CRITIQUE OF HUME ON SUICIDE

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2018.

The immanentist, sensist, phenomenalist agnostic David Hume (1711-1776) was an

advocate of suicide and gives various stoical, sentimentalist and utilitarian reasons to justify
recourse to it. Hume’s detailed position on suicide is taken from his Of Suicide [1757], the
manuscript of which is located in the National Library of Scotland with corrections in Hume’s
own hand.

Of Suicide by David Hume (1757)

“One considerable advantage, that arises from philosophy, consists in the sovereign
antidote, which it affords to superstition and false religion. All other remedies against that
pestilent distemper are vain, or, at least, uncertain. Plain good-sense, and the practice of the
world, which alone serve most purposes of life, are here found ineffectual: history, as well as
daily experience, affords instances of men, endowed with the strongest capacity for business and
affairs, who have all their lives crouched under slavery to the grossest superstition. Even gaiety
and sweetness of temper, which infuse a balm into every other wound, afford no remedy to so
virulent a poison; as we may particularly observe of the fair sex, who, though commonly
possessed of these rich presents of nature, feel many of their joys blasted by this importunate
intruder. But when sound philosophy has once gained possession of the mind, superstition is
effectually excluded; and one may safely affirm, that her triumph over this enemy is more
complete than over most of the vices and imperfections, incident to human nature. Love or anger,
ambition or avarice, have their root in the temper and affections, which the soundest reason is
scarce ever able fully to correct. But superstition, being founded on false opinion, must
immediately vanish, when true philosophy has inspired juster sentiments of superior powers. The
contest is here more equal between the distemper and the medicine: and nothing can hinder the
latter from proving effectual, but its being false and sophisticated.

“It will here be superfluous to magnify the merits of philosophy, by displaying the
pernicious tendency of that vice, of which it cures the human mind. The superstitious man, says
Tully, is miserable in every scene, in every incident in life. Even sleep itself, which banishes all
other cares of unhappy mortals, affords to him matter of new terror; while he examines his
dreams, and finds in those visions of the night, prognostications of future calamities. I may add,
that, though death alone can put a full period to his misery, he dares not fly to this refuge, but
still prolongs a miserable existence, from a vain fear, lest he offend his maker, by using the
power, with which that beneficent being has endowed him. The presents of God and Nature are
ravished from us by this cruel enemy; and notwithstanding that one step would remove us from
the regions of pain and sorrow, her menaces still chain us down to a hated being, which she
herself chiefly contributes to render miserable.

“It is observed of such as have been reduced by the calamities of life to the necessity of
employing this fatal remedy, that, if the unseasonable care of their friends deprive them of that
species of death, which they proposed to themselves, they seldom venture upon any other, or can

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summon up so much resolution, a second time, as to execute their purpose. So great is our horror
of death, that when it presents itself under any form, besides that to which a man has endeavored
to reconcile his imagination, it acquires new terrors, and overcomes his feeble courage. But when
the menaces of superstition are joined to this natural timidity, no wonder it quite deprives men of
all power over their lives; since even many pleasures and enjoyments, to which we are carried by
a strong propensity, are torn from us by this inhuman tyrant. Let us here endeavor to restore men
to their native liberty, by examining all the common arguments against suicide, and showing,
that that action may be free from every imputation of guilt or blame; according to the sentiments
of all the antient philosophers.

“If suicide be criminal, it must be a transgression of our duty either to God, our neighbor,
or ourselves.

“To prove, that suicide is no transgression of our duty to God, the following
considerations may perhaps suffice. In order to govern the material world, the almighty creator
has established general and immutable laws, by which all bodies, from the greatest planet to the
smallest particle of matter, are maintained in their proper sphere and function. To govern the
animal world, he has endowed all living creatures with bodily and mental powers; with senses,
passions, appetites, memory, and judgment; by which they are impelled or regulated in that
course of life, to which they are destined. These two distinct principles of the material and
animal world continually encroach upon each other, and mutually retard or forward each other’s
operation. The powers of men and of all other animals are restrained and directed by the nature
and qualities of the surrounding bodies; and the modifications and actions of these bodies are
incessantly altered by the operation of all animals. Man is stopped by rivers in his passage over
the surface of the earth; and rivers, when properly directed, lend their force to the motion of
machines, which serve to the use of man. But though the provinces of the material and animal
powers are not help entirely separate, there result from thence no discord or disorder in the
creation: on the contrary, from the mixture, union, and contrast of all the various powers of
inanimate bodies and living creatures, arises that surprising harmony and proportion, which
affords the surest argument of supreme wisdom.

