 The Constitution likewise provides that:

The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the

office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to
function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may
be provided by law, contempt except those conferred on
the office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.

Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given

to the Ombudsman, the incumbent
Tanodbayan (caged Special Prosecutor under the 1987
constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and
duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan,
except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do
so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he
has been divested of such authority.

Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is

a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and
can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's
authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate
the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if
instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original
power to issue subpoena under Section 10(d) of PD 1630,
is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may,
however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection
with the cases he is ordered to investigate.

8 **Gonzales III v. OP -679 SCRA 614 The Special Prosecutor may removed by the Office of
[2012](Luneta Siege) the President.

While Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No.

6770) declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority
over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other
hand, grants the President express power of removal over
a Special Prosecutor ONLY. Thus, the SC resolved to
maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar
as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally
within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not
entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.

13

9 **Gonzales III v. OP, GR 196231,
January 28, 2014 (President’s
disciplinary authority over OMB and
his Deputies)
10 **Hernandez v. Ombudsman, GR
197307, Feb 26, 2014 (power of the
OMB to dismiss v. power to
recommend the removal)
As a general rule, all officers appointed by the President
are also removable by him except when the law expressly
provides otherwise — that is, when the power to remove
is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the
appointing power. Under the doctrine of implication, the
power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a
general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the
President are also removable by
him. The exception to this is when the law expressly
provides otherwise — that is, when the power to remove
is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the
appointing power. In some ca ses, the Constitution
expressly separates the power to remove from the
President’s power to appoint.
SC held that Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 vests the President
disciplinary authority over the Deputy OMB. This violates
the independence of the OMB, hence, is unconstitutional.
SC held that subjecting the Deputy OMB to discipline and
removal by the President seriously place at risk the
independence of the OMB itself.
The OMB, by express constitutional mandate, includes its
key officials, all of them tasked to support the OMB in
carrying out her mandate. Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 violates
such independence. o By doing so, said provision directly
collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the OMB, but inevitably with
the principle of checks and balances that the creation of
an OMB office seeks to revitalize.
However, by a vote of 8-7, SC maintained the validity of
Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. o SC
did NOT consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
be constitutionally within the Office of the OMB and,
hence, is not entitled to the independence the OMB
enjoys under the Constitution.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
seeks to reverse and set aside the July 22, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals and its June 13, 2011
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.88954, affirming the
decision of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0327-I that
14
 found petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty and dismissed them from the service.

Administrative disciplinary authority of the OMB does

not end with a recommendation to punish. The
statement in Tapiador that the Ombudsman is without
authority to directly dismiss an erring public official as its
mandate is only to recommend was mere obiter dictum,
and cannot, in the words of Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, "be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the
Supreme Court." In fact, the pronouncement in Tapiador
on the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority was only
limited to two sentences, to wit:
x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority
to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government
service x x x. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only "recommend" the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.

11 **Carpio-Morales v. CA – 774 SCRA OLD JURISPRUDENCE:

431 (condonation doctrine
abandoned) Condonation Doctrine:
- An elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby
cutting the right to remove him therefor. Courts
may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed
to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers.

The doctrine is not based on statutory law but is a

jurisprudential creation. (Pascual vs. Provincial Board)

But the condonation doctrine does not apply to the ff.:

- Criminal cases, and
- Appointive officials (since, as to them, there is no
sovereign will to disenfranchise)

NOW THIS CASE SAYS CALLS FOR A RE-EXAMINATION

OF THE PASCUAL DOCTRINE:

Pascual was decided within the context of the 1935

Constitution which was silent with respect to public

15
 accountability, or of the nature of public office being a
public trust.

The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution,

AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is
PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea that an elective
local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning
an administrative offense!

There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support the

notion. In fact the Local Government Code and the rules
preclude condonation since in the first place, an elective
local official who is meted with the penalty of removal
could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to
a direct disqualification from running for such post.

If condonation of an elective official's administrative

liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then
the same should have been provided by law under our
governing legal mechanisms.

Liability arising from administrative offenses may only be

condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.

