* Question of law and fact

1. CIR vs CA (1998) - Galicinao

FACTS:
In 1980, YMCA earned an income of 676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its
premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators and 44,259 from
parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an assessment
to YMCA for deficiency taxes which included the income from lease of YMCA’s real property.
YMCA formally protested the assessment but the CIR denied the claims of YMCA. On
appeal, the CTA ruled in favor of YMCA and excluded income from lease to small shop
owners and parking fees. The CIR elevated the case to the CA which reversed the CTA
ruling. YMCA filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the findings of fact of the CTA,
being supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive. The CA found merit in
the motion and reversed itself.

ISSUE:
Whether what the CA reversed was legal conclusion and not the factual finding of the CTA.

HELD:
Yes. It is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the CTA, when
supported by substantial evidence, will be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the
said court committed gross error in the appreciation of facts. In the present case, this Court
finds that the February 16, 1994 Decision of the CA did not deviate from this rule. The latter
merely applied the law to the facts as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue raised by the
CIR: "Whether or not the collection or earnings of rental income from the lease of certain
premises and income earned from parking fees shall fall under the last paragraph of Section
27 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended." 15
Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the aforementioned
issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did so in a manner different from that of the CTA
did not necessarily imply a reversal of factual findings.
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been
held that "[t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts." 16 In the present case, the CA
did not doubt, much less change, the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to
the facts. That its interpretation or conclusion is different from that of the CTA is not
irregular or abnormal.
2. Villanueva vs CA (1998) - Galicinao

FACTS:
In 1991, private respondent, Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of
money with damages before the RTC against petitioner, Felix Villanueva and his wife
Melchora. The subject matter of the action involved a check dated June 30, 1991 in the
amount of P167,600.00 issued by petitioner in favor of private respondent. The check
supposedly represented payment of loans previously obtained by petitioner from private
respondent as capital for the former's mining and fertilizer business. When the check was
presented for payment, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. A demand was made
upon petitioner to make good the check but he failed to do so. Private respondent then filed
a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 before the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office and the
subject civil complaint for sum of money. Petitioner, on the other hand, avers that his
principal obligation only amounts to P23,420.00.
The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondent, but both parties appealed the decision to
the CA. The petitioner prayed for the reversal the RTC’s decision and contended that his
principal obligation is only P23,420.00, while private respondent sought interest, attorney’s
fees, and damages. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but also granted interest,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses to private respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the SC, alleging issues regarding questions of fact as follows: (a) the
Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the five (5%) and ten (10%) percent interest
imposed is not enforceable due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) the Court of
Appeals erred in not finding that petitioner is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c)
the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the Central Bank and Monetary Board has
no power or authority to repeal the usury law.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition should prosper

HELD:
No. Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law
allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As
such, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below.
The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
*Factum porbandum and Factum probans

3. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (1991) - Galicinao

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in civil case
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful
concert with the principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public funds,
plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of
corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power; (2) he acted as dummy,
nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator, director, board member and/or
stockholder of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal
defendants; (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another,
in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with
gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten
wealth ; (4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such
Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of
government funds; and (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself
to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or
member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to
conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.
On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of
documents was denied by respondent court in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner
filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly
committed by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a
private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms
and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal basis thereof, and
that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the particular acts allegedly
committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that
plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein.
In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to
annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his
motion for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which denied his
motion for reconsideration; to compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of
particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil
Case No. 0035 should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the
respondent Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of
particulars is submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid
resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him
in the ordinary course of law other than the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions.

HELD:
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or
allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural
reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable,
constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts
which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to
prove the existence of those facts.
The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or
why he is perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the
complaint how petitioner allowed himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are,
why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or
formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not
state which corporations petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder, director, member,
dummy, nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's name does not even
appear in annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and
Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to,
pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of
law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the particulars
prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification
purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the
complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material
facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the
defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he
may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned
resolutions. The petition is granted and the resolutions in question are annulled and set
aside. The respondents are ordered to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars containing the
facts prayed for by petitioner, or otherwise, respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude
the herein petitioner as defendant in the above-mentioned civil case.
4. Fareast Marble, Inc., and Tabuenas v. CA, BPI (1993) – Galicinao

FACTS:
In 1976, petitioner Fareast Marble received from private respondent (the former
Commercial Trust Bank Company which was absorbed by BPI) the following, viz:
several loans evidenced by promissory notes; AND
the former was extended by the latter credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts;
Petitioner Tabuena (Ramon and Luis) executed in favor of BPI a “continuing guaranty”
whereby they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to answer for the loan obligations of Far East
to the bank.
Far East failed to pay its obligations (both the promissory note and the trust receipts) and
Ramon and Luis Tabuena also did not comply with their solidary liability under the “continuing
guaranty.” As a result, in 1987, private respondent BPI filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel
mortgage with replevin against petitioners.
Far East filed a compulsory counterclaim where it admitted the genuineness and due
execution of the promissory notes but alleged further that it has already prescribed, so it
raised the defense of prescription and lack of cause of action; it also denied that BPI made
prior demands for payment;
BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses, alleging that its
cause of action against Far East have not prescribed, since within 10 year from the time its
cause of action accrued, various written extrajudicial demands were made by BPI to Far
East.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of cause of action and on grounds of
prescription. BPI filed an appeal and the CA ruled in its favor and remanded the case for
further proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether the interruption of the prescriptive period to institute an action is an
ULTIMATE FACT which had to be expressly and indispensably pleaded by BPI in its
complaint, and that failure to so alleged such circumstance is fatal to BPI's cause of action.