“The providence of the deity appears not immediately in any operation, but governs every
thing by those general and immutable laws, which have been established from the beginning of
time. All events, in one sense, may be pronounced the action of the almighty: they all proceed
from those powers, with which he has endowed his creatures. A house, which falls by its own
weight, is not brought to ruin by his providence more than one destroyed by the hands of men;
nor are the human faculties less his workmanship than the laws of motion and gravitation. When
the passions play, when the judgment dictates, when the limbs obey; this is all the operation of
God; and upon these animate principles, as well as upon the inanimate, has he established the
government of the universe.

“Every event is alike important in the eyes of that infinite being, who takes in, at one
glance, the most distant regions of space and remotest periods of time. There is no one event,
however important to us, which he has exempted from the general laws that govern the universe,
or which he has peculiarly reserved for his own immediate action and operation. The revolutions
of states and empires depend upon the smallest caprice or passion of single men; and the lives of

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men are shortened or extended by the smallest accident of air or diet, sunshine or tempest. Nature
still continues her progress and operation; and if general laws be ever broke by particular
volitions of the deity, it is after a manner which entirely escapes human observation. As on the
one hand, the elements and other inanimate parts of the creation carry on their action without
regard to the particular interest and situation of men; so men are entrusted to their own judgment
and discretion in the various shocks of matter, and may employ every faculty, with which they
are endowed, in order to provide for their ease, happiness, or preservation.

“What is the meaning, then, of that principle, that a man, who, tired of life, and hunted by
pain and misery, bravely overcomes all the natural terrors of death, and makes his escape from
this cruel scene; that such a man, I say, has incurred the indignation of his creator, by
encroaching on the office of divine providence, and disturbing the order of the universe? Shall
we assert, that the Almighty has reserved to himself, in any peculiar manner, the disposal of the
lives of men, and has not submitted that event, in common with others, to the general laws, by
which the universe is governed? This is plainly false. The lives of men depend upon the same
laws as the lives of all other animals; and these are subjected to the general laws of matter and
motion. The fall of a tower or the infusion of a poison will destroy a man equally with the
meanest creature: An inundation sweeps away every thing, without distinction, that comes within
the reach of its fury. Since therefore the lives of men are for ever dependent on the general laws
of matter and motion; is a man’s disposing of his life criminal, because, in every case it is
criminal to encroach upon these laws, or disturb their operation? But this seems absurd. All
animals are entrusted to their own prudence and skill for their conduct in the world, and have full
authority, as far as their power extends, to alter all the operations of nature. Without the exercise
of this authority, they could not subsist a moment. Every action, every motion of a man
innovates in the order of some parts of matter, and diverts, from their ordinary course, the
general laws of motion. Putting together, therefore, these conclusions, we find, that human life
depends upon the general laws of matter and motion, and that ‘tis no encroachment on the office
of providence to disturb or alter these general laws. Has not every one, of consequence, the free
disposal of his own life? And may he not lawfully employ that power with which nature has
endowed him?

“In order to destroy the evidence of this conclusion, we must show a reason, why this
particular case is excepted. Is it because human life is of such great importance, that it is a
presumption for human prudence to dispose of it? But the life of a man is of no greater
importance to the universe than that of an oyster. And were it of ever so great importance, the
order of nature has actually submitted it to human prudence, and reduced us to a necessity, in
every incident, of determining concerning it.

“Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the peculiar province of the
almighty, that it were an encroachment on his right for men to dispose of their own lives; it
would be equally criminal to act for the preservation of life as for its destruction. If I turn aside a
stone, which is falling upon my head, I disturb the course of nature, and I invade the peculiar
province of the almighty, by lengthening out my life, beyond the period, which, by the general
laws of matter and motion, he had assigned to it.

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 “A hair, a fly, an insect is able to destroy this mighty being, whose life is of such
importance. Is it an absurdity to suppose, that human prudence may lawfully dispose of what
depends on such insignificant causes?

“It would be no crime in me to divert the Nile or Danube from its course, were I able to
effect such purposes. Where then is the crime of turning a few ounces of blood from their natural
channels!

“Do you imagine that I repine at providence or curse my creation, because I go out of
life, and put a period to a being, which, were it to continue, would render me miserable? Far be
such sentiments from me. I am only convinced of a matter of fact, which you yourself
acknowledge possible, that human life may be unhappy, and that my existence, if farther
prolonged, would become uneligible. But I thank providence, both for the good, which I have
already enjoyed, and for the power, with which I am endowed, of escaping the ill that threatens
me. To you it belongs to repine at providence, who foolishly imagine that you have no such
power, and who must still prolong a hated being, though loaded with pain and sickness, with
shame and poverty.

“Do you not teach, that when any ill befalls me, though by the malice of my enemies, I
ought to be resigned to providence; and that the actions of men are the operations of the almighty
as much as the actions of inanimate beings? When I fall upon my sword, therefore, I receive my
death equally from the hands of the deity, and if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a
fever.

“The submission, which you require to providence, in every calamity, that befalls me,
excludes not human skill and industry; if possibly, by their means, I can avoid or escape the
calamity. And why may I not employ one remedy as well as another?

