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 THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY:
REFORMULATION AND TEST OF THE
SELF EVALUATION ARGUMENT*

JOHN F. STOLTE
Northern Illinois University

Why does a disadvantaged actor, as well as an advantaged actor, often accept a

structure of inequality as right, reasonable, and legitimate? The self-evaluation
argument proposes that variation in objective resource level produces variation in
self-evaluation, which, in turn, leads both deprived and privileged actors to accept
their respective positions as legitimate. The argument is clarified through a
reformulation that links exchange structural inequality, negotiation, and
self-efficacy. The reformulation is experimentally tested. Though the results
diametrically oppose a key implication of the reformulation, they stimulate thinking
that further illuminates this core issue in the social psychology of stratification, and
they lay a basis forfurther research.

How do "legitimations of stratification be- (1939), and Parsons's functionaltheory (1949)

come part of the consciousness of individuals
who make up society?" (Della Fave, 1980:959)
An adequate answer to this question would
help to explain, in part, the perpetuationof
structuralinequalities in power, wealth, and
prestige.It is easy to understandwhy a person
with a positionaladvantagetends to supporta
stratified system, but more difficult to com-
prehend why one with a positional disadvan-
tage also frequentlytends to supportit. Della
Fave (1980) proposes "the self-evaluationhy-
pothesis"to answerthis question. Raisingcru-
cial issues in the social psychology of stratifi-
cation, his analysis is important,but it must be
conceptually refined and empirically tested.
Pursuingthese goals, this paper (a) examines
and appraises the argument,(b) reformulates
and tests it, and (c) reconsidersit in lightof the
results.
LEGITIMATION:THE
SELF-EVALUATIONARGUMENT
Differentin manyways, Marx'sradicalconflict
theory (1886), Mosca's elite conflict theory
*Directall correspondenceto: John F. Stolte, De-
partmentof Sociology, NorthernIllinoisUniversity,
DeKalb, IL 60115.
This paper is a much revised version of one pre-
sented at the meetingsof the AtnericanSociological
Association, Boston, Massachusetts, 1979. I am
grateful to Dick Emerson, Buzz Zelditch, Michael
Epelbaum,and two anonymous referees who con-
tributedto this papereitherthroughdirectcomments
or throughstimulatingconversations.Also, I wish to
thank the GraduateSchool, NorthernIllinois Uni-
versity for funds it provided in support of the re-
search reported here. Finally, I express my warm
appreciationto Carol Ann Stolte for her skilled ef-
forts in typing and proofingthe manuscript.
American Sociological Review 1983, Vol. 48 (June:331-342)
are similar in one respect. Each describes an
importantprocess in stratification:structural
inequality is ideologically justified so as to
"allocate feelings of potency, competence,
and, above all, importanceand self-worthin a
manner congruent with (the distribution of)
primaryresources" (power, wealth, and pres-
tige) (Della Fave, 1980:959). Della Fave
amplifiesthis insight, synthesizing ideas from
Mead's (1934) theory of the self-concept and
Bem's (1967) theory of self-perception.
Accordingto Mead, objectivity of self-view
is promoted by seeing oneself from the per-
spective of the "generalizedother," a compos-
ite conception of attitudes and expectations
held in generalby others towardthe self. Mead
used the economic marketplaceto illustratethe
impact of the "generalizedother" on the self-
concept (Reck, 1964). A person learns the
"objective"value of an economicgood through
observingthe price others regularlypay for it.
Similarly,a person gets a sense of self-worth
throughthe reflected appraisals,high or low,
received generallyacross a career of symbolic
interactions.'
Mead's theory is compatible with Bem's
(1967)self-perceptionapproach,subsumedas a
special case within attributiontheory (Kelley,
1967).A person looks at his/herown behavior
as somethingto explain. S/he makesjudgments
about (attributionsof) causes, in a manner
taken to be reasonable with reference to an
external,objective observer, thus achievingan
I Mead'sprocess approachto the self is thusjux-
taposedwith the structuralconcernsof stratification,
an effort complementedby a wider backgroundof
social psychological work. For example, Stryker
(1980)connects a symbolicinteractiontheoryof self
with a role theory of social structure.
331
332
explanation. Della Fave argues that the "ex-
ternalobserver"of attributiontheory is closely
analogous to "the generalizedother" of sym-
bolic interactiontheory.2
Considered in the context of structuralin-
equality, the two theories link self-evaluation
and legitimation.If it is evident to a personthat
s/he occupies a favorable social position, s/he
will develop a favorable self-evaluation. The
evident facts of the situation and the positive
reflected appraisalsconfirmthat self-view. To
an objective observer ("the generalized
other"), it would seem reasonableto attribute
the advantaged position to the "objective"
superiority of the self in competence, in
morality, etc. The person thus comes to be-
lieve that s/he deserves to-occupy a privileged
position. Conversely, if it is apparentto a per- indirectly. Figure 1 depicts two kinds of ex-
son that s/he occupies a disadvantagedsocial
position s/he will develop an unfavorableself-
evaluation. The negative reflected appraisals
and the obvious facts of the situationlead the
person to attributehis/her relative deprivation
to the "objective" inferiorityof the self. Con-
sequently, the person will come to believe that
s/he deserves to be located where s/he is lo-
cated in the structureof inequality. Both ad-
vantagedand disadvantagedactors will there-
fore come to accept the structureof inequality
as legitimate, right, and reasonable.
Critical Appraisal
In general thrust, Della Fave's analysis is ple, "An exchange structureis an opportunity
richly suggestive, fixing attentionon a signifi- structure for each party located within the
cant process, but it needs to be clarified. structure"(Stolte and Emerson, 1977:120).