12 **Ledesma v. CA – 465 SCRA 437 The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique
[2005] (the “recommendatory” feature of the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his
function of OMB does not divest deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act
Congress of plenary legislative promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
power to vest OMB powers beyond against officers or employees of the Government, or of
the Constitution) any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate
and prosecute cases involving public officers and
employees

Petitioner insists that the word recommend be

given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsman’s
action is only advisory in nature rather than one having
any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman.

Section 15 is substantially the same as Section

13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the
powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We

16

13 **Lastimosa v. Vasquez – 243 SCRA
497 [1995] (prosecutor’s assistance)
note that the proviso above qualifies the order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute
an officer or employee akin to the questioned
issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without
just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of
the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee
is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication
that the Ombudsman’s recommendation is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the
head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been
settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers
intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with
sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out
its mandate as protector of the people against inept and
corrupt government officers and employees. The Office
was granted the power to punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of
impeachable officers, members of Congress and the
Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer
under its authority pending an investigation when the case
so warrants. It is thus clear that the framers of our
Constitution intended to create a stronger and more
effective Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach
of political influences and vested with powers that are not
merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional
Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did
when RA 6770 was enacted.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is
authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31 of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The
Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or
lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under
his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
17
 It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman
Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C.
Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file
an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrismo.

It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be done was for the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary
investigation had been given over to the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of
the offense to be charged would still be subject to the
approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because
under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is
deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control"
of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the
power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve,
reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner
cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and
file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

Article XII

14 **IID v. PSALM -682 SCRA 602 Appropriation of water, as used in the Water Code refers to the
[2012] "acquisition of rights over the use of waters or the taking or
diverting of waters from a natural source in the manner and for
any purpose allowed by law."

Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign

company may not be said to be "appropriating" our natural
resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and
converts the same into electricity through artificial devices. Since
the NPC remains in control of the operation of the dam by virtue
of water rights granted to it, as determined under DOJ Opinion
No. 122, s. 1998, there is no legal impediment to foreign-owned
companies undertaking the generation of electric power using
waters already appropriated by NPC, the holder of water permit.
Such was the situation of hydropower projects under the BOT
contractual arrangements whereby foreign investors are allowed
to finance or undertake construction and rehabilitation of
infrastructure projects and/or own and operate the facility
constructed. However, in case the facility requires a public utility
franchise, the facility operator must be a Filipino corporation or

18
 at least 60% owned by Filipino.|||

Lease or transfer of water rights is allowed under the Water

Code, subject to the approval of NWRB after due notice and
hearing. However, lessees or transferees of such water rights
must comply with the citizenship requirement imposed by the
Water Code and its IRR. But regardless of such qualification of
water permit holders/transferees, it is to be noted that there is no
provision in the EPIRA itself authorizing the NPC to assign or
transfer its water rights in case of transfer of operation and
possession of multi-purpose hydropower facilities. Since only
the power plant is to be sold and privatized, the operation of the
non-power components such as the dam and reservoir,
including the maintenance of the surrounding watershed, should
remain under the jurisdiction and control of NPC which continue
to be a government corporation. There is therefore no necessity
for NPC to transfer its permit over the water rights to K-Water.
Pursuant to its purchase and operation/management contracts
with K-Water, NPC may authorize the latter to use water in the
dam to generate electricity.|

15 **La Bugal-B’laan v. Ramos, GR Regalian doctrine - all natural resources are owned by the
127872, Dec. 1, 2004 (Regalian State. The exploration, development and utilization (EDU)
Doctrine) of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

The State may undertake these EDU activities through

either of the following: (i) By itself directly and solely, (ii) By
co-production; joint venture; or production sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations, at least
60 percent of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, (iii) Small-scale utilization of natural resources
may be allowed by law in favor of Filipino citizens, or (iv)
For large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the President may enter into “agreements
with foreign- owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law. The last mode is the subject
of this case.