“If my life be not my own, it were criminal for me to put it in danger, as well as to
dispose of it: nor could one man deserve the appellation of hero, whom glory or friendship
transports into the greatest dangers, and another merit the reproach of wretch or miscreant, who
puts a period to his life, from the same or like motives.

“There in no being, which possesses any power or faculty, that it receives not from its
creator; nor is there any one, which, by ever so irregular an action, can encroach upon the plan of
his providence, or disorder the universe. Its operations are his work equally with that chain of
events, which it invades; and which ever principle prevails, we may, for that very reason,
conclude it to be most favored by him. Be it animate, or inanimate, rational or irrational, it is all
a case: its power is still derived from the supreme creator, and is alike comprehended in the order
of his providence. When the horror of pain prevails over the love of life: when a voluntary action
anticipates the effect of blind causes; it is only in consequence of those powers and principles,
which he has implanted in his creatures. Divine providence is still inviolate, and placed far
beyond the reach of human injuries.

“It is impious, says the old Roman superstition, to divert rivers from their course, or
invade the prerogatives of nature. It is impious, says the French superstition, to inoculate for the

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small-pox, or usurp the business of providence, by voluntarily producing distempers and
maladies. It is impious, says the modern European superstition, to put a period to our own life,
and thereby rebel against our creator. And why not impious, say I, to build houses, cultivate the
ground, or sail upon the ocean? In all these actions, we employ our powers of mind and body to
produce some innovation in the course of nature; and in none of them do we any more. They are
all of them, therefore, equally innocent or equally criminal.

“But you are placed by providence, like a sentinel, in a particular station; and when you
desert it, without being recalled, you are guilty of rebellion against your almighty sovereign, and
have incurred his displeasure. I ask, why do you conclude, that providence has placed me in this
station? For my part, I find, that I owe my birth to a long chain of causes, of which many and
even the principal, depended upon voluntary actions of men. But providence guided all these
causes, and nothing happens in the universe without its consent and cooperation. If so, then
neither does my death, however voluntary, happen without its consent; and whenever pain and
sorrow so far overcome my patience as to make me tired of life, I may conclude, that I am
recalled from my station, in the clearest and most express terms.

“It is providence, surely, that has placed me at present in this chamber: but may I not
leave it, when I think proper, without being liable to the imputation of having deserted my post
or station? When I shall be dead, the principles, of which I am composed, will still perform their
part in the universe, and will be equally useful in the grand fabric, as when they composed this
individual creature. The difference to the whole will be no greater than between my being in a
chamber and in the open air. The one change is of more importance to me than the other; but not
more so to the universe.

“It is a kind of blasphemy to imagine, that any created being can disturb the order of the
world, or invade the business of providence. It supposes, that that being possesses powers and
faculties, which it received not from its creator, and which are not subordinate to his government
and authority. A man may disturb society, no doubt; and thereby incur the displeasure of the
almighty: but the government of the world is placed far beyond his reach and violence. And how
does it appear, that the almighty is displeased with those actions, that disturb society? By the
principles which he has implanted in human nature, and which inspire us with a sentiment of
remorse, if we ourselves have been guilty of such actions, and with that of blame and
disapprobation, if we ever observe them in others. Let us now examine, according to the method
proposed, whether suicide be of this kind of actions, and be a breach of our duty to our neighbor
and to society.

“A man, who retires from life, does no harm to society. He only ceases to do good;
which, if it be an injury, is of the lowest kind.

“All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something reciprocal. I receive
the benefits of society, and therefore ought to promote its interest. But when I withdraw myself
altogether from society, can I be bound any longer?

“But allowing, that our obligations to do good were perpetual, they have certainly some
bounds. I am not obliged to do a small good to society, at the expense of a great harm to myself.

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Why then should I prolong a miserable existence, because of some frivolous advantage, which
the public may, perhaps, receive from me? If upon account of age and infirmities, I may lawfully
resign any office, and employ my time altogether in fencing against these calamities, and
alleviating, as much as possible, the miseries of my future life: why may I not cut short these
miseries at once by an action, which is no more prejudicial to society?

“But suppose, that it is no longer in my power to promote the interest of the public:
suppose, that I am a burden to it: suppose, that my life hinders some person from being much
more useful to the public. In such cases my resignation of life must not only be innocent but
laudable. And most people, who lie under any temptation to abandon existence, are in some such
situation. Those, who have health, or power, or authority, have commonly better reason to be in
humor with the world.

“A man is engaged in a conspiracy for the public interest; is seized upon suspicion; is
threatened with the rack; and knows, from his own weakness, that the secret will be extorted
from him: could such a one consult the public interest better than by putting a quick period to a
miserable life? This was the case of the famous and brave Strozzi of Florence.