"Structuralinequality" and "self-evaluation"
must be more sharply specified. Truly, which a single kind of resource ("A" or "B")
"structuralinequality"has been a centralcon-
cern in the sociological classics, and the au- A.
thor's language connotes this core concern.
But can the meaning, determinants,and con-
sequences of "structuralinequality" be for-
mulated more exactly? Also, " self-
evaluation,"as discussed by Della Fave, is too
broad and loose. The self-concept is intricate.
Are there not differentkinds, sources, and ef-
fects of "self-evaluation"(Franksand Marolla,
1976; Rosenberg, 1979)? What are the recip-
rocal effects of self and situationin the context
of social inequality?
These and other questions must be consid- B.
ered to make theoreticalprogress.While Della
Fave's analysis is a useful pointof departure,it
must be explicated and empirically refined.
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
Thoughthe researchdescribedbelow does not
resolve all relevant questions, it deals with
some importantfirst issues suggested by the
self-evaluationargument.
A REFORMULATION:EXCHANGE
STRUCTURE,NEGOTIATIONPROCESS,
SELF-EFFICACY
Structural Inequality: Position, Power,
Stratification
A fruitfulstartingplace is an exchange theory
(Emerson, 1972)of structuralinequality(Stolte
and Emerson, 1977). In this theory, an ex-
change network is conceptualizedas a config-
uration of established exchange relations, in
which a set of actors are linked directly and
change network. Each network (Figure 1-A
and Figure 1-B) contains four actors, A, . . .
A4and B1 ... B4, respectively. Letters A and
B represent kinds of resources. A resource
could be virtuallyany action, object, or event
valued by and transferredbetween humanac-
tors in social exchange. For example, "social
support" consisting of various "favors" is a
common resource exchanged in various social
networks. Networks of professionals and
businesspersons who provide mutual favors,
networksof politicianswho give mutualpoliti-
cal support, and networks of organizedcrimi-
nals who bestow mutual assistance are
everyday-life illustrations.In any such exam-
Concern here is limited to a network in
A Unilateral Monopoly Exchange Structure
A2 A3
A1
A4
A Closed Social Circle Exchange Structure
B1 B2

2 Della Fave also carefullyconsiders"statusattri-

bution theory" (Berger et al., 1972) and "equity
theory"(Cook, 1975),but limits his focus to Mead's
B3 R4
and Bem's formulations,which avoid the cognitive
consistency assumption. Figure 1.
 THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY
is exchanged. "Social support"suffices as an
example and will be used throughout. The
theory assumes that each actor in the network
places equal value on a resource unit, i.e., a
"favor." And it assumes that each actor can
-provideto one or more actors in the network
one or more units of the resource, i.e., one or
more "favors."3
In Figures 1-A and 1-B, each exchange re-
lation is representedby a line signifyinga lon-
gitudinalseries of discrete transactions,across
which varying numbers of resource units are
mutuallyexchanged. An establishedexchange
relationwill persistonly if it is reciprocalin the
long run. Put differently,while resource units
mightbe given by one persononly to the other
in a given transaction, resource units would
have to be given in returnby the recipient in
some subsequenttransaction,or the exchange
relation would eventually extinguish. How-
ever, given such reciprocity,the relative num-
bers of resourceunits (e.g., "favors")mutually
given across a longitudinalset of transactions
need not be and often are not equal. Thus, a
minor Mafia boss might give fifteen favors in
exchangefor two favors received froma major
Mafiachieftainacross a series of transactions
in an exchange network among organized
criminals. Across time, the chieftain would
benefit more in favors received than the minor
boss, and thus the terms of exchange ("the
exchange ratio") of resource units given and
received would be relatively more favorable
for the Mafia chieftain.
A fundamentaltask, therefore, is to explain
why any exchange ratio, regardlessof the kind
of network or the kind of resource, either re-
mains equal or comes to favor one actor over
another across a series of transactions. The
theory delineatesan importantstructuralcause
of variation in exchange ratios: positional
power. This concept implies that while an ex-
changenetworkis an opportunitystructure-for
each actor in it, not all actors necessarilyhave
equal opportunity.
Structural differences between exchange
networks, entailing differences in exchange
opportunities,also entail differencesin depen-
dence (and thus power). Each networkshown
in the Figure(I1-Aand 1-B) is characterizedby
a distinct configurationof exchange relations.
Actor A1 is linked in three relations to actors
A2, A3, and A4, while actors A2, A3,and A4are
each linked in one relation only, that which
each has with A1. In contrast, B1, B2, B3, and
3 Stolte and Emerson (1977) refer to a single re- anotherrelation,while a negativeconnectionimplies
source network as an "intra-category"exchange that exchange in one relationwill decrease with ex-
structure, in contrast to an "inter-category"ex- changein anotherrelation.-Thepresentdiscussion is
change networkin which units of differentresource limited to negatively connected relations in intra-
dimensions(e.g., labor and pay) are exchanged.