Agreements involving technical or financial assistance

(FTAA) are service contracts (between the government
and foreign corporations) with safeguards. Such service
contracts may be entered into only with respect to
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
safeguards are:

1. The service contract shall be crafted in

19

1 **Resident Marine Mammals v. Sec.
Reyes – 756 SCRA 513
accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and
requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
2. The President shall be the signatory for the
government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms
to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
3. Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the
President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over
the agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any.
The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in
La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with
respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among
which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance
with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the
government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been
vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that
it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the
President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement
and interpose timely objections, if any.
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the President himself enter into any service
contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC- 46
appeared to have been entered into and signed only by
the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr.,
contrary to the said constitutional requirement.
20
 The "alter ego principle," cannot apply in this case since
the the Constitution requires the Chief Executive to be the
signatory to the agreement

2 **Dir. of Lands v. IAC – 146 SCRA
509 [1986] (right of corporations to
acquire land)
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically
"public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels
and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually
confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public
Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right
to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed
to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring
interests in public land to which the vendor had already
acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title.

The only limitation then extant was that corporations

could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental
circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain
cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came
into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid
and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested
rights.

The correct rule is that alienable public land held by a

possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by
Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a
juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is technical, rather than substantial

3 **Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, GR 7-7 voting: Constitutional

21
135385, December 6, 2000 (IPRA
Law)
Justice Puno (Separate Opinion):
In Cariño v. Insular Government, the Court ruled :"x x x
the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an
indigenous member of the cultural communities as one of
private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed
"native title.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership
over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral
lands are not the same as ancestral domains.
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs
held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously until the present, except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings with government and/or
private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains
comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein and includes ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and
other lands individually owned whether alienable or
not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources.
They also include lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the
same conditions as ancestral domains except that these
are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the
ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership. These lands include but are not limited to
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands
and domains held under a claim of private ownership as
far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
never to have been public lands and are indisputably
22
presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by
virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected.127
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral
lands and domains held by native title as never to have
been public land.

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens

certificate of title over their individually-owned ancestral
lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not
domains, and such lands must be individually, not
communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of

ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of
owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less
than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the
members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under
C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act
496, the Land Registration Act.

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the

rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of
customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domain." It is the recognition of the
ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral
domains and lands that breathes life into this
constitutional mandate.

The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of

their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and
does not include the right to alienate the same.

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to

their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous
concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view
that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not

23
part of the public domain. But its private character ends
there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the
ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. It is held not
only by the present possessors of the land but extends to
all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future,
to the domain.

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants

to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of
ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna and all other natural resources"
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution as belonging to the State.

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral

domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are
merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them
for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from
their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms
and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of
"ensuring ecological and environmental protection and
conservation measures."

The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7

(b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of
natural resources .

The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting,

extraction, development or exploitation of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains.

Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of
these natural resources, may directly undertake the
development and exploitation of the natural resources by
itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority
rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the
natural resources are found by entering into a co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into
any of said agreements with a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving

24

4 **Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez – 111
SCRA 704 [1982] (usufruct)
5 **Halili v. CA – 287 SCRA 465
[1998] (subsequent sale to Filipinos)
6 **Republic v. CA – 235 SCRA 567
[1994] (citizenship at time of
acquisition; read with Retention
and Reacquisition Law)
either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-
member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs
Jose’s will: ⅔ usufruct in favor of Wanda, an Austrian
national. SC upheld the usufruct because while it is a
real right, does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Exception: 1935 Constitution allows vesting of title to
foreign nationals in cases of intestate succession.
Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands
or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of
legal succession. However, the effect of the subsequent
sale by an alien to a Filipino citizen cures such invalidity.
The subsequent sale can no longer be impugned on the
basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of
the constitutional provision—to keep our land in Filipino
hands—has been served by the subsequent sale to a
Filipino citizen.
if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in
the original transaction is considered cured and the title of
the transferee is rendered valid.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian
citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal
impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in
view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land
sought to be registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation
thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or
since 1937.
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be
a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case or rural
25
 land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a

private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel
of residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question.
What is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution.