HELD:
NO. Section 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaborating
thereon, Section 1 of Rule 8 declares that every pleading, including, of course, a complaint,
"shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." "Ultimate facts" are the
essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or
which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant (Tantuico, Jr. vs.
Republic of the Phil., et al., 204 SCRA 428 [1991]), while "evidentiary facts" are those which
tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.
Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for
payment, Far East has failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action.
Besides, prescription is not a cause of action; it is a defense which, having been raised,
should be supported by competent evidence. But even as Far East raised the defense of
prescription, BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive period was interrupted and
renewed by written extrajudicial demands for payment and acknowledgment by Far East of
the debt.
A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even
though the allegation may be vague or indefinite, for in such case, the recourse of the
defendant would be to file a motion for a bill of particulars. It is indeed the better rule that,
pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be liberally construed so that the litigants may
have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims so as to avoid possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities.
In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits to Far East and the
failure of the latter to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts
which have to be pleaded, although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid
enforceable must be proven during the trial

* Uses of Evidence

5. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO. 90478 - Jacinto

FACTS:
PCGG filed a complaint against private respondents Tantoco , Jr. and Santiago together
with the Marcoses for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages, and
was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order no. 14 of President Corazon Aquino before
the Sandiganbayan. After the case was set for pre-trial, the defendant filed a pleading
denominated “interrogatories to the plaintiff”, amended interrogatories to plaintiff, as well as
“Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents” relevant to the issue of the case.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the pleading contending that the
interrogatories are defective because they do not name the particular individuals to whom
they are propounded, being only addressed to the PCGG and are the same matters…(private
respondents) sought to be clarified through their Bill of Particulars. Secondly, it contended
that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG’s proof
upon trial. As to the “Motion for Production and Inspections of Documents”, the plaintiff
prayed for the nullity of the pleading contending there is no good cause in the production of
the documents sought for. Furthermore, it contended that some of the documents are non-
existent. The Court decided in favor of the defendant’s motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “interrogatories to the plaintiff” and “Motion for the Production
and Inspection of Documents” were in accordance with the Rules of Court as to consider it
to be valid

HELD:
YES. The Court ruled in favor of the defendant.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with
the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the
parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident
purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said
trials are carried on in the dark. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether
they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which
states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or
private corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any
officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf."
As to the second contention, the Court opined that as already pointed out, it is the precise
purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all
parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the
stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period
preceding it.
As to the Motion for the Production and Inspection of Documents, the court ruled that t,
contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection of
the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53 Some of the documents are,
according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material
allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff.
It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery,
to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other
documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the
counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.

6. FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION - Jacinto

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City
disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was the chairman of the Board Directors of private
respondent. An action for breach of contract was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent and after the latter filed
its answer petitioner served them with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for
January 9, February 12 and April 22, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the
latter that petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private Respondent
filed an Urgent Motion Not to Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination alleging that: a) petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, b) there is absolutely no sound reason
or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition, c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and
oppression upon the prospective deponent, d) deponent has no intention of leaving the country, e)the intended deponent is
available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits.

Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope appears
unwarranted since the proposed deponent had already responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has
signified his availability to testify in court. The petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to
the CA for further adjudication on the merits. CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to direct,
in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for the ruling. This is provided for in Sections
16 and 18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the right of the party to take depositions as means of discovery is not
absolute. They reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories; b)deponent had
signified his availability to testify in court; c)to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask
clarificatory question.

With the denial of the petitioner’s MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC.

ISSUE: 1.WON that the decision of respondent court dismissing its petition on the ground that appeal and not certiorari is the
proper remedy in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based on facts which are not obtaining in the case
at bar, viz.: (a) that petitioner had already obtained a deposition, which it had not; (b) that said deposition was offered as
evidence, which was not done because there was nothing yet to offer, and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen
because there was nothing to reject as nothing was offered.

2. WON the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition be not taken in the absence of good cause
therefor. It asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court cannot
be considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law, which reasons, to repeat, are: (a) that the proposed deponent
had earlier responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court;
and (c) that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the vital
witness.

HELD: The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of discovery would contribute immensely to the attainment of the
judiciary’s primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases. The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy
the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue formulation and face revelation
theretofore performs primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a
device, along with the pretrial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and 2) as a
device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is to enable the parties consistent with recognized
privileges to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are
carried on in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as
when the interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial.

I. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion
seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which
the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition shall not be taken.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the
authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not
unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.

Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. 11
This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable, 12
considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it. However, such rules are
subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably
cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is
a clear or serious abuse of discretion. It is our considered opinion that on the bases of circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar, and which will hereinafter be discussed, certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. SC
ruled that certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court.

II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29 imposes
serious sanctions on the party who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of discovery, such as dismissing his action
or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of
the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel
discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal
to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out his pleadings or parts thereof;
or staying further proceedings. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown that
the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the
exercise of judicial discretion. The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on
the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific demonstration of facts,
as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. 16
What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is sought.

The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of the
deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that privileged information or
trade secrets will be sought in the course of the examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed
in writing. 18 In the present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the
order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken.

1. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken after service of interrogatories, the courts took a relatively
liberal view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which this question was raised, Judge Hilbert said that:
"Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has been inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in a proper
case should exercise, discretion to permit an oral examination. But it should be made to clearly appear that the relevant
subject matter will not involve the interrogation of the witness with respect to those particulars upon which he was examined
by interrogatories." It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to
a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting
to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to
resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence.

2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that
his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a
witness may be used in court during the trial. 25 But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of
his deposition.

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed
in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact
investigation, our legal system is now thoroughly committed to the notion that on the trial itself the adducing of facts by viva
voce testimony of witnesses — whose demeanor and manner are subject to the observation of the judge — is superior to the
use of written statements of the same witnesses. Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use
of depositions as evidence. And since their use as evidence was originally conceived as the sole function of depositions proper,
the limitations on their taking dovetailed with the limitations on their use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules,
the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a
method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking
of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever
practicable.

3. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not observe the
behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition
becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being
common to all depositions alike. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy,
harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following
requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the
motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the
other party.

4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed
deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following
requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the
motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the
other party. Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition.
32 No doubt, private respondent and its representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties when
required to submit to examination — but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in affirming the same.

*Admissibility and weight or credibility of evidence

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABELARDO PARUNGAO (1996) - Jacinto

FACTS:
Parungao was arraigned and tried separately for the information filed against him
and the other 15 jail-breakers of the Provincial Jail of Pampanga of the crime of robbery
with homicide upon which on the incident of the jailbreak 2 jail guards were killed on the
discharge of their duties and of the missing 6 firearms and for serious physical injury
caused to the other jail guard, he was convicted as a co-conspirator and principal by
inducement. Unsatisfied with the lower court's ruling hence the case was elevated to the CA
upon which the accused contended that the testimonies of the 4 witnesses presented by the
prosecution are merely hearsays of which the witnesses testified and conveyed matters to
court that are not of their own personal knowledge and were merely narrated to them with
the other detainees.

ISSUE: W/N hearsay evidence are admissible.

HELD: The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of
objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should
not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative
value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not be given credence for it has no probative value.

Plainly the foregoing testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana that accused-appellant was the
mastermind of the jailbreak is not sufficient to prove such fact, such evidence being merely
hearsay because said witnesses testified and conveyed to the court matters not of their own
personal knowledge but matters only narrated
The court also emphasizes that the trial court gravely erred in giving weight to the hearsay
evidence that was presented since it is violative of the hearsay rule and same was
unconstitutional for said act-the accused was not given an opportunity to meet the
witnesses face-to-face and to subject the source of the information to the rigid test of cross-
examination. Conspiracy against the accused-appellant has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
The court ruled in favor of the accused acquitting the latter of the crime charged.

8. PRATS & COMPANY VS. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY

FACTS: Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership instituted an action in the RTC of the City of
Manila for recovery from the Phoenix Insurance Co. the sum of P117, 800.60 with interest,
by reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff from a fire for said loss
was covered by insurance issued by the defendant company. Phoenix Insurance admitted
the insurance of the insurance but by way of special defense, alleged that the fire in
question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and the plaintiff had
submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss in contravention of the
express terms of the policy. The trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with
respect to the obligation created by the policy but ordered the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P11, 731.93 with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account
of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of remnants of the
insured stock.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner caused the fire to be set or connived therein and
submitted fraudulent proof as the trial judge found.

HELD: YES. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure
manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia
and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega before the fire. It appears that cases
of old stock were shipped to Manila before the fire but instead of being taken directly to the
bodega they were housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor where the petitioner
had office. Also, the manipulation of one of their people to attend to the alarm box not to
allow others to touch it and reasoned out that he already have done it, when in fact the fire
chief noticed that it was never touched and he himself turned on the alarm. The finding of
the trial court in the effect that plaintiff had submitted false proof in the support of his
claim is also well founded. First, the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the
fire as of a value of P 12,800 when the true value of the said jewelry was about P 600; and
secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the value of
the goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire.
As a conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connive therein, but
also that it submitted fraudulent proof.

The court commends the maintenance of a liberal attitude on the part of trial judges in the
matter of admission of proof. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality, or relevancy, or technical objections to the questions, should be avoided.