333
B4are each linked in three relations,and each
actor has access to every other actor in the
network as an opportunityfor exchange. Fol-
lowing Emerson (1972:76-82), the structure
shown in Figure 1-A will be labelleda "unilat-
eralmonopoly"and that shown in Figure1-B a
"closed social circle." The labels designateex-
change structures which differ fundamentally
in the relativepositionalpower to whichactors
have access. In Figure 1-A, party Al occupies
a monopolistic position in the opportunity
structurein relationto A2,A3,and A4. ActorAl
has a relative positional power advantage
based on the three alternativeopportunitiesfor
exchange s/he has in comparisonwith the one
opportunityeach other actor has. On the other
hand, in Figure 1-B, no party occupies a
monopolistic position in the opportunity
structuresince each actor has an equalnumber
of alternativeexchangeopportunities.Thus, in
Figure 1-B, no actor occupies a moreadvanta-
geous power position than another.4
The positionalpower advantageenjoyed by
actor Al in Figure 1-A will tend to be used
longitudinally in exchange. Across
transactions,should A1 meet resistance in ob-
tainingfavorabletermsof exchange, s/he is in a
position to seek better terms from alternative
exchange opportunitiesin the network. Rela-
tive to the other actors in the network, A, can
overcome more resistance (i.e., "use more
power") in a given transactionto achieve fa-
vorableterms of exchange. Withinthe "closed
social circle" depicted in Figure 1-B, on the
other hand, actors occupy positions of equal
structuralpower, and no actor can overcome
more resistance (use more power) in
transactions than another actor. The theory
predicts that within a "unilateralmonopoly,"
the exchange ratio in each relationwill change
longitudinallyto the favor of an actor with po-
sitionalpower advantage.However, the theory
argues that within a "social circle" the ex-
change ratio-in each relation will stabilize at
terms which favor each actor equally across a
longitudinal series of transactions. That
structuralpoweradvantagecan andwill tend to
be used in exchange has been empiricallysup-
4 An exchange network,by definition,consists of
"connected" exchange relations. Two "exchange
relationsare connectedif the frequency,probability,
or magnitudeof exchange in one is contingent-upon
exchange in the other" (Stolte and Emerson,
1977:123).A positive connection implies that ex-
changein one relationwill increasewith exchangein
category exchange networks (see footnote 3).
334 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
ported (Stolte and Emerson, 1977; Cook and ronment, . . . [and] . . . that these perceptions
Emerson, 1978). are orderedby the actors to forma subjectively
This social exchange formulation of posi- meaningfulcontext in which intelligentaction
tional power and stratification is explicitly is possible" (Singelmann,1972:517).Important
structural in character.5 By careful design, it features of an exchange relation and the net-
uses behavioraland sociological principles to work as a whole are constructed throughand
understand social processes in complex ex- constrained by the individual and collective
changenetworks(Emerson, 1976).As a result, cognitivecontent that emerges in social negoti-
the formulation by itself tells us virtually ation and exchange.7
nothing about processes of "cognition," The self-concept is a centralcognitiveentity
"awareness," or, more generally, "knowl- operatingin negotiationand exchange, and, as
edge" and its role in networks of social ex- Della Fave (1980)has persuasivelyargued,it is
change.6Clearly, however, if we are to begin crucial for understandingthe legitimation of
to understandthe relationshipbetween the self structural inequality. But a third line of re-
and legitimation,which necessarily implicates search must be considered to clarify the links
"ideologicalfactors," the cognitive aspects of among exchange structuralinequality, negoti-
exchange in networks must be dealt with ex- ation, and the self, as related to legitimation.
plicitly. A step in this direction involves the
judicious incorporationof concepts and princi-
Self-Efficacy: Cognition In Social Learning
ples drawn from research on negotiation.
In Emerson'stheory, an exchange relationis An individualacts not on the basis of a single,
a longitudinalseries of "transactions"through broad"self-evaluation"process, but ratheron
whichunits of a valuedresource(such as social the basis of differentself-dimensionsstemming
support)are exchanged. But a transactionwill from different sources. Self-efficacy is a dis-
often entail more than a final arrangementfor tinct aspect of the self and mustbe demarcated
resourceexchange. It will frequentlyinvolve a from other aspects such as self-esteem.
dynamic set of actions and reactions, "social Relevant because it pertainsto perceptions
negotiation,"throughwhich the specific terms of resource control, self-efficacy is the extent
of exchange come to be settled. For example, to which a person perceives him/herselfable
the terms surroundinga request for and the successfully to produce rewarding action-
provisionof a favor, its nature,its timing,etc., outcomes within a specified action domain.
are mattersto be raised and settled before the Bandura (1977) formulates a cognitive social
transactionis complete. learning theory around this concept and dis-
cusses several of its sources. Among these,
Social Negotiation
Some research has focused directly on cogni- 7Relevant to this point is a basic complementarity
tive processes in social exchange and negotia- between symbolic interactiontheory and social ex-
change theory, recently recognized and promoted:
tion. Thus, "bargaining"has been concep- "Commonalitiesare frequentlyhiddenby difference
tualized as a communicationprocess through in language. Yet there are affinities between ex-
which meanings are built, modified, and change theory and symbolic interactiontheory both
transmittedacross time (Ikl&,1973).Thoughit in the sense of having some of the same intellectual
would be misleadingto overemphasizethe de- forebearsand in the sense of buildingwith compara-
liberateness of the calculation in social ex- ble underlying ideas and concepts" (Stryker,
changeand negotiation,it is heuristicto "begin 1977:156).Also, many contributionsillustratebroad
with the premise that human actors have per- linkages between these two theoretical schools.
ceptions of objects and events in their envi- Goode (1960)uses the concept of "role bargaining"
to analyze role-conflictresolution. Scheff (1968)ex-
amines the process of realitynegotiationin the psy-
5 "Structural"is opposed here to "voluntaristic." chiatric interview. Goslin (1969) integrates diverse
The power-use principlesays that the actions of in- bodies of socialization theory and research, using
dividuals will be governed generally by structural "role negotiation" as a key organizing concept.
determinants implicit in a surroundingexchange Weinstein (1969) borrows concepts from exchange
structure.While such voluntaristicevents as an ac- theory and symbolic interactiontheory to analyze
tor's beliefs, intentions, and personalitytraits may "identitybargaining."Harr6and Secord (1972)sug-
occasionally affect the deliberateuse or nonuse of gest, in theirethogenicframework,that social reality
power, the principlerests on underlyingstructural is constructed through negotiation. Strauss (1978)
determinantsoften unseen or only dimly seen by develops a negotiatedorderapproachto the study of
actors. formalorganizations.McCalland Simmons(1978:16)
6 While Emerson, with deliberatecare, chose not examine how persons negotiate identities and allo-
to include cognitive processes, nowhere does he cate "life resources" among "associates, activities,
arguethat such processes must be excluded (Emer- times, and locales." An attempt to synthesize the
son, 1972:87). two perspectivesis providedby Singelmann(1972).
THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY
"direct feedback from performance accom-
plishments"is consideredthe most important.
The theory concerns the relationshipbetween
a personand a specifiedactiondomain,e.g., an
educationalsetting, a work setting, a marriage
andfamilysetting,a recreationalsetting,etc. If
s/he acts instrumentallyto solve a problemor
accomplish a task within that domain, action-
contingentfeedback signifyingsuccess or fail-
ure will result. S/he mightstudy and get a good
or poor grade, mightexpend effort at workand
achieve high or low praise, etc. If, across a
series of such instrumentalacts, the feedback
signals increasing success, the person's self-
efficacy with referenceto that domainwill in-
crease. If, on the other hand, the feedback
signals a steady lack of success, the person's
self-efficacy with respect to the domain will
decrease. If a person's current level of self-
efficacy is high, s/he will tend actively to initi-
ate and persist in adaptive, problem-oriented
actions despite obstacles, failures, and short-
term setbacks. If self-efficacy is low, s/he will
accept his/her incompetence with respect to
the problemdomain,will become apatheticand
passive, will stop expending problem-solving
efforts in that domain.
Linkingself-efficacy, social negotiation,and
exchange structuralinequalitycan clarify im-
portant aspects of the self-evaluation argu-
ment. An actor's position in an exchange net-
workdetermineshis/herrelativepower, which,
in turn, determineshow favorable his/her ex--
changeratiowill become across time. An actor
with positionaladvantagewill tend to negotiate
an increasinglyfavorableexchangeratio, while
an actor with a positional disadvantage will
tend to settle for one which is increasinglyun-
favorable.
Besides being a vehicle for resource ex-
change, social negotiation underlies the con-
struction, use, and dissemination of knowl-
edge. Power and stratificationare among the
network conditions that become known with
varying levels of clarity and accuracy. Often
(perhapsmost of the time) the knowledge ac-
tors have about such conditions is implicit,
vague. The valid facts of structuralinequality,
its extent and causes, are typicallyunclearand
distorted. However, an actor, usually in-
terested to know such facts as clearly as possi-
ble, will form and test hypotheses with frag-
ments of informationobtained throughnegoti-
ation.
An object of specialconcern, aboutwhich an
actor has considerableknowledge, is the self.
An importantsource of self-knowledgeis the
patternof changes in the exchange ratio s/he
achieves through transactions negotiated in
various networks. If, in a given network, an
actor has a positional power advantage, and
335
thus regularlynegotiates a favorableexchange
ratio, s/he will develop high self-efficacyin that
setting. However, if an actor has a positional
power disadvantageand repeatedlynegotiates
an unfavorableexchange ratio, s/he will de-
velop low self-efficacy in that exchange con-
text.
FollowingDella Fave's reasoning,stratifica-
tion in an exchange network and resulting
self-efficacy perceptionsare likely to lead ac-
tors to form beliefs about the fairness of the
relative terms of exchange. One who achieves
high self-efficacy will come to judge his/her
own relatively more favorable exchange ratio
as right and reasonable. Likewise, one who
achieves low self-efficacy will come to judge
his/her own relatively less favorable terms of
exchange as legitimate.
HYPOTHESES
The argument, as reformulatedhere, can be
empirically assessed by testing the following
hypotheses:'
Withina specifiedexchangenetworksituation:
(1) The extent to which an exchange ratio
comes to favor an actor will be directly
proportionalto that actor's relativeposi-
tional power.
(2) The level of self-efficacy an actor
achieves through negotiation across a
series of transactions will be directly
proportionalto that actor's relative po-
sitional power.
(3) The perceptionsof fairness an actor has
with reference to his/her exchange ratio
will not vary with that actor's relative
positional power.
AN EXPERIMENTALTEST OF THE
HYPOTHESES
Subjects
Thirty-six 4-person exchange networks (N =
144)were formed,all participantsWeingfemale
college students recruitedat a large midwest-
ern university.A uniformfee of $3.50 was paid
to each subject, plus an additional amount
varying between $1.00 and $1.50 which was
paid for "profit points" negotiated during an
experimentalsession.
An Experimental Session
Four subjects arrivedat an interactionlabora-
tory and, without meeting one another face-
to-face, were ushered individuallyinto sepa-
rate rooms. Each person was seated at a desk
on which was found: (a) a push-buttontele-
phone (intercom), (b) an experimentalclock,
336 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
(c) a package of experimentalforms ("profit points in a given transaction, and a subject
schedules"), and (d) a set of detailed written could make either 1 or 2 points, depending
instructions describing a negotiation task. upon the agreementnegotiated.
