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REPUBLIC VS DRUGMAKER’S LAB (GR NO.

190837 MARCH 5, 2014)

Republic of the Philippines vs Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc.


GR No. 190837 March 5, 2014

Facts: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act” primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measure of foods, drugs and
devices and cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of Health, thru then Secretary
Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of
Pharmaceutical products. Among others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and
medicine products with FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a
satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for
these products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because
there was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of circulars no. 1 s. of 1997
resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of BA/BE
testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided
additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.

Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.

Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only if there exist
a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the
confines of the granting statutes and must not involve discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely
the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as
to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of
legislative powers.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule or a contingent


rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a d designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-
statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by the congress amd effect a change in
existing law or policy which affect individual rights and obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are
intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body
operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statue being administered and purpory to
do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no
single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be
covered by the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based
on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by EO 292 s. of
1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing and publication in order
to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because when an
administrative rule is merely intepretative in nature its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When,
on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that ca facilitate
or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that A0 67 is actually the rule that originally
introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the issuamce of CPR
covering certain pharmaceutical products as such, it is considered an administrative regulation – a
legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with the express authority
granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be
registered with the FDA prior to their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the
validity of its issuance, the court deems that AO 67 complied with the requirements of prior hearing,
notice and publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded tl the govt in the exercise of its
official duties.

On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations
because they do not: a.) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; b.) Interpret,
clarify or explain existing statutory regulation under which FDA operates and/or; c.) Ascertain the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only
purpose of these is for FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s.
of 1989 including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720.
Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since theu would not affect the
substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking,
administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation and publication are needed for
their validity.

52 SM LAND VS BCDA

FACTS

 BCDA “Bases Conversion and Development Authority” opened for disposition and development
its Bonifacio South Property pursuant to RA 7227 “Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992”
 SM Land Inc submitted to the BCDA unsolicited proposals for the development of the lot
 BCDA then entered into negotiations witn SM Land until BCDA finally accepted the terms of the
final unsolicited proposal
 Thereafter, their agreement was reduced into writing through the issuance of the Certification of
Successful Negotiations in 2010
 It was agreed that BCDA accepted SM Land’s unsolicited proposal and declared SMLI eligible to
enter into the proposed Joint Venture activity.
 It also “agreed to subject SM Land’s Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge pursuant to
NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines, which competitive challenge process shall be immediately
implemented following the Terms of Reference.
 Moreover, said Certification provides that the BCDA shall commence the activities for the
solicitation for comparative proposals. Years later however, the BCDA through the issuance
of Supplemental Notice No. 5 terminated the competitive challenge for the selection of BCDA’s
joint venture partner for the development of a portion of Fort Bonifacio.
 SMLI, argued that BCDA’s unilateral termination of the competitive challenge is a violation of
SMLI’s rights as an original proponent and constitutes abandonment of BCDA’s contractual
obligations. BCDA, on the other hand, responded that it is justifiable since NEDA JV Guidelines
is a mere guideline and not a law, and that the Government has a right to terminate the
competitive challenge when the terms are disadvantageous to public interest.
ISSUE

 Whether BCDA and SM land have a contract that would bestow upon the latter the right to
demand that its unsolicited proposal be subjected to a competitive challenge
HELD

 There exists a valid agreement between SMLI and BCDA


 Article 1305 of the New Civil Code defines a contract as “a meeting of minds between two
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render
some service.” It is a “juridical convention manifested in legal form, by virtue of which one or more
persons bind themselves in favor of another or others, or reciprocally, to the fulfilment of a
prestation to give, to do, or not to do.”The succeeding Article 1318 of the Code lays down the
essential requisites of a valid contract, to wit:

 (1)Consent of the contracting parties;


(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

 In the case at bar, there is, between BCDA and SMLI, a perfected contract––a source of rights
and reciprocal obligations on the part of both parties. Consequently, a breach thereof may give
rise to a cause of action against the erring party.