*Classification of Evidence
9. People vs. Precioso (Gr No. 95890, 12 May 1993) - Robinos
Facts: Accused Precioso and Monforte were held guilty of the crime of robbery in band with
rape. They appealed, on the contention that the trial court erred in (1)finding that the guilt
of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; (2) ruling that the two accused
had been positively identified by the rape victims, allegedly basing its decision not on a
correct findings of facts but on inferences, surmises and presumptions; and (3) finding no
motive or reason whatsoever the complainants to charge the accused, its decision being
supposedly contrary to the common experience of man, the natural course of events, and
existing jurisprudence.

The facts are as follows:

The accused, wearing masks that covered their faces, robbed the store and then the house
of the Galvadores. They first woke Leah Alimpoos in the store. The latter started to recognize
Precioso in his voice and general physical appearance. They escorted Alimpoos to the house.
They told her to wake the Galvadores couple. Suddenly, Teresita Pescador was also
awakened, and recognized Precioso through his voice, clothes, and physical appearance.

Precioso raped Alimpoos in the store, thereby removing his mask making the latter
recognize him. On the other hand, Monforte raped Pescador in the pigpen at the house. The
latter scratched the former’s face, thus his masked was removed.

Issue/s: Whether or not the witnesses and their testimonies are credible. (Yes)
Held: The transcripts of the notes taken at the trial reveal that the witnesses for the
prosecution testified in a clear, consistent and forthright manner. The testimonies of the
complainants were basically congruent with and mutually corroborative of each other, and
were confirmed by those of the other prosecution witnesses. Their minor errors and
inconsistencies do not affect the substance of their declaration or adversely reflect on their
veracity.

In contrast, the testimonies of appellants consist merely of denials and alibi, without
any other credible evidence to sustain their exculpatory claims and defense. The Supreme
Court consistently ruled that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the
positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the
accused, the former deserve more credence.

Appellants further argue that they were not properly identified. However, the records
show that Precioso and Monforte were positively identified by the two rape victims in a
police line-up and in open court. They were further definitely identified by complainant
Irene Galvadores and her husband, complainant Rafael Galvadores. All these witnesses had
sufficient time and ample opportunity to recognize and identify appellants. In People
vs. Calixtro, the Supreme Court ruled that private complainant's identification of the
accused through the latter's voice may be accepted considering that they are barriomates
and friends. Here, with much more reason can we accept the identification of appellants
since the prosecution witnesses not only heard their voices but actually saw their faces.

The Supreme Court also gather from the evidence that the complainants have no ill
motives or any plausible reason whatsoever to impute the commission of such serious
offenses upon appellants if, in truth, the latter are guiltless as claimed. Accordingly, as the
Supreme Court have held in a number of cases, the absence of evidence of any improper
motive impelling the principal witness sustains the conclusion that his testimony is worthy
of full faith and credit.

The foregoing doctrine squarely applies to the multiple rapes committed by appellants
on their two victims. Furthermore, considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a
Filipina to airing in public things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the
complainant would assume and admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not
true. Complainants Leah Alimpoos and Teresita Pescador, both young barrio girls, would
not have publicly admitted that they had been criminally ravished if that was not true, for
their natural instinct is to protect their honor. Their testimony given at a public trial
wherein they narrated their ordeal with all the sordid details thereof, as synthesized in
appellee's brief and set forth earlier could not have been conjured and fabricated by these
hapless and innocent victims.

The defense of alibi interposed by appellants is evidentially sterile and

jurisprudentially weak as they were not able to demonstrate by convincing evidence that it
was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. The defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on credibility, and is an
unavailing defense especially if contradicted by eyewitness testimony.

Precioso claimed that when the crime was committed, he was sleeping in the house of
his grandmother, but said house is admittedly only around 150 meters away from the house
of the Galvadores spouses. His pretension, therefore, cannot be sustained in the face of the
settled rule that it is not enough to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but he must likewise show that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime.

Monforte, on the other hand, would like to convince the trial court that he was
working at the time. However, the lower court correctly made short shrift of said defense
with this terse documented observation: "Gerardo Monforte also negated the accusation,
giving as a reason thereof that they had overtime at the bandsaw of Lucio Cortes that fateful
evening. Nonetheless, the prosecution on rebuttal, presented a (c)ertification that at the time
of the incident, there was no operation at the Cortes' bandsaw because their electrical power
was disconnected by ASELCO on July 25, 1985 (Exhs. "H" and "H-1") and reconnected only
on August 12, 1985 (Exhs. "I" and "I-1") for non-payment of electric bills. (TSN, p. 4 & E, . . .
August 8, 1989). Not a tiny thread of evidence was introduced to contradict this vital aspect
nor was it shown that the Cortez sawmill has its own source of electric power or generator.
As a matter of fact, sole reliance on the ASELCO electric current was confirmed by defense
witness, Francisco Bolanio (TSN, p. 19, . . . September 12, 1982).