Each subjecthad telephoneaccess to the three These proceduresallowed the experimental
other subjects. As coordinatedby the exper- operationalizationof the essential features of
imental clock, an interpersonal negotiation the "unilateralmonopoly"and the "closed so-
session began. The basic task was for each cial circle" exchange networks depicted in
subject to initiate contact with or wait to be Figures 1-A and 1-B. For the "unilateral
contacted by any one of the three other sub- monopoly,"profit schedules were constructed
jects at a time during each of a longitudinal so that one subject (Al in Figure 1-A) was
series of "transactionperiods." Duringa given linkedto three subjectsin relationsof extended
period, though numerous contacts could be profitoverlap, while each of these others (A2,
made with other subjects, only one exchange A3, and A4 in Figure 1-A) was linked in a
agreementcould be made. Each subject had a relationof extended profitoverlap to only one
hypothetical resource, and during a given person (Al). Subjects in positions A2, A3, and
contact subjects attempted to negotiate an A, were linked to one another in relations of
agreementto exchange different amounts of shortprofitoverlap. The subjectat position Al
their respective resources. Duringa given pe- in this kind of exchange structurethus has a
riod, each pair of subjects could settle on any positionalpower advantagein negotiationsrel-
one of sixty-six possible, fixed-quantity ex- ative to the other subjects. In the "closed so-
change agreements. A different number of cial circle" network, profit schedules were
profitpoints was associatedwith each possible constructedso that subjects(B,, B2, B3,and B4
agreement.The amountof profitthat could be in Figure 1-B) were linked to one another in
madeby one subject was negativelycorrelated relations of extended profit overlap. Subjects,
with the amountthat could be madeby another in this kind of structurethereforedo not differ
subject. Subjects were encouraged to in relativepositionalpower.8All subjectswere
maximize their negotiated profit by making randomlyassigned to positions in 18 "unilat-
offers and counteroffersand by usingany other eral monopoly" structuresand 18 "closed so-
persuasive tactics that promised to be effec- cial circle"structuresestablishedfor the study.
tive. Each subject had access only to her own No subject "knew" the objective shape of
profitschedules, and she knew for certainonly the networkto which she was assigned, nor did
the profit she would make from various she know anythingat the outset abouther rela-
agreements. Subjects were sensitized to the tive positionalpower. However, a subjectwas
probable use of deceptive tactics by other able to discover duringthe process of negotia-
subjects. Data showing a series of resource tion varioussubtle interpersonalfeaturesof her
transactions between each pair of subjects positional power as it influenced the process
across the longitudinal negotiation session and the outcome of negotiation.
were recorded. A session was divided into
three 30-minutesegments punctuatedby brief
Dependent Variables
rest breaks. Each segment was divided into 11
transactionperiods, each lasting 2.5 minutes. One dependentvariablewas the relativeterms
Subsequent to the negotiations, each subject of exchange (the "exchange ratio") a subject
filled out a postexperimentalquestionnaire. negotiated. A subject's average number of
profit points was used as an indicator.During
The Manipulation of Positional Power
the longitudinalprocess of negotiation,the ex-
change agreements reached and the profit
Through prearrangementof the experimental points negotiated duringeach transactionpe-
profit schedules, it was possible to establish riod were recordedfor each subject. The mean
either of two kinds of exchange relations be- numberof profit points achieved per transac-
tween pairsof subjects. A relationof extended
profit overlap permitted 13 profit points to be 8 The exchange-negotiation networks opera-
distributed variously between persons in a tionalized here, in contrast to the communication
transaction, dependingupon which exchange networks studied by Bavelas (1968) and others,
agreementwas negotiated. One subject might entail a "mixed-native"task, where each actor pur-
makethe maximumof 12points, and the other sues his/her self-interest, and where each pair of
actors is linked both cooperatively and competi-
subjectmightmakethe minimumof 1point. Or tively. For either party to benefit ("makea profit")
two subjects might negotiatean agreementre- some cooperativeagreementmustbe negotiated.But
in
sulting a more equal distribution of profit parties face conflictful competition, because the
points, e.g., 6 for one and 7 for the other. A amount of benefit ("profit") achieved by one is
relation of short profit overlap, on the other negatively correlated with that achieved by the
hand,permittedthe distributionof only 3 profit other.
THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY
tion was calculatedfor subjects in all relations
of extended profitoverlap. Averageprofit was
calculated separately for each of the three
negotiationsegments taken singly, and across
the three segments taken as a whole.
A second dependentvariablewas the level of
a subject's perceived self-efficacy. Following
Franksand Marolla(1976),the potency dimen-
sion of the semanticdifferential(Osgoodet al.,
1957)was used as an indicator.After the final
transaction period, each subject answered a
postexperimentalquestionnairein which "my
self in the experiment"was listed as a concept
to be rated on a series of semanticdifferential
scales. On each of a set of bipolar adjective
scales (e.g., "weak-strong," "delicate-
rugged,"etc.), a subjectchecked one of seven
spaces. An average self-efficacy (potency)
score was computedfrom the responses each
subject made to the separate scales. The
maximumscore was 7 and the minimumwas 1,
and higher scores imply a higher level of per-
ceived self-efficacy.
A third dependent variable was a subject's
judgment of the fairness of her own terms of
exchange. Semantic differential procedures
were used to construct an indicator. In the
postexperimentalquestionnaire,"my own total
level of profit" was listed as a concept to be
rated on a set of bipolaradjective scales con-
sisting of "fair-unfair" and "inequitable-
equitable." An average judged fairness score
was computedfromthe responses each subject
made to the separate scales. The maximum
score was 7 andthe minimumwas 1, and higher
scores imply higherlevels of fairness imputed
by subjects to the terms of exchange each
negotiated.9
Analysis
Datadescribingsubjectslocated at position A1,
and positions A2, A3, and A4 in the "unilateral
monopoly"networksas well as datadescribing
subjects at B1 in the closed social circle net-
works were used in the analysis. Regression
techniques (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973)
were applied to test the hypotheses. The ma-
9 The use of semantic differentialproceduresto
scale "fairness"is not an ideal solution.The reliabil-
ity of such a measureis not known. However, such
procedureshave strongface validityin the context of
the problembeing investigated,and I am awareof no
alternativewell-testedproceduresfor measuringthe
perceived fairness of an experimental exchange
ratio. Traditionally,equity has been conceptualized
and operationalizedin terms of objective input/
outputratios. Whateverthe value of this traditional
objectiveapproachto measuringequity, it will not do
for studying fairness as it relates to subjectively
sensed legitimacy.