7 **Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS – 267 In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
SCRA 408 [1997] (national pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
patrimony) national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial

of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book

The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. During
World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese
Military Administration into a military headquarters. When
the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel
was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as
the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the
1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention.
In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment
of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was
the site of a failed coup d‘etat where an aspirant for vice-
president was proclaimed President of the Philippine
Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with

26

8 **Army and Navy v. CA – 271 SCRA
36 [1997] (historical landmark)
public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51%
of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold
is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands.
The City of Manila is the owner of a parcel of land in South
Blvd. Cor. Manila Bay. Petitioner entered into a lease
contract with private respondent sometime in January,
1983. In said lease contract, it agreed to: 1) pay an annual
a rent of P250,000.00 with a 10% increase every two (2)
years; 2) pay the realty tax due on the land; and 3)
construct a modern multi>storey hotel provided for therein
within five (5) years which shall belong to the City upon
expiration or termination of the lease without right of
reimbursement for the cost of construction. However,
petitioner failed to pay the rents for 7 consecutive years.
Petitioner also failed to erect a multi>storey hotel in the
site and to pay the realty taxes. For violations of the lease
contract and after several demands, the City of Manila
had no other recourse but to file the action for illegal
detainer and demand petitioner's eviction from the
premises. The MTC, RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the
City and ordered that petitioner vacate the area and to
pay the rentals and taxes. The issue is w/n petitioner was
ejected from the premises validly. The SC upheld the
lower court’s decision.
The contention by ANCM that Army and Navy Club has
been declared a national historical landmark by the
National Historical Commission holds no water. While the
declaration that it is a historical landmark is not
objectionable, the recognition is specious. Citing the
Manila Hotel case, which enumerated the procedure on
how to declare a property as a historical landmark, the SC
held that there is no showing that the procedure to
27
 declare the property as a historical landmark has been
complied with. The City of Manila even observed that the
signatories thereto are officers and members of the Club
making such certification self> serving. Furthermore, the
same was issued 3 years after the suit was instituted, thus
showing that it was merely an afterthought. Nonetheless,
such certification does not give any authority to the
petitioner to lay claim of ownership, or any right over the
subject property. Nowhere in the law does it state that
such recognition grants possessory rights over the
property to the petitioner. Nor is the National Historical
Commission given the authority to vest such right of
ownership or possession of a private property to the
petitioner. As a mere lessee, it is bound to comply with its
contract, and failure to do so warrants its ejectment. Such
was the case. Considering that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact, a summary judgment is proper.
The argument that it was declared a historical landmark, is
not a substantial issue of fact which does not, in any way,
alter or affect the merit of the ejectment suit.

9 **Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance
Secretary Margarito B. Teves, GR
176579, 28 June 2011.
“capital” refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in
the election of directors of a public utility, i.e., to the total
common shares in PLDT.] Considering that common
shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting
rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if
the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the
election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include
such preferred shares because the right to participate in
the control or management of the corporation is exercised
through the right to vote in the election of directors. In
short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in
the election of directors.

Article XVI

10 **Republic of Indonesia Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a
v. Vinzons (2005) – foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the
ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure
gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign
State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign
State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial

28
 activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged,
the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii.

Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating

that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled
according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of
the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity
from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not
necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other
hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the
sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise
waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of
Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its
totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity.
Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of
settling the case, except to dismiss it.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear
and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary
implication. We find no such waiver in this case.

Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic

mission is a sovereign function. On the other hand, he argues that
the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic
mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment, is
no longer a sovereign function of the State.

We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment of a

diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does
not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its
maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings
and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents
and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of
Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it
entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or
maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical
facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian
Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

11 **Mobil Philippines v. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function
Customs Arrastre – 18 proprietary in nature doesn’t necessarily result in its being suable. If
SCRA 1120 [1966] - said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its
unincorporated agencies
governmental functions, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign

29
 immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The BOC,
acting as part of the machinery of the nat’l gov’t in the operations of
the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as
a necessary incident of its prime government function, is immune
from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

12 **Del Mar v. PVA – 51 Suit against the Philippine Veterans Administration not a suit against
SCRA 340[1973] the Government.

