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I May 2018
SUBJEc·r: (U) llcport to the Intelligence Oversight 13oard on NS;\ Activities, First Quarter,
Calendar Year 2018-INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
(U//rOUO) ·rhc Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise
oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training. revie\V of directives and
guidelines, and advice of counsel.
ROBERT P. STORCH
I.
··~
General Counsel
(U) I concur with the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby
make it our co1nbined report.
.-/'l '
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MICHAEL S. ROGERS
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, NSA/ChicC (~SS
l:nc\:
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
Quarterly llcporL
( lJ) ·rhis docun1cnt n1ay bc dt:c!assilied and n1arkcd ··t ·N(" L1\SSI I IL'.1 )//F<JJ{ OFJ-"ICJAl. l.JS I:
()Nl, y·· upon n.:n1oval of cnclosurc(s)
Clussificd By)
Approved for Release by NSA on :J6-17-2019, IJcrivcd Fron1: NSAICS~SM,,...,l""'-5"2~
FOIA Case ft 105767 (litigation) Dutcd: 20180110
[)cclassi!)' ()n: 28431:'141' !
TOP 5ECRET//51ffK#?fOFOR1'1/¥If!!_,
(1) (U) I11cident Description: Provider-caused compliance incident regarding call detail
TOP SECRET//Sli'TK1'/J>f0FOR~l/Fl~A
.. ....
Date repo;ted to DoD S!OO: l May 2018
(3) (U//1'9110) Reason for R£port: 50 U.S.C. 41"86l(b)(2)(C)(ii) limits data that ca1(lie
sought (and therefore collected) to.t.ilat pertaining to a !'(oreign power engaged in internationa} :
terroris1n or activities in preparati'on therefor, or an ag·e.nt of a foreign po\ver engaged in : •
international terrorisn1 or acti'-'ities i11 preparation tl\~refor." While NSA lawfully sought data=
pertai11ing to a foreign powe1! e11gaged in internatiqhai terrorisn1, the provider produced
inacc11rate data and data peyond that which NSA.s~ight.
0
(4) (TS/i'Sl/1'f'-tF) Cause: NSA continues t~ work \Vith the provider to understand tl1e
scope of this anomaly and re111ediate this inatter· l f
I .0 0
.
f~he provlder's syste1ns populated fields of ce1 in
.
CDRs with innccurate data. soecificallv in.Circumstances in which•
• •
As a result, when somel J...DRs were produced by the provider to NSA, these
tie1as incl uded certain incorrect values.
(6) (U//FOUO) Impact on Civil Liberties or Privacy: The NSA CLPT Office will
assess the scope of the civil liberties and privacy impact of this incident upon co1npletion of the
investigation.
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TOP SECR£T//SI/TKJl!'lOFQR..1';/FI~l.1
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29 July 2015
(U//.FCUO) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise
oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, reviev,1 of directives and
guidelines, and advice of counsel.
(U) I concur with the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby
n1ake it our con1bined report
//-;;/gi'
/ ( /~ '=2----
------
'" MICHAELS. ROGERS
Admirdl, U.S. Navy
Director, NSNChief, CSS
Encl:
Quarterly lleport
(lJ) ·rhis docun1cnt n1ay be dec!assified and n1arked ··tJNCLASSlFIED//FOR. OfFIClAI~ USE
()NL Y.. upon rcn1oval of cnclosure(s)
(U) Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (E.0. 12333), as a1nended, National Security
Directive 42, and other legal and policy directives, the National Security Agency (NSA)
conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance (IA) activities on behalf of the
U.S. govern1nent. These activities n1ight result in the acquisition of non-public information of or
concerning U.S. persons (USPs). NSA perso1u1el are required to follow procedures designed to
protect USP privacy, consistent witl1 the Fourth Amend1nent to the U.S. Constitution and other
laws. NSA personnel n111st also comply with requiren1ents of Presidential Policy Directive 28
(PPD-28) concerning protection of personal inforn1ation of all individuals, regardless of
nationality.
(U) NSA has established controls to provide reasonable assurance that its personnel
co1nply with procedures for handling USP inforn1ation, such as minin1ization procedures adopted
by the Attorney General (AG) and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) to govern USP infor1nation acquired during SIGINT activities conducted pursuant to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, as a1nended.
(U) The nlatters reported herein are based on the infom1ation available at the ti1ne of this
report and are not believed to be cases of willful 1nisuse.
Classified By:},I=_,.,.._.
. . . - - - - - - - - - . . . . . · · · • O.ri<etl "Fhini:" NSAitSSM 1-52
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-361 ~ated:20140930
. Declassify On: lQ4QQ7ll
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Non - Responsive
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8 February 2019
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
SUBJECT: (U) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (JOB) on NSA Activities, Fourth
Quarter, Calendar Year 2018-INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
(U) The NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel continue to
exercise oversight of Agency activities focused on achieving compliance with the laws and
regulations for protecting privacy during the conduct of Agency operations.
I PA IRICK J. ill<£:ottos
Director of Compliance
l.····~ ~
Intelligence Oversight 0 icer
General Counsel
(U) I concur with the report of the NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General
Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.
Encl:
Quarterly Report
TOP SECRETI'i'Sl1~~IOFO~f
TOP SECRET/1'Sl/J'P40FORP4
NSA FO\A Case 105767 Page 029
Doc lD: 6671373
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TOf SEC~f;'f;Y~D?l'JOFURN
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TOP SECR£'fh'Sh'i'!'JOFOR:!~
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TOP SECRETi'/SlA~JOFORPl
130 (1) (Si'IN"F) Incident Description: Provider misprovision of call detail records (CD Rs)
131 produced pursuant to Title V of FISA, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act (UFA).