337
nipulated positional power variable was
dummy coded in two ways: one procedure
provided a within-structure comparison, where
the A, position (N = 18) was coded 1 and the
other positions (A2, A3, and A4) (N = 54) were
grouped and coded 0; a second dummy coding
procedure provided a between-structure com-
parison, where position A, in the "unilateral
monopoly" (N = 18) was coded 1, and position
B1 in the "closed social circle" (N = 18) was
coded 0. When relative mean profit was re-
gressed on positional power, the dummy cod-
ing procedure reflecting between-network dif-
ferences was used, because within-network
differences in profit level are not statistically
independent (i.e., one subject's profit fixes
what the other can achieve). However, when
the analysis focused on perceptions of self-
efficacy and fairness, which are statistically
independent within networks, the dummy
coding procedure showing within-network
comparisons was used.'0
Results: Effect of Relative Positional Power on
Terms of Exchange
The data displayed in Table 1 support the first
hypothesis, which predicted that the extent to
which the terms of exchange will favor an actor
is directly proportional to that actor's relative
positional power. Relevant to this prediction is
the comparison of the mean profit levels
negotiated by subjects at position A, in the
"unilateral monopoly" network with the mean
level of profit negotiated by subjects in posi-
tions A2, A3, and A4 in the same structure. As
shown in Table 1, for the negotiation segments
taken singly' and taken together, the mean
profit achieved per transaction by subjects at
position A, was higher than that achieved by
subjects at positions A2, A3, and A4. While
these mean profit levels are not statistically
independent, each was shown to depart signifi-
cantly (by a single-sample t-test) from the ex-
pected value (6.5), under the assumption of no
difference. Thus, the within-network data
show a consistent, marked effect of relative
10 Explicit knowledge of relative exchange ratios
was also manipulated.In half the networks,subjects
were providedwith informationabout the exchange
ratios that were actually negotiated right after the
negotiationsand before they filled out the postex-
perimental questionnaire. Analysis showed that
knowledgehad small (main and interaction)effects.
In general, knowledge simply confirmed what the
subjects already strongly suspected on the basis of
the give-and-takeof negotiation.Since the effects of
this variableare tangentialto the present work, the
results of the analysis includingit are not reported
here. The results of that analysis are, however,
availablefrom the authoron request.
338 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 1. Mean Relative Terms of Exchange(Profit)by PositionalPower and Negotiation Segment

Positions A2, A3, A4
Position Al in the in the Position B1 in the
UnilateralMonopoly UnilateralMonopoly Closed Circle
Relative Terms (N = 18) (N = 54) (N = 18)
of Exchange X SD X SD X SD
First Segment
of Negotiation 8.46* 1.95 3.13 1.45 6.45** 1.53
Second Segment
of Negotiation 9.18* 2.42 2.44 1.38 6.57** 1.25
ThirdSegment
of Negotiation 9.13* 2.46 2.47 1.29 6.52** 1.16
Across the Three
Segmentsof
Negotiation 8.89* 2.20 2.65 1.23 6.53** 1.16
* Differentfrom the expected value (6.5) under the assumptionof no differenceby single-samplet-test
(p < .01).
** Not significantlydifferentfrom expected value (6.5).

positional power.on the relative terms of ex- eral monopoly:'had a higherlevel of perceived
change negotiatedby subjects. self-efficacy(X = 5.15) thansubjectslocated in
Otherdata shown in Table 1 and data shown positions A2, A3, and A4 in that structure(X =
in Table 3 are also relevant to Hypothesis 1. 4.33). Further,the regressionresults displayed
Table 1 contrasts the average profit level in Table 3 show'that positional power had a
achieved by subjects at position A1 in the significanteffect on self-efficacy perceptions,
"unilateralmonopoly" with that achieved by as predicted,and that position accounts for 10
subjects at position B1 in the "closed social percent of the variance in those perceptions.
circle." For each negotiationsegment, and for The third hypothesis predicted that a sub-
the segmentstaken as a whole, subjectsat po- ject's perceptions of the fairness of her own
sition A1negotiateda mean profitlevel signifi- terms of exchange (negotiatedexchange ratio)
cantly higherthan that negotiatedby subjects would not vary with that actor's relative posi-
in position B1. Thus, the between-network tional power. The data presented in Tables 2
comparisonsalso supportthe first hypothesis. and 3 are clearly contraryto this expectation.
Bivariate regressions were calculated to de- As Table 2 shows, subjects in position Al
terminethe magnitudeof the effect. As Table3 judged the fairness of their own terms of ex-
shows, position accounts for between 26 and change to be higher (X = 5.52) than did sub-
33 percentof the variancein profitlevel across jects in positionA2, A3,and A4 (X = 4.55). The
the three segments of negotiation. Again, the regressiondata presented in Table 3 show the
data show the expected effect of relativeposi- difference to be significant, with positional
tionalpoweron the relativetermsof exchange. power accounting for 10 percent of the vari-
ance in a subject'sperceptionsof fairness. The
Results: Effects of Positional Power on results are clear. Hypothesis three is not sup-
Self-Efficacy Perceptions and Judged Fairness ported.