Finally, appellant Precioso's assertion that "(a) man who is guilty flees. But being a
close friend and confidant, accused Rolando Precioso remained and helped the robbery
victim load the latter's things preparatory to their evacuation," is a simple pettifogging
argument to evade complicity. This uncorroborated imposture was categorically belied by
complainant Leah Alimpoos.

Furthermore, we have ruled that an accused may not have fled from the scene of the
crime, but this is not necessarily indicative of a clear conscience. The crime may have been
committed with impunity and the accused may have thought that the victim or his heirs
would not complain, or that eyewitnesses will not be able to identify him. Appellant's
pretended innocence is clearly non-sequitur to his decision not to flee. Apart from the fact
that there is no case law holding that non-flight is a conclusive proof of innocence, the
argument does not hold weight in the light of definite and inarguable identification of
appellant. The material factor here is that, there is positive identification of him as the
author of the crime.

*Judicial Notice
10. Expertravel & Tours, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (GR No.152392, 26 May 2005) -
Robinos

Facts: Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South
Korea and has been granted license to do business in the Philippines. On 6 September 1999, KAL,
through its legal counsel, Atty. Mario Aguinaldo filed a complaint against Expertravel & Tours, Inc.
(ETI) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the collection of sum of money totaling
PhP260,150.00 plus attorney's fees and exemplary damages. The complaint was attached with
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping wherein indicated that Atty. Aguinaldo is the agent
and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the said complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to
execute the above-mentioned verification and non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court. KAL, thereafter, opposed the motion contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its
resident agent and was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It
was also alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo also served as the company's corporate secretary.
During the hearing, Atty Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through
the resolution approved by the KAL Board of Directors during a special meeting held on June 25,
1999. Thereafter. KAL submitted an Affidavit executed by its General Manager Suk Kyoo Kim,
alleging that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference which he and Atty. Aguinaldo
attended. It was also averred that in that Teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution
authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the said
complaint. Furthermore, Su Kyoo Kim alleged that the corporation had no written copy of the
aforesaid resolution.
The Trial Court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty.
Aguinaldo and Su Kyoo Kim. ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order alleging that it is
inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition and ruling that the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the
Rules of Court.

Issue/s: Is the petitioner correct in assailing that until and after teleconferencing is recognized as a
legitimate means of conducting meetings, gathering quorum of board of directors, such cannot be
taken judicial notice of by the court? (Yes)

Held: Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As
the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of
any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has
no constructive knowledge.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may
be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group
communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In
general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are
separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group communication may be used in a number of
ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented
with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and (3)
audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or
telecopying.
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It was first introduced
in the 1960s with American Telephone and Telegraphs Picturephone. At that time, however, no
demand existed for the new technology. Travel costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling
to pay the monthly service charge for using the picturephone, which was regarded as more of a
novelty than as an actual means for everyday communication. In time, people found it advantageous
to hold teleconferencing in the course of business and corporate governance, because of the money
saved, among other advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldnt normally attend a distant FTF meeting can
participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings are shorter and more
oriented to the primary purpose of the meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference from any location
equipped with a telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.
6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate teleconferencing.
7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information exchange, and procedural
tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated teleconferences than an FTF meeting.
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences because of the following
disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that arent made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as negotiation or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one person monopolizes the
meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible.
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of
group communication. Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be
easier to miscommunicate. Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of
meeting.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private
corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission
issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be
complied with related to such conferences. Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the
Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business
transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference
along with the respondents Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted;
even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly
passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required
certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
respondent failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the
motion on December 1, 1999, on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly
authorized to sue in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that Atty.
Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo
which the respondent appended to its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the
respondents Manila Regional Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the teleconference only during
the hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000,
within which to submit the board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and
execute the required certification against forum shopping. The court granted the motion. The
respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said
resolution, contending that it was with its main office in Korea. The court granted the motion per its
Order dated February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for an extension within which to
submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000. It was on the said date that the respondent
submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty.
Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors
supposedly approved the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates or any of its
lawyers are hereby appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to effect
the collection of the unpaid account of Expert Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized
to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and execute any document or paper necessary to the filing and
prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-trial Proceedings and enter into a compromise
agreement relative to the above-mentioned claim
But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent do[es] not keep a written
copy of the aforesaid Resolution because no records of board resolutions approved during
teleconferences were kept. This belied the respondents earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000
motion for extension of time to submit the questioned resolution that it was in the custody of its main
office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial court the impression that it needed time to secure a
copy of the resolution kept in Korea, only to allege later (via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had
no such written copy. Moreover, Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the resolution was
embodied in the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no such
resolution was appended to the said certificate.
The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999
and approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the
additional fact that no such allegation was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been
approved on June 25, 1999, long before the complaint was filed, the respondent should have
incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It
was only on January 28, 2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a
meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even represented to the Court that a copy
of its resolution was with its main office in Korea, only to allege later that no written copy existed. It
was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged, for the first time, that the meeting of the
Board of Directors where the resolution was approved was held via teleconference.
Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a
Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference on
June 25, 1999. No such certificate was appended to the complaint, which was filed on September 6,
1999. More importantly, the respondent did not explain why the said certificate was signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized one year later (on January 10, 2000); it
also did not explain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint, as well as to its
Compliance dated March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent filed its
comment in the CA that it submitted the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate dated January 10,
2000.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never
took place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors during
the said teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this
Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.