132 {TSllSl/;Hf) Pursuant to UFA, the FISC has authorized the targeted production to NSA
133 ofCDRs pertaining to certain specific selection terms, and issued Secondary Orders to certain
134 providers to compel the production of those CDRs. On or about October 12, 2018, NSA
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TOP 8ECRETI~'S:Ei'i'+JOFOR?4
... ....1------~-----i..•
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135 technical analysts examining the targeted production o~ CDR~ 9h.5'1/v.f! fill anomal ••
136 S ecificall , these analysts identified a lar er than-ex· ecteQ niuhl:Jetof · ••
137
138 t...,,....,..,,----,----.,,..-...:,:,--r---:-"'""'-""f-:,,-~ Further investigation determined ..
.... ..
'
139 that these records wer~ pro'duced b • On 0Gt0ber 12 :2018 NSA re uested the:·
140 rovider inv s.tiga.te the anomaly. The.Pfbvider lrat:;:e::.r.:;co"n:::fi:::rm="e"d'-'th=•:i...-------...---;u
141 had resulted in the creatibn ofCDRs
142
143 '----:.-----.-.,...,.,....,..,...... According to the proviqer, it produced CDRs affected by the error
144 starting on or about October 3, 2018.
153 (6) (U) Impact on Civil Liberties or Privacy: CLPT will reassess the scope of the
154 civil liberties and privacy impact of this incident upon completion of the investigation. CLPT's
155 initial assessment is that the impact was limited given the quick identification, purge processes,
156 and lack of reporting.
157 (7) ff!lil'!lllll'W) Remedial Action: Onl [NSA suspended the data
158 flow from the provider until it could validate that the issue had been.resolved. The provider
159 informed NSA onl !that it implemented a solution that corrects the error, and
160 NSA worked with the provider to vefify the solution. od · INSA reinitiated the
161 data flow from the provider. NSA is contifiUing ~~review the prod~ction ofCDRs.
162 (8) (U) Additional Information: None. (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 INon Responsive I
•
163 (9) (U) Status: Open.
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TBF SEC~Ti';'Sli~'tJOFO~l
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TOP SECRETJ/S:Ei'i~JOFO~I
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TOP BECRET.~8!41.l>IOFOP~I
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TOR SfCRFiff£I//]'\10fORN
7 August 2018
SUBJEC'r: (U) lleport to the Intelligence Oversight Board (JOB) on NSA Activities, Second
Quarter, Calendar Year 2018 - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
(U//['OUO) ·rite NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel continue
to exercise oversight of Agency activities focused on achieving con1pliance \Vith the laws and
regulations for protecting privacy during the conduct of Agency operations.
(U) I concur with the report of the NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General
Counsel and hereby n1ake it our con1bined report.
Encl:
Quarterly l?..t..:port
(U) ·rhis docun1enL n1ay bt..: declassified and 1narked ··LJNCLASSIF!El)//FOR (JFrlCIAL USE
()NL y·· upon ren1oval of cnclosurc(s).
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I Non - Responsive
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- - - - - - - - - · ' • •''
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-361
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!3) (U//1'0!;0) Reason:for Re~ort: 50 U.S.C. Section 186l(b)(?JIG;Xi\)'lil)lits data
~ .•---------'
(bl (3J-P.L. 86-36
327 that can:'be sought (and there fora collected) to that pertaining to~ :•f.ore~~n 'Pbwer enj;aged in
328 internat}onal terrorism or activities in prepa.fat~on there[qr, or'afl a~nt'of a foreign ~wer
329 engaged in international terrorism or activities fl\ preparation.therefor." While NS : awfully
330 sought data pertaining to a foreign P,Dl".er erig~gecf iq ~nJ:erh~tional terrorism.,__ _~-~
331 produced inaccurate data anff .dittt beyond that wbich 'NSA sought.
. . . • .
'U/!FOUO) ~ause:: ·rhis,ineiO~~t occurred a~
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333 1..._....,.:......JfThere was nothing ii}dre'substance of the CDRs thcit•\yould have alerted:NSA
334 targetitJ.g analysts to this pwblern as the information was being cotie:ted. Rather, iJ was NSA
335 technieal analysts' 9bsefvationS' of anomalies in certain CD Rs that led them to investigate further
336 I ; I .
337 : (5) (U//'f8U9) Impact on National Security or International Rel~fioni.: None.
. .•
338 : (6) (U//FOUO) lmpac.f: on Civil Liberties or Privacy: The CLP·r asses;~s·that the
339 incidOnt had a significant impa~t on civil liberties and privacy. A determination Was mB.de to
340 I t 'all the CDRs and any asSociated reporting. NSA began deleting all CDRs }lcquirc~'---'
341 D nder ·ritle V of the FIS!(. . • .
342 (7) (TSHSINNF) Rcmfdial Action: On 23 May 2018. NSA began deletln •all call detail
343 records (CD Its) acquiredf Iunder ·ritle V of the FISA. Becaus 1ave
344 infor1ned NSA that the issue has been ren1cdiated. NSA believes that CD Rs e 1verc alter
345 23 May 2018 \Vil! not contain these errors. NSA has revie\ved all intelligence reports based on
346 USA FREEDOtvl Act CDR data and has recalled and reissued one report to correct erroneous
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349 (8) (U) Additional Information: NSA notified the congressional intelligence
350 committees of this incident on 10 April 2018. DoJ notified the FISC about the details of this
351 matter as they became available on 22 November 2017, 5 March 2018, 11 April 2018, and
352 4 June 2018. This matter has also been reported to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
353 Board (PCLOB). NSA also reported this matter publicly.
Pagellofl3
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l!ll''.ll.P! I ?:I !''1 1 1l''
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