of Own Terms of Exchange
The second hypothesispredictedthat the level CONCLUSIONS
of self-efficacy an actor achieves through While the results do not supportthe reformu-
negotiationacross a series of transactionswill lated self-evaluationargument,they stimulate
be directlyproportionalto that actor's relative furtherthinkingwhichcan shed additionallight
positional power. As indicated in Table 2, on the topic at issue and lay a basis for future
subjects located in position A, in the "unilat- research. An account of the data must ac-
Table 2. MeanPerceivedSelf-EfficacyandJudgedFairnessof OwnTermsof Exchangeby PositionalPower
Position Al in the Unilateral Positions A2, A3, A4 in the
Monopoly (N = 18) Unilateral Monopoly (N = 54)
X SD X SD
Perceived Self-Efficacy 5.15 .88 4.33 1.12
JudgedFairness of Own
Terms of Exchange 5.52 1.11 4.55 1.34
THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY
Table 3. Regressionsof RelativeTermsof Exchange,PerceivedSelf-Efficacy,and JudgedFairnessof Own
Terms of Exchange on PositionalPower
Metric
Relative Terms Coefficient
of Exchange b B
First Segment 2.56
Second Segment 3.33
ThirdSegment . 3.49
Across All Segments 3.83
PerceivedSelf-Efficacy .90
JudgedFairnessof Own
Terms of Exchange .89
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
knowledge limitations in the study reported
here. Some importantfeaturesof everyday so-
cial stratificationwere not adequatelycaptured
in the experiment. However, it will be in-
structiveto interpretthe findings, with a keen
eye to the contrastbetweenthe experimentand
the world beyond the laboratory.
First, a theory by Kimberly (1977) helps
makesense of the findings.This formulationis
concerned,in part, with a person'sreactionsto
inconsistencies between the bases of stratifi-
cation (positions, performances, skills, and
motivations) and the stratified structures of
prestige, power, and wealth. Cognitive con-
sistency and reward-costmechanismsare em-
ployed to account for such reactions. These
mechanismsdeterminewhat a person takes to
be fair and legitimatewith referenceto his/her
status in a stratified system. The theory as-
sumes that a person will form, graduallyand
across time, a stable self-conceptionof ability.
If s/he becomes situated in a position that is
inconsistentwithhis/herself-conceivedability,
the net rewardlevel ("reward-costoutcome")
obtained throughactions in that position will
be out-of-line with his/her customary and ex-
pected net reward level ("CL, comparison
level"). The felt inconsistencywill lead the in-
dividualto judge the reward-costoutcome s/he
obtains as unfair.
It is likely that the student subjects in the
experiment had relatively high, stable self-
conceptions of negotiating ability. When
placed in disadvantaged positions, they
negotiatedexchange ratios ("reward-costout-
comes")below their"CL's,"and consequently
judged their rewardlevels as unfair.
Kimberly'stheory suggests that an individu-
al's self-concept has a fundamentalimpact on
his/her reactions to stratification.This notion
was not adequatelyincorporatedin the refor-
mulationor experiment.A person'sexperience
of inequalityis examinedagainst expectations
formed in the past and brought into the im-
mediate situation. The "higher" processes of
339
Standardized
Coefficient
d/f F r2
.51 1/34 11.86** .26
.57 1/34 16.55*** .33
.57 1/34 16.52*** .33
.57 1/34 16.66** .33
.38 1/70 7.90** .10
.30 1/70 7.65** .10
self-conceived abilities or expected reward
rights go beyond self-efficacy perceptions,
which are bound to an immediatesocial situa-
tion. As Kimberlydoes, it is necessary to ask:
What meaning is placed by the person on his!
her personal experiences of stratification?'"
While Kimberly uses cognitive consistency
theory to answer this question, one might al-
ternativelyuse causal attributiontheory (Kel-
ley, 1967). Suppose a person located in a posi-
tion of structuraldisadvantage negotiates an
unfavorable exchange ratio and forms low
self-efficacyperceptions.If s/he were to attrib-
ute these personalfacts to the self, s/he might
well accept them as legitimate and fair. Evi-
dently, the disadvantagedsubjects in the pres-
ent experimentattributedtheir relative depri-
vation to the surroundingstructureinstead of
themselves, and thus did not accept it as
legitimateand fair. The reformulationomitted
the vital process throughwhich an individual
explains the causes of his/her exchange ratio
and perceived self-efficacy in a stratified
structure.In futureresearch,proceduresto in-
duce disadvantagedsubjects to attributetheir
relativedeprivationto themselves mightbe de-
vised, and the effects on the judged fairness of
exchange ratios might be monitored.
Using the attributionperspective, it is intri-
guing to ask: Whatconditions probablyobtain
in real social life to induce a disadvantaged
individual to attribute relative deprivationto
I Besides Kimberly's work, the "status value"
approachto justice (Berger et al., 1972)and equity
(Cook, 1975)are suggestive for furtherresearchon
legitimation.Also, Psathas and Stryker (1965) and
Stryker(1972)have noted that a subjectwill enter an
experimentalsituation with a socialized predisposi-
tion to "make sense of' the situation. S/he will
"read"cues and infermeaningswith referenceto the
experimenter,the instructions,and the interaction,
beingparticularlysensitive to signsof unequalpower
and status. Such inequalitieswill be judged against
"normsof equity"importedby subjectsinto the situ-
ation. Subjects typically expect equal payoffs.
340
himself/herselfand thus accept it as right and
reasonable?Part of the answer may lie in the
class-related socialization experiences that
persons have across the lifecycle (Rosenberg,
1979; Stolte, 1978). Such experiences may
shape "attributional styles" (Ickes and
Laydon, 1978), such that some persons, as a
matter of individual bent, come to attribute
relative deprivationto the self, while others
come to attributeit "to the system" (or another
external source). The "disadvantaged"sub-
jects in the present study, most of whom came
from middle-class backgrounds, might have
reacted to the experimental deprivation in
terms of a class-related attribution style,
locating its cause not in themselves but in the
surroundingsituation.