11. Estrada vs. Desierto (GR No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001) - Robinos
Facts: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30,
1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the
President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng
hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the
House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13,
2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued
to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations.
Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the
protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment
trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential

election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election.

On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant,
saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming
the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about
the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give
up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later
left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by
filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner’s allegation against respondent Ombudsman is

meritorious. (No)

Held: The evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news
reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice
and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which
he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be
reversed but they cannot be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other
words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines.
Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and
the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he
still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more weighty
social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a
bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing
preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of
the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the
pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out
with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be
unfavorable to the petitioner.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress
recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,
we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue “in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the
government.” Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a “textually demonstrable or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Clearly, the
Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of
the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a coequal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by this Court.

*Judicial Admissions

12. Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. V. Estrada (2008) - Janz

G.R. No. 171052

Facts:
Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare) formally appointed Estrada as its
General Agent evidenced by a letter-agreement granting her a commission equivalent to: 15 to 18%
from individual, family, group accounts.
 Maxicare had a "franchising system" in dealing with its agents whereby an agent had to
first secure permission from to list a prospective company as client.
MERALCO account was included as corporate accounts applied by Estrada
Estrada submitted proposals and made representations to the officers of MERALCO regarding the
MAXICARE Plan but MERALCO directly negotiated with MAXICARE and was renewed twice for a
term of 3 years each
March 24, 1992: Estrada through counsel demanded his commission for the MERALCO account and
9 other accounts but it was denied by MAXICARE because he was not given a go signal to intervene
in the negotiations for the terms and conditions
RTC: Maxicare liable for breach of contract and ordered it to pay Estrada actual damages.
CA: Affirmed

Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts disregarded Estrada’s admission that the negotiations
with Meralco failed.

Held:
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a
judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two
exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when
it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an
admission by denying that he made such an admission.
For instance, if a party invokes an admission by an adverse party, but cites the admission
out of context, then the one making the admission may show that he made no such admission, or that
his admission was taken out of context.
This may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the admission is made to
appear. That is the reason for the modifier such.
There is no dispute as to the role that plaintiff-appellee [Estrada] played in selling
[Maxicares] health insurance plan to Meralco. Plaintiff-appellee [Estradas] efforts consisted in being
the first to offer the Maxicare plan to Meralco, using her connections with some of Meralco
Executives, inviting said executives to dinner meetings, making submissions and representations
regarding the health plan, sending follow-up letters, etc.
These efforts were recognized by Meralco as shown by the certification issued by its
Manpower Planning and Research Staff.

This Court finds that plaintiff-appellee [Estradas] efforts were instrumental in introducing
the Meralco account to [Maxicare] in regard to the latters Maxicare health insurance plans. Plaintiff-
appellee [Estrada] was the efficient intervening cause in bringing about the service agreement with
Meralco. As pointed out by the trial court in its October 8, 1999 Decision, to wit:
Had not [Estrada] introduced Maxicare Plans to her bosom friends, Messrs. Lopez and
Guingona of Meralco, PHPI would still be an anonymity.
In this case, the letter, although part of Estradas Complaint, is not, ipso facto, an
admission of the statements contained therein, especially since the bone of contention relates to
Estradas entitlement to commissions for the sale of health plans she claims to have brokered. It is
more than obvious from the entirety of the records that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently
declared that her involvement as broker is the proximate cause which consummated the sale between
Meralco and Maxicare.
The petition is hereby DENIED.
13. UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION VS. CA (33 SCRA 1) - Janz