 The first requisite, consent, is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon
the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.2 In the case at bar, when SMLI
submitted the first Unsolicited Proposal to BCDA on December 14, 2009, the submission
constituted an offer to undertake the development of the subject property. BCDA then
entered into negotiations with SMLI until the BCDA finally accepted the terms of the final
unsolicited proposal. Their agreement was thereafter reduced into writing through the issuance
of the Certification of Successful Negotiations where the meeting of the parties’ minds was
reflected in this wise:
o NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, BCDA and SMLI have,
after successful negotiations pursuant to Stage II of Annex C xxx, reached an
agreement on the purpose, terms and conditions on the JV development of the subject
property, which shall become the terms for the Competitive Challenge pursuant to Annex
C of the JV Guidelines xxx.4
(emphasis ours)
 Then, to manifest their assent to the terms thereof and their respective obligations, both
parties––BCDA and SMLI, represented by Gen. Narciso L. Abaya and Ms. Ana Bess Pingol,
respectively––affixed their signatures on the Certification of Successful Negotiations and had
it notarized on August 6, 2010.
 Cause, on the other hand, is the essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the
contract. It is the immediate, direct and proximate reason which justifies the creation of an
obligation through the will of the contracting parties. Complementing this is Article 1350 of the
New Civil Code which provides that “[i]n onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for
each contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other.” As such, the
cause of the agreement in the case at hand is their interest in the sale or acquisition and
development of the property and their undertaking to perform their respective obligations,
among others, as reflected in the Certificate of Successful Negotiations and in the Terms
of Reference (TOR) issued by BCDA.
 Lastly, object certain refers to the subject matter of the contract. It is the thing to be delivered or
the service to be performed. Here, when the BCDA Board issued, on August 6, 2010, the
Certification of Successful Negotiations, it not only accepted SMLI’s Unsolicited Proposal
and declared SMLI eligible to enter into the proposed JV activity. It also “agreed to subject
[SMLI]’s Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge pursuant to Annex C [of the NEDA JV
Guidelines], which competitive challenge process shall be immediately implemented
following the [TOR] Volumes 1 and 2.” Moreover, said Certification provides that “the BCDA
shall, thus, commence the activities for the solicitation for comparative proposals xxx starting on
August 10, 2010, on which date [SMLI] shall post the required Proposal Security xxx.”
 The elements of a valid contract being present, there thus exists between SMLI and BCDA
aperfected contract, embodied in the Certification of Successful Negotiations, upon which certain
rights and obligations spring forth, including the commencement of activities for the solicitation for
comparative proposals.

ISSUE no. 2

W/N the NEDA JV Guidelines has the binding effect and force of law

Yes. Administrative issuances, such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly


promulgated pursuant to the rule-making power granted by statute, have the force and effect of law.
Being an issuance in compliance with an executive edict, the NEDA JV Guidelines has the same binding
effect as if it were issued by the President himself, who parenthetically is a member of NEDA. As such,
no agency or instrumentality covered by the JV Guidelines can validly deviate from the mandatory
procedures set forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or not.

G.R. No. 109023 | August 12, 1998 | RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DE PARUNGAO, VENUS
M. POZON AND other similarly situated personnel of the LOCAL WATER UTILITIES
ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND LEONARDO L.
JAMORALIN in his capacity as COA-LWUA Corporate Auditor,respondents. | PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On July 1, 1989, Republic
Act No. 6758 "An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of
allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional
compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. Prior to this, they were receiving honoraria
as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee. To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November
1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.

Pursuant to said Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit,
the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the
validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. They contend that the Circular is inconsistent with the
provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without
force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette.

COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.

The Solicitor General supported the petitioners, saying that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a nullity for
being inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to implement. The DBM Secretary
asserted that the honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that
they are not listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force or effect despite its lack of publication in the Official
Gazette
RULING:

No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446), publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is
in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law.
Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

It is clear that DBM-CCC No. 10 is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. Before the said circular
under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and
employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines — to the end that they be given
amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the
matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and
transparency. The ineffectiveness of the Circular makes resolution of the other issues at bar
unnecessary.

Petition is granted.

MASANGCAY vs COMELEC
6 SCRA 27
Scope of Powers of Administrative Agencies
Inherent Powers

FACTS: On 24 October 1957, Benjamin Masangcay — then provincial treasurer of Aklan designated to
take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of
their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province— with several others, was charged
before the Comelec with contempt for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballots for
the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in
its resolution promulgated on 2 September 1957, and its unnumbered resolution dated 5 March 1957,
inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan,
the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and
the Citizens’ Party, as required, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

Masangcay et.al. complied with the summons issued by the Comelec to appear and show cause why
they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the charge. On 16 December 1957 the
Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and
sentencing each of them to suffer 3 months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment of 2 months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other
respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.

Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section 5
of the Revised Election Code which grants the Comelec as well as its members the power to punish acts
of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and
members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the
separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from insofar as Masangcay is concerned, as well as
the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him; without pronouncement
as to costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec may punish Masangcay for contempt


RULING: No. Under the law and the constitution, the Comelec has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any
controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. The Commission, although it
cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII),
for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.

The Comelec lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to Masangcay in the decision
subject of review. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to
punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in
the administration of justice.

The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its
exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit
testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative
function has been held invalid.

The resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt
was filed against Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for
they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia among the different municipalities. The Commission, thus, has exceeded its jurisdiction in
punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void.