As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of the Government

from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in
"adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property." In such actions, which,
in effect, constitute suits against the Government, the Court has no
option but to dismiss them.

Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application

where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails
to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from
the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the
said claimant.

13 **Ministerio v. CFI – 40 As a general rule, the government is immune from suit without its consent.
SCRA 464 [1971]
o To avail of this immunity, it doesn’t even need to be named in the case as
the party proceeded against.
o If it appears that the action would hold the government liable, then the
immunity applies.

o So even if the defendants named are public officials, with the

government not being named, the immunity would hold.

o This is clearly so where a litigation would result in a financial

responsibility for the government
§ Disbursement of funds
§ Loss of property

o In these cases, the party that may be adversely affected is the

government. Thus, the defense of non-suability may be interposed.

● However, it is a different matter where the public official is sued, in

his capacity as such, for acts contrary to law and injurious to the
rights of a plaintiff.

Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean

o State authorizes only legal acts by its officers — unauthorized acts are not
acts of the State.
§ Thus, an action against these officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated is not a suit against the state which requires consent.

30
 o In the same tenor, an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer
on the ground that...
§ While claiming to act for the State;
§ He violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff;
§ Under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have

o Such suit is not a suit against the State within the constitutional
provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.

14 **Syquia v. Almeda- Where the judgment in such a recovery case would result not only in the
Lopez – 84 SCRA recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a
312[1978] charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should
be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it
cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the
consent of said Government.

15 **The Holy See v. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private
Rosario – 238 SCRA 524 party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start
[1994] of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is
engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. tested
by its nature.

If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,

then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit. If the Holy See has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. HOWEVER, the Holy See
has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the
site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status
of a foreign sovereign. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the
creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The
determination of the executive arm of government that a state or
instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a
political question that is conclusive upon the courts. Where the plea
of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is
the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign
relations.

31
1 **Arigo v. Swift, GR This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being
206510, September 16, sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver
2014 (supra., Art. 2, Sec. has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
2) governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary
acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State
immunity extends only to acts jure imperii.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their o cial capacity as

commanding o cers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing o fficial military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said o fficials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling

2 **DOH v. Canchela – 475
SCRA 218 [2005]
The nullity of the Owner-Consultant Agreements (Agreements) with
private respondents covering infrastructure projects notwithstanding,
the ends of substantial justice and equity will be better served if
payment to private respondents for their consultancy services is
allowed on a quantum meruit basis.

The measure of recovery under the principle of quantum meruit

should relate to the reasonable value of the services performed,
taking into account the standard of practice in the profession, the
architectural and engineering skills of private respondents, and their
professional expertise and standing.

Respecting petitioners argument that the State is immune from suit,

the same deserves scant consideration. To sustain the argument
would not only perpetuate a grave injustice on private respondents
who performed their services in good faith and were given the run-
around for over eight years, but would sanction as well unjust
enrichment on the part of the State.

3 **Republic v. Purisima – In Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the

78 SCRA 470 [1977] Philippines, the Court held that "The doctrine of non-suability
recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the
[1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of
law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal
right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which
such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all.lwphl@itç Even if such
a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly
expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the
analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued

32
 applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They
could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by
pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass
upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication.

The consent to be sued, to be effective though, must come from the

State acting through a duly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel
for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding
force on the government.

4 **Philippine Agila v. PASI entered into an MOA with DOTC through Sec. Garcia
Lichauco – 489 SCRA 22 concerning the launch of Ph owner satellite. PASI and gov't
[2006] coordinated with ITU 2 orbital slots (161 and 153 East Longitute).
Lichauco, then DOTC USEC, sabotaged the business of PASI by
offering the offering orbital slot to unknown bidder. PASI instituted
civil complaint against Lichauco and unknown awardee.

Lichauco cannot raise the defense of state immunity from suit. The
public official concerned committed illegal or tortious acts against
plaintiff. An action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming
to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be
sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.

33