Facts:
In 1938, plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. discovered a formula for the manufacture of a
food seasoning (sauce) derived from banana fruits popularly known as MAFRAN sauce. It was used
commercially since 1942, and in the same year plaintiff registered his trademark in his name as
owner and inventor with the Bureau of Patents. However, due to lack of sufficient capital to finance
the expansion of the business, in 1960, said plaintiff secured the financial assistance of Tirso T.
Reyes who, after a series of negotiations, formed with others defendant Universal Food Corporation
eventually leading to the execution on May 11, 1960 of the aforequoted "Bill of Assignment"
On May 31, 1960, Magdalo Francisco entered into contract with UFC stipulating among other
things that he be the Chief Chemist and Second Vice-President of UFC and shall have absolute
control and supervision over the laboratory assistants and personnel and in the purchase and
safekeeping of the chemicals used in the preparation of said Mafran sauce and that said positions are
permanent in nature.
Thereafter, however, due to the alleged scarcity and high prices of raw materials,
Secretary-Treasurer of UFC issued a Memorandum duly approved by the President and General
Manager Tirso T. Reyes that only Supervisor Ricardo Francisco should be retained in the factory and
that the salary of plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr., should be stopped for the time being until the
corporation should resume its operation. On December 3, 1960, President and General Manager
Tirso T. Reyes, issued a memorandum to Victoriano Francisco ordering him to report to the factory
and produce "Mafran Sauce" at the rate of not less than 100 cases a day so as to cope with the orders
of the corporation's various distributors and dealers, and with instructions to take only the necessary
daily employees without employing permanent employees. Again, on December 6, 1961, another
memorandum was issued by the same President and General Manager instructing the Assistant
Chief Chemist Ricardo Francisco, to recall all daily employees who are connected in the production of
Mafran Sauce and also some additional daily employees for the production of Porky Pops. On
December 29, 1960, another memorandum was issued by the President and General Manager
instructing Ricardo Francisco, as Chief Chemist, and Porfirio Zarraga, as Acting Superintendent, to
produce Mafran Sauce and Porky Pops in full swing starting January 2, 1961 with further
instructions to hire daily laborers in order to cope with the full blast operation. Magdalo V. Francisco,
Sr. received his salary as Chief Chemist in the amount of P300.00 a month only until his services
were terminated on November 30, 1960. On January 9 and 16, 1961, UFC, acting thru its President
and General Manager, authorized Porfirio Zarraga and Paula de Bacula to look for a buyer of the
corporation including its trademarks, formula and assets at a price of not less than
P300,000.00. Due to these successive memoranda, without plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. being
recalled back to work, he filed the present action on February 14, 1961. Then in a letter dated March
20, 1961, UFC requested said plaintiff to report for duty, but the latter declined the request because
the present action was already filed in court.It is alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents'
complaint that what was ceded and transferred by virtue of the Bill of Assignment is the "use of the
formula" (and not the formula itself).
It is alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents' complaint that what was ceded and
transferred by virtue of the Bill of Assignment is the "use of the formula" (and not the formula itself)

Issue:
WON UFC made a judicial admission
Held:
YES. The last part of paragraph 3 of the complaint and paragraph 3 of the answer are
reproduced below for ready reference:
3. — ... and due to these privileges, the plaintiff in return assigned to said corporation his interest
and rights over the said trademark and formula so that the defendant corporation could use the
formula in the preparation and manufacture of the mafran sauce, and the trade name for the
marketing of said project, as appearing in said contract ....
3. — Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint.
This incontrovertible fact is admitted without equivocation in paragraph 3 of the
petitioner's answer. Hence, it does "not require proof and cannot be contradicted.

*Relevance and conditional admissibility

14. Prats & Company vs. Phoenix Insurance Company (1929) – Supra (No.8) –
Janz
Add info: EVIDENCE; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE; LIBERAL ATTITUDE INDICATED.—
The court commends the maintenance of a liberal attitude on the part of trial judges in the
matter of admission of proof. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality, or relevancy, or technical objections to the questions, should be avoided.

15. People vs Abalos. 30 scra 599

Facts:
An information was filed with said court, presided over by respondent Judge, accusing
Mohammad Ussam Dambong, et al., of the crime of double murder upon Abdulhadi Maoludani and
Maoludani Habissi, with multiple frustrated murder upon the persons of allegedly committed. When
the case was called for trial, the prosecution introduced evidence tending to show that defendant
Mohammad Ussam Dambong had, on February 6, 1961, gone to the place aforementioned,
accompanied by his co-defendants, and then fired at and killed Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi
Maoludani, as well as shot and wounded the other persons named in the information. After the
reception of said evidence for the prosecution, the defense proceeded with the presentation of its own
evidence, in the course of which, defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong testified that the casualties
and the injuries adverted to above were due to shots fired, not by him, but by Abdulkadil Habbisi
because, as a police sergeant in the performance of his duty, he (Mohammad Ussam Dambong) had
merely fired into the air, to stop a fight between two (2) groups of persons, to one of which the victims
belonged. The defense having, thereafter, completed the introduction of its evidence, on April 24,
1968, the prosecution called Majid Andi as rebuttal witness.
After the preliminary questions propounded to him, the defense objected to further
questions, The prosecutor having announced that Madjid Andi would be its last witness and that he
(prosecutor) would appeal from the resolution of the court as soon as copy thereof had been
furnished him, respondent Judge incorporated his aforementioned resolution in an order, dated May
2, 1968, directing that the testimony of said witness, be "discarded from the records on the ground
that the testimony are answers to questions not proper in rebuttal" and stating that "from the
observation of the Court, the witness in rebuttal should have been presented as a witness in the
presentation of the evidence in chief of the prosecutor", and declaring that the case would be deemed
submitted for decision on May 15, 1968, unless the parties sought permission to file memoranda on
or before said date.
The prosecution presented evidence to show that the accused killed the persons
mentioned in the information, as well as wounded several other specified persons. The accused
presented evidence to establish the contrary—that he did not kill or wound said persons. He,
however, went further, by testifying that it was AH who killed and wounded the persons.
ISSUE:
May the prosecution present the testimony of MA as rebuttal evidence to show that it was
the accused, not AH who committed the crime alleged in the Information?
HELD:
Yes. The evidence of the accused that it was AH who killed and wounded the persons
mentioned in the information was a new matter not covered directly by the evidence for the
prosecution It is true that if it was the accused who caused the deaths and the injuries alleged, it
would follow that AH was ot the author thereof. The prosecution was entitled, however. as a matter of
strict legal right, to introduce positive evidence to this effect, instead of relying upon a mere inference
from its evidence in chief.
Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not the parties should be allowed to
introduce evidence in rebuttal. Moreover, its resolutions on these matters are interlocutory in nature
and will not generally be reviewed, except on appeal taken from a decision rendered on the merits.
Judicial discretion, however, is not unlimited. It must be exercised reasonably, with a view to
promoting the ends of justice, one of which is to ascertain the truth.
As a matter of general practice, it is deemed best to resolve doubts in favor of the
admission of the contested evidence, without prejudice to such action as the court may deem fit to
take in deciding the case on the merits. This practice has added importance as regards the evidence
for the prosecution in criminal cases, for, once the accused has been acquitted, there is no means to
secure a review by appeal, no matter how erroneous the action of the lower court may have been.
*Object of Evidence