“Again, suppose a malefactor justly condemned to a shameful death; can any reason be
imagined, why he may not anticipate his punishment, and save himself all the anguish of
thinking on its dreadful approaches? He invades the business of providence no more than the
magistrate did, who ordered his execution; and his voluntary death is equally advantageous to
society, by ridding it of a pernicious member.

“That suicide may often be consistent with interest and with our duty to ourselves, no one
can question, who allows, that age, sickness, or misfortune may render life a burden, and make it
worse even than annihilation. I believe that no man ever threw away life, while it was worth
keeping. For such is our natural horror of death, that small motives will never be able to
reconcile us to it. And though perhaps the situation of a man’s health or fortune did not seem to
require this remedy, we may at least be assured, that any one, who, without apparent reason, has
had recourse to it, was cursed with such an incurable depravity or gloominess of temper, as must
poison all enjoyment, and render him equally miserable as if he had been loaded with the most
grievous misfortunes.

“If suicide be supposed a crime, it is only cowardice can impel us to it. If it be no crime,
both prudence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves at once of existence, when it
becomes a burden. It is the only way, that we can then be useful to society, by setting as
example, which, if imitated, would preserve to every one his chance for happiness in life, and
would effectually free him from all danger of misery[1].

“Notes

“1 It would be easy to prove, that suicide is as lawful under the Christian dispensation as
it was to the heathens. There is not a single text of scripture, which prohibits it. That great
infallible rule of faith and practice, which must control all philosophy and human reasoning, has
left us, in this particular, to our natural liberty. Resignation to providence is, indeed,

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recommended in scripture; but that implies only submission to ills, which are unavoidable, not to
such as may be remedied by prudence or courage. Thou shalt not kill is evidently meant to
exclude only the killing of others, over whose life we have no authority. That this precept like
most of the scripture precepts, must be modified by reason and common sense, is plain from the
practice of magistrates, who punish criminals capitally, notwithstanding the letter of this law. But
were this commandment ever so express against suicide, it could now have no authority. For all
the law of Moses is abolished, except so far as it is established by the law of nature; and we have
already endeavored to prove, that suicide is not prohibited by that law. In all cases, Christians
and heathens are precisely upon the same footing; and if Cato and Brutus, Arria and Portia acted
heroically, those who now imitate their example ought to receive the same praises from posterity.
The power of committing suicide is regarded by Pliny as an advantage which men possess even
above the deity himself. Deus non sibi potest mortem consciscere, si velit, quod homini dedit
optimum in tantis vitae paenis. [Although God cannot inflict death upon himself, even if he
would, he has given this to man as the best course in life’s great pains.] Lib. ii. Cap. 7.

Answer to Hume on Suicide: Various Critiques of Suicide

Austin Fagothey’s Critique of Suicide

Austin Fagothey, S.J. critiques suicide in the second edition of his Right and Reason
(1959) as follows: “Suicide is here taken in the strict sense, not as any killing of oneself, but as
the direct killing of oneself on one’s own authority.

“Direct killing is an act of killing that is directly voluntary, that is, death is intended
either as an end or as a means to an end. Either the action is capable of only one effect and that
effect is death, or the action is capable of several effects including death and among these death
is the effect intended. To commit suicide a man must intend his death either as end or as means.

“Indirect killing is an act of killing that is indirectly voluntary; death is not intended
either as an end or as a means to an end, but is only permitted as an unavoidable consequence.
The action must be capable of at least two effects one of which is death, and the agent intends,
not death, but the other effect. To avoid misunderstanding, it is better not to speak of the indirect
killing of oneself as killing at all, but as the deliberate exposure of one’s life to serious danger.
Such exposure is not what is meant by suicide.

“The killing is not suicide unless it is done on one’s own authority. Two others might be
thought of as having authority in the matter: God and the state. God, having supreme dominion
over all things including human life, could order a man to kill himself. The act would not be
suicide, for the man would only be acting as God’s instrument and carrying out His will. But to
know God’s will in such a case a special revelation would be needed; there is certainly no
provision for anything like this in the natural law. The state might appoint a man condemned to
death to be his own executioner, as in the famous case of Socrates. Whether the state has the
right to do so or not is a disputed question, and of little application today, since the practice has
been abandoned by all civilized peoples. Whatever be its morality, it is not suicide according to
the accepted definition.

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 “Suicide can be committed positively or negatively: positively, by the performance of
some death-dealing act against oneself; negatively, by omitting to use the ordinary means of
preserving one’s life. It is suicide to starve one self to death, to refuse to step out of the way of an
oncoming train, to neglect to use the ordinary remedies against an otherwise fatal disease.

“Suicide is Against the Natural Law. – Various arguments either of a utilitarian or

sentimentalist nature can be brought forth for and against the permissibility of suicide: how, on
the one hand, it is folly to go on living after life has become an intolerable burden; and how, on
the other hand, suicide is an act of cowardice and a refusal to face life like a man. But we shall
base our argument wholly on the natural law. From the natural law and from man’s status as a
creature it follows that the right to life is an inalienable right that is also a duty, that life is a gift
with definite restrictions and responsibilities attached.

