Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No.

138570, October 10, 2000

I. THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such
visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as
a treaty by the other contracting State.”

II. THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and
sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate
through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the
VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense
they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement
under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United
States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance
with the mandate of the Constitution.