16. G.R. No. 109140. March 8, 1995.

PEOPLE vs TACIPIT - Vasquez

FACTS:

• The complainant, Onelia Pamittan, was a 17-year old high school student at the
Abulug School of Fisheries in Abulug, Cagayan at the time of the commission of the offense.
• In the afternoon of January 3, 1991, Eden, her friend, invited some of her friends,
including the complainant, over to her house.
• When the group arrived at Eden's house, at about 4:30 p.m., Roland Tacipit was
already there with Eden's brother, Elmer Molina, the latter being a friend and co-worker of
the accused.
• According to the complainant, as she was about to leave the Molina house, the
accused restrained her, held her left hand and her notebooks and told her friends to go
ahead. Despite her cries and pleas for help, the owners of the house did nothing to help her.
• On the other hand, defense witness Elmer Molina alleged that the complainant
and the accused were sweethearts. They left the house together, with their hands over each
other's shoulders. At any rate, it is undisputed that the complainant left the Molina
household with the accused.
• On the way, they passed through a coconut plantation. There, the accused committed
the alleged rape tearing her clothes.
• After the carnal act, the accused accompanied the complainant to a point near her
home and before leaving her, threatened to kill her or her family if she reports the matter to
anyone.

• The complainant, however, did not heed the warning and immediately upon arriving
at her house, reported the incident to her uncle.

• The following day, the complainant accompanied by her mother, aunt and cousin,
reported the incident to the police at the municipal building.

• She submitted her clothing for examination and after being investigated, submitted
herself for medical examination.
• After executing a sworn statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime and filed the corresponding complaint for rape and after a
thorough investigation the municipal trial court issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.

As his defense, the accused claimed that he and the complainant were sweethearts since
October 3, 1990 and that the complainant voluntarily yielded herself to him. As proof of
their relationship, the accused presented a ring engraved with the name "Onelia" and
alleged that it was given to him by the complainant as a token of her love. Defense witness
Elmer Molina corroborated the testimony of the accused, stating that he courted the
complainant but was spurned by her because she was already the accused's sweetheart.

On the other hand, these contentions were firmly denied by the prosecution. The
complainant testified that she knew the accused to be a married man and he never visited
her house to court her. She also denied that Elmer Molina courted her or that she told him
that he was the accused's girlfriend. As for the ring, the complainant denied ownership
thereof. True enough, when the ring was tried on her hand, it was loose and did not fit
her finger.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tacipit is guilty of the crime rape.

HELD:

Yes. For one, although there was an absence of external injuries on the body of
the complainant, the clothes worn by her at the time of the offense speak well of the use of
force and the presence of a struggle. As the trial court noted: “Her T-shirt was torn which
corroborates her testimony that it was forcibly removed. It also proves that she offered
resistance to the criminal advances of the accused. Her shorts, like her panty, had blood
stains. Her panty was detached from her shorts. Her bra was torn, also denoting that it was
forcibly removed. These physical evidence x x x are consistent only with the force and
compulsion applied on her; they prove she offered resistance and her defloration was
against her will.”

Thus, the accused’s reliance on the defense that he and the complainant were lovers is
unfounded. But even if it were true, such relationship would not give the accused the
license to deflower the complainant against her will, and will not exonerate him from the
criminal charge for rape. Furthermore, there is nothing in the testimonies of either the
complainant or even the accused himself which could indicate any sort of special
relationship between the two. The alleged proof of such relationship, the ring with
complainant’s name engraved on it, does not even fit the fingers of the complainant. Their
actuations with respect to each other before, during and even after the commission of the
crime were consistent with the contention of the complainant that they are nothing more
than acquaintances. The evidence of the prosecution, therefore, completely negates the
existence of any relationship between the accused and the complainant. People vs. Tacipit,
242 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 109140 March 8, 1995