“Though God by the natural law gives rights to man, there are some rights God cannot
give, for by their very nature they are exclusively God’s. One of these is the direct dominion
(sovereignty, ownership, proprietorship) over the human person, the compound of body and soul,
that the suicide seeks to dissolve. What God gives to man is an indirect dominion over himself,
the use and stewardship of his person; but no direct dominion, no right to consume and destroy
his person at his own discretion.

“The reason why God must reserve to Himself direct dominion over human life is the
peculiar nature of a rational being, such as man is, who must deserve his last end by his free acts.
By the eternal law God decrees that all His creatures attain the end for which He created them.
Man can attain his end only by doing morally good acts. These acts take time, and the length of
each man’s life is the opportunity allotted him for doing them. It is for God and not for man to
say that a sufficient number of good acts has been performed and a sufficient amount of merit
acquired. The suicide equivalently tells God that He will have to take the merits accumulated so
far, and that He will simply get no more. The creature thus tries to dictate to God what God will
have to be satisfied with, in contradiction to what God in creating him has a right to demand
from him. God cannot give such authority to a creature without ceasing to be God.

“Therefore man is obliged to live out his life to the end of its natural span. God owns
both man and man’s works, and has a right to both. The actual performance of these works God
has put under man’s stewardship to be guided by man’s free will, but the final approval of these
works both in quantity and quality rests with God alone. The suicide, by making firther works of
his own impossible, invades God’s exclusive right. To sum up in a syllogism:

“Any act contrary to our nature as dependent creatures is forbidden by the natural law.

“But suicide is an act contrary to our nature as dependent creatures. For suicide, as an
exercise of direct dominion over the human person, is the seizure of a right that is so exclusively
God’s that even God cannot transfer it to another. God cannot grant to man direct dominion over
himself, since to do so would be to allow man to dictate to God the conditions for the attainment
of his last end, and thus to assume supreme lordship over himself.

“Therefore suicide is forbidden by the natural law.

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 “Questions on the Argument. – The following are a few of the more common difficulties
against the wrongness of suicide:

“1. The argument seems to rest on a false foundation, that man can defraud God of His
right; is it not impossible for any creature to defraud God of anything? This objection is invalid
because it would prove that no sin is possible. No sin can actually hurt God, but that does not
make sin allowable. God cannot be outwitted and is too wise for all our malice. From all eternity
He has adjusted His providence to His foreknowledge that a certain man will freely commit
suicide (or any other sin), and derives either from that man’s punishment or from other creatures
the external glory He might have derived from the rest of that man’s natural life (or from the
good contrary to any other sin). Man can never actually defraud God, but he is not allowed to try,
or to be willing to do what would defraud God were He not infinitely beyond all possible harm.
In this the malice of all sin consists.

“2. God has given man direct dominion over the lives of animals and plants, which he
can destroy for his own purposes; why could not God give man direct dominion over his own
life? The difference is that these lower beings are not persons. They are made for man’s use and
consumption, as the impossibility of human life without them shows. Their acts have no moral
value, for they have not the gift of immortality and cannot merit a future state by acts done
during life.

“3. Does not God give direct dominion over human life in the cases of capital punishment
and self-defense? No; the killing may be direct, a directly voluntary act, but it is not an exercise
of direct dominion, which is full control over a thing to dispose of as one pleases and at one’s
discretion. The state has no such control over criminals. It can take life only on the authority of
God, by the right communicated to it by God through the natural law, to be exercised not in any
way the state pleases but only for proved crime after a fair trial. The same is true of self-defense.
The defender kills the attacker only on God’s authority manifested by the natural law and
implicit in the defender’s own right to life. The right to destroy does not of itself give direct
dominion; a man who hires a wrecking company to destroy his house does not give them direct
ownership over the house.

“4. If it is not wrong to interfere with nature to prolong life, why should it be wrong to
interfere with nature to shorten life? Both curing and killing are interferences with nature; if
man may cure (which no one will deny), why may he not kill? This objection confuses direct and
indirect dominion. If man had direct dominion over his life, he could do either. But indirect
dominion or stewardship means that life is only lent to man for his use. Not only must a man not
destroy what is under his stewardship, but he must use ordinary means and reasonable care to
preserve it. It is not contrary to nature to use intelligently the remedies nature provides, to
develop them scientifically, and to apply them as means of preserving life, as good stewardship
requires. But to use them to destroy life is not stewardship, but the unjust assumption of direct
dominion and the violation of God’s rights.