RATIO: An administrative agency has no inherent powers, although implied powers may sometimes be
spoken of as "inherent." Thus, in the absence of any provision to punich for contempt which has always
been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of the courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies
has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

-
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before the Commission on
Elections with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial numbers 1-8071, 1-8072 and 1-
8073 containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of
the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated on September 2, 1957, and
its unnumbered resolution dated March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence
of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, as required in the
aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission
in its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and custody of the
official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different
municipalities of the province.
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to appear and show
cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the aforementioned charge, they all
appeared before the Commission on October 21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon,
evidence was presented by both the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the
Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and
sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other
respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section 5
of the Revised Election Code which grants the Commission on Elections as well as its members the
power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to
the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the
principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our
constitutional form of government. In other words, it is contended that, even if petitioner can be held guilty
of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the
Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers.
There is merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary
penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision subject of review. We had occasion to stress in the case of
Guevara vs. The Commission on Elections[1] that under the law and the constitution, the Commission on
Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but
also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the
elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice
within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body,
may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law
come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which
inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasijudicial
function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission
exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power
is inherently judicial in nature, as can be clearly gleaned from the following doctrine we laid down therein:
"* * * In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the
law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in
the administration of justice' (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36
Phil, 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz., 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has
always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the
power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an
administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs.
Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810)."

In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the
charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an
administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the
distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact,
Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated to take charge of the receipt,
custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was charged with having opened three
boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several municipalities in violation of the instructions
of the Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except in the presence of the division
superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista
Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and distribution not in
accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions. And because of such violation
he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the
Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and
void.
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the question of
constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code
which confers upon the Commission on Elections the power to punish for contempt for acts provided for
in Rule 64 of our Rules of Court.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay is concerned, as well
as the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him, are hereby
reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SPO1 ACUZAR vs JOROLAN and CA
GR No. 117878; APRIL 7, 2010

FACTS:

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the March 23, 2007 CA decision
reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision
- October 15 2002 RTC Decision – annulled decision of PLEB finding petitioner SPO1 Acuzar
guilty of Grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from service

1. Jorolan filed an Administrative complaint against SPO1 Acuzar before the PLEB (peoples Law
enforcement Board) charging him of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with
Jorolan’s minor daughter.
2. Subsequently, Jorolan also instituted a criminal case against SPO1 Acuzar before the MTC for
violation of the Child Abuse Act
3. Acuzar filed his counter-affidavit before PLEB denying all acussations and attached affidavit of
jorolan’s daughter in support thereof.
4. He also filed a several motion to suspend proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of the
criminal case filed before the MTC, but PLEB denied
5. PLEB issued a decision finding him Guilty of misconduct and with punishment of dismissal from
service
6. Acuzar immediately filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
TRO with the RTC
His contentions were:
a. He was not given an opportunity to be heard
b. PLEB acted without jurisdiction in proceeding without petitioner having been first convicted in
criminal case before the MTC, pointing out that PLEB Rules of procedure requires that prior
conviction is required before the board may act on the admin case considering that the charge
was actually for violation of law, although denominated as one for grave misconduct
7. RTC annulled the Decision of PLEB stating that Acuzar was not given his day in court.
8. Jorolan elevated the case to CA and CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision

CA’s decision:
Acuzar petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy because there is an appeal available
against the decision and that the issues raised were not pure questions of law but both of law and
fact. Acuzar should have appealed the decision of the PLEB to the regional appellate board of the
PNP before resorting to certiorari before the court.
9. Acuzar filed a petition for review to SC contending that the instant case falls under the exception to
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, the decision being patently illegal. And still
maintains his previous argument as to the prior conviction of MTC is needed and that he was not
given opportunity to be heard and his right to due process has been violated.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of RTC

HELD:
NO.
1. A careful perusal of Jorolan’s affidavit-complaint against Acuzar would show that petitioner was
charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with Jorolan’s minor daughter, he being
a married man, and NOT FOR VIOLATION OF LAW.
Difference:
Misconduct- transgression of some established and definite rule of actions, where no discretion is left
expt what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but
implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment
Violation of Law – presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the
RPC or any special law or ordinance.

SETTLED RULE :
Crim and admin cases are separate and distinct from each other. In crim cases, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is needed while in admin, only substantial evidence is required. Admin cases may
proceed independently of the crim proceeding
PLEB being the admin disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints of erring PNP members, has
jurisdiction over the case.

2. The remedy of appeal from decision of PLEB to Regional Appellate Board was available to and He
likewise failed to show any grave of abuse of discretion of the Board which would justify his
immediate resort to certiorari in lieu of appeal. (Principle of Exhaustion of Admin remedies)

3. He was afforded all opportunity to present his side. Acuzar was notified of the complaint and
submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings together
with his counsel and even asked for several postponements. Therefore, he cannot claim that he had
been denied of due process.

Rule:
Due process in administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice. Due process is afforded either through oral arguments or through pleadings.

ADMIN DUE PROCESS


(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported bysubstantial evidence submitted for consideration during
the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

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