Also relevant to attributiontheory, a per-
son's knowledgeof everyday inequalitydiffers
from the knowledge subjects had of inequality
in the experiment.One's grasp of society-wide
stratification is typically unclear, vague,
whereas a subject's grasp of the experimental
stratificationstructurewas probablyclearer.In
the everyday context, one might well act as a
'naive scientist" formingand testing hypothe-
ses. However, information is frequently ab-
sent, or is so complex, that incorrect infer-
ences, distortedcausal attributionsresult. At-
tributiontheorycan disclose muchabout"false
consciousness." Because knowledge has
boundaries(McCalland Simmons, 1978),and a
person tends to live in "consonant contexts"
(Rosenberg, 1979), s/he has only limited,
biased "data"upon which to base attributions.
A disadvantagedindividualin everydaysociety
might overestimate the accomplishments of
high status persons and underestimatehis/her
own potential,thus accepting relativedepriva-
tion as fair and legitimate.
Finally, symbolic interaction theory
(Stryker, 1980)is a frameworkwell-suitedfor
explaining how a person places meaning on
personal experiences of stratification.Added
insights into the present findingsemerge espe-
cially from Strykerand Gottlieb's (1981) con-
trast between attributiontheory and symbolic
interactiontheory. The two perspectivesshare
a concern with the "meaningof meaning,"ad-
dressing the same basic question: "What is it
that people seek to infer, analyze, and interpret
as they carry on their everyday lives?"
(Strykerand Gottlieb, 1981:440)The perspec-
tives differ, however, in how they frame an-
swers to this question. For attributiontheory,
meaningderives from inferencesabout a hard,
objective reality which is "out there" in a fac-
tual sense. For symbolic interaction theory,
meaning "is neither inferred nor externally
predetermined;it is negotiated"(Stryker and
Gottlieb, 1981:447). Further, within certain
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
versions of symbolic interaction theory, the
meanings (e.g., identities) negotiated are par-
tially determined by external structuralcon-
straints. That is, the surroundingcontext, in
which the interactionis embedded, partly de-
termines the resources (e.g., the prior mean-
ings, identities, roles, vocabulariesof motive)
at the disposal of those who negotiate.
The presentstudy, thoughframedin termsof
social exchange theory, can be reconsidered
from this symbolic interactionist perspective
(see footnote 7), because symbolic interaction
theory and social exchangetheory converge on
the notion of "negotiation." The explicit task
faced by the experimental subjects was to
negotiate resource exchanges, and the proce-
dures were limited to recordingsuch negotia-
tions. It is probable,however, that the subjects
also engagedin subtle, "higher-order"meaning
negotiations. Though not monitored, various
symbolic actions and reactions were probably
occurring. Subjects probablypresented them-
selves strategically, used altercasting, ac-
counts, and disclaimers, attempting to
negotiate favorable exchange ratios. Con-
formingwith the "definitionof the situation,"
subjects fulfilled the situational role-
requirements prescribing self-interested, ra-
tional bargaining behavior. Negotiated ex-
changeratiosand sensed self-efficacyprobably
were symbolic objects. Following Della Fave,
the kind of meaningone would have expected
subjects to attach to these objects of negotia-
tion experience is clear: a disadvantagedsub-
ject would have been expected to infer a self-
identity congruent with her positional power
and thus accept her relative deprivationas fair
and legitimate. However, as the data suggest,
the subjects apparentlydid not construe them-
selves in this way, for they did not accept their
circumstancesas fair.
Again, contrastingthe experiment with the
realworldof inequalityis useful. Subjectswere
probablybetterable to resist a definitionof self
as inferior, impliedby the experiment,than is
often possible in real-life inequality contexts
(Stryker and Gottlieb, 1981:450). While the
outcomes of resource negotiations were de-
terminedstructurallyfor the subjects, the out-
comes .of meaningnegotiationsevidently were
not thus determined.Two importantqualities
characterizing real-life inequality were not
adequatelyrealized in the experiment:(a) high
significance of others, and (b) a well-
formulated,consensual definitionof the situa-
tion prescribingand justifying inequalities in
exchange ratios. Society-wide stratificationdi-
rectly experienced by persons in everyday life
is often surrounded with collectively con-
structed, widely shared definitions, which
often explain andjustify privilegeand depriva-
THE LEGITIMATIONOF STRUCTURALINEQUALITY
tion, high and low self-efficacy. In many in-
stances such definitionsconstitute "false con-
sciousness" but are frequently accepted as
"reasonable"and "objectively accurate,"par-
ticularlywhen sharedand voiced by significant
others. Symbolic interactionists have under-
scored "consensualvalidation"(Stryker,1980)
as a motivationalbasis for acceptingviews of
self held by others.12 If an experimentalsubject
would have encountered a definition shared
and voiced by significantothers,justifyingher
relative deprivation, she might well have ac-
cepted her circumstances as legitimate and
fair. However, the significance of the exper-
imental others is questionable, given the ad
hoc, short-term relationships entailed. Also,
there was no consensual definitionprescribing
and justifying unequalexchange ratios. In fu-
ture experimental work, significant others
(e.g., family members,friends) might serve as
subjects, and definitionsof inequalitymightbe
manipulated(perhapsby using confederates).
Effects on the judged fairness of exchange
ratios could then be measured.
In sum, Kimberly'swork emphasizes an en-
during self and consistencies (or inconsisten-
cies) amongpast and presentinequalityexperi-
ences. Attributiontheory also focuses on the
self (an acquiredattributionstyle), noting the
importanceof one's knowledge base for attri-
butionsabout inequality.Symbolic interaction
theory stresses meaning negotiationand defi-
nitions, constructedin concert with significant
others, that shape one's self-concept with ref-
erence to inequality. Though similar in their
concern with "higher-order"socio-cognitive
processes, these frameworks differ in many
ways. At this stage, a choice among them is
neitherpossible nor desirable.It is likely that a
new perspectivecombininginsightsfromthese
approacheswill be necessary to advance our
understandingof how stratifiedstructuresbe-
come legitimated.
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