“5. Though people suffering from temporary despondency should be prevented from
harming themselves, there are some for whom life is really and irremediably hopeless; they are
useless burdens to society and to themselves; is it not better for all concerned if they retire from

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the scene? This question exhibits the logical conclusion of the hedonistic and utilitarian
philosophies. If there is no God, or God’s rights and interests are ruled out of court, man may do
with his life what he pleases. But if God exists and there is a life beyond this, no human being
can be called useless. Suffering in itself has no earthly value and might be called the worst of
earthly disvalues, but it is one of the most powerful sources of merit for the next life offered to
man. A man who faces suffering with heroic courage and patience is an example to his fellows, a
credit to himself, and an honor to God. No such one can be called useless.

“6. It is lawful to choose a lesser evil to avoid a greater; since there are worse evils than
death, why cannot the lesser be chosen? Prudence so dictates, if there is a choice between two
unavoidable physical evils and no moral evil is involved. Moral evil may never be chosen to
avoid a physical evil, and suicide is a moral evil. But suppose one must choose between the sin
of suicide and the commission of some other sin? No such predicament ever occurs. In conflicts
between rights and duties the lesser yields and ceases to be a right or duty. One is therefore never
forced to choose between sins. A person who cannot determine which is the genuine right or
duty can always form his conscience and avoid subjective wrongdoing.”1

Higgins’s Critique of Suicide

Thomas Higgins, S.J. critiques suicide in his Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics
(1958), as follows: “Suicide literally means the killling of self. Self-destruction can be direct or
indirect. Direct self-destruction occurs when one’s own death is the immediate object of one’s
will act, as when a penniless actress deliberately takes an overdose of sleeping pills. Indirect self-
destruction follows from an action which, by its nature and the intention of the agent, can
produce some effect other than death, as when an aviator destroys an enemy vessel by crashing
his plane against it. In direct self-destruction life is destroyed, death is sought; in indirect self-
destruction, death unsought is permitted.

“Direct self-destruction could take place on the authority of a superior who has dominion
over the life of the person. Such self-destruction would not be an immoral act but obedience to
the command of a lawful superior. God is the master of life and death; hence if He inspired the
act of those martyrs who rushed to death of their own accord, they were guilty of no wrong.

“...The suicide whose morality we are now discussing is the direct killing of one’s self
upon one’s own authority. We are not asking if it is generally wrong – a proposition which all
men seem to admit – but if it is always wrong. The ancient Stoics held that suicide was
sometimes noble and honorable, a sentiment which a few moderns like Hume, Bentham, and
Montaigne re-echo. According to them, a general who loses a crucial battle, the master of a
foundering vessel, the victim of prolonged and incurable disease are justified in taking their
lives.

“Suicide, whereby man kills himself upon his own authority, is always forbidden; but
indirect self-destruction or exposure to danger of certain death is allowable for a sufficiently
grave reason.

1
A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, Tan Books, Rockford, IL, 2000 (reprinted from the 1959 second edition), pp.
276-280.

10
 “Proof of Part I: The Natural Law forbids as intrinsically evil any invasion of the
exclusive dominion of God. For man to do what belongs to God alone perverts the essential
order of human nature. Suicide trespasses upon God’s exclusive dominion because (a)
destruction of a thing is the ultimate act of dominion. (b) God has dominion over the life of man
because He is man’s Efficient Cause and Last End. (c) This dominion is exclusively God’s so
that it cannot be shared by man. If man were granted such dominion over himself, then God
alone would not be man’s final end, and man, the creature, would be his own end. But no created
thing can be its own end.

“Corollary. Man is but the steward of his corporeal life and of all his faculties. A steward
is the agent of his principal and has no independent rights over the substance which has been
entrusted to him. Therefore, man may use life and body, but his use of them must accord with the
will of his principal, God. Man may never on his own authority destroy his trust.

“The intrinsic evil of suicide is clear also from a consideration of the truth, that, since
God is the Maker and Last End of man, man belongs totally and essentially to Him. It is contrary
to right reason to hold that one who is essentially the servant of another should determine how
long he is to serve and when he is to receive the reward of his service. By suicide man overturns
right order.

“When man by suicide invades God’s exclusive rights, of what in particular does man
deprive God? Since God owns man absolutely, man cannot say his life is his own to do with as
he chooses. He must use it as God directs through divine law. What God expects of man and has
an exclusive right to exact from man are morally good acts. By morally good acts man gives God
extrinsic glory. How much extrinsic glory is due from each and for how long a time it is to be
rendered are matters for God to determine. Therefore, when man by his own act shortens his life,
he is acting the part of God, and deprives God of that to which God is entitled, namely, further
moral fruits of mortal life, a definite amount of extrinsic glory expected of probationary man.

“Suicide as an escape from overwhelming personal disaster, an evil life, misery,

frustration, or dishonor, far from being an act of fortitude, is an act of cowardice. It is a refusal to
accept a severe test sent us by God. Persons who take their lives under such circumstances have
the false view that happiness in this life is man’s last end.

“Suicide as an escape from being a burden to others also manifests the erroneous
conception that the purpose of life is temporal happiness. The aged, broken, chronically infirm,
and seemingly useless give others magnificent opportunities for practicing the moral virtues.
God has promised eternal beatitude to those who feed the hungry, clothe the naked, shelter the
homeless. How could such virtues be exercised if God did not permit appropriate opportunities?

“It is lawful to wish death, that is, orderly death in conformity to the plans of Divine
Providence, but we may not wish to kill ourselves.

“Part II. Men sometimes embark on a most hazardous enterprise whence death is surely
or most likely to ensue. The timid onlooker calls it suicide. And it is suicide if self-destruction is
intended. But even if they do not intend their death, if they are merely resigned to accept it if it

11
comes, are they justified? Does the fact that they are stewards of their mortal life demand that
they take every means to save their lives and avoid every proximate danger of death? No, for
reason may allow, sometimes demand, exposure to imminent peril. The morality of such acts
must be judged by the principle of double effect.

“Proof. Exposure to danger of certain death is justified if all of the following conditions
are verified:

“1. The action which results in the bad unintended effect of death and some other good
effect must itself be morally good or at least indifferent.

“2. The effect other than death must be morally good, as when a man plunges into icy
water to save a drowning skater.

“3. The intended good effect may not be caused by one’s death. If it were, then one
would first have to intend one’s death, which is always wrong. Hence the good intended must
follow from the act of exposure as immediately as does death. If exposure to death has one and
only one immediate effect, namely, self-destruction, one cannot intend it without intending
suicide. In such cases, the principle of double effect does not apply.

“There must be a reasonable proportion between the good intended and one’s death.
Death is allowed only for a gravely compensating reason. This reason could be a spiritual good,
for example, avoidance of a proximate occasion of serious sin, or some notable material benefit
to one’s neighbor or the community.”2

Bittle’s Critique of Suicide

Celestine Bittle, OFM, Cap. critiques suicide in his Man and Morals: Ethics (1953), as
follows: “No person is allowed to take his own life by committing suicide. Suicide is the direct,
intentional destruction of one’s own life. Suicide must not be confused with the indirect and
unintentional surrender of one’s life which may be permissible. Anyone performing a morally
good act, knowing that his death will follow, provided that he has a sufficiently grave reason for
the act, does not commit suicide; he ‘permits’ the forfeiture of his life in a good cause for a
sufficiently grave reason…Actions of this kind must be judged by the principle of ‘double effect’
and may be, depending on the circumstances, entirely permissible.

“Suicide is self-murder. A person has no more right to murder himself than he has to
murder someone else. The person alone has the right to destroy a thing who has dominion over
it. In order that an individual be permitted to destroy his own life, he must have dominion over it.
But how can an individual have dominion over his life? He did not create it; he did not acquire it
through his own effort and industry; he did not purchase it. Life is a gift. The soul is created by
God, and the soul is the life principle of the person. God alone, therefore, has dominion over the
life of a person. Since the life of an individual is an unearned gift, man is only the steward over
his life, and he has the duty to manage and administer his life in the service of his Master. God

2
T. HIGGINS, Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1958, pp. 202-205.

12
alone has the right to take man’s life. Consequently, if a person commits suicide he is guilty of
invading the rights of God.

“That suicide is an unnatural act is clear from the fact that the most fundamental and
peremptory of all instincts in human nature is self-preservation. This instinct is a manifestation
of the will of man’s Creator that he preserve his life against all influences which threaten to
destroy it. The preservation of one’s life, therefore, is a demand of the natural law. Consequently,
man has no right to take his own life intentionally and arbitrarily.

“Even extreme misery and pain are no justification for suicide. The express and tacit
permission of God alone could justify such an act. No one can prove that God gives His ‘express’
permission. And ‘tacit’ permission cannot be presumed, except under the supposition that
suffering would make it impossible for man to attain his ultimate end. Man, however, can attain
his ultimate end even in suffering. Suffering can give rise to the finest opportunities of virtue,
and virtue is always glorification of God. Because of the difficulties involved in leading the good
life under such adverse circumstances, the reward in the life to come will be all the greater.”3

Peter Bristow’s Critique of Suicide

“As St. Augustine points out the fifth commandment simply says, ‘Thou shalt not kill’
not ‘Thou shalt not kill thy neighbour.’4 Suicide is wrong because it violates the fundamental and
self-evident good of life, or to put another way it is an injustice with God who is the sole owner
and arbiter of each human life. It is also an injustice with the community of man in that it
deprives mankind of a human life and the talents that go with it.

“Traditionally, morality distinguishes between direct and indirect suicide. In the first case
one freely makes an attempt on one’s own life, while in the second, one puts one’s life in mortal
danger without directly seeking death. Indirect suicide, then, is only licit if there is a
proportionately grave reason for it. It must be done in agreement with the principle of double
effect and hence there should be a proportion between the good desired and the evil tolerated. An
indifferent or frivolous end, such as Russian roulette, or the vanity of seeking publicity, is
altogether insufficient. Among the reasons that justify indirect suicide are the public good, such
as the defense of one’s country, fire fighting, or the spiritual good of souls as when a priest
attends the dying during a national disaster at the risk of his own life. It is also justified for
reasons of heroic virtue, or charity, as when doctors treat patients with contagious illnesses. It
can also be licit in order to avoid a certain and more painful death as when someone jumps out of
the window of a burning building, especially if there is a chance of thereby saving himself.

“When the danger of death is more remote, the risk may be more readily assumed for a
less serious reason. Hence it is permitted to work in mines, or chemical industries, knowing the
dangers of silicosis, for example, as long as one takes reasonable precautions.

“May a woman allow herself to die rather than be raped in order to defend her virtue?
Certainly direct suicide is not permitted in this case, although indirectly she may put her life in

3
C. BITTLE, Man and Morals: Ethics, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1953, pp. 341-342.
4
ST. AUGUSTINE, The City of God, bk. I, ch. 20.

13
danger by jumping from a window, for instance. Nevertheless, a woman does not have a duty to
desire death rather than be raped, for in this case material cooperation with the sin in order to
save her life is licit. The conduct of St. Maria Goretti who died rather than suffer this treatment is
a case of the heroic practice of a virtue rather than a norm of conduct to be followed.”5

St. Thomas Aquinas’ Critique of Suicide in Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 64, a. 5

“Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

“Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): Hence it follows that the words ‘Thou shalt not kill’
refer to the killing of a man—not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills
himself, kills nothing else than a man.

“I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because
everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being,
and resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature,
and to charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as
being contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to
the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the
community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares
(Ethic. v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God’s gift to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills
and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even…as he who usurps
to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce
sentence of death and life, according to Dt. 32:39, I will kill and I will make to live.

“Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder is a sin in so far
as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11.
Therefore no man sins by killing himself.

“Reply to Objection 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also
because it is opposed to charity which a man should have towards himself: in this respect suicide
is a sin in relation to oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by reason also
of its opposition to justice.

“Objection 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to kill evil-
doers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may
lawfully kill himself.

“Reply to Objection 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to death an
evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is judge of himself. Wherefore it is not
lawful for one who exercises public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever:
although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.

“Objection 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser danger that
he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself,
5
P. BRISTOW, The Moral Dignity of Man, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 1993, p. 117.

14
that he may save his whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater
evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill himself.

“Reply to Objection 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore
he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life which is ruled by
man’s free-will. But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man’s
free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take his own life that he may
pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life,
because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is
to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one’s own
life on account of one’s having committed a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a
very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because it is not
lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for
a woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the very
great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sin of another. For she commits no sin in being violated
by force, provided she does not consent, since without consent of the mind there is no stain on
the body, as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication and adultery are less
grievous sins than taking a man’s, especially one’s own, life: since the latter is most grievous,
because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous
since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take
his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because evil must not be done that good may come
(Rm. 3:8) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain
event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time consent to a sin, since God is able
to deliver man from sin under any temptation whatever.

“Objection 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and yet he is
numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill himself.

“Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), not even Samson is to be
excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the ruins of the house, except
the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to
do this. He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of
persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.

“Objection 5: Further, it is related (2 Mach. 14:42) that a certain Razias killed himself,
choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses
unbecoming his noble birth. Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore
suicide is not unlawful.

“Reply to Objection 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain
by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin. But that a man take his
own life in order to avoid penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason
some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude), yet it is
not true fortitude, but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22,23) declare.”

15
 Critique of Suicide from the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1997), nos. 2280-
2283

“Suicide

“2280. Everyone is responsible for his life before God who has given it to him. It is God
who remains the sovereign Master of life. We are obliged to accept life gratefully and preserve it
for his honor and the salvation of our souls. We are stewards, not owners, of the life God has
entrusted to us. It is not ours to dispose of.

“2281. Suicide contradicts the natural inclination of the human being to preserve and
perpetuate his life. It is gravely contrary to the just love of self. It likewise offends love of
neighbor because it unjustly breaks the ties of solidarity with family, nation and other human
societies to which we continue to have obligations. Suicide is contrary to love for the living God.

“2282. If suicide is committed with the intention of setting an example, especially to the
young, it also takes on the gravity of scandal. Voluntary cooperation in suicide is contrary to the
moral law.

“Grave psychological disturbances, anguish or grave fear of hardship, suffering or torture

can diminish the responsibility of the one committing suicide.

“2283. We should not despair of the eternal salvation of persons who have taken their
own lives. By ways known to him alone, God can provide the opportunity for salutary
repentance. The Church prays for persons who have taken their own lives.”

16